What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oscar VILLALON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 79-5162
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 2, 1979.
Anthony G. McGettrick, Corpus Christi, Tex. (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.
James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before COLEMAN, PAY and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.
Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 5th Cir. R. 18.
PER CURIAM:
Oscar Villalon contends that his conviction of possession with intent to distribute 195 pounds of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) should be reversed because the district court did not dismiss the indictment after it was shown that the government had destroyed four suitcases that contained the marijuana; that the search in which the marijuana was found was illegal; because the court refused to give a requested jury instruction; and because the evidence was insufficient to show his knowledge that the car which he was driving contained marijuana. We find all four contentions without merit.
In the early morning of September 28, 1978, Villalon and a passenger in the car were stopped at the Sarita, Texas checkpoint by a Border Patrol officer for an inquiry about their citizenship. While questioning the men, the officer noticed two shock absorbers in the back seat. Because smugglers often exchange standard shock absorbers for air shocks to prevent the car from riding low, the agent asked to check the trunk. In the trunk were three large vinyl suitcases which felt hard to the agent. Villalon claimed that there were clothes in the suitcases but that he did not know whose clothes they were. When the agent opened one suitcase, he found bricks of marijuana wrapped in tin foil. After arresting Villalon and his passenger, the agent found marijuana in the other two suitcases, as well as in another small suitcase on the back seat and in cigarettes in a package in the front seat area. Later, the suitcases were destroyed by the government in accordance with its policy of disposing of contraband; however, this was done before rather than after the trial.
At trial, Villalon claimed he did not know that the suitcases contained marijuana. He testified that he had been paid $100 by an unknown person to whom he had talked on a pay telephone to drive the car north and that he suspected only that the car might be stolen.
I.
The destruction of the four suitcases is not fatal to the prosecution. It is not shown how either in fact or in theory the defendant was prejudiced by this event. Considered as evidence, the suitcases themselves were neither favorable nor material to the defense. See Brady v. Maryland, 1963, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; United States v. Delk, 5 Cir. 1978, 586 F.2d 513, 518. Even if they are considered potentially favorable, the omission of evidence does not warrant reversal unless its production would have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. See United States v. Agurs, 1976, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 355; United States v. Brown, 5 Cir. 1978, 574 F.2d 1274, cert. denied, 1978, 439 U.S. 1046, 99 S.Ct. 720, 58 L.Ed.2d 704; United States v. Anderson, 5 Cir. 1978, 574 F.2d 1347. Villalon does not deny that the suitcases contained marijuana, and it is difficult to understand how the empty containers were material or favorable to the defense or would have created a reasonable doubt about his guilt.
II.
Conceding that the Border Patrol agent justifiably opened the trunk, Villalon contends that the agent was not justified in opening the suitcases because he lacked probable cause. This argument, too, must fail.
There is no doubt that the agent had the right to stop the car and to inquire about Villalon’s citizenship. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 1976, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116. It was also permissible for the agent to look inside the trunk for aliens. See United States v. Thompson, 5 Cir. 1973, 475, F.2d 1359. And because the Sarita checkpoint is the functional equivalent of the border, United States v. Reyna, 5 Cir. 1978, 572 F.2d 515, 518, cert. denied 1978, 439 U.S. 871, 99 S.Ct. 203, 58 L.Ed.2d 183, a search of the car was permissible without probable cause, and, indeed, even without suspicious circumstances, United States v. Flores, 5 Cir. 1979, 594 F.2d 439. Nonetheless, the sight of the shock absorbers provided reasonable suspicion in light of the agent’s knowledge that air shock absorbers are often used in smuggling contraband, as did the palpable hardness of the contents of the suitcases. Therefore, under the agent’s dual role as an immigration officer and a customs officer, he was entitled to search the suitcases.
III.
The requested jury instruction concerning knowledge was more in the nature of an argument on the facts than a charge, and the district court adequately instructed the jury on the element of knowledge. See United States v. Barham, 5 Cir. 1979, 595 F.2d 231, 245.
IV.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in support of the jury verdict, United States v. Houde, 5 Cir. 1979, 596 F.2d 696, 701-02, the evidence was sufficient to warrant conviction. Furthermore, although Villalon denied knowledge that the car contained marijuana, he did testify that he thought the car was stolen, acknowledging that he was aware of suspicious circumstances surrounding the mission. In this situation, deliberate ignorance suffices for knowledge for purposes of conviction under § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Meneses-Davila, 5 Cir. 1978, 580 F.2d 888; United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 5 Cir. 1978, 575 F.2d 524, cert. denied 1978, 439 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 331, 58 L.Ed.2d 332.
V.
Because we find no merit in any of the appellant’s contentions, the conviction is AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1