What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CRANE CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CRANE HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING CO., a corporation, Frank J. Crane, Jr., Thomas Crane, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14639.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 23, 1962.
Gerrit P. Groen, Chicago, Ill. (Dean A. Olds, Byron, Hume, Groen & Clement, Chicago, Ill., on the brief), Truman A. Herron, Wood, Herron & Evans, Cincinnati, Ohio, of counsel, for plaintiff'appellant.
William J. Rielly, Cincinnati, Ohio (Lloyd, Ferguson & Rielly, Cincinnati, Ohio, on the brief), Walter S. Murray, Cincinnati, Ohio, of counsel, for defendants-appellees.
Before WEICK, Circuit Judge, and BOYD and THORNTON, District Judges.
WEICK, Circuit Judge.
In the present case, Crane Co. sought to enjoin the defendants from using the name Crane in the conduct of their business claiming infringement of its trademark and unfair competition. The District Judge adopted findings of fact and conclusions of law. He denied the injunction and dismissed the complaint.
Crane Co.'s name was derived from R. J. Crane who established the business in 1855. Crane Co. was incorporated under the laws of Illinois with its principal office in Chicago. It has a large business and is engaged in the sale of a variety of products throughout the United States and in some foreign countries. These products include bathroom fixtures, plumbing, heating, air conditioning and related equipment and valves and fittings. It maintains a Cincinnati sales office. Prior to 1955 it did not concentrate on the sale of heating equipment in Cincinnati. Crane Co. manufactures about 50% of its products and has others manufacture for it the remaining 50%. It makes no sales at the retail level and distributes its products through jobbers and retailers. It does not service any of its products except when a complaint made by a purchaser of one of its products is not properly handled by the retailer who sold it.
Crane Co. established the right to use the name "Crane" as a trademark or trade-name on its products. It asserts that its name is "renowned."
Defendants are a small outfit engaged in the installation and repair of heating and air conditioning equipment in homes and buildings in the Cincinnati area Frank J. Crane, Jr. and Thomas Crane are brothers. They formed a partnership in 1953 under the name and style of Crane Heating & Air Conditioning Co. and the following year organized a corporation under the laws of Ohio using the same name. The corporation took over the partnership business. The brothers are President and Vice President respectively of the corporation. They do not manufacture any equipment or market any product bearing their names. They instal in a home or building whatever brand of equipment may be selected by a contractor or customer which included American Standard, Janitrol, Carrier and General Electric. All of the products handled by them bore the trademark or trade-name of the manufacturer.
About 95%% of their business consisted of installations of heating and air conditioning units in new homes on orders of contractors who specified the equipment, 1% in replacement of units in old homes and 3%% in servicing or repairing of equipment.
The District Court found that the Crane brothers were using their own surname in good faith; that they had not held themselves out to the public as being associated or connected with Crane Co. or attempted to palm off the equipment handled by them as being the products of that company; that all of the products handled by them were marked with the names of the manufacturers thereof.
There was no evidence of any damage to Crane Co. resulting from the use by Crane brothers of their own surname in their corporate set up.
There was evidence that another concern named M. H. Crane Company was engaged in the heating business in Cincinnati. This company had no connection with defendants. There was no proof that Crane Co. ever undertook to stop M. H. Crane Co. from using the name Crane although defendants offered to show that M. H. Crane Co. had been in business here since the 1800’s. The court also found that Crane Co. knew of the use of the name Crane by the defendants since April 1954 and thereafter sold supplies to defendants; that Crane Co. through its local manager sought to encourage defendants to use the name Crane to sell Crane Co. products and did not object to their using the name Crane until 1958. The court found Crane Co. guilty of laches.
In our opinion, the Crane brothers had the right to use their surname Crane in their business so long as they did not attempt to palm off the products which they handled as products of Crane Co. or mislead the public into believing that they were dealing with Crane Co. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129 (CA6, 1959); Dant Distillery Co. v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 297 F.2d 935 (CA6, 1962) affirming D.C., 189 F. Supp. 821.
It was, of course, proper for R. J. Crane to use his surname in the business which he established known as Crane Co. The Crane brothers have the same privilege so long as they do not attempt to deceive or mislead.
Counsel for Crane Co. says he does not agree with our decisions in the Johnson and Dant cases and asks us to reconsider them, but we are satisfied that they correctly state the law.
One of the findings of fact of the District Court is set forth in the footnote. We think that the agreement of the defendants set forth in this finding should have been made a part of the judgment of the District Court even though protective provisions are not ordinarily adopted in the absence of fraud or deception. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 35 S.Ct. 91, 59 L. Ed. 142; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Royal, 122 F. 337 (CA6). It should eliminate any possible confusion in the names of the parties. We will, therefore, enter the judgment which should have been entered by the District Court and adopt and make the agreement of the defendants set forth in Finding No. 9 a part of our order affirming the judgment. Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure § 68.85.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed as modified herein.
. “No. 9. Defendant uses no trademark or trade-name and, therefore, is not infringing on Plaintiff’s mark. However, Defendant, in a few instances of advertising used styling and type of lettering of the word ‘Crane’ in such a way that might be considered an infringement on Plaintiff’s copyright. Defendant, in open court, however, agreed that it would not in the future carry out such advertising and agreed that it would adopt a style and type of advertising that would fully and completely advise all persons reading the advertisement that they were not dealing with Plaintiff and avoid all confusion. Defendant further agreed in open Court that in all of its advertising copy it would print the name ‘Crane’ in the same style and size of lettering as the other words of its name, viz. — ‘Crane Heating & Air Conditioning Company.’ The infringing instances were minor, and have caused Plaintiff no damage so injunctive relief is not proper.”

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0