What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
BETH ISRAEL HOSPITAL AND GERIATRIC CENTER, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, and Beth Israel Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals AFT/FNHP, CFT, AFL-CIO, Intervenor. ST. ANTHONY HOSPITAL SYSTEMS, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, and St. Anthony’s Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals, Intervenor.
Nos. 80-1942, 80-1968.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 13, 1982.
Certiorari Dismissed Nov. 23, 1982.
See 103 S.Ct. 433.
Earl K. Madsen of Bradley, Campbell & Carney, Golden, Colo., for St. Anthony Hosp. Systems.
John D. Coombe, Denver, Colo. (John M. Husband and Jeffrey T. Johnson, Denver, Colo., with him on the brief) of Holland & Hart, Denver, Colo., for Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center.
John H. Ferguson, Attorney, Washington, D. C. (William A. Lubbers, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Gen. Counsel, Robert E. Allen, Associate Gen. Counsel, and Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., with him on the briefs), for the N. L. R. B.
Michael Radzilowsky, Chicago, 111. (Lawrence A. Poltrock and Gregory N. Freerksen, Chicago, 111., also of DeJong, Poltrock & Giampietro, Chicago, 111., Laurence Gold, Washington, D. C., Marsha S. Berzon and Michael Rubin of Altshuler & Berzon, San Francisco, Cal., with him on the brief), for intervenor Unions and amicus AFL-CIO.
Clifton L. Elliott and Gina Kaiser of Elliott, Kaiser & Freeman, Kansas City, Mo., filed a brief for amicus American Hosp. Ass’n.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY, McWILLIAMS, BARRETT, McKAY, LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
Honorable William E. Doyle, Circuit Judge, did not participate in the disposition of these cases.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
Upon the petition of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), this Court granted en banc rehearing of these eases limited to reconsideration of the statements in the panel opinions that the NLRB’s use of presumptions violated the mandate of Federal Rule of Evidence 301. See Beth Israel Hospital and Geriatric Center v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1981); St. Anthony Hospital Systems v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981). Since the language the NLRB objects to originated in an opinion entered earlier, Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981), what is said here necessarily affects the authority of that decision. The en banc court now reaffirms the dispositions in the prior panel opinions, but modifies them by eliminating their reliance upon Federal Rule of Evidence 301.
The Beth Israel and St. Anthony panel opinions hold that the NLRB cannot employ a presumption of appropriateness when certifying a bargaining unit in health care institutions — -reasoning that to do so would contravene Congress’ admonition to avoid undue proliferation of health care bargaining units. Instead, the NLRB must determine whether a unit is appropriate without resorting to a presumption that shifts to the employer the burden of showing the proffered unit is inappropriate, and the NLRB must state why the unit it chooses complies with Congress’ admonition. This is not intended to be an onerous burden. The NLRB’s certification of bargaining units consisting solely of registered nurses may be entirely proper and within its discretion, but only if the NLRB states why establishing these units will not lead to undue proliferation at those health care facilities. See, e.g., Bay Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1978). The NLRB cannot rely solely on the employer’s failure to show that the units are inappropriate.
Our need to alter the two opinions arises only because they repeat a justification given in our prior decision, Presbyterian/St. Luke’s Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981), finding impermissible the NLRB’s use of a presumption of appropriateness when certifying a health care bargaining unit. That decision not only relies on the NLRB’s need to comply with Congress’ admonition, but declares that by relying ón a presumption the NLRB violated the statutory requirement of following the Federal Rules of Evidence at unfair labor practice proceedings so far as practicable. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The panel in Presbyterian/St. Luke’s reasoned that because Federal Rule of Evidence 301 forbids the use of a presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion, the NLRB violates Rule 301 when at the representation proceeding it invokes the presumption and shifts to the employer the burden of showing the proposed unit is inappropriate, and then at the unfair labor practice hearing refuses to relitigate the issue of the appropriate bargaining unit.
Because Presbyterian/St. Luke’s, which is not before us in this en banc hearing, indicates that the NLRB, when certifying bargaining units in the health care or any other field, cannot employ a presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer, we cannot simply delete references to Rule 301 in the two subsequent opinions and leave the issue to be decided another day. That would not eliminate the statements in Presbyterian/St. Luke’s and would confuse whether its reasoning would be binding on future panels of this Court. Therefore, we decide the issue to eliminate the confusion.
Turning to the merits, we observe that Congress limited its directive that the NLRB follow the Federal Rules of Evidence to unfair labor practice proceedings; its discussion of representation proceedings says nothing about following the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1), 160(b). There is good reason for this. A representation proceeding is intended to be informal and nonadversarial.
“Obviously great latitude concerning procedural details is contemplated. Requirements of formality and rigidity are altogether lacking. The notice must be ‘due,’ the hearing ‘appropriate.’ These requirements are related to the character of the proceeding of which the hearing is only a part. That proceeding is not technical. It is an ‘investigation,’ essentially informal, not adversary. The investigation is not required to take any particular form or confined to the hearing.”
Inland Empire District Council, Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 706, 65 S.Ct. 1316, 1321, 89 L.Ed. 1877 (1945). The NLRB’s Regional Director may even consider information that is outside the record. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348-49, 73 S.Ct. 287, 289-90, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953); Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 887, 75 S.Ct. 207, 99 L.Ed. 697 (1954).
On the question of which unit is appropriate for bargaining purposes, the NLRB has no burden of persuasion that might be shifted by use of a presumption. Rather, the NLRB relies on its expertise and experience in a particular industry or organizational structure to decide the composition of a bargaining unit.
Judicial review of the NLRB’s choice of a bargaining unit is restricted to whether it was arbitrary and without substantial support. E.g., Daylight Grocery Co. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 905, 908 (11th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Gold Spot Dairy, Inc., 432 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1970). Unless Congress has given the NLRB a specific directive, as it has in the health care industry, the courts should defer to the NLRB’s exercise of expertise and discretion — including decisions it bases on presumptions drawn from past experience — so long as when challenged the NLRB provides substantial support for its decision and shows it was not arbitrary. If the certified unit is an appropriate one the NLRB has not abused its discretion, even if the employer shows another unit was more appropriate. Daylight Grocery Co., 678. F.2d at 908; NLRB v. Fuelgas Co., 674 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 444 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Amoco Production Co. v. NLRB, 404 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 287, 30 L.Ed.2d 255 (1971). Outside the health care area, not allowing the NLRB to presume, based on its past experience, that a particular unit is appropriate would depart from the holdings of the other circuits that have considered the issue. See NLRB v. J. W. Mays, Inc., 675 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1982); Alaska Statebank v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981); Big Y Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 40, 45-46 (1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co., 413 F.2d 117, 118 n.5 (3d Cir. 1969); cf. Magic Pan, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1980) (mentioning NLRB’s use of presumption and not disapproving); Prudential Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975, 96 S.Ct. 2176, 48 L.Ed.2d 799 (1976) (mentioning NLRB’s use of presumption and not disapproving).
Thus, in the face of congressional silence, we do not infer that Congress intended the NLRB to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence at the informal, nonadversarial representation proceedings. See Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn and Queens, Inc. v. NLRB, 589 F.2d 1166, 1170 n.4 (2d Cir. 1978) (NLRB “probably” need not follow rules of evidence at representation proceedings); Riverside Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912, 90 S.Ct. 915, 25 L.Ed.2d 94 (1970) (rules of evidence “not controlling” at representation proceeding). It would be particularly inappropriate to impose on the NLRB a burden of proof to be met every time it wants to certify a bargaining unit. To do so would conflict with the deference we give the NLRB and would make labor organizational efforts more difficult than Congress intended.
The instant case differs from other bargaining unit determinations only because it involves unions in health care institutions. As we noted in Presbyterian/St. Luke's, 653 F.2d at 453, Congress directed the NLRB to justify more rigorously its bargaining unit determinations in the health care field because it feared frequent strikes that would close hospitals and increases in the cost of medical care through wage “leapfrogging” and “whipsawing” if hospital employees were represented by many different unions. See Bay Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1978). Thus, in the instant cases, when the NLRB applied its traditional presumption approach and certified the nurses’ unit without stating how its determination complied with Congress’ admonition, it abused its discretion. Accord Mary Thompson Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1980) (stationary engineers unit); NLRB v. Mercy Hospital Association, 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979) (maintenance employees unit), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 971, 100 S.Ct. 1665, 64 L.Ed.2d 248 (1980); NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979) (nurses unit); NLRB v. West Suburban Hospital, 570 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978) (maintenance employees unit); St. Vincent’s Hospital v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977) (boiler room employees unit); see also Bay Medical Center, 588 F.2d 1174 (approving unit of “technical employees” when NLRB expressly considered Congress’ admonition).
If the employees vote for union representation, but the employer refuses to bargain with the certified unit, the employer may be charged with an unfair labor practice. At that proceeding, the NLRB’s general counsel need not prove that the unit chosen at the representation hearing was appropriate by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court has held that the NLRB need not reconsider at the unfair labor practice proceeding any issue it previously decided at the representation hearing. Magnesium Casting Co. v. NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 141-42, 91 S.Ct. 599, 601-02, 27 L.Ed.2d 735 (1971). If the NLRB declines to redetermine whether an appropriate unit was selected, then that issue is not addressed at the unfair labor practice proceeding; thus Federal Rule of Evidence 301 would not apply and the employer could challenge the unit selection only through judicial review in the circuit court. Whether redetermined or not, unit selection remains a matter of agency discretion and expertise, unlike factual questions that must be resolved at the unfair labor practice proceeding, on which the circuits presently are split as to whether the NLRB’s prima facie case shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer. See Bed Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, (1982), -U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 2282, 73 L.Ed.2d 1293 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, setting forth conflict between circuits). The question at issue in Red Ball is not before us.
Since this modification does not alter the disposition on the merits in the cases before us, the remand to the NLRB ordered in the panel opinions is reaffirmed. It is so ordered.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2