What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case.

Opinion:
HALL et ux. v. BEALS, CLERK AND RECORDER OF EL PASO COUNTY, et al.
No. 39.
Argued October 14, 1969
Decided November 24, 1969
Richard Hall argued the cause pro se and for other appellant.
Bernard R. Baker argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Carroll E. Multz and Robert L. Russel.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, Louis F. Claiborne, and Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., for the United States; by William F. Reynard, Melvin L. Wulf, and Eleanor Holmes Norton for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., John Silard, and Elliott C. Lichtman for the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting; and by Harvey M. Burg.
Louis J. Lefkowits, Attorney General, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New York as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Per Curiam.
The appellants moved from California to Colorado in June 1968. They sought to register to vote in the ensuing November presidential election, but were refused permission because they would not on election day have satisfied the six-month residency requirement that Colorado then imposed for eligibility to vote in such an election. The appellants then commenced the present class action against the appellees, electoral officials of El Paso County, Colorado. Their complaint challenged the six-month residency requirement as a violation of the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privilege and Immunities Clauses of the Constitution. For relief they sought (1) a writ of mandamus compelling the appellees to register them for the upcoming presidential election; (2) an injunction restraining the enforcement and operation of the Colorado residency laws insofar as they applied to the presidential election; and (3) a direction that the appellees register the appellants and allow them to vote “on a conditional basis, so that should either party choose to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States and such appeal should run past the time of the National Election on November 5, 1968, . . . the relief sought by [the appellants will] not become moot.”
On October 30 the three-judge District Court entered judgment for the appellees and dismissed the complaint, holding that the six-month requirement was not unconstitutional. Hall v. Beals, 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. C. Colo.). As a result the appellants did not vote in the 1968 presidential election. They took a direct appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U. S. 1011. Thereafter the Colorado Legislature reduced the residency requirement for a presidential election from six months to two months.
The 1968 election is history, and it is now impossible to grant the appellants the relief they sought in the District Court. Further, the appellants have now satisfied the six-month residency requirement of which they complained. But apart from these considerations, the recent amendatory action of the Colorado Legislature has surely operated to render this case moot. We review the judgment below in light of the Colorado statute as it now stands, not as it once did. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281-282; United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 60; Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 U. S. 23, 26-27; United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, 110. And under the statute as currently written, the appellants could have voted in the 1968 presidential election. The case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 110; Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653.
The appellants object now to the two-month residency requirement as vigorously as they did to the six-month rule in effect when they brought suit. They say that such statutes, in Colorado and elsewhere, continue to have an adverse effect upon millions of voters throughout the Nation. But the appellants' opposition to residency requirements in general cannot alter the fact that so far as they are concerned nothing in the Colorado legislative scheme as now written adversely affects either their present interests, or their interests at the time this litigation was commenced. Nor does the result differ because the appellants denominated their suit a class action on behalf of disenfranchised voters. The appellants “cannot represent a class of [which] they are not a part,” Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 32-33 — that is, the class of voters disqualified in Colorado by virtue of the new two-month requirement, a class of which the appellants have never been members.
Nothing in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, is to the contrary. There we invalidated an Illinois statute requiring that independent candidates for presidential elector obtain signatures on their nominating petitions from voters distributed through the State. We noted that even though the 1968 election was over, “the burden . . . placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections, as long as Illinois maintains her present system as she has done since 1935.” 394 U. S., at 816. The problem before us was “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review/ ” not only because the same restriction on Moore’s candidacy that had adversely affected him in 1968 could do so again in 1972, but because Illinois, far from having altered its statutory scheme for the future benefit of those situated similarly to Moore, had adhered for over 30 years to the same electoral policy with no indication of change.
Here, by contrast, the appellants will face disenfranchisement in Colorado in 1972 only in the unlikely event that they first move out of the State and then re-establish residence there within two months of the presidential election in that year. Or they may take up residence in some other State, and in 1972 face disqualification under that State’s law. But such speculative contingencies afford no basis for our passing on the substantive issues the appellants would have us decide with respect to the now-amended law of Colorado. Golden v. Zwickler, supra.
The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the cause as moot.
It is so ordered.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49-24r-l (1963) provided:
“Eligibility of new resident to vote. — Any citizen of the United States who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, shall have resided in this state not less than six months next preceding the election at which he offers to vote, in the county or city and county not less than ninety days, and in the precinct not less than fifteen days, and shall have been duly registered as required by the provisions of this article, shall have the right to vote as a new resident for presidential and vice-presidential electors.”
The appellant Richard Hall went to the office of the appellee Beals on or about August 1, 1968, to request that his wife and he be allowed to vote in the presidential election. Upon denial of his application, he wrote to the Colorado Secretary of State to ask that his wife and he be allowed to vote despite the six-month residency requirement. On September 6 the State Election Office informed the appellants they would not be permitted to vote.
Apart from the special provision relating to the eligibility of new residents to vote in a presidential election, Colorado requires that persons desiring to vote in general, primary, and special elections must have resided in the State for one year. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49-3-1 (1) (c) (1963).
The request for relief continued:
“Should Plaintiffs win an eventual appeal, the Defendant Election Officials shall be directed to count Plaintiffs’ votes as normally cast and valid ballots; should Plaintiffs lose on final appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Defendant Election Officials shall destroy Plaintiffs’ ballots as if they had never been cast. This conditional registration is the only way Plaintiffs’ sought-for relief can be preserved should an appeal by either party run past the date of the National Election in question.”
The opinion of the District Court was issued on November 29, 1968.

Question: Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case?

Choices:
Yes
No

Answer: 1