What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kent N. REED, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 81-1525.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued March 5, 1982.
Decided April 1, 1982.
Richard L. Rosenfield, Los Angeles, Cal., with whom Flax & Rosenfield, Los Angeles, Cal., was on brief, for appellant.
Jose R. Aguayo, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Juan, P. R., with whom Raymond L. Acosta, U. S. Atty., San Juan, P. R., was on brief, for appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, BOWNES and BREYER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Kent Nixon Reed pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 to piloting an airplane which illegally carried some 1,735 pounds of marijuana and 85,000 methaqualone tablets into Puerto Rico. He now appeals from the seven-year sentence imposed upon him by the district court. Defendant seeks to be resentenced, claiming that the district court based its punishment decision upon impermissible factors and erroneous assumptions. We disagree and affirm the district court’s judgment.
In his appeal, defendant relies principally upon this court’s decision in United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932 (1st Cir. 1978). In Wardlaw, we reversed a sentence in a drug smuggling case where the district court’s remarks caused us to believe that it had failed to consider any of the criteria traditionally weighed in sentencing and instead had relied exclusively upon the questionable theory that, by imposing unusually harsh sentences on drug smuggling “mules” (those who smuggle drugs over a border), the court would eventually force the larger dealers into the open. In reaching our conclusion to require resentencing in Wardlaw, this court stated that “[defendants [are] entitled to have their sentences set primarily in terms of the seriousness of their own crimes and associated individual factors.” Id., at 939.
In the present case, unlike Wardlaw, the district court engaged in an extensive discussion of various individual factors in passing sentence. The court viewed a videotape of some four character witnesses from California who spoke on defendant’s behalf. It explicitly, considered defendant’s presen-tence report, his cooperation with the authorities, and the fact that this was his first offense. The court, however, also took account of and weighed quite heavily the fact that defendant “was very much involved” in “a very serious offense” for which he had been offered a considerable amount of money. The court further, and quite legitimately, considered the sentences given to defendant’s co-conspirators and the importance of the deterrence factor where drug smuggling is involved. Taking all of these factors together, the court handed down a seven-year sentence (the statutory maximum for the crime at issue is 15 years) with the special proviso that defendant be made eligible for parole after 25 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1).
The sentence here was thus well within the statutory limits, and the judge indicated that he had given attention to various individual factors including the seriousness of the crime and defendant’s role in it. We recognize that the district court made a misstatement in one part of its remarks, to the effect that the defendant “had to cooperate with the authorities once he was caught. . .. ” (Emphasis added.) This statement is literally incorrect, but can be read as simply amounting to an assertion that there was little else for one caught red-handed to do but try to ameliorate his situation by cooperating. While it may be that many judges would have placed a greater premium on cooperation, this is not a black or white issue but a policy judgment left to the discretion of the sentencing judge. A federal court of appeals is without authority to review an otherwise legal sentence except in unusual and extreme circumstances of which this is not one. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1284, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958).
Defendant’s further argument that the court should have recused itself was not raised below and is, in any event, unsupported on the record before us.
Affirmed.
. The district judge in Wardlaw is the same judge whose sentence is challenged in this appeal.
. We reject defendant’s reading of various portions of the judge’s statement as indicating that the judge felt he was somehow legally required to render the sentence he did. Rather, we read the judge as having been led by his own judgment to his conclusions.
. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) provides that a district court may
designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become eligible for parole, which term may be less than but shall not be more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed by the court. ...

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1