What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Cecilia S. JACOBE, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
No. 76-2154.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 5, 1978.
Decided May 11, 1978.
Edward L. Dubroff, Steven S. Mukamal, Barst and Mukamal, New York City, for petitioner.
Chester J. Halicki, Government Regulations & Labor Section, Criminal Division, U. S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., David W. Marston, U. S. Atty., Robert S. Forster, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Before GIBBONS and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and WEINER, District Judge
WEINER, District Judge.
This case involves an appeal filed by Cecilia S. Jacobe for review of a deportation order of the Board of Immigration of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a denial of a stay thereof, and denial of a motion to reopen the deportation proceedings.
Petitioner, Cecilia S. Jacobe (nee Ranees) entered the United States on January 15, 1974. She had been issued a permanent immigration visa as the result of her statement that she was married to one Adolf Michael Martin, a United States citizen. Subsequently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service discovered that Adolf Michael Martin was a fictitious name and that petitioner knowingly and fraudulently made statements in her visa application alleging marriage to the non-existent Mr. Martin in order to obtain entry into this country. Deportation proceedings were commenced and on April 23, 1976, the Immigration Judge directed her deportation. On April 27, 1976, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal contending that the Immigration Judge erred in denying petitioner’s request for relief from deportation under § 241(f) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f).
On May 4, 1976, petitioner married one Francisco C. Jacobe, a United States citizen. On May 27, 1976, Mr. Jacobe, on behalf of petitioner, his new wife, petitioned the INS for an “immediate relative” visa for his new wife. On that same date, petitioner withdrew her appeal of the April deportation order.
Petitioner, on August 26, 1976, moved for a stay of deportation and for a reopening of the deportation proceedings to permit adjustment of status based upon her husband’s visa petition on her behalf. On September 1, 1976, the District Director of INS denied Mr. Jacobe’s visa petition and an Immigration Judge denied Mrs. Jacobe’s motion to reopen the original deportation proceeding of April, 1976. On June 3,1977, after an appeal had already been taken to this Court, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the District Director’s denial of Mr. Jacobe’s visa petition on his wife’s behalf, and remanded the case for further proceedings. They also affirmed the denial of Mrs. Jacobe’s motion to reopen the original deportation proceeding.
Petitioner summarizes her argument into three parts. We will deal with each in turn. First, she contends that the denial of the immediate relative visa petition filed by her United States citizen husband in her behalf was erroneous as a matter of law. The District Director denied Mr. Jacobe’s visa petition, filed on behalf of his wife. After the appeal to this Court was taken, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the denial and remanded it to the agency for a determination of the bona fides of the marriage. Petitioner acknowledges that this issue is moot and we agree.
Petitioner’s second ground of review is that the institution of deportation proceedings against her on documentary grounds, rather than on ground of fraud, at the time of entry, was erroneous as a matter of law. This is an attack upon the validity of the original deportation proceeding. Petitioner, on May 27, 1976, withdrew her appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision to deport which was rendered on April 23, 1976. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) states: “An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations . . ” The immigration regulations provide, in relation to deportation proceedings, that an appeal lies with the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1977). In spite of this available administrative appeal, petitioner withdrew her Notice to Appeal on the same day that her new husband petitioned for an immediate relative visa on her behalf. Petitioner then proceeded by way of motion to reopen the original deportation proceedings, rather than by way of direct appeal. In Vergel v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 536 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1976), petitioner challenged the validity of the original order of deportation and denial of her motion to reopen deportation proceedings. The court ruled it had no jurisdiction to review the original order of deportation since no appeal was taken. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies results in a lack of jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals. We, therefore, cannot entertain an attack on the original deportation proceeding.
The third issue the petitioner is appealing is the decision denying her motion to reopen the deportation proceedings and a denial of a stay of deportation pending appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1977) states the grounds for reopening or reconsideration:
“. . . Motions to reopen in deportation proceeding shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . ”
Petitioner’s ground for reopening is her new marriage to a U.S. citizen and she seeks adjustment of her status on this basis. This marriage is evidence that could not have been presented at the former hearing because it was not entered into until after the order of deportation issued from the original hearing. However, the Board of Immigration has wide discretion in deciding whether to grant the motion to reopen.
“The regulation [8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1977)] does not require the Board to grant a motion to reopen merely because some new circumstances are recited; rather, the regulation bars reopening if relief is not sought on the basis of changed circumstances ... At most, the regulation dictates that the Board consider any new circumstances advanced in support of a motion to reopen, and that the Board not abuse its discretion in determining whether the circumstances are sufficient to justify granting of the motion.” Au Yi Lau v. U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 181 U.S.App. D.C. 99, 107, 555 F.2d 1036, 1043, 1044 (1977).
The Board denied the motion on the ground that the petitioner was not the beneficiary of a visa petition and therefore she has not established prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status — the core of her motion. The statute clearly requires that three prerequisites be met in order to be eligible for an adjustment of status. They are: “. . (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is approved”. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). There is no immigrant visa immediately available to petitioner, in fact her husband’s petition on her behalf for an immigrant visa still has not been finally acted upon. Therefore, the Board did not abuse their discretion in denying the motion to reopen. Since our scope of review is limited to whether the Board abused its discretion, we accordingly affirm the denial of the motion to reopen. It is not necessary to deal with the denial of the stay because the petition for review in this Court stayed her deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3).
The decision of the Board of Immigration appeals will be affirmed and the petition for review will be denied.
Honorable Charles R. Weiner, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
. It states:
“The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”
Presumably, petitioner sought relief under this section relying upon the birth of her child on February 25, 1974, in the United States and upon her status as a parent of this United States citizen. We state no opinion as to the viability of that position.
. Mr. Jacobe filed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b):
“The ‘immediate relatives’ referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States: provided, That in the case of parents, such citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age. The immediate relatives specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in this chapter.”
. Cecilia Jacobe, Board of Immigration Appeals (June 3, 1977).
. The Court cited inter alia 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c). Vergel v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 536 F.2d 755, 757 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976).
. Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 539 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1976); Accord Luna-Benalcazar v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 414 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1969); Chung Chow Wa v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 854 (1st Cir. 1969); Arias-Alonso v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 391 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1968); Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F.Supp. 583 (D.C.N.J.1975); Garcia-Sarquiz v. Saxbe, 407 F.Supp. 789 (S.D.Fla.1974).
. Cecilia Jacobe, Board of Immigration Appeals, (June 3, 1977).
. See Schieber v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 520 F.2d 44 (1975); Biggin v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 479 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1973); Bufalino v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928, 93 S.Ct. 2751, 37 L.Ed.2d 155 (1973); Chan Yiu Fai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 467 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1972); Lopez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 356 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 839, 87 S.Ct. 88, 17 L.Ed.2d 73 (1966).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0