What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
THE CORAPEAK. RICKSON v. VELAZQUEZ.
No. 3076.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 13, 1931.
Braden. Vandeventer, of Norfolk, Va. (Vandeventer, Eggleston & Black, of Norfolk, Va., on the brief), for appellant and cross-appellee.
Jacob Louis Morewitz and Morewitz & Morewitz, all of Newport News, Va., for appellee and cross-appellant.
■Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAM C. COLEMAN, District Judge. '
NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.
This is a libel brought by one Benigno Velazquez, a naturalized American citizen, born in Porto Rico, against the steamship Corapeak. The libelant, who was a fireman, claimed to have been injured on the vessel while it was lying off Newport News, and the injury occurred while libelant, who was off duty, was engaged in showing a green hand .coal passer how to work an ash ejector. The injury evidently occurred because of the action of the coal passer in turning the steam into the machine at the wrong time. The injury consisted of a bruise on the arm, and seems to have been of no great importance, as neither the skin nor bones were broken. The injured man was promptly given medical attention on board the ship, and was tendered a hospital certificate admitting him to the Norfolk Marine Hospital, free of ehhrge, and was offered a taxi to take him to the hospital boat.
The injury occurred on the morning of May 4, and wages were due libelant from the 1st of May, at the rate of $67.50 per month. At the time libelant left the boat he was tendered $10.13, which was found by the judge below to be the correct amount due him for wages, and was requested to sign the portage bill, which contained no other condition than that it was for “whole wages.” Libelant refused to sign the portage bill and was not paid.
Libelant entered a private hospital and was treated for his injury. Negotiations were entered into by libelant through his proctor, looking to a settlement of his claim against the ship, but these negotiations failed, and the libelant brought this proceeding.
The court below rejected libelant’s claim for damages for injury and allowed him one month’s wages, amounting to $67.50, for maintenance and cure. The court also held that at the conclusion of the negotiations for settlement the libelant should have been paid the wages due, and allowed libelant the sum of $544.50 as double pay for the withholding of wages under section 4529, Rev. St'., as amended by Act March 4, 1915, § 3 (46 USCA §, 596), from which action of the court below this appeal was brought. Libelant filed a cross-appeal.
This court has had occasion to discuss the question of withholding seamen’s wages in numerous eases, a résumé of which will be found in the Lake Gaither, 40 F.(2d) 31. A reading of these decisions will show that it has been repeatedly held that no condition may be imposed on tender of wages due, but in this case we find a- tender made of all wages due with no other condition attached than that a receipt be given for “all wages,” a receipt which the captain of the ship certainly had a right to demand upon payment. The record discloses nothing was demanded -of the seaman other than he sign a receipt, and further discloses that at the conclusion of the negotiations for settlement no direct demand was ever made by the seaman or his proctor for the payment of this amount. Having once made a proper tender the captain of the ship was certainly under no obligations to repeat the tender in the absence of a direct demand for payment, and we are of the opinion that the judge below was in error in allowing libelant any waiting time.
In Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U. S. 52, 50 S. Ct. 189, 191, 74 L. Ed. 696, heard by the Supreme Court on certiorari for this court, in an able opinion discussing the question of waiting time, Mr. Justice Stone lays down the proper principles to- be applied, and among other things says:
“The phrase ‘without sufficient cause’ must be taken to embrace something more than valid defenses to the claim for wages. Otherwise, it would have added nothing to the statute. In determining what other causes are sufficient, the phrase is to be interpreted in the light of the evident purpose of the section to secure prompt payment of seamen’s wages (II. R. Rep. 1657, Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 55th Cong., 2d Sess.), and thus to protect them from the harsh consequences of arbitrary and unscrupulous action of their employers, to which, as a class, they are peculiarly exposed. The words ‘refuses or neglects to make payment * * * without sufficient cause’ connote, either conduct which is in some sense arbitrary or willful, or at least a failure not attributable to impossibility of payment. We think the use of this language indicates a purpose to protect seamen from delayed payments of wages by the imposition of a liability which is not exclusively compensatory, but designed to prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and to induce prompt payment when payment is possible. * * *
“That the liability is not incurred where the refusal to pay is in some reasonable degree morally justified, or where the demand for wages cannot be satisfied either by the owner or his interest in the ship, has been the conclusion reached with practical unanimity by the lower federal courts.”
Here there was no arbitrary refusal to pay, but, on the contrary, there was a tender of all wages due with no improper condition attached.
With respect to the damages suffered by the libelant and his claim for maintenance and cure, we are of the opinion, from the evidence, that $150 would be a liberal recompense to him on those items.
The decree of the court below will he modified so as to allow libelant the said sum of $150, together with the $10.13 due as wages, and the costs of this appeal will be equally divided between the parties.
Modified.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1