What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MILKINT et al. v. MORGENTHAU, Secretary of Treasury.
No. 4169.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 27, 1937.
C. Brooks Deveny and Russell L. Fur-bee, both of Fairmont, W. Va., for appellants.
Jacob S. Hyer, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Buckhannon, W. Va. (Howard L. Robinson, 'U. S. Atty., of Clarksburg, W. Va., on the brief) for appellee.
Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and CHESNUT, District Judge.
NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit in equity brought in April, 1936, by the appellants, C. C. Milkint and P. L. Milkint, partners trading and doing business as Milkint’s Garage, here referred to as the plaintiffs, against Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, and others, here referred to as the defendants, in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarks-burg.
The object of the suit was to enjoin the defendants from further proceeding to forfeit a certain automobile that had been seized by officers of the Alcoholic Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue Service of the United States, upon which automobile the plaintiffs claimed a lien, and to require the officers of the Government to conduct the forfeiture proceedings against said automobile under section 1620, U.S.C.A., title 26 instead of section 1624, U.S.C.A., title 26, under which latter section said automobile had been declared forfeited.
An amended bill of complaint was filed in May, 1936. The defendants appeared and filed a written motion to dismiss the bill and after-argument the court below on January 21, 1937, entered an order sustaining the motion to dismiss and dismissing the bill. From this action this appeal was brought.
In October, 1935, the plaintiff sold the automobile in question to one Max Lashuk and reserved a lien on the car for that part of the purchase price that was unpaid. The lien was duly recorded. In November, 1935, Government agents seized the automobile when they found it. on the premises where they also seized a still, mash, intoxicating liquor, and property used in the illegal manufacture of whisky.
The automobile was appraised as being worth $485 and proceedings were had to forfeit it under section 1624, U.S.C.A., title 26. Forfeiture of the car, after advertisement as required by the statute, was declared on January 20, 1936, and by authority of title 3 of the Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, approved August 27, 1935 (section 301 et seq. [40 U.S.C.A. § 304f, et seq.]), was turned over to the Treasury Department of the United States on April 1, 1936, for the use of the Alcohol Tax Unit. The plaintiffs had full knowledge of the forfeiture proceedings but took no action with regard to them.
The question presented here is whether the Government agents had the right to proceed against the seized automobile in the manner which they did, and if they did not have such right, are the plaintiffs entitled to the relief prayed for?
Section 1624, U.S.C.A., title 26, plainly provides that “any goods, wares, or merchandise” seized as being subject to forfeiture under any provisions of the Internal Revenue Laws, of the appraised value of $500, or less, should be proceeded against as was admittedly done here.
This method of proceeding against seized property of the value of $500, or less, was an exclusive method and Congress undoubtedly had the right to make this provision. Fisburn v. Jackson (D.C.) 55 F.(2d) 934, and cases there cited.
The proceedings had were regular and the plaintiffs had personal notice of them. They chose to stand idle and allow the forfeiture to be prosecuted to a conclusion without availing themselves of the remedies provided by the statute.
It is contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that both the seizure of the automobile and the proceeding to forfeit it were unlawful. Section 1624, U.S.C.A., title 26, subsec. (c), provides that any person claiming seized articles can, by the giving of a bond of $250, have the forfeiture proceedings thrown into court. This the plaintiffs refused to do, although notified of their right by letter, and no claim is made that they were not able to give the small bond required. By this course the plaintiffs forfeited their right to the relief they now ask. Fisburn v. Jackson, supra; United States v. One Hudson Sedan (D.C.) 16 F.Supp. 895; United States v. Chicelli (D.C.) 10 F.Supp. 900.
In this view of the case, which we think the proper one, all questions as to the legality of the seizure and the forfeiture proceedings that followed become immaterial.
Under the circumstances existing here plaintiffs cannot ignore the plain remedy provided by congress and then invoke the aid of a court of equity.
The order of the court below dismissing the cause is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1