What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James C. AGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard DUGGER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Robert L. Butterworth, Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 87-3448.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
June 25, 1987.
Mark E. Olive, Asst. Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.
Mark C. Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for respondents-appellees.
Before FAY, VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The facts of this death penalty case are amply set forth in the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion on defendant Agan’s direct appeal. Agan v. State, 445 So.2d 326 (Fla.1983). The procedural history has been adequately set out in the district court opinion denying Agan habeas relief, a stay of execution, and a certificate of probable cause. Agan v. Dugger, slip op. (M.D.Fla. June 24, 1987).
Of the numerous issues raised by Agan in his appeal to this court, we need only address Agan’s claim that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel in reaching our conclusion that a certificate of probable cause must issue in this case. We note that no court, state or federal, has afforded Agan an evidentiary hearing on this matter.
Agan’s proffer of evidence suggests that his trial attorney spent a total of only 15 hours working on the case. Those 15 hours include time the attorney spent for investigation, at the guilty plea hearing, and at the sentencing hearing. Agan claims that his attorney conducted little or no investigation either for the guilt or sentencing phase of his case. The proffer further suggests that any adequate investigation would have disclosed substantial exculpatory evidence, including the following: that Agan had a significant history of mental problems, had been diagnosed at one or more times as psychotic and as a paranoid schizophrenic, had been taking medicine for psychosis at times crucial to the facts of this case, and, in the recent opinion of one Dr. Fox, was incompetent to stand trial at the time of the plea and sentencing hearing; that one of the prison officials who investigated the murder had a question as to whether Agan was the killer; that one or more inmates had pointed to someone other than Agan as the killer; and that one or more inmates had seen this other person leaving the area of the murder at about the crucial time. Furthermore, the proffer offers some evidence to suggest the possibility that Agan, for some reason — perhaps attributable to his mental problems — confessed, although innocent, and possibly was induced in this regard and coached by other inmates, possibly with the cooperation of prison officials.
Both the state courts and the district court discounted the foregoing proffer, holding that Agan’s plea of guilty and detailed confessions made any such evidence irrelevant. That perspective overlooks the fact that the proffered evidence of mental problems is highly relevant to Agan’s competence to stand trial and to the validity of the guilty plea itself. Moreover, all of the foregoing evidence would have been highly relevant at sentencing, even if the guilty plea itself were valid.
We conclude that Agan has made a “ ‘substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right’ ” and that the issue is ‘ “debatable among jurists of reason.’ ” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 and n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3394 and n. 4, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (citations omitted). Thus, we hold that a certificate of probable cause must issue. The execution is stayed until further order of this court. “[A] court of appeals, where necessary to prevent the case from becoming moot by the petitioner’s execution, should grant a stay of execution pending disposition of an appeal when a condemned prisoner obtains a certificate of probable cause on his initial habeas appeal.” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893-94, 103 S.Ct. at 3395. The Clerk is directed to issue immediately the briefing schedule.
Agan’s motion for a certificate of probable cause is GRANTED.
Agan’s motion for a stay of execution is GRANTED UNTIL FURTHER ORDER.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1