What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, a Corporation, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 12577.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Dec. 11, 1959.
Bernard G. Segal, Philadelphia, Pa., E. B. McGuinn, Chicago, Ill., Teschke, Burns, Maloney & McGuinn, Chicago, Ill., Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa., Almore H. Teschke, Chicago, Ill., Irving R. Segal, Josephine H. Klein, Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner.
Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, Marion L. Griffin, Thomas J. McDermott, Associate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. General Counsel, Frederick U. Reel, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Isaac N. Groner, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae.
Before DUFFY, KNOCH, and CASTLE, Circuit Judges.
DUFFY, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition to review a decision and order issued by the National Labor Relations Board (Labor Board) under § 10(f) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-166, and a cross-petition by the Labor Board for enforcement of that order.
The instant case was designated before the Labor Board as No. 4-CA-1576. The Board issued an order requiring United Insurance Company of America (United) to bargain collectively with Insurance Agents’ International Union, AFL-CIO (Union) as the collective bargaining agent for the “Licensed Debit Agents” who serve United in Pennsylvania.
On July 22, 1953, Local No. 5, Insurance Workers of America, CIO, filed a petition with the Labor Board seeking certification as collective bargaining agent for United’s debit agents operating in Philadelphia. This proceeding was designated Case No. 4-RC-2052. On August 26, 1953, Insurance Agents’ International Union, AFL, filed a petition seeking certification as collective bargaining agent for United’s debit agents in Harrisburg, Pittsburgh and Hanover, Pennsylvania. The designation of this proceeding was Case No. 4-RC-2110. These two petitions were consolidated for a hearing which was held on October 12 and 13, 1953.
In a decision dated May 11, 1954 (108 NLRB 843) the Board held that the debit agents were employees of United rather than independent contractors. The Board further held that the appropriate bargaining unit consisted of all debit agents serving United throughout the state of Pennsylvania. Since the CIO Union did not wish to appear on a ballot for a state-wide unit, its petition for certification was dismissed by the Board. On May 28, 1954, the AFL Union withdrew its petition for certification. No election was held. No further proceedings were had in these cases.
Two and a half years after the original certification petitions were voluntarily dismissed and withdrawn respectively, the present Union filed a petition seeking certification as collective bargaining agent for all the debit agents serving United in Pennsylvania. An agreement was entered into between United and the Union for a consent election.
An election and a re-run election were held. The Union won the re-run election and on May 7, 1957, the Acting Regional Director of the Labor Board certified the Union as collective bargaining agent for all debit agents serving United’s industrial insurance policies in Pennsylvania. United refused to bargain, claiming it was under no obligation to bargain with the Union because the “licensed debit agents who work in Pennsylvania * * were and are independent contractors and not employees within the meaning of the Act.”
United is an Illinois corporation engaged in the insurance business. It issues commercial and industrial life, health and accident, and hospitalization insurance policies. By Pennsylvania law, industrial life insurance is sold in policies of less than $1000 on a weekly premium basis. Debit agents are engaged primarily in selling and collecting premiums on industrial life insurance policies issued by United. However, they, at times, collect premiums on other types of insurance policies issued by United.
In order to sell insurance, an agent must be licensed by the state. The license authorizes him to sell specific types of insurance for a specific company. However, some agents are licensed to sell insurance for more than one company.
The principal issue litigated at the hearing before the Labor Board was whether the debit agents were employees of United or independent contractors. In many respects, a debit agent has the attributes of an independent contractor. After being introduced to his initial policy holders by his superintendent, he is largely on his own. He sets his own hours of work and work days. He pays his own expenses such as transportation, advertising, postage and gifts to policy holders or prospects.
On the other hand, there are a number of aspects of the duties of debit agents which might indicate their status is that of employees of United. The Labor Board so found in both the 1954 Proceedings and in the instant case. However, we do not reach that question. We are met with a threshold question of whether United has been denied procedural due process.
It is true that in the 1954 Proceedings (4-RC-2052 and 4-RC-2110) the Labor Board determined the debit agents were employees of United, but United had no opportunity to have that adverse decision reviewed. The petition of one Union was dismissed because that Union did not wish to appear on a ballot for a statewide election, and the other Union, with the Labor Board's consent, withdrew its petition before an election was held. Yet, two and a half years later, a Board consisting almost completely of different members than those who considered the 1954 Proceedings, gave binding effect to the earlier Board decision.
The Labor Board is a continuing body. Changes in membership are usually of no moment as to decisions made by the Board. But the trial examiner set the tempo of the instant proceedings when he took the position that he was bound by the Findings of Fact made by the Labor Board in the 1954 Proceedings. He did not make any findings or rulings of his own, nor express an opinion on the basic question of whether debit agents were employees of United within the meaning of the Act. In its final order, the Labor Board approved the examiner’s rulings.
We hold the decision of the Labor Board in the 1954 Proceedings could not serve as a substitute for evidence in the instant proceeding. We approve the rationale of the decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia (Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Leedom, D.C.1959, 174 F.Supp. 171). The Court there said, at page 174: “ * * * And, as indicated by the defendant, the Board itself has held that a prior Board determination of employee status is not binding in future representation proceedings, especially where, as here, there is no bargaining history (Citing cases). A fortiori, a prior Board determination of employee status in a representation proceeding would not be binding in a future unfair labor practice proceedings.”
The order of the Labor Board must be and is set aside and remanded for a full hearing and decision based upon a consideration of all relevant evidence. The cross-petition of the Labor Board for enforcement of its order is denied.
. These cases will be referred to as “The 1954 Proceedings.”
. Paragraph 13 of that Agreement provided: “By consenting to this Agreement (United) does not waive its position that licensed debit agents of United Insurance Company of America are independent contractors and not employees but waives the right to raise such issue in these proceedings.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1