What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PARKER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 9792.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 20, 1941.
Adolphus E. Graupner and Louis Janin, both of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.
Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key, A. F. Prescott, S. Dee Hanson, and Carl Marold, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before WILBUR, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
The proceeding is for a review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. It involves an asserted transferee liability on the part of the petitioner, Parker, under the provisions of § 311(a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev. Acts, page 569.
The case is a companion case to Tooley v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 121 F.2d 350, decided June 10, 1941. The essential facts as found by the Board are as follows: For many years prior to March 1, 1934, James M. Botts was president of the American Marine Paint Company. Parker was vice-president. In 1922 Botts made a will containing a bequest to Parker, “as a mark of appreciation for his loyal and faithful service and friendship”, of 20 percent of the stock of the company “which shall stand in my name upon the books of said corporation at the time of my death.” On July 12, 1933, there were 1,980 shares of the capital stock of the company outstanding, of which 1,749 shares stood in the name of Botts and 204 shares in the name of C. M. Botts, his wife.' Botts and his wife had contemplated placing their stock in a joint tenancy with right of survivor-ship. On the date last mentioned the two surrendered their certificates, and certificates bearing that date were issued for 1,958 shares to J. M. Botts and C. M. Botts “as joint tenants with right of survivor-ship”. On March 1, 1934, Botts died testate.
Within a few days after his death his widow placed the certificates in the stock book marked “cancelled” and caused the 1958 shares to be issued to herself. On March 15, 1934, Mrs. Botts filed a joint income return of herself and husband for the year 1933. The Commissioner later assessed against the estate of Botts deficiencies in income taxes for that year. One of these assessments in an amount exceeding $16,000 remains unpaid. Notice of the deficiency was given to Parker and others as transferees of the estate of James M. Botts, asserting transferee liability.
The Board found Parker liable as a transferee on the basis of the following circumstances: In April, 1934, the will of James M. Botts, containing the bequest aforesaid, was filed for probate in the superior court of California and an executor was appointed. In the original inventory of the estate property in the hands of the executor was appraised at less than $2,-000, the stock in the Paint Company not being included. In 1936 an amended inventory was filed which included 1,749 shares which had been issued to Botts and his wife as joint tenants. The shares were appraised at a valuation in excess of $100 each. In the final account these shares were charged to the executor, and thereafter, on August 4, 1936, the superior court ordered final distribution of the estate, the decree providing for distribution to Parker of 390.5 shares and to the widow 1,358.5 shares. Parker formally acknowledged receipt of these shares. Two days after the entry of the decree of distribution the shares were divided in this manner: The certificates theretofore held by the widow were surrendered and new certificates issued to her and to Parker for the respective amounts specified in the decree. On the stub of the certificates which Mrs. Botts had caused to be issued to herself upon the death of her husband appears the notation “cancelled — issued by mistake”.
Long prior to Botts’ death Parker had been informed that he would receive 20 percent of the company’s stock when Botts died. At the time the shares were issued to Botts and his wife as joint tenants the two informed-Parker that he would still receive his 20 percent. After Botts died his widow told Parker that her husband’s wish would be carried out.
In Tooley v. Commissioner, supra, we determined that Mrs. Botts was not liable as a transferee of the stock, holding that under the California law she took as survivor of the joint tenancy, not as a transferee of her deceased co-tenant; and that since the California court, acting in probate, had authority to distribute only such title as existed in the decedent, its decree purporting to distribute the stock was not, as the Board of Tax Appeals supposed, an adjudication of the title. Further, that the distributees might show in a collateral proceeding that in fact the estate had no title. The ground covered in that decision need not be gone over again.
The burden was on the Commissioner to show transferee liability “at law or in equity”; and in respect of Parker such liability must be, found, if at all, in his status as a distributee of the estate of the taxpayer, James M. Botts. It is not contended that there was any liability otherwise. Parker was not an heir of Botts and there was no showing that he received the stock in compromise of any claim under the latter’s will. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 59 S.Ct. 155, 83 L.Ed. 119, 119 A.L.R. 410, upon which the Commissioner relies, is not in point. Nor could he have taken pursuant to the will, for, as was held in the Tooley case, supra, Mrs. Botts’ title to the whole number of shares had become vested as of the time of the creation of the joint tenancy, and no shares stood in the name of Botts at the time of his death. It necessarily follows that Parker received his stock as a gift from Mrs. Botts, not as a transferee of property of the taxpayer. Notwithstanding the formality of the decree of distribution, Parker was free to show the true source of the title.
Reversed.
The statute provides a summary method of enforcing “the liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property of a taxpayer, in respect of the tax * * * imposed upon the taxpayer by this title”. Subdivision (f) defines the term transferee as including “heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0