What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CAMBIST FILMS, INC., a Corporation, Appellant, v. Robert W. DUGGAN, District Attorney for Allegheny County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Edward G. Crone, Chief of Detectives, Allegheny County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Joseph M. Loughran, District Attorney for West-moreland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Edward Gordon, Chief of Detectives of Westmoreland County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
No. 17985.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Nov. 7, 1969.
Decided Dec. 30, 1969.
David F. Alpern, Alpern & Alpern, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Henry A. Martin, Asst. Dist. Atty., Greensburg, Pa. (Joseph M. Loughran, Dist. Atty., Greensburg, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARIS, SEITZ and STAHL, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff in this case is the owner of distribution rights to a motion picture film, titled “The Female”. In March, 1969 the plaintiff contracted with four theatres in Allegheny County and one in Westmoreland County, both in the Western District of Pennsylvania, to exhibit the picture for a week’s run. On March 7 and 8, 1969 Allegheny County detectives viewed a portion of the showing of the film at each of the four theatres in that county, after which they seized the prints of the film being projected at those theatres without warrants, alleging the picture to be obscene, and instituted criminal proceedings against the theatre managers for violation of the Pennsylvania obscenity statute. 18 P.S.(Pa.) § 4524. On March 13, 1969 Westmoreland County detectives viewed the entire showing of the film at the theatre at which it was being shown in that county and then seized, without a warrant, the print of the film being projected in that theatre and instituted criminal proceedings against the theatre manager and the projectionist.
On March 17, 1969 the plaintiff filed the present action in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the district attorneys of Allegheny and Westmoreland Counties and their chiefs of detectives for an order to compel the return of the prints and an injunction against any criminal prosecutions arising out of the seizure of the prints. After a hearing the district court filed an opinion, 1969, 298 F.Supp. 1148, and entered an order directing the Allegheny County defendants to return the prints seized in that county and dismissing the action as to the Westmore-land County defendants. The order did not enjoin any of the criminal prosecutions. From the order dismissing the action as to the Westmoreland County defendants the plaintiff took the appeal which is now before us.
Briefly stated, the rationale of the district court was that the seizure of the film prints without a warrant was lawful if made incident to a lawful arrest without a warrant for a crime committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The court further reasoned that the arrest in Westmoreland County was lawful because the arresting officers were in a position to determine that the film was obscene, having viewed it in its entirety, but that the arrests in Allegheny County were not valid, and therefore the seizures were invalid, because the officers, not having viewed the film in its entirety, were not in a position to determine that “its dominant theme, taken as a whole, [had] an appeal to prurient interest”, the test laid down by the Pennsylvania statute. 18 P.S.(Pa.) § 4524(a).
We cannot agree with the basic premise of the district court that police officers may, after viewing a motion picture themselves, determine whether it is obscene and, if they determine it to be obscene, proceed to arrest the exhibitor and seize the film without a warrant. On the contrary, it is now settled that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution require that there be an adversary judicial hearing and determination of obscenity before a warrant may be issued to search and seize alleged obscene materials. Marcus v. Search Warrants, 1961, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127; A Quantity of Copies of Books v. State of Kansas, 1964, 378 U.S. 205, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 12 L.Ed.2d 809. Such a hearing and determination is, a fortiori, required where officers, as in this case, seize without a search warrant materials alleged by them to be obscene. For such a nonjudieial ex parte determination does not afford the owner due process of law. State v. Parisi, 1962, 76 N.J.Super. 115, 183 A.2d 801; Stentel v. Smith, 1963, 18 A.D.2d 458, 240 N.Y.S.2d 200; Flack v. Municipal Court for Anaheim-Fullerton J. D., 1967, 66 Cal.2d 981, 59 Cal.Rptr. 872, 429 P.2d 192; City News Center, Inc. v. Carson, D.C.Fla.1969, 298 F. Supp. 706; Sokolic v. Ryan, D.C.Ga.1969, 304 F.Supp. 213.
We are in complete accord with the views expressed by the Supreme Court of California in Flack v. Municipal Court, supra, in which case, which involved facts similar to those in the present case, the court said: [59 Cal. Rptr. at 878, 879, 429 P.2d at 198, 199]
“While it is settled that in the ordinary case a search incident to an arrest is not ‘unreasonable’ if the arrest itself is lawful * * * the First Amendmént compels more restrictive rules in cases in which the arrest and search relate to alleged obscenity. The lesson of Marcus, Quantity of Books * * * is that since constitutionally protected speech is involved, ‘Determination by police officers of the status of suspected books, papers, etc. — whether to be classified as obscene or not obscene — is not enough protection to the owner to constitute due process.’ (Italics added) ■3v
“* * * It is incongruous to condemn, as vesting too abundant discretion in the enforcing officer, a search and seizure made on an overly broad warrant * * * while permitting officers an unfettered discretion in seizures effected without a warrant under the guise of being incident to arrest. In both circumstances constitutionally compelled procedural safeguards are lacking * * *”
It follows that the seizure of the print of the plaintiff’s film “The Female” by the Westmoreland County detectives on March 13, 1969 was illegal and that so much of the order entered by the district court as dismissed the action against the Westmoreland County defendants must be reversed and the cause remanded for the entry of an appropriate order directing those defendants to return the print to the plaintiff.
In its notice of appeal the plaintiff complained of the failure of the order of the district court to enjoin the prosecution of the criminal cases arising in connection with the seizure of the film prints. This point, if pressed, would involve the more difficult question of the power of a federal court to interfere with the prosecution of a criminal case in the state court. However, it was not pressed on appeal and we do not consider it.
So much of the order of the district court as dismissed the action with respect to defendants Joseph M. Loughran and Edward Gordon will be reversed and the cause will be remanded to the district court with directions to enter an order directing those defendants forthwith to return to the plaintiff the print of the motion picture film, titled “The Female”, which was seized by Westmore-land County detectives on March 13, 1969.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1