What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
John D. LAWTON, Petitioner, v. Jeremiah J. DACEY, Warden, Respondent.
Misc. No. 158.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Oct. 29, 1965.
Ronald J. Chisholm, Winchester, Mass., for petitioner.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, and McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.
Petitioner, having been convicted of a felony in the state court, and having lost his appeal based upon the court’s failure to suppress certain evidence seized at the time of his arrest, Commonwealth v. Lawton, Mass., 202 N.E.2d 824, brought a habeas corpus proceeding in the district court. His allegation that the seizure was unconstitutional because he was wrongfully arrested was rejected, the district court finding, as did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that although he was arrested without warrant, the officer had probable cause to make the arrest. The district court denied his application for a certificate of probable cause, without which he cannot appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. He accordingly renews his request in this court. Zimmer v. Langlois, 1 Cir., 1964, 331 F.2d 424.
Petitioner, so far as we can discover from the record presented to us, makes three claims. The first is that the Massachusetts statute relating to arrest of suspicious persons who, during the nighttime, give no satisfactory account of themselves, Mass.G.L. c. 41, § 98, is unconstitutional. His second is that there was no probable cause, apart from this statute, for his arrest. His third is that even if there •were probable cause, the officer did not rely- upon those circumstances, though known to him, but relied on the statute.
The district court found there was probable cause, known to the officer, apart from the statute, and held that this was enough even though in fact the officer, in his thinking process, relied on the statute. This was sufficient. An officer on the beat can hardly be expected to be that precise a lawyer. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 1965, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684. Appellate courts, as is well known, may affirm lower courts for reaching the correct result even though they gave the wrong reason. At least equal consideration should be given an arresting officer. If he was justified in doing what he did, in the absence of an affirmative showing of prejudice it should make no difference that his legal thinking may have been short of perfection. This is not a case where the state came up with a new justification on appeal. Cf. Giordenello v. United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503. The Commonwealth took this position from the outset, within the express procedure recognized in Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 488, 78 S.Ct. at 1251.
The constitutionality of the nighttime statute is not raised. We see no possible merit in the appeal. '
An order will be entered denying the application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1