What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
W. Willard WIRTZ, Secretary of Labor, Petitioner-Appellee, v. George B. ROBB and Erick E. Erickson, Respondents-Appellants.
No. 16363.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
June 11, 1965.
See also D.C., 235 F.Supp. 913.
James H. Hudnut, Detroit, Mich., for appellants, Goldfarb & Hudnut, Detroit, Mich., on the brief.
Paul D. Borman, Detroit, Mich., for appellee, Lawrence Gubow, U. S. Atty., Paul J. Komives, Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., on the brief, Charles Donahue, Sol. of Labor, James R. Beaird, Assoc. Sol., A. A. Caghan, Regional Atty., U. S. Dept, of Labor, Washington, D. C., of counsel.
Before CECIL, PHILLIPS and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.
HARRY PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
Respondents-appellants have appealed from an order of the district court adjudging them to be guilty of contempt for refusing to obey the court’s order directing that they testify before the Department of Labor under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Procedure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.
The Petition to Compel Respondents to Testify which was filed in the district court avers that the Secretary of Labor, having reasonable grounds for believing that respondents and other persons have violated or are about to violate Section 203 and other provisions of the Act, sought to make an investigation pursuant to Section 601(a) 29 U.S.C.A. § 521; that respondents are officers and active managing officials of Detroit Plastic Products Company, a Michigan corporation, which has a labor agreement with a labor organization, the General Industrial Employees Union, Local No. 42; that two subpoenas were issued requiring respondents to testify before an authorized representative of the Department of Labor; that respondents were assured that a grant of immunity would flow coextensive with their individual testimony, but that they refused to answer questions on the ground that their answers may incriminate them; and that they continued in their refusal to testify after being ordered and directed by the Department’s representative to answer the questions propounded.
The district judge, the Honorable Thomas P. Thornton, conducted a hearing on the Secretary’s Petition to Compel Respondents to Testify, and rendered an opinion which is published at 235 F. Supp. 913.
The district court ordered respondents to appear before the Department’s representative and “there fully testify and answer all questions propounded as required by the subpoenas ad testificandum duly issued and previously served upon them.”
When respondents continued in their refusal to testify, an application was filed for adjudication of contempt, and an order was entered adjudging the respondents guilty of contempt of court and remanding them to the custody of the United States Marshal for a maximum of sixty days, “unless they shall sooner purge themselves of this contempt.” Execution of the contempt order was stayed pending determination of this appeal.
It is argued in this court that the district court erred in holding that appellants effectively have been granted immunity from both federal and state prosecution.
On this point the district court said:
“Any support for the position of respondents in relation to the self-incrimination claim that may have heretofore existed has been, in our opinion, abrogated by two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. They are Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678. We deem these to be not only directly applicable here but controlling.” 235 F. Supp. at 915.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1609, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, the Supreme Court said:
“We hold that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law.”
As said by this court in United States v. Earl Coplon, 6 Cir., 339 F.2d 192, 193:
“We find appellant’s contention as to self-incrimination to be completely without merit. He clearly will be immune from both federal and state prosecution. His immunity is coextensive with his constitutional privilege not to incriminate himself. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678; Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 79 S.Ct. 539, 3 L.Ed.2d 609; United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460 (C.A.2); United States v. Testa, 326 F.2d 730 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 931, 84 S.Ct. 701, 11 L.Ed.2d 652; Marcus v. United States, 310 F.2d 143 (C.A.3), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 944, 83 S.Ct. 933, 9 L.Ed.2d 969.”
In Coplon this court construed the grant of immunity contained in the Federal Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 409(1). In the present case the grant of immunity is set forth in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 49, which is made applicable to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Procedure Act of 1959 by 29 U.S.C.A. § 521.
Respondents-appellants contend that the grant of immunity made in the Federal Trade Commission Act is not as broad as that contained in the Federal Communications Act, and point out that neither of these acts contains the words “in any court” which appears in the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, 18 U.S.C. § 1406.
We hold that the grant of immunity set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 49, like 47 U.S.C. § 409(1), when implemented by an order of the district court as has been done in the present case, is coextensive with the constitutional privilege of appellants not to incriminate themselves, and protects appellants from both state and federal prosecution with respect to the matters concerning which they have been ordered by the district court to testify. Ahlers v. United States, 336 F.2d 191 (C.A.2), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 963, 85 S.Ct. 654, 13 L.Ed.2d 558.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. “No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing documentary evidence before the commission or in obedience to the subpoena of the commission on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no natural person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before the commission in obedience to a subpoena issued by it: Provided, That no natural person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. Sept. 26, 1914, c. 311, § 9, 38 Stat. 722.”
. “(b) For the purpose of any investigation provided for in this chapter, the provisions of sections 49 and 50 of Title 15 (relating to the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents), are made applicable to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Secretary or any officers designated by him. Pub.L. 86-257, Title VI, § 601, Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 539.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2