What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Edward W. SPANNAUS, Treasurer of the LaRouche Democratic Campaign, Appellant, v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.
No. 92-5191.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
April 20, 1993.
Robert L. Rossi, Boston, MA, was on the brief, for appellant.
Lawrence M. Noble, Richard B. Bader, and Marcus C. Migliore were on the brief, for appellee.
Before: WALD, RUTH BADER GINSBURG, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Spannaus appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for review as untimely. Spannaus sought review in district court of the Federal Election Commission’s decision to dismiss an administrative complaint he filed pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (“the Act”). Under the Act, a petition for review must be filed “within 60 days after the date of the dismissal.” 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(B).
Spannaus contends that his petition for review was timely because it was filed within 60 days of the date he received the Commission’s letter notifying him that his complaint had been dismissed. The district court rejected Spannaus’ contention, finding it inconsistent with the plain meaning of the governing judicial review statute. We agree.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that, where filing deadlines are concerned, “a literal reading of Congress’ words is generally the only proper reading of those words.” United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1792, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985). Consistently, this court has declared mandatory, i.e., “jurisdictional and unalterable,” statutes that fix the time for seeking judicial review. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 905 F.2d 1568, 1570 (D.C.Cir.1990); Kessenich v. CFTC, 684 F.2d 88, 91 (D.C.Cir.1982).
The judicial review prescription in this case is precise: the 60-day review period runs from the “date of dismissal.” 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(B). It is undisputed that the date of dismissal was January 9, 1991. Measured from that date, Spannaus’ April 2, 1991 petition for review was untimely.
In reaching this decision, we reject the holding in Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission, 630 F.Supp. 508, 512 (D.D.C.1985), which Spannaus contends should control this case. The district court in Common Cause held that “the sixty-day review period begins when the complainant actually receives notice of the dismissal.” Although there was no appellate decision on this issue until now, this court cannot extend the filing deadline for Spannaus simply because he relied on an unreviewed and, we now hold, incorrect district court decision. See Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 948 F.2d 742, 756 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“Everyone in our society bears the risk of getting bad legal advice. And we all also bear the risk of relying on an incorrect district court judgment.”).
Spannaus alternately asserts that, in light of his pro se status and his reliance on Common Cause, the district court violated his due process rights by dismissing his petition. While pro se litigants are “held to less stringent standards” than counseled litigants, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), that is not a pertinent factor here, for the district court decision we now review simply respects the statutorily-fixed deadline; in thus following the legislature’s direction, the district court contravened no due process right to fundamentally fair procedures.
Finally, Spannaus urges equitable tolling of the 60-day review period “in light of the late receipt of notice and reliance on the Common Cause case.” As the Supreme Court recently observed, courts have accorded such relief “sparingly,” and have been “much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.” Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). Notwithstanding his reliance on Common Cause, it appears that, in filing late, Spannaus was less than fully diligent. The Commission’s notification letter, which Spannaus admits he received approximately one month before the end of the 60-day review period, conspicuously stated the dismissal date and referred Spannaus to the appropriate judicial review provision. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Spannaus qualifies for the dispensation afforded by the doctrine of equitable tolling. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S.Ct. at 458 (“The principles of equitable tolling ... do not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”).
For the reasons stated, the decision of the district court dismissing the petition for review as untimely is
Affirmed.
This result contrasts with the one we reached in LaRouche v. Federal Election Commission, 990 F.2d 641 (D.C.Cir.1993), also issued today. There, the governing judicial review statute provided for review "within 30 days after the agency action,” 26 U.S.C. § 9041(a), without specifying whether the critical date of that "action" was the date on the agency’s decision or the later date on the notice thereof. We held that the notice date was the critical one, and relied on the FEC’s own regulations in support of that conclusion. Here, however, the statute, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(B), permits no such reading; it specifies, unambiguously, “the date of the dismissal.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0