What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Robert Benton GOAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin CIVILETTI, Attorney General of United States of America; Norman Carlson, Director, Bureau of Prisons; Mr. McCune, Reg. Director, Bureau of Prisons; Robert Christensen, Warden, FCI, Ashland; Charles Crandall, Superintendent FCI, Ashland; Mr. E. Goss, Unit Manager, FCI, Ashland; Mr. D. Darworth, Unit Manager, FCI, Ashland; Mr. C. McCloud, Unit Counselor; Mr. R. Alvis, Unit Counselor; and Mr. Berry, Correctional Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 80-5333.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Aug. 2, 1982.
Decided Sept. 13, 1982.
Robert Benton Goar, pro se.
David E. Melcher (court-appointed), Douglas Miller (argued), Cynthiana, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant.
Patrick H. Molloy, U. S. Atty., James A. Zerhusen, Asst. U.S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., F. Stine (argued), Newport, Ky., for defendants-appellees.
Before MERRITT and CONTIE, Circuit Judges, and NEESE, District Judge.
The Honorable C. G. Neese, Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge.
For purposes of this appeal, we accept as true the following allegations: Robert Goar, an informant, was a federal prisoner at the Ashland, Kentucky, prison in early 1980. The sentencing judge cautioned that Goar should not be sent to Tallahassee, where the principal defendant against whom Goar had testified was imprisoned. After discovering that two inmates at Ash-land knew he was an informant, Goar accepted a transfer to Atlanta. The principal defendant was then housed at Atlanta. Goar was transferred back to Ashland. Though he requested administrative segregation, he was placed in the general population. On August 23, 1980, he was attacked by an inmate who knew of Goar’s informant activities. He suffered loss of blood from a head wound, a neck and jaw injury, for which he received inadequate medical treatment.
On September 15, 1980, Goar filed a complaint against various officials, alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for his constitutional tort claims for cruel and unusual punishment arising under the Eighth Amendment. He asked for $500,000 in damages and injunctive relief to prevent any future transfers to unsafe prisons. He was then in the process of exhausting his administrative remedies.
The lower court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We reverse and remand for further proceedings on the money damages claim.
A long line of Supreme Court cases recognizes the rule that a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim to federal court when the administrative remedy is inadequate or cannot provide the relief requested. See Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1981), reversed on other grounds, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) and eases cited therein; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 200, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1666, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). This rule applies to the case before us.
Section 542.13, 28 Code of Federal Regulations, specifically excludes tort claims from the grievance procedures and administrative remedies available to federal prisoners: “Filings will not be accepted under the Administrative Remedy Procedure for tort claims.... ” Administrative officials, therefore, do not have the authority to award money damages for tort claims either against the government or against other officials.
These circumstances distinguish the case before us from Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1979). In Brice, the prisoner alleged overcrowded conditions. Both injunctive and monetary relief were sought. In that case, however, an administrative remedy could cure the condition complained of. Although the administrative apparatus could not award money damages to the plaintiff, administrative consideration of the possibility of corrective action and a record would have aided a court in measuring liability and determining the extent of the damages. In the case before us, the alleged tortious acts were not continuing. They were complete. Administrative action would not affect either the questions of liability or damages.
We are not required to decide whether the District Court erred in dismissing the equitable portion of Goar’s claims. As noted by appellant’s counsel in oral argument, the injunctive relief sought is now moot since Goar is no longer imprisoned.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court dismissing the portion of Goar’s claim which requested money damages is reversed and the ease is remanded for further proceedings on his claim.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1