What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FRANKLIN v. FRANKLIN.
No. 9706.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 10, 1948.
Decided Sept. 28, 1948.
Mr. Henry J. Siegman, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. John J. O’Brien, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. John Alexander, of Washington, D. G, with whom Mr. Raymond Neudecker, of Washington, D. G, was on the brief, for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, CLARK, and WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judges.
EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.
In 1934, in a suit brought by appellant against her husband, the appellee, the District Court awarded her the custody of their minor children and ordered him to pay her $50 a month “as maintenance for herself and the minor children.” Twelve years later, in 1946, she moved in the same suit to adjudge him in contempt and for a money judgment fo'r accumulated arrears. After a hearing on this motion the court found “(a) That the defendant, John W. Franklin, ceased his payments to the plaintiff December 1, 1942, after the plaintiff, Bessie E. Franklin, advised him that she would accept no more payments addressed to her under, the name of Bessie E. Franklin. (b) That the plaintiff, Bessie E. Franklin, in 1938, 1939 and 1940 openly lived with one, James I. Stansberry, by whom she had a child still born on July 26th, 1939. (c) That since the year 1938 the plaintiff has gone by the name of Mrs. Bessie E. Stansberry, under which name she is now living and known, (d) That the, plaintiff made no effort to collect the maintenance previously ordered from December 9, 1941 until November 7, 1946. (e) That all of the children of the parties have been emancipated by age, marriage, or employment, except June Franklin, who was seventeen years of age in September, 1946, and who is unemployed and residing with the plaintiff.”
The evidence supports these findings. It shows, also, that appellant’s conduct in the presence of the children made her unfit for their custody. Some of them left her during their minority and lived with appellee, who contributed directly to their support. Appellant told appellee he need pay her no more money.
The court held that appellant was guilty of laches, and also that she was “estopped ■to seek any further assistance from a court of equity by reason of her direct representation to the defendant upon which he relied and her conduct in general.” It found that appellee was not in contempt. He had filed a cross-complaint asking a divorce on the ground of appellant’s adultery. This the court granted. It ordered appellee to pay appellant $25 a month, beginning June 1, 1947, for maintenance of the daughter who was still a minor.
It did not require appellee to pay accrued arrears of maintenance under the 1934 order. The question is whether this was error. We think not. Before and also after the passage of the maintenance statute, D.C.Code 1940, § 16 — 415, 31 Stat. 1346, § 980, suits for maintenance have been regarded in the District of Columbia as equitable rather than legal. The court exercised the discretion of a court of equity. In 1946, when the present motion was filed, the purpose of the accrued installments could no longer be accomplished since it was to provide support for appellant and the children between 1942 and 1946. And an unfair burden would be imposed upon áppellee if, after he had contributed directly to the support of the children and had otherwise acted in accordance with appellant’s assurance that she wanted no money from him, he were now to be required to pay her a large accumulation of arrears. Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 16 L.Ed. 226, and Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 682, 54 L.Ed. 905, 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 1068, 20 Ann.Cas. 1061, do not hold that a court which formerly issued an order for maintenance or the like must, regardless of equity and good conscience, enforce payment of accrued installments years later. Those cases and Phillips v. Kepler, 47 App.D.C. 384, hold only that other courts should enforce such payment if the court that issued the order would do so. So far as Caffrey v. Caffrey, 55 App.D.C. 285, 4 F.2d 952, Biscayne Trust Co. v. American Security & Trust Co., 57 App.D. C. 251, 20 F.2d 267, and Lockwood v. Lockwood, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 160 F.2d 923, imply that the issuing court lacks authority to apply equitable principles when asked to enforce payment of accrued installments under its own order, those cases rest on a misunderstanding of the earlier cases and should be overruled. “The power of the court of equity to adapt its remedial relief to existing conditions and circumstances should not be curtailed.” Affirmed.
Tolman v. Tolman, 1 App.D.C. 299; Lesh v. Lesh, 21 App.D.C. 475; Bernsdorff v. Bernsdorff, 26 App.D.C. 520; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 36 App.D.C. 261.
Cf. Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 21 S.Ct. 555, 45 L.Ed. 810.
A number of cases in other jurisdictions seem to take that view.
Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 15 A.2d 914, 919. Ex parte Jeter, 193 S.C. 278, 8 S.E.2d 490; Kumlin v. Kumlin, 200 Minn. 26, 273 N.W. 253; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 233 Ala. 125, 170 So. 198, 200. Cf. Tolman v. Leonard, 6 App.D.C. 224, 233; Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App.D. C. 334, 352, 45 L.R.A. 806; Wochler v. Wochler, 107 Mont. 69, 81 P.2d 344; Duffy v. Duffy, 19 A.2d 236, 19 N.J. Misc. 332.
1 “After a decree of divorce in any ease granting alimony and providing for the care and custody of children, the case shall still be considered open for any future orders in those respects. (Mar. 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1346, ch. 854, § 978.)”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1