What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
GRISHAM v. HAGAN, WARDEN.
No. 58.
Argued October 22, 1959.
Decided January 18, 1960.
Charles Wolfe Kalp and Frederick Bemays Wiener argued the cause' for petitioner. On the brief were Mr. Kalp and if. Clay Espey.
Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Acting Assistant Attorney General Ryan, Harold H. Greene, William A. Kehoe, Jr.-, Peter S. Wondolowski and William M. Burch II.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case tests by habeas corpus the validity of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 802, as applied to á civilian tried by court-martial for a capital offense while employed overseas by the United States Army. It is a companion case to No. 22, Kinsella v. Singleton, ante, p. 234, which involves the application of the same Article to noncapital offenses committed by dependents accompanying soldiers stationed outside the United States, and to No. 21, McElroy v. Guagliardo, and No. 37, Wilson v. Bohlender, post, p. 281, involving noncapital offenses committed by armed-services employees while stationed overseas — all of which cases are decided today.
Petitioner, a civilian employee of the United States Army attached to an Army installation in France, was tried by a general court-martial for the capital offense of premeditated murder as defined in Article 118 (1) of thé Uniform Code of Military Justice. He was 'found guilty of the lesser and included offense of unpremeditated, murder, and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for the term of-his natural life. The'sentence was subsequently reduced to 35 years. While serving this sentence at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, he filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that Article 2 (11) was unconstitutional as applied to him, for the reason that Congress lacked the power to deprive him of a civil trial affording all of the protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. • The writ was dismissed, 161 F. Supp. 112, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 261 F. 2d 204. In the light of the opinion of this Court on the rehearing in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957), as well as that of the Court of Appeals on the issue of the severability, of Article 2 (11) in Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F. 2d 927, we granted certiorari. 359 U. S. 978 (1959).
We are of the opinion that this case is controlled by Reid v. Covert, supra. It decided that the application of the Article to civilian dependents charged with capital offenses while accompanying servicemen outside the United States was unconstitutional as violative of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.- We have carefully considered the Government’s position as to the distinctions between civilian dependents and civilian employees, especially its voluminous historical materials relating to court-martial jurisdiction. However, the considerations pointed out in Covert have equal applicability here. Those who controlled the majority there held that the death penalty is so irreversible that a dependent charged with a capital crime' must have the benefit of a jury. The awesomeness of the death penalty has no-less impact when applied to civilian employees. Continued adherence to Covert requires civilian employees to be afforded the same right of trial by jury. Furthermore, the number of civilian employees is much smaller than the number of dependents, and the alternative procedures available for controlling discipline as to the former more' effective. See McElroy v. Guagliardo, post, p. 281. For the purposes of this decision, we cannot say that there are any valid distinctions between the two classes of persons. The judgment is therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, see ante, p. 249.]
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, see ante, p. 259.]
Art. 2. “The following persons are subject to this chapter:
“(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the following: that part of Alaska east of longitude 172 degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.”
In the light of our opinion in No. 21, McElroy v. Guagliardo, handed down today, post, p. 281, we deny the contention that the article is honseverable.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 6