What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Arminda H. HEDGER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ethel H. REYNOLDS, Defendant-Appellant, and The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, Defendant.
No. 35, Docket 23007.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 13, 1954.
Decided Nov. 5, 1954.
Gray & Wythe, New York City, Horace M. Gray, New York City, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.
Henry J. Smith, New York City, for defendant-appellant.
Before CHASE, MEDINA and HARLAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the court, the appellee brought this suit to set aside an instrument she had signed at the request of her deceased husband which had enabled him to have a policy of insurance on his life, in which she had previously been the sole beneficiary without right reserved to the insured to change the beneficiary, amended to give him that right. Before his death, he revoked the designation of his wife as beneficiary and had the appellant designated as such. When the insured died, the policy was payable to a third party to whom it had been assigned as security for money loaned to the insured. The insurance company paid the proceeds of the policy to the assignee who, after deducting the amount due him, paid the remainder to the appellant. Additional relief sought was to have appellant declared a constructive trustee, for the benefit of the appellee, of that part of the proceeds of the policy which the appellant had received. After trial by court, judgment was entered for the plaintiff-appellee setting aside the instrument the appellee had signed and impressing a trust for her benefit upon the proceeds of the policy which had been paid to her. This appeal is from that judgment. The insurance company was named as a defendant but did not appear and has no interest in the suit.
The appellant does not, nor well could she, contend that, on the facts as found, the judgment is erroneous since, at the least, they show that there was a breach of fiduciary relationship on the part of the appellee’s husband and that he was guilty of constructive fraud in persuading her to sign the instrument. Matter of Smith’s Estate, 243 App.Div. 348, 353, 276 N.Y.S. 646; Haack v. Weicken, 118 N.Y. 67, 73, 74, 23 N.E. 133.
The critical findings are that, “On or about the 23rd of March, 1948, the insured presented to the plaintiff, an instrument for her signature stating that the instrument when executed would obviate the need for signing others in the event of successive borrowings on the policy. Plaintiff, without time or opportunity to examine the instrument which insured forthwith took with him, but relying on the faith of her husband and on the practice of such earlier transactions, without any consideration, and in the absence of any witness, signed the instrument presented consenting to it only as an instrument designated to permit the obtaining of further loans on the policy. It was never acknowledged by her.”
Such evidence as there was to contradict these findings was by no means such that the judge was bound to accept it at face value. Certainly the certificate of the notary was only rebuttable evidence that the appellee’s acknowledgment had been taken as certified and that the instrument had been duly executed by her. Section 384(3) of the New York Civil Practice Act; Breuchaud v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 157 Misc. 375, 283 N.Y.S. 812. The burden on an appellant, who seeks to reverse a judgment for error in fact, to show that essential findings are clearly erroneous, is, indeed, a heavy one when, as in this instance, decision must turn largely upon the credibility of witnesses the trial judge saw and heard testify. Rule 52(a) F.R.C.P., 28 U.S.C.A. United States v. Aluminum of America, 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 416, 433; Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 2 Cir., 43 F.2d 685. The evidence of the appellee was not inherently improbable in the light of all the circumstances shown and we find nothing in this record which persuades us that the trial judge, who obviously did find it credible, committed any error in so doing. As it gave the findings substantial support they should be given effect by us. Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., Inc., 2 Cir., 82 F.2d 245, 247.
Judgment affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0