What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LA SALLE v. UNITED STATES.
No. 3292.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,
May 14, 1946.
Edward Rooney, of Topeka, Kan. (Jacob A. Dickinson, of Topeka, Kan., and Dallas M. Potts, of Wichita, Kan., on the brief), for appellant.
Randolph Carpenter, U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan. (Sewall Key, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Louis Monarch and Ernest R. Mortenson, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for the United States.
Before PHILLIPS, HUXMAN, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
An indictment, returned against LaSalle, charged that on June 21, 1945, in the Second Division of the District of Kansas, a grand jury of the United States, which had been duly and regularly impaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire into offenses against the United States committed in the District of Kansas, was investigating a charge against certain named persons accused of violating § 145(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 145(b), and that LaSalle appeared as a witness before the grand jury. That an oath was required, was duly administered to LaSalle and taken by him, was sufficiently alleged.
It further charged that upon such investigation before the grand jury, “the fact as to whether Joe LaSalle on or about the night of September 30, 1944, and the morning of October 1, 1944, was present at a conversation in the County Jail of Sedgwick County, and did, after said conversation, in the company of others, drive to a certain field in Sedgwick where certain liquor was obtained and placed in an automobile belonging to one Robert Brunch were material and relevant matters and questions relating” to the charge being investigated by the grand jury; that LaSalle, in answer to the following questions, willfully, falsely, and corruptly testified as follows:
“Q. You never were present at any time at the County Jail with Carnahan and Brunch? A. No.
“Q. At any time? A. That is right.
“Q. Ever? A. That is right, sir.
“Q. All right, you never went with Bob Brunch at any time in an automobile for the purpose of picking up some liquor ? A. No, sir.
“Q. Did you ever ride with Bob Brunch in an automobile in which there was any liquor? A. No, sir.
“Q. I will ask you further if on the same occasion you and Brunch and Moline didn’t go out to the home of Ivan Pierce and took Mrs. Pierce into the car, went over to some farm where Brunch drove into a field, then found the field to be muddy and having a new car he left you there and went back to town and got another car, which he brought back and you then loaded some liquor into that car? A. No, sir.
“Q. That never happened? A. No, sir.”; and “that Joe LaSalle at the time he made the statements aforesaid • then and there knew that such' statements were * * * false and untrue in that he had been present at the County Jail of Sedgwick County with the persons referred to and thereafter did drive to a certain field in Sedgwick County where liquor was loaded into an automobile belonging to Robert Brunch.”
LaSalle entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment and waived trial by jury. On the day the case came on for trial, LaSalle asked leave to withdraw his plea in order that he might file a motion to quash the indictment. Leave was denied. The trial proceeded. After the identification of the first witness for the United States, LaSalle objected to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that the indictment did not charge any offense against the United States. The objection was overruled. Thereupon, LaSalle entered a plea of guilty. LaSalle also challenged the sufficiency of the indictment by a motion in arrest of judgment. The motion was overruled and sentence imposed.
18 U.S.C.A. § 558 provides:
“In every presentment or indictment prosecuted against any person for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged * * * together with the proper averment to falsify the matter wherein the perjury is assigned, * * *.”
The test of materiality in a grand jury investigation is whether the false testimony has a natural effect or tendency to influence, impede, or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its investigation, and, if it does, an indictment for perjury may be predicated upon it.
The materiality of the false statements is sufficiently charged, if the facts alleged show such statements were material. Here, the indictment alleged that certain facts were material to the charge under investigation and set forth the false testimony which LaSalle gave. That testimony had direct relation to the facts which the indictment charged were material to the charge under investigation. It, therefore, affirmatively appeared that the false testimony which LaSalle gave was material.
The indictment alleged that the testimony which LaSalle gave was false in that he was present at the county jail of Sedgwick County with Carnahan and Brunch and in that he, thereafter, drove to a certain field in Sedgwick County where liquor was loaded into an automobile belonging to Brunch. It is true that the question propounded to LaSalle with respect to the county jail did not include the words “of Sedgwick County” but the grand jury was sitting in Wichita only two blocks distant from the Sedgwick County jail, and it must have been clear to LaSalle that the question referred to the Sedgwick County jail. It is likewise true that the question propounded with respect to the automobile did not describe it as belonging to Brunch, and did not embrace the location of the field, but if, after the conversation at the county jail, LaSalle drove to a certain field in Sedgwick County where liquor was loaded into an automobile belonging to Brunch, then his statement that he and Brunch did not go to a field and did not load liquor into a car was clearly false.
We conclude the assignment of perjury was sufficient.
Affirmed.
United States v. Hirsch, 2 Cir., 136 F.2d 976, 977; Carroll v. United States, 2 Cir., 16 F.2d 951, 953.
Travis v. United States, 10 Cir., 123 F.2d 268, 270; Markham v. United States, 160 U.S. 319, 325, 16 S.Ct 288, 40 L.Ed. 441.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1