What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WOODS, Housing Expediter, v. KNICKERBOCKER et al.
No. 12487.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 11, 1949.
Ed Dupree, Gen. Counsel, Hugo V. Prucha, Asst. Gen. Counsel and Benjamin I. Shulman, Spl. Lit. Atty., all of Washington, D. C., and H. C. Happ, Regional Atty. and J. Edwin Fleming, Lit. Atty., both of Dallas, Tex., for Housing' Expediter:
Norman R. Crozier, Jr., of Dallas, Tex., for appellees.
Before HUTCHESON, SIBLEY, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.
The Housing Expediter proceeded against H. D. Knickerbocker and his sons Bruce R. Knickerbocker and R. C. Knickerbocker in respect to overcharges of rent on twenty-eight housing units subject to rent control, asking an injunction against future violations of the applicable Acts and Regulations, a restoration to the tenants of the overcharges, and a recovery of three times the overcharges collected since one year before the filing of the suit less the overcharges restored for that period; the tenants not having sued therefor.
Several days before the hearing the parties made a stipulation admitting overcharges on .fourteen of the housing units, with dates and amounts. The defendants made out checks payable to the tenants ■for these and some other contested items and delivered them to the Expediter’s attorney to be .used if suit iwas not filed.. The Expediter elected to proceed with the suit. An answer was filed which set up a number of defenses in law, which were not sustained and are not involved now. The overcharges stipulated as above were admitted, others denied, and some explained; and it was pleaded that none were wilfull or the result of a failure to take practicable precaution and that triple damages were not due. Mainly on the testimony of two of the defendants, which was ■not materially contradicted, the court adjudged the overcharges covered by the stipulation, and overcharges on seven other units, found against the remainder of them; awarded no damages; and denied an injunction. The Expediter, appealing, complains that 1. Overcharges on two ■units ought to have .been for larger ■amounts. 2. Damages ought to have been allowed; and 3. An injunction ought to have been granted, especially on evidence of other violations .erroneously excluded.
1. The brief for appellees is accompanied by .an affidavit of H. D. Knickerbocker that he has refunded to each tenant the amount found due him iby the judgment, and as to the two units where the Expediter claims too little was found he has refunded the full amounts which the Expediter asserts was due, the paid checks therefor being attached. The truth of this affidavit was not denied in argument before us. Taking it as conceded, there is no point in attempting to decide whether the judge or the Expediter was right as to the correct amount. The matter is moot.
2. As to damages, it is conceded that, iby reason of limitation, only the overcharges since April 30, 1947, can be considered, the suit having been filed April 30, 1948; and the complaint sues for none after June 30, 1947. Within these narrow-time limits, -whatever the amount of the overcharges may be, an award of some damages is due under Section 205(e) of the Price Control Act of 1942 as amended. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e). The Expediter has succeeded to the rights of the tenants under thi-s Section by their failure to sue. The overcharged tenant is authorized thereby to “bring an action against the seller on account -of the overcharge. In any action under this subsection, the seller shall be liable for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the court, plus whichever of the following sums is greater: (1) Such amount not more than three times the amount of overcharge, or the overcharges, upon which the action is -based as the court in it-s discretion may determine, or (2) An amount not less than $25 nor more than $50 as the court in its discretion may determine: Provided, however, That such amount shall be the amount of the overcharge or overcharges if the defendant proves that the violation of the regulation order, or price schedule in question was neither willful, nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence of the violation.” The defendants here pleaded this proviso, but we discover no attempt to prove what it requires, and the court did not find that they had proved what it requires. The proviso therefore does not govern. The liability is not here measured by the arbitrary $25 to $50 measure, because that measure Is apparently less than the overcharges. So the measure is “not more than three times the amount of the overcharge, or the overcharges.” It is not to be thought that this measure can be only the amount of the overcharges, because the proviso fixes that a-s the liability when no wi-lfullness and no want of precaution are shown. It must be something between the amount of the overchaiges- and three times the overcharges. The discretion of the court does not extend to nullifying the intent of the statute that something more than mere restoration .be imposed unless the proviso is by proper proof brought into operation. On these questions see Bowles v. Hasting, 5 Cir., 146 F.2d 94; East v. Bowles, 5 Cir., 158 F.2d 227; Porter v. Maule, 5 Cir., 160 F.2d 1; McCoy v. Fleming, 5 Cir., 160 F.2d 4. On this question of damages the judgment must be reversed, with leave to the defendants to prove, if they can, that they are within the proviso; and if not, that the court may exercise its discretion as to the amount to be fixed as damages over and above mere restoration.
3. On the question of an injunction, its grant is within the -sound discretion of the court under all the circumstances of the case. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754. Proof here was offered that H. D. Knickerbocker at some previous time had confessed and paid up other overcharges and signed a statement that he would comply with the -rent law, but did not; also that -he 'had made overcharges since this suit was fi-led. On objection, this evidence was ruled out a-s irrelevant to the overcharges in this suit. But it was expressly offered on the question of injunction and as tending to show wilf-ullness and -that violations would continue if not enjoined. For this purpose the -evidence was admissible and proper to be considered. For error in its rejection the question of. the grant of injunction must also be reconsidered for the court’s exercise of discretion in view of all the relevant circumstances.
The judgment is accordingly reversed as to the matters above indicated, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1