What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Edward Lee McLALLEN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES MARSHAL, WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI, et al., Appellee.
No. 20256.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Jan. 13, 1971.
Ronald M. Sokol, Kansas City, Mo., on brief for appellant.
Bert C. Hum, U. S. Atty., and Frederick O. Griffin, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., on brief for appellee.
Before MATTHES, Chief Judge, and LAY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
On April 10, 1964, the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4163, mandatorily released Edward Lee McLallen from the Leavenworth Penitentiary with 445 days remaining on his sentence for a Dyer Act violation. Under the statute, such a mandatorily released prisoner acquires the same status as that of a parolee until the expiration of his prison term less 180 days. 18 U.S.C. § 4164. While on such status as a parolee, Mc-Lallen was arrested for second-degree burglary in the State of Missouri. Based on this arrest, the United States Board of Parole issued a warrant directed to any proper United States officer to take McLallen into custody as a parole violator. Upon instructions from the Board of Parole, Respondent United States Marshal, holding the said warrant, withheld its execution, but lodged a detainer with Missouri state officials charged with holding custody of the petitioner.
McLallen filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court for the Western District of Missouri seeking to invalidate the detainer. He contended that the delay in executing the warrant, thereby necessarily delaying disposition of the parole violator claim, violated his constitutional right to due process. The district court construed the petition as one for declaratory relief and dismissed the proceedings, holding that the delay in execution did not strip the warrant of legal validity.
McLallen appeals in forma pauperis from the district court decision. He delineates the issue on appeal in the following language:
On appeal there is no contention that the Board of Paroles may not revoke a mandatory release for commission of a crime while in mandatory release status. Nor is there any contention that statutory good time may not be revoked for violation of mandatory release. Nor is it contended that the Board of Paroles may not, within its discretion, determine that the remaining federal time is to be served consecutively to the state incarceration. What is contended is that it is arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process of law for the Board of Paroles or some employee or agent thereof to refuse and fail to reach a determination, particularly after request, as to whether there has been a violation; whether there are factors in mitigation; whether the mandatory releasee is still a good “parole risk”; whether the violation, if established, is to be ignored or the releasee rein-carcerated, or whether his incarceration is to be served concurrently with, or consecutive to, his state sentence.
Petitioner’s claims of constitutional deprivation are similar to those asserted by the appellant, and rejected by us, in Chaney v. Ciccone, 427 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1970). See also Petition of Castaldi, 428 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1970); Hash v. Henderson, 385 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1967). In Chaney, supra, we held it a permissible practice for the Board of Parole to lodge a detainer against a parole violator and to delay the execution of a parole violator’s warrant until the conclusion of the state sentence then being served by the alleged violator. We consider this court’s decision in Chaney, supra, as dispositive of this case.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0