What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Leonard F. DREW, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 21023.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
June 26, 1967.
Mr. James S. Brocard, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellant.
Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., entered appearances for appellee.
Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and Weight and Leventhal, Circuit Judges, in Chambers.
Chief Judge Bazelon did not participate in this opinion.
JUDGMENT
PER CURIAM.
This cause came on for consideration on the record on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on consideration whereof and of the brief filed herein by appellant and of the pleadings filed herein by the parties, it is
Ordered and adjudged by this Court that the order of the District Court appealed from herein entered on May 24, 1967, is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s opinion filed this date.
BAZELON, Chief Judge, did not participate in the foregoing judgment.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant was arrested on a charge of first degree murder. After being ordered detained pending action of the Grand Jury, he moved in the District Court for release on bond. The motion alleged that the underlying background was a dice game in which decedent flashed a switchblade knife when appellant told him to put down money he took from the pot. These allegations, renewed in this Court, have not been contested before us by appellee. Appellant’s motion for release on bond was supported by an affidavit from his former employer and six letters attesting to his good character. The District of Columbia Bail Agency filed a report in which it recommended pre-trial release on personal recognizance.
After a full hearing, a District Court judge ordered appellant released pending trial upon the execution of a $5,000 personal bond and the deposit of 10% thereof ($500) in the Registry of the District Court. Approximately six weeks after appellant was thus released, he was indicted for first degree murder. At arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty. The District Court judge who accepted the plea ordered appellant committed to jail prior to trial, thereby revoking the earlier release order entered after a full hearing by another District Court judge. On appeal from that order, appellee sought and was granted an extension of time to file a brief. On the extended date, appellee filed a motion to remand and a motion for a further extension of time to file its brief should the motion to remand be denied.
Appellant contends that the District Court judge erred in that he “summarily and arbitrarily revoked the appellant’s pre-trial bond without affording him a hearing * * * ” at arraignment. The Government acknowledges “that the record is susceptible of the interpretation that the District Court did not consider the merits or exercise judgment as to whether this appellant should be released on bond.”
A defendant in a capital case may be released prior to trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3148; Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(a). A District Court judge granted pre-trial release, upon execution of a $5,000 personal bond and deposit of 10% of that amount, only after a hearing. That order, like any order admitting to bail, can be revoked or modified, but “ [p] roper showing of a reason for revocation or modification must be made.” Cf., Christoffel v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 347, 196 F.2d 560, 566 (1951).
The Government did not request or set forth any reasons for a revocation or modification of the bail order. There was neither a hearing nor a statement of reasons for modification or revocation of the earlier bail order. When the court sua sponte ordered appellant committed, defense counsel asked: “You are going to commit him?” The Court: “Yes. First Degree Murder.” For all that appears, the action of the arraignment judge in revoking bail reflects merely a broad approach that such pretrial release is unavailable in first degree murder cases, an approach clearly contrary to the statute. Accordingly, the order is reversed and the cause remanded with directions that appellant be released prior to trial subject to the conditions originally imposed. Should the Government feel that adequate grounds for revocation or modification of the conditions of pre-trial release exist, it of course may make a proper motion which could be decided according to law.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BAZELON, Chief Judge, did not participate in the foregoing opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0