What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Milton ABRAMSON, Appellant, v. The COUNCIL BLUFFS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees. Milton ABRAMSON, Appellant, v. COUNCIL BLUFFS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee. Milton ABRAMSON, Appellee, v. The COUNCIL BLUFFS COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants.
Nos. 86-1125, 86-1168.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 14, 1986.
Decided Jan. 26, 1987.
David T. Siegel, Omaha, Neb., for appellant.
Becky S. Knutson, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and NICHOL, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Fred J. Nichol, United States Senior District Judge, District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge
Milton Abramson appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his claims filed under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found that a prior administrative adjudication that appellant was dismissed from his teaching position for cause barred him from relitigating that issue under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Appellant was hired by the Council Bluffs Community School District as a teacher in November of 1978. On February 2, 1983 appellant filed Charges of Discrimination with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, the City of Council Bluffs Human Relations Department, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against appellees Council Bluffs Education Association and the School District. Area Education Agency 13 was added as a respondent in the Charges of Discrimination on April 13, 1983. Appellant claimed discrimination on the basis of his religion and retaliatory harassment stemming from a 1981 lawsuit brought by the appellant against the School District which successfully challenged the ordering of involuntary prayer in public schools.
Appellant received a letter on March 9, 1983 notifying him that the Superintendent of Schools would recommend to the Board of Education that he be terminated effective June 3, 1983. On April 5, 1983 appellant amended his charge of discrimination to include an allegation that his employment was being terminated on the basis of his religion.
Appellant invoked administrative review procedures, Iowa Code §§ 279.15 — 270.18, and the Board of Directors of the School District conducted a hearing on May 6, 7, 11 and 18. Appellant was represented by counsel at the hearing and had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him and to produce witnesses on his behalf. The Board of Directors voted unanimously to terminate appellant on June 14, 1983. Appellant appealed the Board’s determination to an adjudicator, Iowa Code § 279.17, who upheld the Board’s decision. Appellant did not seek further review to the state district courts available under the statutory scheme. Iowa Code § 279.18.
Appellant obtained a Letter of Right to Sue from the EEOC on November 7, 1983 and filed his first complaints in the United States District Court. The cases were consolidated by the district court. On September 13, 1984 appellant filed an amended complaint which added numerous individual defendants who had not been included in his Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC.
In April of 1985 all of the defendants filed motions to dismiss. Those motions were granted because the district court concluded that under the doctrine of issue preclusion the administrative determination that appellant’s dismissal was for just cause barred the relitigation of that issue in federal court. See Gear v. City of Des Moines, 514 F.Supp. 1218, 1222 (S.D.Iowa 1981).
Subsequent to the district court’s dismissal, the United States Supreme Court has resolved the question of the preclusionary effect of an unreviewed administrative proceeding in University of Tennessee v. Elliott, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). Issues in Title VII claims are not subject to preclusion by unreviewed state administrative proceedings. Elliott, 106 S.Ct. at 3225. Appellant did not seek further review in the state courts. Thus, under Elliott he is entitled to trial of his Title VII claim.
Unreviewed administrative proceedings may, however, have preclusive effect on claims based on the Reconstruction civil rights statutes including § 1983. With regard to these claims the Supreme Court held
that when a state agency “acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” ... federal courts must give the agency’s factfinding the same preclusive. effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts.
Elliott, 106 S.Ct. at 3227 (citation omitted).
Our decision on the preclusive effect of the administrative factfinding is dictated by Yancy v. McDevitt, 802 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir.1986). In Yancy another panel of this court determined that the Iowa courts would give the school board’s decision preclusive effect. Id. at 1030. Accordingly, that portion of the district court’s order dismissing Abramson’s § 1983 action is affirmed.
In partial support of the district court’s dismissal, the appellees also raise two jurisdictional grounds. The district court did not address the jurisdictional arguments in its order. First, the various organization appellees contend that the court lacks jurisdiction in a Title VII action over its individual members named in appellant’s amended complaint because the individuals were not included in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the EEOC. In certain instances it is unnecessary to name each proposed defendant as a respondent in the EEOC charge. Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 251-52 (3d Cir.1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. G.C. Murphy Co., 451 U.S. 935, 101 S.Ct. 2013, 68 L.Ed.2d 321 (1981). The parties dispute the outcome of the four-part Glus test in determining jurisdiction over the unnamed parties. This court declines to decide the issue on the present record. Whether the Glus exception is satisfied is best left for the district court’s determination in the first instance.
The second jurisdictional challenge is made by the Council Bluffs Education Association. The Association contends that it is not a labor organization as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d). The Association’s sole contention in this regard is that it is not “engaged in an industry affecting commerce.” Id. Here again, in the absence of some expression from the district court, we decline to decide this mixed question of law and fact on the record now before this court.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. Non-preclusion of Title VII claims by unreviewed state agency decisions was the rule in the Eighth Circuit before Elliott. See Heath v. John Morrell & Co., 768 F.2d 245, 248 (8th Cir.1985). A different result may attach when judicial review of the administrative decision has been sought in state court. See Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1899, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982).

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99