What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MANGURAN v. McCLINTIC, District Judge.
No. 3056.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
July 16, 1930.
J. Raymond Gordon, of Charleston, W. Va., for petitioner.
Ellis A. Yost, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Huntington, W. Va., for respondent.
Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and GRONER, District Judge
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner, Simon Manguran, filed with this court, on July 5, 1930, a petition setting forth that he had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of possession of untax-paid liquor and had been sentenced by the District Judge of the Southern district of West Virginia to a term in the Federal Penitentiary- in Atlanta. He further stated in the petition that his plea of guilty had been entered pursuant to an arrangement with the district attorney by the terms of which he was to be admitted to probation and was to be used as a witness against another person supposed to be guilty of the same crime, but that the District Judge had ignored this arrangement in imposing sentence upon him and had refused to allow him to file a petition setting forth the facts and asking that the sentence be set aside and that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty. The petition concluded by praying that a writ of habeas corpus be awarded petitioner to inquire into the legality of his imprisonment.
We were of opinion that, upon the face of the petition, the petitioner was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, but was prima facie entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the District Judge to hear and pass upon his petition. 38 C. J. 633; Ex parte Roberts, 15 Wall. 384, 21 L. Ed. 131; In re Russell, 13 Wall. 664, 20 L. Ed. 632; In re United States, 16 Wall. 699, 21 L. Ed. 507. We accordingly entered an order directing that he certify to us the faets with respect to the matters set forth in the petition, to the end that we might determine whether an order should enter directing that petitioner be allowed to file his petition and that the District Judge be required to pass upon same and find the faets with regard thereto. This order was in effect an order to show cause why the writ of mandamus should not be granted. 38 C. J. 908, and eases cited. And it is well settled that the use of such order to show cause as substitute for an alternative writ of mandamus is proper.
The District Judge has filed his certificate with this court, setting forth the faets as to the matters alleged in the petition. From this statement it appears that he was not a party to any agreement made with the petitioner and that he did not lead petitioner to believe that he would act upon any recommendation, and, on the contrary, distinctly advised petitioner before his plea of guilty was entered that he would not be bound by the recommendation if one was made, and, in spite of this warning, petitioner thereafter entered his plea of guilty. While the District Judge has not in his certificate denied that he refused to consider the petition which petitioner’s counsel attempted to file with him, it appears from his certificate that, in passing sentence upon petitioner, he gave full consideration to the matters which petitioner’s counsel attempted to lay before him in said petition. It appears, therefore, that, if the judge were to consider Manguran’s petition that the sentence against him be set aside and he be allowed to with(draw his plea of guilty, such motion would necessarily be denied, as Manguran was not misled in entering his plea, and the judge in sentencing him passed upon all matters raised by the petition. Under such circumstances, we do not think that the writ of mandamus should issue.
As the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because he is lawfully in the custody of the marshal under a sentence of the court, and as he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus for the reasons hereinbe-fore set forth, his petition will be denied, and the order staying the execution of his sentence will be dissolved.
Petition denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0