What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CHICAGO RAILWAY EQUIPMENT CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
Nos. 4225, 4226.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
March 27, 1930.
William S. Oppenheim, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
John V. Groner, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before ALSCHULER, PAGE and: SPARKS, Circuit Judges.
PAGE, Circuit Judge.
No. 4225. In Chicago Ry. Equipment Co. v. Blair, 20 F.(2d) 10, where most of the facts appear, we reversed the order of the Board of Tax Appeals (Appeal of Chicago Ry. Equipment Co., 4 B. T. A. 452), which, sustained assessments of additional taxes for the years 1917, 1918, and 1919.
On the second hearing, the Statute of Limitations was pleaded, new evidence was taken, an order sustaining the assessments entered, and petitioner again asks for a reversal.
That the assessments for the years 1917' and 1918 were made after the statute had run,, unless saved by waivers, is admitted. Petitioner admitted a waiver on December 10,. 1925, long after the statute had run.
The Board has held that the burden is upon the Commissioner to prove a waiver. Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 1300; Farmers Feed Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 1069; Stevens v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 1120. Respondent offered no evidence of a waiver. The evidence shows the waiver of December 10, 1925, and two letters written to petitioner by the Revenue Department, both after the statute as to the 1917 and 1918 taxes had run, stating that waivers had been filed.
The Board held the assessments legal on the theory that: (a) The statements in the letters were evidence that waivers had been made; (b) a waiver at any time is a sufficient basis for an assessment.
We are of opinion that the letters were not even evidence that waivers had been made, and certainly they were no evidence of the time when they were made, or when they expired, or of any other fact. Such waivers were so obviously a part of respondent’s ¡case that the only inference to be drawn from 'his failure to produce them is that they did not exist.
It is urged, on authority of Insley Mfg. Co. v. Thurman, 33 F.(2d) 441, decided by This court, that a waiver, after the statute has •run, is good. While in that ease there was .such a waiver, it was made while a former waiver, made before the statute had run, was still in force. The question here was not "there decided, nor was it before us.
In Pictorial Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 38 F.(2d) 563, decided February 28,1930, we had before us the question as to whether .a waiver, made at a time when the Commissioner had no authority to assess the tax in question and the taxpayer was under no obligation to pay it, had any force. We there held that no valid waiver was shown, and we .here hold that the statute had run as to the 1917 and 1918 assessments. No such error is assigned as to the 1919 assessment.
It is urged that the Board erred in fixing The March 1, 1913, fair market value of pe.titioner’s properties, consisting of large factory buildings and equipment, located in five .states.
The plants were bought between 1892 and 1912, from older concerns, some of them from receivers or trustees, and at prices much below the original cost. From time to time large sums of money were -spent upon the properties for buildings, renewals, and repairs.
Appraisals prior to 1913 showed a property value of $334,244.09" greater than the cost of the properties to petitioner, and the book values were increased by that sum.
Respondent, apparently ignoring the question of March 1,1913, fair market value, proceeded to find the cost of the properties on December 31, 1916. The parties undertook before the Board to establish the March 1, 1913, market value.
The evidence before the Board shows several sets of figures bearing upon values.
(1). It is admitted that the cost of the properties as of Dee. 31, 1916, was..............$1,384,034.11
There was expended on the properties between Jan. 1, 1913, and Dee. 31, 1916.....$ 385,441.05
So that the cost March 1, 1913, was, .....................$ 998,593.06
If we add the amount put on the books because of the appraisals prior to 1913 and above referred to,..........$ 334,244.09
We have, as the March 1, 1913, undepreciated value, as shown by those figures,...........$1,332,837.15
Four of the appraisals prior to 1913 were made as early as 1908, and the last one in 1912. The above figures aid but little in finding the March 1, 1913, market value.
(2). Coats & Burchard, between Nov. 27, 1915, and Feb. 1, 1916, appraised all of petitioner’s properties. Those appraisal books are not before us, but the appraisals purport to show the reproduction cost, new, of all properties at that time. Such cost was, .....................$1,720,884.47
By deducting additions for 1913, 1914 and 1915, amounting to, $ 326,130.75
We have the March 1,1913, reproduction value, as,........$1,394,753.72
Forward testified he thought Coats & Burchard depreciation figures were...’........$ 262,000.00
So’ that, on those figures, the March 1, 1913, depreciated value was, ................$1,132,753.72
(3) . Petitioner’s president Leigh testified that he knew the fair cash market value of the properties March 1, 1913, and stated that it was $1,536,323. Forward testified that the properties on that date were worth $1,584,926.13 — some $48,000 higher than Leigh. If Leigh gave the details of his figures, we have not been able to identify them. He did, however, give what he said were figures in the Coats & Burehard appraisals, showing a total of $1,782,939. He testified that those figures represented the fair reproduction value of those properties at that time. If we deduct the additions in 1913, 1914, and 1915, $326,130.75, there remains as of March 1, 1913, $1,456,808.25, as Leigh’s idea of the Coats & Burehard 1913 reproduction value. That was nearly $100,000 less than Leigh testified was the March 1, 1913, fair cash market value. Leigh had not appraised the properties. His testimony, above referred to, may be explained by his testimony elsewhere — that he did not think there was much difference between the fair market value and the reproduction value. He also said his figures were identical with Coats & Burchard’s. Forward’s situation is much the same as Leigh’s. He testified: “I have not made any independent appraisal of any property other than on eertain items in the plant.” He took his figures from- the books and appraisals made by others..
(4). The record shows various balance sheets, beginning in 1908, that purport to show gross reproduction values. Depreciation reserves are there stated in gross. The Board had before it the details of those balance sheets, but they are not before us.
With their appraisal, Coats & Burehard prepared a depreciation sheet that was in petitioner’s possession, but that was not offered in evidence before the Board on either hearing. The presumption is that it was unfavorable to petitioner. This presumption is strengthened by the fact that the Coats & Burehard figures, on one Chicago property, show a depreciation of about 25 per cent. All properties, figured on that basis, would show a depreciation much greater than the amount stated by Forward to be his recollection of what the Coats & Burehard depreciation figures showed.
The Board gave full consideration to all the evidence, and out of all the conflicting evidence reached a conclusion as to the 1913 market value that must’be sustained.
For the purpose of arriving at the taxable value of the plant equipment, it was agreed that equipment classed as “power” should be depreciated 5 per cent., and that classed as “machinery and tools” 10 per cent. Petitioner’s complaint is that $239,677.35 worth of equipment that should have been classed as “machinery and tools” was erroneously classed as “power,” thereby depriving petitioner of a 5 per cent, depreciation on that amount.
In arriving at a proper depreciation percentage on such a large amount of equipment, located in five different states, it is quite manifest that the useful life of individual items could not be determined. Coats & Burehard, in their appraisal, listed 29 lots. Some of those lots are: Electric lighting system, $15,624.69; flasks, $35,092.05; furnaces and forges, $130,551.21; miscellaneous, $40,857.79, etc. • No detail is before us. Possibly the first item is power. Without further information, it is doubtful if anyone could, with a feeling of confidence that he was right, say to which class the other three lots should be assigned. It was necessary, arbitrarily, to make classes into which the items of the equipment could be placed, because many of the items could not be identified as belonging to one class or another, except on the theory that it was entitled to'the depredation fixed for that class. The testimony is unsatisfactory. Forward said, “I include in power the boilers and engines.” The witness and respondent got into a controversy over what was power and what was machinery and tools. We have here no information upon which to determine that question. The Board gave every opportunity for a full hearing, and was liberal'in the admission of evidence. We find no basis for disturbing its finding on the classification for depreciation purposes.
The order is affirmed as to the 1919 taxes, and reversed as to the 1917 and 1918 taxes.
No. 4226. There is in this ease no issue on the Statute of Limitations. Otherwise, the issues are the same as in No. 4225, and are determined by our decision in that ease.
The order of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
In cases where, we have made deductions of expenditures on the properties made after Jan. 1,1913, we have deducted the whole of the 1913 expenditures, because expenditures, if any, for the months of January and February, 1913, do not separately appear.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1