What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. John OLIVER, Appellant, v. Alfred T. RUNDLE, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania.
No. 17924.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Oct. 9, 1969.
Decided Oct. 24, 1969.
Benjamin Lerner, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
James D. Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa. (Richard A. Sprague, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before McLAUGHLIN, FORMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
Presented here is a Sixth Amendment confrontation question which arose when a witness for the Commonwealth was not available to testify and the transcript of his testimony given at a previous judicial proceeding was read to the jury as evidence. After the jury found appellant guilty of rape and burglary, he unsuccessfully appealed his conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. A petition for habeas corpus in the district court followed. Before us is an appeal from a denial of the relief sought.
Appellant and a juvenile had been arrested on a charge of rape and burglary. A preminary hearing was held before a state judge at which time appellant was represented by counsel who participated fully in the proceedings. Thereafter, the court announced that it intended to conduct a juvenile court hearing as to the possible delinquency of the youthful co-defendant. The following colloquy then occurred:
[Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, I think that since allegedly everything happened here involves these defendants, and is supposed to have happened at the same time, I think that in the interest of justice the defendant [Oliver] should be present at every moment of this proceeding.
THE COURT: All right, as far as the preliminary hearing, he has been heard. However, if you want me to continue the evidence in this case so that it may be used in regards to John Oliver, and give you a chance to cross-examination, I will do so. I realize this is a serious charge and I will do so at your request.
COUNSEL: I so request.
The juvenile co-defendant testified, with appellant’s counsel participating in a cross-examination reflected by five pages of typescript. At appellant’s subsequent trial the Commonwealth successfully requested leave to use the testimony of the juvenile adduced at the previous hearing. To justify the use of this prior testimony, the Commonwealth showed that the juvenile had escaped from confinement at a youth study center to which he had been sent after being adjudged a delinquent, and further demonstrated that in an effort to locate him, detectives questioned his mother and thirty to forty neighbors and examined lists of gas, electric and telephone users.
This court has previously held that the transcript of testimony of an unavailable witness received at a preliminary hearing where a defendant was afforded an opportunity for cross-examination may be used at the subsequent trial of that defendant provided appropriate and adequate measures have been taken to locate the missing witness. Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540 (3 Cir.1967).
Appellant seeks to distinguish his case by asserting that the testimony was not adduced at a preliminary hearing but at a separate juvenile court proceeding. He also suggests that the rule should not be extended to circumstances where the missing witness was in fact a co-defendant in the preliminary proceedings.
We do not find distinctions in the case at bar to dictate a departure from the holding in Aquino. First, we are not convinced that the testimony was received at a separate proceeding, inasmuch as the trial judge said he was “continuing] the evidence in this case so that it may be used in regards to John Oliver [appellant].” The important consideration is neither the nomenclature to be affixed to the hearing nor the status of the witness, but whether there was an adequate opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the witness at a prior proceeding involving the defendant qua defendant. We find that such opportunity was afforded and that appellant’s counsel fully and freely availed himself of it.
Appellant further argues that the Commonwealth’s efforts to locate the missing witness did not satisfy the requirements set forth in Barber v. Page, supra. We disagree. The evidence clearly indicates that the Commonwealth made a good faith effort to obtain the witness’ presence.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), the unavailable witness was a co-defendant in the prior proceeding. Neither the opinion of the Supreme Court nor those of the Tenth Circuit, majority or dissent, 381 F.2d 479 (1966), attributed any significance to the co-defendant status of the unavailable witness.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1