What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
CONNOR et al. v. WILLIAMS, GOVERNOR OF MISSISSIPPI, et al.
No. 71-221.
Decided January 24, 1972
Per Curiam.
After determining that the reapportionment plan for the State Senate and House of Representatives, passed by the Mississippi Legislature in January 1971, failed to comply with the Equal Protection Clause because of a total variance of 26% between the largest and the smallest senatorial district (a determination that was not appealed), the District Court fashioned its own plan for the quadrennial elections for both Houses scheduled for 1971, and these elections were held under the court’s plan. Connor v. Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506 (SD Miss. 1971). Appellants now challenge the constitutionality of the court’s plan, contending that a total variance of 18.9% between the largest and smallest Senate district and one of 19.7%- between the largest and smallest House district require that the court’s districting plan be voided, a new plan instituted, and new elections held.
Appellants rely on our recent cases invalidating congressional redistricting statutes that contained total variations of 5.97%, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 (1969), and of 13.1%, Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542 (1969), between the largest and the smallest districts. These decisions do not squarely control the instant appeal since they do not concern state legislative apportionment, but they do raise substantial questions concerning the constitutionality of the District Court’s plan as a design for permanent apportionment.
But conceding, arguendo, that the District Court’s plan does not precisely square with Fourteenth Amendment requirements, it does not necessarily follow that the 1971 elections must be invalidated and new elections ordered. Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (ED Va. 1964), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. WMCA, 379 U. S. 694 (1965); Toombs v. Fortson, 241 F. Supp. 65, 71 (ND Ga. 1965), aff’d, 384 U. S. 210 (1966); Drum v. Seawell, 249 F. Supp. 877, 881-882 (MDNC 1965), aff’d, 383 U. S. 831 (1966). In the circumstances of this case, we decline to disturb these elections.
The prospective validity of the plan for the 1975 elections, absent legislative action, poses different issues, but we need not decide those questions at the present time. Under the District Court plan, approximately one-fifth of the seats in both Houses were filled by at-large elections from temporary countywide districts in 1971. The District Court retained jurisdiction over these three counties and ordered that a Special Master be appointed in January 1972 to “take testimony and make findings as to whether the Counties of Hinds, Harrison, and Jackson may feasibly be divided into districts of substantially equal numbers in population for the elections of 1975 and 1979.” 330 F. Supp., at 519. Such proceedings should go forward and be promptly concluded, for, as this Court has emphasized, “when district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans, single-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter.” Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690, 692 (1971). Pending completion of those proceedings, we deem it inappropriate to give further consideration to this case. If we are to consider the applicability of Preisler and Wells to state legislative districts, it would be preferable to have before us a final judgment with respect to the entire State. To accomplish this result and to preserve the right to appeal from such a judgment, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, except insofar as it applied to the 1971 elections, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
A three-judge court has twice previously voided apportionment plans enacted by the Mississippi Legislature because they embodied impermissible population variances. Connor v. Johnson, 279 F. Supp. 619 (SD Miss. 1966), aff’d, 386 U. S. 483 (1967) (appeal limited to congressional districting). This Court has already considered an interlocutory appeal in the instant case. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690, 403 U. S. 928 (1971).
There are 52 seats in the State Senate and 122 seats in the State House of Representatives. According to the 1970 census, Mississippi has a population of 2,216,912, making the ideal single-member Senate district one containing 42,633 persons and the ideal single-member House district one containing 18,171 persons. Under the court’s plan, Senate district 29 (46,719 persons, one Senator) is 9.6% underrepresented, and district 19 (77,320 persons, two Senators) is 9.3% overrepresented. House district 18 (32,772 persons, two Representatives) is 9.8% overrepresented, and House district 3 (59,912 persons, three Representatives) is 9.9% underrepresented.
Legislators elected from temporary multi-member districts:
Senators Representatives
Hinds County. 5 12
Harrison County. 3 7
Jackson County. 2 6*
10 25
*With George County.
Thus, 10 out of 52 Senators (19%) and 25 out of 122 Representatives (21%) were elected from temporary multi-member districts in 1971.
Meanwhile, it is possible that the state legislature will adopt a plan of its own. During the course of this litigation, the District Court has emphasized that “the exercise of this unavoidable judicial duty [drafting an apportionment plan] cannot, does not, and will not in any way tie the hands of the Legislature at any time to adopt and enact any plan of its own for the reapportionment of its membership so long as it complies with Constitutional requirements.” Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492, 494 (SD Miss. 1967) (emphasis in original). This Court has frequently emphasized that “legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 586 (1964). See also Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 85 (1966); Ely v. Klahr, 403 U. S. 108, 114 n. 6 (1971).

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2