What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SMITH v. HUNTER, Warden.
No. 4535.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 12, 1952.
Malcolm Miller, Wichita, Kan., for appellant.
Ernest J. Rice, Asst. U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan. (Eugene W. Davis, U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and MURRAH and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.
On January 23, 1950, Smith, hereinafter called petitioner, upon a plea of guilty to Count Two of an indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in cause No. 6024, was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for imprisonment for a period of 40 months.
The sentence provides that it shall “run concurrently with the sentence in! Criminal Case 8312 at the Laredo Division of this Court which was this day put in force as to the fine of Five Hundred ($500) Dollars.”
On the same day the court in another proceeding, Criminal Case No. 8312, found that the petitioner had violated the conditions of an order suspending the imposition of sentence and imposed the following sentence:
“It is the sentence of the Court that the Defendant pay to the United States of America a fine of Five Hundred ($500) Dollars for fraudulently and knowingly concealing narcotic drug, Vio. Sec. 174, Tit. 21, U.S.C.A. as charged in Count Two of the Indictment and that the United States of America do have and recover of and from the said Raymond O. Smith said sum of Five Hundred ($500) Dollars for which execution may issue. Further that the said Raymond O. Smith is committed until such fine is paid. This sentence to run concurrent with the sentence imposed on s.aid Defendant Smith on this date in Criminal No. 6024, United States of America vs. Raymond O’dell Smith at the Galveston Division of this Court.”
In his petition for the writ the petitioner set up that the two sentences were to r concurrently; that he had served his month sentence; that he was entitled to discharged; and that the respondent refused to discharge him. sr$B
The trial court held that unless petitioner paid the fine he was not entitled to discharge-until he had served the maximum sentence which could be imposed in Criminal Case-No. 8312, or until he served 30 days in addition to the 40 months and had filed the affidavit provided for by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3569.
The maximum term of imprisonment which could háve been imposed upon .petitioner for the offense of which -he was convicted in No. 8312 was 10 years. 21 U.S. C.A. §-174.
In Nd. 8312 petitioner was committed until the fine imposed had been paid. Had there been no provision' in the' sentence in No. 8312 that it should run concurrently with the sentence imposed in No. 6024, there could be no doubt that petitioner, unless he either paid the fine or filed the affidavit provided for in § 3569, supra, was subject to imprisonment for' nonpayment of the fine for'such maximum period of'10 years. What, then, was the effect of the provision in the sentence in No. -8312 that.it should run concurrently with a. sentence imposed in- No. 6024?, Obviously, a sentence of a fine could not run concurrently with a sentence of imprisonment. The only part of the sentence in No. 8312.which cpuld run concurrently with the sentence in No. 6024 was the imprisonment under the former for nonpayment of the finé. We are of the opinion that the effect of the concurrent provision in the sentence in No. 8312 was to make the sentence of imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine commence at the time the 'imprisonment under the sentence in No. 6024 began, and not at the time such imprisonment terminated. Accordingly, the maximum term of imprisonment for nonpayment of the fine commenced on January 23, 1950, when petitioner commenced the service of the imprisonment sentence imposed in No. 6024.
Since petitioner has not served the maximum term of 10 years from January 23, 1950, and has neither paid the fine nor filed the affidavit provided for in § 3569, supra, he is not now- entitled to discharge.
It was settled in McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-138, 55 S.Ct. 24, 26, 79 L.Ed. 238, that the only inquiry which may be made in a habeas corpus proceeding is the legality of the detention; that the only relief authorized is discharge or admission to bail if the detention be found to- be unlawful, and that the writ may not be employed as a means of obtaining the judicial decision of any question which, even if determined in the prisoner’s favor, will not result in his immediate release.
Hence, we do not now determine whether petitioner will be entitled to discharge upon the filing of the affidavit provided for in § 3569, supra.
The order discharging the writ is affirmed and the cause is remanded with instructions to vacate the order enlarging the petitioner on bond and to remand him to the custody of. the warden.
. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3569 provides:
“(a) When a poor convict, sentenced for violation of any law of the United States by any court established by enactment of Congress, to be imprisoned and pay a fine, or fine and costs, or to pay a fine, or fine and costs, has been confined in-prison thirty days, ¡solely for the non-payment of such fine, or fine and costs, such convict may make application in writing to the nearest United States commissioner in the district where he is imprisoned setting forth his inability to pay such fine, or fine and costs, and after notice to the district attorney of the United States, who may appear, offer evidence, and be heard, the commissioner shall proceed to hear and determine the matter.
“If on examination it shall appear to him that such convict is unable to pay such fine, or fine and costs, and that he has not any property exceeding $20 in value, except such as is by law exempt from being taken on execution for debt, the commissioner shall administer to- him the following oath: ‘I do solemnly swear that I have not any property, real or personal, exceeding $20, except such as is by law exempt from being taken on civil process for debt; and that I have no property in any way conveyed or concealed, or in any way disposed of, for my future use or benefit. So help me God.’ Upon taking such oath such convict shall be discharged; and the commissioner shall file with the institution in which the convict is confined, a certificate setting forth the facts. In case the convict is found by the commissioner to possess property valued at an amount in excess of said exemption, nevertheless, if the Attorney General finds that the retention by such convict of all of such property is reasonably necessary for his support or that of his family, such convict shall be released without further imprisonment solely for the nonpayment of such fine, or fine and costs; or if he finds that the retention by such convict of any part of such property is reasonably necessary for his support or that of his family, such convict shall be released without further imprisonment solely for-nonpayment of such fine or fine- and costs upon payment on account of Ms fine and costs, of that portipn of Ms property in excess of the amount found to- be reasonably necessary for Ms support or that of Ms family.
“(b) Any such indigent prisoner-in a Federal institution may, in the first in-, stance, make Ms application to the warden of such institution, who- shall have all the powers of a Urnted States Commissioner in such matters, and upon proper showing in support of the application shall administer the oath required by subsection (a) of this section, discharge the prisoner, and file Ms certificate to that effect in the records of the institution.
“Any such indigent prisoner, to whom the warden shall fail or refuse to administer the oath may apply to the nearest Commissioner for the relief authorized by this section and the Commissioner shall proceed de novo to hear and determine the matter.”
. In re Greenwald, C.C., 8th Cir., 77 F. 590.
. In that case the court said:
“The purpose of the proceedMg defined by the statute was to inquire into the legality of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was the discharge of the prisoner or Ms admission to bail, and that only if his detention were found to- be uMawful. * * * Diligent search of .the English authorities and the digests before 1789 has failed to disclose any case where the writ was sought or used, either before or after conviction, as a means of securing the judicial decision of any question which, even if determined in the prisoner’s favor, could not have resulted in Ms immediate release.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0