What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Martin CAVALIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. T. SMITH AND SON, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 81-3143
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 26, 1982.
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1982.
George J. Kambur, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas W. Thorne, Jr., New Orleans, La., for T. Smith & Son and Employers Nat. Ins. Co.
Before RUBIN, SAM D. JOHNSON and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:
A longshoreman injured by the negligence of the crew of a vessel may sue the owner of the vessel even though the owner is also his employer, liable to him for compensation under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Smith v. M/V Captain Fred, 546 F.2d 119, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1977). In this case the district court held that a longshoreman’s suit is barred by the provisions of the LHWCA, however, if the negligence that caused the injury is attributable to members of the vessel’s crew who are performing stevedoring services when the plaintiff is injured. This holding is based on an express provision of the LHWCA, and we, therefore, affirm.
The facts were stipulated. Because they are set forth at length in the district court’s opinion, 499 F.Supp. 650 (E.D.La.1980), we merely sketch them here. T. Smith & Son, Inc. (“T. Smith”), a general contract stevedore, contracted with the owners of the M/V Sei Shin to discharge cargo from that ship and to load the cargo into river barges. Martin Cavalier, a longshoreman employed by T. Smith, was a member of a gang of longshoremen working inside a lower hold of the ship hooking up bundles of cargo. The cargo was to be removed from the ship by a crane mounted on the derrick barge Patricia, owned and operated by T. Smith, then lying alongside the ship. The flagman and the operator of the derrick crane, both of whom were members of the derrick crew, controlled the passage of cargo as it was lifted up through open hatches of the ship. The crane operator could not see the loads until they cleared the coaming of the hatch at the main deck of the ship, so the flagman was positioned on the main deck of the ship giving hand signals to the crane operator. Cavalier was injured when, solely through the negligence of either the crane operator or the flagman, a draft of pipes failed to clear the hatch coaming, causing the pipes to slip out of their sling and fall into the hold below, injuring Cavalier. T. Smith, through its compensation insurer, paid Cavalier compensation benefits under the provisions of the LHWCA. Cavalier now seeks to recover from T. Smith for negligence in causing his injury.
In Smith v. M/V Captain Fred, supra, we analyzed the applicability of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) when longshoremen working on a vessel owned by their employer are injured through the fault of members of the .crew of the vessel. We have since applied its precepts when the crew members were not performing stevedoring work. Bossard v. Port Allen Marine Serv., Inc., 624 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). However, the scope of Smith v. M/V Captain Fred is limited by the statute itself, which provides that an action for “negligence of a vessel” cannot be brought “if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel.” That proscription fits this case perfectly. The authority of Smith v. M/V Captain Fred stops at the statute’s bar. This is the interpretation given the LHWCA by other Courts of Appeals. Richardson v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 621 F.2d 633, 634-635 (4th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Eastern Seaboard Pile Driving, Inc., 604 F.2d 789, 795 (2d Cir. 1979); Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 521 F.2d 31, 41 (3d.Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054, 96 S.Ct. 785, 46 L.Ed.2d 643 (1976).
We join these courts in following the clear language of the statute and we AFFIRM for these reasons and for the additional reasons set forth in the district court’s clear opinion.
. Section 905(b) provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed by the vessel to provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing ship building or repair services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of.all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
(Emphasis added.)
. Accord, Mayfield v. Wall Shipyard, Inc., 510 F.Supp. 605, 608 (E.D.La.1981).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1