What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. ARDITTO.
No. 7081.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Dec. 15, 1936.
F. Marbury, of Baltimore, Md., and Francis X. Norris, of Detroit, Mich. (Gregory H. Frederick, Francis X. Norris, and Trent McMath, all of Detroit, Mich., and Will G. Beardslee, Wilbur C. Pickett, and Randolph C. Shaw, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States.
Rowland W. Fixel, of Detroit, Mich. (Fred H. Sims, of River Rouge, Mich., and Felix Silver, of Detroit, Mich., on the brief), for appellee.
Before HICKS and ALLEN, Circuit Judges, and RAYMOND, District Judge.
RAYMOND, District Judge.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment for appellee rendered November 27, 1934, in the sum of $11,557.50, upon a war risk insurance policy issued to Anthony Abboni. The trial court had previously denied appellant’s motion to dismiss based upon the following grounds:
“1. That no disagreement exists as provided for by section 19 of the World War Veterans’ Act, as amended (section 445, title 38 U.S.C.A.), and that failing in said disagreement this Court has no jurisdiction of the above-styled cause.
“2. That the above-styled cause has been barred by the running of the statute of limitations as provided by section 19 of the World War Veterans’ Act (section 445, Title 38 U.S.C.A.) and this Court has no jurisdiction of this action.”
Upon appeal the same claims are relied on for reversal. In support of the first, appellant urges that claimant, having presented a meritless claim of one character and obtained denial thereof, has prosecuted this litigation upon a claim of wholly different character which was never presented to the Veterans’ Bureau for consideration. The contention is made upon the authority of United States v. Knott, 69 F.(2d) 907 (C.C.A.6), and Berntsen v. United States, 41 F.(2d) 663 (C.C.A.9).
A brief history is as follows: In 1892 Anthony Abboni was taken from a home for abandoned children in Italy. He was brought to America in 1907. On November 18, 1917, at the age of twenty-five years, he entered the military service of the United States. He had been a member of the claimant’s household for a number of years, but without legal relationship or adoption. A war risk insurance policy in the sum of $10,000 was issued to him, his estate being named as beneficiary. On February 5, 1918, while the policy was in force, he was drowned as the result of the sinking of the transport Tuscania. On February 26, 1919, the Wayne county probate court appointed Samuel Arditto (the claimant) administrator of the estate, and on June 5, 1919, through his attorney, he made claim, as administrator and “adopted father,” for the proceeds of the policy. He had previously made claim as “adopted cousin.” On January 2, 1920, the director of the Veterans’ Bureau denied the claim, apparently for lack of proof of adoption or of dependency. Over twelve years later, on February 23, 1932, suit was commenced by claimant, individually and as administrator, the declaration alleging that he “stood in the position of loco parentis to the veteran” and praying for recovery in that capacity, and, in the alternative, for recovery as administrator of the estate. No proofs were presented to sustain recovery on the theory of the declaration, but on March 9, 1933, the probate court of Wayne county entered an order allowing an alleged nuncupative will of the deceased veteran by which his estate and insurance were left to claimant and the declaration was later amended to allege claimant’s rights as beneficiary in the will.
The affidavit in support of motion for summary judgment set forth appellee’s claim solely as beneficiary of the insurance policy by virtue of the provisions of the will. The affidavit further set forth: “That said Anthony Abboni was an illegitimate abandoned child abandoned in 1892, and that no known relatives are in existence.” The judgment first entered decreed recovery to plaintiff individually. This was amended the following day to decree recovery as beneficiary under the will.
A stipulation entered into several weeks after the entry of judgment establishes facts which might warrant consideration of appellee’s right of recovery upon other theories, but we are here concerned only with the judgment appealed from.
Whether a claimant under a war risk insurance policy may file a claim with the Veterans’ Bureau as adopted father and as administrator of the soldier’s estate, and then recover upon the theory of being the beneficiary of a nuncupative will allowed nearly fourteen years later, is at least doubtful. However, in view of the other controlling question involved, we need not determine this issue. Assuming disagreement on June 2, 1920, as to the claim asserted in the suit filed February 3, 1932, we are of the opinion that suit was barred under section 445 of title 38 U.S.C.A., which provides: “No suit on yearly renewable term insurance shall be allowed under this section unless the same shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made or within one.year after July 3, 1930, whichever is the later date: * * * Provided, That for the purposes of this section it shall be deemed that the right accrued on the happening of the contingency on which the claim is founded: Provided further, That this limitation is suspended for the period elapsing between the filing in the Veterans’ Administration of the claim sued upon and the denial of said claim by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs.”
Appellee claims that his failure to institute suit before July 3, 1931, is excused by the fact that the claim was pending with the Bureau subsequent to filing and before disallowance from June 5, 1919, to June 2, 1920, a period of eleven months and twenty-seven days; that the statute of limitations was suspended for this period; and that suit instituted February 23, 1932, was not within the bar of the statute. It is familiar law that statutes of limitation in favor of the sovereign must be strictly construed in its favor. See United States v. Valndza, 81 F.(2d) 615 (C.C.A.6); Board v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 51 F.(2d) 73 (C.C.A.6).
Nothing in the history of the legislation on behalf of veterans, in the act itself, or in its practical administration warrants the conclusion that the suspension of limitation was intended to operate as to claims filed and denied by the Veterans’ Bureau prior to the enactment of July 3, 1930. The purpose of the statute was to preserve the rights of veterans whose claims were thén pending or which might thereafter be filed. Only one adjudicated case has been found in which the question under consideration was discussed. In Miller v. United States (D.C.) 57 F.(2d) 889, it was recognized in like circumstances that no portion of the one-year extension was consumed by delay in acting upon the claim. The general purpose of extending the period of limitations upon claims of this character has been to aid those unaware or uncertain of their rights because of confusion which arose concerning the definition of the words “total and permanent disability.” In the present case, the right accrued, by death of the soldier in February, 1918.
In the case of McLaughlin v. United States, 74 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A.10), relied on by appellee, the action was dismissed on other grounds. This question was not discussed. In the case of Kemp v. United States, 77 F.(2d) 213 (C.C.A.7), Judge Sparks held that the statute of limitations was not suspended by the Act of July 3, 1930 (38 U.S.C.A. § 445), as to a claim for insurance not then pending. Several cases have recognized that the general purposes of the act are prospective. See United States v. Earwood, 71 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A. 5); Westling v. United States, 64 F.(2d) 464 (C.C.A.9).
We think the motion to dismiss should have been sustained. The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0