What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
INTERSTATE OIL PIPE LINE CO. v. STONE, CHAIRMAN STATE TAX COMMISSION.
No. 287.
Argued January 13, 1949.
Decided June 20, 1949.
Phelan H. Hunter argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Villard Martin and Garrett Logan.
J. H. Sumrall argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee,
Mr. Justice Rutledge
announced the judgment of the Court and the following opinion, in which
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy join.
This appeal questions the power of Mississippi, as affected by the commerce clause, to impose a tax measured by gross receipts from the operation of a pipe line wholly within the state.
Appellant is a Delaware corporation which has qualified to do business in Mississippi as a foreign corporation. It owns and operates pipe lines which are used to transport oil from lease tanks in various oil fields in Mississippi to loading racks adjacent to railroads elsewhere in the state. From these racks the oil is pumped into railroad tank cars for shipment outside the state. If there are no tank cars available the oil is stored in tanks near the racks. But such delays in loading are usually of short duration and never exceed a week, according to appellant’s uncontradicted statement. ' When delivered to appellant the oil is accompanied by shipping orders from the producer or owner directing that the oil be transported to out-of-state destinations. There are no refineries in Mississippi. There is no through bill of lading from the point of origin at the fields to the destination outside the state. Appellant ships the oil by rail as agent of the owner on bills of lading showing the owner as shipper, the appellant as agent of the shipper, and indicating-the destination specified in the shipping orders issued to appellant. Appellant is paid by the producer at the rate per barrel specified in its tariff for transporting the oil from the gathering point to the rack, and is paid an additional- charge for loading the oil in the tank cars.
The chairman of the Mississippi State Tax Commission, appellee, levied a tax against appellant for the years 1944, 1945 and the first half of 1946, in the sum of $20,296.36, measured by appellant's receipts for transporting oil from the lease tanks to the railroad loading platforms, pursuant to the following sections of the Mississippi Code, Miss. Code, 1942, Ann., tit. 40, c. 3, § 10105, and § 10109 (1948 Cum. Supp.), which provide:-
“10105. . . . There is hereby levied and shall be collected annual privilege taxes, measured by the amount or volume of business done, against the persons, on account of the business activities, and in the amounts to be determined by the application of rates against values, or gross income, or gross proceeds of sales, as the case may be, as follows [see sections following]:''
“10109. . . . Upon every person engaging or continuing within-this state in the business of operating a pipe line for transporting for compensation or hire from one point to another in this state oil or natural gas or artificial gas through pipes or conduits in this state, there is likewise hereby levied and shall be collected a tax, on account of the business engaged in,- equal tó two per cent of the gross income of the business.
“There shall-be excepted from the gross income used in determining the measure- of the tax imposed in this section so much thereof as is derived from the business conducted in commerce between this state and other states of the United States, or between this state and foreign countries which the state of Mississippi is prohibited from taxing under the constitution of the United States of America. . .
The State Tax Commission sustained the assessment. The trial court dismissed a declaration seeking review of the Commission’s action. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed that judgment, overruling appellant’s contention that because the tax was levied on the privilege of conducting an interstate business and measured by gross receipts therefrom the tax could not be imposed without offending the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 203 Miss. 715, 35 So. 2d 73.
The state supreme court held that the operation of these pipe lines between points within the state was intrastate rather than interstate commerce, and that the tax was therefore “merely on the privilege of operating a pipe line wholly within this State as a local activity. ... a tax on the privilege of doing an intrastate business, and-measured by a percent of gross income as a matter of convenience.” 203 Miss, at 732, 35 So. 2d at 81.
Appellant contends that operation of the pipe lines between points in Mississippi was in fact interstate commerce, and that the tax was construed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi to be a tax on the privilege of operating the pipe lines. From these premises, together with the major premise that no state can tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, appellant concludes that the tax may not constitutionally be imposed.
We do not pause to consider whether the business of operating the intrastate pipe lines is interstate commerce, for, even if we assume that it is, Mississippi has power to impose the tax involved in this case. Further, we do not find it necessary to dispute that the Supreme Court of Mississippi construed the statute as imposing a tax on the privilege of operating a pipe line wholly within the state, and not a tax solely upon the “local activities of ‘maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities’ ” situated in Mississippi, Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 92-93, or upon the gross receipts themselves, Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U. S. 653. While we are of course bound by the construction given a state statute by the highest court of the State, we are concerned with the practical operation of challenged state tax statutes, not with their descriptive labels.
The statute is not invalidated by the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution merely because, unlike the statute attacked in Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, supra, it imposes a “direct” tax on the “privilege” of engaging in interstate commerce. Any notions to the contrary should not have survived Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 217, which flatly rules the case at bar. That case sustained a state statute which imposed upon an interstate railroad corporation “an annual excise tax [measured by,apportioned gross receipts], for the privilege of exercising its franchises in this State.” The Grand Trunk decision has been approved by this Court as recently as the other controlling case of Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, supra at 658, 663, in which the Court permitted New York to impose a tax on the gross receipts from the operation of an interstate bus line, provided that tax was apportioned according to mileage traveled within the state. The Mealey case is not distinguished by saying that it involved only a tax on gross receipts and not a tax on interstate commerce itself, for gross receipts táxes have long been regarded as “direct” in cases which are supposed to support the proposition that “direct” taxes on interstate commerce are invalid under the commerce clause.
Since all the activities upon which the tax is imposed are carried on in Mississippi, there is no due process objection to the tax. The tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of competing intrastate commerce of like character. The nature of the. subject of taxation makes apportionment unnecessary; there is no attempt to tax interstate' activity carried on outside Mississippi’s borders. No other state can repeat the tax. For these reasons the commerce clause does not invalidate this tax.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Appellant also gathers oil which is transported through the Mississippi pipe lines directly into interstate trunk lines, through which the oil is carried outside the state. Mississippi has not attempted to tax the receipts attributable to shipments of this kind.
All appellant’s transportation of oil in Mississippi is covered by-tariffs which are published and filed with the Interstate. Commerce Commission as required by the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, 49U.S.C. §§1 (1), 1 (3), and 6.
Other provisions of the Mississippi Code not here involved impose franchise, net income and ad valorem property tdxes, all of which appellant paid for the years involved. This fact does not of course preclude Mississippi from exacting a different tax for the protection upon which one or moré of these taxes is based'. E. g., Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 85.
Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U. S. 270, 273; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U. S. 509, 513.
International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 346, 347; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359, 363.
See concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 259.
Nothing in the Grand Trunk opinion suggests the explanation hazarded by Mr. Justice Holmes in Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 226, that the tax in the Grand Trunk case was sustained on the ground that it was imposed in lieu of ad valorem taxes. A copy of the statute reprinted in the margin of the Reports discloses that the tax was “in lieu of all taxes upon such railroad, its property and stock,” except that cities and towns were permitted to tax not only all buildings owned by the railroad but also railroad-., owned “lands and fixtures” outside the right of way. 142 U. S. 217-218, n. 1.
See the cases discussed in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255-257; concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 264 — 266. As the cited discussions point out, most of the cases invalidating ■ “direct” taxes on interstate commerce are explicable on the ground that the taxes were not fairly apportioned. But cf. the following cases, which involve apportioned franchise or privilege taxes measured by a standard other than gross receipts: Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555; Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203; cf. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218.
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 423-424; Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444-445; separate opinion in International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, 352-353; concurring opinion in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 271; concurring opinion in Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 96.
Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454; Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434.
Cf. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 439-440; Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311-312; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 255-257.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 116