What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Herbert WINFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 289, Docket 29201.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit
Argued Jan. 13, 1965.
Decided Feb. 3, 1965.
Glen W. Watkins, Hardy, Peal, Raw-lings, Werner & Maxwell, New York City (Anthony F. Marra, The Legal Aid Society, New York City, on the brief), for defendant-appellant.
R. Harcourt Dodds, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., for the Southern District of New York; John E. Sprizzo, Asst. U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
Before SMITH, KAUFMAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents a very narrow issue: whether the defendant, Herbert Winfield, made a “sale” within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a), which makes it unlawful “to sell, barter, exchange or give away narcotic drugs except in pursuance of a [prescribed] written order.” After a trial without a jury, Winfield was convicted for selling cocaine to a Federal Bureau of Narcotics Agent, Charles R. McDonnell, for which he received $150. The statutory mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment was imposed, 26 U.S.C. § 7237(b). Having failed to persuade the trial judge by his testimony that he had not sold or delivered any drugs whatever to the agent, Winfield now claims for the first time on this appeal that if he did participate in the transaction, it was as a procuring agent rather than a seller, and moreover, that he was entrapped. We believe, however, that on the record before us these defenses are of no avail and therefore affirm.
The experienced trial judge obviously did not credit Winfield’s unequivocal denial of any dealings with the Government agent and so a brief summary of the evidence upon which the conviction rests will suffice. On the evening of May 13, 1963, while standing on 116th Street in Manhattan, an informant introduced Agent McDonnell to the appellant. Without further ado, the informant asked, “Can you do that thing for us ?” Winfield replied that he would first have to make a telephone call and advised the agent and informant to meet him in the Hollywood Bar, across the street, in a few minutes. At the appointed rendezvous, McDonnell asked Win-field “what he could get” and was told, “anything you want.” The agent said he had $150 and would like “to get” heroin, to which Winfield replied, without hesitation “I can get you three-quarters of an ounce of something good.” McDonnell paid in advance, after Win-field handed him a slip of paper noting his telephone number and address.
Within thirty minutes all the participants met close to Winfield’s residence and waited vainly in a parked automobile for appellant’s “connection” to arrive. Almost five hours later, McDonnell, the informant and appellant parted company, after Winfield agreed to contact the agent when he received the narcotics. In a telephone conversation the next day with McDonnell, Winfield said “his guy * * * had left him the wrong package” — cocaine instead of heroin— which McDonnell agreed, nevertheless, to purchase. He arrived by car at Win-field’s residence shortly thereafter, accompanied by the informant. Winfield entered the car which drove off and as they approached 139th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue he gave the agent a tin-foil package containing cocaine, suggesting that he “try it and let me know how you like it.”
Careful scrutiny of the totality of facts in each case is required to determine whether a defendant, charged with violating Section 4705(a), acted as a seller or as a procuring agent. Although deliberative examination of the precedents is helpful, we can hardly expect to be provided with all-purpose, ever-applicable standards, for these cases cannot be pigeonholed.
We learn from United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3 Cir.1954), that the procuring agent-seller distinction is important because there can be no § 4705' (a) violation if the evidence establishes that a federal agent asked the defendant to buy drugs for him and the defendant then purchased them from a third person with whom he was not associated in selling. Sawyer’s precise holding was that a conviction must be reversed where a judge, when requested by the defendant to do so, fails to explain to the jury “the difference in fact and in law between dealing with a purchaser as seller and acting for him as a procuring agent.” See also Kelley v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 275 F. 2d 10 (1960). Of course, this holding does not, without more, require reversal where as here the trial was to a judge alone for, as the court acknowledged, the distinction would be “obvious to a lawyer.”
It is apparent, nonetheless, that when Sawyer is adapted to this case the relationship between Winfield and the ultimate seller assumes critical significance. But, in considering the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it, we must as appellate judges view it in a light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Robbins, 340 F.2d 684 (2 Cir. Jan. 12, 1965); United States v. Tutino, 269 F.2d 488, 490 (2 Cir.1959) ; United States v. Brown, 236 F.2d 403, 405 (2 Cir.1956). With this in mind, we note that here, unlike Adams v. United States, 220 F.2d 297 (5 Cir. 1955), the evidence and the inferences which the trial judge could reasonably draw indicate that Winfield had been previously associated with his connection in selling narcotics. As an illustration, in apologizing for his supplier’s delay, the appellant explained that he had never been late before. And when the agent expressed concern about the money paid in advance, Winfield sought to allay his fears by stating that the sum meant nothing to the connection with whom he had been “doing business” for “quite some time.” When the total absence of any evidence tending to support the procuring agent theory is contrasted with this proof of prior dealing, we hold that it was reasonable for the trial judge to infer that Winfield was associated with his supplier in selling narcotics.
It is true that the Government in United States v. Valdes, 229 F.2d 145 (2 Cir. 1956), made a stronger showing of previous association and this Court therefore found it unnecessary to express an opinion on the applicability of the Sawyer-Adams principle. In Valdes, the defendant had been in the narcotics traffic for ten years and apparently had his own supply of heroin. Appellant, nevertheless, takes an overly casuistical view of the law in suggesting that the distinguishing line is whether the Government agent said he wanted to “buy” rather than “get” narcotics.
Equally without merit is the entrapment defense, which in this case is inextricably linked with the procuring agent theory and which falls with the evidence of prior dealings between Win-field and his connection. According to the Supreme Court’s exegesis in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), the defendant is required to show that he was induced by the creative activity of Government officers to commit an offense he would otherwise not have attempted. But “there was here,” as Judge Smith noted in another case, “no more than affording an opportunity to one already disposed and willing to commit the crime.” United States v. Carter, 320 F.2d 1, 3 (2 Cir.1963). Winfield never expressed reluctance to sell narcotics to the Government agent, cf. Sherman, supra; instead, he assured the agent that the quality of the drugs was “good” and gave his address and telephone number to facilitate delivery. Indeed, he indicated his proclivity, if not anxiety, to continue selling to McDonnell by asking the agent to “let me know how you like” the cocaine.
The court has been greatly aided by the able efforts of Glen W. Watkins, Esq., appellant’s assigned counsel, and wishes to take this opportunity to express its appreciation.
Affirmed.
. Henderson v. United States, 261 F.2d 909 (5 Cir. 1959), upon which the appellant relies, is easily distinguishable. There the Government agent “solicited, indeed implored” the defendant’s aid and even told her where to buy the drugs. Both Adams and Henderson may be distinguished on the further ground that they involved situations where Government agents resorted to appeals to friendship and sympathy in persuading the defendants to purchase drugs to satisfy the agents’ supposed personal cravings. Hero, on the other hand, Winfield agreed to furnish McDonnell, a total stranger, with narcotics without hesitation soon after they were introduced. And he delivered the cocaine even though the agent had indicated it was not for personal use but was for “some of my people” who bad been “asking for it.” This distinction is relevant because a comparison of tile defendant’s relationships with the buyer and the ultimate seller bears on determining which of the two he was aiding and abetting. Cf. United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166, 168 (3 Cir. 1955).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0