What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LOGAN v. HAYNES et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
February 8, 1926.)
No. 6993.
Bankruptcy <@=>288(1) — Referee has jurisdiction to determine in summary proceeding claim to property in possession of bankruptcy court, and plenary action by trustee is not necessary.
Where property on which claimant has chattel mortgage is in possession of bankruptcy court or its officer, referee has jurisdiction to determine claim in summary proceeding, and plenary action by trustee is not necessary.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas; John C.. Pollock, Judge.
In the matter of bankruptcy of Frank Haynes. From an order sustaining the order of the referee • allowing the claim of Martha Haynes, J. G. Logan, trustee, appeals.
Affirmed.
Eugene S. Quinton and James E. Larimer, both of Topeka, Kan., for appellant.
R. M. Lee, of Topeka, Kan., for appellees.
Before KENYON and VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judges, and YOUMANS, District Judge.
YOUMANS, District Judge.
This is an appeal from an order in bankruptcy of the District Court of Kansas, sustaining an order of the referee in allowing a claim of Martha Haynes against the bankrupt, Frank Haynes, and overruling objections of the appellant as trustee of said bankrupt estate to said claim.
Eleven errors are assigned by appellant. In his brief, counsel for appellant says:
“All of the specifications of error will be presented as directed to one question of law; the jurisdiction of the referee to determine an adverse claim in a summary proceeding.”
Therefore the only question in the ease is the jurisdiction of the referee to make the order. The sufficiency of the evidence is not questioned.
The claim of Martha Haynes was. a note of the bankrupt, secured by chattel mortgage executed by him on his property. The contention of appellant is that the sole jurisdiction of the referee was to determine whether Martha Haynes, under her chattel mortgage, was an adverse claimant, and, when so ascertained, to make a finding to that effect, and to direct the validity of the mortgage as a lien upon the property therein described to be determined in a plenary suit brought by the trustee. In support of that contention counsel for appellant relies on the case of Babbitt v. Dutcher, 30 S. Ct. 372, 216 U. S. 102, 54 L. Ed. 402,17 Ann. Cas. 969.
In that contention the question of the possession of the claimed property at the time is overlooked. The jurisdiction of the referee in such a case depends upon possession of the property claimed.
In the case of Weidhorn v. Levy, 40 S. Ct. 534, 536, 253 U. S. 268, 271, 64 L. Ed. 898, the Supreme Court said:
“There may be controversies arising in the course of bankruptcy proceedings that are so far connected with those proceedings as to be in effect a part of them and capable of summary disposition by the referee under the general order of reference, although because of their nature or because involving a distinct and separable issue they may be reviewable, under the section cited by appeal rather than by petition to revise. Hewit v. Berlin Machine Works [24 S. Ct. 690] 194 U. S. 296, 300 [48 L. Ed. 986]; Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co. [30 S. Ct. 412] 216 U. S. 545, 553 [54 L. Ed. 610]. Thus, if the property were in the custody of the bankruptcy court or its officer, any controversy raised by an adverse claimant setting up a title to or lien upon it might be determined on summary proceedings in the bankruptcy court, and would fall within the jurisdiction of the referee. White v. Schloerb [20 S. Ct. 1007] 178 U. S. 542, 546 [44 L. Ed. 1183]; Mueller v. Nugent [22 S. Ct. 269] 184 U. S. 1, 13 [46 L. Ed. 405]. But in the present instance the controversy related to property not in the possession or control of the court or of the bankrupt or any one representing him at the time of petition filed, and not in the court’s custody at the time of'the controversy, but in the actual possession of the bankrupt’s brother under an adverse claim of ownership based upon conveyances made more than four months before the institution of the proceedings in bankruptcy. In order to set aside these conveyances and subject the property to the administration of the court of bankruptcy a plenary suit was necessary. Babbitt v. Dutcher [30 S. Ct. 372] 216 U. S. 102, 113 [54 L. Ed. 402, 17 Ann. Cas. 969].”
It thus appears that the jurisdiction of the referee depends upon the possession of the property. In this instance the property was in the custody of the bankruptcy court. It was included in the bankrupt’s schedules. The possession was not being held adversely. The claimant was making her claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. She subfnitted herself and her claim to the jurisdiction of the referee. The referee had jurisdiction to pass on the question as to whether the mortgage constituted a voidable preference. He held that it did not, and he overruled the objections of the trustee.
The order of the District Court,is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0