What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
EVE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Russ Meyer, St. Louis Orpheum Corporation, Ronnie J. Sellers, Donald S. Meyers and Howard Flier, Appellants, v. Thomas W. SHANNON, as Prosecuting Attorney for the City of St. Louis, Robert W. Van Dillen, as City Counselor of the City of St. Louis, Joseph Soehn-gen, as Sergeant in Charge of the Vice Squad of the Police Department of the City of St. Louis, and Officer Lorraine Geders, as Policewoman in Said Squad, Appellees.
No. 20308.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
March 16, 1971.
Albert J. Stephan, Jr., Paul B. Rava, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants; Elmer Gertz, Chicago, Ill., Lashly, Caruthers, Rava, Hyndman & Rutherford, St. Louis, Mo., of counsel.
Bernard Edelman, Asst. Pros. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for Thomas W. Shannon.
Robert W. Van Dillen, City Counselor, Eugene P. Freeman, John J. Fitzgibbon, Associate City Counselors, St. Louis, Mo., for Robert W. Van Dillen, Joseph Soehngen and Officer Lorraine Geders.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, GIBSON and LAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal arises from the federal district court’s denial of injunctive relief from prosecution in St. Louis City Court under two municipal obscenity ordinances. Plaintiff, Eve Productions, Inc., is the distributor of the motion picture film “Vixen”; plaintiff Meyer is the creator, director and producer of “Vixen”; plaintiff, St. Louis Orpheum Corporation (Loew’s), is the owner and operator of Loew’s Mid-City motion picture theatre;- plaintiffs Sellers and Meyers are managers of two theatres owned by or affiliated with St. Louis Orpheum Corporation; and plaintiff Flier is the projectionist at Loew’s Mid-City Theatre. Jurisdiction is asserted under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343(3) and (4) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The film “Vixen,” an “X” rated movie, was seized by city officials from a downtown thea-tre in St. Louis. After the arrest of thé manager and projectionist of the thea-tre, a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction was sought in federal district court against further prosecution by the city. Plaintiffs asserted that the seizure of the film was in violation of their constitutional rights in that it was seized without notice and without a prior adversary hearing to determine whether the film was obscene. The trial court denied plaintiffs relief, refusing to enjoin the prosecution by the City of St. Louis, and did not require the return of the film as requested. The district court’s opinion is found at 312 F.Supp. 26.
In its opinion handed down on February 13, 1970, the court refused to enjoin prosecution on its finding that no bad faith or harassment was involved. The court properly observed:
“ * # * [Interference upon state criminal processes is permissible only in those exceptional cases where the injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent or where the danger of such injury is both great and immediate.” 312 F.Supp. at 29.
Discussion of the various cases existing in this area is not necessary. On February 23, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States held that intrusion by federal process into state criminal proceedings must rest upon a showing of “proven harassment” in “bad faith” or where “irreparable injury” can be shown. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971). See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S.Ct. 777, 27 L.Ed.2d 792 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781 (1971).
Furthermore, it is now clear under the above authority that any order suppressing evidence for use in the pending state prosecution or a direction to return the seized materials would have been improper. Perez v. Ledesma, supra. In Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138 (1951), Mr. Justice Frankfurter earlier observed :
“We hold that the federal courts should refuse to intervene in State criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure. The maxim that equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution summarizes centuries of weighty experience in Anglo-American law. It is impressively reinforced when not merely the relations between coordinate courts but between coordinate political authorities are in issue. The special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law, has been an historic concern of congressional enactment, see, e. g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342, 2283, 2284(5). This concern has been reflected in decisions of this Court, not governed by explicit congressional requirement, bearing on a State’s enforcement of its criminal law.” 342 U.S. at 120-121, 72 S.Ct. at 120.
We have reviewed the facts and contentions of the respective parties and find no basis to suggest bad faith, harassment or irreparable harm. There is no showing that the state courts will not adhere to federal constitutional requirements in processing the pending city court prosecutions.
Judgment affirmed.
. A three-judge court in Carter v. Gautier, 305 F.Supp. 1098 (M.D.Ga.1969), determined that the seizure of the film “Vixen” was “constitutionally deficient because its owners and possessors were not first allowed an adversary hearing on the question of its obscenity.” Cf. United States v. Alexander, 428 F.2d 1169 (8 Cir. 1970). Nevertheless, for the same reasons we have set forth in our opinion, the Georgia District Court refused to intervene in the state prosecution.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 6