What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN FORT LAUDERDALE, Appellant, v. William H. DAVIS, as Trustee of the Estate of Broward Electric Service, Inc., Bankrupt, Appellee.
No. 20042.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
May 22, 1963.
William P. Owen, English, McCaughan & O’Bryan, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for appellant.
David E. Maurer, Maurer, Maurer & Maurer, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for appellee William II. Davis, as trustee.
Before RIVES, LEWIS and BELL, Circuit Judges.
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
GRIFFIN B. BELL, Circuit Judge.
Broward Electric Service, Inc. was indebted to appellant bank on an unsecured monthly installment note dated June 10, 1959. Regular payments were made for July, August, and September by charging the deposit account of Broward in the bank pursuant to agreement.
On September 14, 1959 Broward filed a petition for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S. C.A. §§ 701 et seq. At the time of filing, the balance due on the note was $5,564.-98, and Broward had $4,307.41 in its bank account. The bank was entitled to a set-off in the amount of the account on that day but failed to exercise the right. § 68(a), The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. C.A. § 108(a). See McKee v. Hood, 5 Cir., 1963, 312 F.2d 394, and eases therein cited on the right of set-off. And the same rule applies in Chapter XI proceedings. Tyler v. Marine Midland Trust of New York, 2 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 927.
Broward remained in charge of its property and continued to operate. Instead of setting off the sum on deposit against the account due it, the bank continued to do business in the regular manner with Broward, paying out all sums in the deposit account in the usual course of business, plus other sums deposited after the filing of the petition for arrangement. Thereafter, and monthly, the bank deducted the unpaid installments on the note as they became due.
On September 20, 1960, a little more than a year after having filed the petition for arrangement, and after the bank had collected the entire balance due on the note, Broward was adjudicated a bankrupt. The trustee here successfully sought a turn-over from the bank of all sums collected after the date when the sums on deposit on the filing date, and which might have been set off, had been paid out, less a credit to the bank in the amount to which it was entitled as a general creditor. The District Court affirmed the action of the Referee in ordering the turnover, and this appeal followed.
Reed v. Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville, 5 Cir., 1918, 250 F. 983, an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, gave effect to the first in-first out rule, and made it clear that a bank has no right of set-off against funds deposited after the filing date, and after the funds on deposit at the time of filing have been paid out. This same application has been made in a Chapter X proceeding. 11 U.S. C.A. §§ 501 et seq. See In re Hotel Martin Co. of Utica, 2 Cir., 1936, 83 F.2d 231; and In re Mauch Chunk Brewing Co., 3 Cir., 1942, 131 F.2d 48, 143 A.L.R. 451.
We think the rule is the same in Chapter XI proceedings. A bank under the circumstances here has the right of set-off. It may or may not exercise the right. It is not self-executing. Here it did not, and the right was lost after those funds on deposit at the time of filing were paid out. The right does not run to funds later deposited. See generally 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, pp. 788, 791; 792-6; and Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank & Trust Co., 8 Cir., 1936, 84 F.2d 847.
Having waived its right, the position of the bank as a creditor was no different from that of the other creditors involved, and the turn-over order to restore equality among them was proper.
The judgment appealed from is
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1