What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GOLD KIST, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, John R. Block, Secretary, Agricultural Stabilization & Conservation Service, Merrill D. Marxman and Commodity Credit Corporation, Defendants-Appel-lees.
No. 83-8386.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 28, 1985.
Franklin R. Nix, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
Myles Eastwood, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
(Opinion Sept. 6, 1984, 11 Cir., 1984, 741 F.2d 344).
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, HILL and THORNBERRY, Circuit Judges.
The portions of this opinion which amend the original opinion, found at 741 F.2d 344, were incorporated therein for bound volume.
Honorable Homer Thornberry, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
GODBOLD, Chief Judge:
On petition for rehearing the government contends that the following paragraph of the court’s opinion, Gold Kist, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 741 F.2d 344, 348-49 (11th Cir.1984), is incorrect:
Besides relying on the Secretary’s inherent authority to impose administrative sanctions, the Secretary also asserts that Gold Kist’s introduction into the domestic market of additional peanuts without first obtaining substitution credits is a violation of section 1359(g), which specifically authorizes imposition of marketing penalties. However, Gold Kist was never charged with having violated section 1359(g) or its companion regulations, 7 C.F.R. §§ 1446.8(a), 1446.9(d), both of which involve the handling and disposition of additional peanuts.
Gold Kist doggedly insists that it was not “charged” with violating § 1359(g) because, although there may have been references to this subsection, it was not charged with engaging in conduct that would constitute a violation. Assuming that Gold Kist was sufficiently “charged,” we find that it did not violate § 1359(g).
Former section 1359(g) provided as follows:
Upon a finding by the Secretary that the peanuts marketed from any crop for domestic edible use by a handler are larger in quantity or higher in grade or quality than the peanuts that could reasonably be produced from the quantity of peanuts having the grade, kernel content, and quality of the quota peanuts acquired by such handler from such crop for such marketing, such handler shall be subject to a penalty equal to 120 per centum of the loan level for quota peanuts on the quantity of peanuts that the Secretary determines are in excess of the quantity, grade, or quality of the peanuts that could reasonably have been produced from the peanuts so acquired.
Gold Kist contends that it did not violate this provision because, even though it mistakenly sold additional peanuts into the domestic market, it “had previously exported quota peanuts identical in type, grade, and screen size to those additional peanuts substituted into the domestic market.” Therefore it had “ample ‘substitution credits’ to cover all of the sales of inadvertently miscoded, additional peanuts into the domestic market.” Response to Petition for Rehearing at 5.
The government contends that the U.S. Department of Agriculture interprets § 1359(a) to mean that “quota peanuts exported simply reduce the total number of quota peanuts that can be sold in the domestic edible market until such time as the handler actually receives an approval, and at that time they become substitution peanuts____” Reply Brief on Petition for Rehearing at 7.
We cannot accept the government’s interpretation. U.S. v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 2155, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977). Assuming, as the government implicitly does, that the grade and quality requirements of § 1359(g) have not been violated, the question is whether Gold Kist marketed peanuts “larger in quantity ... than the peanuts that could reasonably be produced from the quantity of ... quota peanuts acquired by [the] handler from [the] crop for such marketing____” 7 U.S.C. § 1359(g). Thus the quantity that cannot be exceeded is calculated with reference to the quantity of quota peanuts “acquired ... for such marketing.” The statute cannot be construed to reduce this quantity because some portion of the quota peanuts so acquired are thereafter exported.
We delete from our opinion the sentence: However, Gold Kist was never charged with having violated section 1359(g) or its companion regulations, 7 C.F.R. §§ 1446.8(a), 1446.9(d), both of which involve the handling and disposition of additional peanuts.
and in lieu thereof substitute the following:
Assuming that Gold Kist was charged with having violated § 1359(g) or its companion regulations, 7 C.F.R. §§ 1446.8(a), 1446.9(d), both of which involve the handling and disposition of additional peanuts, it did not commit a violation thereof.
In all other respects the Petition for Rehearing is DENIED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1