What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David GELBARD, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sidney PARNAS, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 71-1263, 71-1264.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
June 8, 1971.
Rehearings Denied June 23, 1971.
Adrian Marshall (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant, Parnas.
Burton Marks (argued), Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant Gilbard.
Alfred N. King (argued), Atty., for Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., Robert L. Meyer, U.S. Atty., Dennis E. Kinnaird, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KOELSCH, CARTER and TRASK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated appeals involve persons who proved recalcitrant when they appeared as witnesses before a federal grand jury and who were each committed to custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), after being adjudged guilty of civil contempt. In order to meet the rigorous statutory time limit imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) it was necessary to, and this court did, immediately following oral argument, render decision. We affirmed the judgment of the court below and stated an opinion would follow. This is that opinion.
Both Gelbard, the appellant in No. 71-1263, and Parnas, the appellant in No. 71-1264, refused to answer any questions based upon information gained by the government from wiretapping authorized by the district court pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which is a part of Title III of the Omnibus Criminal Control Act and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 218. When cited for contempt in the district court, each attacked the constitutional validity of Section 2518, and additionally urged that he should not be required to testify until and unless first allowed to inspect all applications, orders, tapes and transcripts relating to such electronic surveillance and afforded an opportunity to suppress the use before the grand jury of any evidence so secured. The court rejected their contentions and held the statute valid.
We find it unnecessary to consider the district court’s finding that Section 2518 is constitutionally valid. A witness before a grand jury lacks standing to challenge a statute on constitutional grounds unless the statute directly bears upon his privilege against self-incrimination. Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384, 386-387 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 2253, 26 L.Ed.2d 807 (1970). Section 2518 is not in that category.
It appears to be settled that a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) and Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958). Finally, we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Dudley v. United States, 427 F.2d 1140, 1141 (5th Cir.1970) “that nothing in the Omnibus Act, particularly § 2518(10) (a) created a statutory exception which would permit a pre-indictment motion to suppress evidence that might be presented to the grand jury. * * * The legislative history of the Act supports this conclusion. See Senate Report No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968) at p. 2195.”
. The report contains this statement:
“Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself.. Normally, there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforcible by an individual. (United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)). There is no intent to change the general rule.” Neither does 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) support appellants in their contention that as witnesses they were entitled to copies of the applications and orders for the interceptions, together with transcripts, tapes, etc.
The language of paragraph (9) does not so indicate and the Legislative Report shows that paragraph (9) must be read in pari materia with paragraph (10). Thus, paragraph (9) is intended to enable a party charged with a criminal offense or facing other adversary proceeding to secure copies of the application for and the order permitting the interception to enable him to move to suppress evidence so gathered; but it does not extend to grand jury proceedings. As the Report states: “ ‘Proceeding’ is intended to include all adversary type hearings. It would include a trial itself, a probation revocation proceeding, or a hearing on a motion for reduction of sentence. It would not include a grand jury hearing.” H. p. 2195.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1