What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BONNAR-VAWTER, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 5761.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
April 26, 1961.
Paul H. Farrell, Boston, Mass., with whom Ronald H. Marcks, Cambridge, Mass., and Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Boston, Mass., on brief, for petitioner.
Julius G. Getman, Washington, D. C., Attorney, with whom Stuart Rothman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. General Counsel, and Melvin Pollack, Attorney, Washington, D. C., on brief, for respondent.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
HARTIGAN, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board and a cross-petition by the Board for the enforcement of its order. Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. (hereinafter called the Company) contends that the order, which specified that four discharged strikers were to be reinstated to their jobs with back pay, was punitive and beyond the power of the Board.
The circumstances leading up to this order may be briefly stated. The Rock-land, Maine, plant of Bonnar-Vawter, Inc. was struck by members of Rockland Printing Specialities & Paper Products Union, Local 643 on April 11, 1959. The strike continued until about July 2, 1959. During that time the Company permanently replaced many of its striking employees and continued its operations. The four employees ordered reinstated by the Board were discharged by the Company for alleged misconduct on the picket line. They had not been permanently replaced by the Company at the time of the discharges. The trial examiner in his Intermediate Report found that the discharges of the four employees were not justified, and that these employees were discharged for “participation in protected concerted activity in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.” This finding, which was adopted by the Board, was not excepted to by the Company and is not involved in this petition to review and set aside the order.
At the conclusion of the hearing before the trial examiner on charges of unfair labor practices in regard to the four discharges and other actions of the Company, a partial settlement agreement was made dismissing various charges in regard to Section 8(a) (5) violations and others derivative therefrom and providing that employees who had been permanently replaced during the strike would be put on a preferential hiring list. Under this agreement when openings were available in any department of the plant they would be filled by reference to the names listed under the appropriate department heading (without loss of seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed) before any new employees would be hired.
The Company contends that in the circumstances of this disposition of the charges involving all the strikers, the order for reinstatement of the four discharged strikers is punitive and beyond the power of the Board. It is the Company’s view that the maximum remedy that should be given to the four dischargees is to grant them reinstatement rights identical with those given by the settlement agreement to the replaced strikers.
We believe that this contention is without merit. It was the Company’s action which placed the strikers other than these four in a different position by replacing them during the strike. The four dischargees as we have indicated had not been replaced at the time of the discharges. They still had their jobs and were entitled, therefore, to protection of that status as against discriminatory discharge for participation in protected concerted activity. The measure of remedy for the four dischargees should not be limited to that of a group which was already in a less favorable position in regard to their jobs, i. e., permanently replaced.
Since the four dischargees were discriminated against as compared with other employees who were not engaged in the concerted activity, we believe that the Board’s remedy was appropriate to effect recompense to the four employees illegally discharged and to vindicate the right of non-replaced employees to engage in protected concerted activities free of the threat of discriminatory discharge. See generally National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Co., 1938, 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381; National Labor Relations Board v. Cowles Pub. Co., 9 Cir., 214 F.2d 708, certiorari denied 1954, 348 U.S. 876, 75 S.Ct. 110, 99 L.Ed. 689.
The Company argues that it is necessary to place the four dischargees on the preferential hiring list in order to give the settlement agreement a definite legal effect. We find no merit in this argument. The settlement agreement is to be given definite legal effect in regard to those covered by it, i. e., the replaced strikers. The Company’s action in discharging the four employees involved in this order placed them in a separate and distinct status.
A decree will be entered enforcing the order of the Board and dismissing the petition to review and set aside the order.
. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (8).
. The four discharged strikers ordered reinstated by the Board were not on this list.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1