What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SSD DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 87-4081.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 20, 1988.
Decided Aug. 21, 1989.
John J. McCarthy, Joel Levin argued, Nurenberg, Plevin, Heller & McCarthy Co., LPA, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.
Louis Paisley, Harry Sigmier argued, Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant-appellee.
Before MERRITT, MARTIN and MILBURN, Circuit Judges.
MILBURN, Circuit Judge.
In this diversity action arising under Ohio law, plaintiff-appellant SSD Distribution System, Inc. (“SSD”) appeals the judgment of the district court in favor of defendant-appellee General Motors Corporation (“General Motors”), denying plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend the court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Although we certified three issues to the Ohio Supreme Court, only one of the issues was considered and answered as hereinafter set out. In light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s response and for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
SSD commenced the present action on April 6, 1987, by filing a complaint against General Motors in which SSD sought to recover for increased workers’ compensation insurance premiums resulting from an accident to one of SSD’s employees, Anthony Angelo. SSD alleged that General Motors manufactured a defective 1981 Chevrolet van and that Angelo was injured on November 30, 1984, while attempting to unload the van. According to SSD, the van’s transmission slipped from the park position into reverse, pinning Angelo between a loading dock and the van and causing Angelo severe injury. SSD asserted that as a result of this injury, Angelo sought and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits and that SSD’s workers’ compensation insurance premiums later increased. SSD sought damages in the amount of $200,000 and asserted theories of legal liability in negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied warranties.
General Motors filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that SSD’s cause of action was time barred by the two-year statute of limitations for actions for bodily injury or injury to personal property. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1987). General Motors also argued that under Ledex, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 10 Ohio St. 3d 126, 461 N.E.2d 1299 (1984), an action for increased workers’ compensation insurance premiums may be maintained only where the plaintiff-employer has a contractual relationship with the defendant and that no such relationship existed in the present case.
SSD responded to General Motors’ motion arging that while the two-year statute of limitations as provided in Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10 is applicable, the statute of limitations was extended by virtue of Ohio’s “discovery rule.” The district court, however, granted General Motors’ motion to dismiss concluding that SSD’s action was time barred. SSD then filed a motion to alter or amend the district court’s judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or, in the alternative, for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and (6). SSD argued that despite its initial concession, Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10 is not the applicable limitations period governing its cause of action. SSD argued instead that either Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.09 or Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.07 is applicable. Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.09 provides for a four-year limitations period, and Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.07, applicable for actions under a contract, provides for a six-year limitations period.
On November 19, 1987, the district court denied SSD’s motion, concluding that Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10 is the applicable statute and that SSD failed to file its action within the two-year limitations period allowed. This timely appeal followed.
II.
By our order of December 22, 1988, we certified three questions of state law to the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to Rule XYI of its Rules of Practice. The questions certified were:
1. Does Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10 govern actions by employers to recover increased workers’ compensation premiums from third parties?
2. Does the statute of limitations governing actions by employers against third parties for recovery of increased workers’ compensation premiums begin to run at the time of the accident wherein the employee is injured or at a later time after the employee files a workers’ compensation claim?
3. Is a contract a prerequisite to an action by an employer against a third party for recovery of increased workers’ compensation premiums?
The Ohio Supreme Court accepted certification.
On June 14, 1989, the Ohio Supreme Court in SSD Distribution System, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 43 Ohio St.3d 173, 539 N.E.2d 1121 (1989), answered only the third issue certified as follows:
On authority of Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Straley (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 372, 533 N.E.2d 764, we hold that an employer may not recover damages against a third party whose negligence caused an employee’s injury absent a legal relationship based upon contract or warranty between the employer and the third party.
We decline to exercise our discretion under Rule XVI to address questions one and two at this time, absent a showing that there is a need to do so.
After receiving the Ohio Supreme Court’s response to the third certified question, we afforded the parties an opportunity to submit supplemental briefs. The supplemental briefs have now been received and reviewed.
As earlier stated, SSD alleged that General Motors manufactured a defective 1981 Chevrolet van and that its right of recovery against General Motors was under three separate theories of legal liability; viz., negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and implied warranties. In this regard, we note that the issue of a legal relationship based upon express and implied warranties was not considered by the district court. As this issue is dispositive of SSD’s claim against General Motors based upon the response of the Ohio Supreme Court to our third certified question, a remand is necessary.
III.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that General Motors does not contend on appeal that SSD’s apparent concession in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss bars plaintiff from arguing that a statute of limitations other than Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.10 is applicable to its claims.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1