What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
IOANNOU v. NEW YORK et al.
No. 191,
October Term, 1962.
Decided June 3, 1968.
Sydney J. Schwartz on the motion.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, and Daniel M. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, in opposition.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing is denied upon the representation of the Attorney General of New York that the movant may file a new application “to withdraw the funds deposited with the New York City Treasurer” in the light of changed circumstances. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U. S. 429; Goldstein v. Cox, 389 U. S. 581.
Mr. Justice Douglas.
Since the only changed circumstances concern the intervening decision of this Court in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U. S. 429, and since the rationale of that decision applies to custodial statutes such as New York has as well as to escheat statutes like Oregon’s, I would dispose of the case here and now (either after or without oral argument) and not require petitioner to retravel once more the long, arduous, and expensive path from New York’s surrogate court.
Mr. Justice Harlan would deny unconditionally the motion for leave to file a petition for rehearing, substantially for the reasons given in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98, 99.
Mr. Justice Fortas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0