What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. LOUISIANA et al.
No. 9,
Orig.
Argued October 9, 1967.
Decided December 4, 1967.
Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Weisl, Richard A. Posner and George S. Swarth.
Victor A. Sachse, Special Assistant Attorney General of Louisiana, argued the cause for defendant State of Louisiana. With him on the brief were Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General, John L. Madden, Assistant Attorney General, and Paul M. Hebert, Thomas W. Leigh, W. Scott Wilkinson, J. B. Miller, Oliver P. Stock-well, J. J. Davidson and Frederick W. Ellis, Special Assistant Attorneys General.
Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, and Houghton Brownlee, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for defendant State of Texas. With them on the brief were George Cowden, First Assistant Attorney General, /. Arthur Sandlin, Assistant Attorney General, A. J. Carrubi, Jr., and Price Daniel.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In United States v. California (the first California case), 332 U. S. 19 (1947), we held that the States did not own the submerged lands off their coastlines and that the United States had paramount rights in these lands. Some States violently objected to this decision claiming that they had historically owned at least out to a distance of three geographical miles from their coastlines; others asserted a historical claim out to three marine leagues from their coastlines. Responding to these objections, Congress in 1953 passed the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1301-1315, which makes two entirely separate types of grants of submerged land to the States. The first is an unconditional grant allowing each coastal State to claim a seaward boundary out to a line three geographical miles distant from its “coast line.” The second is a grant conditioned upon a State’s prior history. It allows those States bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, which at the time of their entry into the Union had a seaward boundary beyond three miles, to claim this historical boundary “as it existed at the time such State became a member of the Union,” but with the maximum limitation that no State may claim more than “three marine leagues” (approximately nine miles). In United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960), we held that Texas qualified for this conditional three-league grant. We did not decide, however, what is the “coast line” from which this three-league grant is measured. That question was specifically reserved. Texas now claims that, for purposes of the three-league grant, its coastline extends to the seaward edge of artificial jetties constructed by it in the Gulf of Mexico and that it is entitled to lease certain submerged lands, portions of which lie more than three leagues from any part of the natural shoreline of Texas, but within three leagues of these jetties. The United States claims these portions for itself and invokes our original jurisdiction for a supplemental decree to that effect. The question we must decide is whether Congress intended that this grant, based as it is on the historical boundaries of the State, be measured from artificial jetties constructed many years after the State’s entry into the Union. For reasons to be stated we reject Texas’ contention and hold, as the Act clearly says, that its three-league claim must be measured to “such boundary as it existed at the time such State became a member of the Union.”
Texas relies heavily on this Court’s prior decision in the second California case, United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139 (1965). Our opinion there, however, dealt, not with the conditional statutory grant we have here, but with the other unconditional grant — the congressional creation of a new and standard three-mile seaward boundary for all coastal States. While some States in the past had claimed three-mile seaward boundaries — a claim explicitly rejected by this Court in the first California case, supra — Congress made it clear by the following wording in § 4 of the Submerged Lands Act that it was establishing a new standard boundary for all coastal States: “Any State admitted subsequent to the formation of the Union which has not already done so may extend its seaward boundaries to a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line . . . 67 Stat. 31, 43 U. S. C. § 1312. The decision in the second California case, supra, held that Congress had left it up to this Court to define the “coast line” from which the standard three-mile grant was to be measured. The Court then borrowed the international definition of coastline in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U. S. T. (Pt. 2) 1607, T. I. A. S. No. 5639, used by the United States in its foreign relations with other countries, reasoning that “[t]his establishes a single coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our future international relations .... Furthermore the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome.” United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, 165 (1965).
Article 8 of this Convention makes the following provision for artificially constructed extensions into the sea: “For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.” [1964] 15 U. S. T. (Pt. 2) 1607, 1609. Thus, it is clear that in the case of the three-mile unconditional grant artificial jetties are a part of the coastline for measurement purposes, and if Texas were claiming under the standard three-mile grant, its argument regarding the jetties would be far more persuasive.
Texas has not claimed the standard three-mile grant, however, but has asserted ownership over three marine leagues or approximately nine miles of submerged land, and this Court has sustained that claim. United States v. Louisiana, supra. This it was allowed to do under that part of the Act providing the special conditional historical grant. There is a critical distinction, however, between this historical grant and the unconditional three-mile grant. The three-mile grant involved in the second California case is not keyed to the State’s boundary as of any particular date, but the three-league grant is keyed to a State’s boundary as of the date it entered the Union. This is clear from the words of § 2 (a) of the Act which state that the historical grant extends “to the boundary line of each such State where in any case such boundary as it existed at the time such State became a member of the Union . . . extends seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three geographical miles_” 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. § 1301. (Emphasis added.) This meaning is reinforced by the wording of § 4 which states that “[n]othing in this section is to be construed as questioning or in any manner prejudicing the existence of any State’s seaward boundary beyond three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State became a member of the Union . . . .” 43 U. S. C. § 1312. (Emphasis added.) This historical grant of three marine leagues is, through § 2 (b) of the Act, made to apply only to those States bordering the Gulf of Mexico. 43 U. S. C. § 1301.
In effect what Congress has done is to take into consideration the special historical situations of a few Gulf States and provide that where they can prove ownership to submerged lands in excess of three miles at the time they entered the Union, these historical lands will be granted to them up to a limitation of three marine leagues. No new state boundary is being created, but a State which qualifies simply is being given the same area it had when it entered the Union. Unlike the three-mile grant where this Court held that Congress left boundary definitions up to it, here Congress granted land the boundaries of which are determined by fixed historical facts. This is clear from the wording of the statute itself. In making the three-mile grant Congress speaks in terms of “three geographical miles distant from its coast line.” 43 U. S. C. § 1312. (Emphasis added.) In the three-league grant, however, the term “coast line” is omitted and in its place the word “boundary” is used with the following express qualification: “as it existed at the time such State became a member of the Union . . . ,” No definitions are required by this Court and there is no need to resort to international law; Texas has simply been given that amount of submerged land it owned when it entered the Union.
Thus, the State of Texas, which has been allowed by the United States to claim a larger portion of submerged lands because of its historical situation, is limited in its claim by fixed historical boundaries. It may not combine the best features of both grants in order to carve out the largest possible area for itself. If it wishes to take advantage of the present three-mile grant then it may use its present coastline as defined by Article 8 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra, to include artificial jetties. But if Texas wishes to take under the more expansive historical grant, it must use boundaries as they existed in 1845 when Texas was admitted to the Union. At that time there were no artificial jetties in existence so obviously they are not considered.
It cannot be ignored that the application of the Convention to Texas here would allow Texas, unlike all other States except Florida, to expand its own state boundaries beyond the congressional limitation simply because of a rule governing the relationships between maritime nations of the world. This is a domestic dispute which must be governed by the congressional grant. There is no reason why an international treaty should be applied when it simply works to take away land from the United States in order to give to Texas more land than it ever claimed historically. We cannot believe that Congress intended such a result.
Thus, we hold today that the congressional grant to Texas of three marine leagues of submerged land is measured by the historical state boundaries “as they existed” in 1845 when Texas was admitted into the Union. The United States is entitled to a supplemental decree to this effect, and we grant 60 days to each of the parties in which to submit proposed supplemental decrees for our consideration.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Louisiana was the only State to raise the question and our answer was as follows: “We decide now only that Louisiana is entitled to submerged-land rights to a distance no greater than three geographical miles from its coastlines, wherever those lines may ultimately be shown to be.” 363 U. S., at 79. (Emphasis added.)
In United States v. Florida, 363 U. S. 121 (1960), we held that Florida also was entitled to the historical three-league grant. Since historical claims by the other Gulf States of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were rejected in United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1 (1960), Texas and Florida are the only two States which qualify for the expansive grant of three marine leagues instead of the grant of three miles.

Question: Who is the respondent of the case?

Choices:
attorney general of the United States, or his office
specified state board or department of education
city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
state commission, board, committee, or authority
county government or county governmental unit, except school district
court or judicial district
state department or agency
governmental employee or job applicant
female governmental employee or job applicant
minority governmental employee or job applicant
minority female governmental employee or job applicant
not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
retired or former governmental employee
U.S. House of Representatives
interstate compact
judge
state legislature, house, or committee
local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
state or U.S. supreme court
local school district or board of education
U.S. Senate
U.S. senator
foreign nation or instrumentality
state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
state college or university
United States
State
person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
advertising business or agency
agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
airline
distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
American Medical Association
National Railroad Passenger Corp.
amusement establishment, or recreational facility
arrested person, or pretrial detainee
attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
author, copyright holder
bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
water transportation, stevedore
bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
brewery, distillery
broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
construction industry
bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
business, corporation
buyer, purchaser
cable TV
car dealer
person convicted of crime
tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
chemical company
child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
religious organization, institution, or person
private club or facility
coal company or coal mine operator
computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
consumer, consumer organization
creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
defendant
debtor
real estate developer
disabled person or disability benefit claimant
distributor
person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
drug manufacturer
druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
electric equipment manufacturer
electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
eleemosynary institution or person
environmental organization
employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
father
female employee or job applicant
female
movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
fisherman or fishing company
food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
franchiser
franchisee
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
person who guarantees another's obligations
handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
hospital, medical center
husband, or ex-husband
involuntarily committed mental patient
Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
insurance company, or surety
inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
investor
injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
juvenile
government contractor
holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
magazine
male
medical or Medicaid claimant
medical supply or manufacturing co.
racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
minority female employee or job applicant
manufacturer
management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
mother
auto manufacturer
newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
radio and television network, except cable tv
nonprofit organization or business
nonresident
nuclear power plant or facility
owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
tender offer
oil company, or natural gas producer
elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
out of state noncriminal defendant
political action committee
parent or parents
parking lot or service
patient of a health professional
telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
public interest organization
physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
pipe line company
package, luggage, container
political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
indigent, needy, welfare recipient
indigent defendant
private person
prisoner, inmate of penal institution
professional organization, business, or person
probationer, or parolee
protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
public utility
publisher, publishing company
radio station
racial or ethnic minority
person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
realtor
journalist, columnist, member of the news media
resident
restaurant, food vendor
retarded person, or mental incompetent
retired or former employee
railroad
private school, college, or university
seller or vendor
shipper, including importer and exporter
shopping center, mall
spouse, or former spouse
stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
retail business or outlet
student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
tenant or lessee
theater, studio
forest products, lumber, or logging company
person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
trucking company, or motor carrier
television station
union member
unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
union, labor organization, or official of
veteran
voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
wholesale trade
wife, or ex-wife
witness, or person under subpoena
network
slave
slave-owner
bank of the united states
timber company
u.s. job applicants or employees
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service

Answer: 27