What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SHOP & SAVE FOOD MARKETS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PNEUMO CORPORATION, Abbott Realty Company, and P & C Food Markets, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20, Docket 80-9053.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 9, 1981.
Decided Jan. 20, 1982.
On Rehearing July 2, 1982.
John L. Primmer, St. Johnsbury, Vt., Robert D. Rachlin, Downs, Rachlin & Martin, St. Johnsbury, Vt., of counsel, for plaintiff-appellant.
Leslie W. Jacobs, Cleveland, Ohio, Charles L. Freed, Thompson, Hiñe & Flory, Cleveland, Ohio, Joseph E. Frank, Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc., Burlington, Vt., Francis D. Price, Jr., Syracuse, N. Y., of counsel, for defendants-appellees.
William F. Baxter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert B. Nicholson, George Edelstein, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., of counsel, for amicus curiae United States.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, MES-KILL, Circuit Judge, and PALMIERI, District Judge.
Hon. Edmund L. Palmieri, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
MESKILL, Circuit Judge:
Rehearing has been granted. The opinion filed on January 20, 1982, slip op. 883, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
Shop & Save Food Markets, Inc. (Shop & Save) appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, Albert W. Coffrin, Judge, granting summary judgment for defendants Pneumo Corporation (Pneumo), Abbott Realty Company (Abbott) and P & C Food Markets, Inc. (P & C), in an action asserting violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
Shop & Save, a Vermont corporation, operates retail grocery stores in St. Johns-bury, Derby and Lyndonville, Vermont. Pneumo, a Delaware corporation, owns or controls the other defendants: P & C, a New York corporation which operates a chain of retail grocery stores in New England; and Abbott, a Vermont corporation, which manages property for Pneumo. Pneumo acquired Abbott and Cross Company (Cross), a wholesale grocery distributor, in 1972.
Prior to the events giving rise to this action, Shop & Save purchased virtually all of its groceries from Cross. From 1970 to 1977 Shop & Save subleased from Abbott the property where it operates its Lyndon-ville grocery store, paying a rental of $20,-000 per year. Abbott’s assets were transferred to P & C in 1977.
In July 1976, Shop & Save sought from Pneumo a long-term sublease with renewal options for the Lyndonville property. Thereafter, a protracted course of negotiations ensued, dictated in part by the parties’ competing business considerations. During this time, Shop & Save began to purchase a portion of its wholesale groceries from a competitor of Cross. Further, correspondence between the parties indicated that P & C would be opening a competing grocery store in Lyndonville.
Initially, Pneumo responded to Shop & Save’s request by offering to provide a long-term lease if Shop & Save agreed to continue to buy groceries from Cross. When Shop & Save refused to commit itself to purchases from Cross, Pneumo responded that it would not offer a lengthy sublease at the month-to-month rate because that figure was “far below” current “fair rental values.” Pneumo stated that if it had to risk the loss of Shop & Save’s wholesale purchases from Cross, it wanted “compensation.” Pneumo repeated its offer to provide a long-term lease if Shop & Save agreed to continue its purchases from Cross.
On December 16, 1976, Shop & Save reiterated to Pneumo that it was unwilling to commit itself to any wholesale purchases from Cross. Pneumo responded on January 12, 1977, with an offer of a long-term sublease at $31,500 per year plus 1.5 percent of Shop & Save’s annual sales above $1,500,-000. Thereafter, several offers and counteroffers were considered by the parties. Among these was an offer by Pneumo on January 24, 1977 that rent vary from $20,-000 to $31,500 per year depending upon the amount of groceries purchased from Cross. Shop & Save found the rental formula acceptable but was not satisfied with the lease term and renewal options. Accordingly, no final agreement was reached on the basis of the January 24 offer. Pneumo ultimately revoked its variable rent offer, and reiterated its flat rent offer, which Shop & Save accepted on May 5, 1977.
On February 21, 1978, Shop & Save filed a complaint charging, inter alia, that defendants had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Defendants moved for summary judgment on September 19, 1978. In opposing this motion, Shop & Save argued that it was forced to pay defendants a “penalty” rent for the Lyndonville property because it refused to purchase its wholesale groceries from Cross, and that defendants’ conduct constituted a tying arrangement and a group boycott or concerted refusal to deal, all of which are per se unlawful.
The district court, on July 21, 1980, granted summary judgment for the defendants on Shop & Save’s Section 1 Sherman Act claims. Judge Coffrin found that defendants’ alleged conduct did not constitute a group boycott or a concerted refusal to deal because the only relevant conduct which Shop & Save “point[ed] to [was] P & C’s determination to purchase wholesale groceries from Cross to the exclusion of other distributors. This [conduct] involved no other retailers — having failed to coerce [Shop & Save] to join — and we note that the Sherman Act does not prohibit individual companies from dealing exclusively with other individual companies.” J.App. at 223. The district court found in the alternative that even if defendants had conspired to coerce Shop & Save to agree not to purchase wholesale groceries from Cross’ competitors, Shop & Save had failed to allege an injury that was causally related to a group boycott or concerted refusal to deal. The district court also found that the alleged conduct did not constitute an illegal tying arrangement because there was no agreement in existence that involved two products. Shop & Save had acquired a lease for the Lyndonville premises and was free to purchase its wholesale groceries from any supplier.
II
The narrow issues presented on appeal are whether the district court erred in holding that defendants’ alleged conduct did not constitute a per se illegal group boycott or concerted refusal to deal, or a per se illegal tying arrangement. For the reasons set forth in Judge Coffrin’s thorough opinion, J.App. at 212-31, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on Shop & Save’s group boycott or concerted refusal to deal claim. We also agree with the district court that defendants’ alleged conduct does not constitute an illegal tying arrangement.
“[T]he vice of tying agreements lies in the use of economic power in [the tying] market to restrict competition on the merits in [the tied market].” Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11, 78 S.Ct. 514, 521, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958); see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605, 73 S.Ct. 872, 878, 97 L.Ed. 1277 (1953). Therefore, as the Supreme Court and this Circuit have held, to prove a tying violation a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, the existence of two separate and distinct products, see Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 5-6, 78 S.Ct. at 518-519; Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 95 S.Ct. 498, 42 L.Ed.2d 296 (1974), that he was actually coerced by the seller into agreeing to buy the tied product, Unijax, Inc. v. Champion International, Inc., 683 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1982); Capital Tempoaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1974); Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976), or at least into agreeing not to purchase the tied product from another, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 5-6, 78 S.Ct. at 518-519, and that the illegal tying arrangement resulted in the actual foreclosure of competition in the tied product market, id. at 6, 78 S.Ct. at 519; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396, 68 S.Ct. 12, 15, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1980); Coniglio v. Highwood Services, Inc., 495 F.2d at 1292.
In this case, Shop & Save admits that no agreement was reached on Pneumo’s January 24 offer which provided for a variable rent depending upon the level of Shop & Save’s wholesale grocery purchases from Cross. Shop & Save asserts, however, that it has been forced to pay a penalty rent for the Lyndonville property. Shop & Save alleges that Pneumo’s exaction of this penalty rent constitutes an illegal tying arrangement. We disagree.
As stated above, a tying arrangement cannot exist unless the buyer was actually coerced by the seller into agreeing to buy the tied product or to refrain from purchasing the tied product from the seller’s competitors. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 5-6, 78 S.Ct. at 518-519; Unijax, Inc. v. Champion International, Inc., 683 F.2d 678; Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d at 662-63; Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d at 1355. Absent this showing, there is lacking a definite nexus between the tying and the tied markets from which to conclude that the seller’s exercise of economic power in the tying market will “always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20, 99 S.Ct. 1551, 1562-1563, 60 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979), in the tied market. For example, in the present case, even if Shop & Save has to pay a “penalty” for the tying product, Shop & Save is free to purchase and in fact admits that it does purchase its wholesale groceries from competitors of Cross. Accordingly, because the seller is unable to use his power or leverage in the tying market to deny his competitors free access to the tied market, see Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 6, 78 S.Ct. at 519, an attempt to force a tie which results only in an agreement to pay a higher price for the tying product is not a tying violation.
In deciding whether to invoke the per se rule, we must be cognizant of the teachings of the Supreme Court that “easy labels do not always supply ready answers[,]” Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 8, 99 S.Ct. at 1556, and that “[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act[,]” United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08, 92 S.Ct. 1126, 1133-1134, 31 L.Ed.2d 515 (1972). The alleged unlawful conduct in this case may well give rise to a cause of action. However, it does not constitute a per se illegal tying arrangement. Neither does it constitute a per se illegal group boycott or concerted refusal to deal, for the reasons spelled out in Judge Coffrin’s opinion below, J.App. at 212-31.
Affirmed.
. Although Shop & Save also asserted claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, and a claim under the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act, Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 9 §§ 2451 et seq., Shop & Save does not appeal from the grant of summary judgment for the defendants on these federal claims and the dismissal of the state claim.
. Shop & Save alleged in its complaint that it had accepted Pneumo’s January 24 offer but that in April 1977, before a sublease embodying these terms was signed, Pneumo revoked the offer. Shop & Save claimed that in the interim, it had purchased groceries from Cross with the understanding that the January 24 agreement was in effect. However, Shop & Save alleges no injury from this conduct. Accordingly, we need not decide whether an unlawful tying arrangement existed during this period.
. See note 1, supra.
. We express no opinion on whether an unlawful tying arrangement would have existed had an agreement been reached on the January 24 offer.
. As stated by this Court:
Tying arrangements are abhorred by the courts primarily because they foreclose a substantial quantity of business to competitors and extend preexisting economic power to new markets for no good justification .... Foreclosure implies actual exertion of economic muscle, not a mere statement of bargaining terms which, if they should be enforced by market power, would then incorporate an illegal tie.
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063, 92 S.Ct. 737, 30 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1