What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WHITE, Warden, v. STEIGLEDER.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth. Circuit.
January 24, 1930.
No. 116
October Term, 1929.
Alton. H. Skinner, Asst. TJ. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan. (Al F. Williams, U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellant.
Charles A. Coakley, of Tulsa, Okl. (Walter I. Biddle, of Leavenworth, Kan., C. B. Stuart, of Oklahoma City, Okl., and E. J. Doemer, of Tulsa, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.
Before LEWIS, COTTERAL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. ,
COTTERAL, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is brought by appellant as warden of the penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kan., to obtain a reversal of an order of the District Court for Kansas, granting to the appellee a writ of habeas corpus for his discharge, subject to terms of probation.
The appellee was convicted on eight counts of an indictment for violations of the National Banking Act in the Northern District of Oklahoma. He was there sentenced to serve a term of one year and a day and pay a fine of $2,500 on the first count. He was further sentenced to serve a term of five years and pay a fine of $100 on each of the other counts, the sentences to run concurrently and begin at the expiration of sentence on the first count. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Steigleder v. United States (C. C. A.) 25 F.(2d) 959. Thereafter, at a hearing of defendant’s application for probation, it was ordered that a-commitment be issued for service of the sentence by the defendant on the first count of the indictment, and probation was granted for his release on the other counts, until further order and during good behavior.
His petition for the writ of habeas corpus which he filed in the District Court for Kansas recites he had served the sentence required on the first count of the indictment and an additional 30 days on account of the fine therein imposed, and is entitled to a dischax’ge by virtue of the probation order applicable to the other counts. The warden moved to dismiss the cause and deny the discharge for want of jurisdiction in the Oklahoma District Court to suspend execution of any part of the original sentence. The case was heard, and, the warden electing to stand on his motion, appellee was discharged, subject to the probation terms.
It is conceded the appellee had fully served the sentence and was exonerated from the fine imposed under the first count of the indictment. The question involved is whether the trial court had the power, after the sentence term and affirmance of the convictions, to grant the probation, effective in the future as to the last seven counts, after completion of the sentence on the first count. We conceive of no sound reason why this may not be done.
The Probation Act (43 Stat. 1259 [18 USCA §§ 724-727]) confers the power on the Federal Courts to suspend a sentence or grant probation after conviction, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. The act was construed by the Supreme Court as meaning that the power might be exercised before execution of the sentence begins. United States v. Murray, 275 U. S. 347, 48 S. Ct. 146, 72 L. Ed. 309. This construction was rested on the ground that probation was not intended to coexist with executive clemency under the pardon and parole acts. We are of opinion it is decisive of the controversy before us, as it limits the exercise of the power only in eases where service of a sentence has begun.
The intervention of an appeal does not affect the power of the district courts to grant probation. The act does not purport to so curtail it. When the convictions of appellee were upheld on appeal, he still clearly had the status of an offender whose sentence had not begun. Nor is the objection tenable that probation is not grantable after the sentence term, as the power is broadly authorized after conviction or plea, and its exercise neither vacates nor modifies the judgments of conviction. Nix v. James (C. C. A.) 7 F.(2d) 590; Kriebel v. United States (C. C. A.) 10 F.(2d) 762; Ackerson v. United States (C. C. A.) 15 F.(2d) 268; United States v. Young (D. C.) 17 F.(2d) 129; United States v. Davis (D. C.) 19 F.(2d) 536; United States v. Gargano (D. C.) 25 F.(2d) 723.
It is urged that appellee is not entitled to the benefit of probation, because he was imprisoned some four months before he was released by a supersedeas bond on his appeal. We doubt if the fact in such a ease would affect a right to probation, the convictions not having reached finality. But the fact does not appear in the record. And assuming there was a partial service of the sentence, it was necessarily for the separate offense charged in count 1 of the indictment, and not for the different offenses charged in the remaining counts wherein sentence was deferred until the expiration of sentence on the first count. Clearly, sentence had not begun under the counts affected by the probation order.
The order of the District Court was right, and it is accordingly affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1