What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
50 EAST 75TH STREET CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 228.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 17, 1935.
White & Case, of New York City (Russell D. Morrill, Henry Mannix, and Francis L. Casey, all of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and John G. Remey, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Before MANTON, L. HAND, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.
The taxpayer, 50 East 75th Street Corporation, purchased in 1926 a tract of land in New York City known as Nos. 46 to 62 East Seventy-Fifth Street, and, on October 26 of that year, made an agreement with the 812 Park Avenue Corporation, hereafter called the owner, to convey to it the plot and erect thereon an apartment house. In return, the taxpayer was to receive stock of the owner corporation which carried with it the right to proprietary leases of apartments for 99 years at the rate of $1 per year in accordance with a plan allotting certain shares to certain apartments. It was further agreed that the taxpayer should have the right to sell the stock of the owner and that the purchasers from it of blocks of stock should receive proprietary leases of apartments in the building as designated on the plan. Under a form of subscription agreement made a part of the contract, purchasers of stock from the taxpayer were to pay the purchase price in eight installments of 10 per cent, each, and one of 20 per cent., which were to be paid as the building progressed, the final installment to be paid when a certificate of occupancy was issued by the municipal authorities.
In 1926 and 1927 the taxpayer constructed the building containing 35 apartments and received 20,100 shares of no par value capital stock which had cost $67.20 per share. During 1927 the taxpayer sold 10,290 shares of stock of the owner to twenty-two persons under installment contracts, who took a corresponding number of apartments and agreed to pay a net contract price of $1,013,683.47 by installments. The book profit from these sales was $322,-195.47, but the cash received was only 52.54 per cent, of the net contract price. The taxpayer returned a profit of $169,-281.50, or 52.54 per cent, of the total, but the Commissioner claimed that the whole amount was taxable and so the Board of Tax Appeals held. The taxpayer relied on section 212 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (26 USCA § 953 (d), which provided that: “Under regulations prescribed by the commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on the installment plan may return as income therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the total profit realized or to be realized when the payment is completed, bears to the total contract price. In the case (1) of a casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property for a price exceeding $1,000, or (2) of a sale or other disposition of real property, if in either case the initial payments do not exceed one-fourth of the purchase price, the income may, under regulations prescribed by the commissioner with the approval of the Secretary, be returned on the basis and in the manner above prescribed in this subdivision. * * * ”
We think the Commissioner was right in not regarding the taxpayer as “a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on the installment plan.” 'The first provision of section 212 (d) was perhaps intended primarily to relieve persons engaged in selling furniture or other chattels on the installment plan from paying a profit tax on the entire transaction at the outset, when, owing to the failure of the purchasers to meet all their payments, nothing like the expected profit might ever be realized. While we do not suggest that the provisions will only mitigate the sorrows of persons engaged in selling chattels on the installment plan, it seems clear that it was not intended to include the disposition of a single block of stock sold in order to close out one enterprise, but rather contemplated a business that was to continue for a substantial period of time and to involve numerous transactions. It certainly did not relate to a corporation marketing a single block of stock and then going out of business.
But if the taxpayer was not “regularly engaged” in the installment business, we think it was engaged in making “casual” sales to wind up its adventure and thus was entitled to the benefits of the later clause of section 212 (d).
The Treasury Department in G. C. M. 1162 VI-I.C.B. p. 22, remarked: “* * * It is probable that the corresponding expression ‘casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property’ was intended by Congress to serve no other or different purpose than to designate personal property transactions other than those entered into by regular dealers in the commodity.”
We think that the Board of Tax Appeals should have applied the provisions of section 212 (d) embracing “casual” sales and should have determined the taxable income of the petitioner for the year 1927 on that basis.
Last of all, it is claimed by the taxpayer that assessments on stock held‘for sale were not capital expenditures to be added to the price of its stock as determined by the Board, but were ordinary and necessary business expenses to be deducted from its income in assessing the tax.
In the contract between the taxpayer and the owner, it was provided that funds needed to amortize the mortgage on the property, to pay mortgage interest, taxes, and maintenance were to be raised by periodical assessments on the stockholders -in proportion to their holdings. Under that agreement the taxpayer, during 1927, paid assessments on stock amounting to $14,739.80, of which $4,341.20 was paid on shares sold during that year. It is conceded that $4,341.20 should be allowed as additional cost of stock sold during 1927, but the taxpayer asserts that the balance is deductible from its income as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
Some of the expenditures such as those to amortize a mortgage on the property were capital expenditures, while others incurred for interest, taxes, and maintenance of the building, were for current business outlays. It is to be remembered that the taxpayer was not merely a stockholder, but also owned or controlled leases of apartments which it was endeavoring to dispose of. While these leases remained - undisposed of and the taxpayer had to bear the upkeep, we can see no reason why current obligations incurred for maintenance were not ordinary and necessary business expenses. We think by the analogy of J. A. Dart v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 74 F.(2d) 845, and Biscayne Trust Co., Executor, v. Com’r, 18 B. T. A. 1015, 1022, current expenditures connected with the maintenance of the apartments in the building were in the nature of expenses for upkeep and maintenance of property held for sale and should have been allowed as deductions from income under section 234 (a) (1) of the Act of 1926 (26 USCA § 986 (a) (1).
The case is-remanded to the Board of Tax Appeals, with directions to deal with the profits realized from the installment payments under the provisions of section 212 (d), 26 USCA § 953 (d), relating to “casual” sales and to allow as business expenses such part of the $14,739.80 expended during 1927 as was properly incurred in the current maintenance of the taxpayer’s leasehold interest in the building.
Orders modified accordingly.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1