What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In the Matter of GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS “OPERATION GATEWAY” Appeal of James Charles DUGAN.
No. 86-2705.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 7, 1988.
Decided Feb. 8, 1988.
Patrick B. Mathis, Mathis, Marifian & Richter, Ltd., Belleville, Ill., for petitioner.
William A. Whitledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Before FLAUM, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge.
In March of 1981 the district court issued an order under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) authorizing disclosure of grand jury materials in appellant’s case to the Internal Revenue Service. After reviewing the disclosed information, the IRS issued a statutory notice of deficiency to appellant for his 1978 and 1979 tax payments. Appellant contested the deficiency, and his case is now pending before the United States Tax Court. In August of 1986, after the Tax Court denied appellant’s motions to suppress the grand jury evidence, appellant sought to prevent the government from using the materials by asking the district court to vacate its 1981 disclosure order. The district court denied appellant’s motion and he appeals. Because the only issue appellant raised before the district court is controlled by our decision in In re Disclosure of Grand Jury Material, Basic Earth Science Systems, Inc., 821 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir.1987), we affirm.
I.
In 1980, a grand jury began investigating James Charles Dugan in connection with the drug smuggling activities of an organization known as “the Company.” On March 17, 1981, pursuant to an ex parte government motion, the district court permitted disclosure to the IRS of the grand jury records and testimony. The IRS determined that Dugan had underpaid his 1978 and 1979 tax liability, and issued a statutory notice of deficiency on March 4, 1983. Dugan filed motions with the United States Tax Court on June 3, 1983 contesting the deficiencies.
On June 30, 1983, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases limiting the scope of disclosure under Rule 6(e). In United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 3164, 77 L.Ed.2d 785 (1983), the Court held that Rule 6(e) does not allow disclosure of grand jury materials for use in an investigation to determine civil tax liability. In United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983), the Court held that the government must make a showing of “particularized need” in order to obtain disclosure of grand jury materials. Arguing that these decisions should have retroactive effect, Dugan asked the Tax Court to suppress the disclosed evidence. The Tax Court, citing its ruling in Kluger v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 309 (1984) that Baggot and Sells should not be applied retroactively, denied the motion. Dugan v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. 586 (1985). After failing to persuade the Tax Court to prevent the IRS from using the grand jury materials, Dugan then made the identical argument to the district court: that the disclosure order must be vacated by retroactive application of Baggot and Sells. The district court denied the motion without explanation on September 19, 1986. Dugan now argues on appeal that the disclosure order only authorized use of the grand jury materials in a civil investigation (not in tax court proceedings), and that equitable considerations require that the order be vacated.
II.
Two months before the parties filed their briefs on appeal, this court decided in Basic Earth Science that retroactivity analysis is not applicable to Rule 6(e) orders which became final prior to June 30, 1983, when the Supreme Court decided Baggot and Sells. The district court's Rule 6(e) order in this case is final and binding. Appellant’s only appropriate remedy, therefore, is an independent action in equity to challenge the final order. Basic Earth Science, 821 F.2d at 1293 n. 4. A movant seeking equitable relief from such an order may prevail only by bearing the substantial burden of showing “exceptional circumstances.”
Dugan argued to the district court only that Baggot and Sells should apply retroactively to the disclosure order in his case. That argument was squarely rejected by our decision in Basic Earth Science. Du-gan raised no other grounds before the district court, and has therefore waived the other arguments he seeks to advance on appeal. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed. Nothing in Basic Earth Science, however, prevents Dugan from asking the district court to rule on whether the IRS is exceeding the scope of the order by seeking to use the materials in the Tax Court proceedings. Dugan may also try to convince the district court that exceptional circumstances require that the order be modified or vacated.
. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) reads, in relevant part,
Rule 6. The Grand Jury
(e) Recording and Disclosure of Proceedings.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
(3) Exceptions.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made—
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
. The disclosure order read:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, on this date [March 17,1981] that the records and testimony occurring before the Grand Jury of this District, entitled "Operation Gateway”, may be disclosed to and made available for inspection and use by Revenue Agents of the Springfield Division of the Internal Revenue Service, and their supervisors and clerical support personnel, for purposes of conducting a civil investigation, for tax purposes, of James Charles Dugan.
. The Baggot Court held that an audit to determine civil tax liability is not "preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(C)(i). 463 U.S. at 477, 480, 103 S.Ct. at 3167.
. The Tax Court certified its order for interlocutory appeal under § 7483 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This court denied Dugan’s petition for permission to appeal the Tax Court’s ruling on June 16, 1987. Dugan v. Commissioner, 7th Cir.Misc.No. 87-8029.
. The district court’s order became final despite the fact that the government’s ex parte disclosure motion did not afford appellant the opportunity for intervention and appeal. See Basic Earth Science, 821 F.2d at 1293 n. 4.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0