What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Donald Robert MATHES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 15786.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
April 28, 1958.
Ronald Robert Mathes, in pro. per.
Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Lloyd F. Dunn, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before FEE and CHAMBERS, Circuit Judges, and CHASE A. CLARK, District Judge.
CHASE A. CLARK, District Judge.
This is an appeal by Donald Robert Mathes from the Order of the Trial Court denying Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Sentence under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.
Appellant was indicted in November, 1956, with others, in a five count indictment alleging violations of Title 21, U.S.C.A. § 174, charging “Sales of heroin and conspiracy to sell heroin”. Appellant was named in substantive counts one and four, and in the conspiracy count five. He was later arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On February 12,1957, the date set for trial, appellant asked permission from the court to withdraw his previous plea. Appellant claims that government counsel stipulated and agreed not to prosecute count four if a guilty plea were made on counts one and five. The previous not guilty plea was withdrawn at that time and Appellant entered a plea of guilty to counts one and five. The matter was referred to the Probation Officer for pre-sentence investigation, and continued to March 4, 1957 at 11:00 A.M. for sentence on counts one and five, and disposition of count four.
On that date, in Appellant’s presence, but in the absence of both his counsel and the United States attorney, the Court sentenced the Appellant to two years on count one, and two years on count five. Thereupon, the sentence was suspended, and he was released by Court Order, under probation.
Immediately thereafter the Assistant United States Attorney, Mr. Abbott, appeared in the courtroom and was advised by the Clerk of the Judgment of the Court. Mr. Abbott, in the absence of appellant or his attorney, called the Court’s attention to the fact that the statute carried a mandatory five year minimum. Upon being so advised the Court vacated the sentence, and ordered the matter continued until 2:00 P.M. (Apparently the appellant at that time was in the process of being released, and had been returned to the County jail.)
On the Appellant's return into Court at 2:00 P.M., he was advised by the Court that it was mandatory under the law that his sentence be a minimum of five years. It also appears in the record, Vol. II of the transcript, page 10, that the Honorable District Judge said, “This defendant more or less had an understanding that I was going to give him probation”, although it is not shown when that understanding was had.
An opportunity was then given the Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, previously entered, and enter a plea of not guilty. The United States Attorney advised the Court that he had no objection, and then said “Under the two Counts to which he has pleaded guilty, he faces five or ten years on each or a total possible penalty of forty years. I certainly think that in imposing sentence, reasonable consideration should be given to the fact he did enter a plea of guilty and did testify truthfully so far as I know.” (Transcript, Vol. II, p. 11.)
Counsel for Appellant then stated that he had discussed with his client the advisability of changing his plea, and standing trial, and that he would let his plea of guilty stand.
The Trial Court pointed out to the United States Attorney that he would never have been able to convict the other defendants without the testimony of the Appellant. The Appellant was then sentenced to five years in the penitentiary on each count, the two sentences to run concurrently.
The United States Attorney then moved to dismiss count four, saying “That was the understanding at the time the plea was entered, and that understanding will be honored.” No appeal was taken from the Judgment of conviction or sentence. On September 19, 1957, Appellant filed his motion to vacate or set aside the sentence on the grounds that the trial court was without jurisdiction and exceeded its authority in correcting the first sentence. This appeal is from the denial of that motion.
Appellant here claims that he “had been induced to testify at the trial of the co-defendants, and therefore had not been; able to stand on his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution,, therefore giving testimony that would: incriminate himself”. There is nothing in the record to substantiate this. This contention, made by the Appellant in his briefs on appeal, was never presented to the Trial Court. Had the Appellant changed his plea, faced with the testimony that he had given at the trial of his co-defendants, his chances of acquittal were, undoubtedly, very slim. He had burned his bridges behind him.
This appeal, however, only raises the question: Did the Trial Court have jurisdiction to vacate an erroneous sentence and impose the sentence that was provided for under Title 21 U.S.C.A. § 174?
Section 174 provides that one convicted of the offense charged in the Indictment “ * * * shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty years”. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7237(d), as amended July 18, 1956, provides that imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended and probation shall not be granted upon conviction under 21 U.S.C.A. § 174.
It is well settled that a sentence which does not comply with the letter of the criminal statute is not only erroneous but void. Where such an erroneous sentence is imposed by the trial court, it may be corrected in conformity with the provisions of the Statute, and the Appellant would not be placed in double jeopardy by so correcting it. United States v. Bozza, 3 Cir., 155 F.2d 592, at pages 595, 596, and cases cited therein, affirmed 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818.
The scope of this appeal being limited to only this one question, the trial court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1