What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
STEINBERG v. RAMSPECK et al.
No. 11527.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 10, 1953.
Decided July 2, 1953.
Mr. Morton C. Steinberg, appellant, pro se.
Mr. William R. Glendon, Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time of argument, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Charles M. Irelan, U. S. Atty. at the time of argument, and Mr. Joseph M. Howard, Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees. Mr. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., and Mr. John J. McCarthy, Atty., United States Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C., also entered appearances for appellees.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, PRETTYMAN and PROCTOR, Circuit Judges.
PRETTYMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court granting the motion of the defendants for summary judgment in a civil action. Appellant Stein-berg filed a complaint in that court, praying for preliminary and final injunctions against the members of the Civil Service Commission, enjoining them from enforcing a “Departmental Circular” dealing with the appointment and examination of hearing examiners under the Administrative Procedure Act. He also prayed for a declaratory judgment.
In brief the facts are that the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, issued regulations and also appointed a board of examiners to aid in determining the qualifications of both incumbents and applicants for appointments as hearing examiners. Examinations were held, and ratings were assigned to those applicants whose qualifications were determined under this procedure. As a result of those ratings a register was issued, although the ratings were subject to appeal by the applicants to the Board of Appeal and Review and to the Commission. Stein-berg’s name was on that register. In July, 1949, the board of examiners resigned. At that time the rating of the open competitive examinations had not been completed, and appeals from the initial ratings were pending. The Commission decided to rerate the entire open examination. It is not clear upon the record whether the non-competitive examination of incumbents had or had not then been completed. However, on December 13, 1949, the Commission issued Departmental Circular No. 592, Supplement No. 3. This circular announced that the registers theretofore established would no longer be used for absolute appointment and that the Commission had decided to review the qualifications of all applicants who had filed in the open competitive examination and to rerate the entire examination. Steinberg was at first rerated ineligible but subsequently was rated eligible and has remained on the successive Federal Hearing Examiner lists, although in less favorable positions than the one in which he was placed on the original register. The gravamen of Steinberg’s complaint, he tells us in his brief, is the legality of Circular No. 592.
It is well established that the courts will not interfere with the management of the executive branch of the Government. The Supreme Court has dealt with the problem a number of times, and this court has had the problem in a number of cases. The Administrative Procedure Act specifically gives the Commission authority to promulgate rules and to appoint advisory committees.
Steinberg contends that the Commission arbitrarily and capriciously discarded the register of eligibles, but there is no evidence to support that contention. As to the applicants in the open competitive examination, the record contains an uncontradicted sworn statement that the rerating was for the purpose of according uniform treatment to all applicants. Steinberg stresses a claim that the action was arbitrary because the ultimate result, which he says was the purpose, was to reinstate some sixty incumbents who had been rated ineligible by the board of examiners. But the action of the board was at all times subject to review by the Commission, and it apparently disagreed with the board. We cannot say that the Commission was wrong without re-evaluating qualifications, a task which we cannot undertake.
Even as to incumbent examiners the Supreme Court said in the Ramspeck case:
“The position of hearing examiners is not a constitutionally protected position. It is a creature of congressional enactment. The respondents have no vested right to positions as examiners.”
A fortiori applicants for positions as hearing examiners have no vested rights to the positions.
That the Commission had difficulty in carrying out its duties in respect to hearing examiners under the Administrative Procedure Act is no secret. Nevertheless we think that the revision of its procedure, involved in Departmental Circular No. 592, Supplement No. 3, was well within the discretion conferred upon the Commission by the statute and by the general rules relating to executive control over the personnel in the executive departments.
Affirmed.
. 60 Stat. 244 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1010.
. 12 Fed.Reg. 6321 (1947), as amended, 5 Code Fed.Regs. § 34.
. E. g., Decatur v. Paulding, 1840, 14 Pet. 497, 40 U.S. 497, 10 L.Ed. 559; Keim v. United States, 1900, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S. Ct. 574, 44 L.Ed. 774.
. E. g., Powell v. Brannan, 1952, 91 U.S. App.D.C. 16, 196 F.2d 871; Levy v. Woods, 1948, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 138, 171 F.2d 145; Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 1946, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 159 F.2d 22, certiorari denied, 1947, 330 U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 979, 91 L.Ed. 1285; Hammond v. Hull, 1942, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 131 F.2d 23, certiorari denied, 1943, 318 U.S. 777, 63 S.Ct. 830, 87 L.Ed. 1145; Levine v. Farley, 1939, 70 App.D.C. 381, 107 F.2d 186, certiorari denied, 1940, 308 U.S. 622, 60 S.Ct. 377, 84 L.Ed. 519; Bailey v. Richardson, 1950, 86 U.S.App.. D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46, affirmed, 1951, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669, 95 L.Ed. 1352.
. See Keim v. United States, 3900, 177 U. S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574, 44 L.Ed. 774; Powell v. Brannan, 1952, 91 U.S.App. D.C. 16, 196 F.2d 871.
. Ramspeck v. Trial Examiners Conf., 1953, 345 U.S. 128, 133, 73 S.Ct. 570.
. See, for example, Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 737, 767 (1960).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1