What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HENSEL PHELPS CONSTRUCTION CO., a Colorado corporation and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, a Connecticut corporation, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America for the Use and Benefit of Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, Inc., Appellee.
No. 10137.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
July 28, 1969.
John J. Mullins, Jr., Denver, Colo. (Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker & Grover, Denver, Colo., were with him on the brief), for appellants.
Stuart S. Gunckel, Denver, Colo. (Akolt, Shepherd, Dick & Rovira, Denver, Colo., were with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before LEWIS, BREITENSTEIN and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
In this Miller Act case, Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, a subcontractor, had judgment for $22,660 against Hensel Phelps Construction Company, the prime contractor, and its surety because of extra work performed by Reynolds in the construction of certain motor repair shops for the United States at Fort Carson, Colorado.
Hensel Phelps disputes the findings of the trial court that the work was not covered by the written subcontract and that Reynolds performed the work at the request of Hensel Phelps. The prime contract included the installation of 120 electrically operated overhead doors. Reynolds was the electrical subcontractor. The doors were supplied by McKee Door Company. The disputed items relate to the wiring of certain switches controlling the doors and to the additional wiring necessitated by the relocation of the motors which operate the doors.
The operation of each door requires an electric motor, two limit switches, and a safety switch. At the time of execution of the Reynolds contract, the drawings showed the motor location on the wall at the top of the door and did not show the control wiring for the switches. The door contract with McKee was made some 8-10 months after the Reynolds contract. The drawings accompanying the McKee contract showed the motor location some 20 feet inside from the top of the door opening and set out the control wiring for the switches.
In its description of the work to be performed the Reynolds contract specifically includes all work under Section 36 of the specifications and says: “Included in this subcontract are all required equipment connections, overhead door hookup, and fence grounding.” Section 36-21 of the specifications reads:
“All wiring for the connection of motors and control equipment as indicated on the electrical drawings shall he furnished and installed under this section of the specifications. Except as otherwise specifically noted, automatic-control wiring, signaling, and protective devices are not included in this section of the specifications, but shall be furnished and installed under other sections of the specifications. Control wiring not shown on the electrical drawings shall be furnished under other sections of the specifications.”
We are concerned with automatic control wiring which was not shown on the drawings and with additional wiring caused by the change in motor location.
The arguments of Hensel Phelps are not persuasive. The general reference in the contract to “over head door hookup” does not control over the specific provision of § 36-21 that “automatic-control wiring, signaling, and protective devices” are not included. Reliance on § 2 of the specifications is misplaced. It provides that anything mentioned or shown in either the specifications or drawings shall be considered as if mentioned in both. The wiring of the switches was not shown on the drawings originally submitted to Reynolds when it bid on and contracted to do the work, and § 36-21 of the specifications excludes such wiring. The reference to § 18-10c(5) of the specifications is not appropriate because that section is not included within the provision of the Reynolds contract covering the work to be performed. We construe § 36-16 to cover design changes in the equipment. The Hensel Phelps construction would make § 36-16 conflict with § 36-21. The intent of the parties to a contract shall be ascertained from the contract as a whole rather than from a specific provision. Fanderlik-Locke Co. v. United States, 10 Cir., 285 F.2d 939, 947, cert. denied 365 U.S. 860, 81 S.Ct. 826, 5 L.Ed.2d 823. When we view the Reynolds contract as a whole, we are convinced that neither the wiring for the switches nor the additional wiring required by the change in motor location was covered, or intended to be covered.
Before the execution of the Reynolds contract, an official of Reynolds discussed with an official of Hensel Phelps the situation regarding the overhead doors and said in effect that Reynolds was responsible for anything on the drawings. Hensel Phelps did not disagree. This testimony is said to be inadmissible. It was received subject to the court’s determination of whether an ambiguity existed. If there was an ambiguity, the evidence was proper. If there was not, the evidence was not prejudicial. We agree with the trial court that the work in question was not covered.
Reynolds told Hensel Phelps before the electrical work on the doors was undertaken that it considered the wiring for switches and for the changed motor location extra work. Later, Reynolds wrote Hensel Phelps a letter saying that the work was extra and that its estimate therefor was $19,519. It also said that in the interest of maintaining the job schedules it would proceed with the questioned work. About two months thereafter, Hensel Phelps wrote McKee that it considered the questioned wiring part of the McKee contract. This evidence was pertinent because if the contract is not clear the conduct of the parties is given great weight in construing it. Sam Macri & Sons, Inc., v. United States, 9 Cir., 313 F.2d 119, 124; and see Fanderlik-Locke Co. v. United States, 10 Cir., 285 F.2d 939, 947, cert. denied 365 U.S. 860, 81 S.Ct. 826. Although we disagree with the Hensel Phelps contentions that the work was covered by the Reynolds contract, the effect of those contentions, if any, is to make the contract unclear. Hensel Phelps was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence.
The wiring for the switches was not within the Reynolds contract. The change of motor location required additional wiring. A contractor who bids for work has the right to rely on the plans and specifications submitted to him for bidding purposes. Wunderlich Contracting Company v. United States, 10 Cir., 240 F.2d 201, 205, cert. denied 353 U.S. 950, 77 S.Ct. 861, 1 L.Ed.2d 859. Burdens other than those contemplated by the contract may not be placed upon the contractor without additional compensation. Id. The wiring in question was extra work for which Reynolds is entitled to be paid.
Reynolds is entitled to damages in an amount equal to the reasonable value of services and materials, including profit and overhead, for which they could be obtained under like circumstances. Wunderlich Contracting Company v. United States, 10 Cir., 240 F.2d 201, 205, cert, denied 353 U.S. 950, 77 S.Ct. 861, and Wynne v. United States, 10 Cir., 382 F.2d 699, 701. Three expert witnesses, Henley and Raque for Reynolds and Sharp for Hensel Phelps, testified on damages. We do not consider the letter from the Reynolds project engineer in which he estimated the extra work at $19,519 because that was an offer made to encourage an agreement on the extra work and it was not accepted by Hensel Phelps.
Henley, the district manager of Reynolds, testified that the amount claimed in the complaint, $23,156, was the reasonable value. He said that actual costs were not available because of the difficulty of keeping actual cost records when the extra work was done in conjunction with contract work. Henley based his figure on the original Reynolds estimate with adjustments for factors obtainable from job costs available at the end of the work. He also gave consideration to independent estimates one of which was prepared by an independent estimator in connection with a similar problem relating to 60 doors. That estimate was $11,560. Hensel Phelps argues that the Henley testimony should not be received because it is based on the expert opinion of another. We held in 6816.5 Acres of Land, etc. v. United States, 10 Cir., 411 F.2d 834, that an expert opinion may not be based on the opinion of another person. That rule is not controlling here because Henley used the independent estimates to corroborate the figure which he, Henley, had reached through his own analysis.
Raque, testifying for Reynolds, fixed the reasonable value of the extras at $25,757. Sharp, a witness for Hensel Phelps, testified that the value of the extras was a total of $9,309.79. The trial court found that the estimates of the Reynolds’ witnesses “were the most satisfactory.” Hensel Phelps argues at length the differences in approach between Henley and Raque and criticizes the methods used and the results obtained. We decline to enter into this area of disagreement. Hensel Phelps is not entitled to a trial de novo in the appellate court on the question of damages. The amount awarded is within the range of the evidence and is not clearly erroneous. Freeman v. Warrior, 10 Cir., 409 F.2d 1101, and cases there cited.
The trial court disallowed a claim by Reynolds for extra work resulting from the change in placement of plates on which the motor starters and disconnects were mounted. The change was from the top of each door to a location six feet above the floor. The amount claimed and disallowed was $496. Hensel Phelps says that a greater amount should have been disallowed. The project engineer for Reynolds fixed the value of the plate work at $496. Hensel Phelps offered no evidence on this item. The effect of the court’s ruling was to deny any claim for the relocation of the plates. We believe that the trial court treated the item properly.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2