What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William C. BARNES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. REDERI A/B FREDRIKA, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, and ATLANTIC & GULF STEVEDORES, INC., Third-Party Defendant, Appellees.
No. 9939.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued July 1, 1965.
Decided Sept 9, 1965.
C. Arthur Rutter, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (Gerald Rubinger and Amato, Babalas, Breit, Cohen, Rutter & Friedman, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant.
Charles R. Dalton, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (Peter W. Rowe and Seawell, McCoy, Winston & Dalton, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellee Rederi A/B Fredrika.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BRYAN and BELL, Circuit Judges.
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
Unseaworthiness, the basis of his unsuccessful action for injuries suffered aboard the MS Dorotea, longshoreman Barnes contends, was erroneously submitted to the jury by the District Judge when he charged that:
“Under the Maritime Law there is absolute and continuing duty on the part of the defendant, as owners of the vessel, to provide, maintain, and warrant that ship’s equipment and gear aboard the vessel are reasonably safe in the area where the plaintiff may reasonably be expected to go.
*«•#***
“If you believe from the evidence that the absence of hatch boards on the number five hatch, or the lighting conditions in and around the immediate area of the number five hold, ’tween deck level, or lack of stanchions around number five hatch, or the clearance between the stacked cargo and hatch square number four hold, ’tween deck level, were in any way in whole or in part unsafe, then the ship was unseaworthy. And if you believe that as a proximate result thereof the plaintiff became injured, at a place where the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to go, then the defendant is liable to the plaintiff.
******
“We will now turn to the defense, as asserted by the shipowner. The shipowner owes the longshoreman-the duty to provide him with a reasonably safe place in which to discharge his work. But such duty is confined to those parts of the ship to which longshoremen may reasonably be expected to go.
“To determine whether the shipowner should have reasonably anticipated Barnes would go into number five ’tween deck, you may consider proximity or lack of proximity to the work area, and Barnes’ reasons for being there. And if the shipowner could not reasonably have anticipated Barnes would go to the point where he was injured, then warranty of seaworthiness did not extend to Barnes in that area, and you must find for the defendant.” (Accent added.)
Barnes’ exceptions run to the portions we have emphasized. His claim of negligence was voluntarily relinquished.
Barnes’ argument is that the warranty of seaworthiness was not limited in area but extended to and protected him throughout the entire vessel; that the absence of the hatch boards constituted unseaworthiness as a matter of law; and therefore he was entitled to a peremptory charge of the ship’s unseaworthiness, the submission of the question to the jury being error. We think not, and affirm the judgment of the District Court upholding the verdict in favor of the shipowner, defendant-appellee Rederi A/B Fredrika.
Employed by a stevedore in the discharge of general cargo from the Dorotea, while docked in Hampton Roads, Virginia, William C. Barnes was working with others at No. 4 hold. Near the end of the day certain bales of wool were discovered to have been unloaded through mistake. Barnes’ gang was ordered to reload them upon the ’tween deck, just forward of No. 4 hold.
The hatch of No. 5 hold, immediately aft of No. 4, had been closed at the weather deck. There was no bulkhead or other fixed separation of the two holds at the ’tween level. In lieu, cargo had been piled athwartships between them to a height of 4 or 5 feet, for about 6 feet in thickness. This wall of cargo extended, at each end, to within 2 or 3 feet of the ship’s hull. Between the cargo-wall and the coaming around the squares of the holds, there was approximately 3 feet for passage.
Barnes had not worked in the No. 5 area that day, and the re-stowing required neither access to nor any use of it whatsoever. A few minutes before Barnes’ ill-fortune, pier superintendent Riley had gone part way down the ’tween deck ladder, on the fore side of No. 5, while looking for a reportedly missing stowage of canned beef. He found it stacked in the No. 5 ’tween deck side of the cargo-wall near the ladder. None of it had been disturbed. The hold was dark and unlighted. It was covered at the ’tween deck with hatch boards, several of which had been set aside at the ladder and an opening into the lower hold thus created. Barnes was then engaged forward of No. 4 on the ’tween deck.
After the search Riley left the area. Very shortly, upon hearing the report of a fall in No. 5, he went to the weather deck where rescuers had opened No. 5 hatch. He could see Barnes lying at the foot of the ladder in the lower part of the hold. Cartons of the canned meat on the ’tween deck had been broken open, with several cans spread about on the deck. The ladder and the point of the missing boards in No. 5 were approximately 40 feet from where Barnes and his companions had been working.
No mistake is perceived in the Court’s submission of the issue of unseaworthiness. Confining the duty of maintaining a seaworthy vessel to the reasonable scope of the longshoreman’s activity is logical and correct in principle. Fully acknowledged as an obligee of the ship’s duty, nevertheless the longshoreman’s due should not exceed the need for his protection as measured by his function on the vessel. He is not subject to momentary orders, as is a crewman, to any part of the vessel whatsoever, and his presence at a location unconnected with his task is not to be anticipated.
The legal soundness of this proposition was explicitly recognized in Calderola v. Cunard S.S. Co., 279 F.2d 475, 477 (2 Cir. 1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 884, 81 S.Ct. 172, 5 L.Ed.2d 104 where this was said:
“ * * * [A] shipowner’s duty to provide stevedores with a reasonably safe place to work is ‘confined to those parts of the ship to which the [stevedore] * * * may reasonably be expected to go. * * * ’ ”
This language was borrowed from Lauricella v. United States, 185 F.2d 327 (2 Cir. 1950), which admittedly was a negligence case, but the Second Circuit’s adoption of this statement in an unseaworthiness ease gives it pertinency here.
Therefore, the pivotal questions presently were, first, whether the absence of the hatch boards created an unseaworthy condition, next whether it caused his fall and, thirdly, within what space longshoreman Barnes was warranted seaworthiness. In the disputed circumstances, obviously these were factual issues. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 98, 64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944); cf. Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113, 127 (4 Cir. 1964). The jury was left entirely free to decide them, circumscribed only by the evidence it accredited. The verdict went against Barnes on all questions, and certainly the findings were not without support.
The District Judge, overcautiously we think, told the jury it could not consider whether Barnes had been stealing beef. Evidence on this point was admissible and relevant to establish, if only by inference, that Barnes had not gone around the cargo-bulkhead in his work but, instead, piratically. As the evidence was excluded and the error favored Barnes, the ruling does not enter into our decision.
The judgment of the District Court will be
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1