What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
STANDARD OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA v. UNITED STATES
No. 72-1251.
Decided October 18, 1976
Per Curiam.
Following an eight-day trial, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined movant from engaging in certain practices found to violate § 3 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 3. 362 F. Supp. 1331 (1973). The judgment was summarily affirmed by this Court. 412 U. S. 924. Movant now seeks to have the judgment set aside on the basis of alleged misconduct by Government counsel and by a material witness who is now prosecuting a treble-damages action against movant. Preliminarily to filing a motion in the District Court pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60 (b), movant has filed a motion in this Court requesting that we recall our mandate and grant leave to proceed in the District Court. We hold that the District Court may entertain a Rule 60 (b) motion without leave by this Court. We therefore deny the motion to recall our mandate, without prejudice to Standard Oil’s right to proceed in the District Court.
We recognize that in the past both this Court and many Courts of Appeals have required appellate leave before the District Court could reopen a case which had been reviewed on appeal. The requirement derived from a belief that an appellate court’s mandate bars the trial court from later disturbing the judgment entered in accordance with the mandate. See In re Potts, 166 U. S. 263 (1897); Butcher & Sherrerd v. Welsh, 206 F. 2d 259, 262 (CA3 1953), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 925 (1954); Home Indemnity Co. of New York v. O’Brien, 112 F. 2d 387, 388 (CA6 1940). It has also been argued that the appellate-leave requirement protects the finality of the judgment and allows the appellate court to screen out frivolous Rule 60 (b) motions. Tribble v. Bruin, 279 F. 2d 424, 427-428 (CA4 1960); 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 60.30 [2], p. 429 n. 27 (1975).
In our view, the arguments in favor of requiring appellate leave are unpersuasive. Like the original district court judgment, the appellate mandate relates to the record and issues then before the court, and does not purport to deal with possible later events. Hence, the district judge is not flouting the mandate by acting on the motion. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2873, pp. 269-270 (1973). Cf. SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 539 F. 2d 649, 650 (CA7 1976). Furthermore, the interest in finality is no more impaired in this situation than in any Rule 60 (b) proceeding. Finally, we have confidence in the ability of the district courts to recognize frivolous Rule 60 (b) motions. Indeed, the trial court “is in a much better position to pass upon the issues presented in a motion pursuant to Rule 60 (b),” Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 405 F. 2d 165, 166 (CA10 1968). Accord, Wilson Research Corp. v. Piolite Plastics Corp., 336 F. 2d 303, 305 (CA1 1964); 11 Wright & Miller, supra, at 269.
The appellate-leave requirement adds to the delay and expense of litigation and also burdens the increasingly scarce time of the federal appellate courts. We see no reason to continue the existence of this “unnecessary and undesirable clog on the proceedings,” S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F. 2d 176, 184 (CA2 1949) (Clark, J., dissenting). We therefore deny the motion to recall because the District Court may take appropriate action without this Court’s leave.
Me. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
It is technically incorrect to refer to our “mandate” because a copy of the judgment was issued in lieu of a mandate. See this Court’s Rule 59 (3). Nevertheless, to avoid confusion with the District Court judgment, we will use the term “mandate” throughout this opinion.
This Court held that appellate leave was required in In re Potts, 166 U. S. 263 (1897), and spoke approvingly of the practice in Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U. S. 238, 248 (1944). The appellate-leave requirement has also been approved by several Court of Appeals decisions, in addition to those cited in the paragraph of the text accompanying this footnote. See Wilson Research Corp. v. Piolite Plastics Corp., 336 F. 2d 303, 305 (CA1 1964); Hartman v. Lauchli, 304 F. 2d 431, 432-433 (CA8 1962) (alternative holding). On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has rejected the requirement, Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 500 F. 2d 110, 112-113 (1974); Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp., 405 F. 2d 165 (1968), and the Seventh Circuit has recently indicated that it now “would probably not go so far as to hold that appellate leave is necessary whenever relief is sought under Rule 60 (b)(5),” SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 539 F. 2d 649, 650 (1976).

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3