What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WAYNE TITLE & TRUST CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 10541.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 10, 1952.
Filed March 17, 1952.
Charles S. Jacobs, Philadelphia, Pa. (William R. Spofford, Robert R. Batt, Philadelphia, Pa., Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for petitioner.
Harry Marselli, Washington, D. C. (Theron Lamar Caudle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, Lee A. Jackson, Special Assts. to the Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before GOODRICH and HASTIE, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, District Judge.
HASTIE, Circuit Judge.
In issue here is the status for income tax purposes of a percentage of title insurance premiums received by the taxpayer, an insurer, and set aside by it during the taxable year, in a “reinsurance reserve fund” in compliance with a state statute.
The taxpayer is a Pennsylvania corporation authorized to engage in a general banking, trust and title insurance business. A Pennsylvania statute regarding title insurance provides, among other things, that one engaging in the title insurance business must establish and maintain a reinsurance reserve fund so long as any policies shall be outstanding; that sums not less than stated percentages of all premiums received shall be set aside in this fund until the accumulation shall reach a certain amount; that the custody of the fund shall be retained by the title insuring company; that the fund shall be earmarked and kept separate and apart from other assets of the company; that the fund shall be under the supervision of the Insurance Commissioner; that the income from the fund shall become a part of the general assets of the company and that the principal of the fund “shall be a trust for the protection of the policyholders, and shall be applied only for the benefit of the holders of policies of title insurance.” Penn.Stat. Ann., Title 40, §§ 900, 901, 903, 904.
In compliance with this statute, petitioner set aside in its “reinsurance reserve fund”- during the taxable year 1946, an amount of money equal to 10% of all title insurance premiums collected during the year. This amount was not included in its gross income for federal income tax purposes. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency which the Tax Court upheld. The matter is before us on petition for review.
Preliminarily, it is clear, as was recognized by the Tax Court, that, because insurance constitutes only a small part of taxpayer’s business, its gross income is determinable under the general provisions of Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code rather than other special provisions applicable to insurance companies. But in applying Section 22(a) to the facts of this case it is important that the money in question was received in payment for title insurance.
Normally, title insurance premiums are regarded as fully earned when received. And this characteristic is not destroyed by the requirement of Pennsylvania law that a portion of such premiums, or an equivalent sum, be set aside and retained in a reinsurance reserve fund. This court so ruled in American Title Co. v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 1935, 76 F.2d 332, and that ruling is not challenged here. Rather, taxpayer argues that though the premiums paid to it were fully earned by it, the portion in dispute was received in trust for the insured so as not to be income to the insurer. Whether the concept of trust for the benefit of the insured can ever be used to prevent fully earned premiums from being income to the insurer we need not consider. It is enough that in the circumstances of this case the premiums clearly were income.
Since taxpayer’s task is to prove that premium payments actually received by it were not received as income it must show that a part of each premium came to it from the insured impressed with a trust. Such, it says, is the effect of the Pennsylvania statute. But that conception requires an unwarranted construction of the statutory scheme. The basic requirement of the statute is that the insuring company shall build a reinsurance reserve up to a required $500,000. This may be done by setting aside sums equal to specified percentages of premiums, or it may be done by setting aside sums out of surplus and undivided profits, or by utilizing reserves accumulated under a precedent statute, or by a combination of these methods. But the build up toward the required $500,000, however achieved, must be fast enough so that the fund will at no time be smaller than a stipulated percentage of premiums received. The required maintenance of a minimum proportional relationship is in itself not enough to make a part of any premium a trust res as it is received. It is much more significant that the insurer was explicitly authorized to use resources other than current premiums to establish and maintain the required fund. The flexible scheme for the accumulation of a reinsurance reserve must be considered whole, and so viewed cannot be described as imposing a trust upon premiums as received.
As a separate point, it is noteworthy that under the Pennsylvania statute, the income of the reinsurance reserve fund becomes the sole property of the taxpayer and can be used or disposed of as the taxpayer may see fit. In this very case the fund was invested in bonds. The resulting income was the unrestricted property of taxpayer. This is a significant distinction between the present situation and those cemetery association cases relied upon by taxpayer in which certain types of perpetual care funds have been regarded as trust funds excludible from cemetery association income. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Cedar Park Cemetery Ass’n, Inc., 7 Cir., 1950, 183 F.2d 553; American Cemetery Co. v. United States, D.C.D.Kan. 1928, 28 F.2d 918; Troost Avenue Cemetery Co. v. United States, D.C.D.Mo. 1927, 21 F.2d 194.
The Tax Court was correct in its conclusion that the entire amount of title insurance premiums received by taxpayer constituted income.
But even so, taxpayer says in its alternative argument, the transfer of the sum here in question from its unrestricted funds to the statutory reinsurance reserve fund amounted to a business expense deductible from gross income. We think, however, that in setting money aside in its reinsurance reserve fund taxpayer did not pay or incur expense within the meaning of the provision of Section 23 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 23, which permits the deduction from gross income of ordinary business expenses incurred within the taxable year.
No payment was made to a third person as when a risk is reinsured. No fixed obligation to policyholders was involved. The insurer merely segregated and kept in its own custody, as a required safeguard against contingent liability, a portion of the Premiums collected. It is well settled that analogous voluntary segregation of reserves is not expense. Parkview Memorial Ass’n v. Commissioner, 1936, 34 B.T.A. 406; Springdale Cemetery Ass’n, 1925, 3 B.T.A. 223; Appeal of Pan-American Hide Co., 1925, 1 B.T.A. 1249. And the fact that this precaution is mandatory rather than voluntary does not make it any more the incur-cence of expense. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 10 Cir. 1930, 43 F.2d 78, 76 A.L.R. 1063, certiorari denied Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 654, 52 S.Ct. 33, 76 L.Ed. 555. This failure to meet the concept of expense is very clear in the title insurance field because the protected obligation is so patently contingent. Unlike life insurance which insures against death liabilities certain to arise but uncertain only as to time, title insurance insures against defects which may or may not, at some future date, be found to have existed in real property titles at the time the policy was issued. Any liability which the title insurance company may have on its policies is, therefore, contingent and any reserve it may set up in the nature of self-insurance to meet this liability must be contingent rather than fixed. The attempted deduction of such a reserve, whether maintained voluntarily or in compliance with law, from gross income must be disallowed since it reflects no expenses paid or incurred.
The decision of the Tax Court will be affirmed.
. Insuring titles is insurance business. American Title Co. v. Commissioner, 1933, 29 B.T.A. 479, affirmed 3 Cir., 1935, 76 F.2d 332. In determining the tax liability of a company engaged in several activities including tbe insurance of titles, however, whether its gross income is determined by § 204 applicable to insurance corporations or by § 22(a) applicable to non-insurance corporations, 26 U.S.C. §§ 22(a), 204, depends on the activities which are the principal source of income during the taxable year. Bowers v. Lawyers Mortgage Co. 1932, 285 U.S. 182, 52 S.Ct. 350, 76 L.Ed. 690; Empire Title & Guaranty Co. v. U. S., 2 Cir., 1939,101 F.2d 69. Here the Tax Court found that only 9.4% of petitioner’s income during the taxable year was derived from the insurance business.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1