What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DIKEMAN et al. v. JEWEL GOLD MINING CO. et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
June 14, 1926.)
No. 4829.
Execution @=»302.
Under Alaska Statute, execution sale of property of lessor to satisfy specific liens against it-held to exhaust such liens, and after redemption of property 'by lessee it was not subject to resale to satisfy same demands.
Appeal from the- District Court of the United States for the Third Division of the Territory of Alaska; E. E. Ritchie, Judge.
Action by J. M.' Dikeman and others against the Jewel Gold Mining Company and others. From an order denying a petition for resale of property of the named defendant to satisfy certain claims, plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
See, also, 2 F.(2d) 665.
Arthur Frame and. Jas. S. Truitt, both of Anchorage, Alaska, and Walter Christie, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellants.
W. H. Rager, of Anchorage, Alaska, for appellee Jewel Gold Mining Co.
Before GILBERT, HUNT, and RUD-KIN, Circuit Judges.
RUDKIN, Circuit Judge.
This case was
before this-court on writ of error in Dikeman v. Jewel Gold Mining Co., 2 F.(2d) 665, where a full, statement of the facts may be found. After the writ of error was there dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs in the court below petitioned that court for an order directing a resale of the property of the Jewel Gold Mining Company, the lessor, to satisfy the balance due on the personal decrees against the lessee. The present appeal is from an order denying that petition. As will appear from the statement referred to, personal decrees were entered in favor of the several plaintiffs and against the lessee, Jewel Mining Syndicate, but no relief was awarded against the lessor, Jewel Gold Mining Company, beyond a decree establishing certain liens against its property and directing a sale thereof to satisfy them.
Briefly stated, the appellants now contend that the redemption by the lessee reinstated their liens against the property of the lessor, and the property should be resold to satisfy those liens. On the other hand, the appellees contend that the liens against the property of the lessor were exhausted by the sale, and that the same property cannot be resold to satisfy the same demands, even though there has been a redemption from the prior sale. This latter contention must be sustained. As is well known, the Alaska statute was taken from the laws of Oregon, and both sides invoke the construction placed on the laws of Oregon by its Supreme Court. In Flanders v. Aumack, 32 Or. 19, 51 P. 447, 67 Am. St. Rep. 504, it was held that the redemption of real property from an execution sale by the grantee of the judgment debtor, when the property was bid in for less than the amount of the judgment, reinstates the lien.for the unpaid balance, and a resale of the property may be had to satisfy the same. But the court was careful to distinguish between specific liens and general judgment liens. Thus, it was said:
“A mortgage is a specific lien, which attaches by virtue of the contract of the parties concerned; but the lien of a judgment is general, and attaches by operation of law, as a sequence of its rendition. Foreclosure is a remedy by which the property covered by the mortgage may be subjected to sale for the payment of the demand for which the mortgage stands as security, and, when the decree is had and the property sold to satisfy it, the mortgagee has obtained all he contracted for; but, if there is also a personal decree against the mortgage debtor, this becomes, from the date of its docketing, a general.lien upon his real property, as in ease of a judgment; and, if a deficiency remains after the; application of the proceeds of the sale of the lands covered by the mortgage, the decree may be enforced by execution, as in ordinary cases. * * • The resale does not take place under the order for the sale of the specific property covered by the mortgage lien, for that has been exhausted, but under the personal decree which remains as a deficiency decree against the mortgage debtor after the application of the proceeds arising under the order of sale; and a redemption will not reinstate the specific mortgage lien, while it will the general lien acquired by the personal decree. This distinction is clear, and is bottomed both upon principle and authority. The redemption is from the sale, and not from the mortgage; and if the lien of the personal decree has never attached, by reason of the mortgagor not having the fee of the property at the time it was rendered, there never existed any lien to be reinstated against his successor in interest, who purchased prior to the decree.”
See, also, Williams v. Wilson, 42 Or. 299, 70 P. 1031, 95 Am. St. Rep. 745.
It will thus be seen that, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Oregon, the specific liens against the property of the lessor were exhausted by the sale, and were not reinstated by the subsequent redemption.
The decree is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99