What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alvaro GALLEGO, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 90-1109.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard May 7, 1990.
Decided May 9, 1990.
Raymond E. Gillespie, Cambridge, Mass., for defendant, appellant.
Joseph M. Walker, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Atty., was on brief, for the U.S.
Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and CYR, Circuit Judges.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
This is a single issue sentencing appeal. Defendant-appellant Alvaro Gallego objects to the district court’s fixing of a criminal history category (CHC) and the consequent effect of that choice on the applicable guideline sentencing range.
The facts are these. Shortly before the subject offense was committed, defendant pled guilty in state court to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 90, § 24 (1969 & Supp.1989). He was fined $300 (the DUI fine), payable on or before June 16, 1989. At the time of the subject offense (June 7, 1989), the DUI fine was not yet due and remained unpaid. The district court added two points in computing defendant’s CHC because defendant perpetrated the offense of conviction while under a criminal justice sentence. See U.S. S.G. § 4Al.l(d) (in determining an offender’s CHC, court should “[a]dd points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status”). This increase boosted defendant into Category II and upped the high end of the guideline range to 71 months. The offense of conviction carried a mandatory minimum term of 60 months in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court proceeded to impose a sentence of 68 months.
We need not linger long over this appeal. The sentencing guidelines are perfectly clear that a fine is a “criminal justice sentence.” See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a) (defining “prior sentence” to mean “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea [or otherwise], for conduct not part of the instant offense”). In this instance, the DUI fine was not payable until a date subsequent to the commission of the offense of conviction. Thus, defendant’s preexisting obligation to the criminal justice system had not been completed when he committed the new offense. The district court therefore applied the guidelines appropriately.
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the judge followed the letter of the guidelines. We believe he followed the spirit as well. We also think that the applicable guideline, so construed, is neither impermissible nor constitutionally infirm. See generally United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1015 (1st Cir.1990) (“Congress’ power to control judicial sentencing discretion includes the power to specify the factors a court may consider in setting a sentence.”).
We need go no further. The judgment and sentence must be
Affirmed.
. Sentences (including fines) imposed in respect to certain non-felony offenses are specifically exempted. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). It is undisputed that the crime underlying the DUI fine does not fall within this, or any other, exempt category.
. The two point increase in this case was not imposed for nonpayment of the DUI fine. Rather, because the fine was not due and payable until June 16, 1989, Gallego was "under a criminal justice sentence” on June 7. Thus, cases such as Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2072-73, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) (probation may not automatically be revoked for failure to pay a fine or make restitution; court must find a willful refusal to pay or failure to make good faith effort to acquire necessary resources), relied on by appellant, are inapposite.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0