What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Henry JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Robert COOPER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 18878, 18924.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 14, 1965.
Decided July 9, 1965.
Mr. John L. Kilcullen (appointed by this court), Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 18,878.
Mr. John A. Shorter, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 18,924.
Mr. John R. Kramer, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker and Joseph A. Lowther, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Fahy, McGowan and Leven-thal, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The error asserted to infect these convictions of housebreaking and larceny derives from the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful search in connection with an allegedly unlawful arrest. We find no such error.
A police officer in a scout car saw a parked car bearing temporary D. C. tags and a Virginia inspection sticker. Deciding to check the ownership, he approached the driver who, with three other persons (including the appellants), was sitting in it. The driver said the car belonged to appellant Cooper, who was seated on the other side of the front seat. When the officer walked around to talk to him, he observed a blackjack lying on the floor of the car. The possession of a blackjack being illegal (22 D.C.Code § 3214(a)), the officer asked whose it was. When all four denied knowing anything about it, he asked them to get out of the car and told them that he was going to charge them all with the illegal possession. See 23 D.C.Code § 306(a) and (b), providing expressly for arrests without warrant, and for incidental searches, in respect of the possession of illegal weapons. Having already observed a tape recorder and other articles in the car, the officer asked the driver to unlock the trunk, which he did. There a number of other articles were found which were, with the tape recorder, eventually introduced into evidence as stolen. At the scene of the arrest, the officer directed the four to follow him in their car to the station, where the articles in question were removed from the car.
The officer was, it appears to us, fully authorized to make the initial inquiry about the ownership of the car, and, in the course thereof, to make the arrest for illegal possession of a blackjack. The search of the car, as an incident to that arrest, was not so remote from it in point of time or place as to be unreasonable. See Price v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. -, 348 F.2d 68, decided June 10, 1965; Adams v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 336 F.2d 752 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977, 85 S.Ct. 676, 13 L.Ed.2d 567 (1965).
The judgments appealed from are Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1