What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
LEHIGH PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant.
Nos. 14584-14586.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued March 12, 1964.
Decided June 17, 1964.
Order July 1, 1964.
Michael A. Mulroney, Washington, D. C. (C. Moxley Featherston and John B. Jones, Jr., Acting Asst. Attys. Gen. Lee A. Jackson, Melva M. Graney, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Drew J. T. O’Keefe, U. S. Atty., of counsel, on the brief), for appellant.
Joseph B. Brennan, Atlanta, Ga. (Arthur Littleton, Philadelphia, Pa., Edward W. Hyland, Allentown, Pa., Willis B. Snell, Washington, D. C., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, Pa., Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Atlanta, Ga., of counsel, on the brief), for appel-lee.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and HASTIE and SMITH, Circuit Judges
HASTIE, Circuit Judge.
In the district court the taxpayer, Le-high Portland Cement Co., obtained a judgment for the refund of income and excess profits taxes which it had paid pursuant to allegedly erroneous assessments for the taxable years 1951, 1952 and 1953. The United States has appealed.
The taxpayer manufactures cement, using as a principal ingredient limestone from its own quarries. Under section 23 (m) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, as applicable to the taxable years, it was entitled to a percentage deduction from gross income for depletion of these limestone deposits. The sole question here is whether the taxpayer’s limestone qualifies as “chemical grade limestone”, for which section 114(b) (4) (A) (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes a 15 per cent depletion allowance, or only as “calcium carbonates” for which the immediately preceding subsection allows a 10 per cent deduction. The district court, disagreeing with the Commissioner’s decision upon this issue, held that the mineral in suit is “chemical grade limestone” within the meaning of the statute.
Calcium carbonate in varying amount is the principal ingredient of limestone, which also contains smaller amounts of magnesium carbonate, silica and other substances. The percentage by weight of various ingredients constituting the limestone extracted from each of the taxpayer’s ten quarries involved in this appeal appears in the following table:
TYPICAL CHEMICAL ANALYSIS
Percentages
It will be observed that all but two of the quarries yield limestone containing less than 85 per cent calcium carbonate and less than 90 per cent total (calcium and magnesium) carbonates. The highest total carbonate content, 93.2 per cent, is found in the limestone from the taxpayer’s Mitchell, Indiana quarry.
In terms of its principal ingredient, limestone of every grade is calcium carbonate. Indeed, limestone is by definition a rock containing more than 50 per cent mineral calcium carbonate. It is the government’s position that only such limestone as contains more than 95 per cent total carbonates, or, conversely, less than 5 per cent of “impurities”, qualifies as “metallurgical grade” or “chemical grade” limestone as those phrases are used in section 114(b) (4) (A) (iii) to define that mineral for which a 15 per cent depletion allowance may be taken. The government relegates less “pure” limestone to the more general, and for tax purposes less advantageous, category of “calcium carbonates”.
The taxpayer approaches the problem of classification in a different way. It says that any limestone is of “chemical grade” if it is suitable for a commercial' use in which it undergoes some chemical reaction, and that the taxpayer so uses its limestone. Thus, in the taxpayer’s manufacture of cement, the raw materials are heated in kilns where the limestone undergoes chemical reactions and changes essential to the transformation into cement. Later, the cement, mixed' with aggregates and water, functions as a chemically reactive agent to produce concrete.
To resolve this controversy and to determine what Congress meant by “chemical grade limestone”, we have examined the legislative history of the subsection in question. The proposal to authorize a 15 per cent depletion allowance for “metallurgical grade” and “chemical grade” limestone was submitted with justifying testimony at the congressional! hearings on the 1950 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code and was adopted by the House of Representatives, but not by the Senate. Further hearings in 1951 resulted in the enactment of this amendment in the Revenue Act of 1951,. c. 521, sec. 319(a), 65 Stat. 452. Its proponents were representatives of the National Lime Association. The basic justifying document introduced at both the 1950 and the 1951 hearings was a survey report by Professor Kenneth Landes. 1 House Hearings, Revenue Revision of 1950, 338; 3 House Hearings, Revenue Revision of 1951, 1555.
The report begins with a discussion of the composition and grades of limestone, pointing out that the greater the calcium carbonate content, the higher the grade or quality of the limestone. It is stated that the only grades of limestone “satisfactory for metallurgical or chemical use” are those which contain not more than 4.6% of “impurities”. Silica, alumina and sulfur are classified as principal “impurities” in limestone.
The report lists the principal specific uses for which these high grades of limestone are required as “blast-furnace flux” in the conversion of iron ore into pig iron, “furnace lining” in the manufacture of steel, “lime burning and chemical manufacture”. Apart from use for lime making, “chemical stone” is characterized as that which is “used in making such products as soda ash and calcium carbide, and in the refining of beet sugar”.
The report then contrasts this relatively pure and high grade limestone with the estimated % of the national limestone product which is unsuitable for the above ■mentioned uses but is satisfactory “for concrete aggregate, road metal, railroad ballast, agricultural limestone, cement manufacture and other purposes where chemical purity is not essential”. Moreover, at the 1951 House hearings, Phillip Corson, a lime manufacturer, told the House committee, that the 15 per cent depletion allowance was sought only for “the small percentage of available limestone which meets the metallurgical and ■chemical grade requirement”, p. 1567. This statement was supported by testimony at the 1950 hearings that only 5 per cent of our national limestone reserve is of this high quality, p. 336. Finally, :in concluding the testimony at the 1951 hearings, Ralph Dickey, a representative of the National Lime Association, advised the committee that deposits of “metallurgical and chemical grade limestone * * * are much scarcer than coal deposits and are being depleted much more rapidly”. He concluded that since “Congress has * * * provided such [depletion] allowance for natural resources certainly no more critical in the economy than high grade limestone, we respectfully request that a percentage depletion allowance be granted to metallurgical and chemical grade limestone at the rate of 15 per cent”, p. 1551.
None of this testimony was challenged or contradicted. No one proposed that limestone other than grades of such purity and high carbonate content as the industry witnesses described be granted a 15 per cent depletion allowance. The witnesses made it clear that the “metallurgical and chemical grades” of limestone about which they were talking were the relatively scarce and very pure limestones which contained very little silica, alumina and sulfur, substances classified as impurities in this mineral. They showed that such high grade limestone was “metallurgical” in that one of its important uses occurs in the manufacture of pig iron and steel. They also showed that limestone of similarly high grade is “chemical” stone in that it is required for the manufacture of lime and such other chemicals as soda ash and calcium carbide.
Finally, they repeatedly stated that the mineral most suitable for cement is ordinary limestone of relatively low grade, preferably containing a substantial percentage of the impurity silica, which is needed in cement. They expressly excluded cement stone from the purer “chemical grade” required for the manufacture of such “chemicals” as lime, soda ash and calcium carbide. Any possible doubt about this must have been eliminated by the following interrogation of the witness Dickey by Congressman Jenkins during the 1951 hearings:
“Mr. Jenkins. * * *
“Does the cement industry require this metallurgical and chemical grade of limestone?
“Mr. Dickey. No sir; it does not. They do not care how much silica or alumina there is in the limestone.”
Since the phrase “chemical grade” limestone was first used in the 1950 bill and its restrictive meaning explained during hearings, and the same language was again incorporated in the 1951 legislation and again explained in the same way, we think Congress must have intended that the phrase have the restrictive connotation that the witnesses gave it. Had there been any suggestion to Congress that “chemical grade” meant suitable for any commercial use or process involving a chemical reaction, the legislative adoption of the phrase without definition would have been ambiguous. But there was no suggestion of such an alternative meaning. In these circumstances, we think it would be arbitrary to attribute to the critical phrase in the enacted statute a meaning significantly different from the one and only meaning that was clearly and repeatedly expressed throughout the legislative hearing.
We think the court below was right in concluding generally that “chemical grade limestone indicates a limestone of a higher degree of purity than its common commercial form”. Indeed, the courts seem to agree upon this connotation. Bookwalter v. Centropolis Crusher Co., 8th Cir. 1962, 305 F.2d 27, 33; Rock Hill Quarries Co. v. United States, E.D. Mo.1963, 217 F.Supp. 324. However, we think the court erred in deciding that the taxpayer’s limestone satisfied the statutory requirement. The product of each of the ten quarries in question contains substantially more than 5 per cent — eight of them, more than 10 per cent — of such impurities as silica, alumina and sulphur. Thus, it is not extraordinarily pure and is not suitable for the manufacture of lime or such chemicals as soda ash and calcium carbide. Therefore, it is not “chemical grade” within the meaning of the statute.
Most of the cases are in accord with this reasoning. E.g. Rock Hill Quarries Co. v. United States, supra; California Portland Cement Co. v. Riddell, S.D.Cal. 1958, 1959-1 U.S.Tax Cas. par. 9156; Dixie Products Co. v. United States, S.D.Fla.1957, 57-2 U.S.Tax Cas. par. 9933; Iowa Limestone Co., 1957, 28 T.C. 881, aff’d 8th Cir. 1959, 269 F.2d 398; but cf. Wagner Quarries Co. v. United States, N.D.Ohio 1957, 154 F.Supp. 655, aff’d 6th Cir. 1958, 260 F.2d 907.
The judgment will be reversed.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the motion by-appellee to amend this Court’s judgment, in the above entitled cases,
It is ordered that this Court’s judgment of June 17, 1964 be and it hereby-is amended to provide that the judgment of the District Court be reversed and' the cases be remanded for the entry of judgment in accordance with the opinion! of this Court.
. Very small quantities of various impurities are omitted.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 0