What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James G. SORCE, Jr., Appellant.
No. 8474.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 6, 1962.
Decided Sept. 11, 1962.
Harold Buchman, Baltimore, Md. (Lawrence B. Coshnear, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.
Arnold M. Weiner, Special Asst, to the U. S. Atty. for the D. of Maryland (Joseph D. Tydings, U. S. Atty. for the D. of Maryland, on brief), for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and BOREMAN and BRYAN, Circuit Judges.
SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.
This appeal from a conviction under the mail fraud statute challenges, primarily, the venue of the trial in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
The First Capitol Savings and Loan Association, now in bankruptcy, was a Maryland corporation organized at the instigation of the defendant. It maintained offices in Belleville, New Jersey, near where the defendant lived, as well ás in Baltimore, Maryland. A New Jersey man, Maurice Moriarty, was the president of the Association, but he was only a figurehead, having a full-time unskilled job elsewhere loading and unloading trucks. Incontestably, the defendant was the sole dominating force in the affairs of the Association throughout its existence.
Howard Rothacker, the victim of the fraud changed to the defendant, resided in Hazelton, Pennsylvania. Early in 1959, Rothacker wrote to the Association in response to an advertisement the defendant caused to be published in a Philadelphia newspaper, soliciting accounts for the Association. Rothacker was attracted by the very high interest rate offered, but desired insurance to cover his deposits. A series of letters passed between Rothacker in Pennsylvania and the defendant in New Jersey, writing over Moriarty’s signature. It was represented to Rothacker, first, that negotiations were in progress with an insurance company to insure his deposits and later, when these negotiations fell through, that federal bonds had been purchased by the Association and set aside in special escrow or trust to cover the deposits. The evidence presented to the jury showed, however, that during most of the period in question the defendant had no such bonds in his possession, and that when he had bonds they were in no way segregated for Rothacker’s protection but remained under the sole control of the defendant.
Ih reliance on the false representations made to him, Rothacker mailed to the Association’s Maryland office a series of deposits aggregating in excess of $40,-000.00. When the Association later went into bankruptcy, Rothacker found that his deposits were not secured by federal bonds. He was thus forced to share the assets of the Association with the other general creditors, and consequently suffered a heavy financial loss.
On these facts, the defendant contends that Maryland was not the proper venue for his trial. It is a settled constitutional principle that venue in a criminal case may be laid in any district where the crime was committed. In deciding in any particular case the propriety of the venue, it is necessary to determine whether the applicable venue statute permits an indictment in that district, and of course whether the crime was committed there. Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, we find that both tests are met in the present case.
The mailings which are the subject of the six-count indictment in this case are not the preliminary correspondence between the defendant in New Jersey and Rothacker in Pennsylvania, which set the trap, but the mailings by Rothacker, enclosing his checks, to the Association in Maryland in response to the fraudulent inducements of the defendant. In order to support a conviction under the mail fraud statute, 18 U. S.C.A. § 1341, it is not necessary that the false representations were themselves transmitted by mail, nor that the defendant personally received the mail from his victim. It is sufficient that the use of the mails was caused by the defendant in furtherance of his fraudulent scheme. In this case, the defendant’s aim was to induce Rothacker to send his savings to the Association in Maryland. The receipt of the mail there was an integral part, indeed the ultimate objective, of the defendant’s fraudulent scheme. Consequently, while criminal acts were also committed in New Jersey and in Pennsylvania, it is certain that the federal offense charged was also committed in Maryland.
Having established that the crime took place in Maryland, there is no doubt that the requirements of the statute for establishing venue in that district were met. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3237(a). It provides in pertinent part:
“Any offense involving the use of the mails * * * is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such * * mail matter moves.” (Our italics).
As the fraudulently induced mail was sent by Rothacker into Maryland, the case falls within the express terms of the statute.
The defendant argues that the trial should have been held in New Jersey where he lives and where, he claims, most of the witnesses and records were to be found. However, the defendant did not move in the District Court under Rule 21(b) for a transfer of the case to another district. Fed.R.Crim.P. 21 (b), 18 U.S.C.A. The asserted grounds are not sufficient to defeat venue once it has been shown that the constitutional and statutory prerequisites have been met.
A number of other issues are raised, but the record lends no support to any of them. For example, the defendant argues that unfavorable publicity in the Baltimore newspapers directed against savings and loan associations prevented him from having a fair trial before an impartial jury in the District of Maryland. However, the newspaper articles submitted to the District Court are not such as would automatically preclude a fair trial, and the defendant made no attempt when the jury was empaneled to show that any juror had been influenced by the publicity.
Finally, it is urged that the District Judge was excessive in his questioning of the defendant. The record shows, however, that the Judge interposed his questions only after the cross-examination of the defendant became disjointed and confusing because of his persistent failure to reply to questions in a straightforward manner. When a defendant or other witness gives unresponsive, evasive, and self-contradictory answers, the judge is not obliged to remain inert. It may become his duty to intervene. Here the Judge did not abuse his discretion in asking questions designed solely to clarify the facts for the jury, and we find nothing unfair in the substance or form of the interrogation. The Judge merely exposed the falsity of the defendant’s brazen insistence that he had, in accordance with his representation, set aside bonds in trust for Roth-acker, when in truth he had acquired no bonds whatever when he first made the representation and later, when he did acquire bonds, they were in an amount less than represented and at no time removed from his own absolute control or put within the reach of Rothacker or anyone else for his protection.
A careful examination of the entire record convinces us that the defendant had a fair trial, conducted impartially and without error, that the case was submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and that its verdict of guilty was the only possible one.
Affirmed.
. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 634, 81 S.Ct. 358, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961) ; United States v. Cores, .356 U.S. 405, 407, 78 S.Ct. 875, 2 L.Ed.2d 873 (195S); Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220-221 (1956); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944).
. “§ 1341. Frauds and swindles
“Whoever, having devised * * * any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises * * * for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do * * * knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954); Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 65 S.Ot. 148, 89 L.Ed. 88 (1944); Marvin v. United States, 279 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir. 1960); Williams v. United States, 278 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1960); Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109-110 (5th Cir. 1958); Stevens v. United States, 227 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1955). Compare Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 80 S.Ct. 1171, 4 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1960).
. “Rule 21. Transfer from the District or Division for Trial
❖ * sis sis * * *
“(b) Offense Committed in Two or More Districts or Divisions. The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him to another district or division, if it appears from the indictment or information or from a bill of particulars that the offense was committed in more than one district or division and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the proceeding should be transferred to another district or division in which the commission of the offense is charged.”
. See United States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1962).
. See United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.1961); Holder v. United States, 231 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1956).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1