What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BROWN v. WINSTON et al.
No. 10918.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 16, 1952.
Decided May 29, 1952.
J. E. Bindeman, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Henry E. Wixon, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, Washington, D. C., with whom Vernon E. West, Corp. Counsel, and Chester H. Gray, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C.., were on the brief, for appellees.
Oliver Gasch, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellees.
Before CLARK, PRETTYMAN and BAZELON, Circuit Judges.
PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in a case which was before that court upon a petition for review of a decision of the Real Estate Commission of the District of Columbia.
Appellant Brown was a licensed real estate broker. In the course of a transaction which involved the sale of real estate, he prepared a written contract, which was signed by the purported vendor, one Rosa Jones, and by Brown with the name “Pearl Malcom” as the purported purchaser. Pearl Malcom was a relative of appellant from whom he held power of attorney. Immediately thereafter Brown procured a notary public, one Robert Fribush, who certified on the contract that Rosa Jones and Pearl Malcom personally appeared before him and acknowledged the contract to be their act and deed. Neither Rosa Jones nor Pearl Malcom personally appeared before the notary or acknowledged to him that the contract was their act and deed. Brown placed the notarized contract on record in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds, where it constituted a cloud on the title to the property. It could not have been recorded without notarization.
The title to the property was of record in the names of Rosa Jones and Lee Pluffmafi, her son. Huffman was not in the City at the time the contract was signed, and upon his return he refused to sign it.
Brown wrote Mrs. Rosa Jones a letter, which recited that he had learned that her son did not want to sell the property. He told Mrs. Jones:
“Unless you do carry out your contract, we shall prevent you from selling the house to anyone at any time, because you have already entered into a contract to sell it If you have in mind to sell this property to somebody else, you might as well forget about it, because you won’t be able to do so.
“It will be to your advantage to close this deal in accordance with the contract; otherwise you’ll be stuck with the property for the rest of your life. * * * ”
A charge was made before the Real Estate Commission that Brown “Demonstrated such unworthiness or incompetency to act as a real estate broker or a business chance broker as to endanger the interests of the public in violation of paragraph (h) of Section 8 of said Act of Congress.” Three specifications under the charge described the securing of Fribush to notarize the signature of Rosa Jones to the contract, the recording of the contract with knowledge that the signatory had not been before the notary, and the recording with knowledge that title was not in the name of Rosa Jones alone but was in the names of her and Lee Huffman.
After public hearing the Commission made findings of fact and conclusions of law and suspended Brown’s license as a real estate and business chance broker for a period of sixty days. The proceeding in the District Court followed. That court entered summary judgment for the defendant members of the Real Estate Commission.
We find no error in the judgment' of the District Court, and it is therefore
Affirmed.
. 50 Stat. 794 (1937), D.C.Code § 45-1409 (1940).
. 50 Stat. 793 (1937), as amended, D.C.Code § 45-1408(h) (1940).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1