What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
Anthony GENUSA, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D.J. MUMPHREY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 90-3828
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 13, 1991.
David E. Walker, Michael T. Tusa, Jr., Walker, Bordelon, Hamlin, Theriot & Hardy, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellant.
Sidney M. Bach, Bach & Wasserman, Me-tairie, La., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before JOHNSON, WILLIAMS and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, D.J. Mumphrey, is the fire chief of the Kenner, Louisiana, Fire Department. He appeals the district court judgment awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $6,857.50 to appellee, Anthony Genusa, a firefighter employed by the Ken-ner Fire Department. The attorney’s fees were awarded in a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The claim was that the fire department and its chief had deprived ap-pellee of one day’s pay when he was absent from work while responding to a witness subpoena in a federal court proceeding. Appellee requested damages of the one day’s pay and also damages for mental anguish and punitive damages and attorney’s fees. On the same day the complaint was filed, Genusa was awarded the one day’s pay by the Civil Service Board. The district court in its judgment denied damages for mental anguish and punitive damages, but awarded attorney’s fees. We reverse and render.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the federal remedy against a state official acting under color of state law who infringes upon the constitutional or statutory right of the plaintiff. The claim in this case is that Genusa’s constitutional rights were violated by the state’s initial refusal to pay him for his appearance under subpoena in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides for the discretionary payment of attorney’s fees in favor of a plaintiff who prevails in a civil rights claim under § 1983.
Genusa cannot prevail in this case because he makes a claim which does not exist in the law. There is no constitutional right established under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which requires a state or local government employer to pay wages for days in which an employee misses work to respond to a subpoena in federal court. The federal law takes care of subpoenaed witnesses by providing in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 for an attendance fee of $40 a day for each day’s attendance by a witness. In addition to this per diem, the same statutory provision grants expenses in travelling to and from the site of the court and a subsistence allowance if overnight stay is required.
Genusa would have had a claim of violation of constitutional rights if the fire department had refused to allow him leave to respond to the subpoena. See generally, Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589, 93 S.Ct. 1157, 1164, 35 L.Ed.2d 508 (1973). But it did not do so. It only initially refused to pay his wages for the time he was absent responding to the subpoena. By analogy, there is also no constitutional right for a state employee called to jury duty to be paid his or her regular state wages while serving on a federal jury. See generally, Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 412 U.S. 543, 93 S.Ct. 2264, 37 L.Ed.2d 137 (1973) (per curiam); Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 589, 93 S.Ct. at 1164.
Genusa also might have had a color-able claim under § 1983 if the fire department ultimately did refuse to pay his wages because such a refusal would deprive him of a property right in violation of state law which entitled him to his wages. But this did not occur because he immediately invoked the administrative processes, and he was awarded his pay for the day in court under the local law enforced by the effective state administrative procedures before the Civil Service Board. The result is that there was neither a procedural nor substantive constitutional violation in the original denial of his wages since it was rectified by the state under effective procedure by the time his § 1983 suit was filed. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1915, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir.1984).
The conclusion must be that Genusa had no cause of action under § 1983 for a violation of the Constitution. It is not necessary, therefore, to rely to any degree upon the fact that he did not prevail in any aspect of his suit to determine he was not entitled to attorney’s fees. He clearly could not be awarded attorney’s fees under § 1988 because he had no constitutional right to be enforced under § 1983. He was left with whatever remedies, if any, he might have had against the local governmental body in state court for whatever damages he might be able to establish solely as a result of temporarily being denied his wages, a denial which was rectified as soon as he pursued the internal administrative procedures provided under state law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3204, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).
It follows that neither § 1983 nor § 1988 are implicated in this case in any way. The judgment must be reversed and a take nothing judgment entered in favor of Chief Mumphrey of the Kenner, Louisiana, Fire Department.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 18