What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In the Matter of Richard KNAPP, Bankrupt-Appellant, Michael J. Daly, III, State Court Receiver of Tanglewood Incorporated, and J. E. Smith & Company, Incorporated, Objecting Creditors, and John F. Phelan, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Estate of Richard Knapp, bankrupt, Appellees.
No. 103, Docket 27591.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 25, 1962.
Decided Nov. 8, 1962.
Fred B. Rosnick, Waterbury, Conn., (Weisman & Weisman, Waterbury, Conn., on the brief; Sherman L. Quinto, Waterbury, Conn., of counsel), for appellant.
Walter R. Griffin, Waterbury, Conn., for J. E. Smith & Co., Inc., appellee.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and SWAN and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The appeal raises a very narrow issue, namely, whether the findings of fact of the referee in bankruptcy are sufficient to support his denial of a discharge. General Order No. 47 requires the judge to accept the referee’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See In re Tabibian, 2 Cir., 289 F.2d 793, 795; Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th ed. Par. 14.65. We hold that Judge Timbers did not err in accepting the referee’s findings and that they are adequate to support denial of a discharge.
The bankrupt conducted his business of constructing and selling residences through Tanglewood, Inc., a corporation formed in December 1957. He was secretary and treasurer of the corporation and he owned 18 of its 20 shares of capital stock, the remaining shares being held by members of his family. After November 1958 he was unable to employ an accountant to keep the books of Tan-glewood. From December 1958 to August 1959 be received some $26,000 from Tanglewood. No books of account or records, either personal or corporate, were produced to reflect to whom or for what purpose this sum was disbursed. His oral testimony left $11,150 of the money not accounted for. The bankrupt’s testimony that he kept the books of account after November 1958 and left them in his home which he vacated in August 1959, and from which they disappeared in some unknown fashion, was not believed by the referee. He found that the books and records of Tangle-wood, Inc., were necessary to determine the bankrupt’s personal financial condition, and held that the bankrupt, in failing to keep adequate books and records for Tanglewood after November 1958, had violated Bankruptcy Act § 14, sub. c(2), 11 U.S.C. § 32, sub. c(2). Further, the referee found that the bankrupt’s inability to explain satisfactorily the loss of assets violated Bankruptcy Act § 14, sub. c(7), 11 U.S.C. § 32, sub. c(7). The discharge was denied on both these grounds.
Under the circumstances disclosed in the record the referee properly found that the corporate books and records were necessary to determine the bankrupt’s personal financial condition. Accordingly, the petition to review was properly denied by Judge Timbers. See In re Sandow, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 807; In re Muss, 2 Cir., 100 F.2d 395, 396; Simon v. Massachusetts Trust Co., 1 Cir., 276 F. 391, 392-93, cited in his memorandum opinion.
Order affirmed.
. It was later stipulated by all parties that the bankrupt did orally account for the disbursement of the remaining $11,-150. The referee, however, was not satisfied even by the bankrupt’s oral explanation as to the balance. Since the referee was under no obligation to accept the bankrupt’s testimony concerning any or all of the lost assets, we hold the error brought to light by the stipulation — if error it was — to be harmless.
. Section 14, sub. c(2) and sub. c(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32, sub. c(2) and sub. c (7) set forth as grounds for denying the bankrupt a discharge his failure “to keep or preserve books of account or records, from which his financial condition and business transactions might be ascertained” [§ 14, sub. c(2)] or “to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities.” [§ 14, sub. c(7)].

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1