What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
J. Robert TULL, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD and Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Respondents.
No. 81-1576.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 13, 1982.
Decided May 19, 1982.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 16,1982.
Mallory V. Mayse, Columbia, Mo., for petitioner.
Robert G. Ulrich, U. S. Atty., E. Eugene Harrison, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., Peter J. Lynch, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D. C., for respondents.
Before HEANEY, BRIGHT and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
The Honorable Roy L. Stephenson assumed senior status on April 1, 1982.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
Robert Tull petitions this Court to review and reverse an order of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which denied Tull a third-class medical certificate. We affirm the NTSB, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to make further evi-dentiary showings or to pursue alternative administrative waivers or exemptions, as indicated herein.
The petitioner has experienced progressive rheumatoid arthritis since 1963, eventually resulting in replacement of both hips and both knees with artificial joints. Treatment appears to have arrested the progression of the arthritis and, in 1978, the petitioner applied for a third-class medical certificate, a prerequisite to obtaining a private pilot’s license from the FAA. See 14 C.F.R. 61.103(c). Such an applicant has the burden of establishing that he meets the medical fitness requirements under 14 C.F.R. § 67.17(f)(2). See 49 C.F.R. 821.25. An FAA medical examiner denied the petitioner’s application; an administrative law judge (ALJ), after a hearing, reversed and approved the application; and the NTSB reversed the ALJ, effecting a denial of the application. The issue before us is whether there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the NTSB’s determination that the petitioner has not carried his burden. We think there is.
The evidence before the ALJ ostensibly consisted of the testimony of the petitioner, petitioner’s doctor, a flight instructor, the Administrator’s doctor and various medical records. The petitioner’s doctor testified that Tull’s condition had improved substantially and was largely under control. He also detailed his opinion as to the degree of functional use of various of petitioner’s joints and broadly classified petitioner’s condition as halfway between Class II and Class III, as defined by the American Rheumatism Association. The flight instructor had flown a test flight with the petitioner and essentially found him physically capable of operating a plane within private pilot standards. This test flight, however, did not include simulated emergency conditions. Pet. Br. at 14.
The Administrator’s doctor, who is also a licensed pilot, testified that the petitioner was not medically fit to safely fly a plane, an opinion based largely on review of the medical records and the testimony of petitioner’s doctor. Much of the testimony of the Administrator’s doctor was flatly contradicted by the flight instructor’s actual observations under normal flight conditions, although there is little direct evidence of ability to handle emergency conditions.
There is no doubt that the petitioner has some difficulty in terms of grip strength and in terms of strength and flexibility of certain joints. The ALJ found that the petitioner has residual limitations, but also that the testimony of petitioner’s doctor and the flight instructor was more persuasive on the issue of ability to safely operate a plane. We tend to agree, but need not reach this issue because the NTSB did not make a contrary factual conclusion. The Board’s decision was based on the evidence as to the petitioner’s physical ability to handle emergency conditions:
We are reluctant to conclude that petitioner is medically fit without the results of a more comprehensive flight check covering the full range of emergency conditions a pilot may encounter and is expected to successfully deal with. Therefore, we conclude on the basis of this record that petitioner has not met his burden of establishing entitlement to a medical certificate.
NTSB Order No. EA-1576, at 7 (March 11, 1981).
Thus, the issue is whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination with respect to emergency conditions. The test flight taken here did not include simulation of such conditions, see Pet.Br. at 14, and there was competent testimony that such conditions might require strength, flexibility and quick reflexes to a degree more demanding than under normal flight conditions. The record as a whole does offer substantial evidence which creates doubts as to the petitioner’s condition, although such doubts were largely dispelled with respect to normal flight conditions. We cannot say, however, that there is no substantial evidence on which doubts could persist as to the petitioner’s ability to handle emergency conditions.
We therefore must affirm the decision of the NTSB. In doing so, we emphasize that there is no prejudice to the petitioner’s right to make further evidentiary showings as to his ability to handle simulated emergency conditions. As we view the record and the order of the NTSB, a sufficient showing on this issue would then entitle the petitioner to a medical certificate, absent new issues or other evidence. There also is no prejudice to the petitioner’s right to pursue alternative administrative waivers or exemptions, as indicated by the NTSB.
The petition is denied and the order of the NTSB is affirmed without prejudice.
. The record indicates that the petitioner held a commercial pilot’s license at some point prior to the arthritis difficulties.
. Class II refers to persons who can perform “adequate or normal activity, despite a handicap, discomfort or limitation of motion at one or more joints;” Class III refers to those who are “limited to little or none of the duties of usual occupation or self care.” Pet.Br. at 5.
. See NTSB Order No. EA-1576, at 7, n.15.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0