What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Leslie PYLES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 19709.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 18, 1966.
Decided June 2, 1966.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc and for Rehearing Before the Division Denied August 5, 1966.
Edgerton, Senior Circuit Judge, dissented.
Mr. William J. Dempsey, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellant.
Mr. David B. Wexler, Atty., Dept, of Justice, of the bar of the Court of Appeals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and John H. Treanor, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appel-lee. Mr. John C. Conliff, Jr., U. S. Atty. at the time the record was filed and Mr. John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered appearances for appellee.
Before Edgerton, Senior Circuit Judge, and Burger and McGowan, Circuit Judges.
McGOWAN, Circuit Judge.
On this appeal from a jury conviction of robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon, the only error asserted is that the District Court should, as a matter of law, have held that a statement made by appellant to the arresting officer was involuntary. There is no claim of a procedural defect in this connection, as there could not be since the trial judge scrupulously observed the standards laid down by the Supreme Court for resolving the issue of voluntariness. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed. 2d 908 (1964); and see Hutcherson v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 351 F.2d 748 (1965). The contention is, rather, that, on the testimony given out of the presence of the jury, the trial court was legally required to rule that the admission was involuntary. Our examination of the record does not suggest to us that the court was so circumscribed; and we affirm the conviction.
I
Only one witness testified at the volun-tariness hearing outside the presence of the jury, and that was the arresting officer. He testified that he was on motorcycle patrol at 9 o’clock in the morning of December 23, • 1964, when he received a radio report that a laundry in his vicinity had just been held up. This report included at least a partial description of the man who had committed the hold-up, and the officer went immediately to the scene of the crime. He kept on going in the direction that an onlooker told him the robber had fled. Shortly thereafter he encountered another man who said he had been chasing the robber. Just at that moment the officer caught a glimpse of a man running from an alley into a school yard. The officer rode his motorcycle into the school yard in pursuit. The man made it across the school yard before the officer could reach him, and went out through a gate on the other side and down some steps into the street. Since the officer could not ride his motorcycle through the gate and down the steps, he dismounted, drew his revolver, and shouted to the fleeing man to stop or he would shoot. The man — later identified as appellant — stopped and came back into the school yard as ordered. At this point the officer’s testimony was as follows:
Q. Did you then place this man under arrest?
A. I did.
Q. Now, did you have any conversation with him immediately after placing him under arrest?
A. I brought him back into the school yard, and upon searching him, I asked him what he committed the hold-up for, and he said: I needed the money. At this time I removed a .38 caliber snub-nosed revolver, fully loaded, from his right pants pocket; and in his left front pants pocket, he had some money and a pair of dark sun glasses, which I left in his pocket.
Q. Did you ask him about the hold-up before you removed the gun and the money or afterwards ?
A. This was right after I took the gun out of his pocket.
On cross-examination by appellant’s counsel, the officer added that, after he finished the search, he ordered appellant to lie on the ground, which he did until a scout car arrived and one of the newly-arrived officers placed handcuffs on appellant. The cross-examination ended in this fashion:
Q. When was the so-called confession —when was that given, before the officers from the scout car—
A. Before, yes, sir.
Q. Before they arrived?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he have the handcuffs on?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you have the gun on him at the time he confessed ?
A. I had the gun in my hand.
Q. Not on him but pointing toward him?
A. You might say it was toward him, yes, sir.
Q. I have no further questions.
The Court: Tell me again, what was the conversation you had with the man at the time?
The Witness: The only conversation I had with the Defendant was, I asked him what did he hold the place up for; and he says: I needed the money. That was the extent of the conversation.
After the officer finished his testimony, this colloquy took place between court and defense counsel:
The Court: Do you want to offer any testimony on the subject of volun-tariness or are you relying solely on the statement of the officer ?
Mr. Graham: No, sir, the officer and the Defendant agree almost a hundred per cent on that.
■ The Court: Very well.
When the trial resumed in the presence of the jury, the officer told his story again, appellant testified as well, and the issue of voluntariness went to the jury on the standard voluntariness instructions which were requested in the first instance by the defense.
II
It is urged upon us that the compromising statement made by appellant to the officer must be involuntary as a matter of law because the officer had his gun in his hand when it was made. It is perhaps possible that a person might be so given to nervousness in the presence of firearms, whichever way they happened to be pointing, as to be prone to uncontrollable verbalizing. Appellant, having just been relieved by the officer of a fully-loaded .38 caliber revolver of his own, hardly strikes us as a person of such acute emotional vulnerability. Indeed, appellant argues that it was the particular attitude of the officer’s gun, rather than the mere fact of its presence, which compels the conclusion that his statement was not, in legal contemplation, his own.
It is certainly possible to conceive of circumstances in which the use of a gun in a process of interrogation would have an intimidating effect of such force as to render the answers coerced. The question here, however, is whether the record of the voluntariness hearing in this case disclosed such circumstances. We think not. In the first place, this was not a sustained interrogation carried on in the privacy of the police station. One question was asked, and one answer promptly given, the whole being on an open school yard in broad daylight. The officer did not draw his gun for the purpose of his question. The gun had been drawn earlier as the only way of apprehending the fleeing suspect. The officer was alone with a suspect whose dangerousness was immediately confirmed by the discovery of the loaded gun on his person. Working with such a person at close range and without cover from another policeman, the arresting officer was not obliged to return his gun to its holster until his search was completed and his prisoner had been made fully secure, which latter did not happen until help came in the squad ear and the prisoner was handcuffed by one of the newly-arrived policemen under the covering protection of the others.
There is nothing in these facts to suggest that appellant believed that, if he did not respond to the question as he did, he would promptly be shot in cold blood and in the open view of the world at large. The officer had not embarked upon a persistent interrogation obviously implying a firm purpose to get a confession. His was a remark which is not extraordinary under the strained and fast-moving events which characterized the apprehension of appellant. There is nothing to compel the conclusion that appellant’s response to it was without evi-dentiary value because of the circumstances.
At least, when the trial court made its ruling, appellant had not so represented his state of mind. The defense declined the court’s express invitation to proceed with evidence of its own. Appellant was wholly free at that time, out of the presence of the jury, to give the court his version of the incident and to describe its intimidating effect, if such it was, upon him. This portion of the record closed without a scintilla of evidence on this point. There can, in our view, be really no question of our now saying that, on this evidence taken out of the jury’s presence, the court erred as a matter of law in failing to find involuntariness.
Under the Jackson v. Denno procedure followed in this jurisdiction, the jury was given its independent opportunity to appraise the voluntariness issue. Appellant did testify before the jury. The defense asked for, and got, proper instructions under which, if the jury believed appellant to have been coerced, it would have disregarded the admission. We find nothing in the record to indicate that that issue was not properly before it.
The judgment of conviction appealed from is
Affirmed.
. In his testimony before the jury, the officer said as follows:
A. When I removed the revolver from his right pants pocket, I asked him what did he hold that place up for; and he said: I need the money.
Q. Did you at that time continue to search him?
A. I did.
Q. And what if anything did that search reveal?
A. In his left pants pocket he had numerous amount of paper money, which I didn’t count at that time; and I just stuck it back in his pocket and had him under arrest.
. Although again, it is possible to hypothesize facts from which a legal conclusion of involuntariness would be irresistible even without the prisoner’s testimony, normally it would appear to be true that, as this court has said on one occasion: “To substantiate a defendant’s contention that his confession was involuntary, it is generally necessary for him to take the stand.” Wright v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 45, 250 F.2d 4, 13 (1957). The United States Supreme Court has remarked that the testimony of the prisoner on involuntariness, given out of the jury’s presence, “would be pertinent to the inquiry on admissibility and might be material and determinative” United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38, 72 S.Ct. 97, 99, 96 L.Ed. 48 (1951). And, in specifying the Jackson v. Denno requirements, the Supreme Court said in so many words that one of the moving considerations was to give the accused a chance to testify out of the presence of the jury, free of the deterrent of impeachment as to credibility, so that the determination of voluntariness would not have to be “made upon less than all of the relevant evidence. Cf. United States v. Carignan * * 378 U.S. at 389 n 16, 84 S.Ct. at 1787.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1