What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Arthur SENA, # 24848, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Levi ROMERO, Warden, and the Attorney General of the State of New Mexico, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 79-1124.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 25, 1980.
Decided March 19, 1980.
William W. Deaton, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, N. M., for petitioner-appellant.
Before BARRETT, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Tenth Circuit R. 10(e). This cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Arthur Sena pleaded guilty in 1975 to charges of burglary brought in a New Mexico state court. After exhausting state court remedies, he petitioned the federal district court for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to set aside that guilty plea as having been uninformed, involuntary, lacking in factual basis, and coerced. An evidentiary hearing was held before a magistrate; the district court adopted the magistrate’s findings and conclusions, and denied relief.
For disposition of this appeal, we need treat only Sena’s contention that his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered because his attorney advised him he would have to pay the cost of transporting witnesses to trial to testify in his behalf.
The transcript of the taking of his guilty plea in state court and the sentencing proceeding shows noncompliance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), or with the New Mexico procedural rule then in effect. N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41-23-21 (1974). This transcript shows only cursory inquiry by the judge concerning Sena’s desire to plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargaining agreement entered into with the district attorney’s office, and whether the plea and disposition agreement had been explained and were understood. Although a trial judge need not specifically enumerate the trial rights a defendant waives by pleading guilty, Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1973), the judge must be satisfied that the plea is being given voluntarily and with knowledge of its consequences. Moore v. Anderson, 474 F.2d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 1973). It is “error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711.
But even if the record is silent, reversal is not required if the voluntariness and intelligence of the plea is proved at a postconviction evidentiary hearing. United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 422-24 (9th Cir. 1976). In the face of the deficiency in the transcript the district court here properly held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether these requirements were met. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963).
At the hearing Sena testified that he did not fully understand his rights, particularly the right to compulsory attendance of witnesses. In this connection, he asserted that his attorney had advised he would have to pay the costs of transporting witnesses to the trial to testify in his behalf. His attorney also testified, and denied that he had so informed Sena. The plea agreement signed by Sena states that he understood he was giving up his right to “compel the attendance of witnesses.” Thus, the record shows a sharp conflict in the testimony to be resolved by the judge, who denied relief.
The problem is that the magistrate, whose findings were accepted by the district judge, declares as follows:
Petitioner fails in his burden of proof. The preponderance of the evidence at the evidentiary hearing established that petitioner’s plea was made and accepted in accord with constitutional requirements.
As we read this finding, the trial court placed the burden of proof upon Sena to establish that his plea was involuntary. In this the court was in error. Boykin requires “an affirmative showing” of voluntariness. See also Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d at 915-16. A silent record, as here, shifts the burden to the government to prove that the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417, 423-424 (9th Cir. 1976). Reversal is therefore required.
Sena’s contention that the absence of a record showing of a factual basis for his plea is an independent ground for invalidating the plea, is without merit. Freeman v. Page, 443 F.2d 493, 497 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1001, 92 S.Ct. 569, 30 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). But the absence of such a showing may be relevant to the determining whether a plea is intelligently made. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n. 10, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167 n. 10, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
The denial of the writ is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity herewith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1