What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LIMBACH et al. v. YELLOW CAB CO.
No. 4431.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Nov. 17, 1930.
Julius Limbach and Edward H. S. Martin, both of Chicago-, 111., pro se.
Benjamin Samuels, John W. Costello, and David H. Greenberg, all of Chicago, 111., for appellee.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.
EVANS, Circuit Judge.
The eause was tided by the court without a jury. No special findings were made.
Passing directly to the controverted question of service, it appears from the record that counsel made two contracts with Hazel Rogers. The firtt called for an attorney’s fee “equal to one-third of the amount recovered.” Notice of lien for such fee was duly served on appellee by registered letter. Later, appellants made another contract with the claimant wherein a somewhat different fee arrangement was made. Appellants attempted to serve a notice of lien on appellee. Appellee denied knowledge of such second contract, and that the notice of lien thereon was served as required by the statutes of niinois.
The evidence respecting the service is not disputed. One of the appellants testified that he had no knowledge that a settlement was made until after it had been completed. He further said: “I made that service (of the lien) on the date that notice bears ® “ * at the office of the defendant on the south side ® * * Chicago * * * Illinois. I endeavored to find the president of the defendant on that occasion. I found the def endant but was not able to- find the president. On that occasion I went to the second floor of tho general offices of: tho defendant. At a counter, I inquired o C the lady that was in charge. She was tho only one there. On that occasion I inquired if the president was there, ■—whether he was in. She said no. I asked if any of the .other officers were in. She said, 4no, wliat do yon want? ’ I told her that I had an attorney’s lien notice that I wanted to serve on the company and she directed me to the rear, to a man named Joe Gard, who bad charge of those matters, and I went back there. She said that the officers were not in, that I should go back there and serve it. She mentioned Mr. Gard’s name. I then went where I was directed * * * asked for Joe Gard, met him and told him that I had-an attorney’s lien notice and desired to serve it on the company. He said, ‘all right, I will take charge of it.’ I asked him to receipt for it. He said they did not receipt for notices of that kind. I gave him a duplicate * ” * together with the contract. I asked him to sign for it and he said he would not and directed me to a man standing up. That man signed the name of Joe Gard on it. I don’t know the name of the man who signed it.”
The applicable Illinois statutes governing the service of notice of lien (Cahill’s 111. Rev. Statutes, c. 13, par. 13, and chapter 110, par. 8) permit of seiviee either by registered mail or by personal service. Good personal service requires notice to- be served on the president of the corporation if he can be found in the county. Norris Coal Mining Co. v. Beam, 223 Ill. App. 333. As no- showing whatever was made that the president of appelleo was not or could not bo found in the county, it follows that no valid service was made. True, such personal service, may be waived or the corporation may be estopped to deny it. But in the instant ease, appellant has failed to show either a waiver or an estoppel. For the evidence fails to- show either agency or tho agent’s authority, if it be assumed that tho unnamed lady and Gard were appellee’s agents. It does not appear that either had authority to waive the requirement of tho statute or to bind appellee in reference to tho matter of service of notice of lien.
The view most favorable to appellant presented a situation where the inferences from the testimony were conflicting. Upon such showing the finding of the District Court will not be disturbed.
Other propositions urged by appellee need not bo considered.
Tho judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2