What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
TAYLOR v. UNITED STATES. TAYLOR v. SIQUIER, Warden (two cases).
Nos. 12272, 12307, 12385.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 19, 1950.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1950.
Herbert A. Waterman, San Francisco, Cal., Earl W. Taylor, in pro. per., for appellant.
Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Attorney, Robert B. McMillan, Asst., U. S. Atty., Ernest R. Mortenson, Sp. Attorney, Bureau Internal Revenue, San Francisco, Cal., for the United States.
J. Charles Dennis, U. S. Attorney, Guy A. B. Dovell, Asst. U. S. Attorney, Tacoma, Wash., for appellee Squier.
Before STEPHENS, HEALY and BONE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Three appeals involving the same litigant were consolidated for hearing and disposal on appeal.
No. 12,272
Earl W. Taylor was indicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, on four counts for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. He pleaded guilty to count two, whereupon the United States Attorney moved for, and was granted, dismissals of the remaining three counts. After imposition of sentence appellant moved to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the grounds that at the time of arraignment he ■ was mentally incompetent, and that at the time of judgment and sentence the trial court was biased and prejudiced against appellant. This appeal is from the order denying the motion.
Prior to ruling on the motion the trial court appointed two reputable psychiatrists (one of whom was named on the recommendation and suggestion of appellant’s counsel who ably represented appellant at every stage of the proceedings below) who conducted an examination into appellant’s mental condition. They reported that he was highly neurotic but was legally and mentally competent and had been so at the time of sentence and the time of plea and prior thereto. The trial court so found and the record clearly substantiates this finding.
No affidavit of bias and prejudice was filed, and had one been filed at this stage of the proceedings we think it would have been lacking in the timeliness required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 144. A defendant cannot take his chances with a judge and then, if he thinks that the sentence is too severe, secure a disqualification and a hearing before another judge. However, appellant argues that in this case the prejudice grew out of irrelevant and prejudicial hearsay testimony given (over objection) subsequent to the plea and prior to sentence by an agent of the Internal Revenue Bureau which testimony related to alleged unlawful activities which had no exact relation to the crime charged and for which he had never been convicted; that due process of law requires an unbiased tribunal and fair procedure at every stage including pre-sentence proceedings, and that a sentence based in part upon such testimony should be set aside, else the denial of liberty will be without due process of law.
Rule 32 of the Criminal Rules, 18 U.S.C.A., gives the court very wide discretion regarding matters it may take into consideration in determining punishment. Due process of law does not limit the contents of a pre-sentence report to information which would be admissible under rules of evidence applicable to the trial, Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, rehearing denied 337 U.S. 961, 69 S.Ct. 1529. The testimony called for by the court was not inappropriate for its consideration and the fact that it was taken in open court (and the witness cross-examined by appellant’s attorney) rather than in chambers or in a written report cannot be said to'have injured appellant. In any event, appellant’s record of prior criminal' convictions fully justified the maximum sentence which was imposed.
The trial court correctly denied the motion.
No. 12,307
After Taylor was taken to the United States Penitentiary at McNeil Island, Washington he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Southern Division, basing it on the ground that his imprisonment was premature because an appeal was pending and on the additional ground that the prison rules, which prevented access to lawbooks necessary to prepare his appeal, denied him due process of law. This appeal is from the order dismissing that petition.
No appeal was taken from the judgment under which appellant was convicted; as indicated above, the only appeal was from the order denying a motion to vacate the sentence. Therefore, Rule 38 of the Criminal Rules providing for relief pending review had no application. His imprisonment was not premature.
It is not within the province of the courts to supervise the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there. Shepherd v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 163 F.2d 872; Sarshik v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 142 F.2d 676. Prison rules concerning the use of lawbooks could not change the legality or illegality of appellant’s detention.
The trial court correctly dismissed the petition.
No. 12,385
This appeal is from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Southern Divison, dismissing another petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Ground for the petition was that the indictment under which appellant was convicted failed to state an offense because the section of the Code under which the indictment was laid had been repealed by implication by subsequent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code.
The indictment charged appellant with, in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 145(b), a willful attempt to defeat and evade his income tax by filing a false return. That section makes it an offense to willfully attempt “in any manner to evade or defeat any tax * * Appellant contends that the indictment (if it charges any offense) actually charges an offense under § 145(c) for which a lesser penalty is prescribed. Section 145(c), which was added to the Code by Act of October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 836, reads: “(c) Any individual who willfully makes and subscribes a return which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter, shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to the penalties prescribed for perjury in section 125 of the Criminal Code.” It will be noted that the quoted section prohibits making and subscribing a false return, while the indictment charged an attempt to evade, the tax by “filing and causing to be filed with the Collector” a false return. Congress may make each separate step in a prohibited transaction a separate offense, Catrino v. United States, 9 Cir., 176 F.2d 884. Filing a false return with the Collector clearly includes a separate element from the offense of “making and subscribing a false return.” We hold that the indictment sufficiently charged a violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 145 (b), under which appellant was convicted on his plea of guilty.
Appellant further argues that 26 U.S.C.A. § 3616, (which makes it a mis - demeanor to deliver or disclose to the collector “any false or fraudulent list, return, account, or statement, with .intent to defeat or evade the valuation, enumeration, or assessment intended to be made * * *.”) repealed by implication § 145 (b) insofar as the latter section might be construed to prohibit the evasion of income taxes by filing false returns. The legislative history of the two sections reveals that § 3616 was originally enacted long prior to the enactment of § 145(b). It goes without saying that an existing statute cannot repeal, by implication or otherwise, a subsequent enactment. Both of these sections were re-enacted in the 1939 general codification of the Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. 62, 440. We further note that the penalties provided in § 145(b) are made expressly “in addition to other penalties provided by law.”
Together with the petition for the writ, appellant filed an affidavit of bias and prejudice. He contends that the trial judge erred in failing to disqualify himself. The affidavit merely alleged, in substance, that the judge was biased and prejudiced against appellant because he had held against appellant in a series of former writs. The trial court ruled that the facts and reasons stated in the affidavit were insufficient to charge that degree of personal bias and prejudice required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 144. We agree. Apparently appellant believed that filing an affidavit would automatically disqualify the trial judge. It is well settled that the trial judge has authority in the first instance to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit, Price v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 125 F.2d 806, 811; and see extensive discussion in Cole v. Loew’s Inc., D.C., 76 F.Supp. 872. In any event, any error in this regard would have been harmless since the only question before the court was one of law, and leave to appeal in forma pauperis was granted.
The trial court correctly dismissed the petition.
The three orders appealed from are affirmed.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0