What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PASCO COUNTY PEACH ASS’N v. J. F. SOLLEY & CO., Inc.
No. 5268.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 3, 1945.
William C. McLean, of Tampa, Fla. (John A. Sherman, of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellant.
Wilmer H. Driver, of Baltimore, Md., for appellee.
Before PARKER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges, and HARRY E. WATKINS, District Judge.
DOBIE, Circuit Judge.
This case arose under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of June 10, 1930, as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 499b, 499e (a), 46 Stat. 531, (hereinafter called the Act). There is no material dispute as to the facts.
Pasco County Peach Association (hereinafter called Pasco) owned peaches in Pasco County, Florida, and employed H. W. Springstead as its agent for the purpose of making connections with brokers in the Eastern markets to dispose of its peach crop. On April 13, 1940, Pasco gave Springstead the following letter of introduction to identify him to brokers and others with whom he might be brought in contact:
“April 13, 1940.
“To whom it may concern:
“This is to introduce Mr. Henry Spring-stead of Tampa, Florida, in connection with marketing our crop of Florida Jewel Peaches.
“These peaches will he marketed under the name of Pasco County Peach Ass’n., Blanton, Florida, office address, Box 2880, Tampa, Florida. The charter for this Ass’n. has been applied for and accepted, and will be completed within the next few days.
“I am president of the Ass’n. and the other officers are, J. E. Hinson, of Tampa; J. J. Taylor, State Chemist, Tallahassee, Florida, and H. S. Pollard, Sales Manager, Florida Favorite Fertilizer Company, Lake- * land Florida.
“Mr. Springstead is our sales manager, and this is to advise that he has full and complete authority to close my transactions relating to the marketing of the peach crop belonging to the Association(Italics ours.)
“Pasco County Peach Association “RPT/gm Robt. P. Thornton.”
Sometime during the same month Spring-stead presented this letter of introduction to J. F. Solley & Company, Inc. in Baltimore, Maryland, (hereinafter called Solley) and arranged for Solley to dispose of Pasco’s peach crop for a commission of ten percent. Springstead, under his contract with Pasco, was to receive ten percent of the net proceeds, to be paid him by Pasco at the end of the 1940 peach season, and he was to remain in the marketing area to assist in the movement of the peaches.
The peaches were shipped from Florida by truck in twelve lots during May and June, 1940, and were consigned to Spring-stead in care of Solley. ' Solley rendered separate, itemized accounts to Pasco covering each shipment. The account of sale on the first shipment was made to Springstead, and a check for the proceeds was drawn by Solley, payable to Springstead, who delivered the check to Pasco. At this time, through Springstead, Pasco requested Sol-ley to make all future accounting and checks in the name of Pasco. Solley’s accounts of sale to Pasco on each of the first ten shipments, made from May 21, to June 14, 1940, showed deductions for commissions, storage, drayage, labor, inspection, re-icing, weighing and other items; but these ten accounts contained no listing of advances made by Solley to Springstead during the period from May 25, 1940, to June 11, 1940.
A memorandum accompanying the accounts for the two final shipments listed these advances in a lump sum of $787.50. Pasco immediately wired its protest of this advancement and requested that payment on the check be stopped. Only after this protest did Solley notify Pasco that the sum was not a single advance but a total of twelve, and that an accounting of all these advances had been withheld by Solley at the express direction of Springstead. Pas-co testified that it had not authorized Sol-ley to make advances, nor had it authorized Springstead to collect any proceeds from the sale of its peaches. Witnesses for Sol-ley testified that Springstead had requested these advances to pay hotel bills and travel expenses; but, by reason of set-offs in favor of Pasco, Springstead was not entitled to these advances.
On its failure to recover the amount of these advances from Springstead, Pasco demanded reimbursement from Solley. Sol-ley denied any liability on its part and refused to make payment. Pasco then filed a formal complaint under the Act with the Secretary of Agriculture. After a hearing, the Secretary found that the agent Spring-stead was neither expressly, impliedly, nor apparently authorized to receive payment of the $787.50, and that by reason of Solley’s refusal to pay these sums to Pasco, and Solley’s failure to render a prompt accounting, Solley had violated Section 2 of the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 499b (4). From this action, Solley, under the provisions of the Act, prosecuted an appeal to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The cause was tried de novo and from a judgment entered in favor of Solley, on a directed verdict, Pasco has duly appealed.
We agree with the District Judge that the basic question here is one of agency. That is, was Springstead expressly, impliedly, or apparently authorized to receive from Sol-ley, as part of the proceeds from the sale of Pasco’s peaches, the advancements in question, so as to render this transaction a true and correct accounting within the meaning of the Act ?
The District Court has attached great, if not conclusive, importance to the letter of introduction dated April 13, 1940 (quoted above). Standing alone, this letter would doubtless be entitled to great weight in determining Springstead’s authority. Certainly, its language is very broad. However, by subsequent events, to which little weight appears to have been given by the District Court, the ostensible effect of this letter is greatly minimized.
Solley, in accordance with what might be termed a reasonable interpretation of Springstead’s authority, in the light of the letter of introduction, made accounting for the first two shipments, and payment for the first, directly to Springstead. However, when Pasco learned of this, it immediately ordered Springstead to request Solley that it make all future accountings and payments to Pasco. It would seem that this request was made known to Solley, since subsequent accounts were rendered, and all further checks were made payable, to Pasco. Nor is it without importance that at the time Solley received this notice only one advance of $49 had been made to Springstead. Yet, in the face of this admitted knowledge, Sol-ley continued to make these advances.
Solley strenuously urged before this Court that it is the custom in the business in which it is engaged, to make such advances. Solley is not relying on any usage between the parties to justify its actions, but on a custom of its business, to establish a rule of law in this case. Only a custom of such general character as to have the force of law will sustain Solley’s position. See Jarka, Corp. of Baltimore v. Pennsylvania Ry., 4 Cir., 130 F.2d 804, 807. Should Pasco have no knowledge (actual or constructive) of the practice relied on, it cannot be said to be absolutely bound by any such custom existing in Baltimore. United States Shipping Board, etc., v. Levensaler, 53 App.D.C. 322, 290 F. 297, 303, certiorari denied 266 U.S. 630, 45 S.Ct. 195, 69 L.Ed. 477; see also 7 Ann.Cas. 651. However, if it were assumed, for purposes of argument, that such a custom existed in Baltimore and further, that Pasco was aware of this custom, in the face of Pasco’s specific notice to Solley, the binding effect of any such custom is greatly impaired. Solley evidently had notice of Pasco’s wishes in the matter, and if it had this notice, Solley should have considered this notice before relying so strongly on any apparent authority of Springstead. American Nat. Bank of Sapulpa v. Bartlett, 10 Cir., 40 F. 2d 21. It is well settled that a principal can always limit the authority of his agent, and if the limitation is brought to the attention of the parties dealing with the agent, the limitation must be respected by such parties. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Palmetto Bank, D.C., 23 F.Supp. 844, affirmed 4 Cir., 104 F.2d 671.
Authority to receive payment may not be implied from the mere fact that an agent has authority to sell. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia v. Algar, D.C., 22 F.Supp. 168, affirmed 3 Cir., 100 F.2d 941, certiorari denied 307 U.S. 631, 59 S.Ct. 834, 83 L.Ed. 1513. See also, 2 Am.Jur., Agepcy § 126, p. 102, and cases there cited. The presumption of authority on the part of the agent to receive payment of the purchase price when he has possession of the goods is weakened in the instant case by virtue of Pasco’s subsequent instructions to Solley.
Solley contends that Pasco failed to give it any notice of Springstead’s lack of authority, and it seems clear from the record that the District Court placed the burden on Pasco to show that it had notified Solley of the limitation on Springstead’s authority. The rule was long ago established that when one deals with or through an agent, he assumes all the risks of lack of authority in the agent. Anthony v. Jasper County, 101 U.S. 693, 25 L.Ed. 1005; City of Baltimore v. Reynolds, 20 Md. 1, 83 Am.Dec. 535. One such as Solley here, in dealing with a corporation’s agent is not at liberty to rely on the assumption of authority. Philip Carey Co. v. Thyson, 39 App.D.C. 233; Metropolitan Cas.Ins.Co. v. Potomac Builders’ Supply Co., 61 App.D.C. 255, 61 F.2d 407. The burden of any necessary diligence to ascertain the agent’s authority rests on the party dealing with the agent. Richmond Guano Co. v. E. I. DuPont, etc., Co., 4 Cir., 284 F. 803.
While it is true that Pasco did not in exact words tell Solley that it would hold Solley responsible for any payments made by way of advancements to Spring-stead, there is evidence to indicate that Sol-ley had warning from Pasco sufficient to put Solley at least on notice. Certainly Pasco was entitled to deal with Solley on a basis of complete good faith. After Pasco made the request it did, and when the accounts showed no advances to Springstead, Pasco was entitled to, and had good reason to, believe that Solley was aware of its request and was complying therewith. It has been held that where a bill sent to a buyer requires on its face, that payment be made to the seller, the buyer is bound, although he does not read it. Law v. Stokes, 32 N.J.L. 249, 90 Am.Dec. 655. A fortiori, if a buyer actually receives notice he is bound by what is contained in the notice.
Much is to be desired in Spring-stead’s conduct of Pasco’s business. There is little question but that any good faith on the part of Springstead is conspicuous by its absence. Nothing in the law of agency is more firmly established than that an agency cannot, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be used for the benefit of the agent himself. It is crystal clear that Solley was aware that the funds advanced were being used for Springstead’s own benefit. See Salene v. Queen City Fire Ins. Co., 59 Or. 297, 116 P. 1114, 35 L.R.A.,N.S., 438, Ann.Cas.1916D, 1276 and note.
Finally, Solley’s contention here that it dealt with Springstead and had no knowledge of the agency, is conclusively answered by the very words of the letter of introduction upon which it relies to establish Springstead’s authority to receive payment of the advances made to him.
In the light of the considerations which have been discussed above, we think the District Court erred in holding for Solley as a matter of law and in directing a verdict in favor of Solley, the defendant below. On all the facts, we believe the question of the actual or apparent authority of the agent, Springstead, and his power in receiving these advances, to bind the principal, Pasco, are questions which must be left to the jury for decision under proper instructions from the Court.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1