What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BRYANT CHUCKING GRINDER COMPANY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 25, Docket 30844.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 2, 1967.
Decided Dec. 12, 1967.
Anderson, Circuit Judge, dissented, as to the propriety of the enforcement of the bargaining order.
Kenneth C. McGuiness, Washington, D. C. (Vedder, Price, Kaufman, Kammholz & McGuiness, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
George B. Driesen, Washington, D. C. (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Peter Ames Eveleth, Washington, D. C., Atty., on the brief), for respondent.
Before FRIENDLY, HAYS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
HAYS, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner asks us to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board based upon a finding that petitioner violated Section 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) and (a) (5). The Board seeks enforcement. We deny the petition and enforce the order.
The Board held that petitioner violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by threatening employees, by granting benefits to discourage joining the union, by coercive interrogation and by encouraging employees not to cooperate with the Board in the investigation of unfair labor practices. The Board held that petitioner violated Section 8(a) (5) and (1) by refusing to recognize and bargain with the union.
The union involved is the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) Local 218. The plant of the employer at which the unfair labor practices occurred is located in Springfield, Vermont.
In May 1962 the union undertook a campaign to organize petitioner’s employees. By August 14 the union had authorization cards from 198 of petitioner’s 337 bargaining unit employees. On that date the union notified the employer by letter that it represented a majority of the employees and asked for a bargaining meeting. The petitioner replied to the union’s letter declining to meet with the union and stating the company’s “very definite policy” of refusing recognition in the absence of Board certification. The employer then began a campaign of vigorous opposition to the union, carried on largely by letters and notices to the employees. In the meantime the union had filed a representation petition with the Board.
Interrogation
A number of employees were questioned by supervisory officials as to their attitude toward the union. The Board could properly find that this interrogation was coercive since it took place in an atmosphere of active opposition to the union, Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964), without explanation to the employees of the purpose of the questioning and under circumstances indicating that it had no legitimate purpose, Edward Fields, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 754, 758-759 (2d Cir. 1963) and was unaccompanied by any assurance against reprisals, see NLRB v. Lorben Corporation, 345 F.2d 346, 348 (2d Cir. 1965). Numerous instances of questioning involved particularly threatening connotations because employees were interrogated in connection with interviews concerning eligibility for merit increases.
Threats
There was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that the employer threatened employees with reprisals. Questioning of employees as to union activity in connection with discussion of merit increases, referred to above under “Interrogation” could well have been considered by the employees to carry with it the implication that those who favored the union would not receive an increase. One of the supervisors, when he learned that an employee was a member of the union organizing committee asked him, “Do you like your job?” On another occasion a supervisor told an employee that if the union won he could not be transferred from one job to another when work was slack but would be sent home.
Benefits
During the period prior to the representation election the employer announced an increase in pension benefits. The announcement was coupled in an advertisement published in the local newspaper and in a notice sent to employees with material urging employees to vote against the union. The Board could properly hold that this promise of benefit was a violation of Section 8(a) (1). NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409, 84 S.Ct. 457, 11 L.Ed.2d 435 (1964); NLRB v. D’Armigene, Inc., 353 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1965).
Dissuading employees from cooperation with the Board
We are agreed that the Board could properly find that the employer violated the Act by posting a notice to employees stating that they were under no obligation to assist the Board in connection with its investigation of unfair labor practice charges, and that they did not “have to talk with these people.” This notice accompanied by the employer’s assurance that it would resist the Board’s efforts “with every force available to free men,” constituted an unjustified obstruction of the Board’s processes. See Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1964).
A majority of the court believes that the Board’s finding of violation in the employer’s reinterviewing the employees who testified at the Labor Board hearing between their direct and cross-examination was unjustified. This determination requires no modification of the Board’s order.
Refusal to Bargain
The Board’s finding that on August 14, 1962 when the union wrote to the employer to request bargaining, the union had a majority of the employees is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1966).
The authorization cards signed by the employees were free from ambiguity. The evidence credited by the Board, and therefore accepted by us, see NLRB v. Warrensburg Board & Paper Corporation, 340 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1965), established that the union’s organizers made no misrepresentations to the employees as to the purpose of the cards and the effect of their signatures. Indeed the record shows that a representative of the union correctly explained to the employees at the first organizational meeting the methods by which recognition could be attained and at no time were the employees told that the sole purpose of signing the cards was to secure an election. See NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., supra; NLRB v. S. E. Nichols Company, 380 F.2d 438, 444-445 (2d Cir. 1967).
There is also adequate support for the Board’s conclusion that the employer did not have a good faith doubt of the union’s majority status. Not only did the employer not suggest a card check but it rejected the possibility that such a verification would be acceptable by announcing its “very definite policy” of refusing any evidence of representational rights other than a Board certification.
The history of violations of Section 8(a) (1) is sufficient to establish that the employer deliberately destroyed the union’s majority and the Board’s order to bargain is an appropriate method of correcting this default. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817, 88 L.Ed. 1020 (1944); NLRB v. International Union, Progressive Mine Workers, 375 U.S. 396, 84 S.Ct. 453, 11 L.Ed.2d 412 (1964) (reversing per curiam 319 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1963) which directed an election because such a long period of time had passed since the union had attained its majority status).
The General Counsel’s Delay in Issuing the Complaint
The General Counsel delayed issuing the complaint for about 15 months while awaiting a Board decision clarifying the rule as to sustaining Section 8 (a) (5) charges where the union has participated in an election and lost. Mere delay in the issuance of the complaint is insufficient ground for the denial of relief.
“The company urges that, because of the lapse of time between the occurrence of the unfair labor practices and the Board’s final decision and order, and because the union was repudiated by the employees subsequently to the events recounted in this opinion, enforcement should be either denied altogether or conditioned on the holding of a new election to determine whether the union is still the employees’ choice as a bargaining representative. The argument has no merit. Franks Bros. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 702 [64 S.Ct. 817, 88 L.Ed. 1020]; National Labor Relations Board v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 [62 S.Ct. 397, 86 L.Ed. 380]; National Labor Relations Board v. Mexia Textile Mills, Ina, 339 U.S. 563, 568 [70 S.Ct. 826, 829, 833, 94 L.Ed. 1067]. Inordinate delay in any case is regrettable, but Congress has introduced no time limitation into the Act except that in § 10(b).” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n. 16, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1114, 8 L.Ed.2d 230(1962).
We have examined the other points made by the petitioner and find them to be without merit.
Petition denied. Order enforced.
. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
. I hereby request and accept membership in the above named union, and authorize it to represent me, and in my behalf to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to hours of labor, wages, and all other conditions of employment.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1