What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO. Appeal of SCHRAGER.
No. 7129.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
June 30, 1939.
Archibald Palmer, New York City, and Jenkins, Bennett & Libby, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Henry Alan Johnston, of New York City for stockholders of debtor. -
Arthur Littleton, of Philadelphia, Pa., (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, of Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel), for debtor.
Allen Hunter White, of Philadelphia, Pa., for Philadelphia debenture holders’ committee.
Chester T. Lane, Gen. Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Martin Riger, both of Washington, D. C., Morton E. Yohalem, of New York City, and Leon S. Alschuler, of Washington, D. C., (J. Anthony Panuch, of New York City, of counsel), for Securities and Exchange Commission.
Before BIGGS, MARIS, and CLARK, Circuit 'Judges.
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
In the reorganization proceeding of the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company instituted in the court below under Sec. 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207, a reorganization plan which accords recognition to existing stockholders has been proposed by creditors and referred by the court to a special master for hearing and report. Thereafter a creditor filed a petition praying (1) that the debtor in possession of its property be directed to proceed against the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Corporation to recover a debt of $297,591.32 and (2) that the court proceed to determine the solvency or insolvency of the debtor. On May 15, 1939 the court below denied both prayers of the petition. Lawrence Schrager, a creditor, has appealed.
Considering the second question first we note that the court’s action was based upon the view expressed in its opinion that “The question of the solvency or insolvency of the Debtor Company cannot be determined until after the adoption or rejection of a plan of reorganization because the plan may change the debt structure of the Debtor Company.” In denying the petition upon this ground the court committed a clear error of law since it is the status of the debtor before reorganization which is significant and not its condition thereafter. A plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor may not over the objection of a single creditor be approved as fair and equitable if it diverts to the stockholders any of the assets which by reason of the insolvency of the debtor belong solely to the creditors. In re 620 Church Street Building Corporation, 299 U.S. 24, 57 S.Ct. 88, 81 L.Ed. 16; In re Barclay Park Corporation, 2 Cir., 90 F. 2d 595; In re Day & Meyer, Murray & Young, 2 Cir., 93 F.2d 657; Price v. Spokane Silver & Lead Co., 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 237; Sophian v. Congress Realty Co., 8 Cir., 98 F.2d 499. Consequently it is necessary that the court determine the solvency or insolvency of the debtor before the plan of reorganization is approved. Only in the light of that determination can the court ascertain whether the stockholders may properly be permitted to participate in the reorganization.
Returning to the first question raised in the court below we learn from the re'cord that the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Corporation owns all the stock of the debtor and has no assets except that stock and $400 in cash. The amount of the debt is not disputed but it is contended that it is not in reality a debt owing by the Corporation to the debtor but represents advances made to meet the fees of registrars and transfer agents and other expenses of maintaining the corporate existence of the Corporation. The Corporation was organized under a decree of the court below made pursuant to the opinion of the Supreme Court in Continental Insurance Co., et al. v. United States, Reading Company et al., 259 U.S. 156, 42 S.Ct. 540, 66 L.Ed. 871. In the light of this decree it is contended that the expenses in question were intended to be borne by the debtor, the Corporation being but an agency or device set up to facilitate the separation of the debtor from the Philadelphia and Reading Railway Company.
The ■ court below did not pass upon these contentions, however, but held that since the prosecution of a suit might deprive the Corporation of its status as a stockholder of the debtor it should not be instituted. It is conceded that the only substantial asset of the Corporation is its stock in the debtor. If the debtor is insolvent-that stock is worthless and the debt, even if valid, is uncollectible. Consequently, it is only if the debtor is found to be solvent that it will become necessary to determine the validity of the debt and the proper manner of enforcing it or preserving it for the reorganized company.
■ The Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Corporation has moved to dismiss this appeal.- We find the motion to be without merit. It is accordingly denied. The order appealed from is reversed with directions to the court below itself to determine the solvency or insolvency of the debtor without reference to a special master and thereupon to direct such action to be taken by the debtor with respect to the debt alleged to be due and owing by the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Corporation as justice may require.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1