What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re LUXOR CAB MFG. CORPORATION. Ex parte MASTERMAN PRINTING CO., Inc., et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
April 9, 1928.
No. 199.
Bankruptcy <@=381 (4) — Bankruptcy ■ petition, based on appointment of temporary receivers more than four months before filing petition as act of bankruptcy, held properly dismissed (Bankr. Act, § 3a, as amended by Aot May 27, 1926, I I USCA § 21 [a]).
Where creditor filed bill in equity, alleging that corporate defendant, though solvent, was temporarily unable to pay its debts, and praying that court should take possession of and conserve its property, and defendant’s answer admitted allegations of bill and joined in the prayer, whereupon court appointed temporary receivers, and thereafter'made receivership permanent, held that, under Bankruptcy Act, § 3a, as amended by Act May 27, 1926 (11 USCA § 21 [al), petition that said corporation be adjudged bankrupt, filed within four months after appointment of permanent receivers, but more than four months after their appointment as temporary receivers, was properly dismissed, on theory that act of bankruptcy occurred when temporary receivers were appointed.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
Bankruptcy proceeding by the Master-man Printing Company, Inc., and others, against the Luxor Cab Manufacturing Corporation. From an order dismissing the petition, petitioning creditors appeal. Affirmed.
See, also, 25 F.(2d) 646.
On June 29,1926, the Budd Wheel Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, a simple creditor of the Luxor Cab Manufacturing Company, the alleged bankrupt, a New York corporation, filed a bill in equity against it in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The bill alleged that the defendant, though solvent, was temporarily embarrassed in its affairs and unable to pay its debts, that its creditors were pressing it for payment, had attached its property and threatened to attach more, and “that, in order to conserve” its property, the court should take possession. The defendant filed an answer at the same time, admitting all the allegations of the bill and joining in the prayer. The court immediately appointed “temporary receivers,” and directed them within thirty days to advise all creditors of the defendant by post of the contents of the decree appointing them and to give notice of a motion to make the receivership “permanent.” On the return day of the motion, August 3, 1926, the court “continued” and “made permanent” the same receivers with the same powers.
On December 3, 1926, the appellants, creditors of the alleged bankrupt, filed a petition in the District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging as an act of bankruptcy that on August 3, 1926, while the cab company was insolvent, receivers had been “appointed” and “put in charge of its property.” The cab company thereupon moved to dismiss this petition on two grounds: First, that the receivers had been “appointed” and “put in charge” more than four months before the petition was filed; second, that the amendment of May 27, 1926, to section 3a of the Bankruptcy Act (11 US CA § 21 [a]) did not go into effect until August 27, 1926, and was not retroactive. The petitioning creditors answered by affidavit alleging among other things that the cab company was insolvent as well on June 29, 1926, as on August 3, 1926.
The District Court held that, although the Act of May 27,1926, was retroactive, the only appointment of the receivers was on June 29, 1926, and that the petition was too late.
Katz & Sommerich, of New York City (Otto C. Sommerich and Maxwell C. Katz, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellants.
McManus, Ernst & Ernst, of New York City (Irving L. Ernst, of New York City, of counsel), for receivers in equity.
Joseph Sterling, of New York City, for appellee.
Before MANTON, L. HAND, and SWAN, Circuit Judges.
L. HAND, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). As we agree with the District Court that the only appointment of the receivers was on June 29, it is not necessary to decide whether the Act of May 27, 1926, is retroactive as respects acts of bankruptcy committed between the date of its passage and August 27, 1926. Assuming that it is, it is plain that an act of bankruptcy was committed on June 29, 1926, when the temporary receivers were appointed; for it is scarcely possible that the alleged bankrupt should have been insolvent on August 3, and solvent on July 29, even though meanwhile in the custody of “conservation” receivers, and in any ease the petitioning creditors themselves allege the opposite. If the alleged bankrupt be insolvent, the statute makes no distinction between the appointment of temporary and permanent receivers, nor is there any reason a priori for implying one (Blue Mountain, etc., Co. v. Fortner, 131 F. 57 [C. C. A. 4]; In re Kennedy Tailoring Co., 175 F. 871 [D. C. Tenn.]), though we need not hold that a mere ex parte appointment would bo enough, if later revoked at the demand of the defendant. Here the defendant had joined in the prayer and might no longer contest the validity of the decree ; as to it the court had finally acted, the administration of its assets had begun, and would proceed to a conclusion unless the creditors upon the return day should show cause for its discontinuance. These were, however, not limited to that relief which would have restored the defendant to a possession which it was confessedly unable to protect, a result which nobody could have wanted. They might invoke the superseding jurisdiction of bankruptcy without choosing between such alternatives. Indeed, we do not understand that the appellants dispute that the decree of June 29 was an act of bankruptcy.
What they do assert is that the decree of August 3 which “continued” and “made permanent” the same receivers was another such act. It is perhaps possible so to view it, but it seems to us an artificial and formal interpretation. While the decree of June 29 presupposed some subsequent action, it was not the reappointment of the receivers but to find out whether they should be relieved of duties already imposed upon them. If the creditors could not show any ground for ending their custody, it was to continue; there was to be no interregnum during which the defendant would resume possession, no new appointment, no second assumption of custody by the court. This appears to us by far the more natural way to look at wha.t happened, and, so far as diction should count, the proper meaning of the phrase “continued” and “made permanent,” used in the decree of August 3.
Walker v. Morgan, 20 F.(2d) 547 (C. C. A. 5), which arose upon facts occurring before the amendment of 1926, was quite another case. The temporary receivers had not originally been appointed “because of insolvency,” and no act of bankruptcy therefore took place when they took charge. When they were “made permanent,” the court determined that the bankrupt was insolvent and entered the second decree because of that finding. The bankruptcy court could have refused to adjudicate only by holding that the continuance of the receivership' because of insolvency was not an “appointment,” the receivers having already been appointed for another reason. But, if so, it must have held that no act of bankruptcy had ever been committed at all; not the original appointment, because it was not for insolvency; not the decree making permanent the receivers, because it was no appointment. Naturally the judges did not let the essence fly off with the fumes of their own reasoning. In re Milbury Co., 11 Am. Bankr. Rep. 523, can be supported, if at all, only because the receivers were made permanent upon a second application by the bankrupt’s directors. Section 3a (4) (11 USCA § 21[a]) then read as follows: “Being insolvent,” has “applied for a receiver * * * or because of insolvency a receiver * * * Pas been put in charge.” The bankrupt had within four months made a second application for a receiver, and perhaps that was a new act of bankruptcy. Even if well decided, the case has no relevance here.
Order affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99