What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other, not listed, not able to classify". Your task is to determine which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant.

Opinion:
SCHNELL et al. v. UNITED STATES.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
February 4, 1929.
No. 165.
Charles H. Tuttle, U. S. Atty., of New York City (William E. Collins, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for the United States.
Joffe & Joffe, of New York City (Joseph Joffe, of New York City, of counsel), for appellees.
Before MANTON, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
MANTON, Circuit Judge.
This suit seeks to recover cargo damages to onions shipped from Buenos Aires, Argentine, to New York City, N. Y., on March 3, 1922. The cargo arrived on March 24, 1922, and some of the 2,200 cases, although shipped in good condition, wore damaged when landed.
We need not consider the merits of the controversy as to what caused the damage, or whether the vessel was negligent in the stowage, beeauso the failure to file this suit within three months after giving notice of claim, as required by a condition of the bill of lading, is fatal to its maintenance. Clause 15 of the bill of lading provides: “The carriers shall nob be liable for any claim whatsoever unless written notice thereof shall he given to the carrier before removal of the goods from the wharf. No suit to recover for loss or damage shall in any event be maintainable against the carrier unless instituted within three months after the giving of written notice, as above provided. No agent or employee shall have authority to waive any of the requirements of this clause.”
Notice of claim was filed March 25, 1922. The libel was not filed until June 29, 1922. These dates are not in dispute. While the Admiralty Act of March 9, 1920 (chapter 95, § 5,41 Stat. 525 [46 USCA § 745]) grants two years after the cause of action, arises to institute suits, still the parties may contract to a lesser period, and sucli clauses found in the bills of lading are regarded as reasonable. M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 33 S. Ct. 397, 57 L. Ed. 690; Turret Crown (C. C. A.) 284 F. 439; The Susquehanna (C. C. A.) 296 F. 461. The Suits in Admiralty Act was not intended to invalidate existing contracts, good when made. Leigh Ellis & Co. v. Davis, 260 U. S. 682, 43 S. Ct. 243, 67 L. Ed. 460. The appellees are under the burden of showing compliance with this provision of the bill of lading before they can succeed. The Cudahy Packing Co. v. Munson 8. S. Line (C. C. A.) 22 F.(2d) 898; The General Geo. W. Goethals (C. C. A.) 298 F. 935; The San Guglielmo (C. C. A.) 249 F. 588; The Persiana (C. C. A.) 185 F. 396.
The answer did not plead as a defense the commencement of the action after the three months period. But it was amply established at the trial that the suit was not commenced until after the three months period. An application was made and denied to amend the answer, so as to plead this defense. In view of the state of the record at that time, it was an abuso of discretion to refuse the amendment. The appellant’s delay in pleading this defense in no way prejudiced the appellees. Nor did it waive the defense. Correspondence or pending negotiations may have constituted a waiver. The W. R. Grace & Co. v. Panama R. Co. (C. C. A.) 12 F.(2d) 338. But there were none. The bill of lading, specifying the limitation of three months, was in the appellee’s hands when the pleadings wore drawn and the libel was filed. It is not enough to say that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of the bill of lading. The record established that the suit was brought too late, and it will not sustain the decree below. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 36 S. Ct. 75, 60 L. Ed. 226; The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7 S. Ct. 140, 30 L. Ed. 358.
The decree is reversed, with direetions to dismiss the libel, with costs.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "federal government (including DC)", specifically "other, not listed, not able to classify". Which specific federal government agency best describes this litigant?

Choices:
United States - in corporate capacity (i.e., as representative of "the people") - in criminal cases
United States - in corporate capacity - civil cases
special wartime agency
Other unlisted federal agency (includes the President of the US)
Unclear or nature not ascertainable

Answer: 0