What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
PARKS v. UNITED STATES.
No. 7666.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 17, 1935.
W. O. Cooper, Jr., of Macon, Ga., for appellant.
T. Hoyt Davis, U. S. Atty., and A. Edward Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Macon, Ga.
Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denied May 31, 1935.f
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was convicted upon four counts of an indictment charging: (1) The unlawful sale of distilled spirits in an unstamped container; (2) the concealment of tax unpaid liquor, with intent to defraud the United States; (3) carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer without having paid the special tax; (4) possession of distilled spirits, the immediate container of which was not stamped. He was sentenced not separately upon each count, but generally, to a term of two years in the penitentiary. He appeals, making only one claim of error, that his motion for the suppression and exclusion of evidence obtained by a search of his premises] was wrongfully overruled.
It is contended on the motion that having entered appellant’s premises by authority not of a search warrant, but of a warrant of arrest, the officers thereafter by an unreasonable exploratory search and seizure obtained the evidences of guilt on which he • was convicted. The government offered abundant and uncontradicted evidence establishing appellant’s guilt ón each count. Appellant offered no evidence. He relied entirely on his motion to suppress and exclude.
It is a complete answer to appellant’s claim that the judgment should be reversed to point out that his sentence was no greater than could have been imposed on him on the first count, and that on this count conviction was obtained upon uncontradicted evidence, including that of the purchaser obtained wholly independent of the actions complained of in the motion to suppress. Shelton v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 69 F.(2d) 223. A further answer to the claim of prejudicial error is to be found in the uncontradicted evidence of the officers, that before they entered the house to arrest appellant they had seen him and his codefendant making trips from the house, carrying illicit whisky into the woods, and that they found a large quantity of this whisky they testified' to finding in an open field and not on his inclosed premises. Hester v. U. S., 265 U. S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898.
But the overruling of the motion was not error. The situation existing at and before the arrest, the illicit sale which the officers knew of, the carrying of the liquor out of the house and into the thicket in their presence, the arrest of the defendant, his breaking away and running into the house for concealment, the fact _that the officers - had to search through the house to find him hidden there, and the further fact that when they went into the yard the smell of liquor was heavy on the air, entitled them to follow the evidences of their senses, and uncover the whisky appellant had hidden in his yard. McBride v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 284 F. 416; Marron v. U. S., 275 U. S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231; Agnello v. U. S., 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A. L. R. 409; Benton v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 28 F.(2d) 695.
The cases relied on by appellant, Taylor v. U. S., 286 U. S. 1, 52 S. Ct. 466, 76 L. Ed. 951; Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28, 47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520; Go-Bart Imp. Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344, 356, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374; U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877, 82 A. L. R. 775, are not in point. In the Taylor Case the officers entered a dwelling house with no warrant except that they smelled whisky there; they had neither search warrant nor warrant of arrest, searches in connection with a lawful arrest were expressly distinguished. In Byars’ Case as in Taylor’s, the entry was illegal, in Taylor’s because they had no warrant, in Byars’’ because the warrant was invalid. -In the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz Cases what was seized was not contraband or instruments of crime, but papers. Papers, as it was pointed out in the Lefkowitz Case, which could not have been seized even under a valid search warrant. All of these cases, as well as those on which the government relies, make it clear that no general rule to which all cases must conform has been or may be laid down as to what is the unreasonable search forbidden by the Constitution (Amend. 4). Each case must be determined in accordance with general principles, upon its own facts. It is sufficient to say of this case, that it is quite clear that no unreasonable search such as the Constitution forbids, went on. The judgment is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0