What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James Theodore BENTSEN, Appellant, v. G. A. RALSTON, Jr., Warden, United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Appellee.
No. 81-1303.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 11, 1981.
Decided Sept. 15, 1981.
Raymond C. Conrad, Jr., Federal Public Defender, W. D. Missouri, R. Steven Brown, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Springfield, Mo., for appellant.
J. Whitfield Moody, U. S. Atty., Robert G. Ulrich, Asst. U. S. Atty., Springfield, Mo., for appellee.
William D. Burlington, Attorney Advisor, Springfield, Mo., for Federal Prisoners.
Before BRIGHT and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIES, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Ronald N. Davies, United States Senior District Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
James T. Bentsen appeals from denial by the district court of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that prison officials failed to reinstate 280 days statutory good time credit that was forfeited in a disciplinary proceeding which was overturned on appeal. Also presented was his contention that statutory good time credit on his remaining sentence is being improperly calculated. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate for preliminary review and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court approved the magistrate’s report and recommendation, holding that petitioner had not suffered any adverse effects from forfeiture of good time credit and that credit on his remaining term is being properly computed. We affirm.
Petitioner is currently serving a two year, four month, and twenty-six day parole violator term. The current term represents the remainder of an aggregated seven-year term resulting from a five-year term imposed in 1974 and a two-year term, to be served consecutively, imposed in 1975. Petitioner was initially paroled on November 9, 1977, to a halfway house in Kansas City, Missouri. Petitioner failed to report and, as a result, the United States Parole Commission rescinded the November 9, 1977, parole date and granted him a presumptive parole date of January 25, 1979. Prison disciplinary action over the failure to report resulted in forfeiture of 280 days accumulated good time credit. Because of the forfeiture petitioner’s mandatory release day was recomputed and changed from January, 1980, to October 8, 1980. Subsequently, on October 13, 1978, the National Appeals Board modified the previous action of the Parole Commission by changing the presumptive parole date from January 25, 1979, to November 8, 1978. From this date petitioner was on parole until November 6,1979, when his parole was revoked. After crediting petitioner with the time served on parole, the Parole Commission ordered petitioner to serve the current two year, four month, and twenty-six day parole violator term with a mandatory release date of October 1, 1981.
Petitioner contends that the modification of his presumptive parole date by the National Appeals Board was also a reversal of the good time forfeiture. He asserts primarily that the 280 days of good time should be credited against his parole violat- or term. The district court properly rejected this claim on the basis that petitioner has suffered no adverse effects from the forfeiture either on his regular term or on his parole violator term. First, the consequence of the forfeiture as to petitioner’s regular term was to postpone by 280 days his mandatory release. However, the modification of the National Appeals Board intervened by granting petitioner parole prior to his original mandatory release date. Consequently petitioner has suffered no harm. Second, as to his parole violator term, petitioner is entitled only to the good time credit earned during that term, as any good time credit accumulated during his regular term was forfeited upon the revocation of his parole. Williams v. Ciccone, 415 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1969); McKinney v. Taylor, 358 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1966); Mandel v. Heritage, 267 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1959); Swift v. Ciccone, 351 F.Supp. 1149 (W.D. Mo.), aff’d, 472 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1972).
Petitioner also asserts that the prison officials are calculating his current good time credit on the basis of a two year, four month, and twenty-six day sentence instead of a seven-year sentence. The record convincingly demonstrates, as the district court found, that petitioner’s current good time credit is being properly calculated at a seven-year sentence rate.
After a review of the record, we conclude that the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and its application of the law correct. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court’s opinion.
. The Honorable William T. Collinson, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0