What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BOOTH v. STATE FARM MUT. AUTOMOBILE INS. CO.
No. 5115.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 8, 1943.
Morton L. Wallerstein, of Richmond, Va., (Walter M. Evans, of Richmond, Va., on the brief), for appellant.
Ralph T. Catterall, of Richmond, Va., (Williams, Mullen & Hazelgrove and Guy B. Hazelgrove, all of Richmond, Va., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, SOPER, and DO-BIE, Circuit Judges.
DOBIE, Circuit Judge.
Broadus Booth (hereinafter called Booth) was injured in an accident resulting ’ from the driving of an automobile by Charles Strang (hereinafter called Strang). Strang was killed in the accident. Booth brought suit against Strang’s administratrix and recovered judgment for $10,000. Execution was issued upon this judgment and there was a return of “No Effects”. Booth then brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter called the company) upon an insurance policy issued by the Company to Strang, covering the automobile driven by Strang which caused the accident resulting in the injuries to Booth.
Booth contended that the policy issued to Strang was a liability policy under which the Company was legally bound to pay the judgment obtained by Booth] against the administratrix of Strang’s estate. The Company contended that the policy covered only loss of, or injury to, Strang’s automobile. Both Booth and the Company filed, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, motions for summary judgment. The District Court overruled Booth’s motion and granted the motion of the Company. Booth has duly appealed to this Court.
The District Judge, in an opinion filed January 26, 1943, stated:
“From the pleadings, the policy and the rider thereto attached, the admissions on file and the affidavits, the following facts appear:
“On July 26, 1941, Charles C. Strang bought a used automobile from the Lawrence Motor Company, and to finance the purchase, borrowed from the Southern Bank & Trust Company $399.35 and gave the Bank a lien on the car. The Bank required Strang to take out insurance on the car for the protection of the lien. For that purpose, only a policy insuring against loss or damage to the automobile was necessary. The Bank did not require a policy protecting Strang against liability for damage done by his automobile to the person or property of others. A policy-clause that insures against all kinds of loss or damage, except damage resulting from an impact of the insured chattel against another object, is called ‘Comprehensive’; and a clause that insures against damage caused by such impact is called ‘Collision.’ Strang, in order to comply with the conditions imposed by the Bank that He insure his automobile completely against all forms of loss, damage or destruction, applied to the defendant for ‘Comprehensive’ and ‘Collision’ insurance and paid the premiums for those two types of insurance. The defendant issued to him a policy with a rider attached. The rider was issued as a part of the original policy; it was not issued later. The policy period provided in the policy is six months and for terms of six calendar months thereafter. The rider recites: ‘In consideration of the payment of an additional $18.80, it is agreed that the term of this policy is hereby extended for two terms of six months each.’ On the front page of the policy it is stated that it covered ‘Liability1 and ‘Collision.’ On the rider, immediateley above the clause which recites the payment of an additional premium of $18.80, thal-sum is broken down as follows:
‘COMP 4.20
$25 DED 14.60’
“The rider also contains the following provision:
“ ‘Nothing herein contained shall be held to alter, vary, waive or extend any of the terms, conditions, agreements or limitations of the undermentioned policy other than as hereinabove stated.’ ”
Any ambiguity, or lack of clearness, in the policy, if such existed, arose from the fact that by obvious mistake the premium was entered on the first page of the policy under the heading “Section 1, A, Bodily Injury Liability”, instead of under the heading “2 C, Comprehensive”. On this same first page, under the caption “As stated in endorsement attached” was the symbol “x 330”, and this same symbol, “x 330” appeared at the bottom of the rider.
We agree with the District Court that the policy and contemporaneous rider, when construed together as a single contract, in the light oi the uncontradicted affidavits as to the facts surrounding the issuance of the policy, show clearly that the coverage of the policy extended only to “Comprehensive” and “Collision — $25 Deductible” insurance, and not to “Bodily Injury Liability.”
The expressions on the top of the rider: “COMP 4.20” and “$25 DED 14.60” contain no real ambiguity, when read in connection with the policy. By the rider, the policy was extended for iwo terms of six months each. “COMP” could, in this connection, mean only “Comprehensive”. “$25 DED” could mean only “$25 Deductible” in connection with collision insurance. The premiums for the two extensions of six months each would naturally and normally be twice the amount of the premiums for the original term of six months set out on the first page of the policy. $4.20 is just twice the specified premium of $2.10, entered by obvious mistake under the caption “1 A Bodily Injury Liability”, instead of under the caption “C Comprehensive”; $14.60 is just twice the premium of $7.30 entered likewise under the caption “G Collision — Deductible— Actual cash value less $25.00 deductible”. It is conceded that the premium charged is far less than the minimum fixed by Virginia law for liability insurance. We think it is unnecessary to add anything further to the opinion of the District Judge on this point. If there be any ambiguity here (we think there is not), parol, extrinsic evidence would seem to be admissible to explain the ambiguity. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Justis, 168 Va. 158, 190 S.E. 163.
Two other defenses were raised by the Company: (1) If the policy grants liability coverage, the policy is illegal and unenforceable, because the minimum premiums prescribed by the law of Virginia were not paid; (2) Booth cannot recover against the Company because no judgment ■has been obtained against the insured. Strang, since the judgment was obtained against Strang’s administratrix. The District Court found it unnecessary to pass upon these two defenses; we feel there is no occasion for us to consider them.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0