What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
McLEOD, Sheriff, et al. v. COOPER.
No. 8114.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 19, 1937.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 1937.
Wm. C. Pierce, W. K. Zewadski, Jr., and John B. Sutton, all of Tampa, Fla., for appellants.
Fred S. Abraham, of Tampa, Fla., for appellee.
Before STBLEY, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Writ of certiorari denied 57 S.Ct. 938, 81 L.Ed. —.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court enjoining an execution sale of the bankrupt’s equitable interest in 18,480 shares of the capital stock of Celo Company of America. The execution was issued upon a judgment in personam against the bankrupt rendered March 24, 1935. The involuntary petition against the judgment debtor was filed July 16, 1934, and his adjudication followed on July 23, 1934.
The lien upon the property seized under execution, having been obtained through legal proceedings against an insolvent person within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, was invalidated by the adjudication under section 67f of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended (11 U.S.C.A. 107(f), unless a lien was obtained by virtue of a writ of garnishment issued by the state court, February 3, 1933, when the suit was filed and writ of garnishment served, which was done more than four months prior to the adjudication in bankruptcy. We think an answer to the single question, whether the equitable interest of the bankrupt in said corporate stock was the subject of garnishment, will be determinative of the case.
The trust agreement, made November 18, 1932, embraced an aggregate of 272,498 shares, and was entered into by the corporation and a number of its shareholders, including the bankrupt. It was to continue for twenty years, but might be dissolved by 65 per cent, of the trustors after two dividends had been paid on the capital stock of the corporation not included in the trust, the right to such priority in payment of dividends being provided for in the agreement. The trustee was given full power for ten years to vote the stock in his own discretion, unless instructed in writing by the owners of 65 per cent, of the stock so held in trust. Certain restrictions were also imposed by the parties upon their respective rights to sell their interests in the corpus of the trust. The trustee issued to the bankrupt, on November 18, 1932, a certificate of ownership of said 18,480 shares.
The action of the state court, based upon certain past-due notes, was commenced on February 3, 1933, and on the same day a writ of garnishment was issued against said corporation and the trustee in said agreement. The former filed no answer, but the latter answered, denying that he was indebted to the plaintiff and stating the facts as they existed with reference to his possession of the stock. This is what a garnishee should do under the Florida practice. Jax Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. South Florida Farms Co., 91 Fla. 593, 109 So. 212, 48 A.L.R. 957.
No judgment of any kind was taken against either garnishee, and the trustee in bankruptcy claims that the judgment creditor thereby waived any lien or priority obtained by means of the writ of garnishment; but we do not find it necessary to discuss this point, because we are satisfied that the bankrupt’s equitable interest in the stock in question was not subjected to any prior claim of the plaintiff by what was done in this instance.
The general rule is that equitable interests of this nature are not subject to garnishment, unless expressly authorized by statute. 28 C.J. 102. This rule is an incident of the very nature of garnishment as being a legal as distinguished from an equitable remedy. 28 C.J. 132. In Williams v. T. R. Sweat & Co., 103 Fla. 461, 137 So. 698, 699, the court held: “Garnishment is legal proceeding, purely statutory, and operation thereof, should not be extended beyond statutory authority.”
The only right given creditors under the Florida statutes to reach stock in a corporation is by attachment or execution. Sections 4533-4539, Compiled General Statutes. The garnishment statute does not specifically cover shares of, or interest in, corporate stock, being limited to “any indebtedness due to the defendant by a third person, and any goods, money, chattels or effects of the defendants in the hands, possession or control of a third person.” Section 5284, Compiled General Laws.
As this stock was not subject to a writ of garnishment against the corporation, a fortiori, the equitable interest of the bankrupt was not subject to such a writ against the trustee in the trust agreement. The latter had no property in his hands which he was required to turn over to the bankrupt. The possibility of future dividends being collected by him was a contingent liability not subject to garnishment. Savings Bank v. Loewe, 242 U.S. 357, 37 S.Ct. 172, 61 L.Ed. 360-362. See, also, Huot, Kelly & Co. v. Ely Candee & Wilder, 17 Fla. 775.
The order of the bankruptcy court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0