What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Michael MAROLF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 92-1381.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 13, 1992.
Decided Dec. 11, 1992.
John A. Bowman, Davenport, I A, argued, for plaintiff-appellant.
Janet Braggs, Kansas City, MO, argued (Gene W. Shepard and Christopher D. Ha-gen, Des Moines, IA, and Frank V. Smith, III, and Mary Day Purcell, Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, LOKEN, Circuit Judge, and ROSENBAUM, District Judge.
The HONORABLE JAMES M. ROSENBAUM, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Michael R. Marolf appeals the district court judgment affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny Social Security disability benefits. The issue is whether Marolf proved that he has a medically determinable seizure disorder. We affirm.
Marolf, a radio and computer repairman, filed his application for disability benefits in May 1988, claiming that he became disabled on November 1, 1987 (later amended to October 1, 1987), because persistent though minor blackouts and seizures had left him unable to drive a car or work on electronic equipment. At the administrative hearing, Marolf testified that he has no physical or mental impairments other than the blackouts. Marolf s wife testified that he has numerous, short-term blackouts and seizures while awake and asleep:
He has — well, what we call his blackouts where he goes totally out and does his jerking, or he has conscious blackouts where he’s awake and talking and he won’t remember what he’s done.
Marolf testified that he has no recollection of the blackouts but knows he has them from what his wife tells him.
Extensive medical study and treatment have failed to determine the cause of Ma-rolf’s condition. An initial electroencephalogram (EEG) showed a possible abnormality, and his treating physician placed Marolf on anti-seizure medication. When he complained of continuing seizures, Marolf was then extensively evaluated at the Mayo Clinic. The prior EEG was reviewed by a Mayo Clinic neurologist who determined that the observed data “do not represent potentially epileptogenic activity.” Prolonged EEG investigation, neurological evaluation, and an MRI scan at the Clinic proved normal. No sleep disorder was found, and Marolf’s medications were eliminated without causing problems. A Mayo Clinic physician concluded: “the current EEG confirms the clinical suspicion that the seizures are likely nonepileptic psychogenic or stress related seizures.”
After thoroughly reviewing this extensive medical evidence, the administrative law judge denied disability benefits because Marolf “has failed to show the existence of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” The ALJ explained:
This is not a case where the objective evidence does not support subjective complaints. It is one where, time and time again, the subjective complaints of blackouts have been refuted by the objective medical evidence and have been proved conclusively wrong. Moreover, investigation of a possible psychological etiology for the claimant’s “blackouts” has not disclosed the existence of a mental impairment_ [A treating physician’s] prescription of anti-convulsant medications [was] apparently based on the statements of the claimant and his wife and not on any objective findings. The ... initial [EEG] tests were reviewed by a team of specialists at the Mayo Clinic and, although these tests were considered minimally abnormal by local physicians, this team of specialists in Rochester found them to be completely within normal limits. The claimant has undergone video, sleep, awake, ambulatory, nighttime, and every other possible combination of testing, with no abnormalities recorded.
The Secretary’s Appeals Council denied review of the AU’s adverse determination, the district court affirmed the Secretary’s denial of benefits, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Marolf argues that the AU improperly rejected the subjective testimony of Marolf and his wife as to the seizures and blackouts, citing our cases dealing with pain credibility findings, such as Penn v. Sullivan, 896 F.2d 313 (8th Cir.1990). However, in those cases, the claimants had medically determinable impairments; the question was the extent to which subjective complaints of pain would be used in determining the severity of those impairments and their impact on the claimants’ ability to work. Here, on the other hand, the question is whether Marolf has a medically determinable impairment.
The statute defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity [for at least twelve months] by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A medically determinable impairment is one “that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.-1527(a)(1). In 1984, Congress expressly provided that a claimant’s testimony cannot, by itself, satisfy this medical component of the statutory standard:
An individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment ... which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged....
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). Although this amendment expired of its own terms on January 1,1987, it was intended to codify a regulation that is still in effect. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Bates v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir.1990) (Wright & Wallace, JJ., concurring). Thus, proof of a disabling impairment must be supported by at least some objective medical evidence. See Moothart v. Bowen, 934 F.2d 114,116-17 (7th Cir.1991); Elam v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214-16 (11th Cir.1991).
After careful review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the AU’s conclusion that Marolf failed to prove a medically determinable impairment. We have no doubt that epileptic seizures, both major and minor, can be medically determinable disabling impairments. See, e.g., Braswell v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 531, 532 (8th Cir.1984) (medically diagnosed “post operative brain surgery epilepsy”), and Bradley v. Bowen, 660 F.Supp. 276, 280 (W.D.Ark.1987) (physician witnesses linked “calcifications and lesions in the right hemisphere” of claimant’s brain to her seizures). Indeed, in carefully defined situations, such disorders are presumptively disabling “listed impairments.” See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1, §§ 11.02, 11.03. Here, on the other hand, the AU found that extensive medical evidence — the “clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” mandated by statute — refutes the existence of the seizure impairment that Marolf and his wife described by symptom.
Because substantial evidence supports the AU’s finding that Marolf does not suffer from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, the Secretary’s decision denying Social Security disability benefits must be affirmed.
. The HONORABLE HAROLD D. VIETOR, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0