What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PALADINI et al. v. FLINK.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 30, 1928.
Petition for Modification of Opinion Denied May 14, 1928.
No. 5281.
1. Shipping <@=3203 — State constitutional provision relating to liability of stockholders must yield to federal statutes relating to individual liability of shipowners (Const. Cal. art. 12, § 3; 46 USCA §§ 183, 189).
State constitutions and laws, such as Const. Cal. art. 12, § 3, relating to liability of stockholders, must yield to federal statutes, Rev. St. U. S. § 4283 (46 USCA § 183; Comp. St. § 8021), and 23 Stat. 57 (46 USCA § 189; Comp. St. § 8028), relating to individual liability of shipowners with which it is repugnant, since federal statutes are dominant.
2. Shipping <@=3207 — Rule of limited liability of owners of vessels should be applied in action by one injured while employed on vessel (46' USCA §§ 183, 189).
Rule of limited liability of owners of vessels under 23 Stat. 57 (46 USCA § 189; Comp. St. § 8028), and Rev. St. U. S. § 4283 (46 USCA § 183; Comp. St. § 8021), should be applied in action by one injured while employed in maritime service on vessel.
3. Shipping <3=203 — Statute relating to individual liability of shipowners must be given sensible construction (46 USCA §§ • 183, 189).
Rev. St. U. S. § 4283 (46 USOA § 183; Oomp. St. § 8021), and 23 Stat. 57 (46 USOA § 189; Oomp. St. § 8028), relating to individual liability of shipowners, must be given sensible construction, and construction which would lead to absurd consequences should be avoided whenever reasonable application can be given to it consistent with legislative purpose.
4. Corporations <3=182 — Corporation holds property for its stockholders who are equitable owners.
While a corporation holds legal title to and right to manage, control, and convey its property, it holds its property for its stockholders who are equitable and beneficial owners.
5. Shipping <3=205 — Stockholders of California corporation owning vessel held entitled to limit their liability in action by employee for injuries (46 USCA §§ 183, 189; Const. 'Cal. art. 12, § 3).
Under Rev. St. U. S. § 4283 (46 USOA § 183; Oomp. St. § 8021), and 23 Stat 57 (46 USOA § 189; Oomp. St. § 8028), relating to individual liability of shipowners, stockholders of California corporation owner of vessel held, entitled to limit their liability in action commenced against them by one injured while employed in maritime service on vessel, notwithstanding Const. Cal. art. 12, § 3, providing that every stockholder of corporation is individually and personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities as amount of stock owned by him bears to whole of subscribed capital stock.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Northern District of California.
Petition by Attilio Paladini and others against Andrew Flink for limitation of liability as stockholders of corporation owning tugboat on which claimant was alleged to have been injured. A stay order was issued restraining the further prosecution of law actions by claimant against petitioners, and, from an order vacating the stay order, petitioners appeal.
Reversed with directions.
Ira S. Lillick, of San Francisco, Cal. (J. Arthur. Olson, of San Francisco, Cal., of counsel), for appellants.
Ford, Johnson & Bourquin, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
William Denman and Andros, Hengstler & Dorr, all of San Francisco, Cal., amici curiae.
Before GILBERT, RUDKIN, and DIETRICH, Circuit Judges.
DIETRICH, Circuit Judge.
The appellants constitute all the stockholders of A. Paladini, Incorporated, the owner of the tugboat Henrietta. Claiming that on March 9, 1923, he was injured while employed in a maritime service on the vessel, the appellee brought separate actions against the corporation and its stockholders, in the state court and-also the federal District Court, in California, to recover damages. Thereupon, while-these actions were pending, appellants filed in the court below their petition for limitation of liability, in which proceeding, following an appraisement of the vessel, an order was made for the issuance of monition against all persons claiming damages, etc., and restraining the further prosecution of the law actions brought by Flink against the petitioners. Thereafter, upon special appearance by Flink, the court granted his motion to vacate the stay order, from which ruling the petitioners appeal.
As fairly stated in appellants’ brief, the sole question involved is “whether the stockholders of .a California corporation, which is the legal owner of a vessel, are entitled to limit their liability in an action commenced against them arising out of a claim for personal injuries sustained by a person on board the vessel.” Under section 3 of article 12 of the California Constitution, each stockholder of a corporation is “individually and personally liable for such proportion of all its debts and liabilities contracted or incurred, during the time he was a stockholder, as the amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the subscribed capital stock, or shares of the corporation.” The operation and effect of this provision have had frequent consideration in the courts, and it seems to be well settled that under it stockholders are not merely sureties for the corporation, but their liability is direct and primary. Mokelumne Hill Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal. 265; Trindale v. Atwater Canning Co. (Cal. App.) 128 P. 756; Dolbear v. Foreign Mines Dev. Co. (C. C. A.) 196 F. 646; Buttner v. Adams (C. C. A.) 236 F. 105. Stockholders of foreign corporations doing business in California would seem to have the same status (Cal. Civ. Code, § 322; Provident Gold M. Co. v. Haynes, 173 Cal. 44, 159 P. 155), but presently the consideration is not highly material. And, under the view we have taken upon another branch of the ease, we do not deem it necessary to discuss whether or not, in the light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, it is competent for a state to extend the rule into the realm of maritime law, as perhaps was held in Buttner v. Adams, supra.
The principal provisions of the federal statutes invoked by appellants are: “The liability of the owner of any vessel * * * for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity, or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall in no ease exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending,” R. S. U. S. § 4283 (46 USCA § 183; Comp. St. § 8021); and “the individual liability of a shipowner, shall be limited to the proportion of any or all debts and liabilities that his individual share of the vessel bears to the whole; and the aggregate liabilities of all the owners of a vessel on account of the same shall not exceed the value of such vessels and freight pending, “ * c” 23 Stat. 57 (46 USCA § 189; Comp. St. § 8028).
The federal statutes are admittedly dominant, and to these provisions, in ease of repugnancy, state Constitutions and laws must yield. The question, therefore, is of the meaning and scope of the federal statutes. That they were enacted to put this country upon the same footing with other countries, and thus to encourage the building of ships and participation in the foreign carrying trade, is well known. “The rule of limited liability of owners of vessels is an ancient one, * * * ” and “should be applied having regard to the purposes it is intended to subserve and the reasons on which it rests.” Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola B. Co., 271 U. S. 21, 46 S. Ct. 379, 70 L. Ed. 805; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207, 47 S. Ct. 357, 71 L. Ed. 612, decision United States Supreme Court February 21, 1927. In the latter case, after referring to several of its own decisions, the court said: “It is quite evident from these cases that this court has by its rules and decisions given the statute a very broad and equitable construction for the purpose of carrying out its purpose and for facilitating a settlement of the whole controversy,” etc. See, also, Oregon R. R. & Nav. Co. v. Balfour (C. C. A.) 90 F. 295; People’s Nav. Co. v. Toxey (C. C. A.) 269 F. 793; The Princess Sofia (D. C.) 278 F. 180; The 84-H (C. C. A.) 296 F. 427; The Omar D. Conger (D. C.) 1 F.(2d) 732; Kitsap County Transp. Co. v. Harvey (C. C. A.) 15 F.(2d) 166, 48 A. L. R. 1420. And in view of the consequences which would flow from the adoption of appellee’s contention, we are also to bear in mind the general rule that “all laws are to be given a sensible construction ; and a literal application of a statute, which would lead to absurd consequences, should be avoided whenever a reasonable application can be given to it, consistent with the legislative purpose.” United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 46 S. Ct. 513, 70 L. Ed. 986.
That the recognition of appellee’s view would lead to such consequences is manifest. The purpose of the statute is to encourage contributions of money for the construction and operation of ships, but, under this view, an investor, so contributing through the medium of a holding corporation organized in California, would be wholly without the intended protection, whereas another, so contributing as a stockholder in a like corporation organized in some other state, if not doing business in California, and still another, contributing directly, would be fully protected. Instead of uniformity of results in the operation of a general federal statute, we would have a wide diversity, without any basis at all in reason. And in the case of a California corporation the purpose of the statute would be wholly defeated.
Speaking of the power of the states to legislate in respect to general maritime law, the Supreme Court has said: “And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216, 37 S. Ct. 524, 529, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900. See, also, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438, 64 L. Ed. 834, 11 A. L. E. 1145. True, the protection of the limitation statute extends only to ship “owners,” and, technically speaking, stockholders are not owners; but, in a broad popular sense, and for certain purposes in a legal sense, they are sometimes so regarded. “While a corporation holds the legal title to, and the right to manage, control, and convey, its property, it holds the property for its stockholders, who are the equitable and beneficial owners. * * * ” Lynch v. Turrish (C. C. A.) 236 F. 653; Id., 247 U. S. 221, 38 S. Ct. 537, 62 L. Ed. 1087; Newell-Murdoch Realty Co. v. Wickham, 183 Cal. 39, 190 P. 359; Hobbs v. Tom Reed Co., 164 Cal. 497, 129 P. 781, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1112.
We are not to be understood as holding that in a strict sense a corporation is a trustee for its stockholders; nor is it necessary so to hold. By whatever terms we characterize the relation, it remains true that the stockholders are the real investors, and take the perils, not of creditors, but of Investors, and it was the purpose of the statute in question to encourage investment by exempting the investor from loss in excess of the fund he is willing to risk in the enterprise. Boston Marine Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan R. L. Co. (C. C. A.) 197 F. 703. When we consider the plain purpose of Congress, and the consequences to which appellee’s contentions would lead, and the fact that under the common law, and, as we think, generally under statutory law, when the limitation statutes were enacted, there was no stockholders’ liability such as is imposed by the Constitution of California, we may and should conclude that it was the intent of the statute to provide protection to all who take the risk of investment, whether their ownership is direct or indirect.
Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed, with directions to take further proceedings consistent herewith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99