What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GOOSTREE v. UNITED STATES.
No. 6895.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
March 4, 1940.
Rehearing Denied March 29, 1940.
Stephen A. Cross, of Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Julius C. Martin, Wilbur C. Pickett, and Thomas E. Walsh, all of Washington, D. C., Arthur Roe, of Vandalia, 111., Carl W. Feickert, of East St. Louis, 111., and Wm. M. Lytle, of Chicago, 111., for appellee.
Before SPARKS, MAJOR, and KER-NER, Circuit Judges.
SPARKS, Circuit Judge.
This is an action on a policy of war risk insurance brought by the administratrix individually and as the beneficiary of a deceased soldier. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and the court held that the deceased soldier was not totally and permanently disabled at any time until immediately preceding his final illness; that he was totally disabled at intervals but such periods obviously were only temporary in character; and that he did not become totally and permanently disabled until shortly before his death. Upon these findings the court rendered judgment for the Government, and from this judgment the plaintiff appeals.
Decedent died on November 30, 1923. It is uncontroverted that no premiums on the contract of insurance sued upon were paid after June, 1919; that a claim for insurance benefits was first filed on June 27, 1931; that the claim was denied by the Veterans’ Administration on August 25, 1932; and that a letter of notification advising claimant of the denial was mailed by the Veterans’ Administration to her last address of record on August 29, 1932. It is further admitted that this action was filed September 5, 1932. On November 12, 1935, the Government filed its motion to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, based on the ground that the action was barred under the Statute of Limitations applicable to suits of this character. 38 U.S.C.A. § 445. On December 12, 1935, the District Court sustained that motion and dismissed the action.
On October 19, 1936, the parties stipulated in court, “that the order heretofore entered in this cause dismissing this case for want of jurisdiction may be vacated and set aside and said cause reinstated for trial upon its merits.” The court approved the stipulation, vacated the order of dismissal and tried the case with the result hereinbefore mentioned.
We are first met with the Government’s contention that this court is without jurisdiction for the reason that the Act of June 29, 1936, 38 U.S.C.A. § 445d, expressly provides for reinstatement within ninety days after its passage, and the stipulation and order in the instant case were not entered within that period. This in effect seeks to do away with the stipulation and the reinstatement of the cause. This contention is based on the ground that the Government’s attorneys had no right to stipulate, and that lack of jurisdiction in the first instance could not be cured by agreement of the parties. We are not convinced that there was a lack of jurisdiction in the first instance, and the briefs submitted have not been helpful in the solution of that problem. It is quite true that parties are bound by the orders of the court unless they are appealed from or otherwise abrogated. However, we know of nothing to prevent the parties, with the approval of the court, from entering into a stipulation to set aside a former order even though it be beyond the time allowed for appeal. It is fair to presume that the Government, at the time of the stipulation, thought that the order of dismissal was erroneous and should be set aside, and when this was done it left the parties in the same position they were in before the motion to dismiss was passed upon, and under these circumstances we think the court had jurisdiction.
A reading of this record convinces us that the court’s findings in every respect were supported by substantial evidence. The appellant contends, however, that the court erred in not finding specifically the exact day on which decedent became totally and permanently disabled. This was not necessary. The court found that he was not totally and permanently disabled at any time until immediately preceding his death, and held that there was no liability. This finding must be construed to mean that there was no total and permanent disability at the time the policy lapsed, and the burden was upon appellant to prove the contrary. That she did not meet this burden is clear, and we cannot disturb the finding.
Judgment affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0