What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
GENERAL AMERICAN INVESTORS CO., INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 114.
Argued February 28, 1955.
Decided March 28, 1955.
Norris Darrell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was John F. Dooling, Jr.
Solicitor General Sobeloff argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Holland, Charles F. Barber, Ellis N. Slack and Melva M. Graney.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole question presented by this case is whether a payment is taxable as gross income when received by a corporation pursuant to the “insider profits” provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940. Subject to exceptions not presently relevant, § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that the profit realized from certain defined securities transactions undertaken by a director or major stockholder of the issuing corporation “shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer.” This provision is made applicable to investment companies by § 30 (f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. Under these provisions, petitioner, a registered closed-end investment company, received payments totalling $170,038.04. This sum represented the profits accruing to one of petitioner’s directors and a stockholder through dealings covered by § 16 (b); the money was paid over to petitioner on demand and without litigation. The payments were not reported as income on petitioner’s tax returns. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue allowed a $13,000 deduction for legal expenses incurred in recovering the amounts due but asserted á deficiency for the balance on the ground that the receipts constituted taxable gains under § 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Tax Court, 19 T. C. 581, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 211 F. 2d 522, sustained the Commissioner’s determination. We granted certiorari, 348 U. S. 812, because of an apparent similarity of issues here to those involved in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F. 2d 928 (C. A. 3d Cir.), and the possible conflict between that case and this.
We have this day decided that the recovery of punitive damages for fraud or antitrust violation is reportable as gross income within the meaning of § 22 (a). Commissioner v. Clenshaw Glass Co., ante, p. 426. The reasons which dictated that result are equally compelling here. We see no significant difference in the nature of these receipts which might make that ruling inapplicable. As in Glenshaw, the taxpayer realized the money in question free of any restrictions as to use. The payments in controversy were neither capital contributions nor gifts. Cf. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 286 U. S. 285. There is no indication that Congress intended to exempt them from coverage. In accordance with the legislative design to reach all gain constitutionally taxable unless specifically excluded, we conclude that the petitioner is liable for the tax and the judgment is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
48 Stat. 881,15 U. S. C. § 78a.
54 Stat. 789,15 U. S. C. § 80a-l.
48 Stat. 896,15 U. S. C. § 78p.
54 Stat. 837, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-29.
“SEC. 22. GROSS INCOME.
“(a) General Definition. — ‘Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or ■profits and income derived from any source whatever. . . .” (Emphasis added.) 53 Stat. 9, 53 Stat. 574, 26 U.S. C. § 22 (a).
There was, however, no disagreement among lower courts which faced the question of the taxability of a § 16 (b) recovery of “insider profits.” See Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 509, 107 F. Supp. 941; Noma Electric Corp., 12 T. C. M. 1 (CCH Tax Ct. Mem., Dec. 1953).

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3