What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SMITH v. KING.
No. 4564.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
June 14, 1932.
E. E. Brindley and F. L. Brewer, both of Richland Center, Wis., for appellant.
O. D. Black, of Richland Center, Wis., for appellee.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.
EVANS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant brought this suit to set aside the transfer of two notes aggregating $1,500, secured by real estate mortgage, because made in violation of section 91, title 12, US CA. Other appropriate relief, ancillary in character, was sought. Appellee denied the existence of any knowledge that the First National Bank of Richland Center was in an insolvent or financially embarrassed condition on the tw’enty-third of November, 1928, when the notes were by her purchased, and asserted the bank’s sale of the notes to her and her payment therefor out of monies on deposit in said bank were in good faith and in the usual course of business.
The court found in favor of appellee on the controverted issues and dismissed the suit. A memorandum accompanied the special findings of fact, which indicated that Judge Luse considered the determining fact issue a close one. He said:
“It may be that these transfers were made to the defendant with intent to prefer her and in contemplation of insolvency. The court would hesitate long before it would find affirmatively that they were not. It is clear that there was little or no change in the information whieh the directors and officers possessed between Friday and Sunday evening. They apparently had no intention of assessing the stockholders and were looking around for some method of temporizing with the necessity therefor placed upon them by the notice of the Comptroller, and delayed formally deciding that the notice meant what it said until Sunday, and then passed the resolution closing the bank. If the evidence disclosed the actual condition of the bank, with which the directors and officers were chargeable with knowledge, probably little difficulty would be encountered in confidently finding the intent with whieh these transfers were made, but in the state of the evidence, after careful consideration of the whole thereof, the court has concluded that an affirmative finding on the'issues requires the indulgence in speculation and suspicion, and the conclusion is that this is one of the eases requiring a so-called “Scotch” verdict of “not proven.” In other words, the evidence falls short df meeting the burden of proof which the law lays upon the plaintiff.”
In reviewing the conclusion thus frankly expressed and the findings of fact whieh the court concurrently made, we shall assume that knowledge on the part of appellee of the insolvency of the bank, or of the intent with which the payment was made, was unnecessary. In other words, if the payment of the money on deposit, or the transaction whereby the bank’s securities were transferred to the depositor in cancellation of a deposit, was in contemplation of insolvency or made with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner prescribed by the statute, or with a view to the preference of one creditor over another, it is voidable. This issue the district judge met squarely. No useful purpose would be served in relating all of the evidence or in discussing all of the inferences whieh logically flowed therefrom. While the facts are not greatly in dispute, they give rise to various deductions, some of which are conflicting, and they vary in their persuasiveness.
In view of the testimony of both appellee and the president of the bank to the effect that the sale of the notes by the bank to ap-pellee was in the ordinary course of business and was not in contemplation of insolvency, and in view of the further testimony given by appellee to the effect that she did not know the bank was insolvent, or even embarrassed financially, our duty to affirm is rather clear. The finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed under such circumstances. Uihlein v. General Electric Co. (C. C. A.) 47 F.(2d) 997, 1001.
The decree is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1