What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
EAST et al. v. BOWLES, Administrator, OPA.
No. 11667.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Dec. 2, 1946.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 1947.
Harry S. Pollard, of Austin, Tex., for appellants.
Irving M. Gruber, Chief, General Litigation Branch, of Washington, D. C., J. M. Burnett, U. S. Atty., and William P. Dobbins and Van H. Howard, Jr., Attys., OPA, all of San Antonio, Tex., and David London, Dr., Litigation Div., OPA, of Washington, D. C. (George Moncharsh, Deputy Adm’r for Enforcement, Albert M. Dreyer, Chief, Appellate Branch, and Abraham H. Maller, Sp. Appellate Atty., OPA, all of Washington, D. C., and Leonard M. Cox, Regional Litigation Atty., of Dallas, Tex., on the brief), for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The suit brought under Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act was for statutory damages on account of two sales of poultry above ceiling price. The claim was that though the price per pound stated in the invoice accompanying each shipment was within the ceiling, each shipment was short in weight, and the invoice for the shipment as a whole represented an actual overcharge per pound. The defense was a denial of a violation in that the overcharge, if any occurred, was not willful or intentional, nor was it the result of a failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence of a violation!
On plaintiffs part, there was evidence: that defendants had shipped to Bachelor Officers Mess by Brown Express eigh! boxes of frozen dressed poultry, 800 pounds prepaid, and three boxes dressed poultry, 300 pounds prepaid; that they had invoiced the shipments as 800 pounds fryers at 45j£, $360.00; and 300 pounds fryers at 45^, $135.00; that consignee had weighed the shipments and found them short; and that the amount charged for the poultry was in excess of the ceiling price.
Defendants’ evidence was to the effect; that they did everything they could to make their shipments correct; that if the shipments were short, it was not intentional but due to unintentional error or mistake; that they supposed that the poultry would be weighed upon receipt; and that as soon as they learned of the claim that the poultry was short, they returned the check for the original invoice and sent a new invoice for the amount the consignee claimed to have received. One of the defendants, Alvin G. East, testified that as a matter of fact he knew nothing about the shipments except what his records showed.
The evidence concluded, the jury returned a verdict on special issues, finding: (1) that the shipments were short in weight; (2) that defendants had not willfully or intentionally delivered less than the weight billed for; and (3) that the short delivery was not the result of a failure'to take practicable precautions. Defendants moving for judgment on this verdict, insisted that since the jury had acquitted the defendants both of willfulness and want of care, defendants should have had judgment. The district judge overruled this motion and gave judgment against defendants for the amount of the overcharges, but not for treble damages.
Defendants are here urging that the finding of the jury, that the short weight in the shipments was the result neither of willfulness nor of failure to take practicable precautions, was complete exoneration of defendants and constituted a complete defense to the suit. Pointing out that the violation complained of here was not that the per pound price stated in the invoice was above the ceiling but that, though the stated per pound price was correct. the total number of pounds charged for was short, appellants insist that the cases of sales of specific articles for an above ceiling price, on which the government relies, are not in point, and that no violation is made out here without showing that the weight-shortage was intentional.
We cannot agree. It is just as much an overcharge to bill a shipment at the correct price per pound with the poundage short as to bill the shipment at a price per pound above ceiling would be. The jury’s verdict did indeed furnish a basis for denying plaintiff the recovery of treble damages. It did not furnish any basis for denying all recovery. Indeed, it furnished the basis for the judgment entered. It found that the shipment was short by a number of pounds, and the undisputed evidence established that, figured at the correct rate per pound, the amounts charged for the two shipments were excessive to the extent of $156.85, the amount recovered.
The judgment was right. It is affirmed.
50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901 et seq.
Bowles v. Hastings, 5 Cir., 146 F.2d 94; Bowles v. Indianapolis, 7 Cir., 150 F.2d 597: Shearer v. Porter. 8 Cir., 155 F.2d 77; Kenney v. Hood, 5 Cir., 1946, 158 F.2d 226.
Brown v. Mars, 8 Cir., 135 F.2d 843.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2