What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Joseph A. CAMPBELL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 22214.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 2, 1969.
Decided June 23, 1970.
Mr. Richard M. Sharp, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., and Roger E. Zuckerman, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty. at the time the record was filed, Miss Carol Garfiel, Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time the record was filed, and Mr. John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered appearances for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We remanded this case to the District Court for a hearing pursuant to the following order:
“The only issue raised on this appeal relates to identification. Before Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 [87 S.Ct. 1967,18 L.Ed.2d 1199] (1967), a hospital identification of appellant was made by Government witnesses. After Stovall an identification hearing was held by the trial court which resulted in a ruling that the in-court identification was admissible. In spite of this limited ruling, to which objection was duly recorded by appellant, testimony as to the hospital identification as well as the in-court identification was admitted in evidence. At the time the trial court made its ruling it did not have the benefit of this court’s opinion in Clemons-Clark-Hines (Clemons v. United States, [133] U.S.App.D.C. [27], 408 F.2d 1230 (1968) (en banc). Nor did it have the benefit of the testimony of the hospital personnel who treated appellant when he entered Providence Hospital on March 1, 1967, five days after the robbery.
“It is, therefore, ORDERED by the court that this case be remanded for a hearing to determine:
“1. When appellant received his gun wound. Medical personnel from the hospital, among others, should be called for this purpose.
“2. Whether under the principles announced in Clemons-Clark-Hines the in-court identification of appellant was properly admitted in evidence.
“3. Whether under the principles announced in Clemons-Clark-Hines the hospital identification of appellant was properly admitted in evidence.
“4. Whether under the principles announced in Clemons-Clark-Hines the identification of appellant outside the hospital testified to by the witness Graves (Tr. 151) was properly admitted in evidence.”
The District Court found that there was no relationship between appellant’s gun wound and the robbery in suit, that the in-court identification of appellant was properly admitted in evidence, that the hospital identifications of appellant were improperly admitted in evidence, and that the identification of appellant outside the hospital was improperly admitted in evidence. We affirm these findings of the District Court on remand.
At trial the Government relied heavily on the assumption that appellant received his gun wound in the robbery with which he was charged. Its witnesses, including the complaining witness and ' a ballistics-fabrics expert who traced the course of the bullet as it traveled through appellant’s clothing and body, testified to this effect throughout the trial, and the prosecutor in her summation alluded to this “fact” eight times. Now it appears that appellant’s wound was unrelated to the robbery. Under the circumstances, elemental due process considerations require that the conviction be reversed.
This conviction must be reversed for still another reason. The District Court now has also found that three pretrial identifications of appellant conducted by the police were impermissibly suggestive. Under the teaching of Stovall the admission into evidence of these identifications also violated due process. Since it cannot be held that this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction based on it may not stand. See Clemons v. United States, swpra.
Reversed.
. The memorandum opinion of the District Court on remand, as it relates to the age of appellant’s gun wound, states:
“(1) The age of the wound.
“The medical personnel at Providence and D. C. General Hospitals, who would have been able to testify on this aspect of the case, have long since left Washington, D. C. They were, however, contacted by letters (exhibits to appellant’s pretrial memorandum) and it was stipulated between counsel for the appellant and counsel for the Government that the letters would serve in lieu of sworn testimony. On the basis of- those letters, the sequence would appear to be as follows.
“Campbell was admitted to the emergency ward of Providence Hospital at 11:51 a. m. on March 1, 1967, five days after the robbery took place. Dr. Moon, the admitting physician, recorded that the gunshot wound had been received at 11:41 that same day. (This fact, of course, would have been supplied by the appellant upon his entry to the hospital).
“Campbell was also seen at Providence Hospital by Dr. Nestor Cruz (presently a resident of Bogota, Columbia [sic]) who informed the Court in his letter that:
“.‘The wound that Mr. Campbell exhibited on his left shoulder looked to me fresh, but it was suggested by a policeman that the bleeding that the wound presented had been occasioned by self-scratching and at that point I do remember; it was impossible for me to tell whether or not this wound was fresh.’
“Later in the same day Campbell was transferred to the D. C. General Hospital where he was admitted to the emergency ward at 5 :50 p. m. The principal physician at that hospital, Dr. Richard E. Silberman (presently attached to County General Hospital, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin), states:
“ ‘It is important to note that my entire internship training, as well as all my subsequent training, has been in Internal Medicine. Therefore, I rarely have occasion to treat trauma. Consequently, I have no established mode of handling gunshot wounds.
“ ‘As I recall, the wound was not bleeding when I saw Mr. Campbell. This would only tend to favor an old wound.
Of course, this may mean only a few hours old. On the other hand, the wound edges were clean with little necrotic (dead) tissue at the entrance or exit orifices. Furthermore, there was no evidence of infection in the soft tissues surrounding the wounds. These factors would favor a fresh wound. Moreover, the openings were patent, i. e., there was no indication that enough time had elapsed since the infliction of the wound to permit healing. Neither was there any additional trauma to the soft tissues to indicate that a deliberate attempt had been made to open the wound.
“ ‘Generally, these are my impressions after some three years. While these are not 100% vivid, I would have to say, to the best of my recollection, that the wound was less than 48 hours and perhaps 24 hours old.’
“None of the testimony recited above is persuasive one way or the other as to the exact age of the wound. But none of it on the other hand dates the wound beyond 48 hours prior to the admission to Providence Hospital— whereas the robbery had taken place five days prior thereto. The Court accordingly concludes that the wound was not received in the course of the robbery.”
(Footnote omitted.)
. It should be noted that the District Court on remand was not requested to act on its findings.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0