What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Juan Ramon MARTINEZ, Appellant.
No. 91-3320.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 11, 1992.
Decided Feb. 28, 1992.
Jon Baptiste Schuster, Des Moines, Iowa, argued, for appellant.
Ronald Michael Kayser, Des Moines, Iowa, argued (Gene W. Shepard and Ronald M. Kayser, on brief), for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MAGILL, Circuit Judge, and LARSON, Senior District Judge.
The Hon. Earl R. Larson, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
ARNOLD, Chief Judge.
Juan Ramon Martinez appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the use and carrying of a firearm during the commission of a drug-trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Martinez argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions on all three counts. We affirm the convictions.
I.
Evidence at trial established that Martinez had known the government’s informant, Joe Navin, since January or February of 1990, and had sold cocaine to Navin ten to twelve times before November 1990. Navin was arrested on November 14, 1990, on cocaine possession and gun charges. He immediately indicated to law-enforcement personnel that he wanted to cooperate. In cooperation with the government, Navin set up a meeting with Martinez for him and Agent Weir to buy cocaine. Martinez agreed to call Navin at the Holiday Inn when the cocaine was available. On the evening of December 9, 1990, Martinez called Navin at the hotel and told him to come over to Martinez’s apartment for the purchase in twenty to twenty-five minutes. The government taped the telephone conversation.
When Agent Weir and Navin arrived at Martinez’s apartment, Martinez led them to the apartment of co-defendants Humberto Carlin and Jose Velazquez. Agent Weir was wearing a recording device. During the meeting, Carlin brought out eight ounces of cocaine in eight individual packets and showed it to Agent Weir and Navin. Navin noticed that Carlin was carrying a gun. Martinez and Agent Weir began to negotiate. Martinez told Agent Weir that the cocaine was “primo” and would cost $1,250 an ounce. After discussing the purchase a while longer, Martinez told Agent Weir that he had promised Carlin a sixteenth of an ounce of cocaine for handling the transaction. Agent Weir offered Martinez a $200 bonus in lieu of Carlin’s taking any of the cocaine and handed Martinez $200. Martinez kept a $100 bill and gave $100 to Carlin. Agent Weir and Navin then paid $4,800 each for the cocaine and left the apartment.
Shortly after Navin and Agent Weir left the apartment, they re-entered with law-enforcement officers and arrested Martinez. He still had the $100 bill. Carlin attempted to escape, and in doing so, a gun fell out of his pants. It was this gun which the jury convicted Martinez of using and carrying during the commission of the drug-trafficking offenses.
II.
First, Martinez argues that Navin’s testimony — i.e., the testimony of a drug dealer who struck a deal with the government — was directly contradicted by Martinez and therefore insufficient to support the convictions.
The jury was aware of Navin’s cooperation with the government, of the potential for a reduction of his sentence in exchange for his assistance, and of his extensive criminal record. They were free to give whatever weight they chose to his testimony. It is the sole province of the jury to weigh the credibility of a witness. Had Navin’s testimony been the only evidence presented by the government, it would still have been perfectly proper for the jury to credit this testimony and convict Martinez on all three counts. This was not, however, the only evidence presented on Martinez’s guilt. Navin’s testimony was fully corroborated by Agent Weir, the tape of the telephone conversation, and the tape of the negotiations in Carlin’s and Velazquez’s apartment. Thus, we hold that a reasonable juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Martinez’s second argument is that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support his conviction on possession of a firearm since another individual was in possession of the weapon. In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a party to a conspiracy may be responsible for the substantive offense of a co-conspirator “when the substantive offense is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the [conspiracy].” This is true even though the party has no actual knowledge of the offense as long as it could be “reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the [conspiracy].” Id. at 648, 66 S.Ct. at 1184.
Certainly, it was reasonably foreseeable that one of Martinez’s co-conspirators might carry a weapon in a transaction involving $9,600 worth of cocaine. Moreover, while Martinez might not have known that Carlin had a gun on this particular occasion, Martinez admitted that he himself had carried a loaded gun when he was trafficking marijuana in 1986. The jury could have concluded from this admission that he was aware of the possibility that a weapon might be involved. The evidence was sufficient to convict Martinez of the firearm charge. Carlin’s carrying the gun in furtherance of the conspiracy to sell cocaine was reasonably foreseeable as a natural consequence of the conspiracy.
We affirm Martinez’s convictions on all three counts.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1