What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Clifford G. MARTIN, Doing Business as Martin Music Company, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No, 14581.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit
Feb. 25, 1956.
Randall S. Jones, Jacob, Jones & Brown, Portland, Or., Harrison W. Call, Sacramento, Cal., Morris Galen, Portland, Or., for appellants.
Warren E. Burger, Asst. Atty., Gen., Richard M. Markus, Samuel D. Slade, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., C. E. Luckey, U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for appellee.
Before STEPHENS, HEALY and POPE, Circuit Judges.
STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the judgment entered on August 10, 1954, by the District Court for the District of Oregon, awarding to the United States the sum of $12,978.10. The suit was brought by the Government on December 1,1952, for a violation of Ceiling Price Regulation (CPR) 34, issued by the Office of Price Stabilization pursuant to its authority under the Defense Production Act of 1950.
Appellant, Martin Music Company, is and was engaged in the business of supplying music by coin-operated phonographs, commonly referred to as “juke boxes”, in the states of Oregon and California. Under CPR 34, the ceiling price base period was set forth as being the period December 19, 1950, to January 25, 1951. Between these dates the appellant charged five cents (5^) per play to persons to whom he furnished music on his machines. During the period September 1, 1951, to May 5, 1952, appellant charged ten cents (10$i) per play or three for a quarter. The difference between the actual revenues received at the price of 10$i or three for a quarter, and the revenues that would have been received at the old price of 5^ per play, amounted to the sum of twenty-five thousand nine hundred fifty-six and 20/100 dollars ($25,956.20).
Appellant’s arrangements with the owners of the locations where he placed his machines, provided that he pay fifty per cent (50%) of the revenues to such owners as the cost for the use of their premises. The United States sued in the district court for a violation of the five-cent ceiling price under CPR 34, and sought treble damages in its complaint pursuant to Section 409(c) of the Defense Production Act. The trial court gave judgment to the United States, holding that “this is not a proper case for the imposition of treble damages” and awarded to the government only fifty per cent of the total overcharges ($12,-978.10), the amount the appellant received from the operation of his machines after deducting the share paid to the owners of the establishments where the juke boxes were installed. From that decision this appeal is taken.
Appellant argues for a reversal on two main points: (1) He contends that his business is specifically exempted from the application of Ceiling Price Regulation 34 by the provisions of the said regulation, because he came within the exemption as to “materials furnished for publication by any press association or feature service”. (2) He further contends that if his “services” were within the contemplation of the General Ceiling Price Regulation and of Ceiling Price Regulation 34, the said prices and such services were exempted from the provisions of the said regulation by General Overriding Regulation 14(GOR 14), 16 Fed.Reg. 6664 as amended 32A G.F.R. 1656 (1951).
As to point (1), we disagree with appellant. The General Ceiling Price Regulation (GCPR) provided in part as follows:
Sec. 14(16 Fed.Reg. 814, as amended, 32A C.F.R. 1460):
“Exemption and Exceptions. This regulation does not apply to the following:
* * -x- * * *
“(c) Prices or rentals for:
“(1) Materials furnished for publication by any press association or feature service.”
This court agrees with the interpretation given to this provision by this circuit in Schinkal v. United States, 9 Cir., 225 F.2d 882, at page 884, in which Judge Chambers stated:
“We find that the appellant makes a very fine argument, but we reject it, believing that the exemption in the act for ‘materials used for publication by any press association or feature service’ was designed to protect sources of public information against control rather than Sehinkal’s publications, if such they be.”
It is to be noted that the Schinkal case, as in this case, involved the “juke box” business.
As to point (2), we also disagree with the appellant. Under General Overriding Regulation 14, it was provided in part as follows:
“Sec. 3. Exceptions.
“(a) No ceiling price regulation now or hereafter issued by the Office of Price Stabilization shall apply to the rates, fees and charges for the supply of the services listed below and the services which fall within the scope of the occupations or categories listed below:
“(2) Actors and actresses;
* * * * * *
“(5) Artists;
“(6) Athletes;
******
“(23) Entertainers;
* * * * » *
“(39) Musicians;
* * * * * *
“(51) Program elements (package productions) furnished by independent contractors (package producers) for use in radio or television broadcasting or in motion picture, theatre, or night club * * *;
“(54) Sports officials; ******
“(77) Managers of actors, actresses and athletes.”
Appellant argues that the Office of Price Stabilization in adopting GOR 14 intended to exempt from the application of CPR 34 all entertainers, and that the “juke box” industry fits within the term “entertainer”. We agree with the government that these portions of the regulation were enacted to exempt certain recognized professional persons whose services are unique and whose charges often depend upon their personal reputations. The appellant does not fall within this classification. This position is borne out by the fact that after the adoption of GOR 14 other forms of entertainment, such as bowling alleys, golf courses, and recreational facilities were clearly covered by O.P.S. regulations and were subject to price control. Thus, the mere fact that a person’s business involved some aspect of entertainment to the public did not per se exempt it from price regulation.
It is to be noted that subsequent to the time period involved in this case an amendment was made to GOR 14 which decontrolled the juke box business. Thus, it can be assumed that before the amendment, juke boxes were under price controls, otherwise there would not have been need for such amendment.
The judgment is affirmed.
. 16 Fed.Reg. 4446, as amended, 32A C.F.R. 732.
. Defense Production Act, Public Law 774, 64 Stats, at Large 798, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 2061 et seq.
. See Note 1.
. See note 1.
. See note 2.
. The government in its brief .contends that there is some doubt as to the propriety of this ruling, in view of an official O.P.S. interpretation which estab-fishes that the person who controls the juke boxes and makes collections is the seller and is liable for the full amount' of overcharges. But the government did not care to raise that issue here.
. GOR. 14, 16 Fed.Reg. 6664 as amended, 32A O.F.R. 1656 (1951). .
. See O.P.S. Release O-130, OCH, Emergency Business Control Service, Par. 70,114.
. General Overriding Regulation 14 Amendment 27 (1952).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1