What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack Orvale LEDBETTER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 261-70.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 9, 1970.
James F. Housley, Asst. U. S. Atty. (C. Nelson Day, U. S. Atty., with him on the brief) for plaintiff-appellee.
Jerry G. Elliott, Wichita, Kan., for def endant-appellant.
Before BREITENSTEIN and HILL, Circuit Judges, and THEIS, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant-appellant Ledbetter appeals his conviction by jury for making a false statement in the acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (6) and for unlawful manufacture of a firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (f).
Defendant purchased a shotgun in Ogden, Utah. In making the purchase he omitted to disclose in the required certificate that he was barred from making the purchase by a previous conviction of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d). He converted the gun to a sawed-off shotgun (see 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)) without making the application to the Secretary of the Treasury required by § 5822 and paying the tax imposed by § 5821(a).
Ogden police received word that Led-better and one Wilkerson, both of whom were known to the police, were wanted on a Montana warrant charging burglary. On receipt of word that Ledbetter was in the apartment of Jan Whitehead, the officers went there, knocked on the door, identified themselves, secured admittance, and arrested Ledbetter. They told Jan Whitehead that they were also seeking Wilkerson and asked permission to go through the apartment. She acquiesced. They did not find Wilkerson. On return to the room where Ledbetter had been arrested, and within about six feet from where he was seated, one of the officers saw a sawed-off shotgun behind a partially opened closet door. On this appeal the defendant does not question the fact that the officers had probable cause for his arrest and that the arrest was lawful under Utah law.
By motion to suppress and appropriate objections, the defendant asserted that a search and seizure of the gun violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Prime reliance is placed on Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. We need not concern ourselves with the retro-activity of Chimel because of the difference in the facts. In Chimel there was an arrest in a house and a search of the entire house. Here there was a lawful arrest in a room of an apartment and there was no search because the gun was in plain sight within that room. The officers had the right to be where they were and to seize the contraband article which was clearly visible. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067; Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726; and United States v. Holgerson, 10 Cir., 424 F.2d 1130. See also United States v. Berry, 10 Cir., 423 F.2d 142, 144. In our opinion the gun was properly seized and received in evidence.
On the day before the trial the defendant sought a continuance and a change of appointed counsel. A motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. United States v. Eagleston, 10 Cir., 417 F.2d 11, 14, and Warden v. United States, 10 Cir., 391 F.2d 747, 749. The differences between defendant and his counsel were of defendant’s own making. The court appointed associate counsel to attend the trial. We are convinced that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that the defendant had adequate and competent representation by counsel,
The instructions are attacked on various grounds. The claim that the defendant was not given an adequate opportunity, in compliance with Rule 30, F.R.Crim.P., to object is not sustained by the record. We find no improper comments on the evidence. At the trial no objection was made on the ground of impropriety in this regard. The court’s instructions with regard to the rather complicated provisions of the Firearms Act fairly presented the essential issues to the jury and were subject to no trial objection. We find no error in the instructions affecting any substantial rights of the accused.
The sufficiency of the evidence is assailed for lack of proof of the required intent. Intent may be inferred from the conduct of the defendant and from circumstantial evidence which furnishes a basis for a reasonable inference. Golubin v. United States, 10 Cir., 393 F.2d 590, 592, cert. denied 393 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 100, 21 L.Ed.2d 102. In the instant ease there was substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably find the required intent. We will not disturb the verdict. See Thomas v. United States, 10 Cir., 409 F.2d 730, 731.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0