What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DEAL v. THRASHER et al.
No. 6052.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 13, 1950.
Decided June 10, 1950.
Louis B. Fine, Norfolk, Va., for appel^an1:'
Samuel Goldblatt and James G. Martin, Norfolk, Va., for appellees.
Before PARKER Chief Judge, and DOBIE, Circuit Judge, and HAYES, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is a suit in admiralty to recover damages under the wrongful death statute of Virginia. Libelant is the administrator of Bryant Lee Capps who was drowned when he fell, or was thrown as the result of an explosion, from the motor yacht “Greenbriar”. The defendants are Fred Thrasher, who was operating the yacht, and Sam Thrasher, who was sued as owner, The court below held that there was no negligence in the maintenance or operation of the yacht and that Sam Thrasher was not liable in any event since he was not the owner and was in no way responsible for the operation. From this holding Hbel- , . . , , , , ant has appealed but makes no serious contention that there was liability on the part of Sam Thrasher.
The facts are that Fred Thrasher had obtained from the owner of the yacht, the corporation for which he was working, permission to use it on a picnic or fishing Qn at the time of the f ., ^ . - „ , ^ - - fatal accident with hred ihrasher and ^ls iami^y were Capps and his family, who ha-d been invited by Thrasher to go with him on the trip. The party had gone out into the Waters of Chesapeake Bay between Willoughby Spit and Old Point Comf0rt, and after anchoring and fishing there for about half an hour had put the vessel under way aga;n and had travcled a dis_ tance of a hundred yards or more, when the engjne was thrown into reverse in an attempt to stop. At this point an explosion occurred near the engine and decedent’s chiW was thrown into an open hatchway, the cover of which had been blown off by the explosion. Decedent started to the assistance of his child and was walking along ^-be catwalk at the side of the cabin when, as a result of the rolling of the vessel due to the explosion or of some other cause, he fell or was thrown overboard. Thrasher made every possible effort to rescue him but was unable to do so and he was drowned.
, We have read the record carefully and we agree with the judge below that there is no basis for holding Thrasher guilty o‘f negligence. The evidence shows that he used all reasonable care in the operation of the vessel and was not cognizant of any condition that could have caused the explosion. Appellant attempts to show, by evidence of a telephone conversation between him and his father, that he had knowledge that the carburetor of the motor was leaking; but the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, did not accept this evidence and, so far as we can judge from the record before us, he was correct in not doing so. Certainly, we would not be justified in reversing him as to this matter. There is no occasion to go into the facts in detail. We agree with the following summary made by the judge below:
“Now, as to the operator, Fred Thrasher, the evidence is' that this yacht and its engine received due and ordinary attention and supervision; that diligence, and certainly responsible (reasonable) diligence, was used in maintaining it in good repair and condition; that on the particular day of this unfortunate happening, Fred Thrasher was observant of his duties and of his obligations as the host; that he used and extended such care as was required of him; that he certainly used reasonable care and he was not guilty of want of ordinary care, if we assume that he was charged with the duty of ordinary care. As host it was his duty not to subject his guest to any dangerous condition of which he had knowledge, and there is no evidence here that he had knowledge that there was any defect of any kind in the engine or in the other parts of the vessel. Aside from subjecting himself to any such danger, he subjected his immediate family to the same conditions aboard the vessel, all of which negatives any intimation that he had knowledge, previous or present knowledge, of any dangerous condition aboard the vessel.
“The libelant’s case is pinned largely upon a statement which Fred Thrasher is said to have made over the telephone after the accident, to the effect that he knew the carburetor was leaking and that he had fixed it before too many people saw it. Now, that is the only evidence in this case to indicate that he had knowledge of any dangerous condition, and the court is of the opinion and finds that he did not make that statement. The evidence does not support it.”
Appellant relies upon the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; but we agree with the lower court that, even if that doctrine applies, the evidence in the case absolves Thrasher of the imputation of negligence which arises upon its application.
The decision appealed from will be affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0