What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
EDWARD J. GAY PLANTING & MANUFACTURING CO., Limited, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 10965.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 23, 1944.
Carl J. Batter, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
John F. Costelloe, Sewall Key, and J. Louis Monarch, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., J. P. Wenchel, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Raymond F. Brown and R. E. Maiden, Jr., Sp. Attys., Bureau of Internal Revenue, all of Washington, D. C. for respondent.
Before SIBLEY, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
McCORD, Circuit Judge.
The petitioner seeks a refund of processing taxes which were imposed and which it alleges it paid and did not pass on to consumers. The claim was. for $27,419.-30. The parties filed- a joint stipulation of facts. The Tax Court made its findings of facts on the basis of the stipulation and held that the taxpayer had failed to prove that it was entitled to a refund of any part of the amount involved. The proceeding is here for a review of the decision of the Tax Court.
The taxpayer was a grower and purchaser of sugar cane and was also a producer of direct consumption sugar. The claim for refund, as filed and disallowed, disclosed a tax period margin of $0.01626685 per unit of commodity processed and a margin for the period before and after the tax of $0.00939057 per unit of commodity processed, or an excess margin during the tax period of $0.0068^628 per unit.
The taxpayer produded plantation granulated sugar and first molasses for direct consumption. It also produced blackstrap molasses as a by-product. The taxpayer at all times sold its granulated sugar at aj fixed differential of 35^ under the prices of the large sugar refineries, all of whom increased their prices by 55¡é per hundred pounds ol refined sugar on June 8, 1934, the effective date of the imposition of the processing tax on sugar at the rate of 5’Sí/¿$ per hundred pounds.
The gross sales value of articles derived from the commodity processed computed in accordance with Sec. 907(b) (6) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C.A. § 649(b) (6), and the regulations applicable thereto, was $266,857.50 for the tax period and $388,727.92 for the period before and after the tax.
The units of commodity processed, expressed in terms of 96 degrees sugar, raw value, were 7,260,357 pounds during the tax period and 12,241,586 pounds during the period before and after the tax.
The taxpayer processed sugar cane which it grew on its own plantations and sugar cane which it purchased in the open market from other planters.
The taxpayer contends that the “actual cost” measure should have been used in respect to sugar cane grown upon its own plantations and that if such method had been used, then such computation would have removed it from the burden of proof imposed by the “before and after tax period” measure used by the Tax Court.
Section 907(b) (5) of the Refund Act of 1936 provides alternative methods of computing cost — actual cost or current prices at the time of processing. The Tax Court computed margins based on current prices, and we are of opinion and so hold that such method, under the stipulation of this case, was correct. It is true that we held in the case of Commissioner v. Bain Peanut Co., 5 Cir., 134 F.2d 853, 856, that actual cost “is exclusive if available.” Such “actual cost” measure could be applied here if petitioner had given us a correct premise upon which to move. This it has failed to do. It charged the entire cost of all planting and cultivation of sugar cane grown by it on its plantations to the first year after the sugar cane had been planted, whereas in fact three crops were grown and and gathered, one each year, from the first planting. This cost of planting and cultivation should have been allocated to the three years and not to the first year alone.
The Tax Court found that the evidence affirmatively showed the taxpayer had not borne the burden of the tax on sugar and molasses but had passed it on to its customers.
We agree with the Tax Court that the computation was properly made under Sec. 907(b) (5) (b), and in consequence, the petitioner’s margin during the tax period exceeded the margin during the before and after periods. It follows that the petitioner must be presumed, under 907(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936, to have borne none of the burden of the processing tax but to have shifted it to others. Commissioner v. Webre Steib Co., 5 Cir., 140 F.2d 768, 770; Commissioner v. Bain Peanut Co., 5 Cir., 134 F.2d 853; cf. Helvering v. Insular Sugar Refining Corp., App.D.C., 141 F.2d 713.
There is to be found in the stipulation of facts, which is the record evidence in this case, substantial evidence to support the decision of the Tax Court and the judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0