What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
TWINBORO CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 45.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 7, 1945.
George G. Tyler and Cravath, Swaine & 'Moore, all of New York City (Wm. Dwight Whitney, Roswell Magill, and William R. White, all of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
Hilbert P. Zarky, of Washington, D. C., Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and Robert N. Anderson, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before L. HAND, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
L. HAND, Circuit Judge.
This case presents only one point in addition to those which we discussed in Winter Realty & Construction Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 567, handed down herewith. It is this : Whether an owner whose property has been condemned may buy “similar property” in anticipatory replacement of the award, pay for it out of his own funds, recoup himself later out of the award when he gets it, and treat any “gain” as exempt under § 112(f), 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 112(f). The taxpayer seeks to distinguish this situation from that which was before us in Bandes v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 69 F.2d 812, because here the property condemned was a garage, and the “similar property” was also a “garage,” bought “in anticipatory replacement” of the first. In Washington Railway & Electric Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 40 B.T.A. 1249, the Board of Tax Appeals, upon a review by the full Board, disagreed with our interpretation; but sought to distinguish the facts so as to sustain our decision. We may of course have been wrong and the Board right, but the attempted distinction is untenable. In Bandes v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayers had bought one parcel of land on which they meant to put up an apartment; but before they could do so, it was condemned. They looked about for a substitute, and found two parcels on which they then proceeded to build apartments. The attempted distinction is apparently that, as they had not yet built the apartment when the first parcel was condemned, and, as they might change their minds, the new purchases could not have been made “in anticipatory • replacement” of the old. On what basis this can be supported we do not understand; but, be that as it may, we had not the slightest intention of depending upon anything of the sort; we assumed that the two parcels were bought “in anticipatory replacement” of the first, and to rest our decision upon our understanding that that would not serve. We adhere to that interpretation, though, as before, we reserve decision in case an owner borrows money to pay for “similar property,” and later uses the award to pay the debt. Possibly that may be an instance where the award is “expended in the acquisition of other property similar * * * to the property so converted.” That was not this case, for here the taxpayer bought and paid for the property out of its own funds.
It is quite true that the doctrine will at times put an owner in the trying dilemma of choosing between allowing his business to be stopped, and being obliged to pay a large tax upon a “gain” “realized” against his will. There will be no method by which he can procure any substitute property in season to supply his needs, and yet to avail himself of the privilege which would concededly be his if he were not pressed to act at once. It can therefore be plausibly argued that the situation is a casus omissus; and if we felt sure enough that that were true, we might not stick at its defective expression. But we are not sure whether Congress really meant to provide the full measure of relief which a complete fulfillment of its apparent purpose demanded. The law has now been on the books since 1921, and the regulations, at least since 1934 (Article 112(f)-l, Regulations 86), have provided that “the taxpayer must trace the proceeds of the award into the payments for the property so purchased,” although the proceeds need not be “earmarked” — whatever that may mean. After every allowance which can properly be made for failure to cover obviously overlooked occasions, we remain in too much doubt to force the language so far from its literal meaning. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that we are dealing with an exemption.
Order affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1