What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BETHLEHEM SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION, Limited, et al. v. MONAHAN, Deputy Com’r., et al.
No. 2739.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Dec. 17, 1932.
La Rue Brown, of Boston, Mass. (Elias Eield, Richard H. Field, and Brown, Field & McCarthy, all of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellants.
Raymond F. Barrett, of Boston, Mass. (William J. Holbrook, of .Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellee Leon E. Simpson.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges. ,
BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit-to enjoin the enforcement of a compensation order made under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (33 IT. S. C. § 901 et seq, [33 USCA § 901 et seq.]). In the District Court the plaintiffs contended that the entire award of the Deputy Commissioner was not in accordance with law, in that (1) there was no evidence before him to justify his finding that the employer neglected to furnish medical1 treatment to its employee, Simpson; and (2) that the general finding of the Commissioner that the employer neglected to furnish medical treatment was inconsistent with his specific findings.
.The District Court found and ruled that the compensation order was in accordance with law in so far as it awarded Simpson compensation for medical services of Dr. Ryan, the services furnished at the Weymouth Hospital, and the services of the nurse, Mrs. Campbell, but was not to the extent that it required the plaintiffs'to pay for the surgical services of Dr. Brown, and enjoined the enforcement of the order in fhe latter respect only. It is from this decree in so far as 'it upheld the order of the Commissioner that this appeal is taken.
The question presented relates to the liability of the plaintiffs under section 7(a) of the act, 33 U. S. C. § 907 (a), 33 TTS.CA § 907(a), for the services in question.
The facts as found by the Commissioner-are: - That on March 14, 1931, Simpson, while employed by the shipbuilding corporation, received an occupational injury to the thumb on his left hand necessitating amputation of a portion of it; that the plaintiffs furnished medical treatment by Drs. McCausland and Burke until April 11, 1931; that on that day, Saturday, at about 2 o’clock p. m., Simpson went to Dr. McCausland for treatment, complaining of severe pain in the left arm; that Dr; McCausland examined mm and found red streaks extending up the arm, which condition he diagnosed as lymphangitis ; that he applied hot bandages and directed the patient to go home and put hot dressings on the thumb every two hours; that Dr. McCausland then told Simpson he would be absent from home until the following Monday and advised that, if the treatment did not give relief, to get in touch with Dr. Burke or Dr. Jones, the plant physicians for the employer; that Simpson follow-, ed the instructions, but did not obtain any relief and about 8 o’clock on the same day he went for advice to the home of Dr. Mitchell, first-aid man at the plant of the employer; that Mitchell declined to treat him, but told him to follow the directions of Dr. McCausland, and, if he did not get relief, to get in touch with Dr. Burke or Dr. J ones; that later that evening, the pain became more intense, the red streaks wider, and swelling developed in the left auxilliary glands; that thereupon an effort was made in Simpson’s behalf to secure the services of Dr. Burke and Dr. Jones, but without success in either ease; that an emergency existed; that immediate medical attention was necessary to prevent the spread of the infection in Simpson’s left arm and his possible death; and that the employer neglected to furnish such medical attention; that in this situation Dr. Ryan, Simpson’s own physician, was called at about 11 p. m. that night to attend him; that'when Dr. Ryan arrived Simpson was in a serious condition, suffering from blood poisoning, and was ordered immediately to the Weymouth Hospital, where he remained from April 11 to April 26, 1931; that Dr. Ryan found it necessary to consult Dr. Brown, a surgeon; that on April 16, 1931, Dr. Brown saw Simpson at the Weymouth .Hospital, found a septic condition, and removed several crusts over the thumb of the left hand and also removed an embedded suture. Also that the services of Dr. Ryan, Dr. Brown, the facilities at the Weymouth Hospital, and the services of the nurse were necessary; that these doctors furnished the employer and the Deputy Commissioner a proper report within twenty days following the first treatment; and that the bills of the doctors, the hospital, and the nurse were reasonable.
The evidence before the Commissioner discloses that the plaintiff knew of Simpson’s injury; that they had been requested to furnish medical and surgical assistance, and that they had furnished it down to the afternoon of April 11; that then Dr. McCausland, the physician and surgeon in charge, went away without arranging with Dr. Burke or Dr, Jones to 'attend the patient, and at a time when he had reason to believe that the patient was liable to need' their attention, but left it upon Simpson to get in touch with Dr. Burke or Dr. Jones; and that soon there.after, on that day, his condition became critical, requiring immediate attention. The claimant’s evidence shows that while he was in this critical condition, suffering pain, his wife sent her brother to a nearby grocery store to call one of these doctors over the telephone, but that neither one was at home and it was unknown when they would return home or where they were; that in this extremity Dr. Ryan was called at about 11 p. m., and on his arrival, the claimant being in a serious condition, suffering from blood poisoning, the doctor ordered him taken to the hospital. In this situation it cannot reasonably be said that there was no evidence from which it could be found that the plaintiffs had neglected to provide the necessary medical treatment and care for the claimant. Moreover, it appears that when the plaintiffs, on April 14, objected to the employment of Dr. Brown and endeavored to have Dr. Ryan select a doctor froni one of three that they named to perform the necessary surgical operation, they raised no objection to the services rendered or reasonably necessary to be rendered by Dr. Ryan or the nurse or to the facilities afforded by the hospital, but recognizing their failure, impliedly assented thereto. The evidence not only warrants a finding that the plaintiffs had neglected to provide necessary medical attention and care, but, having done so, they assented to the rendition of services by Dr. Ryan, the use of the hospital, and the services of the nurse.
The general finding of the Commissioner —that the employer neglected to furnish medical treatment—is not inconsistent with his special findings or they with it.
The decree of the District Court is affirmed, with costs to the appellee Leon E. Simpson.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99