What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL, LOCAL 823, Respondent.
No. 5092.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 12, 1955.
Franklin C. Milliken, Washington, D. C. (Theophil C. Kammholz, Gen. Counsel, Chicago, Ill., David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, Marcel MalletPrevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Elizabeth W. Weston, Washington, D. C., were with him on the brief), for petitioner.
Daniel J. Leary, Joplin, Mo., for respondent.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, HUXMAN, Circuit Judge, and SAVAGE, District Judge.
HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.-
This is a petition by the National Labor Relations Board under Section 10 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e), for enforcement of an order issued by it in its usual proceedings under the Act. From the evidence before it in the hearing, the Board found both the employer, Roadway Express, Inc., and Teamster’s Union, Local No. 823, guilty of unfair labor practices under Section 8 of the Act, 29 U. S.C.A. § 158. The employer has undertaken to comply with the order and hence no relief is sought against it. The Union alone resists enforcement of the order.
Both the employer and the Union were found guilty of unfair labor practices. The unfair labor practices with which they were charged arose primarily out of the discharge of two employees, Walter C. Buxton and Jess E. Cawthorn. The Board found that these two employees were discriminatorily discharged in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (2) of the Act.
Since -the employer dries not resist enforcement of the order reference to it need not be made. So far as the Union is concerned, the Board ordered it to cease and desist from such unfair labor practices. Affirmatively it ordered the employer and the Union jointly and severally to make the -two discharged employees whole because of their discharge. It further required the Union to post notices, mail copies to the Regional Director showing compliance, and to notify the employer in writing that it had no objection to the -reinstatement and that it formally requested the reinstatement of the two employees. Other portions of the order are not involved and need not be set out.
The first contention by the Union is that there is no evidence to support the Board’s finding of unfair labor practices in causing the unlawful discharge of the two employees in question. Reciting in detail the evidence which causes us to conclude that the Board’s findings in this respect are amply supported by competent evidence would add nothing of value to the opinion. Neither would it add anything of value to the body of the law as a guide in succeeding cases, because each case is controlled by its own peculiar facts. There are no facts in this case the recital of which would aid in the decision of future controversies. In the interest of brevity and in order not to unnecessarily encumber legal publications, we content ourselves by stating that a perusal of the record supports the findings of unfair labor practices on the part of both the employer and the Union.
It is further contended that the order requiring the Union to notify the company in writing that it not only had no objections but formally requested the reinstatement of the two employees is not warranted by the undisputed record. The requested letter was written and sent June 5, 1954, by the Union, with an express reservation of the right to argue the validity or propriety of that portion of the order.
The Union contends that this part of the order was not justified because on August 19, 1953, its attorney orally notified a representative of the General Counsel of the Board that it had no objection to the reinstatement of the two employees, or in any event because on October 19, 1953, it filed a written statement to that effect in answer to the Board’s complaint. It is argued that the requirement of a formal writing to the employer requesting reinstatement of the employees, when the local Union at least on these two occasions has made its position clear, was punitive and not remedial and hence beyond the power of the Board.
Section 10(c) of the Act places in £he Board powers to forcé the offending party to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act. Of course, the Board has no right under this Section to promulgate orders which are essentially punitive in nature. It has often been held that the Board may require the posting of notices advising employees of the offender’s readiness to comply with the order. A requirement that an employer mail to each of its employees a notice that it would not engage in the conduct from which it was ordered to cease and desist has been upheld. The mere fact that the Union’s attorney orally notified representatives of the General Counsel of the Board that it had no objection to the reinstatement of the employees, or that in its answer to the Board’s complaint it reiterated this statement, does not mean that the Board’s order is arbitrary. That is not such a statement to the employer as to give it positive assurance that further Union trouble will not be forthcoming if the employees are taken back on the payroll. In its answer in which it stated that it had no objection to their reemployment, it denied the charge of unfair labor practices. Obviously, had it been successful in establishing this defense, the employer might have been warranted in concluding that the statement in the answer that it did not object to the reemployment of these men no longer stood. We feel that under all the facts of this case there was a basis for the Board’s requirement that the Union notify the employer in writing that it had no objection to the reemployment of these two employees and that it requested their reemployment.
The Board’s order will be enforced.
. Herein referred to as the Board.
. Herein referred to as the Employer.
. Herein referred to as the Union.
. Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6.
. E. g., National Labor Relations Board v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 61 S.Ct. 693, 85 L.Ed. 930.
. National Labor Relations Board v. American Laundry Machinery Co., 2 Cir., 152 F.2d 400.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1