What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
John Mason KESSLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY OF HAWAII, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 78-3042.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Nov. 12, 1980.
Decided Feb. 9, 1981.
John Harris Paer, Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii, for plaintiff-appellant.
James M. Sattler, Sattler, Spradlin & Brandt, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendantappellee.
Before SKOPIL, FLETCHER and PRE-GERSON, Circuit Judges.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
This case has come back to us after an earlier remand. Kessler v. Associates Financial Services Company of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1977). On remand the district court awarded appellant maximum statutory damages of $1,000, attorney’s fees of $2,000, and court costs.
This appeal presents two significant issues: (1) whether a plaintiff represented by a legal services organization in an action under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., is entitled to an award of attorney fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3); and (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff’s counsel $2,000 in fees, a sum appellant contends is unreasonably low in light of the effort expended and the results achieved by counsel.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) a “creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person ... required [consumer credit information] is liable to that person ... in the case of any successful action .. . [for] a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” The district court awarded attorney’s fees even though appellant was represented without charge by Legal Aid Services of Hawaii, a nonprofit public interest legal aid corporation. Because appellant incurred no obligation to pay attorney’s fees, appellee challenges the propriety of that award.
In Hannon v. Security National Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976), plaintiff successfully brought an action for violations of the Truth in Lending Act in propria persona. Plaintiff was denied an award of attorney’s fees because we concluded that Congress had not intended to compensate non-attorneys who press their individual claims. Because the action was in propria persona, we had no occasion to decide, and therefore left open, the question whether legal services organizations that successfully represent plaintiffs without charge in TILA actions are entitled to an attorney’s fee award. 537 F.2d at 328 n.1. We did, however, explain that the “purpose behind granting attorney’s fees is to make a litigant whole and to facilitate private enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act.” 537 F.2d at 328-29. This purpose is served where a legal services organization, such as Legal Aid Society of Hawaii, without charge successfully prosecutes an action brought under TILA. The attorney’s fee award will be paid directly to the organization, see Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1309 (9th Cir. 1980), and will thereby presumably facilitate private enforcement of the act.
Moreover, in 1976 Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to encourage private enforcement and redress of civil rights violations. Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980). We have held that civil rights plaintiffs represented without charge by legal services attorneys may be awarded attorney’s fees under section 1988. Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, supra. The policy considerations that support awards of attorney’s fees to legal services organizations prosecuting civil rights litigation also support such awards in Truth in Lending cases.
Accordingly, we join the Third and Fifth Circuits in holding that a legal services organization representing without charge a successful plaintiff in a Truth in Lending action is entitled to an attorney’s fee award under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3). See Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865, 97 S.Ct. 173, 50 L.Ed.2d 144 (1976); Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975).
TILA provides that the prevailing plaintiff shall be awarded a “reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3). The amount of the fee award is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Perkins v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976).
In Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d at 70, this court established twelve factors to be considered by the district court in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees. Here the district court considered each of the factors catalogued in Kerr. Although no formal findings of fact or conclusions of law were prepared, the transcript does demonstrate that the district court considered the factors established by Kerr. We therefore cannot say that the district court clearly abused its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees.
AFFIRMED.
. The factors to be considered by the district court are:
(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the “undesireability” of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases.
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d at 71.
The court need not consider all twelve factors, but only those called into question by the case at hand and necessary to support the reasonableness of the fee award. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 682 (N.D.Cal. 1974).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1