What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Tressie SAVOID, Committee of George David Savoid, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
No. 15903.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 25, 1961.
Decided Feb. 23, 1961.
Mr. John D. Fauntleroy, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, with whom Messrs. Chester H. Gray, Corp. Counsel, Milton D. Korman, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Hubert B. Pair, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief for appellee.
Before Mr. Justice Reed, retired, and Washington and Danahek, Circuit Judges.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(a).
DANAHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant is the mother and court-appointed Committee of an incompetent veteran who was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital on December 8,1953. She has challenged the District Court’s order that she reimburse the District of Columbia in the amount of $4,165.10 for the expenses of treatment from September 9, 1954, to November 7, 1956, when the veteran was transferred to the rolls of the Veterans Administration which now bears the costs involved. She relies mainly upon a provision of 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1958) which exempts from the claim of “creditors” payments of benefits, due or to become due under any law administered by the Veterans Administration.
The District’s argument may be paraphrased thus. As an instrumentality of Government the District is not a voluntary “creditor.” It had not, unlike a private institution or an individual citizen, extended credit to the veteran. On the contrary, Congress in furtherance of a benign policy had by statute provided for St. Elizabeths, and the District Court by its order had committed the veteran to that hospital’s care. For the actual cost of maintenance and treatment, the Committee is liable to the District, at least from the date of her appointment, August 26, 1954. Accordingly, subsistence charges imposed pursuant to public authority may be recovered from a guardian or committee who in an official capacity, that is after appointment, has received the ward’s disability payments from the Veterans Administration. Not being a “creditor” in such circumstances, the District of Columbia is not here barred by the statute from securing reimbursement.
We conclude that the District’s position is correct. Various state courts have likewise decided that a governmental authority required by law to care for an incompetent veteran is not a “creditor” under circumstances comparable to those presented by this record. See, e. g., Department of Public Welfare v. Sevcik, 1960, 18 Ill.2d 449, 164 N.E.2d 10; In re Bemowski’s Guardianship, 1958, 3 Wis.2d 133, 88 N.W.2d 22; In re Lewis’ Estate, 1938, 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21. We hold only that the District was entitled to reimbursement for the actual cost of the maintenance, including treatment, of the incompetent veteran, for the period commencing September 9, 1954, and expiring November 7, 1956, when the ward was transferred to the rolls of the Veterans Administration. This disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the District’s further contention that the disability funds on deposit in the bank had become “investments” subject to levy.
Affirmed.
. She also points to District of Columbia v. Reilly, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 9, 249 F.2d 524, where we held that the District was not entitled to recover amounts paid for a veteran patient’s care before the Committee was appointed.
. See D.C.Code, §§ 82-401 to 32-417g (1951).
. The court initially might have committed the insane person to the custody of the Veterans Administration agreeably to D.C.Code, § 21-315 (1951); apparently Veterans Administration facilities were not available until November 1956.
. D.C.Code, § 21-318 (1951); and see Fitzhugh v. District of Columbia, 1940, 71 App.D.C. 290, 109 F.2d 837, and cases cited.
. 38 C.F.R. § 13.339(b) (1959) provides in pertinent part:
“These statutes make no distinction between claims of creditors arising before or after the appointment of a fiduciary or before or after adjudication of insanity. Proper expenses incurred by the fiduciary after appointment and in accordance with law are obviously not comprehended by the statutes.^ (Emphasis added.) It has long been the rule that such a construction given to a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to great weight. United States v. Moore, 1878, 95 U.S. 760, 763, 24 L.Ed. 588.
. Cf. Hale v. Gravallese, Mass.1960, 166 N.E.2d 557; Auditor General v. Olezniczak, 1942, 302 Mich. 336, 4 N.W.2d 679; but see, re bank balances as “investments,” Lawrence v. Shaw, 1937, 300 U.S. 245, 250, 57 S.Ct. 443, 81 L.Ed. 623.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0