What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
SCOTT, TREASURER OF ILLINOIS, et al. v. GERMANO et al.
No. 1152.
Decided June 1, 1965.
Don H. Reuben, Howard J. Trienens and D. Lawrence Gunnels for appellants.
Bernard Kleiman and Lester Asher for Germano et al., and William G. Clark, Attorney General of Illinois, and Richard A. Michael, Assistant Attorney General, for Kerner et al., appellees.
Per Curiam.
Upon remand of this case, 378 U. S. 560 (1964), for further proceedings consistent with the views stated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), the District Court on January 22, 1965, entered a judgment declaring invalid Art. IV, § 6, of the Illinois Constitution and Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, §§158-1 to 158-5 (1963), apportioning the Illinois Senate; directing that all members of the Illinois General Assembly be made parties defendant; and requiring that “any implementation, amendment or substitution of all or part of the said defective portions” of the Illinois Constitution or legislation be submitted to it for approval before the holding of any election thereunder. It further held that if no such “implementation, amendment or substitution” was submitted it would order the parties to show cause why all Illinois State Senators should not be elected from the State at large in the 1966 election and every four years thereafter.
In April 1964 the case of People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner was filed in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, Illinois. It contested the composition of both houses of the General Assembly but was dismissed by the trial court. Upon appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois on February 4, 1965, held the composition of the Illinois Senate invalid; the court expressed confidence that the General Assembly would “successfully perform its duty to enact a constitutionally valid plan during its current session” which expires July 1, 1965. However, the court retained jurisdiction of the case “for the purpose of taking such affirmative action as may be necessary to insure that the 1966 election is pursuant to a constitutionally valid plan.” 32 Ill. 2d 212, 225, 205 N. E. 2d 33, 41.
On February 8, 1965, the appellants here moved that the United States District Court reconsider and vacate its order of January 22, 1965, and stay further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court of Illinois’ opinion in Engle, supra. This the District Court refused to do. Direct appeal was perfected here, 28 U. S. C. § 1253 (1958 ed.), and the appellants have now moved to stay the judgment of the District Court.'
We believe that the District Court should have stayed its hand. The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U. S. 656, 676 (1964); Scranton v. Drew, 379 U. S. 40 (1964), citing Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A. 2d 556 (1964); Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N. J. 453, 473, 205 A. 2d 713, 724 (1964). See also Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S. W. 2d 40 (1956), and discussion thereof in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 235-236 (1962).
We therefore vacate the order of the District Court dated May 7,1965. The case is remanded with directions that the District Court enter an order fixing a reasonable time within which the appropriate agencies of the State of Illinois, including its Supreme Court, may validly redistrict the Illinois State Senate; provided that the same be accomplished within ample time to permit such plan to be utilized in the 1966 election of the members of the State Senate, in accordance with the provisions of the Illinois election laws. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46 (1963).
The District Court shall retain jurisdiction of the case and in the event a valid reapportionment plan for the State Senate is not timely adopted it may enter such orders as it deems appropriate, including an order for a valid reapportionment plan for the State Senate or an order directing that its members be elected at large pending a valid reapportionment by the State itself.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The motion to dispense with the printing of the jurisdictional statement is granted.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2