What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Eugene Lamar JACKSON, Appellant, UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ruth JACKSON, Appellant.
Nos. 16375, 16376.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued July 17, 1967.
Decided Oct. 17, 1967.
G. W. Wilde, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant Eugene Lamar Jackson.
Thomas F. Lamb, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant Ruth Jackson.
Lawrence G. Zurawsky, Asst. U. S. Atty., Gustave Diamond, U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee in both cases.
Before BIGGS, McLAUGHLIN and WAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GERALD McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge.
Eugene Lamar Jackson and his wife Ruth Jackson were both convicted on two counts for violating 26 U.S.C. Sections 4742(a) and 4744(a) (2), of the federal narcotics law. Although appellants were tried separately the questions presented by both appeals are similar in nature and will be treated together in this opinion.
The allegations of error have as their basis the common factual circumstances under which the illegal sales of narcotics were purportedly made. On March 15, 1966 Eugene Jackson was approached by undercover agent Norton J. Wilder of the Federal Narcotics Bureau and an informer, special employee of the Bureau. Agent Wilder testified that after the informer had introduced him to Jackson he negotiated and consummated a sale ot marijuana with the defendant. On May 12, 1966 at about 6:30 P.M. agent Wilder and the informer went to the Jackson residence in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the purpose of furthering the investigation against Eugene Jackson. At the doorway they were met by the appellant, Ruth Jackson, who told the men that her husband was not at home. Wilder then spoke with Ruth Jackson expressing his desire to buy some “bush” (marijuana). She apparently agreed to the sale and produced two brown envelopes of the narcotic which the agent purchased. At their trials appellants’ attorneys asked that the name of the informer be revealed so that he could be questioned to determine his possible usefulness as a witness for the defense. The trial judge ruled against disclosure in both instances and it is with that decision that Ruth and Eugene Jackson now assert error on appeal.
In United States v. Day (opinion filed October 10, 1967), 384 F.2d 464, this Court had the opportunity of discussing some aspects of the informer dilemma in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). Rovario holds that the Government has a privilege of nondisclosure, but that the privilege must give way “[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, * * 353 U.S. 53 at 60, 61, 77 S.Ct. at 628. However, the Supreme Court felt that “ * * * no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable.” and deposited with the trial judge the task of “ * * * balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” 353 U.S. 53 at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628. In the informer ' situation the burden placed upon the trial judge is great since he must often balance conflicting interests without being aware of what relevant information, if any, the informer possesses. In Day the writer’s opinion approved of a procedure employed by the District Court which I think made a substantial contribution to meliorating the disclosure dilemma. The other members of the Day panql refrained from passing upon the procedure followed by the District Court. There the trial judge conducted an in camera confrontation with the informer, who was made to take the oath and testify as to any relevant knowledge he had pertaining to the crime. A record of that in camera session was transcribed and sealed so that only an appellate court would have access to its contents. The advantage of the procedure is that it enables the court to view with a keener perspective the factual circumstances upon which it must rule and attaches to the court’s ruling a more abiding sense of fairness than could otherwise have been realized.
At the trial of Eugene Lamar Jackson the informer was questioned in camera by the trial judge as to the possible physical danger he would encounter if disclosure were allowed and as to any testimony he could offer that might aid the defendant’s cause. An examination of the in camera record reveals that disclosure of the informer’s identity would not have been helpful or essential to a fair determination of the cause; and therefore, it is our opinion that the trial judge’s ruling was not erroneous.
The appeal of Ruth Jackson presents a different problem since there the trial judge did not have the opportunity to conduct an in camera interrogation of the informer. However, the district court’s opinion notes that “ * * * although the United States Marshal extended untiring efforts to have the informer in this proceeding brought to court for a special interrogation, * * * the United States Marshal was not able to secure the presence of said informer.” Thus, absent any evidence showing that the informer would have offered testimony in support of the defense, we fail to see how appellant can base her appeal for a new trial on the ground that the informer’s identity should have been disclosed when in fact that person had disappeared. The shallowness of this claim is further highlighted by the testimony of agent Wilder, that at the time Ruth Jackson made the sale of narcotics there was another woman present in the Jackson home. At the trial there were no witnesses called to support the defense of mistaken identity — that Ruth Jackson was not the person who sold marijuana to agent Wilder on the evening of May 12, 1966. Plainly, appellant is not prejudiced because the informer was not present to testify at her trial since there was reliable testimony indicating that another witness was available who could have substantiated Ruth Jackson’s story. We feel under all the circumstances that the decision of the trial judge was correct.
Also cited as error by both appellants was the refusal by the trial judge to permit the defense attorneys to argue to the jury that, since the Government did not produce the informer (a material witness), they (the jury) may infer that his testimony would be unfavorable to the Government’s case. Appellants’ contention rests on the rule in Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893), followed by this Court in United States v. Jackson, 257 F.2d 41 (3 Cir. 1958), that:
“The rule, even in criminal cases, is that, if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable.” 150 U.S. 118 at 121, 14 S.Ct. 40 at 41.
It is sufficient to say that in the appeal of Ruth Jackson it was not within the Government’s power to produce the informer since under the facts that individual had disappeared. But even if the informer could have been produced, as was the case in the trial of Eugene Jackson, that type of comment on the part of the defense would not be proper. The holding in Graves allows the presumption of unfavorableness to arise only when the Government fails to call someone who would qualify as a witness. When a court denies disclosure in accord with the Roviaro privilege it is in effect ruling that the Government has the privilege to disqualify the informer as a witness. Clearly, if the court allowed the defense counsel to make such inferential statements it would be penalizing the Government for invoking its lawful privilege and would be taking the inconsistent position of condoning, remarks which cut against the rationale of the court’s previous ruling on disclosure —that the informer possessed no information relevant or helpful to the defense of the accused.
We have thoroughly examined the remaining contentions raised by appellants and find them without merit.
The judgments of the District Court will be affirmed.
. Mr. Mattingly, agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, testified in this case, as he had in United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3 Cir. 1967) (concurrence op.), that if informers such as the one involved in this case are discovered, they are in jeopardy of losing their life or suffering grave bodily harm. Counsel for defendant conceded:
“I agree with your conclusion that in all probability this informer is going to indicate that his life will be in jeopardy if he testifies and faces the defendant in this particular case as an accuser.”
See also, United States v. Day, supra, at 464 (concurrence op.).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0