What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
John C. SINGLETON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Lewis B. STEVENS, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Milan, Michigan, United States Board of Parole et al., Respondents-Appellants.
No. 14792.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 22, 1962.
Alan G. Marer, Washington, D. C., Burke Marshall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Lawrence Gubow, U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., Harold H. Greene, Isabel L. Blair, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellants.
Vincent J. Brennan, Detroit, Mich., on brief for appellee.
Before MeALLISTER and O’SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges, and BOYD, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents, the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution at Milan, Michigan, and others, appeal from the discharge of appellee, Singleton, from his confinement in such prison as a federal parole violator. His discharge was ordered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court’s order was based upon the fact that Singleton was not represented by counsel at a hearing at which his parole was revoked.
On April 24, 1951, in the U. S. District Court at Detroit, Michigan, Singleton was convicted and sentenced to an eight year term for a narcotics offense. On. June 29, 1955, he was released on parole from the Federal Correctional Institution at Milan, Michigan. On June 29, 1957, he was convicted and sentenced to a prison term on a state narcotics charge at Wethersfield, Connecticut. Upon his parole from the Connecticut prison, he was taken into federal custody as a federal parole violator and returned to the federal prison at Milan, Michigan, on February 11, 1960. On April 28, 1960, a parole revocation hearing was had before a member of the United States Parole Board and his federal parole was revoked. Notice of such action was given to Singleton in June, 1960. Singleton was not represented by counsel at the revocation hearing. He was not advised that he could have such counsel, nor did he request counsel.
In July, 1960, Singleton was offered a second parole revocation hearing, with an attorney present in his behalf if he so desired. He declined the offer and the habeas corpus proceedings involved here followed. Relying principally on the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Hurley v. Reed, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 288 F.2d 844 (1961); Robbins v. Reed, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 269 F.2d 242 (1959); and Moore v. Reid, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 246 F.2d 654 (1957) the District Judge held that an opportunity to have counsel present at his original revocation hearing should have been given to Singleton. Because such had not been done, he discharged Singleton. He was of the opinion that the offered second hearing with counsel present would not correct what he considered a procedural error in the original revocation hearing. We are of the opinion that the District Judge was in error. Singleton admits his convic-' tion of a narcotics violation while he was on federal parole. There is no intimation that assistance of counsel at his revocation hearing would have helped him in any way.
The Courts are in disagreement as to whether the presence of counsel, or the opportunity therefor, is an essential ingredient of the “opportunity to appear” at a parole revocation hearing as provided in § 4207 of Title 18 U.S.C.A. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia holds that it is. Fleming v. Tate, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 156 F.2d 848 (1946); Hurley v. Reed, supra; Robbins v. Reed, supra; Moore v. Reid, supra; Barnes v. Reed, 301 F.2d 516 (C.A.D.C., 1962). Under facts not in point with the case at bar, the District of Columbia Circuit has held that an offer of a second hearing will not remedy the failure to permit, or offer, counsel at the original hearing. Glenn v. Reed, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 289 F.2d 462 (1961); Barnes v. Reed, supra. Other decisions hold that the presence of counsel for the prisoner at a revocation hearing is not essential to its validity. Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (C.A. 5, 1949), affirmed by equally divided court 340 U.S. 880, 71 S.Ct. 192, 95 L.Ed. 639, rehearing denied 340 U.S. 907, 71 S.Ct. 277, 95 L.Ed. 656 (1950); Washington v. Hagan, D.C., 183 F.Supp. 414, affirmed 287 F.2d 332 (C.A. 3, 1960) cert. denied 366 U.S. 970, 81 S.Ct. 1934, 6 L.Ed.2d 1259; Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F.Supp. 919 (N.D.Cal. 1959) . District Court decisions have held both ways and there is a division within the Eastern District of Michigan, from which this case arises. Supporting a rule that the opportunity to have counsel at a revocation hearing is an essential are Cannon v. Stucker (E.D.Mich. No. 19,-822, June 16, 1960) and the instant case. Contra are Poole v. Stevens, 190 F.Supp. 938 (E.D.Mich.1960); Hoover v. Stevens, (E.D.Mich. No. 20,349, September 15, 1960); Clark v. Stevens (E.D.Mich., 1960), affirmed without discussion of the point here involved, 291 F.2d 388 (C.A. 6, 1961).
A large number of unreported District Court decisions (three in the Eastern District of Michigan), have held that the offer of a new hearing with counsel present renders the issue moot. We are advised of, but have not seen, like holdings by the District Court for the District of Columbia. We are satisfied that the appellee here has had available to him all that the law contemplates that he should have.
Singleton’s petition for writ of habeas corpus further charges that he should be released because there was an unreasonable delay between the time of his arrest and return to the Milan prison in February, 1960, and the time that he was notified of his parole revocation. His parole hearing was held in April, 1960, which was on the occasion of the first visit of a representative of the Parole Board to Milan after Singleton’s return there in February. Singleton makes no claim that he was prejudiced by the delay, and at no time sought speedier action by the parole authorities. The District Judge did not consider the point. It is without merit. Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d 534 (C.A. 2, 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 846, 82 S.Ct. 75, 7 L.Ed.2d 44.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, with instructions to enter judgment dismissing Singleton’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering his return to federal custody.
. Because of various court decisions, the United States Parole Board now provides by rule that:
“All federal prisoners who have been returned to custody as parole or mandatory release violators under a Board war-
rant shall be advised that they may be represented by counsel at the revocation hearing provided that they arrange for such counsel in accordance with Board procedure.
“All prisoners in custody as violators previously given revocation ‘hearings’ without being afforded the opportunity
for representation by counsel shall be given an opportunity for a hearing with counsel.”
. Burdette v. Stevens, Civil No. 20,396 (E.D.Mich., November 17, 1960); Matter of Charles F. Leathead, No. 20,837 (E.D.Mich., 1960); Matter of Ollis II. Goodson. No. 20.249 (E.D.Mich., 1960).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0