What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
COTHREN v. EVANS et al.
No. 13794.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Feb. 17, 1949.
G. P. Houston, of Heber Springs, Ark., and Gerland P. Patten, of Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
M. F. Highsmith and W. D. Murphy, Jr., both of Batesville, Ark., for appellees Miriam' Evans, administratrix of Wilfred J. Evans, deceased, and J. N. Mason.
Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge.
The sole question for decision is whether this case was properly removed to the Federal Court. The appeal is from a judgment entered upon the verdicts of a jury in an action involving claims for personal injuries and an alleged wrongful death.
On June 27, 1947, an automobile owned by Wilfred J. Evans, a citizen of Indiana, and driven by J. N. Mason, a citizen of Illinois, collided with a motor truck belonging to W. M. Hunt, the driver of which was Willard O. Cothren. Both Hunt and Cothren were citizens of Arkansas. The collision occurred in Randolph County, Arkansas. As a result of the accident, Evans' died, Mason and Cothren were injured, and the motor vehicles were damaged.
Counsel for Hunt and Cothren, on September 11, 1947, procured the appointment by the Referee in Probate for Randolph County, Arkansas, of Carl Brown, Sheriff of the County, as Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, deceased. No property of Evans ever came into the hands of Brown. On September 20, 1947, Miriam Evans, the widow of Wilfred J. Evans, was appointed Administratrix of his estate by the Probate Court of Knox County, Indiana, the place of his' and her domicile.
Cothren and Hunt, on October 10, 1947, as plaintiffs, brought this action in a State court of Arkansas against Miriam Evans, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, J. N. Mason, and Carl Brown, Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, deceased. Process was duly served upon all the defendants. The claim of Cothren was that the collision and his injuries were due to the negligence of Mason and Evans, and he asked for a judgment of $22,500. The claim of Hunt was that his truck was damaged to the extent of $2,500 by the negligence of Mason and Evans, and he prayed for judgment in that amount. The case was removed by the nonresident defendants to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The answer of Brown, as Public Administrator of the estate of Evans, was prepared by counsel for the plaintiffs and consisted of a general denial. Miriam Evans, as Administratrix, and J. N. Mason filed an answer denying that the collision was due to the negligence of Wilfred J. Evans and Mason, and asserting, by way of cross-claims, that the death of Evans and the injuries of Mason, due to the collision, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiffs. Mason asked for a judgment of $20,-000 against the plaintiffs, and M-iriam Evans, as Administratrix, asked for a judgment of $30,000 against them as damages for the alleged wrongful death of her husband.
The plaintiffs moved the District Court to remand the case on the ground that Carl Brown, as Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, was a citizen of Arkansas and a necessary party defendant, and that the case had therefore been improperly removed from the State court. The District Court remanded to the State court the claim of Hunt for $2,500 damages to his truck, but denied the plaintiffs’ motion otherwise. The case was tried to a jury upon the claim of Cothren and the separate cross-claims of the defendants Miriam Evans, as Administratrix, and J. N. Mason. The jury returned a verdict against Cothren on his claim, and verdict's against the defendants upon their respective cross-claims against Cothren. Judgment was entered on the verdicts.
Cothren has appealed from the judgment, asserting that the District Court erred in denying his motion to remand the case to the State court. He contends that Brown, the Sheriff of Randolph County, Arkansas, who was appointed Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans at the instance of Cothren’s counsel, was an indispensable party defendant and that the case was therefore not removable.
It is obvious that Brown, as Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, had “no real substantial legal interest in the controversy.” Ex parte State of Nebraska, 209 U.S. 436, 445, 28 S.Ct. 581, 584, 52 L.Ed. 876. He was in no way connected with the controversy between Cothren and Mason and had no actual interest in the controversy between Cothren and Miriam Evans as the domiciliary representative of the estate of her husband. The controversies were in reality between citizens of different states, and the removal of the case could not be prevented by making Brown a party defendant. See 'and compare, Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185, 186, 27 S.Ct. 184, 51 L.Ed. 430, 9 Ann.Cas. 757; Ex parte State of Nebraska, supra, 209 U. S. 436, 445, 28 S.Ct. 581, 52 L.Ed. 876; Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers’ Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 189, 190, 44 S.Ct. 266, 68 L.Ed. 628, 31 A.L.R. 867.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0