What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NAYLOR v. CANTLEY et al.
No. 11024.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 16, 1938.
Winstead Johnson, of Memphis, Tenn. (S. S. Hargraves, of Memphis, Tenn., on the brief), for appellant. i
R. B.- McCulloch, of Forrest City, Ark. (Ross Mathis, of Cotton Plant, Ark., and Burk Mann, of Forrest City, Ark., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GARDNER, SANBORN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge.
This controversy arises out of a refusal of the court below to administer in bankruptcy mortgaged lands belonging to the estate of a. farmer debtor who, prior to the sale of his lands under foreclosure, had filed a petition under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended August 28, 1935, c. 792, 49 Stat. 942-945, 11 U.S.C. § 203, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203.
John W. Naylor was, at all times which are here material, the owner of a well mortgaged farm of some 555 acres in St. Francis county, Ark. The first mortgage ran to St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank, the second mortgage to Fussell-Graham-Alderson Company, and the third mortgage to National Bank of Eastern Arkansas. In 1933, S. L. Cantley, as receiver of St. Louis Joint Stock Land Bank, commenced a suit in equity in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to foreclose the first mortgage. Pending foreclosure, the court appointed John W. Naylor, the debtor,- and Paul H. Albers receivers of the mortgaged lands. On February 24, 1936, a decree was entered in the foreclosure suit adjudging that there was due upon the first mortgage $27,145.72 with interest and costs, ordering a sale of the land to satisfy this indebtedness, and appointing a special master to. execute the decree. The special master gave notice that a foreclosure sale would be held May 7, 1936. On May 6, 1936, Naylor, as a farmer debtor, filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas a petition under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended August 28, 1935, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203. This petition was approved by the court and referred to the conciliation commissioner. Notwithstanding the filing of the petition, the special master held the foreclosure sale on May 7, 1936, and, for $24,000, sold the lands in question to John W. Alderson, Jr., who, ■evidently on behalf of the second mort-1 gagee, had purchased the rights of the first mortgagee. On May 22, 1936, the second mortgagee filed in the court of bankruptcy a petition asking that court to refuse to take jurisdiction of the mortgaged lands, on the ground that the debtor’s petition had not been filed in good faith, that rehabilitation of the debtor was not feasible, and that section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended was unconstitutional. Apparently this petition was not ruled upon.
On or about September 7, 1936, the debtor filed a petition in the equity suit, asking that the sale of the mortgaged lands to John W. Alderson, Jr., be not confirmed, and that the sale be vacated. On October 29, 1936, the court, as á court of equity, confirmed the foreclosure sale, overruled the.debtor’s exceptions to confirmation, and denied the petition of the debtor to vacate the sale. On January 25, 1937, the court ordered the receivers, appointed in the foreclosure suit, to pay over funds in their hands to G. B. Fogg, clerk of the chancery court of St. Francis county, Ark., to “hold the same for the account of the cause of John W. Naylor, plaintiff, versus John W. Alderson and John W. Alderson, Jr., and Fussell-Graham-Alderson Company.” On March 6, 1937, P. H. Albers was discharged, as a receiver. The debtor was directed by the court of equity to continue as receiver for the sole purpose of receiving and paying a rental for the year 1936'.
On April 20, 1937, the debtor filed a petition in the bankruptcy proceedings, in which petition he asserted that all proceedings which had taken place in the foreclosure suit after the filing of his petition under section 75 were void. He prayed for an order directing S. L. Cantley, receiver, John W. Alderson, Jr., and the clerk of the chancery court of St. Francis county, Ark., to show cause why the foreclosure sale, the special master’s deed, and the order confirming sale should not be set side, and why the rents received by Alder-son and by the clerk of the chancery court should not be paid over to the conciliation commissioner. The debtor also prayed “that said estate be administered by said conciliation commissioner, and for all other proper relief.”
• The court of bankruptcy thereupon issued the show-cause order prayed for in the petition, returnable on April 30, 1937. The appellees filed a response entitled in the equity suit, which, in effect, asserted that, the foreclosure sale having been confirmed over the objections of the debtor, the entire matter was res judicata, that the debtor had not come into the court with clean hands, and that his rehabilitation was not feasible. On May 27, 1937, the court of bankruptcy entered an order denying the debtor’s petition of April 20, 1937, praying that his estate be administered in bankruptcy. This court allowed an appeal.
The single question presented is whether the United States District Court had jurisdiction to proceed in the foreclosure suit after the filing by the debtor of his petition under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended.
By the express provision of subsection (n) of section 75, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203(n), the filing of the petition subjected the debtor and all of his property to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy, and, for the purposes of jurisdiction, was the equivalent of an adjudication in bankruptcy. By the provisions of subsection (<?) of section 75, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203(o), “proceedings for foreclosure of a mortgage on land,” if instituted prior to the filing of a petition, shall not be maintained in any court or otherwise against the farmer or his property after the filing of the petition, “except upon petition made to and granted by the judge after hearing and report by the conciliation commissioner.” In this case it is conceded that after the debtor filed his petition under section 75 no application to maintain the foreclosure proceedings was made to or granted by the judge of the court of bankruptcy in accordance with subsection (o).
The appellees contend that, since the bankruptcy proceedings and the foreclosure suit were both pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and that since the same judge had both matters in charge, the orders .made and the things done by the court sitting as a court of equity are to be regarded as though made or sanctioned by the court of bankruptcy.
In Hanna v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 8 Cir., 62 F.2d 139, at page 145, this court pointed out that the equity jurisdiction of a federal court is something entirely separate and apart from its jurisdiction in bankruptcy; that the jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy is exclusive with respect to all questions pertaining to bankruptcy and to the administration of insolvent estates in bankruptcy; .that courts of bankruptcy are separate and distinct courts; that the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy cannot be surrendered; that attempts of other courts to interfere with the jurisdiction of courts of bankruptcy have been consistently resisted; that an adjudication of bankruptcy made by the court having jurisdiction of the bankrupt cannot be impeached collaterally; and that an adjudication, until vacated, is binding upon all parties to it. See, also, Cornwall Press, Inc., v. Ray Long & Richard R. Smith, Inc., 2 Cir., 75 F.2d 276. That the judge of a federal court sitting in equity can protect the rights of all parties as well as if he was sitting in bankruptcy is entirely beside the question. Hanna v. Brictson Mfg. Co., supra, page 146; Moore v. Scott, 9 Cir., 55 F.2d 863, 865; Silberberg v. Ray Chain Stores, Inc., 3 Cir., 58 F.2d 766, certiorari denied Winne v. Siberberg, 287 U.S. 631, 53 S.Ct. 83, 77 L.Ed. 547.
Since, under the provisions of section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended, the court of bankruptcy was, upon the filing of the petition, vested with the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his property, and since that court could not surrender its jurisdiction to any other court, it was incumbent upon the court of bankruptcy to administer the estate of the farmer debtor in accordance with section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act. Bradford v. Fahey, 4 Cir., 76 F.2d 628; In Re O’Brien 2 Cir., 78 F.2d 715; United States National Bank of Omaha, Neb. v. Pamp, 8 Cir., 83 F.2d 493; Hoyd v. Citizens Bank of Albany Co., 6 Cir., 89 F.2d 105.
The order appealed from is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below with directions to procure, by appropriate orders, the vacation of all of the proceedings in the foreclosure suit subsequent to the filing of the debtor’s petition, and to require that all- rents and profits from the land which are properly a part of the estate in bankruptcy be paid over to the conciliation commissioner, and for further proceedings in accordance with section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1