What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Marvin Niles STUBBLEFIELD, Appellant, v. Dr. George J. BETO, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Appellee.
No. 24088.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
July 24, 1968.
Joel J. Finer, Stanford, Cal., Philip Juarez, Austin, Tex., for appellant.
Allo B. Crow, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for appellee.
Before BELL, COLEMAN, and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The question presented on this appeal from the denial of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus arises in an unusual context. Appellant is serving a life sentence by virtue of his third conviction of a felony less than capital. The third conviction was for burglary with the sentence having been enhanced to life on the basis of two prior felony convictions. See Art. 63, Texas Penal Code. The life sentence was imposed in 1959. The two prior felony convictions were for burglary in 1955 and for driving while intoxicated in 1950. This latter offense was deemed a felony under Texas law because of a 1948 conviction based on a plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge of driving while intoxicated. See Art. 802b, Texas Penal Code.
No infirmity is alleged as to the prior felony convictions. Appellant’s position is that he was denied counsel when he pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor charge in 1948. In the event he is able to sustain this view, the 1950 felony conviction for driving while intoxicated will fall and the life sentence will likewise fall because of the absence of the requisite number of prior felony convictions for enhancement.
The difficulty with appellant’s position is that there is an adequate factual foundation for the conclusion reached by the District Court that he waived counsel when he entered his plea of guilty to the misdemeanor. The evidence was clear that appellant was not an indigent at the time. He had an income of approximately $6,000 per year from his business. He was arrested in Johnson County, Texas for driving while intoxicated and released on bond shortly thereafter upon the payment of $10.00 to a bondsman. He testified on the habeas hearing that the County Court of Johnson County did not inform him that he might or might not have a lawyer. He stated that the court said to him only that his fine was $50.00. He testified with respect to the County Court proceeding: “* * * I didn’t see a reason for hiring a lawyer when I could pay the fifty dollars and get turned a-loose.” The County Court records reflect only that “ * * * defendant pleaded guilty as charged, after being reminded by the judge of his rights.”
In the view we take of the case, which is that there was intelligent and competent waiver of counsel by appellant, Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, we do not reach the further question of whether our decisions in McDonald v. Moore, 5 Cir., 1965, 353 F.2d 106; and Harvey v. State of Mississippi, 5 Cir., 1965, 340 F.2d 263, would afford appellant a basis for claiming a Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he was tried by the County Court in 1948.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0