What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BRANDON v. UNITED STATES.
No. 11814.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 6, 1951.
T. J. Brandon, Jr., in propria persona.
J. Earl Cooper, U. S. Atty., Anchorage, Alaska, for appellee.
Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and HEALY and ORR, Circuit Judges.
DENMAN, Chief Judge.
Appellant, under the assumed name of Will Key Jefferson, was charged in count I of an indictment with having forged a check purported to have been signed by one Wosdon P. Lang, and in count II with having uttered and published the check with intent to defraud. He was found guilty and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. He appeals to us. On such an appeal, if either sentence is held valid, we need not consider the other. Danziger v. United States, 9 Cir., 161 F.2d 299, 301.
Count I alleges, concerning the Lang check that Brandon, then named as Jefferson, did “knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, fraudulently, and feloniously, with intent to injure and defraud, falsely make, forge, and counterfeit a check for the payment of money on the People’s National Bank of Paducah, Kentucky, the tenor and purport whereof was as follows: * * * said signature written on the face of said check purporting to be the genuine signature of Wosdon P. Lang as maker thereof.”
Brandon contends this count fails to charge the crime of forgery as stated in the Alaska statutes, because the name of the party intended to be defrauded is not alleged. There is no merit to this contention. The indictment substantially states the offense of Section 4856 of the Compiled Laws of Alaska, 1933, providing, so far as pertinent: “If any person shall, with intent to injure or defraud anyone, falsely make * * * forge, counterfeit * * * [any] check * * * or shall, with such intent, knowingly utter or publish as true and genuine any such false * * * forged, counterfeited * * * instrument * * *, such person, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than twenty years.”
That the name of the person intended to be defrauded need not be alleged appears from Section 4861 providing: “In any case where the intent to injure or defraud is necessary, by the provisions of this chapter, to constitute the crime, it shall be sufficient to allege in the indictment therefor an intent to injure or defraud without naming therein the particular person or body corporate intended to be injured or defrauded, and on the trial of the action it shall not be deemed a variance, but be deemed sufficient, if there appear to be an intent to injure or defraud the United States, or any state, territory, county, town, or other municipal or public corporation, or any public officer in his official capacity, or any private corporation, copartnership, or member thereof, or any particular person or persons.”
A brief history of Sections 4856 and 4861 Compiled Laws of Alaska 1933 reflects that the same were adopted as a part of the penal code for the Territory of Alaska by Act of Congress March 3, 1899, 30 Statutes at Large, 1263-1266. These provisions were taken from the laws of Oregon, October 19, 1864 and are presently embodied in the Oregon Compiled Laws, Volume 3, Penal Code as Sections 23-560 and 23-568. With this legislative history in mind, it would appear that the decisions by the Supreme Court of Oregon should be given controlling effect.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has held that an indictment is sufficient where it alleges an intent to injure or defraud without naming therein the particular person intended to be injured or defrauded. State v. McElvain, 35 Or. 365, 58 P. 525.
Appellant contends that the court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a change of venue. A review of the evidence shows its support of the court’s decision.
Brandon’s forgery of the check was proved by the evidence before the jury of the Lang check itself and three signatures of Brandon, using the name Will Key Jefferson, and the testimony of a competent handwriting expert, one Appel, that Brandon signed Lang’s name. Appellant contends that Appel’s testimony is invalid because he had seen other copies of the Jefferson signature, but the testimony is clear that what Appel relied on were the three Jefferson signatures in evidence. There is no merit in this contention.
Appellant contends that at the trial there was no evidence to show an intent to defraud anyone in making the check. Since the check was shown to have been forged by appellant, his use of the moneys obtained from one Cole, credit manager of the Northern Commercial Company, warrants an inference by the jury of his intent to defraud in forging the check. There was no error in denying appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Appellant assigns error in several instructions given and to the refusal to give another requested by the appellant. In none of these did appellant state the grounds of his objections in compliance with Rule 30 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. However, we have examined appellant’s contentions and find them without merit, and that the appellant was not prejudiced by the court’s action respecting the instructions.
Appellant contends that the evidence of forgery of the check is entirely circumstantial and that it warrants as much the inference of innocence as that of guilt, seeking to invoke the principle stated in our opinion in Paddock v. United States, 9 Cir., 79 F.2d 872, 876. There is no merit in this contention. The evidence of forgery, if believed by the jury, warranted only the inference of guilt.
At the trial, appellant testified the check was given him by Lang as a six months’ prepayment of rent on a lease to him of an apartment. It was in a building requiring some construction, and appellant needed the prepaid rent for that purpose. The check had on its face a notation that it was for an amount equal to the six months’ rental plus other charges there stated. It is not questioned that appellant had made such an arrangement with another tenant for such an advance.
At the trial the lease was not produced. After the verdict, appellant moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, offering duplicate originals of the lease with Lang, which the court declined to consider. Reserving our jurisdiction of the appeal, we ordered the district court to consider and dispose of the motion.
At the hearing on the motion, the duplicate copies of the lease were offered in evidence. They were for a rental corresponding with the notation on the check. The court denied the motion. It found that the leases were known by the appellant to exist at the time of the trial and that he then made no attempt to find them. In so doing, the court was entitled to consider Brandon’s testimony, having in view his several prior criminal convictions.
On appellant’s motion, there was produced the report of a handwriting expert of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on photostatic copies of the leases and of the check. It showed that the handwriting of the signature Wosdon P. Lang on the check was unlike the handwriting of the Wosdon P. Lang on the copies of the leases. The photostatic enlargements of the two signatures on the two leases and the one on the check are before us. The Lang signature on the check seems a poor copy of those on the leases.
The motive for not producing them at the trial is apparent. The Lang signatures on the leases would have added weight to the testimony of the forgery based on the comparison of the check’s signature with that of Brandon’s handwriting. One cannot withhold such evidence at the trial and, being convicted, seek a second chance before another jury by then producing it.
We have stated the rule in such cases in Wagner v. United States, 9 Cir., 118 F.2d 801, 802. Speaking of the affidavits on such a motion for a new trial, we said: “We do not regard them as meeting the requirements, and particularly requirement (e) of Johnson v. United States, 8 Cir., 32 F.2d 127, 130. We quote from the opinion: ‘There must ordinarily be present and concur five verities, to wit: (a) The evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, i. e., discovered since the trial; (b) facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant; (c) the evidence relied on, must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to the issues involved; and (e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal.’ ”
Even if the evidence had been newly discovered, it was not of such a nature that it probably would produce an acquittal.
The order denying the motion for a new trial and the judgment sentencing appellant on count I of the indictment are affirmed. For the reasons stated, the judgment on the concurrent sentence for the same period on count II is ignored.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0