What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Bernice C. WHALEY, Appellant, v. John W. GARDNER, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Appellee.
No. 18522.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
March 14, 1967.
Donald H. Whaley, Clayton, Mo., for appellant.
Stephen H. Gilmore, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee. John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., and Richard D. FitzGibbon, Jr., U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., were on the brief.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, BLACKMUN and MEHAFFY, Circuit Judges.
VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge.
This action was brought by claimant, Bernice C. Whaley, against the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final decision of the Secretary denying claimant’s application for disability benefits under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416(i) and 423.
The District Court for reasons stated in a well-considered opinion — 255 F. Supp. 862 — affirmed the Secretary’s decision. This is a timely appeal from such final judgment.
Coverage under the Act is conceded. The dispositive issue before us is whether the District Court erred in its determination that the Secretary was warranted upon the record in finding that the claimant did not establish the degree of disability required by the Act to entitle her to disability benefits.
The standards for review in cases of this kind are well-established and fully developed in our prior cases and need not be repeated here. Brasher v. Celebrezze, 8 Cir., 340 F.2d 413; Celebrezze v. Sutton, 8 Cir., 338 F.2d 417; Celebrezze v. Bolas, 8 Cir., 316 F.2d 498.
We have carefully examined the entire record. It clearly appears that the applicable standards above stated were strictly adhered to by the trial court. We are in full agreement with the trial court’s determination that the Secretary’s findings have substantial evidentiary support. No purpose will be served in reviewing the extensive evidence in detail. Such evidence is fairly stated and summarized in the decision of the Appeals Council which became the final decision of the Secretary and in the District Court’s opinion. The evidence is likewise considered and stated in detail in the original Examiner’s report and in the report of the second trial Examiner made after remand. The decision of the District Court is affirmed upon the basis of the findings and reasoning contained in its well-considered opinion.
Prior to the hearing on remand before the Examiner on July 8, 1965, the claimant’s disability claim was based upon physical disability. Many doctors examined claimant and their reports appear in the record. While some of such testimony lends support to claimant’s claim of physical disability, there is substantial evidence to support a contrary view. Hence, the court was fully warranted in accepting the Secretary’s findings and determination that physical disability to the extent required by the Act had not been established.
Claimant first presented a contention of mental disability in the nature of a psychosomatic or psychoneurotic condition at the hearing before the Examiner on July 8, 1965. Such claim is based primarily upon the testimony of Dr. Gagliardo, a qualified psychiatrist who first examined claimant on June 30, 1965, and again examined her on July 6, 1965. He testified that claimant was suffering from a depressive reaction, that she was in need of treatment, and was totally disabled at the time he testified. He further stated that she was having no delusions or hallucinations, that she was oriented in all spheres, that her memory was intact, that her judgment was impaired, that she did not express any suicidal tendencies and did not need hospitalization. He was unable to say when the mental problem developed or became disabling. Included in his testimony is the following:
“Q. Do you feel like there is a reasonable expectation of substantial improvement of her condition with your treatment and therapy?
“A. Yes, I do.
“Q. What percentage * * * of your patients — would you say that have similar ailments, do show substantial improvement * * *
“A. * * * according to my experience with a patient like this, * * * if she goes along with the treatment, they improve.
“Q. And doctor, what is the normal time usually that is required to show improvement if they will follow your therapy and your treatment?
“A. From three to six months.”
Upon the basis of such testimony, the Secretary was warranted in determining that the claimant had not established that her mental disability was such that meets the requirement of 42 U.S.C.A. § 416 (i) as amended in 1965 that it “has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”
As pointed out by the trial court, an individual will not be considered under disability if, with reasonable effort and safety to himself, the impairment can be diminished.
Claimant raises several errors with respect to the reception and consideration of evidence. Such contentions are without merit. Objection is made to the consideration of the report of Dr. Cannon which was received in evidence at the first hearing. At the time of the first hearing, the only objection made went to the qualifications of the doctor and an expressed desire of the claimant to explain the nature of the examination. Claimant was permitted at both hearings to testify fully as to the character of the examination. No right to cross examine Dr. Cannon was asserted at the first hearing. Such issue was first raised at the 1965 hearing. Other medical reports similar to that of Dr. Cannon were received in evidence at both hearings. The reports introduced at the first hearing became a part of the record when they were received. At the time of the first hearing, Dr. Cannon would have been available for cross-examination. He died before the second hearing. Administrative agencies are not restricted to rigid rules of evidence. See Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-706, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010.
Claimant’s additional contention relates to the consideration by the first trial examiner of various medical books and papers not in evidence. We agree with the trial court that claimant was accorded a full and fair hearing by the second trial examiner and by the Appeals Council and that no consideration was given to such extraneous matter in connection with their determinations and that no prejudice could possibly result from any erroneous consideration of extraneous matter by the first hearing examiner.
The judgment of the trial court upholding the Secretary’s denial of the claim here asserted is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1