What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Kenneth I. BROWN, Appellant, v. HERMAN MILLER, INC., Appellee.
No. 86-5283.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Nov. 17, 1989.
Kenneth I. Brown, pro se.
Jeffrey J. Peek, with whom Jeffrey A. Dunn, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before WALD, Chief Judge, D.H. GINSBURG, Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth I. Brown instituted an action against Herman Miller, Inc. (Miller), asserting a breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The District Court entered summary judgment for Miller on the ground that a District of Columbia statute foreclosed any recovery by Brown. We reverse.
I
The essential facts are straightforward and undisputed. In December, 1981, Brown apprised Miller of the possibility of selling office furniture to MCI Communications Corporation (MCI). When Miller expressed interest, Brown set up a meeting between Miller and MCI personnel, which led eventually to a sale. Brown was not involved in the negotiations; his participation ended when he arranged the meeting. He alleges, however, that Miller agreed orally to compensate him, though eoncededly they never settled on any particular amount. Brown demanded payment on several occasions, but Miller steadfastly refused.
Brown’s complaint contained two counts. One claimed entitlement to a reasonable “finder’s fee,” and the other sought recovery on the theory of unjust enrichment. The District Court, however, held that Brown was a “business-chance broker,” and, for lack of a license as such, was statutorily barred from suit.
The legislation upon which the District Court rested its decision provides in relevant part:
No person ... engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a ... business-chance broker or a business-chance salesman within the District of Columbia shall bring or maintain any action in the courts of the District of Columbia for the collection of compensation for any services performed as a ... business-chance broker or a business-chance salesman, ... without alleging and proving that such person ... was a duly licensed ... business-chance broker or a business-chance salesman, at the time the alleged cause of action arose.
The term “business-chance broker” is defined as follows:
A “business-chance broker” is any person ... who for a compensation or valuable consideration sells or offers for sale, buys or offers to buy, leases or offers to lease, or negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of a business, business opportunity, or the good will of a business for others.
The court relied heavily upon Wickersham v. Harris, a Tenth Circuit decision interpreting a District of Columbia statute dealing with “real-estate brokers” to include a real-estate finder within the statute’s definition of “broker.” The District Court referred also to the legislative purpose of the business-chance licensing provisions— protection of the public from fraud and other imposition — as justification for its holding that finders are not exempt from the licensing requirement.
The statute invoked by the District Court erects a barrier to Brown’s suit only if he was a “business-chance broker” within the contemplation of the legislative scheme. On the record before us, Brown could have been so classified only if he “negotiate[d] the purchase or sale ... of a ... business opportunity ... for others.” The District Court properly focused on the question whether Brown, at most a finder who merely introduced Miller to MCI, was a “business-chance broker” as well. Our difficulty is with the court’s answer in the affirmative.
II
In reviewing the District Court’s action, we remain advertent to the peculiar role of a federal court sitting in a diverse-citizenship case. Substantive rules of decision must derive from applicable local law; decisions elsewhere have value only insofar as they may reflect what expectably the local law may turn out to be, or how it may be applied. To be sure, the statutory definition of “business-chance broker” does not totally exclude the possibility that a finder may properly be deemed a broker, at least in some situations. But neither the text of the definitional provision nor its legislative history yields any significant clue one way or the other on that score, and the District of Columbia courts have never construed it in that respect.
Thus left completely without guidance by local law, the District Court’s obligation was to divine, as best it could, how the District of Columbia courts would have construed the pivotal statutory language. For that purpose, the court was free to consult decisions in other jurisdictions for assistance. Additionally to the Tenth Circuit’s pronouncement that real-estate finders are a species of real-estate brokers, other courts in some number have concluded similarly under varying statutory regimes. It has also been held that the mere act of bringing interested parties together for discussion suffices as the “negotiation” of a resulting sale.
These cases, however, support only partially the District Court’s ruling that Brown was intercepted by the statute involved. The question was not whether he was a broker, but whether he was a business-chance broker.
The business-chance legislation makes it crystal clear that Brown did not encounter the statutory ban on suits for compensation by unlicensed plaintiffs unless the subject of the Miller-MCI bargain was “a business, business opportunity, or the goodwill of a business_” Since that transaction involved no more than office furniture, Brown needed a license only if its purchase by MCI amounted to the acquisition of a “business opportunity.” That term is widely taken as a reference to an opportunity to acquire something of entrepreneurial quality — for instance, an enterprise to develop property, a licensing agreement to market products, or a chance to obtain the controlling interest in a corporation’s voting stock. On the other hand, transactions such as a purchase of a paper-converting machine or a paper inventory, a machine for making ice for retail sale in' a grocery store or even a minority stock interest in a corporation do not confer entrepreneurship, and thus do not qualify as business opportunities. It plainly follows that neither does a single purchase of office furniture.
Moreover, a holding that Brown needed a license authorizing the limited role he played would open the door to a bizarre state of affairs. It could serve as the foundation for rulings demanding licensing of just about anyone connected significantly with a sale, purchase or exchange of personal property, no matter how innocuous the particular activity or transaction might be. “Business opportunity,” as used in licensing statutes, was hardly meant to sweep so broadly and loosely.
We realize that a legislative purpose to curb fraud and other dishonesty is not to be compromised by stingy construction of statutory requirements. At the same time, it is imperative that an overly-expansive view of the licensing provisions implicated here be tempered to avoid ambushing of situations not intended to be targets. We think the District of Columbia courts would have been sensitive to this concern, and would have responded in much the same fashion that other tribunals have.
This case does not call for an effort to delineate the outer boundaries of “business opportunity” as employed in the statute. We need do no more than express here our deep-seated belief as to what the District of Columbia judiciary would have done in the case before us. We hold that licensing as a “business-chance broker” was not required of Brown, and that he is not precluded from pursuing his claims in court.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
. Brown v. Herman Miller, Inc,, Civ. No. 83-3316 (memorandum) (Mar. 11, 1985) at 4-9.
. This legislation was repealed in 1983, D.C.Law 4-209, 30 D.C.Reg. 390 (1983), but, by virtue of a savings clause, it retains its vitality for purposes of the case at bar. D.C.Code Ann. § 45-1951 (1986 repl. vol.).
. D.C.Code Ann. § 45-1907(h) (1981).
. Id. § 45-1902(a)(2) (1981).
. 313 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.1963).
. Brown v. Herman Miller, Inc., supra note 1, at 5-7.
. Id. at 6.
. It has been held that when licensing under the statute is essential to institution of a suit in a District of Columbia court, it is equally a prerequisite to one brought in a federal court. Wickersham v. Harris, supra note 5, 313 F.2d at 471-472. We need not address this question since we conclude that Brown's activity in this case did not necessitate a license.
. See D.C.Code Ann. § 45-1907(h) (1981), quoted in text supra at note 3. Brown could not have been a "business-chance salesman” since here he was not "employed by a licensed business-chance broker.” See D.C.Code Ann. § 45-1902(a)(4) (1981).
. See D.C.Code Ann. § 45-1902(a)(2) (1981), quoted in text supra at note 4.
. "[T]he question before this court is whether a mere 'finder' is also a 'business-chance broker’ under D.C.Code Ann. § 45-1902(a)(2), or, in other words whether a finder 'negotiates' the purchase or sale of a business opportunity." Brown v. Herman Miller, Inc., supra note 1, at 5.
. See id. at 4-9.
. The jurisdiction of the District Court rested exclusively upon a diversity of citizenship between Brown and Miller. See Complaint ¶ 1, Brown v. Herman Miller, Inc., Civ. No. 83-3316 (D.D.C.) (filed Nov. 7, 1983); Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Brown v. Herman Miller, Inc., Civ. No. 83-3316 (D.D.C.) (filed Apr. 17, 1986); Brown v. Herman Miller, Inc., Civ. No. 83-3316 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 1986) (order finding diversity jurisdiction).
. Steorts v. American Airlines, Inc., 207 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 371 n. 24, 647 F.2d 194, 196 n. 24 (1981); Tuxedo Contractors, Inc. v. Swindell-Dressler Co., 198 U.S.App.D.C. 426, 428 n. 14, 613 F.2d 1159, 1161 n. 14 (1979); Lee v. Flintkote Co., 193 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 124-125 n. 14, 593 F.2d 1275, 1278-1279 n. 14 (1979).
. Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661, 663 (1st Cir.1972); Francis v. INA Life Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir.1987); Union Carbide Corp. v. Consumers Power Co., 636 F.Supp. 1498, 1501 (E.D.Mich.1986).
. Cunninghame v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 652 F.2d 306, 308-309 (2d Cir.1981); Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1205-1207 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 2237, 56 L.Ed.2d 404 (1978); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 472 F.2d 240, 242 (4th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940, 93 S.Ct. 2779, 37 L.Ed.2d 400 (1973); Winston Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 508 F.2d 1298, 1301-1304 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914, 96 S.Ct. 218, 46 L.Ed.2d 142 (1975).
. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
. Wickersham v. Harris, supra note 5, 313 F.2d at 471-472.
. See George Nangen & Co. v. Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., 238 F.Supp. 157, 159 (E.D.Wis.1965); Broughall v. Black Forest Dev. Co., 196 Colo. 503, 593 P.2d 314, 315-316 (1978); Baird v. Krancer, 138 Misc. 360, 246 N.Y.S. 85 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1930); Alford v. Raschiatore, 163 Pa.Super. 635, 63 A.2d 366, 368 (1949); Schmitt v. Coad, 24 Wash.App. 661, 604 P.2d 507, 510 (1979).
. George Nangen & Co. v. Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., supra note 19, 238 F.Supp. at 159; Broughall v. Black Forest Dev. Co., supra note 19, 593 P.2d at 315 n. 1; Alford v. Raschiatore, supra note 19, 63 A.2d at 368.
. See D.C.Code Ann. § 45-1902(a)(2) (1981), quoted in text supra at note 4.
. Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 479 F.2d 201 (1973).
. Sporn v. Suffolk Marketing, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 864, 865, 453 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394, 438 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (1982).
. Pass v. B.S.F. Co., 40 A.D.2d 813, 338 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (1972).
. Anchor Paper Corp. v. Anchor Converting Co., Inc., 79 N.C.App. 144, 338 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1986).
. Graham v. Kold Kist Beverage Ice, Inc., 43 Or.App. 1037, 607 P.2d 759, 761 (1979).
. See Hiller v. Franklin Mint, Inc., 485 F.2d 48, 50 (3d Cir.1973) (construing New York statute).
. Cf. Freedman v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 260, 267, 401 N.Y.S.2d 176, 181, 372 N.E.2d 12, 16-17 (1977).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1