What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
George W. THOMAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 20287.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 9, 1967.
Decided May 4, 1967.
Mr. William P. Bernton, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. Robert A. Ackerman, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with whom Mr. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Messrs. Frank Q. Nebeker and Joel D. Blackwell, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
. Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, Pretty-man, Senior Circuit Judge, and Danaher, Circuit Judge.
PRETTYMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
Appellant Thomas was indicted, tried before a jury, and convicted for carnal knowledge of a 15-year-old girl. He seeks reversal on the sole ground that there was inadequate corroboration of the prosecutrix’s testimony identifying him as her assailant. We affirm.
The case for the Government was that the complainant-victim left her home at about 8 :30 in the evening in mid-February to walk half a dozen blocks to visit a school girl friend. Halfway there she was accosted by Thomas, who told her he went to the same school she attended. He seized her wrist, threatened her, and caused her to sit with him on a nearby ledge. After several minutes’ conversation, when she arose to go, he grabbed her, forced her to a nearby playground, and raped her. She ran screaming to her home, and the police were notified immediately. The testimony of one of the investigating officers and of her grandfather was that the girl was distraught, that there were red welts on her neck where she claimed her assailant had held her, and that her clothing was muddy and in disarray. Shortly after the arrival of the police, the girl, with her mother and the officers, retraced the route she had taken and returned to the scene of the crime. Later that evening she was taken to D. C. General Hospital, where medical examination established that she had been sexually assaulted and that the experience was her first. The girl positively identified the appellant as her assailant the next day, after he had been arrested. There was no evidence to indicate that the girl was emotionally unstable, that she had any incentive to implicate the defendant falsely, or that she had been pressured in any way to make the identification.
At the trial appellant rested his defense on the testimony of his mother that he did not own a red-checked shirt such as the victim said her assailant wore, and testimony by the dry-cleaner who periodically cleaned his clothes that he did not remember any such clothing. As we have said, upon this appeal Thomas presents as his only point the contention that the prosecution lacked the corroborating evidence necessary in a case such as this.
Appellant argues that the Government failed to establish circumstances in proof that independently “point to the probable guilt of the accused, or, at least, corroborate indirectly the testimony of the prosecutrix.” He points out that this standard, first announced in Kidwell v. United States, generally requires corroboration of both the corpus delicti and the identification of the attacker.
The need for corroboration depends upon the danger of falsification. The “danger of an erroneous identification in a rape case is not of the same magnitude as the danger of a fabricated rape”. And where, as here, (1) there is no dispute that a rape in fact occurred, (2) consent is not an issue, and (3) there is no evidence undermining the trustworthiness of the complaining witness, her identification “based on adequate opportunity to observe” may need no further corroboration.
This is not a case where the prosecutrix admittedly was unable to see the accused’s face fully during the assault and was uncertain at the time she made the original identification. Nor is it a case where the victim’s original description of her assailant did not fit the man whom she subsequently identified on a street corner while she was being driven by the police through certain neighborhoods in a random search for her attacker.
The circumstances in this case substantially minimize any danger of mistake or falsification in the girl’s identification. There is no dispute that the victim was attacked. And her description of the event was supported by her prompt report, the condition of her clothing, the welts on her neck, and her reported emotional condition. Nothing appears which casts doubt upon her testimony that she had abundant and unfettered opportunity to observe the accused prior to the crime, and she positively identified him the day following the crime. Her good character and credibility were unscathed by rigorous and extensive cross-examination.
We think the facts here presented were sufficient to send the case to the jury.
Affirmed.
. D.C.Code § 22-2801 (1961).
. He appeals specifically from the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment made after a prior trial on this charge ended in a hung jury; from the denial of his motion for a directed acquittal made at the close of the Government’s case; and from the denial of his motion for a new trial or in the alternative for a judgment n. o. v. made following the verdict.
. Kidwell v. United States, 38 App.D.C. 560, 573 (1912); Ewing v. United States, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 10-17, 135 F.2d 633, 635-636 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 776, 63 S.Ct. 829, 87 L.Ed. 1147 (1943) ; Roberts v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 75, 284 F.2d 209 (1960). See 62 Yale L.J. 55 (1952).
. 38 App.D.C. 566 (1912).
. Walker v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 148, 223 F.2d 613 (1955); Franklin v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 330 F.2d 205 (1964).
. Franklin v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 334, 330 F.2d 205, 208 (1904).
. Id. at 335, 330 F.2d at 209.
. McKenzie v. United States, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 126 F.2d 533 (1942).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1