What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley Aaron HEADRICK, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18521.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 17, 1969.
Joseph R. Huddleston, Bowling Green, Ky., for appellant, Huddleston & Huddleston, Bowling Green, Ky., on the brief.
John L. Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., Louisville, Ky., for appellee, Ernest W. Rivers, U. S. Atty., Louisville, Ky., on the brief.
Before WEICK, Chief Judge, and PHILLIPS and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Stanley Aaron Headrick was convicted by a jury on both counts of a two count indictment for passing falsely made United States postal money orders in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 500 and 2. The sole question on appeal is whether the District Judge erred in not granting the defendant’s motion for acquittal. We find no reversible error.
At 11:42 p. m. on March 14, 1967, the appellant and David Allen Smith checked out of a motor hotel in Cleveland, Ohio, in possession of a box full of postal money orders which they knew to be stolen. They had registered under aliases at the hotel. According to the appellant, he and Smith then went to the home of a friend to whom he gave the box of money orders.
On March 15 at 10:30 or 11 o’clock in the morning one of the money orders was cashed in Cousin Jack’s Discount Store in Bowling Green, Kentucky, about 500 miles from Cleveland. Two witnesses identified Smith as the man who cashed the money order. On the same day the other money order was cashed at the Shoe Center in Bowling Green. The person who cashed the latter money order could not be identified by the owner of the store, but a fingerprint of the appellant was on the money order.
The appellant testified that they drove the entire distance from Cleveland, Ohio, to Clarksville, Tennessee, where he and Smith checked into a motel the afternoon of the fifteenth of March. Both the appellant and Smith testified that the appellant drove the automobile the entire distance, because Smith’s eyes were inflamed to an extent which prevented his driving. The appellant testified that Smith went out without him, leaving the motel for a while, on the day after they arrived in Clarksville. Smith testified that he alone had cashed both of the money orders while the appellant was asleep on the day they arrived in Clarksville.
Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the Government, we hold that reasonable minds could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting in the passing of the money orders. Compare Serio v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 377 F.2d 936, 938-939, vacated by the Supreme Court on grounds not involved on this appeal, 392 U.S. 305. See also Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919.
Although appellant denied having been in Bowling Green, appellant testified affirmatively that he was with Smith at a time when other witnesses stated that Smith cashed one of the two money orders in Bowling Green. There are numerous conflicts as to details in the testimony of appellant and Smith and much evidence from which the jury could have made credibility determinations against the testimony of appellant. The distance by highway between Clarksville, Tennessee, to Bowling Green, Kentucky, is approximately 74 miles. Bowling Green is geographically located so as to be generally on the route which appellant and Smith logically could have taken in driving from Cleveland, Ohio, to Clarksville, Tennessee.
We find sufficient testimony in the record from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant drove Smith to Bowling Green and was with him at the time the money orders were passed.
Affirmed.
. Smith was indicted with the appellant and plead guilty on both counts. He appeared at the appellant’s trial as a witness for the defense.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0