What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
B. B. WOODSON, Trustee, Appellant, v. Bernard P. CHAMBERLAIN, Appellee. In the Matter of Sterling R. DECKER.
No. 9028.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 23, 1963.
Decided May 20, 1963.
Bernard P. Chamberlain, pro se, in support of motion.
William S. Aaron, Jr., Charlottesville, Va., in opposition to motion.
Before HAYNSWORTH, BOREMAN and BRYAN, Circuit Judges.
HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judge.
The appellee has moved to docket and dismiss the appeal upon the grounds of complete compliance by the appellant with the judgment below and of an asserted estoppel in pais. We deny the motion.
The appellee, Bernard P. Chamberlain, had sold to the bankrupt, Dr. Sterling Decker, a tract of land for $30,000. Payment of the purchase price was secured in part by bonds, one of which in the face amount of $5,000 is in issue. On this bond, there is recorded an agreement between Chamberlain and Decker that if certain developmental work contemplated by Decker on the land should cost more than $20,000, one-half of the excess should be a credit on the bond. Since this agreement made the ultimate purchase price uncertain, the ten per cent real estate commission could not be finally computed and $500 was deposited in escrow for the purpose of securing payment to the real estate agent of ten per cent of whatever amount ultimately proved to be payable upon the bond. Since the maximum credit could not exceed $5,000 and the maximum reduction of the real estate commission could not exceed the $500 placed in escrow, the remainder of the real estate commission was paid at the time of closing. Chamberlain had a contingent interest in the escrowed funds to the extent that they proved to be in excess of the ultimate amount determined to be due the real estate agent.
The contemplated development of the tract of land was never performed. Decker became interested in another development and subsequently appears to have abandoned this one altogether. Thereafter, he became insolvent and was declared a bankrupt.
In the bankruptcy proceedings Chamberlain filed as a secured creditor upon the $5,000 bond remaining unpaid and which contained the special agreement for the credit in the event the developmental costs exceeded $20,000. The land was sold free of the bond’s lien and the Trustee had funds with which to pay Chamberlain’s preferred claim. The Trustee resisted the claim, however, for, under the special agreement, he contended he was entitled to a credit of' $5,000, the face amount of the bond. He did this on the basis that the developmental work on the land had never been done, but a current estimate of the cost of such work if then undertaken exceeded $30,000.
The Referee found that the Trustee was entitled to the credit he claimed, but the District Judge disagreed, holding that the credit was allowable only if the developmental work had actually been performed with incidental advantage to other lands owned by Chamberlain, and that the credit could not be claimed on a current estimate of the cost of work which had not been done and which now is clearly not to be done. He ordered the Trustee to pay Chamberlain’s claim.
Shortly thereafter, the Trustee paid Chamberlain’s claim. Chamberlain asserts that the Trustee said, at the time, that he was not going to1 appeal from the order of the District Court, and it does appear that Chamberlain then thought that the controversy was finally settled, for he then released to the real estate agent the $500 held in escrow. The Trustee asserts, however, that he did not make any commitment about an appeal, and on this motion we have no means to resolve the factual conflict between the parties.
Since there was no undisputed agreement not to appeal, we have then only the fact of the Trustee’s payment of the judgment and Chamberlain’s subsequent release of the escrowed funds.
The usual rule in the federal courts is that payment of a judgment does not foreclose an appeal. Unless there is some contemporaneous agreement not to appeal, implicit in a compromise of the claim after judgment, and so long as, upon reversal, restitution can be enforced, payment of the judgment does not make the controversy moot.
Chamberlain contends, however, that his release to the real estate agent of the $500 placed in escrow has created an estoppel in pais which ought to foreclose the Trustee’s right of appeal. As indicated above, however, we have no basis for a finding upon the present record as to whether or not and to what extent the Trustee was responsible for Chamberlain’s assumption or opinion that the controversy was ended by the Trustee’s payment of the judgment. Nor do we think that the release of the escrowed funds was such an additional circumstance as to avoid the general rule that payment of a judgment does not foreclose a subsequent appeal. Doubtless, if the Trustee led Chamberlain reasonably to believe that the controversy was ended and thus unconditionally to release the $500 in escrow, and if it should ultimately eventuate the unconditional release of the escrowed funds resulted in an overpayment of real estate commissions, the loss arising out of the overpayment should fall upon the Trustee and not upon ■Chamberlain, but that is a matter which can be subsequently determined and adjusted. In the meanwhile, Chamberlain’s risk of possible loss, not exceeding $500 by reason of a speculative overpayment of the real estate commission, •ought not to foreclose the Trustee’s right of appeal of his claimed entitlement to a •credit of $5,000, when Chamberlain’s loss, if any eventuates, is subject to ■equitable adjustment if the Trustee is found to be responsible for it.
For the foregoing reasons, Chamberlain’s motion to docket and dismiss is •denied and the Trustee’s appeal will be •docketed in its regular order.
Motion denied.
. Cahill v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 351 U.S. 183, 76 S.Ct. 758, 100 L.Ed. 1075; Dakota County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222, 224, 5 S.Ct. 428, 28 L.Ed. 981; Ferrell v. Trailmobile, Inc., 5 Cir., 223 F.2d 697; 698; Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 8 Cir., 150 F.2d 394, 397-398; Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 91 F.2d 141; Luedinghaus Lumber Co. v. Luedinghaus, 9 Cir., 299 F. 111; Josevig-Kennecott Copper Co. v. James F. Howarth Co., 9 Cir., 261 F. 567; Hoogendorn v. Daniel, 9 Cir., 202 F. 431; Leader Clothing Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 10 Cir., 227 F.2d 574.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0