What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
J. L. KAMSLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. F. I. CORPORATION, Caine Steel Co., G & H Steel Plate Co., Beverly Steel Corp., Clearing Steel, Inc., and Sgt. Ed McGlynn of the Chicago Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15395.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
March 29, 1966.
J. L. Kamsler, Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Barry B. Nekritz, Joel S. Siegel, Donald J. Veverka, Elsdon C. Smith, Chicago, 111., Friedman, Koven, Salzman, Koenigs-berg, Specks & Homer, Chicago, 111., of counsel, for appellees.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and KNOCH and KILEY, Circuit Judges.
HASTINGS, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, J. L. Kamsler, has appealed from an order of the district court dismissing his complaint for damages, under civil rights statutes, for want of jurisdiction.
In general, Kamsler asserts that the district court committed the following errors: dismissed the complaint and all its counts for want of jurisdiction; considered previous litigation which did not directly relate to the instant case; and failed to accept alleged facts as true.
In the first count of his complaint, Kamsler contended that defendants, M.F.I. Corporation, Caine Steel Co., G & H Steel Plate Co., Beverly Steel Corp., Clearing Steel, Inc. and Sgt. Ed McGlynn, of the Chicago Police Department, conspired to violate his constitutional rights by conspiring to extort money from him. Count two alleged the carrying out of the alleged conspiracy. Count three alleged malicious prosecution.
In the counts, Kamsler alleged injury to his reputation and pain in mind and body stemming from the alleged activities of defendants. On each count, he sought 5 million dollars in damages and 5 million dollars in punitive damages.
The record in the instant case is scant. From Kamsler’s complaint, however, it is possible to glean the following allegations of fact.
Kamsler, together with an unnamed individual, purchased steel from a number of companies, among which were some of the defendants. Promissory notes were given for these purchases, but the notes were not paid.
Sometime between July, 1962 and February, 1963, the defendants allegedly conspired with Sgt. Ed McGlynn, of the Chicago Police Department, to extort money from Kamsler by threatening to send him to jail for failure to pay the promissory notes.
It was further alleged that defendants signed criminal complaints against Kam-sler. The alleged conspirators urged individuals unacquainted with Kamsler, but to whom he owed money, to sign complaints. Kamsler was required to make bond.
There was an alleged conspiracy between defendants, certain assistant state’s attorneys and other unnamed public officials to ensure that Kamsler was harassed and prosecuted.
Defendants gave evidence before the grand jury, and indictments were returned against Kamsler. Kamsler was held under special bond and ordered to stand trial in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois.
Kamsler was prosecuted. The record before us does not reveal the re-suit of the prosecution. However, in the interests of justice, we may take notice of the proceedings of this court in related litigation. Cf. Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d 216, 217 (1960), cert. den., 365 U.S. 835, 81 S.Ct. 749, 5 L.Ed.2d 745 (1961); A. G. Reeves Steel Const. Co. v. Weiss, 119 F.2d 472, 474 (1941), cert. den., 314 U.S. 677, 62 S.Ct. 181, 86 L.Ed. 541 (1941). We take notice therefore of the opinion of this court in Kamsler v. Ward, 353 F.2d 207 (1965) in which it is revealed that six indictments were returned against Kamsler and that he stood trial and was convicted on two of them. The remaining four indictments were nonprossed.
The relevant portions of the civil rights statutes, upon which Kamsler relies, are;
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
“(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;”
“ * * *
“(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(1), (3).
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Under these statutes, a district court does not have jurisdiction unless a person is deprived of Constitutional or statutory rights, privileges, or immunities.
Kamsler has alleged violations of his rights under the fifth, sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. He has not, however, related such violations to his allegations of fact; that is, there is no showing how or in what manner his federal rights were violated.
Due process is not concerned with the reason for an indictment or a prosecution, but with fairness. Kamsler does not allege that the grand jury proceedings themselves were illegal or unfair. Nor has it been alleged that there was a denial of due process in the subsequent trials.
A careful examination of Kamsler’s complaint does not reveal a deprivation, under color of state authority, of his Constitutional rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Kamsler v. Zaslawsky, 7 Cir., 355 F.2d 526 (1966). No claim has been presented upon which relief can be granted. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(h), 28 U.S.C.A.
Finally, in his reply brief, Kamsler admits that he was convicted on trial of two counts of the six count indictment. He states he was sentenced to serve a term of one to five years in the “Zaslaw-sky case” and a term of two to six years in the “case of the M.F.I. Corp.” It was disclosed in oral argument that one of the convictions had been affirmed on appeal, while an appeal in the other is still pending. This sad conclusion would appear to effectively illustrate the inadequacy of Kamsler’s complaint to state a claim under the relevant statutes.
We hold that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. The relevant part of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 reads as follows:
“(2) If two or more persons in any State or Territory eonspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or prop-
erty on. account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons eonspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0