What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".

Opinion:
ALASKA CONSOL. CANNERIES, Inc., et al. v. TERRITORY OF ALASKA.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
December 3, 1928.
No. 5431.
J. A. Hellenthal and S. Hellenthal, both of Juneau, Alaska, for plaintiffs in error.
John Rustgard, Atty. Gen., for the Territory of Alaska.
Before GILBERT, RUDKIN, and DIETRICH, Circuit Judges.
DIETRICH, Circuit Judge.
In February and March, 1923, the appellant companies took out several licenses to operate fish traps in Alaskan waters and paid as fees at the rate of $200 per trap, as was then required by the laws of the territory. On May 5, 1923, the Legislature passed an amendatory act (Laws Alaska 1923, e. 101) by which there was added to the $200 fee at the rate of $2 per 1,000 for all fish caught in any one trap in excess of 100,000, and by virtue of an emergency clause the act became immediately effective. Up to that time the appellants had caught no fish, but during the remainder of the calendar year they took in excess of 100,000 in each trap. They declined to make any further license payment, and this suit was brought to recover from them an amount arrived at by computing the excess catch at the rate of $2 per 1,000 as provided in the amendatory act. To an answer setting up certain legal defenses, a demurrer was sustained, and, the appellants declining to plead further, judgment was entered against them, from which they prosecute this appeal.
They first contend that the exaction is void, because it is essentially a property tax, and is not according to value, as required by the Organic Act of the territory. But we think it is an excise and not a property tax; we so held in Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. Territory of Alaska (C. C. A.) 236 F. 52. The slight differences between the law as it then stood and as now amended are inconsequential. See, also, Pacific American Fisheries v. Territory of Alaska (C. C. A.) 2 F.(2d) 9; Id., 269 U. S. 269, 46 S. Ct. 110, 70 L. Ed. 270, and Alaska Consolidated Canneries v. Territory of Alaska (C. C. A.) 16 F.(2d) 256.
It is also contended ' that by the amendatory act the Legislature did not intend that its provisions should apply where, prior to its passage, licenses had issued, and further that, if such was the intent, it cannot be given effect, for a license so issued constitutes a contract which the Legislature is without power to impair. Both contentions we think are ruled adversely by Alaska Consolidated Canneries v. Territory of Alaska, supra. The distinction attempted to be made by putting a strained construction upon the clause “where the taxes were not a fixed sum,” found in the latter part of that decision, is unsubstantial. In principle the two eases are the same, and the reasoning there employed is equally cogent here. To hold otherwise would be to say that only a contract, the obligations of which have been fully performed by the one party thereto, is protected against impairment.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?

Choices:
local
neither local nor national
national or multi-national
not ascertained

Answer: 3