What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Henry JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Robert COOPER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 18878, 18924.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 14, 1965.
Decided July 9, 1965.
Mr. John L. Kilcullen (appointed by this court), Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 18,878.
Mr. John A. Shorter, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 18,924.
Mr. John R. Kramer, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker and Joseph A. Lowther, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Fahy, McGowan and Leven-thal, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The error asserted to infect these convictions of housebreaking and larceny derives from the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful search in connection with an allegedly unlawful arrest. We find no such error.
A police officer in a scout car saw a parked car bearing temporary D. C. tags and a Virginia inspection sticker. Deciding to check the ownership, he approached the driver who, with three other persons (including the appellants), was sitting in it. The driver said the car belonged to appellant Cooper, who was seated on the other side of the front seat. When the officer walked around to talk to him, he observed a blackjack lying on the floor of the car. The possession of a blackjack being illegal (22 D.C.Code § 3214(a)), the officer asked whose it was. When all four denied knowing anything about it, he asked them to get out of the car and told them that he was going to charge them all with the illegal possession. See 23 D.C.Code § 306(a) and (b), providing expressly for arrests without warrant, and for incidental searches, in respect of the possession of illegal weapons. Having already observed a tape recorder and other articles in the car, the officer asked the driver to unlock the trunk, which he did. There a number of other articles were found which were, with the tape recorder, eventually introduced into evidence as stolen. At the scene of the arrest, the officer directed the four to follow him in their car to the station, where the articles in question were removed from the car.
The officer was, it appears to us, fully authorized to make the initial inquiry about the ownership of the car, and, in the course thereof, to make the arrest for illegal possession of a blackjack. The search of the car, as an incident to that arrest, was not so remote from it in point of time or place as to be unreasonable. See Price v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. -, 348 F.2d 68, decided June 10, 1965; Adams v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 336 F.2d 752 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977, 85 S.Ct. 676, 13 L.Ed.2d 567 (1965).
The judgments appealed from are Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 2