What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. CUMBERLAND SHOE CORPORATION, Respondent.
No. 16068.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Oct. 26, 1965.
Melvin H. Reifin, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. General Counsel, Elliott Moore, Attorney, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., on brief, for petitioner.
William M. Pate, Atlanta, Ga., George B. Smith, Atlanta, Ga., on brief; Mitchell, Clarke, Pate & Anderson, Atlanta, Ga., Constangy & Prowell, Atlanta, Ga., of counsel, for respondent.
Before MILLER, O’SULLIVAN and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
This is a National Labor Relations Board petition for enforcement of an order to respondent to cease and desist from certain unfair labor practices and from refusing to bargain collectively with the union as the representative of its employees.
As to the cease and desist order, respondent’s brief states:
“Respondent does not agree with the Board’s findings of violations of Section 8(a) (1). With the exception of those findings covered by the first two questions, however, respondent concedes that they are supported by substantial evidence. Bor this reason, the respondent has framed these questions to reflect the particular findings which if is questioning.”
Since respondent does not oppose enforcement of the cease and desist order concerning 8(a) (1) violations, we shall not detail our views thereon, except to note that the record taken as a whole does contain substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings of such violations.
The basic issue presented by this case concerns whether or not respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the union after it had demonstrated majority status.
In January of 1963 the union began an organizing campaign in respondent’s plant at Chapel Hill, Tennessee. By January 17, 1963, 81 out of 143 employees had signed an authorization card reading as follows:
“I, an employee of the Cumberland Shoe Co. hereby authorize the Boot & Shoe Workers Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O., through its duly accredited representatives, to act for me as a collective bargaining agency in all matters which pertain to rates of pay, wages, .hours and all other conditions of employment, including the signing of an agreement with my employer in conformity with the National Labor Relations Law and/or State Labor Relations Law.
“Name
“Address
“Operation Date
(Reverse side)
“Boot & Shoe Workers’ Union Affiliated with A.F.L.-C.I.O.
Southern Office 912 E. Cheatham Street Union City, Tennessee”
By letter dated January 18, 1963, the union notified the respondent that a majority of its production and maintenance workers had designated it as their collective bargaining representative, offered to agree to a card check by an impartial person, and requested recognition and negotiations.
The company responded by letter indicating that it did not believe the union had a majority of its employees who had joined “freely and without coercion,” and refusing to recognize or bargain with the union. Respondent’s position is that “Seventeen of these cards were solicited by fellow employees through statements that the purpose of the cards was to secure a Board election.”
This issue was the subject of extensive testimony before the Trial Examiner. He found that 17 of the 81 employees claimed to constitute the union majority “were told when they were solicited by fellow employees that the purpose of the cards was to secure an election.” Relying upon a somewhat similar factual situation where oral representations had been held to invalidate the written authorizations (Englewood Lumber Company, 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961)), the Trial Examiner found that the 17 cards were invalid and that as a consequence the union did not represent a majority when it demanded recognition and bargaining.
On review of the Rulings of the Trial Examiner (to which both respondent and the general counsel had filed exceptions), the Board found:
“We believe that the instant case is factually distinguishable from Englewood Lumber, supra, and that hence that case is inapplicable. While it is true, as found by the Trial Examiner, that 17 of the signatories testified that they were told that the purpose of the cards was to secure a Board election, it does not appear that they were told that this was the only purpose of the cards, and we cannot say, on the basis of this record that the card solicitors so indicated to employees.
The Board also found:
“In view of the Respondent’s threats, promises of benefit, and coercive interrogation of employees, as found by the Trial Examiner, we are persuaded that Respondent’s refusal to bargain with the Union on January 23, 1963, was not the result of a good-faith doubt of the Union’s majority, but in order to gain time to destroy that majority. We find, accordingly, that the Union has demonstrated its majority status and that Respondent, by refusing to recognize or bargain with it, violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act. ”
Respondent in this case relies principally upon two cases: Englewood Lumber Company, 130 N.L.R.B. 394 (1961) and N. L. R. B. v. Koehler, 328 F.2d 770 (C.A.7, 1964). We are convinced that the factual situation in each of these cases was materially different from that posed by our instant case.
In the Englewood case the Trial Examiner and the Board placed much emphasis upon the fact that one of the solicitors of the union authorization cards testified that he secured cards from persons expressing hostility to the union. He said that they signed only after he assured them that the purpose was to secure an election where they could vote either way.
In the Koehler case the court relied upon this testimony:
“Thus Simons testified he told the employees that by signing the cards they were not selecting the Teamsters as their bargaining agent, that they would have a chance to vote at a secret election, and that they could vote for the Teamsters Union or against it.” N. L. R. B. v. Koehler, supra at 773.
In our present case we find no claim of outright misrepresentation on the part of any solicitor. The authorization cards were themselves wholly unambiguous and they related solely to authorization of union representation as collective bargaining representative.
The record does disclose, of course, that 17 employees testified generally to the effect that they had been told that the purpose was to have an election. But, of course, the signing of authorization cards was an essential preliminary to a union petition for an election. In no instance did any employee testify that he was told that the election was the only purpose of the card. And the union did indeed seek an election, withdrawing that request only after it had become convinced that the company’s Section 8(a) (1) violations had coerced a sufficient number of employees so as to eliminate the union’s majority support.
This sort of issue pertaining to the validity of a union’s claim of majority status has been before the courts a number of times. In a recent case, N. L. R. B. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750 (C.A.6, 1965), this court quoted with approval the following relevant paragraph from Joy Silk Mills v. N. L. R. B., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 185 F.2d 732 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914, 71 S.Ct. 734, 95 L.Ed. 1350 (1951):
“[A]n employee’s thoughts (or afterthoughts) as to why he signed a union card, and what he thought that card meant, cannot negative the overt action of having signed a card designating a union as bargaining agent. N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 9 Cir., 110 F.2d 780, 790; N. L. R. B. v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 737, 739, enforced [2 Cir.,] 163 F.2d 376, cer-tiorari denied 332 U.S. 824, 68 S.Ct. 164, 92 L.Ed. 399.” N. L. R. B. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra 341 F.2d at 755
In both Joy Silk Mills and Winn-Dixie the courts concerned upheld the Board’s findings of majority status of the union concerned, and a refusal to bargain collectively in violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act,
A similar result as to this particular issue was reached by the First Circuit in N. L. R. B. v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell, S. En C., 300 F.2d 886 (C.A.1, 1962), on the following reasoning:
“Even though many of the' employees testified that they had not understood the meaning of the cards, the cards were very clearly phrased. The employees were not illiterate. There was no claim of affirmative misrepresentation by the. union. The Board was justified in accepting the cards at their face value and rejecting the oral testimony that the employees had thought they meant something else.” N. L. R. B. v. Gor-bea, Perez & Morell, S. En C., supra at 887.
See also, N. L. R. B. v. Greenfield Components Corporation, 317 F.2d 85 (C.A.1, 1963).
The underlying problem in this whole area is, of course, that of determining from the record of testimony before an NLRB Trial Examiner whether or not the employer’s refusal to bargain was based upon a “good-faith doubt,” or on the contrary, was a mere device on the part of the employer to take such steps as he could to deprive the union of employee support needed to constitute that majority. In cases such as this, where the employer’s unfair labor practices are clearly established, both before and after the demand for bargaining, the good faith of his doubts of the union majority may properly be regarded with some suspicion. In an early somewhat classic case, N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F.2d 780 (C.A.9, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 678, 61 S.Ct. 447, 85 L.Ed. 1118 (1941), we find this interesting discussion of the problem:
“It is insisted in any event that a majority of the employees had not selected the Union as its bargaining agent. At the hearing the Union’s membership books were checked against respondent’s payroll; membership application cards were examined, and witnesses testified in reference thereto. Respondent produced as witnesses some employees who said that they had signed the cards and paid initiation fees for the sole purpose of voting against the strike. Some other employees testified that by signing the cards they had not intended to designate the Union as the representative for collective bargaining. As pointed out in the findings of the Board, the testimony of these witnesses given after the failure of the strike in which they had participated was not sufficient to overcome the effect to be given to their having previously joined the Union or signed the membership cards designating the Union as the bargaining unit. Besides their conduct and demeanor while testifying, there was other evidence tending to discredit these witnesses; they had been restored to their former positions with the company while others similarly situated were denied reemployment. As demonstrated by the Board, this discrimination was brought about through the intervention of certain individuals acting for or with respondent and who, at the time the testimony was given, were present confronting these witnesses. In view of all these circumstances we cannot say that the finding of the Board was not justified.” N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co., supra 110 F.2d at 790.
Particularly appropriate to our present case is the language used by the Second Circuit in N. L. R. B. v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 163 F.2d 376 (C.A.2, 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 824,. 68 S.Ct. 164, 92 L.Ed. 399 (1947):
“Whether the refusal was motivated by a genuine doubt as to the League’s designation by a majority of the pattern makers was for the Board to decide, and the coercive conduct previously discussed supports the Board’s inference that the respondent’s doubt was spurious. Also the choice of the remedy appropriate to expunge the effects of unfair labor practices is for the Board, not the courts. Consequently its affirmative order to bargain with the League was correct. Franks Bros. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817, 88 L.Ed. 1020.” N. L. R. B. v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corporation, supra, 163 F.2d at 378-379.
In our instant case we find that the findings of fact of the National Labor Relations Board were supported by substantial evidence; that respondents did not have appropriate grounds for a good-faith doubt as to the union’s majority status; that respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act in refusing to bargain with the union. N. L. R. B. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., supra; N. L. R. B. v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell, S. En C., supra; Joy Silk Mills v. N. L. R. B., supra; N .L. R. B. v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., supra.
Enforcement of the order of the Board is hereby granted.
. Boot & Shoe Workers Union, AFL-CIO.
“3. The record indicates that the testimony to this effect consisted of affirmative responses by the signatories to leading questions propounded by Respondent’s counsel, upon cross-examination, as to whether they were told that the purpose of the cards was to secure an election. We do not deem such testimony sufficient to controvert the statement of the purpose and effect of such cards contained on the face thereof, nor do we consider it inconsistent with an understanding that the cards served the dual purpose of designating a representative and of securing an election.”
“4. In the Englewood Lumber case the solicitor explained to almost all the employees that the cards were only for the purpose of securing a Board election and thereby secured many signatures, including those of two employees whose hostility to the designated union was open and notorious and explicitly communicated to the solicitor. Cf. also, Morris & Associates, Inc., 138 NLRB 1160, 1164.”
“6. Joy Silk Mills v. N. L. R. B. [87 U.S.App.D.C. 360], 185 F.2d 732, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 [71 S.Ct. 734, 95 L.Ed. 1350].”
“7. Member Brown joins in this finding because, in his opinion, the best evidence of employees’ intent, i. e., their signature to cards designating the Union as their bargaining agent, establishes the majority status of the Union at the time it requested recognition. He believes it unnecessary and inappropriate to consider any representations the Union’s solicitors may have made or what the employees may have been told.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0