What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
DESSALERNOS v. SAVORETTI, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.
No. 287.
Argued April 3, 1958.
Decided April 14, 1958.
David W. Walters argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Maurice A. Roberts argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Beatrice Rosenberg.
Per Curiam.
It was stipulated by the parties in the District Court that the sole question for decision is whether petitioner is entitled to have his application for suspension of deportation considered under § 244 (a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (66 Stat. 163, 214; 8 U. S. C. § 1254 (a)(1)). We hold that petitioner is so entitled. The judgment of the Court of Appeals (244 F. 2d 178) is therefore vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to enter an appropriate judgment declaring that petitioner is entitled to have his application for suspension of deportation considered by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service under § 244 (a)(1).
So or fared.
Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom
Mr. Justice Clark joins,
would dismiss the writ for lack of jurisdiction. In his view the record fails to disclose a justiciable case or controversy because (1) the undisturbed administrative finding that petitioner “does not meet the requirement that his deportation [would] result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to himself,” establishes that petitioner is not entitled to suspension of deportation under either subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(5) of § 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952; and (2) the parties’ stipulation in the District Court is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on this Court to decide the question sought to be presented. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U. S. 281, 289; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241. In holding on this record that subdivision (a)(1) governs petitioner’s case the Court has, in his view, rendered what in effect is an advisory opinion.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
would join
Mr. Justice Harlan
if he read the record to be as clear as the latter finds it to be. Being in sufficient doubt about the scope and meaning of the stipulation, he joins the Court’s opinion. This leaves open, on the remand, the administrative determination of the issues under §244 (a)(1).

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1