What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
ILLINOIS v. MICHIGAN et al.
No. 15, Original.
Argued May 21-22, 1959.
Decided June 29, 1959.
William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles A. Báñe argued the cause for the State of Illinois, complainant in No. 15, Original. With them on the brief were Latham Castle, Attorney General, George E. Billett and Calvin D. Trowbridge, Special Assistant Attorneys General.
, For the defendants in No. 15, Original, the cause was argued by Paul L. Adams, Attorney General, for the State of Michigan; John W. Reynolds, Attorney General, for the State of Wisconsin; Richard H. Shepp, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New York and Lois G. Forer, Deputy Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. On the briefs-for defendants were Paul L. Adams, Attorney General, Samuel J. Torina, Solicitor General, and Nicholas V. Olds, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Michigan; Mark McElroy, Attorney General, and J. Harold Read, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Ohio; Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, and Lois G. Forer, Deputy Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Miles Lord, Attorney General, and Raymond G. Haik, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Minnesota; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Richard H. Shepp, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of New York; John W. Reynolds, Attorney General, and Roy G. Tulane, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wisconsin; and Herbert H. Naujoks, Special Assistant to the Attorneys General.
Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause and filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae in No. 15, Original, by invitation of the Court (359 U. S. 963). With him on the brief were Oscar H. Davis, John F. Davis and George S. Swarth.
Stewart G. Honeck and John Reynolds, Attorneys General, and Roy G. Tulane, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Wisconsin; Miles Lord, Attorney General, Melvin J. Peterson, Deputy Attorney General, and Raymond A. Haik, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Minnesota; William Saxbe and Mark McElroy, Attorneys General, Robert E. Boyd and J. Harold Read, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Ohio; and Thomas D. McBride and Anne X. Alpern, Attorneys General, and Lois G. Forer, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of Pennsylvania, complainants in No. 2, Original. Herbert H. Naujoks, Special Assistant to the Attorneys General, was also on the brief.
Paul L. Adams, Attorney General, Samuel J. Torina, Solicitor General, and Nicholas V. Olds, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Michigan, complainant in No. 3, Original.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, Richard H. Shepp and D'unton F. Tynan, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of New York, complainant in No. 4, Original. John R. Davison, for the Power Authority of New York, was also on the brief.
Latham Castle, Attorney General of Illinois, William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney. General, George A. Lane, Lawrence J. Fenlon, Joseph B. Fleming, Joseph H. Pleck and Thomas M. Thomas for defendants.
Solicitor General Rankin, John F. Davis and George S. Swarth for the United* States, as amicus curiae in Nos. 2, 3 and 4, Original.
Sydney G. Craig and David M. Gooder for the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, as amicus curiae in Nos. 2,3 and 4, Original.
Per Curiam.
The motion of Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry for leave to file brief in Nos. 2, Original, 3, Original and 4, Original, as amicus curiae, is granted. The amended application of complainants for a reopening of the decree of April 21,1930, in Nos. 2, Original, 3, Original, and 4, Original [281 U. S-. 696], is granted.
The motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in No. 15, Original, is granted.
It is ordered that Honorable Albert B. Maris, United States Senior Circuit Judge, be, and he is hereby,. appointed special master in each of these causes, with authority to summon witnesses, issue subpoenas, and take such evidence as may be introduced and such as he may deem it necessary to call for. The master is directed to hold hearings with all convenient speed, and to submit such reports as he may deem necessary.
The master shall be allowed his actual expenses. The allowances to him, the compensation paid to his technical, stenographic and clerical assistants, the cost of printing his report, and all other proper expenses, shall bé charged against and be borne by the parties in such proportion as the Court hereafter may direct.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2