What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James PETIACH, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14992.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Feb. 17, 1966.
Edward L. Garnett, Tampa, Fla., for appellant.
Alfred W. Moellering, U. S. Atty., Joseph F. Eichhom, Asst. U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., Frank J. Violanti, Asst. U. S. Atty., Hammond, Ind., for appellee.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and DUFFY and CASTLE, Circuit Judges.
DUFFY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant is a Jehovah’s Witness. He appeals from a conviction, after a trial before the District Court, for failure to report for civilian work in lieu of induction under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C., App. §§ 451 et seq.
Defendant was baptized in 1951 at the age of fourteen. He claims that at that time he became an “ordained minister” in the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
When defendant registered in 1958 with the Indiana Local Board No. 178, he claimed to be an “Assistant Servant” in his congregation and requested a classification of 4-D, Minister of Religion. The Board classified defendant 1-0, conscientious objector, his present classification.
On this appeal, defendant urges that he made a prima facie case before Board No. 178 for his claim to a ministerial exemption and that the Board’s denial of his claim was arbitrary and capricious.
On February 21, 1961, defendant notified the Board that he had moved to Florida. Local Board No. 178 sent him a current information questionnaire. Included was the question “The job I am now working at is.” His answer was “linotype operator.” He also gave the name of his employer. Board No. 178 then asked defendant to designate the civilian employment he would accept in lieu of induction into the armed forces, but the defendant ignored this question.
Defendant renewed his request for a hearing on his application for a 4-D classification. The Board scheduled a hearing for August 28, 1962, but defendant notified the Board he would be unable to attend, and again renewed his request for a reclassification. In support of his claim for a 4-D classification, Petiach informed the Board that he had been appointed a “ministry school servant” by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The Board refused to reopen the classification question and Petiach was subsequently indicted by the United States government for failure to report for civilian work as ordered by the Board.
The scope of our judicial review is limited. United States v. Parker, 7 Cir., 307 F.2d 585, 587. The relevant question at the trial was whether there was a basis in fact for the classification made by the Board, and if so, whether defendant refused to submit to induction. Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442, 68 S.Ct. 115, 92 L.Ed. 59. There is no dispute here that defendant did refuse to submit to induction.
It is clear that Congress did not intend the ministerial exemption to apply to all of the baptized members of any congregation. The Supreme Court commented on this exemption in Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132, as follows: “The ministerial exemption, as was pointed out in the Senate Report accompanying the 1948 Act, ‘is a narrow one intended for the leaders of the various religious faiths and not for the members generally.’”
Pertinent is a 1965 decision of this Court — United States v. Norris, 341 F.2d 527. In Norris, the defendant was a Jehovah’s Witness. He had been baptized at the age of fourteen. He claimed before the Local and Appeal Boards that he was entitled to the ministerial exemption. He alleged that he was a minister of his congregation and that he spent twenty-eight hours a month training others, twelve hours a month giving public sermons, thirty-two hours a month instructing others, twenty hours a month attending ministry school and twenty hours a month distributing literature.
We said in Norris, that it was for the Board to decide “ * * * whether Norris had sustained his burden of showing that his removal would leave a flock * * * without a shepherd * * * Fitts v. United States, 5 Cir., (1964) 334 F.2d 416; United States v. Stewart, 4 Cir., (1963) 322 F.2d 592.”
In the instant case we hold that the classification made by the Local Board had a basis in fact. Further, that the Local Board did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in denying Petiach’s claim to a ministerial exemption.
It therefore follows that the judgment of conviction must be and is
Affirmed.
. Senate Report No. 1268, 80th Congress, 2nd Sess. dated May 12, 1948, in referring to the ministerial status said “Serious difficulties arose in the administration and enforcement of the 1940 Act because of the claims by members of one particular faith that all of its members were ministers of religion. * * * ”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0