What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Norman CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellee, Norman CARPENTER, PetitionerAppellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant.
Nos. 15196, 15197.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 11, 1966.
Richard P. Stein, U. S. Atty., Joseph W. Annakin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for appellant.
Robert A. Lichtenauer, Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, DUFFY, Circuit Judge and GRUBB, Senior District Judge.
DUFFY, Circuit Judge.
On November 16,1960, petitioner, Norman Carpenter, and one Lionel W. Prince, were arrested and charged with the unlawful sale of 600 milligrams of heroin hydrochloride, not in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom said narcotic drug was sold, on a form issued in blank for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. The complaint which was filed alleged that the described narcotic drug was sold by Carpenter to Federal Agent, Clarence Cook.
On December 22, 1960, an indictment in two counts was filed naming Carpenter in both counts, and Prince only in the first count. Count 1 referred to a sale of 600 milligrams of heroin hydrochloride in Indianapolis, Indiana, on August 17, 1960, and count 2 referred to a sale of 1 gram, 600 milligrams of heroin hydrochloride in Indianapolis, Indiana, on September 30, 1960. The Indictment did not name the purchaser of the drug.
Petitioner Carpenter was advised by the Court of the nature of the charges against him and of his constitutional rights. He was given a copy of the indictment and thereafter, he entered a plea of not guilty to both counts of the indictment.
After hearing the evidence, including the testimony of Agent Clarence Cook, the jury found Carpenter guilty as charged. A motion for a new trial was sustained. After a second trial, a jury again found Carpenter guilty as charged.
Petitioner was represented by counsel, but no pre-trial motions were filed requesting the name of the purchaser to whom petitioner was alleged to have sold the narcotics. No motions were filed attacking the sufficiency of the indictment because the identity of the purchaser was not disclosed. No claim was made by petitioner that an insufficient apprisal of the nature of the charges against him was hampering the preparation of his defense.
In September 1964, petitioner filed a motion to vacate and set aside his sentence on the grounds that the indictment upon which he was convicted failed to name the person to whom he was alleged to have sold the narcotics. Petitioner relied principally on Lauer v. United States, 7 Cir., 320 F.2d 187 (1963), where we held it essential in order to validly charge the offense of an unlawful sale of a narcotic in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) that the indictment name the purchaser. Upon the Lauer decision, the District Court released the petitioner from custody, and ordered the indictment in the same cause to be dismissed. From these two orders, the Government appeals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
In Collins v. Markley, 7 Cir., 346 F.2d 230, after an en banc hearing, this Court held that Lauer v. United States, supra, had been wrongly decided. We are now invited to retreat from our decision in Collins v. Markley, supra. We decline this invitation.
In respondent’s brief and particularly on oral argument, reliance was placed on Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240. In Russell, the petitioner had been convicted of violating 2 U.S.C. § 192 which makes it a misdemeanor for a person summoned to testify before a committee of Congress, to refuse to answer “any question pertinent to the question under inquiry * * Motions had been filed by each petitioner to quash the indictment before trial for failure to state the subject under inquiry. We find nothing in Russell that indicates, in any way, that our decision in Collins v. Markley, supra, is erroneous. We adhere to and reaffirm our decision in that case.
It is understandable that the District Court felt bound by our decision in Lauer. But Lauer is no longer the rule of this Circuit. Furthermore, in the instant case, there was no prejudice to the defendant by the omission in the indictment of the alleged purchaser’s name. Moreover, the record is clear that petitioner could successfully plead the judgment herein in bar to a later prosecution for the same offense.
On this appeal, Robert A. Lichtenauer, Esq. of the Indiana bar, has acted as court-appointed counsel for the petitioner. Counsel has rendered excellent and devoted service and this Court compliments him on it.
The District Court’s orders and judgments rendered April 8, 1964, releasing the petitioner from custody and dismissing the indictment are
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1