What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LAL, Amrit, Appellant, v. CBS, INC.
No. 83-1103.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) Jan. 12, 1984.
Decided Jan. 19, 1984.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Feb. 17, 1984.
Eugene A. Steger, Jr., Steger & Howell, Ltd., Kennett Square, Pa., for appellant.
James D. Crawford, Kenneth A. Jacob-sen, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before ALDISERT, HIGGINBOTHAM and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal in a diversity action for defamation (Count I) and trespass (Count II), arising out of the production and publication of a news report aired by the defendant, CBS, Inc. (CBS), through WCAU-TV, a station operated by CBS in Philadelphia. The district court granted CBS’ motion for summary judgment as to Count II and, at the close of all the evidence, directed a verdict for CBS as to Count I. Plaintiff appeals from both orders of the district court, as well as from the court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to compel production of the notes and tapes of the reporter who prepared the broadcast. '
I.
Plaintiff, Amrit Lai, a professor of political science at Cheyney State College, owns several houses in West Chester, Pennsylvania. The house located at 217 East Nield Street (Nield Street house) was leased in March 1980 to five students attending West Chester State College. About March 9, 1980 Lai learned that Ellen Sands, editor of the Quad, the student newspaper at West Chester State College, was preparing to publish a story in the March 18 issue about conditions at properties Lai owned in West Chester. On March 17, 1980 Lai filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County against Sands, West Chester State College, and others, seeking, among other things, to enjoin publication of the article until he had an opportunity to review and respond to it. At a hearing on March 21, 1980, which lasted only a few minutes, the court granted Lai’s request to withdraw his petition for an injunction as moot because the Quad article had been published as scheduled on March 18, three days earlier.
Roseanne Cerra, a news reporter for WCAU-TV,-and a WCAU-TV sound technician and photographer were present at the hearing. At its conclusion, they conducted videotaped interviews of Lai, Sands, and the president of West Chester State College concerning the Quad article and Lai’s suit seeking prior restraint of its publication. In preparing the story, Cerra also visited the Nield Street house. After receiving permission from tenant Amy Wertz to inspect and film the interior of the house, Cerra and her crew filmed certain areas. Finally, Cerra and her two colleagues visited the offices of the: Quad at West Chester State College and filmed the staff at work there. That evening, Cerra’s report was aired during the 5:30 p.m. edition of WCAU-TV’s news telecast. The report included a statement, attributed to the tenants, that “their many complaints of leaking roofs, faulty wiring and other eyesores were never answered.” The video portion of the report shown simultaneously with this statement contained views of the house, in particular, a water-stained first-floor ceiling, an unshaded electric light bulb suspended from the ceiling, and exposed insulation on the back porch of the house.
In Count I of his complaint Lai contends that the broadcast was false and known by CBS to be false, and that the purpose and effect of the broadcast was to portray him as a slumlord. In particular, Lai maintains that the house had neither a leaking roof nor faulty wiring on the date of the broadcast. CBS replies that its broadcast came within the “fair report” privilege, a recognized common law privilege, accepted as well by the Pennsylvania courts, for reports on judicial proceedings and other official action. Under this privilege, the news media may publish accounts of judicial proceedings even when the report contains defamatory matter. CBS concedes that the fair report privilege is not absolute, however, and may be lost if the story is not fair and accurate or the defamatory material is published solely to cause harm to the person defamed. CBS argues it was entitled to the privilege because the news report fairly and accurately summarized the proceedings held on Lai’s petition for preliminary injunction. Lai, on the other hand, argues that CBS exceeded the scope of the privilege by including in the news report matter that was extraneous to the judicial proceedings, especially the videotapes of the house. Lai maintains that the privilege is lost because the juxtaposition of the videotapes with Cerra’s oral summary of the judicial proceeding destroyed the objectivity of the broadcast.
In Count II Lai contends that the entry by Cerra and the two other WCAU-TV employees into the Nield Street house was unauthorized and constitutes a trespass. CBS does not dispute that Lai’s permission to enter the property was never obtained. However, the district court found that Cer-ra and her crew entered with the permission of the tenant in possession of the property, and granted CBS’ motion for summary judgment on the trespass count. Lal v. CBS, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 356 (E.D.Pa.1982).
Finally, Lai contests the district court’s denial of his motion to compel discovery pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 of Cerra’s notes and tapes related to the March 21, H)80 news report on the ground that the material sought was privileged under Pennsylvania’s shield statute, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5942 (Purdon 1982). Lal v. CBS, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 364 (E.D.Pa.1982).
II.
A.
We look to Pennsylvania law to determine if CBS’ broadcast fell within the scope of the common law “fair report” privilege as a report of a judicial proceeding. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]f the ... account is fair, accurate and complete, and not published solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed, it is privileged and no responsibility attaches, even though information contained therein is false or inaccurate.” Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 600, 187 A.2d 586, 588-89 (1963); see also Binder v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 442 Pa. 319, 324, 275 A.2d 53, 56 (1971).
Lai argues that the use of the videotape rendered the news story unfair or inaccurate. However, television is a visual medium and the mere fact that the report of a judicial proceeding is accompanied by videotape to illustrate that report does not constitute abuse of the privilege. There are circumstances under which the nature of the videotape material could constitute an abuse. See, e.g., Purcell v. Westinghouse, 411 Pa. 167, 191 A.2d 662 (1963) (distortion of court proceeding and inclusion of extraneous material in “documentary” constituted abuse). For that reason the trial judge in this case denied CBS’ motion for summary judgment on the fair report privilege issue, as he later said “out of an abundance of caution”, App. at 262a, and gave plaintiff an opportunity to show that there was deliberate distortion and sensationalism connected with the videotape. At. the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, the district court directed a verdict for defendant, finding that there was no evidence on which the jury could- conclude that the video report of conditions at the house presented a distorted ficture or caused a loss of the objectivity of the telecast. App. at 262a-69a.
The burden of proving abuse of the privilege rests with the plaintiff. Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. at 601,187 A.2d at 589. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the use of the videotape rendered the news story unfair or inaccurate. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 146 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 836, 102 S.Ct. 139, 70 L.Ed.2d 116 (1981). Williams v. WCAU-TV, 555 F.Supp. 198 (E.D.Pa.1983). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we agree with the district court that a jury could not reasonably find that CBS’ account of the court proceedings was unfair or inaccurate. The inclusion of the videotape of the interi- or of the Nield Street house in the. broadcast merely provided a visual representation to accompany the verbal description of the conditions that were the underlying subject of the dispute. There is no evidence that the addition of the filmed material to the verbal description so exaggerated and sensationalized the news account as to render it neither “fair” nor “accurate.”
B.
The district court found that Lai’s trespass claim against CBS had no merit. Under Pennsylvania law the lessor of improved land who is out of possession of the property cannot maintain an action for trespass absent some injury to the lessor’s reversionary interest. See, e.g., Clark v. Smith, 25 Pa. 137, 140 (1855); Potts Run Coal Co. v. Benjamin Coal Co., 285 Pa.Super. 128, 135, 426 A.2d 1175, 1178 (1981). Moreover, the consent of the person in possession of the property to the entry onto the premises is a complete defense to a trespass action. See F.A. North & Co. v. Williams, 120 Pa. 109, 13 A. 723 (1888). It is undisputed here that the tenant in possession gave permission for Cerra and her crew to enter the premises and that there was no damage to the property as a result of the entry. It follows that no claim for trespass can be maintained by Lai.
Lai claims that in a written lease, the tenants agreed not to admit members of the news media to the Nield Street house. No such lease was submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, even had the tenant given permission to enter in violation of an undertaking not to do so, there would still be no basis on which Lai, who was not in possession, could maintain a trespass action against CBS.
C.
Finally, Lai argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Cerra’s notes and tapes were privileged under Pennsylvania’s shield statute, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann.- § 5942. In a diversity case we are bound to follow Pennsylvania law as construed by Pennsylvania’s highest court. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822-823, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (3d Cir.1977), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 2237, 56 L.Ed.2d 404 (1978). As the district court noted, although the statute on its face protects only against compelled disclosure of the “source of ... information,” the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has read an earlier version of the statute, virtually identical to the present law, to include “documents, inanimate objects and all sources of information.” In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 40,193 A.2d 181, 185 (1963) (emphasis in original). Thus, in Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.1980), we applied the reasoning of Taylor and found that the statute protected secondary sources as well as primary sources of a reporter’s information. Id. at 277-79. Since this precedent provides an adequate non-constitutional basis to support the denial of the requested discovery of Cerra’s notes and tapes because of the possibility they could lead to the disclosure of a secondary source of information, we will not reach CBS’ First Amendment argument.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1