What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America v. Morris W. VAUGHN, Appellant.
No. 24084.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 23, 1971.
Decided May 25, 1971.
Mr. Robert W. Healy, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. James A. Koerner, Washington, D. C. (both appointed' by this court), was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Michael J. Madigan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before McGOWAN and TAMM, Circuit Judges, and DAVIES, United States District Judge for the District of North Dakota.
Sitting by designation pursuant to Title 28, U.S.Code, Section 292(e).
PER CURIAM:
In this appeal from a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), the so called federal escape law, the only question raised is that of whether that statute is applicable. Appellant, while awaiting trial for robbery, was by order of the court permitted to participate in the work release program. This meant that he was released from the D.C. Jail for a few hours each day for the purpose of working for a private employer. Failing to return to the jail one day, appellant was apprehended two months later on another charge of robbery.
Appellant argues that, at the time he failed to return to the jail, he was not in the custody of the Attorney General within the meaning of Section 751(a). He points out that his participation in the work release program was under the authority of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (5), which provides that the court may grant pretrial release upon conditions, “[ijncluding a condition requiring that a person return to custody after specified hours.” (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant further insists that, since the Bail Reform Act has its own penal provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3150, Congress is to be taken as intending those to be, apart from contempt, the exclusive source of sanctions for vio-, lating a conditional release under that statute.
We are not persuaded of the validity of these contentions, either alone or in combination. The Congressional response in 1965 to a decision holding that an escape from a halfway house was not covered by Section 751(a) is very significant for present purposes. In order to nullify the ruling in United States v. Person, 223 F.Supp. 982 (S.D.Cal.1963), Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 4082 to provide as follows:
The. willful failure of a prisoner to remain within the extended limits of his confinement, or to return within the time prescribed to an institution or facility designated by the Attorney General, shall be deemed an escape from the custody of the Attorney General punishable as provided in [Section 751(a)].
The penal provisions of the Bail Reform Act are couched in terms of a default in appearances “before any court or judicial officer as required.” Appellant’s defection was not of that nature. What he did appears to us to be plainly within the contemplation of Section 751(a) which, as its legislative history makes clear, applies to pretrial, as well as postconviction, custody. See H.R. Rep. No. 1014, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 1 (1963), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1963, p. 1381; and United States v. Barber, 300 F.Supp. 771 (D.Del.1969).
Affirmed.
. Tlio statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or commissioner " * * shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; * * *.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0