What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ralph NAPLETANA and Rosanne M. Goldrick, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HILLSDALE COLLEGE, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17598.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Nov. 24, 1967.
Edward D. Wells, Grand Rapids, Mich., for appellant, Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan, Grand Rapids, Mich., on the brief, William J. Addison, Grand Rapids, Mich., of counsel.
Clay T. Brockman, Coldwater, Mich., for appellees.
Before EDWARDS and PECK, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
This is a damage action brought under the jurisdiction of the federal courts due to diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
In this case a father and daughter, alleging that they were citizens of Ohio, filed suit against a Michigan college. The daughter was attending the college in 1962 when a radiator fell, injuring her left foot. The case was tried to a jury before Judge W. Wallace Kent, with the result of a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $4,000.
This appeal presents only one question: whether the District Judge erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
At the time of the filing of this complaint, January 22, 1965, appellee, Mrs. Goldrick, was a teacher in the Shaker Heights schools, residing in Cleveland Heights, Ohio, with her parents. At that time, however, she was married. Her husband had moved to Michigan to take a new job four weeks before the filing of this complaint. Shortly thereafter, on February 1, 1965, at the conclusion of the school semester, Mrs. Goldrick joined her husband in Michigan.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this action if diversity of citizenship existed at the time the complaint was filed. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1205 (1957); Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469, 472, 31 A.L.R.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1952); 1 W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 26, at 139-40 (Wright ed. 1960). For purposes of the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964), a person is a citizen of a state if he is domiciled there. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624, 34 S.Ct. 442, 58 L.Ed. 758 (1914); C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 26 (1963). Generally, diversity must exist between all plaintiffs and all defendants. Hence, regardless of her father’s Ohio domicile, the domicile of Mrs. Goldrick is crucial to jurisdiction of this case. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806); Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469, 471, 31 A.L.R.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1952). But see generally ALI Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 180-90 (Official Draft, part 1,1965).
The boundaries of federal diversity jurisdiction must, of course, be determined basically by federal law. But customarily the federal courts look to state law, particularly the law of the states concerned, for definitions of terms such as “domicile” which are direct products of state law.
Appellant contends that Mrs. Gold-rick’s domicile necessarily followed her husband’s domicile into Michigan prior to the filing of the complaint. This argument is based on the common-law doctrine that a married woman’s domicile is that of her husband. See 25 AM.JUR.2d Domicil § 53 (1966). Appellees contend that the modern trend in the law is to recognize separate domiciles for husband and wife, if in fact they are residing in and intend to maintain separate domiciles in different states. Appellees argue that this is true where there is an agreement, express or implied, between husband and wife to maintain separate domiciles.
Professor Wright provides this definition of how a domicile may be changed.
“A citizen of the United States can change his domicile instantly. To do so, two elements are necessary. He must take up residence at the new domicile, and he must intend to remain there. Neither the physical presence nor the intention to remain is alone sufficient.” C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 26 (1963).
In one of the few federal court cases cited to us, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held:
“Although the domicile of a wife ordinarily follows that of her husband, it is not so in this case. When Oxley left North Carolina in 1935, it was by agreement that his wife remained there and so her domicile remained in that state, despite the fact that he established a new domicile for himself in the District of Columbia.” Oxley v. Oxley, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 159 F.2d 10, 11 (1946) (Footnote omitted.)
This quotation mirrors the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Conflict of Laws :
“If a wife lives apart from her husband without being guilty of desertion according to the law of the state which was their domicil at the time of separation, she can have a separate domicil.” Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 28 (1934).
Early in the history of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Justice Cooley recognized exceptions to the common-law rule that a wife’s domicile is that of her husband. People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 247, 262 (1872).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio long ago recognized the principle that a married woman can have a domicile separate from that of her husband. Van Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317, 320 (1881).
We believe that for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction a married woman can have a legal domicile separate from that of her husband. Our question in this case then becomes primarily one of fact — whether plaintiff Goldrick’s residence and intent at the time of the filing of this complaint supports the conclusion that she was at that time domiciled in Ohio.
There is ample testimony to establish the fact of Mrs. Goldrick’s lifetime residence in Ohio up to and beyond the date of the filing of the complaint in this case.
We also find evidence of the intent to remain there until February 1, 1965, in her testimony:
“Q. And where were you residing during the month of January, 1965?
“A. At the home of my parents.
“Q. And where was that?
“A. In Cleveland Heights, Ohio.
“Q. And what were you doing at that time, employmentwise ?
“A. I was teaching first grade in Shaker Heights, Ohio.
“Q. And did you complete the first semester of teaching there?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. When did you move to Detroit or the Detroit area?
“A. On the first of February.
“Q. Of’65?
“A. ’65, yes.”
We believe this record establishes that Mrs. Goldrick resided in Ohio on January 22, 1965, and intended to remain there until the end of the school semester.
There is in this case no evidence of any marital rift or disagreement. Mrs. Gold-rick’s testimony concerning her intention to remain in Cleveland to the end of the school semester and her joining her husband in Michigan immediately thereafter allowed an inference that these arrangements were agreeable to both husband and wife.
On this record we find no error in the District Judge’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1