What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
WATSON et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 290.
Argued February 2, 1953.
Decided May 18, 1953.
Arthur McGregor argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was A. Calder Mackay.
Ellis N. Slack argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings, Assistant Attorney General Lyon and Hilbert P. Zarky.
Chester H. Ferguson and Ceorge W. Ericksen filed a brief for Edwards et al., as amid curiae, supporting petitioners.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case relates to a taxpayer who, for several years, held an undivided interest in an orange grove and engaged in the business of growing and selling the oranges it produced. In the midst of the 1944 growing season, she sold her interest in the grove, including an unmatured crop then on the trees. The question before us is whether, for federal income tax purposes, she must treat that part of her profit from the sale which is attributable to the unmatured crop as ordinary income or as a capital gain. For the reasons hereafter stated, she must treat it as ordinary income.
In 1944, Mrs. M. Gladys Watson, one of the petitioners here, and her two brothers, each owned an undivided one-third interest in a 110-acre navel orange grove near Exeter, Tulare County, California. Its management had been supervised by her brothers since 1912 and, since 1942, she and her brothers had operated it as a partnership. It was the oldest and one of the best groves in the locality. Its production per acre was about twice the average of such production in the county. In each of the last five years the value of its crop had increased over that of the year before. In 1943 it produced 79,851 loose boxes of oranges, yielding a gross income of $136,808.71. After deducting all expenses of cultivation, operation, picking and hauling, a net income of $92,153.05 was left. Anticipating a heavy frost after November, 1944, one of the brothers advocated selling the grove before then. Accordingly, in May or June, it was offered for $197,100, complete, including land, trees, unmatured crop, improvements, equipment and a five-acre peach orchard. At about that time the 1944 orange crop was in bloom.
By July the smaller fruit had dropped from the trees and the crop was “set,” but not assured. A purchaser became interested but delayed his decision so as to determine more accurately the probable crop and to cause the sellers to bear more of the expense of its care. He examined past production records and, by early August, received estimates that the 1944 crop might be from 70,000 to 80,000 boxes, which, at current prices, would bring him $120,000 for the crop above expenses. One of Mrs. Watson’s brothers also estimated the 1944 crop at 70,000 boxes if it matured. August 10, the sales price of $197,100 was agreed upon, payable $10,000 in cash and the balance September 1. No allocation of the price between the crop and the rest of the property was specified but the seller bore the expense of caring for the crop up to September 1, amounting to $16,020.54. The sale was carried through and there was no serious frost. The crop filled 74,268 boxes. The purchaser sold them for $146,000, yielding him a net return of $126,000.
Mrs. Watson filed a joint return with her husband, taking full deductions for her'one-third share of all of the business expenses incurred in the cultivation of the crop, but treating her gain from the sale of the grove, including the unmatured crop, as a long-term capital gain. On that basis, her net gain from the sale of the grove was shown as $48,819.82, but, treating it as a long-term capital gain, only 50% of it, or $24,409.91, was included in her taxable income.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency against petitioners, largely based on his claim that whatever part of Mrs. Watson’s income was attributable to the unmatured crop should be treated as ordinary income. He allocated $122,500, out of the $197,100 received for the grove, as attributable to the unmatured crop. On that premise, he assessed a deficiency of $24,101.35 against petitioners on their joint return. On review, the Tax Court, with two judges dissenting, sustained the Commissioner in principle but reduced to $40,000 the portion of the proceeds attributable to the crop. 15 T. C. 800. With other adjustments, not material here, the Tax Court reduced the deficiency to $6,920.35-. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 197 F. 2d 56. In the meantime, the Tax Court made comparable decisions in McCoy v. Commissioner, 15 T. C. 828, and Owen v. Commissioner, P-H TC Memo, ¶ 50,300, each of which was reversed on appeal, 192 F. 2d 486 (C. A. 10th Cir.), and 192 F. 2d 1006 (C. A. 5th Cir.). Shortly before the latter decisions, the Revenue Act of 1951 amended the statute in relation to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1950, to permit proceeds from certain sales of unharvested crops to be treated as capital gains. We granted certiorari in the instant case to resolve the above-indicated conflict of statutory construction still affecting many sales made before 1951. 344 U. S. 895.
The issue before us turns upon the Acts of Congress. In 1951, Congress, for the first time, dealt expressly and specifically with this subject. While that action was prospective only, its terms throw light on the problems of prior years. The adoption of that amendment emphasized the point that the question was one of federal law. Its adoption also recognized that, in order for such income to be a capital gain, an affirmative statement by Congress was needed. Finally, it not only permitted proceeds of unharvested crops to be treated as capital gains under certain circumstances, but it provided that, under those circumstances, the taxpayer could not deduct from his taxable income the expenses attributable to the production of the unharvested crop. Those expenses thereafter must be treated as capital investments added to the basis of the property to which they relate. This emphasizes the impropriety of the interpretation advocated by Mrs. Watson in the instant case. She seeks to deduct her share of the crop cultivation expenses at 100% up to the date of the sale. At the same time, she claims a right to report only 50% of her gain on the sale of those crops to which the cultivation expenses relate. In the instant case, we are dependent upon § 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code, as in effect in 1944. The controlling language in that subsection then required that, in order for gains from the sale of property to be treated as capital gains, the property sold must be “used in the trade or business” of the taxpayer, “held for more than 6 months,” and not “held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade •or business.” In the instant case, the Commissioner contends that, while the land and trees met these and all other tests of the subsection, the unmatured, unharvested crop of oranges met none of the above three.
Each day brought the annual crop closer to its availability for sale in the ordinary course of that business. While the uncertainty of its condition at maturity discounted its current value, nevertheless, its presence contributed substantially to the value of the grove. The Commissioner allocated to the unmatured crop, as of September 1, a value of $122,500 out of the $197,100. The Tax Court reduced this to $40,000. We accept the latter amount now confirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is obvious that the parties to this sale did in fact attribute substantial value to the unmatured crop. If, at any moment, the crop had been stripped from the trees or destroyed by frost, there would have resulted at once a substantial reduction in the sales value of the grove.
Assuming $40,000 to be the value fairly attributable to the presence of the crop in August and September, 1944, it remains for the taxpayer to demonstrate that § 117 (j) has authorized that value, in addition to the value of the land, trees, improvements and equipment, to be treated as a capital gain.
Mrs. Watson and the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have placed emphasis upon a claim that, under the law of the state where the land is situated, an unmatured, unharvested crop, for many purposes, is treated as real property. We regard that as immaterial. Whether or not the crop be real property, the federal income tax upon the gain resulting from its sale is, in its nature, a subject of federal law.
The Commissioner urges two grounds in support of his position that § 117 (j) does not authorize the taxpayer’s treatment of the proceeds of the unmatured crop as a capital gain. The first is that the proceeds fairly attributable to the crop are derived from property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s trade or business. We agree with that contention. Although the property was not sever-able at the date of its sale, there is nothing in the Act requiring it to be severable. While, in previous years, like crops were held for a sale that occurred after maturity, in 1944 the date of that sale came September 1. There is nothing in the Act that distinguishes between the taxable character of a gain derived from a present sale discounting the hazards of the future, and one derived from a later sale when the hazards are past. After the transfer of title to the grove, the crop on the trees retained its character and continued to be held for sale to customers of the grove owner in the ordinary course of the owner’s trade or business.
The Commissioner’s treatment of the proceeds of sales of unmatured crops as ordinary income in the absence of a statutory requirement to the contrary is consistent with the policy evidenced in Williams v. McGowan, 152 F. 2d 570, 572, which established in the Second Circuit, in 1945, the doctrine that “upon the sale of a going business it [the sales price] is to be comminuted into its fragments, and these are to be separately matched against the definition in § 117 (a)(1) . . . It is consistent also with the policy of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Tax Court, dating, at least, from the statement made by the Bureau in 1946, that, under circumstances comparable to those before us, “regardless of their stage of development, any gain realized from the sale of growing crops is ordinary income.”
We do not have here the situation which arises from the sale of land, including coal or other mineral wealth not separated from its natural state and not in the course of annual growth leading to a seasonal separation. See Butler Consolidated Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 183. The instant case also is distinguishable from that of growing timber which is not in itself an annual or short-term product. See Carroll v. Commissioner, 70 F. 2d 806; Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 467.
Having reached this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the Commissioner’s second contention that, because the crop did not come into existence before it was “set” in July, or at least before it was in bloom in May or June, it had not been held by Mrs. Watson for more than six months at the time of its sale.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
In 1942 it yielded 54,939 boxes with a gross income of $82,521.17 and a net of $49,790.10. Its average annual yield from 1934 to 1943 was 55,097 boxes with a gross income of $46,512.68 and a net of $22,141.42.
§ 117 (b) and (c)(2), I. R. C., as amended by § 150 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 843-844, 26 U. S. C. (1940 ed., Supp. V) § 117 (b) and (c)(2).
65 Stat. 500-501, 26 IT. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 117 (j), 24(f), 113 (b)(1).
The Revenue Act of 1951 added to §117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code:
“(3) Sale of LAND with unharvested crop.- — In the case of an unharvested crop on land used in the trade or business and held for more than 6 months, if the crop and the land are sold or exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily converted as described in paragraph (2)) at the same time and to the same person, the crop shall be considered as ‘property used in the trade or business.’ ” 65 Stat. 500, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 117 (j) (3).
And, equally important, it added to § 24 of the Internal Revenue Code:
“(f) Sale op Land With Unharvested Crop. — Where an unharvested crop sold by the taxpayer is considered under the provisions of section 117 (j) (3) as ‘property used in the trade or business,’ in computing net income no deduction (whether or not for the taxable year of the sale and whether for expenses, depreciation, or otherwise) attributable to the production of such crop shall be allowed.” Id,., at 501, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 24 (f).
The purpose of Congress to make this amendment prospective, rather than retroactive, is emphasized in the very next section of the 1951 Act. That section made retroactive to 1942 another amendment to §117 (j). It redefined capital gains so as to include the proceeds of certain sales of livestock, provided such stock be held for draft, breeding or dairy purposes. Stock so held is comparable to the orange trees rather than to the orange crop in the instant case.
In this connection, the Senate Committee on Finance, when reporting the proposed amendment in 1951, said:
“Your committee believes that sales of land together with growing crops or fruit are not such transactions as occur in the ordinary course of business and should thus result in capital gains rather than in ordinary income. Section 323 of the bill so provides.
“Your committee recognizes, however, that when the taxpayer keeps his accounts and makes his returns on the cash receipts and disbursements basis, the expenses of growing the unharvested crop or the unripe fruit will be deducted in full from ordinary income, while the entire proceeds from the sale of the crop, as such, will be viewed as a capital gain. Actually, of course, the true gain in such cases is the difference between that part of the selling price attributable to the crop or fruit and the expenses attributable to its production. Therefore, your committee’s bill provides that no deduction shall be allowed which is attributable to the production of such crops or fruit, but that the deductions so disallowed shall be included in the basis of the property for the purpose of computing the capital gain.
“The provisions of this section are applicable to sales or other dispositions occurring in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1950.
“The revenue loss under this provision is expected to be about $3 million annually.” S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 47-48.
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, 56- Stat. 846:
“SEC. 117. CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES.
“(j) Gains and Losses . . . From the Sale or Exchange op Certain Property Used in the Trade or Business.—
“(1) Definition of property used in the trade or business. — • “For the purposes of this subsection, the term ‘property used in the trade or business’ means property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1), held for more than 6 months, and real property used in the trade or business, held for more than 6 months, which is not (A) property of a kind which would properly be in-' cludible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or (B) 'property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
“(2) General rule. — If, during the taxable year, the recognized gains upon sales or exchanges of property used in the trade or business . . . exceed the recognized losses from such sales, exchanges, and conversions, such gains and losses shall be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than 6 months. If such gains do not exceed such losses, such gains and losses shall not be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets. . . .” (Italics supplied.) See 26 U. S. C. §117 (j).
“The production of fruit from orchards or groves constitutes a business, and section 117 (j) of the Code, supra, is applicable to the sale of an orchard or grove. The crops are produced with the primary purpose of selling the fruit to customers in the ordinary course of the business. Therefore, regardless of their stage of development, any gain realized from the sale of growing crops is ordinary income.
“In view of the foregoing, it is held that, for Federal income tax purposes, where citrus groves are sold with fruit on the trees, a portion of the selling price must be allocated to the fruit and the balance to the land and trees. Gain from the sale of the fruit will constitute ordinary income. Gain from the sale of the land and trees may be treated as capital gain under section 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code, provided the recognized gains from all transactions coming within the purview of that section exceed the recognized losses thereunder.” 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 31.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
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Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
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Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
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Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
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Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
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Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
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Comptroller General
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Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
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Small Business Administration
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Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
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Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
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War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 68