What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Aulden Edward THOMAS, Appellant.
No. 76-1190.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 14, 1976.
Decided July 1, 1976.
E. Alvin Schay, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Walter G. Riddick, Asst. U. S. Atty., W. H. Dillahunty, U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before HEANEY, ROSS and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
ORDER OF REMAND
Aulden Edward Thomas has appealed to this court from his conviction for armed robbery of a United States Post Office in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114. At trial the evidence of guilt was circumstantial, except for a very tentative identification of the accused by Mr. Williamson, the postal employee who had confronted the robber.
Just prior to trial, defense counsel and the Assistant United States Attorney learned that Thomas had been one of the subjects in a lineup held by the Little Rock, Arkansas, police on November 27, 1975. Mr. Williamson had viewed this lineup. Thomas was apparently unaware that this lineup was for the purpose of establishing the identity of the Post Office robber; he believed he was being viewed incident to the investigation of a state offense in which he was a suspect. The witness, Mr. Williamson, was also rather vague about what occurred during this lineup, seeming to confuse it at trial with a subsequent lineup held at the request of Thomas’ counsel. The record does not indicate that Thomas was represented by counsel at the November 27 lineup or that he waived his right to have counsel present.
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the Supreme Court held that a pretrial lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which the accused was entitled to have counsel present, absent an intelligent waiver. Once it is shown that this right has been violated the government must assume the burden of establishing that identification of the defendant at trial is based on the witness’ observation at the scene of the crime, independent of the faulty lineup, or that any noncompliance was harmless error. United States v. Valez, 467 F.2d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1972).
Because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the late disclosure of the November 27, 1975, pretrial lineup, neither counsel had an adequate opportunity to bring out the facts concerning this critical stage of the prosecution. See Fed.R. Crim.P. 52(b). We therefore remand this case to the district court for a hearing, in order that defense counsel may establish whether Thomas was deprived of counsel at his November 27 pretrial lineup without a valid waiver of that right. In this connection we point out that the Miranda waiver which he executed on that date does not necessarily establish a waiver of the right to counsel’s presence at the lineup. United States v. Ranciglio, 429 F.2d 228, 230, n. 3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959, 91 S.Ct. 358, 27 L.Ed.2d 268 (1970).
In the event that the lineup was conducted without counsel present and without a knowing waiver of this right, the burden will devolve on the prosecution to show that the in court identification of the accused was not based on the November 27, 1975, lineup. Consideration should be given to such factors as
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at 241, 87 S.Ct. at 1940. In making this determination the trial court should be especially aware of the weakness of the witness’ identification testimony at trial. See also United States v. Valez, supra, 467 F.2d at 601-602; Cannon v. Sigler, 460 F.2d 311, 312 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ranciglio, supra, 429 F.2d at 231-232.
Since the eyewitness identification of the accused was the only direct evidence of his guilt, any error in its admission could not be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Accordingly, a finding by the district judge that the in court identification was based in whole or in part upon the November 27 lineup will necessitate that he grant a new trial. If, on the other hand, it is determined that Thomas’ right to counsel was not violated or that the in court identifications of the accused were independent of the November 27 lineup, the case should be recertified to this court for review together with the transcript, and the written findings and conclusions of the district court on the issues described herein.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1