What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ALEXANDRINE v. COE, Commissioner of Patents.
Patent Appeal No. 6107.
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
Argued April 3, 1934.
Decided May 14, 1934.
Maurice Leon, of New York City, and Edmund H. Parry, Jr., of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
T. A. Hostetler, Solicitor of the Patent Office, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRO-NER, Associate Justices.
ROBB, Associate Justice.
Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District dismissing appellant’s bill to enjoin the Commissioner of Patents from canceling appellant’s trade-mark No. 206729, for gloves, registered December 8, 1925, and consisting of a fanciful design with the word “Alexandrine” across it.
in August, 1928, Marshall Field & Co., an Illinois corporation, applied for the registration, under the 10-year clause of section 5 (b) of the Trade Mark Act of 1905 (33 Stat. 724, 725), as amended (section 85 (b), tit. 15, U. S. C., 15 USCA § 85 (b), of the name “Alexandre” for gloves. Thereupon interference was declared between the two marks and, after due proceedings, priority was awarded to Marshall Field & Co., as a result of which registration was granted to that company.
In December, 1931, Marshall Field & Co. instituted proceedings in the Patent Office for the cancellation of appellant’s trademark. The application was sustained by the Examiner of Interferences, and on October 18, 1932, was affirmed by the Commissioner. Thereupon, on December 5, 1932) appellant filed this bill under section 4915, R. S., as amended (section 63, tit. 35, U. S. C., 35 US CA § 63). On December 7, 1932, due notice was given Marshall Field & Co. The court below ruled that Marshall Field & Co., being an adver'se party in the Patent Office, is an indispensable party to this suit and that the Commissioner of Patents is neither a necessary nor a proper party.
The answers to the questions involved are to be found in United States ex rel. Baldwin Co. v. Robertson, 265 ü. S. 168, 44 S. Ct. 508, 68 L. Ed. 962. The Baldwin Company filed a bill in the Supreme Court of the District against the Commissioner of Patents to enjoin that officer from canceling two registered trade-marks claimed by it. The Howard Company intervened and resisted the injunction to prevent the cancellation. The Commissioner of Patents filed an answer denying the right of the Baldwin Company to the relief sought.
The court said (265 U. S. at page 177, 44 S. Ct. 508, 509, 68 L. Ed. 962) that the main question to be considered was whether “by the statutes applicable to procedure in settling controversies over the registration of trade-marks in interstate and foreign trade, a remedy by bill in equity to enjoin the Commissioner of Patents from canceling a registered trade-mark is given to the owner of the trade-mark so registered.” The court further said (page 179 of 265 U. S., 44 S. Ct. 508, 510): “The defeated party in the hearing before the Commissioner is not asking registration of a trade-mark, but is seeking to prevent the cancellation of trade-marks already registered. * * * It seems clear that the complainant below was a dissatisfied party to an application for the cancellation of the registration of a trade-mark. We think that both the applicant for cancellation and the registrant opposing it are given the right of appeal to the District Court of Appeals under that section [section 9 of the Trade Mark Act; section 89, tit. 15, U. S. C., 15 USCA § 89]. The next inquiry is whether in addition to such appeal and after it proves futile, the applicant is given a remedy by bill in equity as provided for a defeated applicant for a patent in section 4915, R. S. We have in the cases cited [American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 262 U. S. 209, 43 S. Ct. 541, 67 L. Ed. 953; Baldwin Co. v. Howard Co., 256 U. S. 35, 39, 41 S. Ct. 405, 65 L. Ed. 816; Atkins & Co. v. Moore, 212 U. S. 285, 29 S. Ct. 390, 53 L. Ed. 515] given the closing words of section 9 [of the Trade Mark Act] a liberal construction in the view that Congress intended by them to give every remedy in respect to trade-marks that is afforded in proceedings as to patents, and have held that under them a hill of equity is afforded to a defeated applicant for trade-mark registration just as to a defeated applicant for a patent. It is not an undue expansion of that construction to hold that the final words were intended to furnish a remedy in equity against the Commissioner in every case in which by section 9 an appeal first lies to the Court of Appeals. This necessarily would give to one defeated by the Commissioner as a party to an application for the cancellation of the registration of a trade-mark * * * a right to resort to an independent bill in equity against the Commissioner to prevent cancellation. * * * The applicants in section 9 wore of four kinds and to each of them were intended to be accorded the same resort to the Court of Appeals and the same remedy in equity as to the applicant for a patent in section 4915.” (Italics ours.)
There, as here, it was contended that section 9 of the Trade Mark Act should not bo held to authorize the use of a suit in equity for all of the four eases in which appeals were provided to the Court of Appeals (now to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) because by section 22 of the Trade Mark Act (section 102, tit. 15, U. S. C., 15 USCA § 102) there was a special provision for remedy in equity where there were interfering registered trade-marks. The court rejected the contention, saying (265 U. S. at page 181, 4.4 S. Ct. 508, 510): “Section 9 of the Trade-Mark Act is wider than section 22 in its scope. It includes one who applies for registration of an unregistered trade-mark which interferes with one already registered.” See, also, Corning Glass Works v. Robertson, 62 App: D. C. 130, 65 F.(2d) 476, certiorari denied 290 U. S. 645, 54 S. Ct. 63, 78 L. Ed.-.
In the present case appellant was the unsuccessful party in a cancellation proceeding, and elected to proceed under section 4915, R. S., as amended, instead of appealing to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals under section 9 of the Trade Mark Act, as amended (15 USCA § 89).
The Commissioner points out that in the Baldwin Case the adverse party intervened and that in the present ease it has not. A bill under section 4915, while a proceeding de novo, “intends a suit according to the ordinary course of equity practice and procedure, * * yet the proceeding is, in fact and necessarily, a part of the application for the patent.” Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432, 439, 7 S. Ct. 1290, 1293, 30 L. Ed. 1223; American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 262 U. S. 209, 213, 43 S. Ct. 541, 67 L. Ed. 953; Lucke v. Coe, 63 App. D. C. 61, 69 F.(2d) 379. Marshall Field & Co., having initiated and prosecuted the cancellation proceeding, is in no position to complain because appellant has filed a bill in equity against the Commissioner, which is necessarily a part of the proceeding in the Patent Office. Under the provisions of section 9 of the Trade Mark Act, as amended, and section 4915, R. S., as amended, appellant in the cancellation proceeding, had it so elected, might have prosecuted an appeal to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Marshall Field & Co. would necessarily have been a party to that appeal. The filing of a bill in equity is an alternative remedy and, under the authority of the Baldwin Case, properly may be brought against the Commissioner here.
The decree is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1