What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HAYFORD v. DOUSSONY et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 17, 1929.
No. 5390.
Eugene S. Hayford, of New Orleans, La., in pro. per.
J. L. Warren Woodville, of New Orleans, La., for appellees.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and FOSTER, Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
The appellees filed a libel in admiralty against “the Pleasure Boat ‘Pirate Ship’ or ‘City of Marietta’ ” for the recovery of wages alleged to be owing to them as mariners. The appellant, the owner of the structure proceeded against, duly raised the question of its being subject to the jurisdiction of the court as a court of admiralty. The evidence showed the following: The Pirate Ship, formerly the United States gunboat Marietta, was an old, dilapidated ship of wood and steel construction, which, at considerable expense, had been refitted as an amusement or dance barge, and, after being so refitted, was towed to the Canal street dock at the foot of Canal street in the city of New Orleans, and lay there from March, 1927, until June, 1927, when it was seized under the warrant issued under the libel filed in this cause. The Pirate Ship was secured to the dock, not like an ordinary ship, but with cables and clamps, the cables having eight or ten turns around clusters of piling. A permanent gangway was built ashore, with a house over it extending to the wharf, the gang plank being secured to the hull with seven or eight one-inch pins. Electric wires and water pipes connected the structure with the shore. The structure was intended by its owner to be used, and was used by him, only as a dance platform permanently secured to the dock at all times when so used, and at no time was used or intended to be used for transporting freight or passengers. None of the libelants were employed as mariners or in any way in the capacity of seamen. During the time in 1927 when the Mississippi river was high the Pirate Ship, on the Order of the manager for the board of port commissioners, and over the protest of appellant, was towed to the St. Andrews street wharf, and it was towed to West End after the seizure in this ease.
The Pirate Ship was not used, or intended to bo used, to carry freight or passengers from one place to another, was not an instrument of navigation or commerce, and performed no function that might not have been performed as well by a floating stage or platform permanently attached to the land. A result of it not being a vessel or instrument of navigation or commerce engaged in any maritime venture was that a maritime lien did not attach for the compensation for the services rendered by any of the libelants. Evansville & Bowling Green Packet Co. v. Chero Cola, etc., Co., 271 U. S. 19, 46 S. Ct. 379, 70 L. Ed. 805; J. C. Penney-Gwinn Corporation v. McArdle (C. C. A.) 27 F.(2d) 324. The fact that for purposes foreign to those for which, it was intended and adapted to be used it was towed to and from the place where it was used for dancing and amusement was not enough to bring it within the admiralty jurisdiction. The Hendrik Hudson, Fed. Cas. No. 6355.
On the state of facts disclosed, the libel was not maintainable, the claims asserted not being within the admiralty jurisdiction.
The decree is reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1