What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Carol Joan SHELITE, etc., et al., Appellants, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
Nos. 6837-6839.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
June 28, 1962.
W. A. Kahrs, Robert H. Nelson, H. W. Fanning and Richard C. Hite, Wichita, Kan., for appellants.
Clayton M. Davis and Mark L. Bennett, Topeka, Kan., for appellee.
Before MURRAH and LEWIS, Circuit Judges, and RITTER, District Judge.
RITTER, District Judge.
These actions arose out of a railroad crossing collision between appellee’s (herein referred to as defendant) train and a truck in which the husbands of the three appellants (herein referred to as plaintiffs) were passengers. The collision occurred at the crossing of defendant’s railroad track and the main street of Haviland, Kansas, a town of some six hundred inhabitants.
Plaintiffs’ claims were predicated on the alleged negligence of the railroad in operating its train at the speed of seventy-five miles per hour, in permitting structures to be built on the railroad’s right of way, which blocked the view of the oncoming train, and in maintaining faulty and inadequate signal devices at the crossing. The defendants denied negligence and alleged the contributory negligence of the deceased husbands as a defense.
The District Court granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and the question on appeal is whether plaintiffs were entitled to have their case go to the jury.
The plaintiffs’ own evidence shows that, the three plaintiffs’ husbands, sitting in. the back seat of the truck, were talking to and facing their work supervisor, who. was sitting next to the driver, until the moment of the accident, and that they made no effort to look for approaching trains, when vigilance on their part could; have prevented the accident.
Under Kansas law a passenger in a vehicle is under a duty to look out for trains at railroad crossings. The Kansas Supreme Court in a recent decision noted that the test of contributory negligence for a passenger in Kansas “has. varied somewhat over the years.” However, it quoted the tests stated in two cases with approval. One of the cases so cited states the following to be the duty of a passenger: “ * * * it was his duty to look for approaching trains and warn the driver thereof. Failure to do these things would constitute contributory negligence on his part * * * ” Miller v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 196 F.2d 333, 335 (10th Cir. 1952) quoted in Kendrick v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co., 182 Kan. 249, 320 P.2d 1061 (1958); accord Kessler v. Davis, 111 Kan. 515, 207 P. 799 (1922); Richards v. Chicago Railroad, Inc., 157 Kan. 378, 139 P.2d 427 (1943).
It is unnecessary to consider any of the remaining questions in the case. As a matter of law, the plaintiffs’ conduct does not discharge the duty of care required of a passenger for his own protection.
Judgment affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0