What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary CELESTINE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 89-8046
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 22, 1990.
Mary Stillinger, Caballero, Panetta & Ortega, El Paso, Tex., (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.
LeRoy M. Jahn, Philip Police, Asst. U.S. Attys., Ronald F. Ederer, Helen M. Evers-berg, U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before REAVLEY, KING and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Celestine appeals the district court’s imposition of a one year sentence for violations of the conditions of a term of supervised release. We affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 1988, Gary Celestine (Cel-estine) was arrested after detectives observed Celestine shoplifting several items from the Main Post Exchange at Fort Bliss, Texas. Celestine was indicted on one count of theft of government property valued in excess of $100.00, a felony. In a plea bargain agreement, Celestine pled guilty to an information charging him with theft of government property under $100.00, a misdemeanor, in exchange for dismissal of the felony indictment. The district court sentenced Celestine to eight months’ imprisonment and a one year term of supervised release. Celestine was released from custody after being given credit for time served.
After his release, Celestine’s lack of adherence to the conditions of his supervised release term culminated in the district court’s revocation of the term and an order sentencing Celestine to one year’s imprisonment. Celestine thereafter filed the instant appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Celestine argues that twenty months’ imprisonment violates the eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment because it exceeds the one year statutory maximum provided for an offense involving the theft of government property valued at less than $100.00. Celestine’s argument, however, is foreclosed by a prior holding of this Court in United States v. Butler, 895 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.1989). In Butler, the Court, concluding that the addition of a supervised term of release does not extend a defendant’s term of imprisonment, rejected the argument that the eighth amendment is violated when the sentencing court imposes a term of supervised release in addition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment.
While the instant case factually differs somewhat from Butler in that the supervised term here was not only imposed but revoked, the reasoning in Butler nevertheless effectively defeats Celestine’s argument. Congress has authorized two separate punishments — the primary term of incarceration and the term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583, subsections (a) and (b)(3). In the instant case, it was Celestine’s violation of the conditions of his supervised release rather than the underlying offense conduct, that led to Celestine’s current incarceration.
Celestine next argues that twenty months of incarceration effectively upgrades his misdemeanor to a felony. In that regard, Celestine contends that his sentence constitutes a violation of his fifth amendment right to indictment by grand jury for an infamous crime. Celestine’s argument is predicated on the contention that the one year term of supervised release and the eight month term on the underlying conviction are part and parcel of the same sentence. As discussed above, however, Congress has authorized two separate punishments for the offense of which Celestine was convicted. Moreover, the fifth amendment protection which Celestine seeks attaches only to infamous crimes. Since the United States Supreme Court has held that an infamous crime is one punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary, and since Congress has foreclosed imprisonment in the penitentiary for the offense conduct in the instant case, Celestine’s contentions are without merit. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958) and 18 U.S.C. § 4083.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court’s imposition of a one year term of incarceration after finding that Celestine violated the conditions of his term of supervised release was not error. The sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. Celestine combines the term of eight months on the underlying conviction with the term of twelve months on the revocation of the term of supervised release to arrive at the twenty month figure.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1