What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FRY v. FARIS et al.
No. 5016.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
June 6, 1933.
Robert A. Henderson, of Altoona, Pa., and Lewis M. Alpem, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Robert' W. Smith, of Hollidaysburg, Pa., for appellees.
Before BUPPINGTON, WOOLLEY, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania sitting in bankruptcy. The appellant is the receiver of the Second National Bank of Altoona, hereinafter referred to as the bank. The appellees are the trustees in bankruptcy of the estate of the Altoona Textile Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the textile company. The textile company imported raw silk from Japan. The bank, in accordance with a credit agreement between it and the textile company, paid for the raw silk with commercial letters of credit. . The account of the textile company with the bank was guaranteed up to $150,000 by five individuals, among whom were V. A. Oswald, president of the bank and a director of the textile company, and W. H. Hughes, vice president of the textile company. A consignment of five bales of raw silk arrived at Altoona on November 15, 1930. The cashier of the bank indorsed the bill of lading over to the textile company and gave it to an employee of that company. The latter obtained the silk from the carrier upon presentation of the indorsed bill of lading and took it to the throwing plant of the textile company. On November 16, 1930, Oswald notified the superintendent of the textile company that the silk was to be stored for the bank. On November 20, 1930, an oral agreement was entered into between Oswald and Hughes that, when the next consignment of silk arrived at Altoona, it, together with the first consignment, was to be stored with the textile company for the bank. Fifteen bales of silk arrived on December 18, 1930; the bank cashier indorsed the bill of lading; and the silk was stored with the textile company. It appears that the oral agreement was entered into without the knowledge, consent, or authority of the president or board of directors of the textile company. At the time of the arrival of both consignments at Altoona, it was known to the president and cashier of the bank that the textile company was in financial difficulties. On February 17, 1931, the textile company was declared a bankrupt. The bank filed a reclamation petition with the referee in bankruptcy claiming that the twenty bales of silk in the possession of the trustees in bankruptcy were the property of the bank. The referee in a carefully considered opinion dismissed the petition and the District Court affirmed the order of the referee.
We agree with the conclusion of the District Court that title to the twenty bales of silk was not retained by the bank. Our decision is based upon the following grounds:
The bank indorsed the bills of lading over to the textile company and delivered them to an employee of the textile company without restriction. The bank at no time exercised any right of ownership, control, or possession of the silk from the time of its storage with the textile company. There is ample evidence of a credit arrangement for the benefit of the textile company, which had previously given satisfactory security to the bank. The alleged oral agreement entered into within four months of bankruptcy amounted to an attempted unlawful preference over other creditors, in view of the knowledge of the officials of the bank that the textile company was in financial distress. Oswald and Hughes, who testified to the terms of the agreement before the referee, were guarantors of the textile company’s account with the bank and, as such, were personally liable for the value of the twenty bales of silk unless the bank were the owner of the silk. The parties, who assumed to enter into the agreement on behalf of the textile company, were without authority to do so.
For the reasons indicated above, we are satisfied that title to the silk had been transferred by the bank to the textile company.
The order of the court below is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1