What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Theodore TREVINO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF ARIZONA and Harold Cardwell, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 75-1304.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Dec. 4, 1975.
Bruce F. Rinaldi (argued), of Verity, Smith, Lacy, Allen & Kearns, P. C., Tucson, Ariz., for petitioner-appellant.
Frank T. Galati, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Phoenix, Ariz., for respondentsappellees.
Honorable Charles H. Carr, Senior United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
OPINION
Before WALLACE and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and CARR, Senior District Judge.
CARR, Senior District Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Petitioner is serving a life sentence in the Arizona State Prison for first degree murder. He claims his sentence is invalid because of ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was involuntary.
His attorneys informed him that upon his guilty plea to first degree murder, he would be eligible for parole within seven years. This was erroneous since under Arizona law a prisoner serving a life term would not be eligible for parole unless his sentence was commuted.
The district court conducted a full evidentiary hearing and decided that the plea was motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty, and that it resulted from a negotiated plea.
At the time of the plea, the death penalty was still in effect in Arizona. The district judge found that, “ * * * the issue of parole eligibility was not a significant consideration in petitioner entering a plea of guilty to first degree murder.” The district judge also stated in his opinion, “Given the brutal and premeditated circumstance, giving rise to the decedents [sic] murder, the overwhelming indication from the evidence before this court is that the main consideration in this case was avoiding the imposition of the death penalty.”
Obviously, the district judge found that the plea was voluntary, and it must be concluded from a study of the record in this case that the finding was not clearly erroneous.
It is therefore unnecessary to consider petitioner’s contention that Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964), should be applied retroactively. To do so would lead to a consideration of the applicability of Rule 11, F.R.Crim.P., to state proceedings which, in the end, would not benefit petitioner since an extension of Munich to state proceedings would lead to the result that Munich would not be applied retroactively. Fong v. United States, 411 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1969).
Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel falls far short of meeting the test that the trial must be reduced to a farce, sham or mockery of justice by incompetent counsel.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0