What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
R. W. & M. F. ROSE CO. v. MARVIN. In re HUGHES.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
January 16, 1928.
No. 3663.
Bankruptcy <©=>188(3) — Order given by bankrupt to creditor held not equitable assignment and invalid as against trustee.
An order given to a creditor by bankrupt, who was plaintiff in a pending action against a county, directing his attorney or the county to pay to the creditor a certain sum-from the amount recovered, to be applied on his debt, held not an equitable assignment and not to en- . title the creditor to recover the proceeds of the judgment from bankrupt’s trustee.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania; Albert W. Johnson, Judge.
In the matter of Wells S. Hughes, bankrupt; Frank' M. Marvin, trustee. From an order denying the claim of the R. W. & M. F. Rose Company to a fund in the hands of the trustee, the company appeals.
Affirmed.
David Cameron, of Wellsboro, Pa., for appellant.
Frank H. Rockwell, Crichton & Orvlett, and Rockwell & Rockwell, all of Wellsboro, Pa., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
This case concerns a fund arising from damages to a landowner caused by the construction of a county road through his premises. The pertinent facts are these: Prior to March 10, 1925, Hughes, the landowner, presented his claim for damages and the matter was so i prosecuted by him in an action at law against the county that subsequently he recovered a judgment for some $900. On May 4, 1926, the county paid the balance of said judgment over and above an allowance for attorney’s fees to the trustee in bankruptcy of Hughes, who had on February 18,1926, been adjudged a voluntary bankrupt. On January 17,1927, R. .W. and F. M. Rose, the present appellants, presented a petition to the court below sitting in bankruptcy praying that Hughes’ trustee pay them the money paid to him, as above, by the county of Tioga. The trustee answered, denying their right, and the matter was referred to the referee, who took proofs and reported the petition he denied and discharged. From an order confirming the referee’s report, this appeal was taken by the Roses.
That the claim against the county was Hughes’ property, that it passed to his trustee in bankruptcy and was paid by the county to such trustee are facts which entitle the latter to hold the same for the benefit of Hughes’ creditors unless the Messrs. Rose can show a better right. This they seek to do by showing that on March 10, 1925, Hughes was indebted to them for about a thousand dollars, and on that date executed and delivered to them the paper printed in the margin. This paper was never presented to the commissioners. The Roses did not seek to become parties in his suit against the county nor in fact was any claim made under it until January 17, 1927, when their recited petition was presented to the court below. Do these facts show a right in the Roses superior to that of the trustee? The referee and court held not, and we think rightly. Manifestly the paper was but an order to apply. There is no proof that Hughes paid his debt to the Roses by giving the order or that they accepted it in extinguishment of the debt. It was .but’ an attempt to give them as security a part up to $1,500 of Hughes’ claim against the county, but, under the law of Pennsylvania (Vetter v. Meadville, 236 Pa. 564, 85 A. 19; Appeal of Philadelphia, 86 Pa. 179), the county was under no obligation to recognize such a partial order or assignment. Moreover, under the authorities (Geist’s Appeal, 104 Pa, 355), the Roses could not have enforced this order against either the county, Hughes, or his trustee, for, as was said by the Supreme Court in Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 70, 20 L. Ed. 762, cited in the foregoing ease:
“An agreement to pay out of a particular fund, however clear in its terms, is not an equitable assignment. * * * The assign- or must not retain any control over the fund —any authority to collect, or any power of revocation. If he do, it is fatal to the claim of the assignee. The transfer must be of sueh a character that the fund holder can safely pay, and is compellable to do so, thoug*h forbidden by the assignor.”
For the foregoing reasons we feel the decree dismissing the Rose petition should be, and is, affirmed.
I, Wells S. Hughes, do certify that I have a claim for damages against Tioga county; that the claim is now pending in the courts of Tioga county and from the first proceeds of said claim the commissioners of Tioga county, or my attorney, C. H. Ashton, is hereby authorized and required to pay R. W. & M. F. Rose Company $1,500 or as their interest may appear, and this is an order on them so to do and will be their authority for so doing.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1