What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Timothy A. GILLISON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 21248.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Dec. 7, 1967.
Decided July 2, 1968.
Mr. C. William Tayler, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. W. Carey Parker, Atty., Department of Justice, of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Victor W. Caputy, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and Wright, and Robinson, Circuit Judges.
BAZELON, Chief Judge:
Gillison appeals his robbery conviction in a jury trial at which co-defendant Faustin Moran pled guilty at the close of the government’s case. The government concedes that the prosecutor’s conduct of the cross examination of appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, was improper but argues that the error was not prejudicial. We disagree.
On direct examination appellant testified that he was unarmed and only seeking a job when he entered the construction site office trailer with Moran who thereupon drew a gun and took a $2000 payroll from the supervisor. He denied that he had any knowledge that Moran was armed and intended to rob, or that he assisted Moran in any way. Appellant said that his failure to stop Moran and his flight after the robbery was attributable to panic and fear of Moran. On cross examination he testified about the robbery and the interval before his arrest. The prosecutor then asked:
Q. And how long were you away from the construction shack before you were arrested?
A. I don’t know. Maybe 10 or 15 minutes.
Q. Maybe 10 or 15 minutes. And during that period of time you were out of the presence of Mr. Moran, weren’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There was nothing to prevent you from going back to the construction shack and saying to Mr. Sutton or the police or anyone there, to tell them, “Look, I had nothing to do with this robbery,” was there?
A. Well, when I ran, I ran down in the basement. I didn’t know exactly where Moran was. And I stayed down in the basement, and I didn’t come back. I didn’t want to run into him again.
Appellant denied that he had flushed money down a toilet in an empty bathroom where he was apprehended 10 or 15 minutes after he fled the robbery. Then the following took place:
Q. Now, if you had nothing to do with it, when you were turned over to Officers McCann and Stroman, when they apprehended you, why didn’t you tell them, “Look, I didn’t do it.” ?
A. They wouldn’t listen. When they approached me, he wouldn’t listen. He just jumped right on me.
Q. Didn’t you try to tell them ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. As a matter of fact, you wouldn’t make any statement?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. As a matter of fact, you didn’t?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t want to make any statement when you were asked by the police ?
A. I didn’t want to make any statement without the presence of the attorney.
Q. And that’s the action of an innocent man who went looking for a fob.
MR. RAPOPORT: I object, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Wait just a moment. Don’t argue with the witness, Mr. [Prosecutor].
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Your Hon- or. [Emphasis added.]
Gillison went on to say that he met Moran for the first time in a bus station on the morning of the robbery and rode to the construction site trailer in Moran’s car.
At the conclusion of the cross examination, the defense rested and moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor’s remark was prejudicial error. Although the court stated outside the presence of the jury that defense objections to the remark had been sustained, it refused to instruct the jury to disregard the remark. Appellant was found guilty of one count of robbery and on June 30,1967, sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
In Griffin v. State of California the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids prosecutor and court from commenting on an accused’s failure to testify on his own behalf. The distance between that issue and the prosecutor’s comments here about the accused’s failure to make an exculpatory statement upon arrest is infinitesimal. Indeed, in Miranda v. State of Arizona, the Supreme Court recognized the applicability of Griffin to this situation, when, at footnote 37, the Court noted that “in accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. Cf. Griffin v. State of California * * *; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 [84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653] (1964) * * * [Emphasis added].” Even where there is no interrogation and the accused merely remains silent, no weight whatever can be given to the accused's silence. We agree with the Second Circuit in United States v. Mullings that “it is well settled that an inference of guilt may not be drawn from a failure to speak or to explain when a person has been arrested.”
The government concedes that “the prosecutor’s remark was improper since it related to the issue of the guilt or innocence of the appellant, rather than to the credibility of the appellant’s specific testimony. See e. g. Grünewald v. United States * * *, Rafel [Raffel] v. United States * * But we are told that under Chapman v. [State of] California “the beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” The government contends that it can carry this burden, because the prosecutor’s questioning on cross examination concerning the reasons for appellant’s silence was an isolated line of inquiry which terminated immediately after the court’s admonition. The tainted inquiry, however, marked the entire cross examination which was directed primarily at appellant’s activities after the robbery. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the jury was even aware that defense counsel’s objection was sustained by the court. The trial judge merely admonished: “Wait just a moment. Don’t argue with the witness, Mr. [Prosecutor].” The court’s subsequent remarks concerning this error were made outside the presence of the jury.
Since we have no “belief that [the line of questioning] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” appellant must be afforded a new trial “free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences.”
Reversed and remanded.
. Cf. Garris v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 96, 390 F.2d 862, February 14, 1968.
. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1964 ed.).
. 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed. 2d 106 (1965).
. 384 U.S. 436, 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. 364 F.2d 173, 175 (1966). Only the prosecutor mentioned that Gillison was interrogated when arrested. None of the arresting officers were questioned or testified about that aspect of the arrest.
. 353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957).
. 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926).
. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Since this case fundamentally applies principles enunciated in Griffin and not Miranda, we apply Chapman.
. Id.
. Id. at p. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 829.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1