What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CONCORDIA FIRE INS. CO. OF MILWAUKEE, WIS., v. SUDDUTH et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
February 12, 1925.)
No. 4437.
1. Insurance <®^>282(8) — When possession under land contract constitutes ownership in fee simple, within policy, stated.
Under- the law of Alabama, a vendee of land, in possession thereof under a valid executory contract of purchase, binding him to pay the stated price, and holding the bond or obligation of the vendor, who has the title in fee simple, to make title on full payment of the purchase price, a portion of which remains unpaid,- is the owner of the land in fee simple within the meaning of a provision in an insurance policy that it shall be void if the subject of insurance is a building “on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple,” and the same rule applies to a purchaser from such vendee under a like contract.
2. Insurance <s=392(l) — Insurer cannot accept and retain premium with Euiowledye of breach of condition, and avoid liability on the ground of such breach.
An insurer, which, with knowledge that an insured building is on. ground not owned by insured in fee simple, demands and accepts payment of the premium, cannot retain the same and also claim exemption from liability on the ground that such fact avoids the policy. '
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge.
Action at law by J. W. Sudduth and others, partners as Sudduth Bros., against the Concordia Pire Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wis. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Phares Coleman and M. C. Stewart, both of Birmingham, Ala. (Coleman, Coleman, Spain & Stewart, of Birmingham, Ala., and Smith, Hammond & Smith, of Atlanta, Ga., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
Crampton Harris, of Birmingham, Ala., for defendants in error.
Before WALKER and BRYAN, Circuit Judges, and DAWKINS, District Judge.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
This was an action by the defendants in error, the individuals composing the firm of Sudduth Bros., on a fire insurance policy on a dwelling, issued to J. A. Moore, and which was by him assigned to Sudduth Bros, after the insured property was burned.
The suit was defended on the ground that the lot on which the insured dwelling was located was not owned by the insured in fee simple, within the moaning of the provision of the policy that it “shall be void if the subject of insurance be a building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple.” There was evidence to the following effect: On and prior to March 19, 1923, the Birmingham Realty Company owned said lot in fee simple. On that date that company executed a lease sale contract for the sale of the lot mentioned and another one to Sudduth Bros., the realty company being referred to in that contract as the party of the first part and Sudduth Bros, as parties of the second part. That contract contained the following:
“Parties of the second part agree to pay to the said party of the first part, as rent, the sum of two hundred eleven and thirty-one hundredths ($211.30) dollars per month on the 19th day of each month, for which they have executed their promissory notes bearing even date herewith, as follows: Sixty notes each for the sum of $211.30, dated March 19, 1923, and payable one each on the 19th day of each month, beginning April 19, 1923, and continuing and including the 19th day of April, 1928, said notes having interest at 6 per cent, per annum included, and, in addition, one note for the sum of six thousand dollars, dated March 19, 1923, and payable March 19, 1928, with interest at 6 per cent, per annum, payable semiannually. One thousand and no/100 dollars ($1,000.00) in cash is to be paid on the execution of this agreement, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged. * * * And the party of the first part agree that, upon the performance by the parties of the second part of all the covenants and agreements on their part, and the payment in full of all said promissory notes, it will execute and deliver to them, or to such person as they may direct, a deed in fee simple for said premises, with full covenants of warranty as of this date.”
At the time of the execution of that contract Sudduth Bros, paid to the realty company $1,000 in cash and executed all the notes called for by the contract. On April 4, 1923, Sudduth Bros., then being in possession of said lots, executed an unconditional contract of sale of said lot to Moore, who then took possession of said lot. On May 23, 1923, the policy sued on was issued. On May 28, 1923, the Birmingham Realty Company, pursuant to its above-mentioned contract, signed and acknowledged a deed conveying said lot to Sudduth Bros., which deed was delivered to Sudduth Bros, on June 12, 1923. The insured dwelling was destroyed by fire on June 8, 1923. The court decided that, on the state of facts tended to be proved by the above-mentioned evidence, Moore had, within the meaning of the above-quoted provision of the policy, a fee-simple title to said lot.
A vendee of land, in possession thereof under a valid executory contract of purchase binding him to pay the stated price, and holding the bond or obligation of the vendor, who has the title in fee simple, to make title upon full payment of the purchase price, a portion of which remains unpaid, is the owner of the land in fee simple within the meaning of the above-quoted provision of the policy sued on. Loventhal v. Home Insurance Co., 112 Ala. 108, 20 So. 419, 33 L. R. A. 258, 57 Am. St. Rep. 17; New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 210 Ala. 63, 97 So. 82; 26 C. J. 173. Under the above-mentioned contract, Sudduth Bros, had the absolute and unconditional right to have the lot conveyed to them in fee upon paying the balance of the purchase price, which they unconditionally obligated themselves to pay, and Moore acquired all the rights, and incurred the obligations, of Sudduth Bros, under that contract. The position of Moore was materially different from that of one who is in possession of land under a contract giving him an option to purchase, which option remains unexereised. Decisions, such as the last-cited one, dealing with the case of one who has only an unexereised option to buy, are not applicable to the state of facts which the above-mentioned evidence tended to prove. We conclude that the above-mentioned ruling was not erroneous.
Dealing with another phase of evidence, the court ruled to the effect that if the insurer, with knowledge of the breach of the above-mentioned condition of the policy, demanded and accepted payment of a premium payable, thereunder, it was not entitled to retain both the sum so paid and the right to be exempt from liability under the policy because of the breach of such condition. That ruling was not erroneous. 26 C. J. 325. The record shows no reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1