What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile, (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless".

Opinion:
Earl W. KINTNER et al., Appellants v. Oliver W. TOLL, Appellee.
Nos. 15324, 15325.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit
Argued Jan. 18, 1960.
Decided March 3, 1960.
As Amended June 29, 1960.
Mr. Walter J. Bonner, Asst. U* S. Atty., at the time of argument, with whom Messrs. Oliver Casch, U. S. Atty., and Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Oliver W. Toll, appellee pro se.
Before Bazelon, Danaher and Bastían, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The pertinent background of this suit for declaration of re-employment rights under § 15 of the Veterans’ Preference Act, 58 Stat. 391, 5 U.S.C.A. § 864, and for restoration of Government employment is set forth in our opinion upon a former appeal, Toll v. Gwynne, 1957, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 175, 247 F.2d 581, certiorari denied, 1958, 355 U.S. 926, 78 S.Ct. 383, 2 L.Ed.2d 356. There we reversed a summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that it did not appear "beyond genuine issue, that, while [plaintiff’s] name was on the re-employment list, no new employee, other than a ten-point veteran, was hired; or that, if a new employee was hired, the list did not have three names on it at the time.” 101 U.S.App.D.C. at page 176, 247 F.2d at page 582. On remand, additional facts were developed by deposition and interrogatories which made clear that new employees other than ten-point preference eligibles were hired during the period in question. However, the defense shifted to a new ground. It urged that the supplemented record also showed that the employing agency had a separate re-employment list for each geographical region; hence, two preference eligibles reduced in force from the Chicago area were not to be included in the Washington area list, applicable 1o plaintiff. On that basis the Washington list would never have contained three or more names of preference eligibles during the period in question.
On cross motions, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff without indicating its reasons and without specifying the relief. The court thereafter amended the judgment, on plaintiff’s motion, specifying relief by way of restoration of employment with attendant rights. Defendants brought these separate appeals from the original and amended judgments.
Appellee contends that the system of maintaining geographical re-employment lists is not authorized by law; and, in any event, the present appellants should not be permitted to rely on this new defense because it rests on alleged facts which presumably were always known to them and constitutes a repudiation of the single re-employment list which they relied upon in the prior appeal in this case.
Assuming arguendo that a system of geographical re-employment lists may be authorized by law, the manner in which the system was maintained over the period in suit assuredly left something to be desired. In any event, the application of the practice, right or wrong, in the circumstances of this case should not thus belatedly be available to deprive the appellee of his status. Accordingly we conclude that the new defense based on separate geographical employment lists must fail.
Affirmed.
. The Joint Appendix discloses that there were no rules and regulations “in the broad sense.” “Our board did not operate on the establishment of a formal set of procedures during the time in question.” “We worked as * * * an informal board” making “auxiliary ratings” on “pieces of yellow paper and white paper and scraps.” A change to the card system with its essential data was not made until 1955.

Question: Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?

Choices:
No
Yes
Yes, but error was harmless
Mixed answer
Issue not discussed

Answer: 4