What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Herbert A. ELLENBOGEN, Appellant.
No. 266, Docket 29120.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Dec. 17, 1964.
Decided Feb. 25, 1965.
Michael S. Fawer, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., for Southern Dist. of New York, on the brief), (Charles A. Stillman, Asst. U. S. Atty., of counsel), for appellee.
Herbert A. Ellenbogen, appellant, pro se.
Before FRIENDLY, HAYS and MARSHALL, Circuit Judges.
MARSHALL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment of conviction entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after a trial without a jury. Appellant was found guilty of bribing an employee of the General Services Administration [GSA] in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201, and of conspiring to commit similar offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The co-defendant, the employee of GSA, pleaded guilty prior to trial and was the principal witness for the Government. Appellant, who was represented by retained counsel at trial, appeals pro se.
Because of the narrow ground requiring reversal we will not set forth the facts involved other than to comment that there was convincing evidence of the payment of money by appellant to the purchasing agent of GSA during the period he was giving information to appellant so that appellant could appear to make legitimate lower bids on certain purchasing contracts. During the Government’s examination of the purchasing agent, Samuel J. DiChellis, the following took place:
“Q. Did this practice about your talking to him about the bids continue throughout the time from the fall of 1960, when it first occurred, right to the time when you resigned? A. To the time of my resignation in May of 1962.
“Q. Mr. DiChellis, did you ever provide any type of information to other bidds [sic] on class 81 items ?
A. No.
“Q. How about class 93 items?
A. Yes. Well, it would be the same. 93 would be—
“Q. I will clarify it.
“Did you ever reveal this type of information to other bidders on class 81 and class 93 items? A. No.
* * * *
“Q. Did you have occasion to give this information to other bidders on class 81 and class 93 items?
A. No.”
At the close of the Government’s case, appellant’s attorney requested copies of all prior statements by the witness. The Government produced several statements and gave them to appellant’s attorney. One statement, contained in Government’s Exhibits 38 and 38-A for identification, was submitted to the trial judge, examined by him and ordered sealed after he ruled: “I find 38 up to this point does not deal with this case and will be ordered sealed. 38 and 38-A, pages 3 through 12 will be ordered sealed because it doesn’t have anything to do with this case.”
An examination of Government’s Exhibits 38 and 38-A for identification reveals that it is an FBI report containing a signed sworn statement of the witness in which he explained in detail his similar unlawful dealings with other bidders. This is a “statement” within the meaning of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which requires the production of “any statement * * * of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” There could be no doubt that the statement the Government possessed but re-
fused to produce related to DiChellis’ direct testimony quoted above. The Government examined DiChellis on the point of other dealings and therefore it should have turned over the statement to defendant’s counsel for purposes of cross-examination. “Due process is afforded defendants under the Jencks statute by the provision that there should be available for cross-examination of government witnesses any documents which contain recitals substantially in the words of the witness.” United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 674 (2 Cir.
1959) . Given that the statement “relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified,” and that defendant insisted upon having the statement produced, the statute leaves no room for the trial judge, nor for us, to speculate as to how useful this statement will be for purposes of cross-examination or how important such cross-examination will be to defendant’s case, cf. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391-392 (2 Cir. 1964). The Government relies on general language in two other opinions of this Circuit, United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822, 84 S.Ct. 60, 11 L. Ed.2d 55 (1963) and United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490 (2 Cir. 1964). On the contrary, both of these cases expressly recognize the principle that prior statements that relate “generally to the events and activities testified to” must be produced. 316 F.2d at 615; 337 F. 2d at 497.
In reversing this conviction we echo the late Judge Clark’s regret: “[I]t is perhaps doubly unfortunate that this must occur because of the reluctance of the prosecutor and the trial court to accept the policy of yielding pre-trial statements of prosecution witnesses to the defense * * United States v. Tomaiolo, 280 F.2d 411, 412 (2 Cir. 1960) . See also United States v. Borelli, supra, 336 F.2d at 393.
Reversed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2