What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ELECTRIC APPLIANCE CO. v. ELLIS. In re GRAEBING DRUG & DISTRIBUTING CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals. Third Circuit.
February 9, 1925.)
No. 3213.
Bankruptcy <®==>255 — Landlord cannot, without consent of tenant, resume possession of part of premises and recover rent for the remaining part.
The landlord of bankrupt, under a lease providing that on bankruptcy rent for the remainder of the term. should become due ancT payable, on tender of the premises by the trustee, and without further agreement witli him, took possession of and occupied a part of- the premises. Heldh that it, could not split the lease, and, having taken possession of part, could not recover rent for the remainder thereafter.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; Frederic P. Schoonmaker, Judge.
In the matter of the Graebing Drug & Distributing Company, bankrupt; A. C. Ellis, trustee. The Electric Appliance Com-: pany appeals from an order of the District Court.
Affirmed.
For opinion below, see 1 F.(2d) 397.
Calvert, Thompson & Wilson, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Mcllvain, Murphy & Mohn and Ben Paul Brasley, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
The case concerns a claim for reñí for an entire term, which by the lease became due in advance by reason of bankruptcy. Instead of standing on his rights, the landlord, after the bankruptcy, took possession of; the premises under the following circumstances:
Following bankruptcy, the trustee notified the landlord he elected not to continue in possession, and tendered possession. The landlord thereupon wrote the trustee that he “will accept the surrender of the premises upon the express condition that he will care for the building and rent it, if possible, for the benefit of the estate.” To this the trustee replied, by adhering to his unqualified surrender and tender of the premises, and adding: “I beg to say I could not bind the estate for future rent, as I have no authority to do so.”
Subsequently the landlord himself entered into possession, used the premises himself, and placed it in the hands of a real estate agent for rent, but under condition that, if rented, he was himself to have a certain number of days in which to vacate. Thereafter he claimed to recover the rent for the full term, giving due credit for a fair monthly rental for the time he used it while the real estate agent was trying to rent. This claim the referee refused, holding:
“The landlord, who claims i-ent in advance to the end of the term, must permit the tenant’s trustee in bankruptcy to have the use of the premises,to the end of the term. The landlord cannot have both the rent and the possession, nor can he, in the absence of any agreement, split the tona, and have rent for part of it, and possession for the rest. Wilson v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 114 F. 742, 52 C. C. A. 374, 8 Am. Bankr. Rep. 169. A lease is an entire contract. MeClurg v. Price & Simms, 59 Pa. 420, 98 Am. Dee. 356. The landlord, having resumed the occupancy of part of the premises without the consent of the tenant, cannot claim an apportioned- rent for the rest.”
On certificate, the court followed the holding of the referee, and such action is here assigned as error.
We hold the referee and court were right. In the adjustment of rent questions, the courts of the Pennsylvania districts have followed Wilson v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 114 F. 742, 52 C. C. A. 374, in holding that if, without agreement, the landlord split the term, he could not claim it as though unsplit.
It is urged that the present case is ruled by Rosenblum v. Uber, 256 F. 590, 167 C. C. A. 614; but the facts of the present case are essentially different. The parties in the Eosenblum Case acted under an agreement, in that the qualified offer of the landlord in taking possession was accepted by the trustee. Here the qualified offer of the landlord was unqualifiedly rejected by the trustee, and the subsequent taking of possession and occupation of the premises by the landlord was his own independent aet. When the differing facts in the Wilson and Eosenblum Cases are noted, it will he seen the latter ease is in no way a departure from the former.
The judgment below is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1