What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MISSOURI PAC. R. CO. v. SEWER IMPROVEMENT DIST. NO. 2 OF CONWAY, ARK., et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
June 28, 1929.
No. 8459.
Thomas B. Pryor, Vincent M. Miles, and Thomas B. Pryor Jr., all of Et. Smith, Ark., for appellant.
R. W. Robins, of Conway, Ark., for appellees.
Before BOOTH, Circuit Judge, and SANBORN and DEWEY, District Judges.
BOOTH, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit in equity brought by the appellant against the appellees (the sewer improvement district No. 2 of Conway, Ark., and the two commissioners of the district), seeking to restrain them from collecting or attempting to collect an assessment made against the property of. the appellant within said district, and to set aside the assessment of benefits made against said property, in connection with the construction of a sewer and disposal plant. The court below on motion dismissed the bill of complaint, on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and the present appeal is from the decree dismissing the bill.
The allegations in the bill of complaint were: That the sewer improvement district No. 2 was established in accordance with the statutes of the state of Arkansas; that the assessors under said statutory provisions had made an assessment against the property of the company in the sum of $5,000 for said improvement; that this amount was, upon protest of the company,' reduced to $4,000. The bill further alleged that the assessment-was confiscatory, excessive, and arbitrary; that the company had theretofore been assessed in what was called sewer improvement-district No. 1; and that under said last-mentioned district the company’s property had all of the sewer connections needed. It further alleged that twp other property owners in district No. 2 owned property of far greater value than plaintiff, but were assessed only a fractional part of the assessment against plaintiff. The bill further alleged that the defendants were threatening to add penalties to the assessment against plaintiff, unless the amount of the tax was paid; and were threatening to bring suit against plaintiff. It further alleged that the ordinance making the levy of said assessment was passed July 15,1927, and published July 16, 1927. A map was attached to the bill of complaint showing the sewer improvement district No. 2.
The sole question on this appeal is whether the bill of complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of aetion.
It is plain that the allegations that the assessments were arbitrary, confiscatory, and discriminatory, being merely in general terms, were insufficient. Eacts must be pleaded and not mere conclusions when it is sought to show that an assessment is arbitrary, confiscatory, or discriminatory. The allegations in reference to the assessment against two other property owner’s are also insufficient to show discrimination. By reference to the plat attached to the complaint it is-apparent that there were several hundred assessments. The mere fact that two of these appeared on their face to be much less in proportion to the value of the properties than the assessment against the plaintiff -would not be sufficient to show that the assessment against the plaintiff was’ discriminatory or arbitrary when all of the assessments were considered. There is, moreover, a further defect in the bill of complaint which is fatal. It is alleged that the ordinance was passed July 15, 1927, and was published July 16, 1927. The bill of complaint was filed in the lower court August 30, 1927.
Section 5668, Crawford & Moses’ Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, 1921, relating to assessments such as here involved, reads as follows:
“Publication of ordinance — test proceedings. — Within thirty days after the passage of the ordinance mentioned above, the recorder or city clerk shall publish a copy of it in some newspaper published in such town or city for one time. And all persons who shall faü to begin legal proceedings within thirty days after such publication for the purpose of correcting or invalidating such assessment shall be forever barred and precluded.”
This statute has been construed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas as requiring suits brought for the purpose of testing the validity of the assessment to be commenced within 30 days after the publication of the ordinance. In Ingram v. Thames, 150 Ark. 443, page 447, 234 S. W. 629, the court said: “The statute requires that, within thirty days after the passage of the ordinance mentioned above (assessment ordinance), the recorder or city clerk shall publish a copy of it in some newspaper published in such town or city for one time. And all persons who shall fail to begin legal proceedings within thirty days after such publication for the purpose of correcting or invalidating such assessment shall be forever barred and precluded. Sec. 5668, Crawford & Moses’ Digest. The allegations of the appellant’s complaint show that it is an attack upon the assessment of benefits. The appellant did not comply with this statute, and therefore his cause of action is barred.” See also Meyer v. Board of Imp. of Pav. Dist., 148 Ark. 623, 231 S. W. 12; Thomas v. Street Imp. Dist., 158 Ark. 187, 249 S. W. 590; Gannaway v. Street Imp. Dist., 164 Ark. 407, 262 S. W. 22; Lewellyn v. Street Imp. Dist., 172 Ark. 496, 289 S. W. 470; Smith v. Grabiel, 177 Ark. 611, 7 S.W. (2d) 13; Campbell v. City of Olney, 262 U. S. 352, 43 S. Ct. 559, 67 L. Ed. 1021.
In the case last cited, which was similar to the case at bar, the Supreme Court in its opinion said (page 354 of 262 U. S. [43 S. Ct. 559]): “Plaintiff in error had opportunity to be heard before the city council and was allowed a reasonable time after the assessment to bring suit to set it aside or to correct it or any proceeding with reference thereto. He failed to avail himself of the rights so given him by state laws. Their validity was not drawn in question. His claim that he was denied due process of law is .not even colorable.”
We are clearly of the opinion that under the authorities cited the cause of action was barred. It follows that the decree of the court below must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1