What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eddie Daniel SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 19978.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
May 4, 1970.
James E. Wells (Court-Appointed) Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellant.
Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Chief Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee; James H. Brickley, U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., on brief.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and CELEBREZZE and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was charged in a six-count indictment with transporting in interstate commerce, with unlawful intent, falsely made, forged and altered securities, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged and altered, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2. He was convicted by a jury and was sentenced to seven years in prison on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
The primary issue on appeal is whether the acts proved by the Government constitute an offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. That section provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited; * * * [shall be guilty of an offense].
The evidence proffered by the Government established that a number of blank money orders and some machines used to validate the orders with an agent’s symbol were stolen during the civil disorder in Detroit in 1967. A few months after the thefts, appellant began to cash some of the stolen money orders. In each instance appellant’s name had been inserted in the blank provided for the name of the payee and he cashed the money orders by endorsing his true name. In addition to appellant’s name, an agent’s symbol, an amount and sender’s name had been inserted in the appropriate blanks on the money orders.
Appellant contends that the insertion of the necessary information into the blank portions of the money orders does not constitute falsely making, forging and altering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. He relies on Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 82 S.Ct. 1399, 8 L.Ed.2d 750 (1962), where a tax accountant cashed income tax refund checks of two clients by endorsing the clients’ names and then writing “R. Milo Gilbert, Trustee” below the endorsement. The Supreme Court held that a false representation of agency authority is not a forgery, since the “falsity lies in the representation of facts, not in the genuineness of execution.” 370 U.S. at 658, 82 S.Ct. at 1404, quoting from Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760, 763-764 (10th Cir. 1954). However, the Court also indicated that the Government might be able to establish the charge of forgery if it could prove that Gilbert did not purport to sign the clients’ names in a representative capacity.
Accordingly, the important inquiry in the present case is whether the completion of the blank money orders constituted a false representation or a false execution. We hold that it constituted a false execution. The money orders were not, at the time of the thefts, evidence of an obligation on the part of the issuing company. It was necessary to insert the agent’s symbol, an amount, a sender’s name, and the name of the payee in order to create an obligation. This distinguishes Gilbert, where the refund checks were genuine written evidence of obligations and required only an endorsement to be cashed. Here, the insertion of the necessary information on the blank money orders constituted a false making within the meaning of the statute. United States v. Di Pietto, 396 F.2d 283, 286-287 (7th Cir. 1968); Castle v. United States, 287 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1961).
Appellant also contends that the Government failed to prove that he knew the money orders had been falsely made. We have examined the transcript of testimony and have concluded that this contention is without merit. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that appellant had the requisite knowledge.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1