What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
TEMPCO ELECTRIC HEATER CORPORATION, Petitioner, Cross-Respondent, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, Cross-Petitioner.
Nos. 92-3050 and 92-3249.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued March 30, 1993.
Decided July 19, 1993.
Robert P. Casey, Charles E. Murphy, Richard L. Samson (argued), David B. Montgomery, Murphy, Smith & Polk, Chicago, IL, for petitioner.
Elizabeth Kinney, Denise R. Jackson, N.L.R.B., Chicago, IL, Aileen A. Armstrong, Nancy J. Gottfried (argued), Appellate Court, Enforcement Litigation, Paul J. Spielberg, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Before CUMMINGS and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and TIMBERS, Senior Circuit Judge.
The Honorable William H. Timbers, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is sitting by designation.
CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.
Tempco Electric Heater Corp. seeks review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) requiring it to bargain with Local 1031, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, as the collective bargaining representative of Tempco’s full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance employees at Tempco’s facility in Wood Dale, Illinois. In turn, the Board has applied for enforcement of its order.
Tempco manufactures heating elements for the package and plastic processing industry. In March 1991, the Union filed a petition with the Board seeking to represent Temp-co’s production and maintenance employees. An election with secret ballots was held on May 17, 1991; eighty-one workers voted for the Union and sixty-five against. Although seven ballots were challenged, that would have been an insufficient number to alter the outcome of the election even if the challenges were valid. Nevertheless, Tempco raised several objections to the way the election was conducted. The company complained that workers were intimidated, coerced and misled into voting for union representation.
The company took its objections to an NLRB hearing officer who sided with the Union after listening to testimony for four days. The hearing officer recommended to the Board that a Certificate of Representative issue, meaning that the Union would be approved to represent the employees in collective bargaining. On February 26, 1992, a three-member panel of the Board adopted the hearing officer’s findings and certified the Union, but Tempco still refused to bargain with it. This led the Board’s general counsel in April 1992 to issue a complaint against Tempco for engaging in unfair labor practices. The ease went before the Board again, which found that Tempco violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to bargain with the Union and by withholding critical information from the Union. The Board castigated Tempco because all of the evidence it claimed infected the election had been or should have been raised in the earlier proceedings before the hearing officer and the Board.
Tempco remains persistent. The company appealed the Board’s cease and desist order to this Court, and we conclude its claims that the election was unfair are no more compelling than did the NLRB hearing officer or the Board on two occasions. We have jurisdiction to entertain direct appeals of Board decisions under 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e) and (f).
Tempco argues that at a mass meeting (eighty-six workers attended) held on the eve of the election at a local VFW hall, an agent of the Union threatened the job of one employee who challenged the Union’s promises about better wages and benefits. The company also claims that the Union conducted an improper poll to gauge its support among the workers present. The meeting was conducted by the Union’s assistant business manager and recording secretary, Roy Cortes. A number of other Union officials were there as well including the president of the local. Cortes spoke at some length about the Union’s representation of other companies including Zenith Electronics Corp. and A.R.I. Okasaki, a competitor of Tempco’s. Cortes promised that workers’ wages would go “higher and higher.” At one point Cortes’ assertions of better wages and benefits were challenged by an employee named Orlando Monte, who had been hired only the month before. Monte said that his father had worked at Zenith and that Cortes’ rosy picture of life in a Union was misleading. Monte also said that the Union representatives were liars and that he would rather leave the company than pay union dues. A number of employees starting yelling at Monte; they questioned his authority to speak since he had only been at Tempco for a few weeks. Cortes picked up the theme and claimed that Monte had been sent as an infiltrator by Fermín Adames, Tempco’s president, to disrupt the meeting. Then, according to the testimony of Monte and others before the hearing officer, Cortes said to Monte something like, “Yourself, the one next to you, and those others who are nonunion supporters, I will promise you that from a week to a month’s time you will not be employed; you will not be working” (Monte’s version); or “Once he performs his dirty work, he is going to go somewhere else and perform the same dirty work for another employer” (Cortes’ version); or “His job was finished, he wasn’t going to work anymore for Tempco” (another worker’s version) (plaintiffs app. at 18).
The question we must answer is whether the union representative’s statements to Monte were a threat which poisoned the election and coerced other workers into voting for the Union. Since the results of a Board-supervised and certified election are presumptively valid, NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Ind. of Louisville, Inc., 803 F.2d 345, 347 (7th Cir.1986), and the objecting party bears the burden of proof, NLRB v. Mattison Machine Works, 365 U.S. 123, 124, 81 S.Ct. 434, 435, 5 L.Ed.2d 455, Tempco must show that Cortes’ conduct “so influenced potential voters that free choice was impossible.” NLRB v. Chicago Marine Containers, Inc., 745 F.2d 493, 500 (7th Cir.1984), quoting NLRB v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir.1982). Tempco has not even come close to this showing. First, there is an innocent interpretation to Cortes’ remarks. If he genuinely believed that Monte was a company shill sent to break up the meeting, statements that his employment at Tempco would be short-lived might have merely been a prediction that Monte would move on to perform the same anti-union function at another company after the election. This interpretation of Cortes’ statements is hardly implausible since Monte, the most outspoken opponent of the Union, had been employed for just a month. More to the point, even if Cortes’ remarks were a threat to Monte, most of the workers would have thought it was an idle threat — i.e., that the Union would be unable actually to fire a worker who spoke against collective bargaining. If a reasonable employee would not think that a threat was within the Union’s power to achieve, it is not sufficiently coercive to taint an election. NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corporation, 535 F.2d 917, 924 (5th Cir.1976), certiorari denied, 429 U.S. 1092, 97 S.Ct. 1105, 51 L.Ed.2d 538.
Tempco’s next argument is that the Union conducted an improper poll. The danger of a poll is that it forces undecided workers to express public support or opposition. We have held that employers may not conduct a poll under any circumstances, but that a Union may unless the polling “in fact was coercive and in fact influenced the result of the election.” Kusan Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 362, 365 (6th Cir.1984). Tempco cannot meet that test because there was no poll taken at the May 16 meeting. All that Cortes said was, “See you at the election, we will win. Show your pride,” to which a number of employees shouted “yes!” This was nothing more than a rallying cry to vote. Cortes did not even ask those present to express a preference — that undecided workers might have felt pressured to state an opinion in these circumstances is far-fetched.
The Board’s order will be enforced in full.
. The bargaining unit excludes office clericals, sales persons, employees of independent contractors, professional employees, temporary summer help, guards and supervisors.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1