What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Raymond Lee RUST, Appellant.
No. 81-1017.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted May 20, 1981.
Decided June 9, 1981.
Rehearing Denied July 6, 1981.
J. Whitfield Moody, U. S. Atty., Michael A. Jones, Asst. U. S. Atty., Springfield, Mo., for appellee.
John Edward Cash, Bunch, O’Sullivan, Sandifar & Hill, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Before HEANEY, BRIGHT and McMIL-LIAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Raymond Lee Rust was charged in a two-count indictment with attempting to enter a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with intent to commit larceny and with entering the same bank for the same purpose, both in violation of the Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 2113(a). Rust waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted by the district court on both counts. On appeal, Rust argues that the court erred in refusing to suppress certain physical evidence seized after his arrest and in entering judgments of conviction and imposing sentence on both counts of the indictment. We remand with directions to the district court.
I
Rust claims that there was no probable cause for his arrest ahd, therefore, the evidence seized incident to the arrest, without a warrant, should have been suppressed by the district court. The facts, as stipulated, are that the Mindenmines, Missouri, town marshal received a telephone call at about midnight on Sunday, August 3, 1980. The caller informed the marshal that he had just seen two men with flashlights inside the Bank of Minden. The marshal drove to the bank and discovered that the lock cylinder in the bank’s front door had been twisted loose. He walked around to an alley between the bank and a mobile home which was used as an office, and saw Rust seated on the front porch of the mobile home and another man walking back and forth near the porch. When the marshal approached, the two men fled in different directions. As Rust ran, the marshal saw that he was wearing gloves and a full-face ski mask. The marshal ordered Rust to stop and, when he continued to run, he fired a warning shot from his shotgun. After again ordering him to stop, the marshal fired a second shot at Rust. Although he was not struck by the shotgun blast, Rust tripped and fell. The marshal apprehended Rust and searched him, finding a set of lock-picking tools in his pocket and a walkie-talkie in a harness around his body.
There can be no doubt that the above circumstances provided the marshal with probable cause to arrest Rust. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained incident to the arrest.
II
At the conclusion of Rust’s trial, the district court found him guilty as charged on both counts of the indictment. At the sentencing hearing, the court first announced that he would sentence Rust to ten years imprisonment on Count I (attempted entry) and five years on Count II (entry), the sentences to run consecutively. Upon being informed by the Assistant United States Attorney that the consecutive sentences “may be in conflict,” the court sentenced Rust to fifteen years on each count, the sentences to run concurrent with each other. Rust contends that the trial court erred by entering judgments of conviction and imposing sentences on both counts. We agree.
It is clear that a defendant may be charged with committing a completed offense and with attempting to commit the same offense, and those charges may be submitted to the trier of fact if evidence supports both offenses. It is also clear, however, that a defendant may not be convicted of both the attempt and the completed crime, because all the elements of the attempt are included in the completed offense and a dual conviction would amount to double jeopardy. See O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921, 93 S.Ct. 2741, 37 L.Ed.2d 148 (1973). Moreover, it has been held that the Bank Robbery Act permits only one conviction for a single illegal act. See id.; Wright v. United States, 519 F.2d 13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 932, 96 S.Ct. 285, 46 L.Ed.2d 262 (1975). Consequently, the district court erred in entering judgments of conviction against Rust on both counts of the indictment.
Rust asks this Court to vacate the judgment on Count I and direct the district court to sentence him to the original sentence imposed on Count II — five years imprisonment. While we agree that one of the convictions must be vacated, we do not agree that we must limit the district court’s options as Rust proposes. In our view, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing a fifteen-year sentence on a single count, despite his initial decision to sentence Rust to a total of fifteen years on the two counts.
The cause is remanded to the district court with directions to vacate the judgment of conviction on one of the two counts. The judgment of conviction and sentence on the remaining count is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1