What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 5¼% SECURED SERIAL BONDHOLDERS’ COMMITTEE, Appellant, v. Guy A. THOMPSON, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Debtor, et al., Appellees. Bolton SULLIVAN and Stewart Huston, Independent Directors of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Appellants, v. Guy A. THOMPSON, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Debtor, et al., Appellees. Charles H. ALBERS, Frances M. Blakely, C. W. Boden, Avery Brundage, John Katsulos, Margaret L. Kent, Paul E. Kling, Thomas B. Shearman, James Sullivan and Edith Westercamp, Owners of Certain Shares of New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railway Company, Appellants, v. Guy A. THOMPSON, Trustee, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Debtor, et al., Appellees.
Nos. 15471, 15472, 15475.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Feb. 28, 1956.
C. Ives Waldo, Jr., Chicago, Ill. (George S. Roudebush, St. Louis, Mo., Harry B. Sutter, James J. McClure, Jr., Chicago, Ill., Jones, Hocker, Gladney & Grand, St. Louis, Mo., Hopkins, Sutter, Owen, Mulroy & Wentz, Chicago, Ill., on the brief), for appellants in No. 15,475.
Russell L. Dearmont, St. Louis, Mo. (Thomas T. Railey, St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellees, Guy A. Thompson, as trustee, Missouri Pac. R. Co., and others, debtors, and in behalf of other appellees generally.
Briefs filed on former appeals, Nos. 15,335, 15,336 and 15,337 as reported in 225 F.2d 761, were again submitted to the Court in the instant appeals.
Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and WOODROUGH and VAN OOSTER-HOUT, Circuit Judges.
. The appellant, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company 5)4% Secured Serial Bondholders Committee, should not be confused with one of the appellees — Protective Committee for Secured Serial 5)4% Gold Bonds of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. The appellant is commonly known as the Cubbins Committee, and the named appellee as the Smith Committee.
WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.
After the Plan of Reorganization (sometimes called the Agreed System Plan) for the three principal debtors and their subsidiary debtors herein was approved by the Order of Judge Moore on February 25, 1955, 129 F.Supp. 392, the Interstate Commerce Commission submitted the Plan for acceptance or rejection by creditors and stockholders voting by classes in accordance with Section 77, sub. e of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205, sub. e and two classes of security holders, namely Class 3 and Class 19, failed to accept it by a vote of more than two-thirds of those voting as required by the section. Class 3 consisted of slightly over 4 per cent of the New Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Company capital stock which is outstanding in the hands of the public and shares of that stock pledged to secure Missouri Pacific 554% Secured Serial Bonds and Class 19 consisted of the Missouri Pacific 5}4% Secured Serial Bonds.
A hearing was accordingly held by Judge Moore in July, 1955, on the question of confirming the Plan as contemplated by Section 77, sub. e of the Bankruptcy Act. All of the testimony and exhibits accepted in evidence at the pri- or approval hearing were then before the Court and evidence was adduced showing that no substantial changes in conditions had arisen after the approval to justify withholding confirmation of the Plan. Financial exhibits bringing exhibits offered at the approval hearing down to date were offered and received in evidence and there was additional evidence tending to support the Plan in respect to its treatment of Classes 3 and 19. No testimony was offered on behalf of Class 3 or Class 19.
The Court found that “the Plan makes adequate provision for fair and equitable treatment for the interests or claims of those rejecting it and such rejection is not reasonably justified in the light of the respective rights and interests of those rejecting it and all the relevant facts.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 205, sub. e.
The Court also found that “the Plan of Reorganization among other things provides for the merger or consolidation of Debtor Companies. Such a merger or consolidation was voluntarily initiated by Debtor Companies.”
In general and detailed findings the Court found that all the requirements of the Act had been complied with and it confirmed the Plan.
These three appeals to obtain reversal of the Order Confirming the Plan are taken by the same parties that appealed to this Court from the Order Approving the Plan, 8 Cir., 225 F.2d 761. After establishing jurisdiction here by duly filing Notices of Appeal, they have entered into stipulations subject to this Court’s approval for the purpose of expediting the appeals and the ultimate decision thereof. We find the stipulations to be competent and sufficient for the purposes of the appeal and have received and considered them.
Nos. 15,471 and 15,472
It appears from the stipulations of the parties who prosecute these appeals in Nos. 15,471 and 15,472, and from the Record in these appeals that the issues which they now raise in these two appeals from the Orders Confirming the Plan are the same as those urged by them on their prior appeals from the Orders Approving the Plan, (Nos. 15,335 and 15,336, 225 F.2d 761), and all of the records, evidence, points relied on and contentions of their prior appeals are again presented here in addition to the record of the proceedings upon the Order Confirming the Plan. No new briefs have been filed here by the appellants in these two appeals and they waived oral argument in this Court.
In No. 15,471 the Record shows that the appellant 5%% Secured Serial Bondholders’ Committee opposed the approval of the Plan in the District Court on many specified grounds but on the appeal from the Approval to this Court (No. 15,335), the appellant “relied in its brief and oral argument upon the single point that ‘The present Agreed System Plan is illegal because there has been no compliance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 5)’ * * * " 225 F.2d 761, loc. cit. 764.
That point received full consideration by the Commission, the District Court, 129 F.Supp. 392, this Court, 225 F.2d 761, and on application for certiorari by the Supreme Court. Albers v. Thompson, certiorari denied, 76 S.Ct. 347, January 31, 1956. We consider it again as it is again presented on this appeal and on appeal No. 15,475, hereinafter discussed, and hold as we did in No. 15,335 that Judge Moore has fully supported his conclusions that the Plan should be confirmed as to the merger provisions embodied in it. The appeal in No. 15,471 therefore affords no ground for reversal of the judgment Confirming the Plan which is appealed from.
In No. 15,472 the Record shows that the appellants Bolton Sullivan and Stewart Huston, so-called “Independent Directors of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company", were permitted to participate in the hearing on the approval of the Plan subject to the objection that “they have no authority to represent the Debtor, its Board of Directors or any defined or determinable group-of creditors, stockholders or others having a right to be heard.” On the appeal in No. 15,336 we held, 225 F.2d 761, loc. cit. 764, that these appellants “have no authority to represent ‘any party in interest’ within the intendment of Section 77, sub. e, or to represent ‘any * * * interested party’ within Section 77, sub. e (13)” and we directed “that their appeal be dismissed.” On reconsidering the same matter here, we reach the same conclusion and direct that this appeal, No. 15,472, be dismissed.
No. 15,475
In No. 15,475 the appellants, owners of certain shares of stock of New Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Company, have also entered into a stipulation whereby their objections to the Approval of the Plan as well as their objections to the Confirmation of it, and all of the proceedings relative to both sets of objections and both judgments have been brought up. They have filed a new brief and assign as their point for reversal that the Plan does not make adequate provision for fair and equitable treatment of appellants and that their rejection of the Plan was justified. They also resubmit the prior briefs which they submitted to this Court on their appeal from the Order of Approval of the Plan (No. 15,337). Their position and contentions against Confirmation of the Plan have also been presented to this Court by their counsel in oral argument.
We have not failed to notice the contentions of these appellants that under the particular provisions of Section 77, sub. e of the Bankruptcy Act, the former decision of this Court affirming the District Court’s Approval of the Plan does not control or do away with the necessity of a hearing and decision upon that Court’s Confirmation of the Plan. The Order of Approval was entered on February 25, 1955. It does not necessarily follow that treatment which was fair and equitable on the earlier date was equally so at the later time in July, 1955, when confirmation was in issue.
But the record shows that the question of the value of the stock owned by these appellants and the treatment that should be accorded them in the reorganization has been completely and profoundly studied and expert, informed opinion fully supports the finding of the District Court that the valuation ascribed to it for reorganization purposes in the Plan and the means of compensation included in the Plan are fair and equitable. Though they had full opportunity to do so, the appellants offered no testimony either on the hearing to Approve or on the later hearing to Confirm the Plan that their stock had any greater value or that it should receive any other or better treatment than has been accorded it. On full consideration and re-consideration, we are satisfied that the action of the Commission in respect to the securities of these appellants was based on competent and substantial evidence and that there was no error as respects these appellants in the Order of the District Court Confirming the Plan.
The opinion No. 4590, Order No. 4590-A and “Order, Judgment and Decree” of the District Court filed September 19, 1955, appealed from in 15,471 and 15,475 are accordingly, affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0