What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Josef R. SILBERHORN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL IRON WORKS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 78-1148.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 7, 1978.
Decided Oct. 12, 1978.
Alex Stephen Keller of Keller, Dunievitz & Johnson, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant.
Bruce W. Sattler and L. Tyrone Holt of Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellee.
Before PICKETT, McWILLIAMS and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
Josef R. Silberhorn, a native of Hungary and naturalized United States citizen, and a former employee of General Iron Works Company doing business near Denver, Colorado, brought this action alleging that the company had discharged him because of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). After a trial without a jury the court concluded as a matter of law that Silberhorn had established a prima fa-cie case of employment discrimination by the company. The court then made a factual finding that the discharge of Silber-horn was not tainted with discriminatory motives, and dismissed the complaint. This appeal presents the question of whether this finding is supported by sufficient evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
In the trial of Title VII cases such as this the law is settled that initially the employee is required to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination on the part of the employer. The prima facie showing is not the equivalent of a factual finding of discrimination, but the burden then shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge was for legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons. The employee shall then have an opportunity to rebut that evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). More recently, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,-U.S.-, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), the Court explained the prima facie rule of McDonnell Douglas, as follows:
When the prima facie case is understood in the light of the opinion in McDonnell Douglas, it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race. To prove that, he need not prove that he pursued the course which would both enable him to achieve his own business goal and allow him to consider the most employment applications. .
To dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only “articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817 at 1824.
See also Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977).
The determination of the factual issue of whether there was a discriminatory discharge is for the trial court, and its finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Southern U. Gas. Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959, 97 S.Ct. 381, 50 L.Ed.2d 325 (1977); Woods v. North American Rockwell, 480 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1973).
Silberhorn was born in Budapest, Hungary, in 1926, immigrated to the United States in 1957, and became a naturalized citizen in 1964. He was a welder by trade and obtained employment with General Iron Works Company in 1966. He was discharged on March 10, 1975, for what appeared to be violation of safety rules. During the period of Silberhorn’s employment with the company his association was not very pleasant. He was erratic and subject to displays of violent temper. Over the nine-year period he engaged in numerous conflicts and disagreements with fellow employees, and sometimes with his superiors. During these arguments and disputes vulgarisms and obscenities were often directed toward each of the participating parties. On at least two occasions he was referred to as an Hungarian, supplemented by vulgar language. On one occasion he used vulgar terms toward an employee, which resulted in fisticuffs in which Silberhorn did not fare very well. The evidence is without dispute that throughout his employment company supervisors made special efforts to assist Silberhorn with his work. The record contains no evidence that the company discriminated in any manner against Hungarian or any other non-native Americans. It is doubtful that Silberhorn made a prima facie case of racial discrimination, but that issue is not contested here.
General Iron Works produces and repairs a variety of heavy metal products which requires the employment of numerous welders who engage in varied welding tasks. Following the welding process the welded parts are usually ground smooth by grinding equipment before delivery to customers. The grinding equipment includes a grinding wheel made up of steel bristles which is operated by compressed air and sometimes reaches a speed of 6,000 RPM. When in operation the steel bristles are exposed to the surface of the welded material, which frequently breaks off and is dangerous to individuals close by. The incident which led to Silberhorn’s discharge occurred when a co-worker was working in the same area where Silberhorn was doing his work. To protect Silberhorn, the coworker placed a shield between the two. The co-worker testified that without warning the shield came flying back at him, and when it was replaced Silberhorn continued to push it back onto him. The co-worker lost his balance but was able to get the grinders stopped without injury to himself. Company supervisors learned of the incident and made an investigation at which the co-worker and Silberhorn appeared, together with witnesses who had observed the incident. As a result of the inquiry Silber-horn was discharged. The record is devoid of any evidence that the discharge resulted because of Silberhorn’s national origin. The court found that the discharge resulted from a “good faith, sincere belief that a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for discharge existed. . . .” This finding is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
AFFIRMED.
. Section 2000e-2(a)(l) is as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin; . . .

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 0