What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES et al. v. CONTRACT STEEL CARRIERS, INC.
No. 102.
Argued February 29, 1956.
Decided March 12, 1956.
Charles F. Barber argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Barnes, William J. Lamont and Robert W. Ginnane.
Robert N. Burchmore argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was John S. Burchmore.
Per Curiam.
The Interstate Commerce Commission brings an appeal from a three-judge district court, 49 U. S. C. § 305 (g), that reversed an order of the ICC, 62 M. C. C. 413, directing appellee Contract Steel Carriers to cease operations as a common carrier by motor vehicle. 128 F. Supp. 25.
Appellee holds licenses covering different areas surrounding Chicago, Houston, and St. Louis. As these are substantially in the same form, a single illustration will suffice. It covers contract carriage of
“Steel articles, and such materials as are used or useful in highway construction projects, except cement, rock, sand, and gravel, over irregular routes, in connection with said carrier’s presently authorized operations,
“From points and places in the CHICAGO, ILL. COMMERCIAL ZONE, as defined by the Commission in 1 M. C. C. 673, to points and places in Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas, and return with no transportation for compensation.” No. MC 96505 SUB 6.
The facts are fully set out in the reports referred to above. In essence they show that appellee, by active solicitation from 1951 to 1954 in the areas mentioned, had secured 69 contracts to serve shippers. These had been filed with the Commission and there is no charge of any violation of the restrictions of the license or the requirements of individual contracts except that the appellee has held itself out by its actions to be a common carrier.
The Commission found this holding-out from an advertisement, run without legal advice and since discontinued, offering its transportation service without mentioning whether it was contract or common carriage.
It was also charged that
“. . . the great increase in the number of contracts held by it are attributable in large degree to aggressive sales activities and affirmative precontract traffic solicitation, which amounts to a public offer or holding out. In this connection, it is also asserted that defendant maintained an employee in Des Moines, Iowa, whose duties included the active solicitation of traffic. . . . There is evidence that business has been lost by interveners after a representative of defendant called upon receivers of steel in Iowa, leaving a copy of defendant’s schedule of minimum rates and charges, and a copy of a blank contract to be executed by such shippers.” 62 M. C. C. 413, 41A-415.
It was concluded by the Commission:
“Although the facts here are meager in some respects, they reveal a pattern of extraordinary expansion in a period of approximately 8 months and an easy turnover of contracts thereafter. We believe that there is ample evidence to show that this expansion was brought about, to some extent at least, by indiscriminate solicitation and advertising, among other things.” Id., at 421.
In Craig Contract Carrier Application, 31 M. C. C. 705, 712, the ICC stated that the services of a contract carrier must be individual and specialized. A requirement of specialization is supported by respectable legislative history. See, e. g., 79 Cong. Rec. 5651. In this case the ICC found that appellee had not sufficiently specialized its operation. However, we conclude that if specialization is to be read into 49 U. S. C. § 303 (a) (15) by the legislative history, it is satisfied here since appellee hauls only strictly limited types of steel products under individual and continuing contractual agreements with a comparatively small number of shippers throughout a large area.
We hold also that the fact that appellee has actively solicited business within the bounds of his license does not support a finding that it was “holding itself out to the general public.” A contract carrier is free to aggressively search for new business within the limits of his license. Because the ICC’s order is not supported by evidence in the record and is contrary to the definitions of contract and common-carriers in §303 (14) and (15), we affirm the District Court.
Affirmed.
A common carrier is one “which holds itself out to the general public to engage in the transportation by motor vehicle ... of passengers or property.” A contract carrier is any “person which, under individual contracts or agreements, engages in” such transportation. 49 U. S. C. § 303 (a) (14), (15).
“Provided, however, That no terms, conditions, or limitations shall restrict the right of the carrier to substitute or add contracts within the scope of the permit, or to add to his or its equipment and facilities, within the scope of the permit, as the development of the business and the demands of the public may require." 49 U. S. C. §309 (b).

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3
4