What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. SREDNIK.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
April 27, 1927.
No. 3584.
1. Aliens ®=^711/2(8) — Certificate of naturalization held not illegally procured, authorizing cancellation proceeding, because of any mistake (Comp. St. § 4374).
Certificate of naturalization is not “illegally procured,” so as to authorize cancellation proceeding under Act June 29, 1906, § 15 (Comp. St. § 4374), there being no affirmative act of a sinister character on the part of the procurer, but, at most, a mere mistake in determining in favor of naturalization that applicant’s absence from country with intention to return did not interfere with compliance with statutory requirement of continuous residence.
2. Aliens <s=»711/2(8) — Government’s remedy for mere mistake in holding favoring naturalization is by appeal only.
In case of any mistake in holding, in favor of applicant for naturalization, that there was continuous residence, the government’s onl/ remedy was by appeal.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Oliver B. Dickinson, Judge.
Proceeding by the United States against Thomas Srednik to cancel certificate of cancellation. Petition dismissed, and the United States appeals.
Affirmed.
George W. Coles, U. S. Atty., and Claude O. Lanciano, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Philadelphia, Pa.
David Levinson, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
This case concerns the naturalization of Thomas Srednik, and the present proceeding is one to cancel his naturalization certificate. The facts of the case are these :
On November 9, 1920, Srednik declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and on December 20,1922, in pursuance thereof, filed his petition in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On May 5, 1924, he was admitted to citizenship and was given a certificate of naturalization No. 1,-955,210 by said court. On the record of that ease it appears that his citizenship was contested on the ground that he had not resided in the United States during the statutory period required. This matter was duly considered by the judge, and decided-in favor of the applicant in an opinion in which, after certain discussion, the court stated the conclusion reached was “that the applicant has continuously resided in the United States for a period of more than five years, and it is ordered that the prayer of his petition be granted and that he he admitted to citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.” The United States was represented at the hearing at the time of his naturalization, and no appeal was taken from the above decree.
After the expiration of the term, to wit, on August 25, 1924, a petition was filed by the United States attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, praying that the certificate of naturalization be canceled. An answer was filed thereto by the applicant, wherein he stated that “he is advised by counsel that the only point raised by the said petition is one involving legal construction as to the meaning of the Act of Congress of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. 596), requiring a residence of five years next preceding the issuance of the certificate of naturalization. Defendant avers that this question was heard by this honorable court on April 2,1924, and the certificate of naturalization in question was issued, and inasmuch as no new facts have been alleged as a ground for cancellation he prays that the court dismiss the petition herein filed.”
The underlying primary question here involved is whether the remedy of cancellation here sought could be availed of under the fifteenth section of the act of June, 1906 (Comp. St. § 4374). Was the certificate, in the words of the said act, “illegally procured”? In the case of United States v. Richmond, 17 F.(2d) 28, we held that “to the words ‘procured,’ ‘illegally procured,’ coupled in this statute with fraud, as it is, must he attributed the purpose of Congress to use those words in their commonly understood meaning, as evidencing a positive, affirmative act on the part of the procurer, and one of a sinister character.” No such accusation is involved in the present case. The question before the court is one of fact and legal construction, namely, whether the absence of the applicant-from the country with the intention of returning was a compliance with the.statutory requirement of a continuous residence. That question the naturalization judge held in favor of the applicant under the facts of the ease. If he was mistaken, the remedy of the government, which was represented at the hearing, was by appeal.
Regarding the present case as an effort to review in this indirect way the opinion and decision of the court in the primary case, and. in accord with the-Richmond Case, we affirm the order of dismissal of the petition to cancel made in the present case.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 6