What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
James Frasia MAY, Appellant, v. C. C. PEYTON, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellee.
No. 11428.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 18, 1968.
Decided June 26, 1968.
Robert L. Dolbeare, Richmond, Va. (Court-assigned counsel) [Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson, Richmond, Va., on brief], for appellant.
Reno S. Harp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Virginia (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, on brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BRYAN ■ and WINTER, Circuit J udges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner, who was denied habeas corpus relief by the district court, was convicted of robbery, on February 6, 1958, in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County, Virginia, which tried him without a jury. He was sentenced to ten years in the Virginia State Penitentiary. In 1965, petitioner’s post-conviction attack on that judgment was successful and he was granted a new trial. Petitioner was retried in 1965, and again convicted — -this time by a jury, which sentenced him to twenty years in the Virginia State Penitentiary.
In oral argument, counsel for the Commonwealth admitted that petitioner had served an aggregate of at least ten years on the two convictions, but counsel contends that Patton v. State of North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4 Cir. 1967), cert. den., 390 U.S. 905, 88 S.Ct. 818, 19 L.Ed.2d 871 (1968), is inapplicable where, as here, petitioner’s original sentence, subsequently determined to be void, was imposed by a judge, and petitioner’s current sentence was imposed by a jury.
We perceive no distinction in the application of the doctrine announced in Patton, whether either or both sentences was imposed by the court or by a jury. Petitioner could not constitutionally be resentenced to a term in excess of that originally imposed with credit for the time served under the void sentence. Whaley v. State of North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4 Cir. 1967). Having served the term originally imposed as so computed, petitioner is entitled to his immediate release.
We reverse the judgment of the district court, and direct that the writ issue forthwith. Since counsel for the Commonwealth has not been afforded an opportunity to verify the accuracy of his admission, he may apply for a modification of this opinion and the judgment entered thereon within five days after the same shall be announced should he determine that his statement to us was inaccurate; otherwise, the clerk shall issue the mandate after the expiration of five days.
Reversed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1