What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Frank SHAPIRO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Abraham RIBICOFF as Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare of the United States of America, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 319, Docket 28093.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Submitted March 11, 1963.
Decided April 17, 1963.
Frank Shapiro, plaintiff-appellant, appearing pro se.
Arthur S. Olick, Asst. U. S. Atty., Southern District of New York (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before MOORE, FRIENDLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
MOORE, Circuit Judge.
This case came before us on a motion to dismiss the appeal because of the appellant’s failure to prosecute the same. We denied the motion and, with the approval of both parties, decided to hear the appeal on the basis of the record in the district court. The appeal is taken by the plaintiff below from a judgment on the pleadings in defendant’s favor entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on April 10, 1962.
Plaintiff, suing pro se and as a poor person, brought the action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare which denied the plaintiff old-age insurance benefits for any period prior to November, 1953, because it was not until that month that plaintiff earned his sixth and qualifying quarter of coverage requisite to statutory status as a “fully insured” person. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (2). The amount in question is $360 plus interest, representing $30 a month from April 10, 1954 to April 10, 1955. Plaintiff claims he is entitled to this amount because he should have been credited with “wages” earned in May or June 1953 in connection with his alleged employment by a Madame Duprey, the proprietress of a dress shop. The hearing examiner found that the services performed for Madame Du-prey were not performed in the course of an employer-employee relationship but were those of an independent contractor and did not constitute wages (42 U.S.C. §§ 409, 410(a), 410 (k) (2)), and that, in any event, actual payments for such services were not received until November 1955 so that such remuneration could not be allocated to the quarters in which appellant claims it should have been paid.
In determining whether services are rendered as an employee or as an independent contractor, the factor of the right to control not only the result, but also the details of performance, is of considerable importance. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Higgins, 189 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1951); Zipser v. Ewing, 197 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1952); Cody v. Ribicoff, 289 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1961); 20 C.F.R. No. 404.1004 (c). Also of importance are such factors as to the right to discharge, the furnishing of tools and work and the permanency of the relation. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Higgins, supra; Cody v. Ribicoff, supra; 20 C.F.R. No. 404.1004(c).
The record of the proceedings before the hearing examiner indicates that appellant operated his own business as a dress contractor and pattern-maker in the ladies clothing industry and maintained a small factory employing between two and five people for that purpose. He met Duprey, a custom dressmaker, as the result of an advertisement in a trade publication and the two explored the possibility of becoming partners in the manufacture of ladies dresses. The partnership never materialized but when Duprey opened her own dressmaking shop she engaged the plaintiff to make some patterns for her. Plaintiff contended before the examiner that he was to be paid for this work on an hourly basis but in subsequent litigation over payment for these services he claimed that Duprey agreed to pay him $150 for this pattern work.
The services were performed at Du-prey’s place of business but appellant supplied his own tools and equipment. These services were supplied only as Du-prey required them for particular dresses and were performed only in appellant’s “off” hours and at his own convenience. At the time he performed these services for Duprey, appellant performed the same and similar services for other customers, both at his factory and the customer’s place of business. As to the nature of his services, Duprey would show him a picture or drawing of a dress and provide him the measurements and material but exercised no control over the work performed by appellant. From this brief review of the record and the applicable standards, it is clear that the Secretary’s determination is based on substantial evidence and is therefore conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dondero v. Celebreeze, 2d Cir., 312 F.2d 677; Newman v. Celebreeze, 2d Cir., 310 F.2d 780; Poss v. Ribicoff, 289 F.2d 10 (2d Cir., 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 902, 82 S.Ct. 178, 7 L.Ed.2d 96 (1962).
Affirmed.
. This litigation terminated in a settlement whereby appellant received $125 ($50 of this to his attorney) on November 14, 1955. This is the amount appellant contends should have been credited to him for the year 1953.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0