What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
BUTZ, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. GLOVER LIVESTOCK COMMISSION CO., INC.
No. 71-1545.
Argued February 27, 1973
Decided March 28, 1973
Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas, J., joined, post, p. 189.
Keith A. Jones argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wood, Morton Hollander, and William Kanter.
R. A. Eilbott, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward I. Staten.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture, acting for the Secretary of Agriculture, found that respondent, a registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. § 181 et seq., wilfully violated §§ 307 (a) and 312 (a) of the Act, 7 U. S. C. §§ 208 (a) and 213 (a), by incorrect weighing of livestock, and also breached § 401, 7 U. S. C. § 221, by entries of false weights. An order was entered directing that respondent cease and desist from the violations and keep correct accounts, and also suspending respondent as a registrant under the Act for 20 days. Upon review of the decision and order, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld, as supported by substantial evidence, the findings that respondent violated the Act by short-weighting cattle, and also sustained the cease-and-desist order and the order to keep correct accounts. The Court of Appeals, however, set aside the 20-day suspension. 454 F. 2d 109 (1972). We granted certiorari to consider whether, in doing so, the Court of Appeals exceeded the scope of proper judicial review of administrative sanctions. 409 U. S. 947 (1972). We conclude that the setting aside of the suspension was an impermissible judicial intrusion into the administrative domain under the circumstances of this case, and reverse.
Respondent operates a stockyard in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. As a registered “market agency” under § 303 of the Act, 7 U. S. C. § 203, respondent is authorized to sell consigned livestock on commission, subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act and the Secretary’s implementing regulations. Investigations of respondent’s operations in 1964, 1966, and 1967 uncovered instances of underweighing of consigned livestock. Respondent was informally warned to correct the situation, but when a 1969 investigation revealed more underweighing, the present proceeding was instituted by the Administrator of the Packers and Stockyards Administration.
Following a hearing and the submission of briefs, the Department of Agriculture hearing examiner found that respondent had “intentionally weighed the livestock at less than their true weights, issued scale tickets and accountings to the consignors on the basis of the false weights, and paid the consignors on the basis of the false weights.” The hearing examiner recommended, in addition to a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records, a 30-day suspension of respondent’s registration under the Act.
The matter was then referred to the Judicial Officer.After hearing oral argument, the Judicial Officer filed a decision and order accepting the hearing examiner’s findings and adopting his recommendations of a cease-and-desist order and an order to keep correct records. The recommended suspension was also imposed but was reduced to 20 days. The Judicial Officer stated:
“It is not a pleasant task to impose sanctions but in view of the previous warnings given respondent we conclude that we should not only issue a cease and desist order but also a suspension of respondent as a registrant under the act but for a lesser period than recommended by complainant and the hearing examiner.” 30 Agri. Dec. 179, 186 (1971).
The Court of Appeals agreed that 7 U. S. C. § 204 authorized the Secretary to suspend “any registrant found in violation of the Act,” 454 F. 2d, at 113, that the suspension procedure here satisfied the relevant requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 558, and that “the evidence indicates that [respondent] acted with careless disregard of the statutory requirements and thus meets the test of wilfulness.’ ” 454 F. 2d, at 115. The court nevertheless concluded that the suspension order was “unconscionable” under the circumstances of this case. The court gave two reasons. The first, relying on four previous suspension decisions, was that the Secretary’s practice was not to impose suspensions for negligent or careless violations but only for violations found to be “intentional and flagrant,” and therefore that the suspension in respondent’s case was contrary to a policy of “ ‘achieving] . . . uniformity of sanctions for similar violations.’ ” The second reason given was that “[t]he cease and desist order coupled with the damaging publicity surrounding these proceedings would certainly seem appropriate and reasonable with respect to the practice the Department seeks to eliminate.” Id., at 114, 115.
The applicable standard of judicial review in such cases required review of the Secretary’s order according to the “fundamental principle . . . that where Congress has entrusted an administrative agency with the responsibility of selecting the means of achieving the statutory policy 'the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.’ ” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 112 (1946). Thus, the Secretary’s choice of sanction was not to be overturned unless the Court of Appeals might find it “unwarranted in law or . . . without justification in fact . . . Id., at 112-113; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941); Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S. 411, 413-414 (1958); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U. S. 244, 250 (1967); 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law §30.10, pp. 250-251 (1958). The Court of Appeals acknowledged this definition of the permissible scope of judicial review but apparently regarded respondent’s suspension as “unwarranted in law” or “without justification in fact.” We cannot agree that the Secretary’s action can be faulted in either respect on this record.
We read the Court of Appeals’ opinion to suggest that the sanction was “unwarranted in law” because “uniformity of sanctions for similar violations” is somehow mandated by the Act. We search in vain for that requirement in the statute. The Secretary may suspend “for a reasonable specified period” any registrant who has violated any provision of the Act. 7 U. S. C. § 204. Nothing whatever in that provision confines its application to cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct” or denies its application in cases of negligent or careless violations. Rather, the breadth of the grant of authority to impose the sanction strongly implies a congressional purpose to permit the Secretary to impose it to deter repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or negligent. Hyatt v. United States, 276 F. 2d 308, 313 (CA10 1960) ; G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F. 2d 286 (CA7 1958); In re Silver, 21 Agri. Dec. 1438, 1452 (1962). The employment of a sanction within the authority of an administrative agency is thus not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases. FCC v. WOKO, 329 U. S. 223, 227-228 (1946); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U. S., at 250, 251; G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, supra, at 296; Hiller v. SEC, 429 F. 2d 856, 858-859 (CA2 1970); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F. 2d 107, 110 (CA2 1967) ; Kent v. Hardin, 425 F. 2d 1346, 1349 (CA5 1970).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals may have been in error in acting on the premise that the Secretary’s practice was to impose suspensions only in cases of “intentional and flagrant conduct.” The Secretary’s practice, rather, apparently is to employ that sanction as in his judgment best serves to deter violations and achieve the objectives of that statute. Congress plainly intended in its broad grant to give the Secretary that breadth of discretion. Therefore, mere unevenness in the application of the sanction does not render its application in a particular case “unwarranted in law.”
Nor can we perceive any basis on this record for a conclusion that the suspension of respondent was so “without justification in fact” “as to constitute an abuse of [the Secretary’s] discretion.” American Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S., at 115; Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U. S., at 414; Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 455 (1954). The Judicial Officer rested the suspension on his view of its necessity in light of respondent’s disregard of previous warnings. The facts found concerning the previous warnings and respondent’s disregard of these warnings were sustained by the Court of Appeals as based on ample evidence. In that circumstance, the overturning of the suspension authorized by the statute was an impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain.
Similarly, insofar as the Court of Appeals rested its action on its view that, in light of damaging publicity about the charges, the cease-and-desist order sufficiently redressed respondent’s violations, the court clearly exceeded its function of judicial review. The fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for the Secretary, not the court. The court may decide only whether, under the pertinent statute and relevant facts, the Secretary made “an allowable judgment in [his] choice of the remedy.” Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U. S. 608, 612 (1946).
Reversed.
7 U. S. C. §§ 201-217a. Specifically, registrants are prohibited from engaging in or using “any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice or device in connection with . . . receiving, marketing, buying, or selling on a commission basis or otherwise, feeding, watering, holding, delivery, shipment, weighing, or handling ... of livestock,” 7 U. S. C. §213 (a), and are required to “keep such accounts, records, and memoranda as fully and correctly disclose all transactions involved in his business 7 U. S. C. §221.
The Secretary’s regulations may be found in 9 CFR pt. 201.
App. 35.
The Court of Appeals stated:
“Ordinarily it is not for the courts to modify ancillary features of agency orders which are supported by substantial evidence. The shaping of remedies is peculiarly within the special competence of the regulatory agency vested by Congress with authority to deal with these matters, and so long as the remedy selected does not exceed the agency’s statutory power to impose and it bears a reasonable relation to the practice sought to be eliminated, a reviewing court may not interfere. . . . [A]ppellate courts [may not] enter the more spacious domain of public policy which Congress has entrusted in the various regulatory agencies.” 454 F. 2d 109, 114.
The Court of Appeals cited a 1962 decision by the Secretary in which appears a reference to “uniformity of sanctions for similar violations.” In re Silver, 21 Agri. Dec. 1438 (1962). That reference is no support for the Court of Appeals’ decision, however, for the Secretary said expressly in that decision:
“False and incorrect weighing of livestock by registrants under the act is a flagrant and serious violation thereof ...” and “even if respondent did not give instructions for the false weighings, his negligence in allowing the false weighings over an extended period brings such situation unthin the reach of the cited cases [sustaining sanctions] and we would still order the sanctions below.” Id., at 1452 (emphasis added).
It is by no means clear that respondent’s violations were merely negligent. The hearing examiner found that respondent had “intentionally” underweighed livestock, and the Judicial Officer stated: “We conclude then, as did the hearing examiner, that respondent wilfully violated . . . the act.” (Emphasis added.) “Wilfully” could refer to either intentional conduct or conduct that was merely careless or negligent. It seems clear, however, that the Judicial Officer sustained the hearing examiner’s finding that the violations were “intentional.”
See, e. g., In re Martella, 30 Agri. Dec. 1479 (1971); In re Meggs, 30 Agri. Dec. 1314 (1971); In re Producers Livestock Mar keting Assn., 30 Agri. Dec. 796 (1971); In re Trimble, 29 Agri. Dec. 936 (1970); In re Anson, 28 Agri. Dec. 1127 (1969); In re Williamstown Stockyards, 27 Agri. Dec. 252 (1968); In re Middle Georgia Livestock Sales Co., 23 Agri. Dec. 1361 (1964). These cases involve suspension of registrants under the Packers and Stockyards Act for false weighing of producers’ livestock and in none was there a finding that the violation was intentional or flagrant. There are also many cases of suspension for diverse other violations without a finding that the conduct was intentional or flagrant. See, e. g., In re Wallis, 29 Agri. Dec. 37 (1970).

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 3