What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Aric CARNEGIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGIA HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-9001
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Nov. 8, 1982.
Marilyn S. Bright, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
Karen Fagin White, Macey & Zusmann, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee.
Before HILL, KRAVITCH and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant seeks to discharge, through bankruptcy proceedings, an indebtedness resulting from a student loan. The bank handling the loan, Adel Banking Co. filed a timely proof of claim. The claim subsequently was transferred to appellee Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corp. (GHEAC). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 302(d), the bankruptcy court approved the transfer to GHEAC. The bankruptcy court also entered an order holding appellant’s student loan to be dischargeable. On appeal, the district court, 6 B.R. 1011, reversed the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the loan was dischargeable but affirmed approval of the transfer from Adel to GHEAC. We affirm both actions of the district court.
Appellant’s argument that his student loan is dischargeable fails under the decision of the former Fifth Circuit in In re Williamson, 665 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). Similarly unavailing is appellant’s charge that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in approving the transfer of claim from Adel to GHEAC. Although GHEAC’s proof of claim did not become official until after the applicable time period had elapsed, this filing did not create a new claim. Rather, it constituted a substitution of parties with no change in the nature of the claim against appellant. Accordingly, GHEAC’s filing related back in time to the original filing by Adel and therefore was not untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Fitzgerald, 272 F.2d 121, 129 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919, 80 S.Ct. 669, 4 L.Ed.2d 738 (1960); In re Whicker, 47 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1931). See generally Advisory Committee’s Note to Bankruptcy Rule 302. In light of the circumstances giving rise to the tardy claim by GHEAC, we cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in allowing the claim. Cf. Adams v. Evans, 642 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding abuse of discretion as the standard of review for a bankruptcy court’s decision on whether to allow claims). Because the district court properly upheld this approval of transfer, its judgment is
AFFIRMED.
. Williamson is adopted as the law of this circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0