What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HORST v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 83.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Nov. 13, 1939.
Duer, Strong & Whitehead, of New York City (Orwill V. W. Hawkins and Harry H. Wiggins, both of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and Morton K. Rothschild, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before SWAN, CHASE, and PATTERSON, Circuit Judges.
PATTERSON, Circuit Judge.
The question is whether a taxpayer who detaches coupons from bonds owned by him and delivers them to another as a gift prior' to the time when the coupons are payable is liable for income tax on the amounts later collected on the coupons by the transferee.
The petitioner owned a number of coupon bonds. The coupons represented the interest on the bonds and were payable to bearer. In 1934 he detached unmatured coupons of face value of $25,182.-50 and transferred them by manual delivery to his son as a gift. The coupons matured later on in the same year, and the son collected the face amount, $25,182.50, as his own property. There was a similar transaction in 1935. The petitioner kept his books on a cash basis. He did not include any part of the moneys collected on the coupons in his income tax returns for these two years. The son included them in his returns. The Commissioner added the moneys collected on the coupons to the petitioner’s taxable income and determined a tax deficiency for each year. The Board of Tax Appeals, three members dissenting, sustained the Commissioner, holding that the amounts collected on the coupons were taxable as income to the petitioner.
The Board refused to follow Rosenwald v. Commissioner, 7 Cir., 33 F.2d 423, certiorari denied, 280 U.S. 599, 50 S.Ct. 69, 74 L.Ed. 644, where the facts were the same as in the present case. Rosenwald clipped bearer coupons and delivered them to a donee prior to the due date. The donee collected the money due. It was held that the interest collected on the coupons was not income of Rosenwald for tax purposes. -The Board’s decision is also in substance contrary to Matchette v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 81 F.2d 73, where we held that a stockholder who made an outright assignment of a dividend to another after declaration but before time of payment was not obliged to include the dividend in his income. We are of opinion that those decisions were sound and that, the Board’s decision cannot stand.
When the petitioner detached the coupons and handed them over to his son as a gift, the son acquired full title and dominion. The petitioner could not interfere in any way with the donee’s control and right to receive the money when the coupons matured. Taxwise, the transaction was an outright assignment of future income from property, with the assignee the owner of the income prior to and at its realization. Generally liability to income tax attaches to ownership of the income, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S.Ct. 330, 81 L.Ed. 465, and we see nothing to take the case out of the general rule. The case is not one where the assignor had power over the income after the assignment, as in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336, 74 L.Ed. 916. Nor is it a case of assignment of future earnings, the effectiveness of which for practical purposes is dependent on continued performance of services by the assignor. See Lowery v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 70 F.2d 713; Rossmoore v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 520; Shanley v. Bowers, 2 Cir., 81 F.2d 13; Matchette v. Helvering, supra.
The Board thought that a person who assigns future income from property and retains the property producing the income is liable for income tax on the income belonging to the transferee. The proposition, stated as broadly as this, cannot be supported. Take a case where the owner of income-producing property, such as bonds or stocks, grants by formal instrument a life estate in the property to another, keeping no power of revocation or control during the life estate but reserving the reversionary interest. The life estate is essentially a transfer of future income for the grantee’s life; the corpus stays with the grantor. It would hardly be contended that in such a case the grantor was liable for income tax on the income belonging to the life tenant unconditionally. The situation may be varied by supposing that the estate created was one for years rather than for life, without affecting the result. See United States v. First National Bank, 5 Cir., 74 F.2d 360.
The respondent relies on Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S.Ct. 241, 74 L.Ed. 731, and Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 52 S.Ct. 345, 76 L.Ed. 665. We do not see that these cases support the Board’s decision. In Lucas v. Earl, a husband assigned to his wife salaries and fees to be earned in the future. The salaries and fees later earned by him were held to be taxable income to him. In Burnet v. Leininger, a partner assigned to his wife future income from the partnership. The partner was nevertheless held liable for income tax on such income. It is true that these two cases were given a broad interpretation in Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 177, 53 S.Ct. 570, 77 L.Ed. 1109; but in a more recent case, Blair v. Commissioner, supra, it was pointed out that they concerned assignments of future income from earnings, that they were decided on the provisions of the revenue act applicable to income derived from personal services and from partnerships, and that they did not control assignments of future income from property.
The Board quotes a passage from Bing v. Bowers, D.C., 22 F.2d 450, affirmed on the opinion below in 2 Cir., 26 F.2d 1017. The language quoted must be read against the facts of that case, where it was held that the taxpayer had given up no interest in the land, had created no rent charge, and had in fact retained control over the net income which he had purported to grant to another.
The amounts collected on the coupons were not income of the petitioner. The decision of the Board will be reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0