What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Mary L. McKEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS TECHNICAL SERVICES COMPANY, INC., A Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 81-2406.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 26, 1983.
David T. Lopez, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
Gerald T. Holtzman, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Before RUBIN, RANDALL and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Treating the suggestion for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing, it is ordered that, because the panel opinion did not deal specifically with the consideration to be given on remand to the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, it is amended to substitute for the paragraph beginning “On remand the district judge,” 700 F.2d at 265-66, the following:
The record indicates that, at the time of the grant of summary judgment, 180 days had elapsed from the time McKee filed her EEOC charge and she could by then have obtained a right-to-sue letter. We do not intimate that she may proceed with a suit if she has never obtained a right-to-sue letter, nor do we suggest that the district judge would err in refusing to let McKee proceed without one. However, the order granting summary judgment against her and dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction mentioned only her failure to file a charge as its grounds.
On remand, the district jiidge may conclude that McKee’s 1979 visit to the EEOC did not toll the filing requirement. If so, then he may dismiss the suit, not for want of jurisdiction, but for failure to meet the requisites for relief under the statute. On the other hand, he may conclude that the visit and the actions of the EEOC staff tolled the filing requirement. If he does, and if McKee has obtained a right-to-sue letter, she should be entitled to proceed with her Title VII claim as if her charge had been accepted by the EEOC when she appeared at its office in April 1979. If she has not obtained a right-to-sue letter, then the suit may be subject to dismissal. for failure to comply with the statutory prescription.
We vacate the summary judgment because, at the time the trial judge granted it, he and all of the parties were aware that McKee had in fact filed a charge with the EEOC, and yet he granted summary judgment based on her failure to have done so. Her failure formally to amend her complaint to assert that fact neither obliterated the event nor authorized the judge to ignore it. The district court’s grant of summary judgment, requiring the assertion of the claim in a separate suit, could prejudice McKee by permitting the argument that some or all of her claim has been extinguished. See generally Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc).
The petition for rehearing is DENIED. No member of the panel nor Judge in regular active service of this court having requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; Local Fifth Circuit Rule 16), the suggestion for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge, dissents for the reasons previously assigned. See 700 F.2d at 266-68. ■
. McKee filed a formal charge on June 13, 1980. The district judge granted summary judgment on February 3, 1981.
. We have held that receipt of a right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional but a condition precedent subject to equitable modification. Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215-19 (5th Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); see Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir.1982).
. The lapse of time since the filing of the charge does not necessarily preclude McKee from now securing a right-to-sue letter. See Whitehead v. Reliance Insur. Co., 632 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.1980).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1