What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
HOGAN v. ZERBST, Warden.
No. 8947.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 9, 1939.
Harold C. Hogan, in pro. per.
Lawrence S. Camp, U. S. Atty., and Harvey H. Tisinger and J. Ellis Mundy, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.
Before FOSTER, HUTCHESON, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the prisoner to the custody of the warden of the Atlanta penitentiary. The material facts shown by the. record are these:
Appellant began serving a sentence of four years in a Federal jail on November 7, 1931. He was released on parole December 5, 1933. While on parole he was arrested in the state of Arkansas and charged with aiding four other men in a robbery. His participation in the robbery consisted in conveying the robbers away from the scene of the crime, after it had been committed, for which he received $200. On July 23, 1935, while the state charge was pending, a parole warrant was issued for his arrest and placed with the state sheriff as a detainer. The criminal proceedings in the state court dragged along but were finally terminated in favor of appellant by the entering of a nolle prosequi of the indictment. In th.e meantime he had been reporting regularly to the Federal probation officer and continued to do so after the termination of the state charge. Part of this time he was in jail under the state charge and part of the time he was enlarged on bail. After the termination of the state case the parole warrant was executed, appellant was rearrested on August 12, 1937, and is held to serve out the balance of his Federal sentence.
While awaiting trial under the state charge appellant was either actually or constructively in custody of the state court which had authority to detain him. The facts show reasonable ground for revoking his parole although he was not convicted under the state charge. The Parole Board had jurisdiction over appellant when the parole warrant was issued. Had he then absconded delay in his ultimate arrest would not have prevented revocation of his parole nor the service of the unexpired portion of his sentence. Though appellant was not serving a sentence, the pending criminal proceedings in the state court had the effect of preventing the exercise of jurisdiction by the Parole Board. We find no legal grounds for interfering with the discretion of the Parole Board in this case. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247; Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 58 S.Ct. 872, 82 L.Ed. 1399, 116 A.L.R. 808.
The record presents no reversible error.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0