What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
John Thomas FREEMAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 6776.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Jan. 30, 1962.
H. E. Hurst, Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Benjamin E. Franklin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Kan. (Newell A. George, U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and BRATTON and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is a forma pauperis appeal from a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312. At the time of trial and sentence appellant was serving a life term in the Kansas State Penitentiary for violation of that state’s habitual criminal law. The only question raised is the validity of the sentence which committed appellant to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for a period of 5 years, “such sentence to run consecutively to the sentence which he is now serving.” When imposing sentence the trial judge said from the bench that the 5-year sentence was “to begin at the completion of the sentence now being served in the Kansas State Penitentiary.”
Upon the trial and conviction of one already sentenced for another crime, execution of the second sentence may begin when the first terminates. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 265, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607. A sentence so providing is not void for indefiniteness or uncertainty. Smith v. United States, 10 Cir., 177 F.2d 434, 436; Wall v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 108 F.2d 865, 867; cf. Crawford v. Taylor, 10 Cir., 290 F.2d 197. There is no uncertainty in the intent of the court to impose a 5-year sentence to begin upon release of the defendant from the state penitentiary. Gibson v. Looney, 10 Cir., 258 F.2d 879, 880.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2