What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DUELL v. BREWER et al.
No. 443.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Decided Aug. 2, 1937.
Hurlbert McAndrew, of Larchmont, N. Y., for appellant.
Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, of New York City (David H. Moses, of White Plains, N. Y., of counsel), for appellees.
Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
L. HAND, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a decree in equity dismissing a bill for insufficiency upon its face; every intendment must be taken in its favor, and if any relief whatever was possible, the cause should have gone to trial. The gist of the bill is as follows. The three corporate defendants are banks, called for convenience, the “Trust Company,” the “Old Bank” and the “New Bank”; the plaintiff is the trustee in bankruptcy of a stock corporation organized under the laws of New York. Those of the individual defendants, who succeeded below and whom the appeal concerns, were directors and shareholders of the “Trust Company” and the “Old Bank.” The “Trust Company” was organized under the banking laws of New York, which forbad it to lend to any one borrower more than ten per cent, of its capital and surplus, and directed it to maintain stipulated cash reserves. It lent too much to the bankrupt, and failed to maintain the reserves; and some of the defendants-appellees abetted these violations, and thus became liable to creditors of The “Trust Company” for all resulting damages. The “Old Bank” was a national bank and it lent more than its capital, contrary to section 82 of title 12 U.S.Code (12 U.S.C.A. § 82); and more than ten per cent, of its capital and surplus to the bankrupt, contrary to section 84 of the same title. Others of the defendants-appellees abetted these violations, and they too became liable to the creditors of the “Old Bank” for all resulting damages. The defendants-appellees were also shareholders of the two banks, both of which have become insolvent; as such they are liable to the creditors. On twelve different occasions between October 15, 1931, and March 22, 1932, the bankrupt assigned accounts payable, either to the “Trust Company,” or the “Old Bank,” the proceeds to be.applied upon its indebtedness; the bank knew in each case that the bankrupt was insolvent, both in the sense that it had failed to pay its debts in due course, and that its assets were less than its liabilities. The bankrupt kept control over these accounts and was allowed to use, and did use, some of their proceeds in its business. The assignments were without consideration and for other reasons fraudulent conveyances. Thus they at once were preferences under section 15 of the New York Stock Corporation Law (Consol.Laws, c. 59), and fraudulent conveyances under sections 67 and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act (as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 107, 110). The case against the defendants-appellees, as directors and shareholders, is based upon the fact that they had “demanded” and actively procured the assignments to their bank, and this they did for the purpose of relieving themselves pro tanto of their liabilities to the creditors of that bank, either as directors or as shareholders. The defendants-appellees moved to dismiss the bill as to themselves; the court dismissed it and the plaintiff appealed.
The bill stated a good case against the “Trust Company” and the “Old Bank” for a preference under section 15 of the New York Stock Corporation Law; and the plaintiff does not seek to stand upon section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act (as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 96(b). The directors were the active persons in procuring all the transfers and had full knowledge of the bankrupt’s insolvency; and if taking a preference were a tort, they would be liable, just as the directors of a company are liable for any other torts which they procure it to commit. But preference is the creature of statute, whether under the Bankruptcy Act or the New York Stock Corporation Law; and the only resulting liabilities are those which the statutes declare. Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act enacts that the trustee may recover from the “person receiving it or to be benefited thereby * * * the property or its value.” This is inconsistent with the notion that one person who is the active means in procuring another to obtain a preference is liable in damages. National Bank of Newport v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 184, 32 S.Ct. 633, 56 L.Ed. 1042; Carson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 254 N.Y. 218, 172 N.E. 475, 70 A.L.R. 435; Page v. Moore (D.C.) 179 F. 988; Eyges v. Boylston Nat. Bank (D.C.) 294 F. 286. Moreover, courts have generally held as to fraudulent conveyances that a person who assists another to procure one, is not liable in tort to the insolvent’s creditors. Adler v. Fenton, 24 How. 407, 16 L.Ed. 696; Austin v. Barrows, 41 Conn. 287; Wellington v. Small, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 145, 50 Am.Dec. 719. In Pennsylvania the rule is otherwise. Mott v. Danforth, 6 Watts, 304, 31 Am.Dec. 468; Penrod v. Mitchell, 8 Sarg. & R. 522. The reasons ordinarily given are the impossibility of proving any damages, which scarcely seems sufficient; but the result is settled, at least for us. A fortiori must the doctrine be true for a preference. We conclude therefore that under section 15 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, the liability of one who takes active part in procuring a preference does not extend to any damages suffered by the insolvent’s creditors. Nevertheless, he must be liable for any part of the property which he actually receives just as he would be under section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act; the transferee is a constructive trustee and by hypothesis the abettor has received part of the res from him with notice of the trust.
The question still remains whether this liability extends to indirect benefits received — for instance, by the discharge of an obligation. Hughes, J., National Bank of Newport v. Herkimer Bank, supra, 225 U.S. 178, at page 184, 32 S.Ct. 633, 56 L.Ed. 1042, thought that if the transferee directed the property to be turned over to his creditor, he would be as much liable as though he received it himself, and clearly that must be so. Similarly, if a creditor of the transferee joins with the transferee to secure the preference, and receives it in discharge of the debt, he must be liable, at least to the extent that the transferee cannot respond. He has received it with notice of the trust, and, though a purchaser, is not a bona fide purchaser. Whether he would be liable for the whole amount, or only for so much as the trustee could not collect from the .transferee, we need not decide; the difference is only one of procedure, because if liable in full in the first instance he could prove against the transferee upon his original debt, which would then be unpaid. In the case at bar the directors were not creditors of the banks, but they were liable to its creditors, or to the banks, or to both, for the various statutory violations in which they had participated. So far as the assignments reduced these liabilities they benefited, and they became liable to the plaintiff to the extent that the bank’s assets will not satisfy any judgment he may get. When, for example, the bank lent to the bankrupt more than ten per cent, of its capital and surplus, the directors became liable for so much of the excess as the bankrupt would have been unable to pay, if the debt were still outstanding and unpaid. The assignments relieved them pro tanto of that liability and they are liable to the plaintiff so far as they did. The other liabilities are differently measured, but it is not necessary to work them out in detail. The principle in each case is what we have said. As to the liability of the defendants as shareholders, that depends upon how much the assignments reduced the amount for which they could be assessed. If they can be assessed for the full amount even with the preferences retained, they have not benefited at all. The bill did not, it is true, allege that the assignments in fact discharged the defendants of any liabilities, and it may be urged that we should not supply that omission. Nevertheless, it did allege that the defendants-appellees procured them for the purpose of discharging themselves, and upon motion to dismiss, we may imply the allegation that the intent was fulfilled; that is the general purport of the bill. It was also framed on the theory that the assignments were fraudulent transfers in which the defendants-appellees were also abettors. We cannot see that this presents any different' issues; the question still would be how far they benefited. Enough was alleged to bring the assignments within Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 45 S.Ct. 566, 69 L.Ed. 991; but otherwise the allegations were insufficient to make out a charge of fraudulent transfers.
Decree reversed; cause remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0