What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Jugraj S. DHALIWAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. WOODS DIVISION, HESSTON CORPORATION; David Schirer; and Michael Dawson, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
Nos. 90-2212, 90-2259, 90-2357.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted March 15, 1991.
Decided April 16, 1991.
Jugraj S. Dhaliwal, pro se.
Henry J. Close, John Rearden, Jr., Connolly, Oliver, Close & Worden, Rockford, Ill., for defendants-appellees, cross-appellants.
Before POSNER, FLAUM, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
This case began as a suit by Mr. Dhali-wal against his former employer, charging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In a conference with the district judge, the parties discussed settlement and came to an oral agreement to settle the case: concretely, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the suit and not seek reinstatement in his job, and the defendants agreed to pay him $12,000. The defendants prepared a written memorial of the agreement and asked the plaintiff to sign it. He refused on the ground that the written agreement included a provision that he not seek future employment with the defendants, a matter that had not been discussed at the settlement conference. The defendants asked the judge to enforce the settlement, and he entered an order directing the parties to comply with all the terms of the written agreement except the one relating to future employment, which he agreed had not been discussed at the settlement conference. Nevertheless he ordered the plaintiff to pay the attorney’s fees that the defendants had incurred in obtaining enforcement of the oral agreement, on the ground that the plaintiff had tried to renege on the agreement in its entirety. The plaintiff appeals from the award of attorney’s fees and also from the judge’s refusal to vacate his judgment enforcing the settlement agreement. The defendants cross-appeal from the judge’s order striking the future-employment provision from their redaction of the settlement agreement.
The plaintiff’s appeals raise no general questions and we are affirming them by unpublished order today. The cross-appeal, however, raises a question of some novelty and importance. The defendants acknowledge that the issue of future employment was not discussed at the settlement conference, but they argue that it is implicit in an agreement not to seek reinstatement in the job from which the plaintiff was (allegedly improperly) fired that he will not apply for any other job with this employer in the future. We have found no cases on this question, although we have some slight reason to believe that settlement agreements in Title VII cases in which reinstatement is not contemplated usually contain both provisions — no reinstatement and no future job application. Kuykendall v. Rockwell International Corp., 27 FEP Cases 805, 807 (C.D.Cal.1979); Barbara Lindemann Schlei & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1526 (1988). The argument that the first implies the second and hence that the second need not be stated separately is that an agreement not to seek reinstatement would be nugatory if the plaintiff were free to apply for a job with the same employer “in the future”; for the future begins tomorrow, and the job could be the same one the plaintiff had just lost.
We disagree. “Reinstatement” means putting the plaintiff back in his old job at the conclusion of the lawsuit. If the settlement agreement contains a no-reinstatement clause but no no-future-employment clause and the day after the agreement is signed the plaintiff applies for his old job and is turned down, the court interpreting the agreement may find that he is seeking reinstatement and therefore should not be heard to complain about being turned down: he waived the right to complain, in the settlement agreement. We say the judge “may,” not that he “must,” so conclude, because it could be argued that so long as the employee is seeking merely the same consideration as other applicants, and not automatic reinstatement to his own job, he really is applying for future employment, not for reinstatement. However this may be, it would be clear that if after some decent lapse of time the plaintiff applied for a different job with the same employer — perhaps it is a vast multinational corporation, and the job he is applying for is in an office ten thousand miles away from the office in which he was working when he was fired — he would not be applying for “reinstatement.” If the employer wants to preclude the possibility, it should negotiate for a separate provision in the settlement agreement. The first case, in contrast, is within a fuzzy area in which an employment application could be characterized as either an application for reinstatement or an application for a new job. But the employer can eliminate the fuzzy area as well by negotiating for separate provisions, rather than relying solely on the no-reinstatement clause to keep the former employee out of its hair.
We have treated the issue as one of general contractual interpretation because the parties have done so. We reiterate earlier expressed doubts that Title VII settlement agreements are in fact covered by general law — federal common law — rather than by state contract law. Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 474-76 (7th Cir.1986); Riley v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 368, 371-73 (7th Cir.1989).
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0