What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ruth H. GRAY and Chester H. Gray, Appellants, v. EVENING STAR NEWSPAPER COMPANY et al., Appellees.
No. 15424.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 2, 1960.
Decided April 7, 1960.
Petition for Rehearing Denied May 18, 1960.
Mr. David G. Bress, Washington, D. C. , with whom Lucien Hilmer, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Jeremiah C. Collins, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Frank F. Roberson and David N. Webster, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Before Prettyman, Chief Judge, and Bazelon and Burger, Circuit Judges.
BURGER, Circuit Judge.
Actions to recover $50,000 for personal injuries to appellant Ruth Gray and $20,000 for loss of her services were brought in the District Court and certified by that court to the Municipal Court under Title 11 D.C.Code § 756 (Supp. VII, 1959). Under this section the District Court may transfer an action to the Municipal Court if satisfied that “the action will not justify a judgment in excess of $3,000.” By the very nature of the object to be accomplished as well as by the langauge of the statute, broad discretion is vested in the District Court. Barnard v. Schneider, 1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 152, 243 F.2d 258; Melton v. Capital Transit Co., 1958, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 306, 253 F.2d 42; Davis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 1958,103 U.S.App.D.C. 125, 255 F.2d 534. Moreover, the Municipal Court jury is explicitly empowered to award whatever verdict the evidence warrants, even though in excess of $3,000.
The District Court had before it the pleadings, a deposition of Mrs. Gray describing her injuries and their treatment, a report of her physician and a report from a physician who had examined her on behalf of the appellees. Medical expenses of $1,000 were alleged and no challenge to this appears. On the basis of this information the District Court transferred the cause. Appellants moved for reconsideration, quoting pertinent parts of Mrs. Gray’s deposition and supplementing the record with more detailed reports by her physicians, and emphasizing the special damages. The motion was denied and this appeal followed.
From the admitted fact that the District Judge examined reports of medical examinations made on behalf of all parties, appellants infer that the District Court weighed the report of appellees’ doctor against those of appellants’ physicians and discounted appellants’ medical reports. This, it is argued, is error requiring reversal of the order certifying the case to the Municipal Court.
On this record we have no way of knowing whether, as appellants infer, the District Judge did in fact undertake to weigh the reports of appellees’ medical examiner against those of the appellants in a comparative sense or discount the extent of the claimed injuries by reason of what the appellees’ medical examiner reported. Such a course would be plainly an erroneous application of Section 756 for that is not the time or place for comparative evaluations of evidence. No comparative appraisal could be made adequately at that stage; it would involve, among other things, the comparative credibility of witnesses. In deciding whether to retain or certify a case to the Municipal Court, the District Court should act on the basis of the data presented under the Rules by the parties prior to trial, including the pre-trial hearing. But a comparative evaluation of conflicting evidence is not part of the function of the court at that stage of the litigation. True comparative consideration of conflicting evidence is reserved for the trial when witnesses can be examined and cross-examined fully.
The data before the District Court indicated medical expenses of the plaintiffs in excess of $1,000. Such a figure might conceivably forecast a verdict for total damages in excess of $3,-000, and the District Court might properly keep such a case on its own calendar; but discretion is an area not a line or a point, and our scope of review of this kind of order is necessarily very limited. The issue for us is not whether the District Court wisely exercised its discretion but whether in certifying the case to the Municipal Court it acted arbitrarily and thus abused its discretion.
We are unable to conclude that the action was arbitrary or that there was an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0