What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. Your task is to identify the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court).

Opinion:
Marvin MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEOPLE OF the STATE OF CALIFORNIA, James Musick, Sheriff of the County of Orange, Cecil Hicks, District Attorney for the County of Orange, the Municipal Court of the County of Orange, Harbor Judicial District, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 75-1384.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 11, 1977.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 6, 1977.
Burton Marks, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for plaintiff-appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Frederick R. Millar, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., Cecil Hicks, Jr., Dist. Atty., Oretta D. Sears and Cliff Harris, argued, Deputy Dist. Attys., Santa Ana, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Before CHAMBERS and ELY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District Judge.
Honorable Gus G. Solomon, Senior District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
For the background of this obscenity case, one should examine Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973) and Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915, 94 S.Ct. 3206, 41 L.Ed.2d 1158 (1974) (Miller II).
After Miller II was decided, Miller came to the United States District Court for the Central District of California with a petition for habeas corpus on his state incarceration, the penalty on his original Orange County, California, conviction. He still has a few days to serve on his jail sentence which awaits the outcome of this appeal before time serving begins again.
In his petition for habeas corpus in a conclusory way (inter alia), he asserts the state conviction was infirm because of double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and res judicata, all arising out of other trials in Los Angeles County (next door to Orange) preceding in time the Orange County conviction. The contentions are attractive.
In argument, Miller’s counsel advises that the issues were repeatedly asserted at every stage of the passage of the case through the California state courts. Counsel for the People of the State of California disagrees with the statement and denies the three points were really presented along the state route.
So we come to this: If Miller’s counsel is correct in his recollection, all of his present contentions were concluded by Miller II, supra. If counsel for the People is correct in his recollection, then the habeas corpus has no business being here on issues not presented to the state courts.
As to issues raised by the habeas corpus petition and not mentioned above, the district court was clearly correct.
The trial court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the type of district court decision or judgment appealed from (i.e., the nature of the decision below in the district court)?

Choices:
Trial (either jury or bench trial)
Injunction or denial of injunction or stay of injunction
Summary judgment or denial of summary judgment
Guilty plea or denial of motion to withdraw plea
Dismissal (include dismissal of petition for habeas corpus)
Appeals of post judgment orders (e.g., attorneys' fees, costs, damages, JNOV - judgment nothwithstanding the verdict)
Appeal of post settlement orders
Not a final judgment: interlocutory appeal
Not a final judgment: mandamus
Other (e.g., pre-trial orders, rulings on motions, directed verdicts) or could not determine nature of final judgment
Does not fit any of the above categories, but opinion mentions a "trial judge"
Not applicable (e.g., decision below was by a federal administrative agency, tax court)

Answer: 4