What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
WHITAKER v. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY (MERRILL REESE, INC., REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
No. 94-7743.
Decided April 17, 1995
Per Curiam.
Pro se petitioner Fred Whitaker has filed a petition for writ of certiorari and requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. Pursuant to Rule 39.8, we deny petitioner’s request to proceed informa pauperis. Petitioner is allowed until May 8, 1995, to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court’s Rule 33. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.
Petitioner is a prolific filer in this Court. Since 1987, he has filed 24 petitions for relief, including 6 petitions for extraordinary relief and 18 petitions for certiorari. Fifteen of the twenty-four petitions have been filed in the last four Terms, and we have denied all 24 petitions without recorded dissent. We also have denied petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 39.8 of this Court for the last three petitions in which he has sought extraordinary relief. See In re Whitaker, 513 U. S. 1 (1994); In re Whitaker, 511 U. S. 1105 (1994); In re Whitaker, 506 U. S. 983 (1992). And earlier this Term, we directed the Clerk of the Court “not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.” 513 U. S., at 2. Though we warned petitioner at that time about his “frequent filing patterns with respect to petitions for writ of certiorari,” ibid., we limited our sanction to petitions for extraordinary writs.
We now find it necessary to extend that sanction to petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner. In what appears to be an attempt to circumvent this Court’s prior order, petitioner has labeled his instant petition a “petition for writ of certiorari” even though it would seem to be more aptly termed a “petition for an extraordinary writ”: He argues that the California Supreme Court erred in denying his petition for review of a California Court of Appeals order which denied his petition for writ of mandate/prohibition seeking to compel a California trial judge to make a particular ruling in a civil action filed by petitioner. And the legal arguments petitioner makes in his instant “petition for writ of certiorari” are, just as those made in his previous 18 petitions for certiorari, frivolous. As we told petitioner earlier this Term, “[t]he goal of fairly dispensing justice . . . is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Petitioner’s abuse of petitions for certiorari has occurred only in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. This order therefore will not prevent petitioner from filing a petition for certiorari to challenge criminal sanctions that might be imposed upon him. But like other similar orders we have issued, see In re Sassower, 510 U. S. 4 (1993); Day v. Day, 510 U. S. 1 (1993); Demos v. Storrie, 507 U. S. 290 (1993); Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992), this order will allow the Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our process.
It is so ordered.
Rule 39.8 provides: “If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement; or petition for an extraordinary writ, as the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed informa pauperis.”

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0