What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Herbert Edward HOYT, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 73-2435.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 10, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 27, 1974.
William G. Whatley, Baton Rouge, La., for petitioner-appellant.
Douglas M. Gonzales, U. S. Atty., Baton Rouge, La., Mary William Cazalas, Asst. U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for respondent-appellee.
Before RIVES, WISDOM and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Herbert Edward Hoyt, Jr., after a jury trial in 1971, was found guilty of kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), and sentenced by the District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana to a term of twenty (20) years imprisonment. At the time of sentencing appellant was eighteen (18) years of age and was eligible for sentencing under the terms of the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950, 18 U.S.C. § 5005, et seq. This action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, and applicant, by later motion, seeks removal to the Eastern District of Louisiana.
The main thrust of argument by Hoyt on this appeal is that the District Court erred in failing to make an explicit finding that appellant Hoyt would not benefit from treatment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, Section 5010(d). We have carefully reviewed the record of the sentencing and find that, although counsel for defendant at the time of the sentencing called the attention of the Court to the tender age of the defendant, neither the defendant’s counsel nor the District Court suggested in the record that the Federal Youth Corrections Act be considered at the time of sentencing.
We think that the case at hand is controlled by the recent Supreme Court decision of Dorszynski v. United States, 1974, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855, which holds that 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) requires an explicit finding of “no benefit” as a condition precedent to sentencing an eligible offender as an adult. Chief Justice Burger in Dorszynski held:
“Literal compliance with the Act can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge consider the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.
“This case provides an example of the problems arising when the required finding is left to implication. Counsels’ references to the Act followed by the District Court’s sentence indeed afford support for the argument that by implication, the options of the Act were considered and rejected. However at the post-conviction hearing the District Court found from the record of the sentencing hearing the implication that the Act was ‘not applicable.’ It is thus unclear whether this meant the court believed petitioner to be legally ineligible for treatment under the Act — which would be error — or whether, realizing he was eligible, nevertheless deliberately opted to sentence him as an adult. An explicit finding that petitioner would not have benefited from treatment under the Act would have removed all doubt concerning whether the enlarged discretion Congress provided to sentencing courts was indeed exercised.”
418 U.S. 444, 94 S.Ct. 3053.
As to the appellant’s other assertions of error, we find there is no merit in the contention that the District Court erred in denying the motion to transfer the action from the Middle District to the Eastern District of Louisiana or that there was error in denying a hearing.
Accordingly, the sentence of the District Court is hereby vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
. Applicant Hoyt was tried, convicted and sentenced by the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Since the date of sentencing, July 2, 1971, a new dis-triet, the Middle District of Louisiana, has been created, and the Baton Rouge Division is now a part of the newly created district.
. Immediately prior to sentencing, the Court stated:
“I think that you have a long time before you can be considered fit to be in a free society. I think that possibly the Federal authorities might have some provisions whereby they can offer you training and maybe convince you that there is a better way than the way you have apparently chosen.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0