What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry CHAPLINSKI, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 78-5198
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 1, 1978.
Arthur Addess, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellant.
Jack V. Eskenazi, U. S. Atty., Hugh F. Culverhouse, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.
' Before BROWN, Chief Judge, COLEMAN and VANCE, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
Henry Chaplinski was convicted of importing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952(a) and of possessing cocaine for distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, he first contends that the District Court should have excluded the cocaine from the trial on the grounds that it was seized after an illegal search and that the Government had failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody. Second, he argues that the Court should not have permitted one of the Government’s witnesses to testify. We find no merit to either of these contentions and affirm.
Appellant Chaplinski was employed by George S. Ford, president of an airfreight concern. Ford and Chaplinski travelled to Colombia twice in 1977 to set up an office in that country and to prepare Chaplinski to become the manager. Chaplinski was arrested in the Miami International Airport after the return flight from the second trip.
While making a routine inspection of Chaplinski’s luggage, Customs Agent Johnson smelled a strong odor of glue and observed that the sides of the suitcase seemed unusually thick. He asked Chaplinski to remove his belongings from the suitcase, and, taking it into a separate office, cut the lining of the case and discovered two plastic bags filled with white powder glued to the sides of the suitcase. A thorough examination revealed a total of 18 such bags. The bags, which were tested “on the field” and proved to contain approximately 1,439 grams of cocaine, were delivered to Agent Baumwald of the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], who in turn took them to the DEA Office and laboratory.
Chaplinski’s first argument is that the strong odor of glue provided the customs inspector with insufficient basis for the “reasonable suspicion” necessary to search the suitcase within constitutional limits. This argument misunderstands the law and understates the facts. At the border, customs agents need not have a reasonable or articulable suspicion that criminal activity is involved to stop one who has traveled from a foreign point, examine his or her visa, and search luggage and personal effects for contraband. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 1975, 422 U.S. 873, 887, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607; United States v. Himmelwright, 5 Cir., 1977, 551 F.2d 991; United States v. Bowman, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1215, 1219. As we have stated many times before, “[t]he national interests in self-protection and protection of tariff revenue authorize a requirement that persons crossing the border identify themselves and their belongings as entitled to enter and be subject to search.” United States v. Brennan, 5 Cir., 1976, 538 F.2d 711, 715; United States v. Ingham, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1287, 1291 (emphasizing importance of customs searches in collecting import revenues). Furthermore, the combination of a strong odor of glue with suitcase walls of an unusual thickness clearly provided a reasonable suspicion that contraband was present, and fully supported the agent’s action in cutting the lining of the suitcase.
Chaplinski’s second argument is that discrepancies in the amounts of cocaine entered on the reports accompanying the drugs as they were transferred between government personnel fatally taints the chain of custody for the cocaine introduced at the trial. Evidence of the record amply documents the journey of the cocaine from the time it was seized at the airport until it was analyzed at the DEA laboratory. “The adequacy of the chain of custody was a factual question which the jury resolved against appellants].” United States v. Graham, 5 Cir., 1972, 464 F.2d 1073, 1076.
Finally, Chaplinski attacks the admissibility of Charles Ford’s testimony as a Government witness on the grounds that the Government misled the defendant as to the availability of this witness and did not inform the defendant that Ford would testify until the end of the final day of evidence. Chaplinski contends that this was a deliberate subterfuge designed to undermine F.R. Crim.P. 16 and the District Court’s standing discovery order. We hold this contention meritless. The Government’s records indicate that agents unsuccessfully attempted to locate Ford shortly after Chaplinski’s arrest. Chaplinski argues that the uncorrected record entry that Ford could not be found made it unjust for the Government later to present him as a “surprise” witness. The Government’s response is that they later found Ford; that they did not intend to mislead the defendant as to Ford’s availability, but that no rule requires them to reveal the names of the witnesses they intend to call. It is clear law that “[a]part from the Congressionally created exception in capital cases, the granting of a defense request for a list of adverse witnesses is a matter of judicial discretion . . . ”. United States v. Hancock, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286; United States v. Moseley, 5 Cir., 1971, 450 F.2d 506, 510. Chaplinski made no request for the names of the Government witnesses and we find no evidence of discretion used or abused.
AFFIRMED.
. Customs agents have broad authority to stop and search for contraband. 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1581, 1582; see also § 1496.
. The standing discovery order does not require the Government to report the names of witnesses adverse to the defendant, with the exception of alleged coconspirators, accomplices, or informants, witnesses who gave grand jury testimony, and witnesses receiving any preferential treatment or promises of immunity or leniency. R., vol. I, at 8-10.
. Indeed, Ford testified that Chaplinski had telephoned him two weeks before the trial at Ford’s office. Tr., at 174-75.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1