What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Charles L. FARRAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUTHERAN BROTHERHOOD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 92-2983.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued April 7, 1993.
Decided May 3, 1993.
Opinion Denying Rehearing June 7, 1993.
Raymond J. Hafsten, Jr. (argued), Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert K. Bellamy (argued), Tim A. Baker, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants-appellees.
Before EASTERBROOK and KANNE, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.
Hon. Albert J. Engol, of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), holds that a stockbroker who agrees to arbitrate disputes covered by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange must arbitrate with his employer a claim arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Charles Farrand agreed with the Lutheran Brotherhood financial companies to arbitrate “any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm ... that is required to be arbitrated under the rules ... of the organizations with which I register”. Gilmer and Farrand signed identical agreements, securities industry Form U-4. But while Gilmer registered -with the NYSE, Far-rand registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers. We must decide whether the rules of the NASD require arbitration of employment disputes.
The district court dismissed the suit on the authority of Gilmer. The judgment states: “This cause is dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, nothing in Order [sic] shall prevent Plaintiff from arbitrating his claims against Defendants.” An order dismissing a complaint “without prejudice” usually is not appealable, because the plaintiff may file an amended complaint. The judgment and accompanying opinion show, however, that no amendment is possible, which makes the order final and appeal-able. “Without prejudice” means only “without detriment to Farrand’s ability to present the claims to an arbitrator.” Although the defendants asked the court to “compel arbitration,” the judgment rightly does not do so. Farrand may elect between arbitration and accepting his termination; all the judge decreed was that Farrand could not pursue his ADEA claim in court. So 9 U.S.C. § 16(b) does not pose an obstacle to Farrand’s appeal — which would in any event be proper because the district court conclusively disposed of all issues in the case. S + L + H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir.1993); Perera v. Siegel Trading Co., 951 F.2d 780 (7th Cir.1992).
Several district courts have held that persons registered with the NASD must arbitrate disputes arising out of their employment. E.g., Foley v. Presbyterian Ministers’ Fund, 1992 W.L. 63269 (E.D.Pa.); Gardner v. Benefits Communication Corp., 1991 W.L. 294564 (D.D.C.). None of these opinions quotes the language of the NASD’s rules; each assumes that Gilmer turned on the clause in the securities industry form rather than the provisions of the exchange’s rules. Yet the form refers only to arbitration “required ... under the rules ... of the organizations with which I register”. Rule 347 of the NYSE provides for arbitration of “[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative”. The NASD lacks any similar rule. Instead it adopted a Code of Arbitration Procedure, § 1 of which provides:
This Code of Arbitration Procedure is prescribed ... for the arbitration of any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the Association, with the exception of disputes involving the insurance business of any member which is also.an insurance company:
(1) between or among members;
(2) between or among members and public customers, or others; and
(3) between or among members, registered clearing agencies with which the Association has entered into an agreement to utilize the Association’s arbitration facilities and procedures, and participants, pledgees or other persons using the facilities of a registered clearing agency, as these terms are defined under the rules of such a registered clearing agency.
Section 8 of the Code requires arbitration of all disputes within the scope of § 1.
Lutheran Brotherhood picks out the language “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the Association” and insists that the NASD’s rule is universal. That would be an appropriate reading if the rule stopped at the colon. But it continues with language that the Brotherhood does not mention. The text following the colon establishes which matters are arbitrable. Thus, for example, § 1(2) when read in conjunction with the body of the rule calls for arbitration of “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the Association ... between or among members and public customers, or others”. At oral argument the Brotherhood seized on “or others”, contending that this extends § 1 to all persons. Yet such a reading of “or others” would make all of the words after the colon surplus. What is the point of writing down a list of parties, only to sweep everything off the table with a comprehensive “or others”? Language of this kind in a list usually means “others” similar to preceding terms — here, perhaps, clients who for technical reasons cannot properly be called “public customers.” Perhaps the term establishes a form of pendent party jurisdiction: “others” may be added to the arbitration of a dispute between a member and a public customer.
It would not exceed the bounds of reason for the NASD or the SEC to conclude that “or others” has the purport Lutheran Brotherhood finds there. But neither the SEC nor the NASD has published an interpretation of this language. The NASD adopted its Code of Arbitration Procedure in 1968, when the rules of such organizations did not require the SEC’s approval. Until the 1975 amendments to §§ 15A and 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78s(b)(l), changes in the NASD’s rules became effective unless the SEC objected. The NASD did not have to submit explanations of its rules, and the SEC did not explain why it let them go into force. So there is no paper trail that might assist in interpretation.
The Arbitration Act tells courts to treat arbitration agreements the same as other contracts. 9 U.S.C. § 2. No contract, no arbitration. AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). Gilmer did not establish a grand presumption in favor of arbitration; it interpreted and enforced the texts on which the parties had agreed. The NYSE’s Rule 347 and the NASD’s Code of Arbitration Procedure are dissimilar. Bereft of interpretive assistance, we conclude that § 1 of the NASD’s Code does not authorize, and § 8 therefore does not require, the arbitration of an employment dispute between a member of the NASD and one of the member’s registered representatives. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for adjudication on the merits.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1