What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PORTER, Price Administrator, v. McRAE.
No. 3269.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 29, 1946.
Max Melville, Regional Litigation Atty., Office of Price Administration, of Denver, Colo. (George Moncharsh, Deputy Administrator for Enforcement, Milton Klein, Director, Litigation Division, David London, Chief Appellate Division, and Jack Werner, Atty., Office of Price Administration, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Clarence L. Bartholic, of Denver, Colo., for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, HUXMAN, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
MURRAH, Circuit Judge.
Chester Bowles, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, appeals from an order dismissing his cause of action against Gretchen McRae to recover statutory damages for past violations, and to enjoin future violations of Rent Regulation for Housing (8 F.R. 7322), issued under Section 2(b) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as extended and amended. 58 Stat. 640, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901 et seq.
Appellee, Gretchen McRae, is the owner of two apartments in Colorado Springs, which she rented for the first time in September 1944. Under the Rent Regulation for Housing, Section 4(e), the owner had the right to fix the maximum rent for each apartment, subject to an adjustment by the Rent Director for that area. Section 5(c). In registering the property with the Rent Director, as required by Section 7 of the Rent Regulation, appellee listed " the maximum rent for ’Apartment No. 1 at $15 per week and for Apartment No. 2 at $18.75 per week. Each registration statement contained a notation to the effect that an extra charge of $1 per day would be made for each additional occupant over two.
In November the Rent Director, acting in pursuance of Section 5(c) of the Rent Regulation, decreased the maximum rent for the “described accommodations” from $18.75 per week and $15 per week to $6 per week, with the landlord furnishing linens, towels, bedding and dishes; and, from $18.75 per week and $15 per week to $5 per week if the landlord did not furnish linens, towels, bedding and dishes. The orders were silent concerning the $1 extra charge for additional occupants, as noted in the statement of registration. But, each order recited that “no rent in excess of the maximum rent established by this order may be received or demanded.” The orders were affirmed on review to the Regional Rent Director and appellee filed an appeal to the Office of Price Administration, which was pending when the Administrator filed this action.
The complaint alleged specific violations in demanding and receiving rents in excess of the maximum established by the Director’s orders. Appellee’s defense was, and is, that since the apartments were, at all times complained of, occupied by more than two people the rent received was legal under the registration statement, which was not nullified or changed by the Director’s orders. At the pre-trial conference the Administrator admitted that each of the apartments was occupied by more than two persons, and that the alleged excessive charges represented $1.00 per day for each additional occupant over two. It was contended, however, that the orders reducing the rent for the “accommodations” to $6 per week with the landlord furnishing linens, towels, bedding and dishes, and $5 per week if the landlord did not furnish linens, towels, bedding and dishes,' forbade any additional charge for the occupancy of the apartments regardless of number. On the issues thus presented, the trial court dismissed the complaint, entered judgment for the landlord, and this appeal followed.
Section 4(e) (3) of the Rent Regulation for Housing, when translated into the common speech of man means that when a housing accommodation is not rented during the period in which the maximum rent is established or the effective date of the Act, the landlord may fix the first, rent subject to limitations not material here, provided that within thirty days after the renting he registers the accommodations with the Administrator as provided in Section 7 of the Regulation. The rent thus fixed becomes the maximum rent under the Regulation, unless and until decreased by the Administrator, as provided in Section 5(c).
The registration statement, required under Section 7, identifies the rented accommodation and the amount of the first rent, and contains such other information as the Administrator “shall require.” Under Section 5(c) of the Regulation, the Administrator may at any time, on his own initiative or on application of the tenant, order a decrease of the first rent, as fixed and charged by the landlord, if he finds that such rent is higher than the rent generally prevailing in the defense area for comparable housing accommodations on the date when the maximum rents for that particular defense area were fixed.
Of course, it is clear beyond doubt that the Administrator is authorized to decrease the rent as fixed by the landlord under Section 4(e) for accommodations of this type. If the appellee was aggrieved by such order her remedy is elsewhere, not here. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 U.Ed. 834; Bowles v. Griffin, 5 Cir., 151 F.2d 458; Bowles v. Nu Way Laundry Co., 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 741. Our sole ■province is to interpret the order fixing the allowable maximum rent for the described accommodations.
It is true that the Administrator’s order decreasing the maximum allowable rent for the accommodations does not mention or specifically rescind the notation in the registration statement to the effect -that $1 per day will be charged for each occupant over two, but the rent order concerned itself with the accommodations, not with the number of occupants. The legal effect of the order was all inclusive, and established the maximum rent which could 'be charged for the accommodations, regardless of the number of occupants. The fact that the order did not mention or .specifically nullify the notation on the registration statement to the effect that $1 per day would be charged for each occupant over two, certainly gave the landlord ■no authority to charge more than the maximum established rent for the accommodations.
We conclude that the order, by its terms, precluded the appellee from charging more than $6.00 per week, with the landlord furnishing linens, towels, bedding and dishes and $5.00 per week if the landlord did not furnish linens, towels, bedding and dishes, regardless of the number of occupants.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with directions to proceed in accordance with the views expressed herein.
Section 4 (e) (3) pertinently provides: “Maximum rents (unless and until changed by the Administrator as provided in Section 5) shall be: * * * (3) housing accommodations not rented at any time during the two months ending on the maximum rent date nor between that date and the effective date, the first rent for such accommodations after the change or the effective date, as the case may be, but in no event more than the maximum rent provided for such accommodations by any order of the Administrator issued prior to September 22, 1942. Within 30 days after so renting the landlord shall register the accommodations as provided in section 7. The Administrator may order a decrease in the maximum rent as provided in section 5 (c).”
Section 7 (a) pertinently provides: “Registration statement. On or before the date specified in Schedule A of this regulation, or within 30 days after the property is first rented, whichever is the later date, every landlord of housing accommodations rented or offered for rent shall file in triplicate a written statement on the form provided therefor to be knowa as a registration statement. The statement shall identify each dwelling unit and specify the maximum rent provided: by this regulation for such dwelling unit, and shall contain such other information as the Administrator shall require- * * *»
Section 5 (e) provides: “Adjustments and other determinations. Grounds for decrease of maximum rent. The Administrator at any time, on his own initiative or on application of the tenant may order a decrease of the maximum rent otherwise allowable only on the grounds .that: (1) Rent higher than rents generally prevailing. The maximum rent for housing accommodations under paragraph (c), (d), (e), (g), or (j) of section 4 is higher than the rent generally prevailing in the Defense-Rental Area for comparable housing accommodations on the maximum rent date.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0