What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Pitt Tyson MANER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant, v. Ingela Idfors MANER, Plaintiff-Appellee.
No. 26267.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
May 13, 1969.
R. Lea Harris, Montgomery, Ala., for defendant-appellant.
Jack Crenshaw, Crenshaw & Waller, Montgomery, Ala., for appellee.
Before RIVES, BELL and DYER, Circuit Judges.
RIVES, Circuit Judge:
Pitt Tyson Maner, Jr. appeals from a judgment of $11,933.83'rendered against him in the Middle District of Alabama. This appeal is the latest litigatory event in a lengthy dispute over separate maintenance awards in favor of Maner’s ex-wife, Ingela Idfors Maner.
Mrs. Maner’s prior suits to enforce the Florida separate maintenance decrees failed because of her failure to reduce the Florida awards to non-modifiable judgments in an amount sufficient to invoke the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, the prior failures were “without prejudice to [her] presenting a subsequent claim based on final judgments from a Florida court.” Maner v. Maner, 302 F.Supp. 894 [M.D.Ala., May 1,1968]. It is undisputed that on February 2, 1968 a Florida circuit court granted Mrs. Maner final judgment on separate maintenance arrearages in the amount of $5,-949.83. This judgment was “in addition to and not a part of” the June 19, 1967 Florida circuit court judgment of $5,-984.00. The district court consequently found:
“On the basis of the Florida judgments entered by a court with personal jurisdiction over the parties and jurisdiction over the martial [sic] res, defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of $11,933.83. There is no dispute as to any material fact in this cause.
“This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties to this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The judgments now sued on are final judgments within the meaning of Art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution of the United States and as such are entitled to full faith and credit and should be enforced by this court. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The broad question raised on this appeal is whether the district court properly gave full faith and credit to these Florida money judgments. We find .appellant’s challenges legally insufficient and affirm.
I.
Appellant raises the question of finality by arguing, first, that the latest circuit court judgment is on appeal and, second, that separate maintenance awards are inherently non-final and unenforceable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Even if an appeal is presently being prosecuted from the circuit court decree, the pendency of such an appeal does not necessarily render non-final a judgment which would otherwise be enforceable under the doctrines of comity or full faith and credit. Under the current Florida practice, a judgment is non-final for enforcement purposes only when an appellant files a supersedeas bond. The record indicates that Mrs. Maner duly recorded the judgment in question and that appellant failed to file a supersedeas bond. The judgment therefore is enforceable notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal. Since the judgment is final for purposes of execution in the state of its rendition, comity compels us to hold that it can be regarded no less than final in Alabama.
The second finality argument urged by appellant is equally unpersuasive. Another panel of this Court said in a prior appeal in this litigation:
“In regard to the enforcement of the Florida alimony decree with respect to installments previously due but unpaid, the full faith and credit clause, Const., Art. IV, § 1, normally would require Alabama courts to enforce that decree unless it were subject to retroactive modification in the state where it was entered. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 682 [54 L.Ed. 905] (1910).”
Maner v. Maner, 401 F.2d 616, 618 (1968). That panel found it unnecessary to determine the question it begged: whether, under Florida law, accrued installment payments are subject to such retroactive modification as would vitiate a foreign suit on the judgment. Although we note that Florida courts generally hold that separate maintenance payments are vested rights not subject to modification, we also find it unnecessary to determine this elusive question of Florida law since Mrs. Maner has reduced the accrued payments to a judgment for a sum certain.
We find no substantial support either in statute or case law for the proposition that a Florida court can modify such a judgment. We, therefore, find that the latest Florida circuit court judgment is final and entitled to enforcement under the doctrine of full faith and credit.
II.
Appellant collaterally attacks the jurisdiction of the Florida circuit court upon whose judgments Mrs. Maner is presently suing. Specifically, appellant argues that the lack of personal service upon himself obviates enforcement of those judgments in Alabama. We find appellant’s argument untenable and hold that the Florida judgments are entitled to enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The record indicates that although Pitt Tyson Maner, Jr. was not personally served with process in the arrearage proceedings, he was apprised of the proceedings and was therein represented by retained counsel. Under Florida law; enforcement of alimony decrees can be had on “reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard.” Kosch v. Kosch, 118 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla.1959). We hold that the arrear-age judgments of June 19, 1967 and February 2, 1968 do not offend Florida’s doctrine of fair notice. Id., Accord: Prensky v. Prensky, 146 So.2d 604, 605 (Fla.App.1962); Arrington v. Brown, 116 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla.App.1959). Consequently, we find that the district court correctly held that the judgments are entitled to enforcement.
Affirmed.
. The factual background of this dipute is reported sub nom. Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 189 So.2d 336 (1966); Maner v. Maner, 302 F.Supp. 894 [M.D.Ala., May 1, 1968]; Maner v. Maner, 5 Cir. 1968, 401 F.2d 616. We are told by supplemental papers filed in this appeal that the parties are now divorced under Alabama law.
. Mrs. Maner’s brief contains an uncerti-fied copy of a dismissal of the appeal from the latest circuit court judgment. Nonetheless, we proceed on the basis of what is told to us by the record: that an appeal is still pending.
. 31 F.S.A. Rule 1.550 (Fla.R.Civ.P. 1967); 32 F.S.A. Rules 5.5, 5.2 (Fla.R. Appellate P. 1967); Jenkins Trucking, Inc. v. Emmons, 207 So.2d 280 (Fla.App.1968), cert. den. 210 So.2d 867 (Fla.1968). See generally, Annot. 5 A.L.R. 1269 (1920). Cf. Bros., Inc. v. W. E. Grace Manufacturing Co., 5 Cir. 1958, 261 F.2d 428, 433 n. 4.
. See, e. g., English v. English, 117 So.2d 559 (Fla.App.1960); Goff v. Goff, 151 So.2d 294 (Fla.App.1963).
. Cf. 4 F.S.A. § 61.14 (1969 Supp.); Adam v. Saenger, 1938, 303 U.S. 59, 62, 58 S.Ct. 454. 82 L.Ed. 649 (Judgment is prima facie evidence of right which it purports to adjudicate).
. U.S.Const., Art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1967); Barber v. Barber, 1944, 323 U.S. 77, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82. Cf. 4 F.S.A. § 61.14, n. 6 (1969 supp.)
Appellant also questions the propriety of the lump sum determination of the district court. We regard this contention as frivolous and merely note that this appeal is from a judgment of debt, not from an equity decree of domestic relations.
. The Florida standard for notice of proceedings to enforce alimony decrees does not offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Repeated personal service is not an essential element of due process in post-decree enforcement proceedings. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 1913, 228 U.S. 346, 353, 33 S.Ct. 550, 57 L.Ed. 867. Cf. Griffin v. Griffin, 1946, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635; Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195, 204-205, 16 L.Ed. 628; Reichert v. Appel, 74 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1954).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1