What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Myrl A. MOYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CASS COUNTY POST NO. 60, DEPARTMENT OF INDIANA AMERICAN LEGION, INC., an Indiana corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 13466.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 18, 1962.
R. Kent Rowe, South Bend, Ind., for appellant.
Roland Obenchain, Jr., South Bend, Ind., for appellee.
Before SCHNACKENBERG, KILEY and MAJOR, Circuit Judges.
SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.
Myrl A. Moyer, plaintiff, has appealed from a judgment entered for Cass County Post No. 60, Department of Indiana American Legion, Inc., an Indiana corporation, defendant, based upon a directed verdict entered upon defendant’s motion at the close of plaintiff’s case, in a suit where she sued for personal injuries sustained as a result of her fall upon the floor of a hall in defendant’s building in Logansport, Indiana.
It appears from the evidence that plaintiff, aged 65 years, went with Mrs. Ruth A. DesJardins, on July 8, 1957, to attend a bingo game operated in said hall by defendant. The hall had a cement floor, covered with asphalt block tile, and was equipped with ceiling lights. Tables for players were arranged in rows.
The floor was maintained by an employee of defendant who waxed and polished it at intervals of three to five weeks. Neither the chairman of the house committee, nor any one else, to his knowledge, inspected the premises prior to plaintiff’s injury to determine the condition of the floor.
Vfhen the two women entered the hall and walked about fifteen feet, Mrs. Des-Jardins’ right foot slipped from under her and she grabbed plaintiff to hold herself up. Mrs. DesJardins looked to see if she might have stepped on something, but the floor was just shiny and had a high sheen to it, a high gloss, was very slippery looking in that spot, and it seemed very highly polished and very slippery.
According to plaintiff’s testimony, she paid $3 for bingo cards and sat at a table to play. At the conclusion of the game, she arose and took four or five steps across the floor, whereupon, to use her words as a witness, “my left foot flew right straight out in front of me. I felt the ball of it hit something slick and it flew right straight out in front of me * * * and when I came to the realization of what happened I was on the floor. * * * flat on my back, * * She observed the floor around her; it was more shiny than the rest. As she hit the floor, she put her hands out to catch herself. Plaintiff testified, “they were dirty, sticky and waxy”.
After plaintiff arrived at a hospital in an ambulance, Mrs. DesJardins observed that plaintiff’s hands were dirty and had a wax-like substance on them.
As a result of the fall, plaintiff sustained an iritracapsular fracture of the neck of the femur in her left hip region which required that an open reduction operation be performed.
Plaintiff contends that the district court, in passing upon defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, was required to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to her. She further contends that the evidence thus considered required that the motion for a directed verdict be denied and that the questions of fact involved in the case be submitted to the jury for determination.
We have heretofore recognized that waxing of a floor is not negligence per se. Stephens v. Sears Roebuck § Co., 7 Cir., 212 F.2d 260. However, waxing of a floor, within the holding in Stephens, means a proper waxing. It does not encompass an application of wax lacking uniformity in distribution, which results in inconspicuous slick spots upon which an ordinarily careful walker might slip. The jury might reasonably have found from the evidence introduced by plaintiff in this case that the waxing had been done in a negligent manner and that as a proximate result thereof plaintiff fell while exercising ordinary care. Therefore, it was error to direct a verdict for defendant.
For this reason the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 1