What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John Ross GREER, Appellant.
No. 82-5259.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 14, 1983.
Decided Aug. 17, 1983.
Michael Morchower, Richmond, Va. (John B. Boatwright, III, Morchower & Luxton, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellant.
William G. Otis, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Alexandria, Va. (Elsie L. Munsell, U.S. Atty., Martha Roadstrum, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before RUSSELL, PHILLIPS and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges.
SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:
John Ross Greer was convicted by a jury of seven counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, seven counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and six counts of interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. § 2314. The district court sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment on each of the first two counts of mail fraud, with the sentences to be served consecutively and to be followed by three years’ probation. Sentences on the remaining 18 counts were suspended. Greer’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial judge should have recused himself sua sponte from passing sentence because of inflammatory remarks directed at the judge made by the Assistant United States Attorney during the sentencing hearing. We disagree and affirm.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor directed the court’s attention to several cases it had decided, two involving black defendants and two involving white defendants. The prosecutor commented that the cases showed an “interesting pattern.” The following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: What is interesting about the pattern, counsel?
MR. BAUGH: The interesting pattern to the counsel, Your Honor, is that very often, people, including me, have gotten upset with the coddling of quote white-collar crimes. But from reviewing the records, it appears the color of the collar is not the key. This man sits right there, stole more money than all the bank robbers we have tried in this district in the past two years.
THE COURT: Are you suggesting that the Court sentences people on the basis of their race?
MR. BAUGH: I am suggesting to the Court, Your Honor—
THE COURT: Are you suggesting that, Counsel? Yes or no?
MR. BAUGH: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You are wrong. Proceed with your argument.
MR. BAUGH: Thank you. I am suggesting, also, Your Honor, that there is no pattern. People breaking the law or people who are victims of the law don’t know what is going to happen and as that— THE COURT: I’m afraid I can’t hear you any more, counsel. Be seated.
MR. BAUGH: Thank you, Your Honor.
The court then took a brief recess after which it heard defense counsel.
At the conclusion of the remarks of defense counsel, the court stated:
I think that it is extremely unfortunate that an effort was made to enhance the sentence by suggesting that the Court would go easy on the Defendant because he is a member of the white race. As a matter of fact, I think it is not only unfortunate; I think that it is despicable. The Court wants to assure the Defendant that the Court’s sentence will not be affected by the effort at bigotry on the part of the United States Attorney.
The court then discussed the factors it considered in sentencing Greer, and imposed the sentence described above.
An examination of the record in this case clearly reveals that, despite the Assistant United States Attorney’s egregious conduct, the trial judge conducted a fair sentencing hearing. The judge simply rejected the prosecutor’s accusation without engaging in debate. He called a recess immediately after the dialogue, providing time to calm any possible emotional reaction he might have had. He thereafter allowed defense counsel his full right of allocution. He prefaced his remarks on sentencing with a rebuke to the prosecutor for his comments and an assurance to Greer that they would not affect his decision. He explained in detail the reasons for imposing the sentence, referring exclusively to evidence adduced at trial and the information contained in the presentence report. Indeed, Greer received prison sentences for only two of the twenty counts on which he was convicted. The judge’s conduct under the circumstances of this case was impeccable; no impartial jury or the public at large could reasonably be of the opinion that the United States Attorney’s misconduct influenced the trial judge in his sentencing. See In re Chaplain, 621 F.2d 1272, 1278-79 (4th Cir.1980) (en banc) (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting); Paul v. Pleasants, 551 F.2d 575, 579 (4th Cir.1977).
In view of these considerations, the trial judge did not err in failing to recuse himself from sentencing Greer. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0