What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
In the Matter of Richard KNAPP, Bankrupt-Appellant, Michael J. Daly, III, State Court Receiver of Tanglewood Incorporated, and J. E. Smith & Company, Incorporated, Objecting Creditors, and John F. Phelan, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Estate of Richard Knapp, bankrupt, Appellees.
No. 103, Docket 27591.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 25, 1962.
Decided Nov. 8, 1962.
Fred B. Rosnick, Waterbury, Conn., (Weisman & Weisman, Waterbury, Conn., on the brief; Sherman L. Quinto, Waterbury, Conn., of counsel), for appellant.
Walter R. Griffin, Waterbury, Conn., for J. E. Smith & Co., Inc., appellee.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and SWAN and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The appeal raises a very narrow issue, namely, whether the findings of fact of the referee in bankruptcy are sufficient to support his denial of a discharge. General Order No. 47 requires the judge to accept the referee’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See In re Tabibian, 2 Cir., 289 F.2d 793, 795; Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th ed. Par. 14.65. We hold that Judge Timbers did not err in accepting the referee’s findings and that they are adequate to support denial of a discharge.
The bankrupt conducted his business of constructing and selling residences through Tanglewood, Inc., a corporation formed in December 1957. He was secretary and treasurer of the corporation and he owned 18 of its 20 shares of capital stock, the remaining shares being held by members of his family. After November 1958 he was unable to employ an accountant to keep the books of Tan-glewood. From December 1958 to August 1959 be received some $26,000 from Tanglewood. No books of account or records, either personal or corporate, were produced to reflect to whom or for what purpose this sum was disbursed. His oral testimony left $11,150 of the money not accounted for. The bankrupt’s testimony that he kept the books of account after November 1958 and left them in his home which he vacated in August 1959, and from which they disappeared in some unknown fashion, was not believed by the referee. He found that the books and records of Tangle-wood, Inc., were necessary to determine the bankrupt’s personal financial condition, and held that the bankrupt, in failing to keep adequate books and records for Tanglewood after November 1958, had violated Bankruptcy Act § 14, sub. c(2), 11 U.S.C. § 32, sub. c(2). Further, the referee found that the bankrupt’s inability to explain satisfactorily the loss of assets violated Bankruptcy Act § 14, sub. c(7), 11 U.S.C. § 32, sub. c(7). The discharge was denied on both these grounds.
Under the circumstances disclosed in the record the referee properly found that the corporate books and records were necessary to determine the bankrupt’s personal financial condition. Accordingly, the petition to review was properly denied by Judge Timbers. See In re Sandow, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 807; In re Muss, 2 Cir., 100 F.2d 395, 396; Simon v. Massachusetts Trust Co., 1 Cir., 276 F. 391, 392-93, cited in his memorandum opinion.
Order affirmed.
. It was later stipulated by all parties that the bankrupt did orally account for the disbursement of the remaining $11,-150. The referee, however, was not satisfied even by the bankrupt’s oral explanation as to the balance. Since the referee was under no obligation to accept the bankrupt’s testimony concerning any or all of the lost assets, we hold the error brought to light by the stipulation — if error it was — to be harmless.
. Section 14, sub. c(2) and sub. c(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32, sub. c(2) and sub. c (7) set forth as grounds for denying the bankrupt a discharge his failure “to keep or preserve books of account or records, from which his financial condition and business transactions might be ascertained” [§ 14, sub. c(2)] or “to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities.” [§ 14, sub. c(7)].

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0