What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Graham HENDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, and United States of America, for the Use of J.E. Liesfeld Contractor, Inc.; United States of America, for the Use and Benefit of Capital Masonry Corp., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee, and Central Construction Corporation; Union Fidelity Insurance Company of New York; Craig A. Knepp; Linda N. Knepp; Emanuel Jr. Henderson; Diane Green-El, Dr.; William L. Henderson; Carolyn Henderson; Sally Henderson; John Billingsley, Jr., Defendant.
No. 86-1259.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 10, 1987.
Decided Oct. 23, 1987.
Thomas Tillman Hassell, Jr., Richmond, Va., for appellant.
Randolph Porter Tabb, Jr. (Taylor, Hazen & Kauffman, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, WIDENER, Circuit Judge, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.
WIDENER, Circuit Judge:
Graham Henderson appeals from an adverse judgment in the district court holding him liable under a master surety agreement with United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company. While we agree with the district court that there was adequate consideration to support the parties’ bargain, we disagree with the district court’s construction of the contract’s termination clause. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
The facts in this case are undisputed. Central Construction Corporation (Central) contracted with the United States government to provide labor and materials in the construction of a post office in Chesterfield County, Virginia. On July 20, 1984, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF & G) issued performance and payment bonds on behalf of Central. Subsequently, USF & G obtained several parties’ signatures, including Graham Henderson’s, on a Master Surety Agreement dated October 19, 1984.
Central, the general contractor on the project, subcontracted much of the project’s work to various subcontractors, including J.E. Liesfeld Contractor, Inc. (Liesfeld). A disagreement arose concerning performance and payment. Consequently, Liesfeld filed suit in the district court against Central and its bonding company, USF & G.
USF & G then filed a third party complaint against the individuals who had executed USF & G master surety agreement. This appeal involves only USF & G’s action against Graham Henderson.
The district court held that Henderson and others were jointly and severally liable to USF & G for its liability to Liesfeld. This appeal followed.
Henderson attacks the judgment on two grounds-. First, he claims that there was inadequate consideration to support his obligation under the bond. Second, Henderson claims that he successfully relieved himself of liability as an indemnitor on bonds already in place when he sent USF & G a written notice of termination on March 11, 1985.
We are of opinion that Henderson’s argument that there was no consideration for his agreement is without merit. In Virginia, whose law applies in this case, a contract under seal imports a valuable consideration. Wilson v. Butt, 168 Va. 259, 269, 190 S.E. 260, 264 (1937); Watkins v. Robertson, 105 Va. 269, 279, 54 S.E. 33, 39 (1906); see 4B Michie’s Jurisprudence of Virginia and West Virginia, Contracts § 31, at 43 & n. 4 (1986). There is no question that the master surety agreement involved here is a contract under seal. The last part of the agreement provides:
CAUTION!
READ BEFORE SIGNING!
By executing this AGREEMENT you are bound to SURETY with respect to all BOND(S) executed, provided or procured or to be executed, provided or procured by SURETY in behalf of PRINCIPAL as defined on Page 1.
Signed, Sealed and Dated this_day of_19_(emphasis added).
When Henderson signed this agreement, Virginia statute law treated the writing recognizing a seal with the same force as if it were actually sealed by him. Virginia Code § 11-3.
As noted, consideration is presumed from an instrument under seal unless there is proof to the contrary. See Watkins, 105 Va. at 279, 54 S.E. at 36. The only evidence concerning consideration was elicited by USF & G. Henderson testified that he was vice-president of operations for Central and a minority shareholder in Central at the time he signed the surety agreement. This evidence does not present proof contrary to any purported consideration but, instead, provides a basis for finding actual consideration for the surety agreement as the district court in fact did, based on Henderson’s obvious interest in the continuing operation of the post office project. Accordingly, we reject Henderson’s claim that there was not a sufficient consideration for his promise.
The other question in the case is the effect to be given Henderson’s March 11, 1985 written notice of termination of his indemnity. USF & G received this notice on March 18, 1985, as evidenced by a certified mail return receipt. We must decide whether this notice terminated Henderson’s liability under the pertinent provisions of the master surety agreement which provide as follows:
XI (A) There shall be no waiver, modification or change of the terms of this AGREEMENT without the written approval of an officer of SURETY:
(B) this AGREEMENT may be terminated as to any UNDERSIGNED upon written notice given to SURETY by such undersigned by Registered or Certified Mail addressed to SURETY at its Home Office in Baltimore, Maryland:
(C) such termination shall not be effective until thirty (30) days after receipt of the said written notice by SURETY;
(D) such termination shall not relieve any UNDERSIGNED from liability to SURETY arising out of BOND(S) executed, provided or procured by SURETY in behalf of PRINCIPAL in reliance on this AGREEMENT prior to such termination, nor shall it affect, in any manner, liability of any of UNDERSIGNED as do not give the notice required herein.
USF & G initially takes the position that paragraph XI(A) of the contract requires that any release of Henderson was required to have been approved in writing by an officer of USF & G. We disagree. First, it is clear that paragraph XI(A) applies only to waivers, modifications, or changes of the terms of the agreement, none of which situations is involved here. Henderson’s termination notice was made pursuant to an already existing paragraph in the agreement, paragraph XI(B), which permitted Henderson to terminate by giving USF & G written notice by registered or certified mail addressed to its home office in Baltimore, Maryland. There was not any “waiver, modification or change.” Also, if paragraph XI(A) were construed to require a written agreement by both sides to terminate, the termination clause would become a nullity since the same result could be reached by the parties entering into a separate contract. We decline to adopt such a restrictive requirement here in light of paragraph XI(B)’s plain language.
USF & G’s second argument is that even if Henderson’s notice of termination was effective without USF & G’s approval, it does not relieve Henderson from liability on bonds executed in reliance on the master surety agreement. See paragraph XI(D). The district court apparently based its decision that Henderson’s termination notice was ineffective on this point. However, it is clear that USF & G could not have relied on Henderson’s indemnity agreement in executing the bonds in issue here. These bonds were issued almost three months prior to the master surety agreement. Accordingly, paragraph XI(D), which, without explanation, necessarily presumes that the surety agreement is entered into prior to, or substantially contemporaneously with, the issuance of the bonds, is inapplicable here.
We hold that while there was sufficient consideration to support Henderson’s indemnification promise under this contract, Henderson’s notice of termination effectively released him from liability thirty (30) days after it was received by USF & G. Thus, Henderson’s obligations under this agreement terminated on April 17, 1985.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. Liesfeld and Central negotiated a settlement below. Additionally, USF & G was unable to obtain service of process on some of the third party defendants and received a default judgment against others. The judgment against Henderson as third party defendant is the only issue before us.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1