What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
TOZZI v. BALLEY.
No. 10848.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
March 31, 1945.
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1945.
Smallpagc & Macomber, Lafayette J. Smallpage, and Forrest E. Macomber, all of Stockton, Cal., for appellant.
Wilson S. Wiley, of Klamath Falls, Ore., for appellee.
Before DENMAN, HEALY, and BONE, Circuit Judges.
DENMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an .appeal from a judgment of the district court holding that appellant had breached an agreement of April 1, 1940, with appellee to sell appellee 10,851 sacks of potatoes f. o. b. cars at Klamath Falls, Oregon, at $1.45 per sack, and awarding damages for the $2,500 paid appellant on account and an additional amount of $2,471.56 for the value of the potatoes over the agreed sales price on April 6, 1940, the day of the breach.
The parties agree that the $2,500 portion of the damages was properly adjudged. The sole question here is whether the evidence supports the award of damages of $2,471.56 for the increased value over the agreed price of the 10,851 bags on April 6, 1940 — that is, an increased value of 22.7-plus cents per bag over the agreed $1.45. The district court found the awarded amount was not in excess of the market price on the date of the breach.
There is evidence that appellee before April 6 received a bona-fide offer of $2 per sack for a contract sale of a May delivery f. o. b. Klamath Falls, Oregon, with an intervening storage charge of a maximum of 20‡ per sack.
It is also admitted that .appellant sold the 10,851 sacks for their additional 22.7-plus cents or for $1.677-plus per sack. The date of this sale as evidence of the market price is not fixed in the record here with reference to April 6, 1940. Exhibit G showing the date of appellant’s sale was before the district court hut not included in the record on appeal. We are hence required to assume that such omitted evidence sustains the district court’s finding that the damages awarded are not above the market price of the date of the contract’s breach. Bakersfield Abstract Co. v. Buckley, 9 Cir., 100 F.2d 530, 531; Carter Oil Co. v. Norman, 7 Cir., 131 F.2d 451, 456; Cooper v. Dasher, 290 U.S. 106, 108, 54 S.Ct. 6, 78 L.Ed. 203.
Appellant contends that the district court erred in not finding the exact market price. In view of what has been said, if this be error, it was harmless error, not prejudicial to appellant.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1