What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
FASH, School District Treasurer, et al. v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF ALVA, OKL., et al.
No. 1455.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 30, 1937.
W. L. Houts and H. C. Crandall, both of Alva, Okl., for appellants.
C. H. Mauntel and F. B. H. Spellman, both of Alva, Okl., for appellees.
Before LEWIS, PHILLIPS, and BRATTON, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
The First National Bank of Alva, Okl., was the designated and acting depository of school district No. 1 in that city. The bank was declared insolvent and suspended business on March 14, 1932, having $6,258.-61 of school money on deposit at that time. Following our decision in Kavanaugh v. Fash, 74 F.(2d) 435, sustaining the pledge of certain assets to secure the deposit, the treasurer of the school district and the treasurer of the county instituted this action in the state court against the bank and the receiver to foreclose the lien. A decree of foreclosure was sought for the amount of the deposit with interest thereon at the rate provided by law, costs and expenses of preserving the securities and making sale of them, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. After the cause had been removed to the United States District Court the bank and the receiver answered that at all times since receipt of the mandate in the former case, the receiver had been ready, willing, and anxious to pay the amount of the deposit, but that plaintiffs had demanded ’ interest, expenses, and attorneys’ fees in addition.
The court sustained the lien for the amount of the deposit, but denied interest after insolvency and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs appealed.
It is urged that the court should have remanded the cause t'o the state court. The action is against a national bank and its receiver. It relates to the winding up of the affairs of the bank and arises under the laws of the United States. It was, therefore, removable. Judicial Code § 24 par. (16), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(16); International Trust Co. v. Weeks, 203 U.S. 364, 27 S.Ct. 69, 51 L.Ed. 224; Larabee Flour Mills v. First Nat. Bank (C.C.A.) 13 F.(2d) 330; Fleming v. Gamble (C.C.A.) 37 F.(2d) 72; Guarantee Co. of North Dakota v. Hanway (C.C.A.) 104 F. 369.
The comptroller is required in liquidating the affairs of an insolvent national bank to make ratable distribution of all money coming from the receiver on all claims which have been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C.A. § 194. And for the purpose of making such distribution claims of creditors are to be determined as of the date on which insolvency was declared. Their value at that time is the basis of apportionment in paying dividends. White v. Knox, Ill U.S. 784, 4 S.Ct. 686, 28 L.Ed. 603; Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U.S. 131, 19 S.Ct. 360, 43 L.Ed. 640; Kershaw v. Jenkins (C.C.A.) 71 F. (2d) 647; American Surety Co. v. De Carle (C.C.A.) 25 F.(2d) 18; Kennedy v. Boston-Continental Nat. Bank (C.C.A.) 84 F.(2d) 592.
It is well settled that interest accruing on a claim after insolvency cannot be paid unless the assets are sufficient to pay all claims in full, because to pay interest on one while others are .unpaid in whole or in part would violate the exaction of ratable distribution of assets. White v. Knox, supra; Kershaw v. Jenkins, supra; Anderson v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co. (C.C.A.) 69 F.(2d) 794; Richman v. Firs.t Methodist Episcopal Church (C.C.A.) 76 F. (2d) 344; Pinckney v. Wylie (C.C.A.) 86 F.(2d) 541; American Nat. Bank v. Williams (C.C.A.) 101 F. 943. And that rule applies to a claim for a deposit secured by pledged collateral. Interest cannot be paid on such a claim whether it be public money deposited pursuant to the provisions of law, Douglass v. Thurston County (C.C.A.) 86 F.(2d) 899; In re American Bank & Trust Co. of Ardmore, 176 Okl. 202, 55 P.(2d) 470; or money of an individual deposited voluntarily, Gamble v. Wimberly (C.C.A.) 44 F.(2d) 329. Some courts have suggested that where a receiver is unreasonable or vexatious in resisting a claim, interest may be allowed during the delay thus occasioned. Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, 210 Iowa, 613, 231 N.W. 497, 69 A.L.R. 1206; Bank of America Nat. T. & S. Ass’n v. California S. & C. Bank, 218 Cal. 261, 22 P.(2d) 704. It likewise has been intimated that interest may be awarded if the receiver is otherwise at fault in administering the trust. Richardson v. Louisville Banking Co. (C. C.A.) 94 F. 442. But there is no need to explore that field, as it is not contended that the receiver acted in that manner in the institution of the action in which he failed, the sole contention being that interest should be allowed from the date on which insolvency was declared to the date of payment.'
It is urged that the employment of attorneys to represent the school district in the former action which involved the validity of the pledge was necessary; that the attorneys rendered valuable services in causing the pledge to be sustained; that the treasurer of the school district did not have any fund upon which he could draw to pay the attorneys; and that reasonable attorneys’ fees should have been allowed. That the employment of attorneys was necessary and that they rendered valuable services may be freely conceded. But that is not the test. The National Bank Act (12 U.S. C.A. § 21 et seq.) provides a complete and exclusive code for the liquidation of the affairs of an insolvent national bank. Cook County Nat. Bank v. United States, 107 W.S. 445, 2 S.Ct. 561, 27 L.Ed. 537. And the allowance of attorneys’ fees here would constitute a plain impingement upon the provision which requires ratable distribution of the assets among creditors having approved or adjudicated claims. Citizens’ Bank & Trust Co. v, Thornton (C.C.A.) 174 F. 752; Dunnagan v. Best (D.C.) 59 F. (2d) 795.
Concluding that the court was right in disallowing interest after insolvency and attorneys’ fees, the decree is affirmed.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 36