What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ST. LOUIS BARGE FLEETING SERVICE, INC., a Corporation, Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED BARGE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 17943.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Oct. 27, 1965.
Ewald & Boecker, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Patrick O. Boyle, of Lucas & Murphy, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before MATTHES and GIBSON, Circuit Judges, and LARSON, District Judge.
LARSON, District Judge.
Appellee, Consolidated Barge Company, instituted this action in admiralty against appellant, St. Louis Barge Fleeting Service, to recover for damage to its barge, MERRY NO. 2. The District Court made findings of fact that the barge was placed in appellant’s custody and control, in an undamaged condition, pursuant to a contract with appellee’s agents. It further found that the barge sustained damage when it broke away from appellant’s fleet in the St. Louis harbor. Concluding that a bailment existed, the court held that appellant failed to overcome the presumption of negligence on its part. Although appellant introduced no evidence at the trial, it now contends that the proof is insufficient to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Appellant makes a number of arguments, but its principal contention is that it was not a bailee. It asserts there was no evidence of a contract between it and appellee and that the barge was not in its exclusive possession, care, and control.
The Sparks-Waters-Farnen Company handled appellee’s barges in the St. Louis area. The evidence, (1) an invoice from appellant to the Sparks Company in which the latter is billed for fleeting the barge, (2) answers to interrogatories by the President of appellant in which he admitted billing for services to the barge in December, 1960, and (3) a letter to ap-pellee from appellant’s counsel in which he states that the barge was “tied up” in appellant’s fleet, demonstrates that there was a contract of bailment and that the barge was in the care, custody, and control of appellant when it broke loose.
The record lends some support to appellant’s contention that the barge was not free from damage when delivered to the fleet. Mr. William McCune, a member of the crew which surveyed the barge, testified that he noted both “old” and “new” damage. Nonetheless, the court's finding that the barge was delivered in an. undamaged condition can be construed to refer to the absence of any recent damage.
Appellant makes a number of other arguments which need not be discussed. We have studied the testimony and exhibits in this case and find no basis for setting aside the court’s findings of fact. The challenged findings are not clearly erroneous, and they give adequate support to the conclusions of law.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1