What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEAFARE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, and Trenor Corporation; Central Fidelity Bank, Defendants.
No. 86-1183.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 2, 1987.
Decided Oct. 16, 1987.
See also, D.C., 614 F.Supp. 525.
John G. Trimpi (C. Everett Thompson, II, Elizabeth City, N.C., on brief), for defendant-appellant.
Barbara Brandon Weyher (Joseph Walker Yates, III, Raleigh, N.C., on brief) for plaintiff-appellee.
Before WIDENER and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
WIDENER, Circuit Judge:
Seafare Corporation (Seafare) appeals the granting of summary judgment against it and in favor of plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for that court to hold this proceeding in abeyance until the constructive trust claims pending in the state court are resolved.
At issue in both this proceeding and the one pending in the state court of North Carolina is the claim to certain insurance proceeds to be paid on a policy covering the Seafare Restaurant (restaurant) in Nags Head, North Carolina. The Seafare Restaurant burned on August 23, 1984. Prior to 1983, the restaurant was owned by Sea-fare. In that year, Seafare conveyed the restaurant to William A. Stafford, who in turn conveyed the property to Trenor Corporation. Trenor took possession of the restaurant in March 1983 and continued in possession until the restaurant was destroyed by fire. St. Paul insured the restaurant against loss including loss by fire. While Central Fidelity Bank held a mortgage on the property, it was not listed as a loss payee on the insurance policy. Trenor was the only one listed on that policy as the named insured.
On or about September 1984, Seafare filed a state civil action in the Dare County, North Carolina Superior Court against Trenor, St. Paul and others. Seafare claimed that the transfer of the restaurant from Stafford to Trenor was fraudulent because Stafford had taken title of the restaurant only as a fiduciary for Seafare’s benefit in order to aid the financially distressed Sea-fare. Seafare sought to have the transaction set aside. Seafare alleged that it was entitled to a constructive trust on Trenor’s insurance proceeds to be paid by St. Paul.
In March 1985, St. Paul filed the instant declaratory judgment action seeking to adjudicate all of the claims to the insurance proceeds payable on account of the restaurant fire. In its complaint, St. Paul alleged that it was not obligated to pay the proceeds to Trenor because Trenor intentionally set the fire that destroyed the restaurant. St. Paul claimed that it was under no obligation to pay the proceeds to either Central Fidelity Bank or Seafare because neither was a named insured or loss payee on the policy and that both were subject to St. Paul’s claimed arson defense as to Trenor.
Seafare answered that it was entitled to the insurance proceeds because of Trenor’s fraud. Additionally, Seafare referred to the suit it had initiated in state court that was still pending at that time.
Prior to trial, St. Paul moved, pursuant to Fed.Civ.Proc. 56, for summary judgment against Seafare and Central Fidelity Bank. In opposing the motion, Seafare argued that it was entitled to recovery based upon a constructive trust theory and the doctrine of trust pursuit. Under the doctrine of trust pursuit, the beneficiary of a constructive trust may assert his rights in the proceeds from the disposition of trust property. These proceeds must be capable of being traced through any intermediate transfers, but even property which has been converted from one form to another (e.g. from a restaurant, to the charred remains of the restaurant, to the insurance proceeds, as here) may be so pursued. See Edgecombe Bank & Trust Co. v. Barrett, 238 N.C. 579, 78 S.E.2d 730 (1953); see generally 5 Scott, The Law of Trusts § 521 (3rd ed. 1967). The district court rejected Seafare’s contentions and granted summary judgment in favor of St. Paul, concluding that “There is nothing in either St. Paul’s complaint or Seafare’s answer that gives rise to such a claim [constructive trust and trust pursuit claims] in the action. Further, Seafare has not filed any counterclaim or cross-claim.”
We conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Seafare. Seafare was not required to counterclaim and thereby litigate its fraud, constructive trust, and trust pursuit claims'in this action because it already had a pending state court action raising these very issues. Seafare had referred to its pending state court action in its answer to St. Paul's complaint, and a copy of that state court complaint was submitted to the district court for consideration.
FRCP 13(a) provides, with respect to a compulsory counterclaim, that "... the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action____” Since Seafare’s claim was “the subject of another pending action” in the state court, the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Sea-fare while its claims were pending in the state court. Accord, United States v. Sarman, 699 F.2d 469 (9th Cir.1983) (a claim in a state court is “another pending action” under Rule 13(a)).
The policy defense St. Paul asserted in this declaratory judgment action was arson on the part of Trenor. Yet that matter has never been adjudicated, and St. Paul’s settlement with Trenor and Central Fidelity with full knowledge of Seafare’s constructive trust and trust pursuit claims as to the insurance proceeds, coupled with summary judgment against Seafare, would effectively bar Seafare from ever litigating the merits of its claim against St. Paul although it complied with every rule of federal procedure.
We are of opinion that, on remand, the district court should hold this case in abeyance pending the outcome of Seafare’s constructive trust and trust pursuit claims in the state court. If Seafare prevails in the action in the state court, then the district court should try the arson policy defense.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
. Central Fidelity Bank also filed a suit in the Dare County, North Carolina Superior Court seeking reformation of the insurance policy so that it could be named as a loss payee beneficiary and that it thereby recover from St. Paul enough of the insurance proceeds to cover payment of the outstanding mortgage it held on the property.
. Seafare also claimed fraud on the part of Central Fidelity Bank. That claim is not relevant to this appeal.
. Central Fidelity Bank, Trenor Corporation and St. Paul eventually entered into a settlement of all their claims.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1