What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Per Ake SKANTZE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 15905.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Dec. 9, 1960.
Decided Feb. 23, 1961.
Bastían, Circuit Judge, dissented in part.
Mr. T. Emmett McKenzie, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Stephen Shulman, Asst. U. S. Atty., at the time of argument, for appellee. Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. Atty., and John D. Lane, Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time of argument, were on the brief for appellee.
Before Washington, Danaher and Bastían, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant-appellant was convicted of the crimes of grand larceny and false pretenses. D.C.Code §§ 22-2201, 22-1301 (Supp. VIII, 1960). He was a member of the staff of the diplomatic corps of the Kingdom of Sweden, assigned to the embassy in Washington, D. C., as vice consul, chancellor and accountant. He was considered the cashier of the embassy; and it was one of his duties to keep an embassy cash fund in a safe in his office, to make certain disbursals from this fund, to replenish the money in the fund when needed, and to keep records. In order to replenish the cash in the fund, it was necessary for appellant, from time to time, to make out checks payable to “cash” and to obtain the signature of one of his superiors thereto. The checks would then be cashed and the proceeds deposited in the cash fund safe.
The events giving rise to this case occurred between 1956 and 1958. On behalf of the Government, there was testimony that on the several occasions in question appellant presented checks to one of his superiors for signature, saying that the money was needed for the embassy cash fund; that appellant came into possession of the proceeds of the checks and that he then pocketed the money received and falsely reported (by means of bookkeeping entries) having made payments to various business firms. Appellant was prosecuted under a 27-count indictment based on nine transactions such as described, the nine checks totaling $12,000. On each transaction described in the indictment, appellant was prosecuted for false pretenses, grand larceny and embezzlement. It was shown at trial that appellant had no authority to take the money for himself and that the firms he claimed to have paid had in fact received nothing. At the close of the evidence, the Government elected to dismiss the counts charging embezzlement. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the remaining counts of grand larceny and of false pretenses. Appellant was sentenced to terms of from three to nine years on the grand larceny counts and from one to three years on those of false pretenses, the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
Appellant claims that the conviction cannot stand, because grand larceny and false pretenses are inconsistent offenses. We do not agree. Title 22-1301 of the D.C.Code defines false pretenses, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Whoever, by any false pretense, with intent to defraud, obtains from any person anything of value, or procures the execution and delivery of any instrument of writing or conveyance of real or personal property, or the signature of any person, as maker, indorser, or guarantor, to or upon any bond, bill, receipt, promissory note, draft, or check, or any other evidence of indebtedness, and whoever fraudulently sells, barters, or disposes of any bond, bill, receipt, promissory note, draft, or check, or other evidence of indebtedness, for value, knowing the same to be worthless, or knowing the signature of the maker, indorser, or guarantor thereof to have been obtained by any false pretense, shall, if the value of the property or the sum or value of the money or property so obtained, procured, sold, bartered, or disposed of is $100 or upward, be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than three years; or, if less than that sum, shall be fined not more than $200 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. * * * ”
The language quoted shows that appellant, if the Government’s evidence was believed (as it obviously was), committed the crime of false pretenses when he obtained the signature of his superior to the checks, and perhaps again when he negotiated them — though we need not pass on this latter point. Therefore, the convictions for false pretenses must stand.
As to the grand larceny counts: the governing statute, D.C.Code § 22-2201, provides:
“Whoever shall feloniously take and carry away anything of value of the amount or value of $100 or upward, including things savoring of the realty, shall suffer imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.”
This statute has repeatedly been construed by this court. It has long been established that “one who obtains money from another upon the representation that he will perform certain service therewith for the latter, intending at the time to convert the money, and actually converting it, to his own use, is guilty of larceny.” Means v. United States, 1933, 62 App.D.C. 118, 119, 65 F.2d 206, 207, and cases cited. See also Graham v. United States, 1950, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 132, 187 F.2d 87, 90, certiorari denied 1951, 341 U.S. 920, 71 S.Ct. 741, 95 L.Ed. 1353. In the instant case the trial judge pointed to the critical and controlling factor that this appellant from the very outset entertained the specific intent to steal his employer’s money. He not only intended to do so, he consummated his purpose and actually converted the money to his own use. The record overwhelmingly establishes his guilt. As to each of the transactions, the appellant represented to his superiors that the money was needed for the embassy’s cash account and thus procured their signatures to the checks. He intended when he wrote up the checks to keep the money if the bank should cash them as indeed it did. Then the appellant made false entries in the cash journals in an effort to cloak the transactions. He was properly found guilty of grand larceny.
The argument to the contrary errs, we think, in that it overlooks the manner in which the money came into appellant’s keeping. Appellant was a trusted employee and undoubtedly did have other money lawfully in his keeping; but the money stolen was not such. He procured it through a trick or deceit. His position in the embassy, while it undoubtedly was a material ingredient in his deception, does not change the nature of his acts. Means v. United States, supra; Graham v. United States, supra.
We need not discuss the remaining contentions of the parties, as we find no reversible error.
Affirmed.
. As a foreign service officer of the Kingdom of Sweden, appellant had diplomatic immunity. However, his own act of changing his status in 1955 from that of Swedish national to resident alien in the United States would appear to have operated to waive that immunity. No claim of immunity was or is made.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0