What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
HARMON v. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.
No. 80.
Argued January 14-15, 1958.
Decided March 3, 1958.
David I. Shapiro argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 80.
Victor Rabinowitz argued the cause for petitioner in No. 141. With him on the brief was Leonard B. Boudin.
Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade, B. Jenkins Middleton and George W. Hickman, Jr., Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Carl Rachlin for the Workers Defense League in No. 80, and Ben Margolis and John T. McTernan for the Servicemen’s Defense Committee in Nos. 80 and 141.
Per Curiam.
The Secretary of the Army, relying upon 10 U. S. C. § 652a (Act of June 4, 1920, § 1, subch. II, 41 Stat. 809, as amended) and 38 U. S. C. § 693h (Act of June 22, 1944, 58 Stat. 286, as amended), and upon Department of Defense and Army Regulations deemed to be authorized by those statutes, discharged petitioners from the Army and issued to each of them a discharge certificate in form other than “honorable.” In so doing, he took into account preinduction activities of petitioners rather than basing his action exclusively upon the record of their military service. After having exhausted available administrative remedies, petitioners separately brought these proceedings in the District Court seeking judgments declaring those determinations and actions of the Secretary to be void as in excess of his powers under the circumstances, and directing him to issue “honorable” discharge certificates to them. Being of the view that it was without jurisdiction to consider the actions, the District Court dismissed them, 137 F. Supp. 475, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, 100 U. S. App. D. C. 190, 256, 243 F. 2d 613, 834. We granted certiorari, 353 U. S. 956 and 354 U. S. 920.
The respective contentions made here may be summarized as follows:
(1) Petitioners contend (a) that the Secretary acted in excess of his powers, because the statutes referred to did not authorize, nor support Department of Defense and Army Regulations when taken to authorize, consideration of petitioners’ preinduction activities in determining the type of discharges to be issued to them upon separation from the Army, and (b) that the action of respondent in issuing to them less than “honorable” discharges, and the action of the District Court and of the Court of Appeals in refusing review for what they thought was lack of judicial power, deprived petitioners of due process under the Fifth Amendment, and of a judicial trial under the Sixth Amendment, of the Constitution ;
(2) Respondent contends (a) that by 10 U. S. C. § 652a, Congress required that, upon separation from the Army, a former soldier be given “a certificate of discharge, ... in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of the Department of the Army . . (b) that, inasmuch as all certificates of discharge are not required to be “honorable” ones, he was authorized to, and did, prescribe various types of discharge certificates running the gamut from the accolade of “Honorable discharge” to the odious “Dishonorable discharge”; (c) that by 38 U. S. C. § 693h, Congress directed the establishment of an Army Review Board with power to review, upon its own motion or that of the former soldier, the type of discharge issued, and “to change, correct, or modify any discharge or dismissal, and to issue a new discharge in accord with the facts presented to the board,” and prescribed that “the findings thereof [shall] be final subject only to review by the Secretary of the Army”; (d) that the findings of the Board, made under those procedures so afforded to and availed of by petitioners, were final subject only to review by the Secretary of the Army; and-(e) that, therefore, such administrative procedure is exclusive and the courts are without jurisdiction to review those findings.
In keeping with our duty to avoid deciding constitutional questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case, we look first to petitioners’ non-constitutional claim that respondent acted in excess of powers granted him by Congress. Generally, judicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 108; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 621-622; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 310. The District Court had not only jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction but also power to construe the statutes involved to determine whether the respondent did exceed his powers. If he did so, his actions would not constitute exercises of his administrative discretion, and, in such circumstances as those before us, judicial relief from this illegality would be available. Moreover, the claims presented in these cases may be entertained by the District Court because petitioners have alleged judicially cognizable injuries. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 159, 160, and see Army Regulation 615-360, par. 7.
This brings us to the merits. The Solicitor General conceded that if the District Court had jurisdiction to review respondent’s determinations as to the discharges he issued these petitioners and if petitioners had standing to bring these suits, the action of respondent is not sustainable. On the basis of that concession and our consideration of the law and this record we conclude that the actions of the Secretary of the Army cannot be sustained in law. By § 652a, which provides that no person be discharged from military service “without a certificate of discharge,” Congress granted to the Secretary of the Army authority to issue discharges. By § 693h it provided for review by the Army Review Board of the exercise of such authority. Surely these two provisions must be given an harmonious reading to the end that the basis on which the Secretary’s action is reviewed is coterminous with the basis on which he is allowed to act. Section 693h expressly requires that the findings of the Army Review Board “shall be based upon all available records of the [Army] relating to the person requesting such review . . . We think the word “records,” as used in the statute, means records of military service, and that the statute, properly construed, means that the type of discharge to be issued is to be determined solely by the soldier’s military record in the Army. An authoritative construction of the congressional grant of power is to be found in the regulations of the Department of the Army. Army Regulation 615-375, par. 2 (b) states: “The purpose of a discharge certificate is to record the separation of an individual from the military service and to specify the character of service rendered during the period covered by the discharge.” (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, the Army’s Regulation 615-360, par. 7 (which was in effect during the times here involved), further states: “Because the type of discharge may significantly influence the individual’s civilian rights and eligibility for benefits provided by law, it is essential that all pertinent factors be considered so that the type of discharge will reflect accurately the nature of service rendered. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Court for the relief to which petitioners are entitled in the light of this opinion.
Reversed.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 5