What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Edna EPSTEIN, Appellant, v. Shirley D. MESHER, Executrix of the Estate of Jacob Voronoff, Appellee.
No. 18236.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 2, 1964.
Decided May 1, 1964.
Mr. Nathan L. Silberberg, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Alvin L. Newmyer, with whom Mr. Alvin L. Newmyer, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before Wilbur K. Miller, Burger and. Wright, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The will of Jacob Voronoff, which was-admitted to probate February 8, 1963,. contained this sentence, “It is my intention not to make any provision in my Will for my stepdaughter, Edna Epstein.” Within the six-month period permitted by § 19-309, D.C.Code (1961), Mrs. Epstein filed a caveat alleging she was Voronoff’s daughter and praying" that the probate of the will be revoked. The executrix moved to dismiss the caveat on the ground that the caveator was not a “person in interest” who may file a caveat under that section.
In answer to interrogatories propounded by the caveatee, Mrs. Epstein stated she was Voronoff’s daughter by adoption, although she said, “There were-no court proceedings of adoption, to the-best of my knowledge.” She deposed that the testator treated her as his daughter, that in the school records of the District of Columbia he was listed as-her “parent or guardian,” that in the-1920 census she was listed as “Edna Voronoff, Daughter, Age 11, enumerated' in the family of Jacob and Fannie Voronoff,” that in 1927 the local newspapers announced “the engagement of Miss Edna Voronoff, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Jacob Voronoff,” and that her wedding was arranged and paid for by Voronoff.
From this Mrs. Epstein argued that, under the doctrine of equitable adoption, she was the adopted daughter of the decedent. The District Court held, however, that the statutes relative to the subject create an exclusive method for the legal adoption of children, found that Mrs. Epstein had never been legally adopted, and consequently dismissed the •caveat. She appeals.
The only domestic authority cited by the appellant is an unreported decision of the District Court in Estate of Linnie G. Finney, Administration No. 81,052 (1954). There it was held that, as the prospective adoptive parents had contracted with a foundling home in 1892 to adopt the child, had taken him into
their iousehold and treated him as a member of the family, he should be treated as though he had been adopted, even though formal adoption was never consummated.
We need not and do not decide whether the statutory method of adoption is exclusive, or whether the doctrine of equitable adoption also prevails in the District of Columbia, because under either, Mrs. Epstein must fail: there was no promise or contract to adopt which would support her equitable adoption theory and, admittedly, there was no statutory adoption. Being a stepdaughter only, she was not a person “who would be entitled to or interested in the estate of the testator in case such will had not been executed * * *.” § 19-301, D.C. Code (1961). Hence, she was not a “person in interest” within the meaning of § 309.
Affirmed.
. There was no adoption statute in the District of Columbia at that time.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0