What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al. v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.
No. 395.
Argued February 27-28, 1951.
Decided May 21, 1951.
By special leave of Court, Merton Roland Nachman, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, pro hac vice, and Richard T. Rives argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief was Si Garrett, Attorney General. A. A. Carmichael, then Attorney General, and Wallace L. Johnson, then Assistant Attorney General, were also on a brief with Mr. Rives.
Charles Clark argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Marion Rushton, Earl E. Eisenhart, Jr., Sidney S. Alderman and Jos. F. Johnston.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Southern Railway Company, appellee, brought this action in the Federal District Court to enjoin the members of the Alabama Public Service Commission and the Attorney General of Alabama, appellants, from enforcing laws of Alabama prohibiting discontinuance of certain railroad passenger service. Appellee’s Alabama intrastate service is governed by a statute prohibiting abandonment of “any portion of its service to the public . . . unless and until there shall first have been filed an application for a permit to abandon service and obtained from the commission a permit allowing such abandonment.” Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, i 106. Severe penalties are prescribed for wilful violation of regulatory statutes or orders of the Commission by utilities or their employees. Id. §§ 399, 400, 405.
Appellee operates a railroad system throughout the South. This case, however, involves only that Alabama intrastate passenger service furnished by trains Nos. 7 and 8 operated daily between Tuscumbia, Alabama, and Chattanooga, Tennessee, a distance of approximately 145 miles mainly within Alabama. On September 13, 1948, appellee applied to the Alabama Public Service Commission for permission to discontinue trains Nos. 7 and 8, alleging that public use of the service had so declined that revenues fell far short of meeting direct operating expenses. After hearing evidence at Huntsville, Alabama, one of the communities served by the trains, the Commission entered an order on April 3, 1950, denying permission to discontinue on the grounds that there exists a public need for the service and that appellee had not attempted to reduce losses through adoption of more economical operating methods.
Instead of pursuing its right of appeal to the state courts, appellee filed a complaint in the United States District Court alleging diversity of citizenship and that requiring continued operation of trains Nos. 7 and 8 at an out-of-pocket loss amounted to a confiscation of its property in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Injunctive relief was prayed to protect appellee from irreparable loss, flowing on the one hand from operating losses in complying with Alabama law or, on the other, from severe penalties for discontinuance of service in the face of that law. A three-judge court heard evidence, made its own findings of fact and entered judgment holding the Commission order void and permanently enjoining appellants from taking any steps to enforce either the Commission order or the penalty provisions of the Alabama Code in relation to the discontinuance of trains Nos. 7 and 8. 91 F. Supp. 980 (1950). The case is properly here on appeal, 28 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 1253.
Federal jurisdiction in this case is grounded upon diversity of citizenship as well as the allegation of a federal question. Exercise of that jurisdiction does not involve construction of a state statute so ill-defined that a federal court should hold the case pending a definitive construction of that statute in the state courts, e. g., Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941); Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U. S. 321 (1950). We also put to one side those cases in which the constitutionality of a state statute itself is drawn into question, e. g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 (1948). For in this case appellee attacks a state administrative order issued under a valid regulatory statute designed to assure the provision of adequate intrastate service by utilities operating within Alabama.
Appellee takes the position, adopted by the court below, that whenever a plaintiff can show irreparable loss caused by an allegedly invalid state administrative order ripe for judicial review in the state courts the presence of diversity of citizenship or a federal question opens the federal courts to litigation as to the validity of that order, at least so long as no action involving the same subject matter is actually pending in the state courts. But, it by-no means follows from the fact of district court jurisdiction that such jurisdiction must be exercised in this case. As framed by the Court in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 318 (1943), the question before us is:
“Assuming that the federal district court had jurisdiction, should it, as a matter of sound equitable discretion, have declined to exercise that jurisdiction here?”
In assessing the propriety of equitable relief, a review of the regulatory problem involved in this case is appropriate.
Appellee conducts an interstate business over the same tracks and by means of the same trains involved in this case, and such interstate activities are regulated by the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. But, it has long been held that this interblending of the interstate and intrastate operations does not deprive the states of their primary authority over intrastate transportation in the absence of congressional action supplementing that authority. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913). And Congress has since provided:
“That nothing in [the Interstate Commerce Act] shall impair or affect the right of a State, in the exercise of its police power, to require just and reasonable freight and passenger service for intrastate business, except insofar as such requirement is inconsistent with any lawful order of the [Interstate Commerce Commission].” 49 U. S. C. § 1 (17) (a).
This Court has held that regulation of intrastate railroad service is “primarily the concern of the state.” North Carolina v. United States, 325 U. S. 507, 511 (1945) (rates); Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79 (1939) (discontinuance of local service).
State and federal regulatory agencies have expressed concern over the chronic deficit arising out of passenger train operations as a threat to the financial security of the American railroads and have recommended drastic action to minimize the deficit, including the discontinuance of unpatronized and unprofitable service. However, our concern in this case is limited to the propriety of a federal court injunction enjoining enforcement of a state regulatory order.
The court below justified the exercise of its jurisdiction with a finding that continued operation of trains Nos. 7 and 8 would result in confiscation of appellee’s property-in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In pursuing the threshold inquiry whether a federal court should exercise jurisdiction in this case, we find it unnecessary to consider issues relating to the merits of appellee’s case, issues which appellants did not see fit to raise in this Court either in their Statement of Jurisdiction or in their briefs. We do note that in passing upon similar contentions in the past, this Court has recognized that review of an order requiring performance of a particular utility service, even at a pecuniary loss, is subject to considerations quite different from those involved when the return on the entire intrastate operations of a utility is drawn into question. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corporation Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 24—27 (1907). The problems raised by the discontinuance of trains Nos. 7 and 8 cannot be resolved alone by reference to appellee’s loss in their operation but depend more upon the predominantly local factor of public need for the service rendered. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 242 U. S. 603, 608 (1917).
The Alabama Commission, after a hearing held in the area served, found a public need for the service. The court below, hearing evidence de novo, found that no public necessity exists in view of the increased use and availability of motor transportation. We do not attempt to resolve these inconsistent findings of fact. We take note, however, of the fact that a federal court has been asked to intervene in resolving the essentially local problem of balancing the loss to the railroad from continued operation of trains Nos. 7 and 8 with the public need for that service in Tuscumbia, Decatur, Huntsville, Scottsboro, and the other Alabama communities directly-affected.
Not only has Alabama established its Public Service Commission to pass upon a proposed discontinuance of intrastate transportation service, but it has also provided for appeal from any final order of the Commission to the circuit court of Montgomery County as a matter of right. Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, § 79. That court, after a hearing on the record certified by the Commission, is empowered to set aside any Commission order found to be contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law, id. § 82, and its decision may be appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. § 90. Statutory appeal from an order of the Commission is an integral part of the regulatory process under the Alabama Code. Appeals, concentrated in one circuit court, are “supervisory in character.” Avery Freight Lines, Inc. v. White, 245 Ala. 618, 622-623, 18 So. 2d 394, 398 (1944). The Supreme Court of Alabama has held that it will review an order of the Commission as if appealed directly to it, Alabama Public Service Commission v. Nunis, 252 Ala. 30, 34, 39 So. 2d 409, 412 (1949), and that judicial review calls for an independent judgment as to both law and facts when a denial of due process is asserted. Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 253 Ala. 1, 11-12, 42 So. 2d 655, 662 (1949).
The fact that review in the Alabama courts is limited to the record taken before the Commission presents no constitutional infirmity. Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 (1912). And, whatever the scope of review of Commission findings when an alleged denial of constitutional rights is in issue, it is now settled that a utility has no right to relitigate factual questions on the ground that constitutional rights are involved. New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 334-336 (1947); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 576 (1941). Appellee complains of irreparable injury resulting from the Commission order pending judicial review, but has not invoked the protective powers of the Alabama courts to direct the stay or supersedeas of a Commission order pending appeal. Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, §§ 81, 84. Appellee has not shown that the Alabama procedure for review of Commission orders is in any way inadequate to preserve for ultimate review in this Court any federal questions arising out of such orders.
As adequate state court review of an administrative order based upon predominantly local factors is available to appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary for the protection of federal rights. Equitable relief may be granted only when the District Court, in its sound discretion exercised with the “scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the federal courts,” is convinced that the asserted federal right cannot be preserved except by granting the “extraordinary relief of an injunction in the federal courts.” Considering that “[f]ew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies,” the usual rule of comity must govern the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the District Court in this case. Whatever rights appellee may have are to be pursued through the state courts. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 577 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940).
The Johnson Act, 48 Stat. 775 (1934), now 28 U. S. C. (Supp. III) § 1342, does not affect the result in this case. That Act deprived federal district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of certain state administrative orders affecting public utility rates where “A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” As the order of the Alabama Service Commission involved in this case is not one affecting appellee’s rates, the Johnson Act is not applicable. We have assumed throughout this opinion that the court below had jurisdiction, supra, p. 345, but hold that jurisdiction should not be exercised in this case as a matter of sound equitable discretion. As this Court held in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297-298 (1943):
“This withholding of extraordinary relief by courts having authority to give it is not a denial of the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred on the federal courts .... On the contrary, it is but a recognition . . . that a federal court of equity . . . should stay its hand in the public interest when it reasonably appears that private interests will not suffer. . . .
“It is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power to grant or withhold relief so as to avoid needless obstruction of the domestic policy of the states.”
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
Upon the filing of an application for permission to discontinue, the statute provides for notification of municipal officials, publication of notice in the area affected by the change in service, and a hearing by the Commission. Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, § 107. “The commission, as it deems to the best interest of the public, may grant in part or in whole, or may refuse such applications, . . . .” Id. § 108.
Ala. Code, 1940, tit. 48, §§ 79 et seq.
Under 28 U. S. C. (Supp. III) §2281, only a district court of three judges may issue an injunction restraining enforcement of “any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes . . . .” The word “statute” comprehends all state legislative enactments, including those expressed through administrative orders. American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 591-593 (1946); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290, 292 (1923).
Appellants contend for the first time in this Court that a suit to restrain state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state laws is, in effect, a suit against the state prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. The contention is not tenable in view of the many cases prior to and following Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which this Court has granted such relief over the same objection.
The Alabama statute requiring application for a permit from the Alabama Public Service Commission before discontinuing transportation service was upheld by this Court in St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 279 U. S. 560 (1929). The statute was recently construed and applied by the Alabama Supreme Court in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 253 Ala. 559, 45 So. 2d 449 (1950).
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 504-505 (1947); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 297 (1943); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 570 (1939); Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 422-423 (1932).
Appellee seeks to discontinue only two of several passenger trains serving the same communities. This is a proposed partial discontinuance and not an abandonment over which the Interstate Commerce Commission is given exclusive authority under 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (18-20). Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926). The I. C. C. has held that it has no authority under 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 (18-20) to authorize a partial discontinuance as such of intrastate passenger service. Kansas City Southern R. Co., 94 I. C. C. 691 (1925); New York Central R. Co., 254 I. C. C. 745, 765 (1944).
See 64th Annual Report, Interstate Commerce Commission (1950) 5-6; 63d Annual Report, Interstate Commerce Commission (1949) 4 — 5; Increased Freight Rates, 194-8, 276 I. C. C. 9, 32-40 (1949); Proceedings, 61st Annual Convention, National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners (1949) 378-382, 410-414.
As the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under 49 U. S. C. § 13 (4) has not been invoked for decision as to whether the continuance of this intrastate service constitutes an undue discrimination against interstate commerce, we cannot, in this proceeding, consider any impact the order of the Alabama Public Service Commission might have on interstate commerce. Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 267 U. S. 493 (1925), and cases cited therein.
Compare Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196 (1924), where supersedeas was not available to adequately protect federal rights, and Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U. S. 290 (1923), where supersedeas was sought but denied by the state court.
Compare such cases as Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U. S. 134 (1914), where State judicial review procedures plus review in this Court were thought to be inadequate. This inadequacy derived from the rationale that the federal right of a utility to be protected from confiscation of its property depended upon “pure matters of fact” to the extent that a de novo hearing of such facts in a federal court was essential to the protection of constitutional rights. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U. S. 210, 228 (1908). See Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 379,424 (1930). The decisions in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 576 (1941), and New York v. United States, supra, holding that due process does not require relitigation of factual matters determined by an administrative body, eliminated the premise upon which equitable relief in Bacon rested.
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 (1932). See Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 185 (1935).
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940).
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941).
In Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 237 (1943), the Court sustained the exercise of jurisdiction by a federal court in a case involving matters of state law, but only where decision “does not require the federal court to determine or shape state policy governing administrative agencies” and “entails no interference with such agencies or with the state courts.” The absence of a legal remedy in the federal courts does not of itself justify the granting of equitable relief in such cases. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 569-570 (1939).

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 116