What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Samuel NICOSIA, Appellant, v. Harry B. SHER and Gordon A, Yearty, Appellees.
No. 5346.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 6, 1956.
T. Austin Gavin and Allen E. Barrow, Tulsa, Okl., for appellant.
Truman B. Rucker and Bryan W. Tabor, Tulsa, Okl., for appellees.
Before PHILLIPS, MURRAH and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.
. Harwell v. Harding, 96 Ill. 32.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
This is an equitable action, brought by Nicosia against Sher and Yearty to cancel an assignment dated August 25, 1954, executed by Nicosia and running to Sher, covering a one-third interest in the seven-eighths working interest in certain oil and gas leases covering lands in No-wata County, Oklahoma, and to establish and quiet Nicosia’s interest in such leases and for other relief. In his complaint Nicosia offered to do equity.
On June 17, 1955, the trial court entered a judgment cancelling and setting aside such assignment and adjudging that Nicosia was the owner of an undivided one-third of a seven-eighths working interest in a certain oil and gas lease covering 150 acres of land in No-wata County, Oklahoma, and an undivided one-twenty-fourth overriding royalty interest in an oil and gas lease covering 40 acres of land situated in Nowata County, Oklahoma. It further adjudged that Yearty was the owner of an undivided two-thirds of the seven-eighths working interest in such leases, subject to the one-twenty-fourth overriding interest in the 40-acre tract in Nicosia, and that Sher was an owner of an undivided one-third of the seven-eighths working interest in the 40-acre tract, subject to the one-twenty-fourth overriding interest of Nicosia.
It further adjudged that the respective titles of the parties to their respective interests should be quieted.
It further adjudged that Nicosia should immediately pay to Sher $750; that Sher and Yearty should render a verified accounting showing all income and expenses incurred in drilling operations and completion of wells on such leases from the commencement of the first well on August 31, 1954, to the date of the judgment, and that upon final approval of such accounting, that each party to the action pay his proper share of the expenses incurred, less his proportionate share of income derived from the sale of oil and gas, or either, within 15 days after such approval. It further ordered that the parties execute and deliver to each other instruments which would give full force and effect to the provisions of the judgment.
By the judgment the court appointed a receiver of the 150 acres of land. The parties rendered an accounting and on September 16, 1955, the master filed his report, in which he found that the contribution to be made by Nicosia as his pro rata share of the cost of drilling, completion, and operation of the wells, after the allowance of proper credits, was $8,744.65. On September 27, 1955, the court entered an order approving the report. Thereafter, on October 28, 1955, Sher and Yearty filed a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment on the ground that Nicosia had not complied with the judgment by paying $750 to Sher and had not paid the $8,744.65 within 15 days from September 27, 1955, nor within a ten-day extension thereof, granted by the court, which expired on October 22, 1955, and that numerous creditors were threatening to file liens against the leasehold, and that the continuance of the receivership would be unnecessarily burdensome and expensive.
On November 23, 1955, the trial court entered a judgment in which it sustained the motion and adjudged that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment entered in favor of Nicosia and against Sher and Yearty be set aside and held for naught on the ground that Nicosia had not complied with the former judgment and decree of the court, and counsel for Nicosia had notified the court that “they were not complying with the judgment and decree of the court heretofore entered * * By such judgment of November 23, 1955, the court quieted the title in Sher and Yearty against Nicosia in the leases and against all assignees under all assignments made by Nicosia. From the last-mentioned judgment, Nicosia has appealed.
Nicosia did not appeal from the first judgment and it became final.
Under the law of Oklahoma, Nicosia, in order to be entitled to a cancellation of the assignment, was required to do equity.
Where the rules and principles of equity demand it, a court may condition the grant of relief to the complainant, in order to place the defendant in the position which equitably he should occupy in view of the relief granted to the complainant.
The conditions of the relief do not constitute an affirmative decree .against the plaintiff. He may perform them or not at his option. However, if the plaintiff fails and refuses to perform the conditions, the court may deny plaintiff all relief and dismiss his action.
Here, Nicosia failed to comply with the conditions within the time required by the judgment, or at all, to the prejudice of Sher and Yearty and at the hearing on the motion Nicosia announced to the court that he would not comply. It follows that the action of the court in its second judgment was proper.
Affirmed.
. 15 O.S.A. § 235; Duncan v. Keechi Oil & Gas Co., 75 Okl. 98, 181 P. 709.
. Levy v. S. H. Kress & Co., 8 Cir., 285 F. 836, 839; Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 156, 164, 39 U.S. 156, 164, 10 L.Ed. 398; Ingalls v. Ingalls, 257 Ala. 521, 59 So.2d 898, 911; Johnston v. San Francisco Sav. Union, 75 Cal. 184, 16 P. 753, 756; 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 602, p. 994; 19 Am. Jur., Equity, § 412, p. 284.
. Harwell v. Harding, 96 Ill. 32, 38.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1