What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. MANNING.
No. 4732.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Dec. 17, 1932.
Robert D. Dalzell and Dalzell, Palzell, MeFall & Pringle, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
J. Thomas Hoffman, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before WOOLLEY, DAVIS, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge.
Leo Manning brought this aetion under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59) to recover for injuries that he had sustained while in the employ of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
The ease was tried to' the District Court and a jury, and Manning obtained judgment on a verdict in his favor. The railroad company appealed.
At the time of the accident the railroad company employed Manning as an electrician in its classification yards at Conway, west of Pittsburgh, Pa. He was 'ordered to inspect and care for an overheated electrical motor that provided the motivating power for a traveling crane, used in loading and unloading scrap metal from cars, used, according to his testimony, in both interstate and intrastate commerce. But there is no testimony tending to show whether the crane was being used specifically for loading and unloading cars in interstate transportation at the time of the accident. Manning believed it neeessary to inspect the motor that was on the carriage of the crane. This could be done safely, if the crane was in operation, only while unloading. After several unloading trips, the operator of the crane 'apparently forgot that Manning was on the carriage and began a loading operation. As a. result, Manning was painfully injured.
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act provides that a railroad engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages for the injuries of an employee suffered while employed in interstate commerce.
The railroad company insists that Manning was not engaged in interstate commerce at the time he was injured and that the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor.
Recently, and since the trial of this ease, the Supreme Court has removed any conjecture as to the correct test for determining whether an injured employee is engaged in interstate commerce. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company v. Bolle, 284 U. S. 74, 52 S. Ct. 59, 76 L. Ed. 173; Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company v. Industrial Commission, 284 U. S. 296, 52 S. Ct. 151, 76 L. Ed. 304. The test it laid down in these eases was that which it had before applied in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, 36 S. Ct. 517, 60 L. Ed. 941, and in Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, 239 U. S. 556, 558, 36 S. Ct. 188, 189, 60 L. Ed. 436, L. R. A. 1916C, 797, wherein the court said: “Having in mind the nature and usual course of the business to which the act relates and the evident purpose of Congress in adopting the aet, we think it speaks of interstate commerce, not in a technical legal sense, but in a practical one better suited to the occasion, * * * and that the true test of employment in such commerce in the sense intended is, Was the employee, at the time of the injury, engaged in interstate transportation, or in work; so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?”
In Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company v. Industrial Commission, supra, an employee of the railroad, engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, was injured while oiling a motor which furnished the power for hoisting coal into a chute to be taken therefrom by, and for the use of, locomotives principally used in hauling interstate freight. It was decided that the employee was not engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
The court definitely overruled Erie Railroad Company v. Szary, 253 U. S. 86, 40 S. Ct. 454, 64 L. Ed. 794, and Erie Railroad Company v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77, 40 S. Ct. 450, 64 L. Ed. 790, stating that the test of the Shanks Case, supra, had not been applied, the words “interstate commerce” being inadvertently substituted for “interstate transportation.” The facts of both eases are similar to those of Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company v. Industrial Commission. In tho Collins Case, the employee, at the time of his injury, was operating a gasoline engine to pump water into a tank used to supply locomotives in both interstate and intrastate commerce; and in the Szary Case, the employee was engaged, when injured, in his regular duty of drying sand by the application of heat for the use of locomotives operating in both kinds of commerce.
Coming to the present case, Manning, at tho time he received his injuries, was inspecting an electrical motor that furnished the power to a crane which loaded and unloaded cars used in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Was he engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically part of it? Under the doctrine declared in tho above eases, he was not, for his work was merely incidental to the work which the crane did and it might or might not have been primarily used in aid of interstate transportation. There is no closer or more direct relation to interstate transportation in Manning’s case than there was in the ease of Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company v. Industrial Commission.
The judgment of the District Court is re- . versed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1