What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
Claude C. SCOTT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 19763.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 13, 1966.
Decided Oct. 26, 1966.
Mr. Charles R. Work (appointed by this court), with whom Mr. Paul K. Murphy, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Edward T. Miller, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and William H. Collins, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Danaher, Circuit Judge, and Bastían, Senior Circuit Judge, and Wright, Circuit Judge.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge.
Scott was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in violation of D.C. Code § 22-2204 (1961). The jury also found the appellant guilty of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). In the District Court concurrent sentences were imposed with respect to the conviction on each count.
The appellant and the Government stipulated at trial that a certain identified Dodge automobile was owned by a resident of Richmond, Virginia, whose daughter had authorized the car to be parked on a Richmond street in front of a funeral home; further it was stipulated that the car bore a certain serial number and Virginia registration tags. Neither the owner of the car nor his daughter knew the appellant and conced-edly neither had given him permission to use the car.
The car was stolen on May 28, 1964. On the afternoon of November 25, 1964, a Metropolitan Police officer stopped the car for a speeding violation. The car then bore 1964 North Carolina license tags. When called upon to produce evidence of registration, the appellant opened the glove compartment and produced the Virginia registration which had been issued to the owner. A check of the serial number identified the car as that described in the Virginia registration. A similar check with North Carolina authorities developed that the North Carolina tags had been issued for a 1963 Ford.
The appellant offered no explanation for his possession of the stolen vehicle. Rather, he claimed to have been suffering from a form of amnesia and that he had no recollection of events over the period from May, 1964 to the date of his arrest.
In rebuttal, a psychiatrist on the staff at St. Elizabeths testified that he found the appellant had not suffered from mental disease or mental defect. The arresting officer testified that Scott had talked coherently, had answered questions put to him and had seemed normal in all respects.
There would seem to be no possible basis upon which this appellant’s use and operation of the stolen car on the public streets of the District of Columbia could be anything but “unauthorized” as the term is used in the pertinent section of our Code. We find no error.
Appellant contends that his conviction on either count may not stand in that the lapse of time between the theft in Richmond and his being arrested while driving the car in the District of Columbia had been so great that the car could not in any legally satisfactory sense be described as “recently stolen.” We need not decide the point, in the absence at trial of a request for limiting instructions or of objections to the charge as given.
Affirmed.
. This section in pertinent part provides: “Any person who, without the consent of the owner, shall * * * use, operate * * * on a public * * * highway * * * an automobile or motor vehicle, and operate or drive or cause the same to be operated or driven for his own profit, use, or purpose shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both such fine and imprisonment.”
. Cf. Travers v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 335 F.2d 698 (1964); Bray v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 139, 140, 306 F.2d 743, 746, 747 (1962); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896); Gilbert v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 215 F.2d 334 (1954) ; Boehm v. United States, 271 F. 454 (2 Cir. 1921).

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0