What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
YOUNG v. TERRITORY OF HAWAII.
No. 11144.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
March 5, 1947.
Rehearing Denied April 19, 1947.
Writ of Certiorari Denied June 16,1947.
See 67 S.Ct. 1736.
DENMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Fred Patterson and E. J. Botts, both of Honolulu, T. H., and Herbert Chamberlin, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
W. Z. Fairbanks, Public Prosecutor, City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu, T. H., for appellee.
Before DENMAN, HEALY, and ORR, Circuit Judges,
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of abortion, defined by a statute of the Territory of Llawaii, and was given a prison sentence. The appeal is from a judgment of the territorial supreme court affirming the conviction. Territory v. Young, 37 Haw. 150. We are obliged at the outset to determine whether we have jurisdiction in the premises.
Section 128(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S.C.A. § 225(a), as amended.; provides: “The circuit courts of appeal shall have appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal final decisions— * * * Fourth. In the Supreme Courts of the Territory of Hawaii and of Puerto Rico, in all cases, civil or criminal, wherein the Constitution or a statute or treaty of the United States or any authority exercised thereunder is involved; in all other civil cases wherein the value in controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, exceeds $5,000, and in all habeas corpus proceedings.”
The jurisdictional claim is that in consequence of an error in charging the jury appellant was denied due process of law in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. The deprival of due process is said to reside in the italicized portion of the following instruction pertaining to reasonable doubt:
“I further instruct you that the burden of proof is upon the Territory and the law presumes the defendant to be innocent, and this presumption continues and attends him at every stage of the case until it has been overcome by evidence which proves him guilty to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. And in this conneetion, I instruct you that the doubt which will entitle the defendant to an acquittal must be a reasonable doubt, not a conjured-up doubt, such a doubt as you might conjure up to acquit a friend, but a doubt that you could give a reason for.
“A reasonable doubt is not a slight doubt, not a probable doubt, not a possible doubt, not a conjectural doubt, not an imaginary doubt, not a doubt of the absolute • certainty of the guilt of the accused, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon mortal evidence is open to conjectural or imaginary doubt, and because absolute certainty is not required by law. The real question,is whether after hearing the evidence and from the evidence you have or have not an abiding belief, amounting to a moral certainty that the defendant is guilty and if you have such belief so formed, it is your duty to convict and if you have not such belief so formed it is your duty to acquit” [Emphasis supplied.]
Instructions essaying to define reasonable doubt in terms “of a doubt that you could give a reason for,” or in language of like import, have been criticized or condemned in some cases and defended in others. This court in Owens v. United States, 9 Cir., 130 F. 279, 283, disapproved of a similarly worded instruction, but later we held that an identical definition of reasonable doubt, when considered with the whole body of instructions given, was not reversible error, Louie Ding v. United States, 9 Cir., 246 F. 80. In upholding the instruction in. the present case the territorial court said that “from long-continued use and uniform approval by this court when before it for review, it has assumed the dignity of a stock instruction.” Earlier approving decisions of the court, reaching as far back as 1889 and continuing through the years, are cited, including in the number several capital cases; and the court concludes that “measured by the purpose sought to be attained the instruction complained of is, as .a whole, as good as can be devised to convey to the lay mind the ordinary accepted definition of reasonable doubt.” 37 Haw. 154, 155.
So far, then, as concerns the instruction under attack, appellant’s trial appears to have been conducted in conformity with the settled course of judicial proceedings in the territory as established by its laws and the decisions of its courts. While perhaps subject to criticism as affording leeway for misunderstanding, the instruction does no violence to our basic concepts of liberty and justice. Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 63 S.Ct. 1129, 87 L.Ed. 1492. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “leaves the states free to enforce their criminal laws under such statutory provisions and common law doctrines as they deem appropriate; and does not permit a party to bring to the test of a decision in this court every ruling made in the course of a trial in the state court,” Buchalter v. New York supra, 319 U.S. pp. 429, 430, 63 S.Ct. 1130, 1131. And the same holds good of the Fifth Amendment in respect of the administration of the criminal laws of the Territory of Hawaii. Fukunaga v. Territory of Hawaii, 9 Cir., 33 F.2d 396, 397; Kimbrel v. Territory, 9 Cir., 41 F.2d 740. Consult further Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969; Davis v. Texas, 139 U.S. 651, 11 S.Ct. 675, 35 L.Ed. 300; Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 137, 24 S.Ct. 49, 48 L.Ed. 121. It follows that no federal question of substance is presented by the appeal.
-On the oral argument here a member of the court questioned the propriety of the phrase “not a probable doubt” as employed in the definition given. We are not disposed to take notice of any point not raised below, but even if it were otherwise we see no vice in this verbiage in the sense of the due process requirement. The whole instruction, this phrase included, was before the supreme court of the territory and had its approval as being in line with long-settled territorial practice.
Appeal dismissed.
CoffStfit auiirOWties cited by tbe court oelow, Territory v. Young, 37 Haw. 150.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1