What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
AMERICAN MINE EQUIPMENT CO. v. BUTLER CONSOLIDATED COAL CO.
No. 4336.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
May 2, 1930.
Dan T. R. Dickson, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Carl E. Clock and Reed, Smith, Shaw & MeClay, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON and WOOLLEY, Circuit Judges, and SCHOONMAKER, District Judge.
BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
This is an action to recover the purchase price of certain coal mine equipment described in the written purchase contract, as “thin seam type movor conveyors.” The plaintiff agreed to furnish “all material necessary for the assembly of the conveyors ready for operation,” except electric wiring, switches, and circuit breakers, and to provide “the services for four days without charge of an experienced conveyor man to superintend the installation and starting into operation of the conveyors.” The conveyors were manufactured and delivered. The defense is that they did not operate, the defendant contending: (1) That the machinery in question was bought under a special contract to do a specific work known to the manufacturer and that therefore there was an implied warranty that the conveyors would operate; and (2) that there was a parol modification of the written contract by which there was an express warranty that the conveyors would operate.
The court below declined to construe the contract as covering an implied warranty, and declined to admit parol evidence to establish an express warranty that the conveyors would operate.
The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant then appealed.
We agree with the court below that there were no facts proved which would justify in this ease the offer of parol testimony to vary a written instrument, but cannot concur in the interpretation of the contract given by the court below. We are of the opinion that there was an implied warranty in this case that the conveyors would operate. We have not here an instance of the sale of' an article protected by a patent and well known in the market under a specific trade-name. This “thin seam, type movor conveyor” was not on the market under that name, nor was it bought because of that. The name was adopted and used for the first time in the contract in suit. A certain type of conveyor had been used in the ordinary coal seam, but up to the time of the signing of the contract in suit the “thin seam type movor conveyor” had not even been designed, as appears by the testimony of the president of the plaintiff company. The plaintiff knew the uses the defendant was to make of the conveyors, and contracted to manufacture and deliver them, well knowing that it had not only to manufacture them but also to design them before it could start manufacture. Surely we have here a special contract to buy a special machine to do a specific work known to the manufacturer.
The court below relied on paragraph 4 of section 15 of the Pennsylvania Sales Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543 (Pa. St. 1920, § 19663, par. 4) as covering the contract in the instant case. It reads: “In the case of a contract to sell .* * * a specified article under its patent or other trade name there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose.” We are of the opinion that this paragraph only applies to goods known in the market and among those familiar with that kind of trade by that description. So ruled the Circuit Court of Appeals of the First Circuit in Barrett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 F.(2d) 329, 336. In the instant ease the trade-name was adopted and used for the first time in the contract in suit to describe a type of machine which the plaintiff yet had to design before it could manufacture it. The machine contracted for was not known to the market at all.
If the Pennsylvania Sales Act is applicable at all to the instant case we think that the ease comes under the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 15 of the act providing that there shall be an implied warranty that 'the goods are reasonably fit for the purposes purchased where the buyer made known to the seller the purpose for which the goods were required and relied on his skill or judgment.
Our conclusion is that there was an implied warranty in the contract sued on in the instant ease- and we find support in the following authorities: American Piano Co. v. American Pneumatic Action Co., 172 Iowa, 139, 154 N. W. 389; Baldry v. Marshall, 1 K. B. 260; Glover Machine Works v. Cooke Jellico Coal Co., 173 Ky. 675, 191 S. W. 516; Van Publishing Company v. Westinghouse, 72 App. Div. 121, 76 N. Y. S. 340; Peerless Electric Co. v. Call, 82 Pa. Super. Ct. 550.
Judgment reversed, and new trial awarded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1