What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee, v. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY/ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
No. 92-1366.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 13, 1992.
Decided Feb. 16, 1993.
Robert A. Horn, Kansas City, MO, argued (Llarry L. McMullen & Sally B. Sur-ridge, on brief), for appellant.
Thomas B. Alleman, Dallas, TX, argued, for appellee.
Before FAGG, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company/St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (St. Paul) appeals the district court’s summary judgment order requiring St. Paul to pay Federal Insurance Company (Federal) for the defense costs incurred by Federal in defending American Angus Association (Angus) in a defamation and antitrust lawsuit. We affirm.
When the alleged defamation and antitrust violation occurred, Angus held liability insurance policies from both St. Paul and Federal. St. Paul’s policy insured Angus against defamation liability, and Federal’s policy insured Angus against defamation and antitrust liability. Both policies required the insurer to defend any lawsuit brought against Angus for damages covered under the insurance policy. Although St. Paul’s policy provided St. Paul would pay for all the costs of defending a lawsuit even if Angus had other excess insurance, Federal’s policy limited its liability with an excess “other insurance” clause that stated: “If any Loss arising from any claim made against the Insured is insured under any other valid policy ... this policy shall cover such Loss ... only to the extent that the amount of such Loss is in excess of the amount of such other insurance_” Federal’s policy included defense costs in its definition of Loss.
When notified of Angus’s lawsuit, St. Paul denied coverage under its policy. Federal defended Angus and filed this diversity action against St. Paul seeking recovery for the cost of defending Angus. Analyzing the case under Missouri law, the district court concluded St. Paul was liable to Federal for all the defense costs plus prejudgment interest accruing from the dates the bills for legal services and expenses were submitted for payment. We review St. Paul’s appeal de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991).
St. Paul contends Federal should pay for part of the defense costs because St. Paul’s policy only insured Angus against defamation liability. We disagree. The insurance policies’ contractual language controls the insurers’ liability for defense costs. See Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co., 716 S.W.2d 348, 365 (Mo.Ct.App.1986). St. Paul's policy obligated St. Paul to pay for the entire cost of defending Angus’s lawsuit even though the antitrust claim was outside the policy’s liability coverage and Angus had other excess insurance. See Harold S. Schwartz & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 705 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (duty to defend entire lawsuit). Federal’s policy, however, only required Federal to pay for the defense costs that exceeded what St. Paul’s policy would pay. Because St. Paul’s policy covered all the defense costs, there was no excess amount for Federal to pay. Cf. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (excess insurer owes nothing when primary policy’s liability limits are not exceeded); Empire Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Mo.Ct.App.1982) (same).
St. Paul also contends the district court improperly awarded and calculated prejudgment interest on Federal’s award for defense costs. Again, we disagree. Missouri law requires prejudgment interest on awards for legal services and expenses when, as in this case, the only contested issue is liability. See Catron v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Mo.1987) (en banc); Whalen, Murphy, Reid, Danis, Garvin & Tobben v. Estate of Roberts, 711 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Mo.Ct.App.1986). Missouri law also requires courts to calculate prejudgment interest from the dates the bills for legal services and expenses were submitted for payment. See Whalen, 711 S.W.2d at 590. Thus, we conclude the district court properly awarded and calculated prejudgment interest on Federal’s award for defense costs.
Accordingly, we affirm.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1