What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MILLER & MILLER AUCTIONEERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. G. W. MURPHY INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant, Willey Drilling, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees, United States of America and Roy C. Baker, Intervening Defendants-Appellees, James C. Willey, B & W Drilling, a partnership, and Converse County Bank, Additional Defendants on Cross-Claims-Appellees.
No. 72-1220.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Sept. 13, 1972.
Decided Jan. 17, 1973.
Rehearing Denied March 13, 1973.
Donald R. Winship, Casper, Wyo., for defendant-appellant.
Rufus S. Garrett, Jr., Fort Worth, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernest J. Brown (Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Crombie J. D. Garrett, David English Carmack, Tex Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Richard V. Thomas, U. S. Atty., Tosh Suyematsu, Asst. U. S. Atty., Cheyenne, Wyo., on the brief), for the intervening defendant-appellee United States.
Before PHILLIPS, HILL and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges.
HILL, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an interpleader action denying appellant Murphy Industries, Inc. (Murphy) relief against ap-pellee, Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc. (Miller) for allegedly distributing auction sale proceeds in a manner prejudicial to Murphy. Appellant contends Miller wrongfully distributed the auction proceeds after being notified the seller’s property had been garnished in a Wyoming state court garnishment proceeding.
On November 25, 1970, Miller was employed to sell property belonging to Wil-ley Drilling, Inc. Among other things, the agreement provided Miller with a lien for money loaned and services rendered Willey at the auction. Miller in turn agreed to distribute proceeds from the sale to five perfected security interest holders.
On January 12, 1971, the auction was conducted and $148,254.25 was realized from the sale. On the same day as the auction and before the proceeds were distributed, appellant delivered a garnishee notice to Miller informing it of the issuance of an order of attachment on all the property, moneys, credits and effects in its possession belonging to Willey Drilling, Inc. and James C. Wil-ley, dba B & W Drilling Company. Miller disregarded this notice and paid all five secured creditors and itself the full amount due. Since the secured property did not bring the amount secured, Miller applied proceeds from unsecured property to satisfy the claims. A total of $145,312.22 was disbursed by Miller, leaving only a balance of $2,942.03. Realizing .several creditors might sue for this balance, Miller filed an interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 in the Wyoming federal district court.
In the interpleader action, appellant Murphy counterclaimed against Miller asserting that, among other things, Murphy’s garnishment judgment for $21,123.91 against Willey Drilling, Inc. and James C. Willey, dba B & W Drilling Company, should have been paid from the auction proceeds. Murphy contends that Miller wrongfully disregarded the garnishment notice when it paid off secured creditors and itself with unsecured funds.
The United States of America filed a petition in intervention seeking permission to intervene as a defendant. The United States charged that Miller wrongfully distributed proceeds from the auction since the government had properly filed two tax liens against Willey Drilling, Inc. and James C. Willey and his wife, Geraldine, in the amount of $5,412.12.
The United States district court for the district of Wyoming determined that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action. As the five secured creditors were first to perfect their interest, they were entitled to the auction proceeds over any rights acquired by appellant through its attachments occurring on the date of the auction sale. Since Miller’s security interest was perfected by possession prior to appellant’s levy of execution, Miller was entitled to recoup its advancements, selling expenses and commissions prior to any payments to appellant. The United States had two perfected tax liens totaling $5,810.84 which were perfected prior to the auction. The United States therefore was allowed the balance of $2,942.03, and because Miller disbursed the rest of the proceeds, it was compelled to transfer into the registry an additional sum of $2,868.81.
Murphy on appeal raises two pertinent points. Our decision on these points disposes of the appeal. First, the district court erred in discharging Miller since Miller failed to pay all the disputed proceeds into the court registry before bringing the interpleader action. Second, it was error to allow the United States recovery on its tax liens in this interpleader action.
Section 1335 of 28 U.S.C. provides the district court with original jurisdiction of an action in interpleader for every corporation having in its custody or possession money of the value of $500 or more if two or more claimants of diverse citizenship are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money, and if plaintiff has deposited such money in the registry of the court. It is therefore clear that when rival claims for a sum of money are involved, payment of the entire sum into the registry of the court or the giving of a bond meeting the requirements of the statute is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the court. Gannon v. American Airlines, 251 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1958); Metal Transport Corp. v. Pacific Venture Steam. Corp., 288 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1961); 3A Moore, Federal Practice § 22.10, n. 3 (2d ed. 1970); 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil § 1716 (1972).
An interpleader action is one in equity and is governed by equitable principles. Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1957); Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 228 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 986, 76 S.Ct. 473, 100 L.Ed. 853; Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S. v. Cooper, 328 F.Supp. 1126 (W.D.Okl.1971). Hence a federal district court seldom has jurisdiction if the stakeholder deposits in the court registry less than the entire sum of money in controversy. Metal Transport Corp. v. Pacific Venture Steam. Corp., supra; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Lee, 232 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1956); Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., 218 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Naviera Andes Peruana, S.A., 182 F.Supp. 897 (S.D.N. Y.1959). In the instant case, Miller was notified of appellant’s writ of attachment before it disbursed the funds. Miller knew appellant was claiming $21,123.91, but nevertheless paid other creditors the auction proceeds. Because Miller failed to deposit in the court registry the entire sum in controversy, the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to hear this interpleader action.
Although the district court incorrectly exercised jurisdiction in this interpleader action, the court still was vested with authority to award the government a judgment satisfying two of its tax liens. There is no doubt the district court has jurisdiction in a civil action to render any judgment necessary to enforce the internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1340. The power to enforce this tax lien is given the United States Attorney through 26 U.S.C. § 7403(a) and 31 U. S.C. § 191. Nor does the fact this inter-pleader action was improperly brought destroy the government’s judgment on its counterclaim as an intervenor. A court has discretion to treat pleadings of an intervenor as a separate action to adjudicate claims raised by the intervenor. See Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied 313 U.S. 559, 61 S.Ct. 835, 85 L.Ed. 1520; Pikor v. Cinerama Prods. Corp., 25 F.R. D. 92 (S.D.N.Y.1960); Truncale v. Universal Pictures Co., 76 F.Supp. 465 (S. D.N.Y.1948); 3B Moore, Federal Practice § 24.16[2] at 24-613, 614 (2d ed. 1969); 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil § 1917 (1972). The court may properly exercise this discretionary procedure where it appears the intervenor has a separate and independent basis for jurisdiction and in which failure to adjudicate the claim will result only in unnecessary delay. Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965). The tax liens of the United States are unrelated to the interpleader action and thus not subject to its requirements. We therefore hold the district court correctly exercised jurisdiction with respect to the government’s separate claim.
The portion of the judgment adjudicating the tax liens of the United States is accordingly affirmed. The remainder of the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the interpleader cause of action for want of jurisdiction.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1