What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
THE ACADIA. EXNER SAND & GRAVEL CORPORATION v. EASTERN S. S. LINES, Inc.
No. 361.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Aug. 1, 1938.
Maclay & Williams, of New York City (Mark W. Maclay, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
John W. Van Gordon, of New York City (Aaron U. Homnick, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
CHASE, Circuit Judge. ■
The libellant is the owner of three scows which with three others were, on July 18, 1935, in tow of the tug “Dauntless No. 6” from Port Jefferson, L. I. to New York City loaded with sand and gravel. The tug had them on a bridle hawser and they were held together by tow and cross lines. The weather was clear with good visibility; the wind southwesterly; the sea smooth and the tide at flood. At about 12:35 P.M., the tow was proceeding westerly at about four miles an hour a short distance off Matimicock Point in water not less than thirty-five feet and possibly as much as fifty feet in depth. Swells were then encountered which tossed the scows about and against each other in such a manner that they sustained some damage. The court below found that the swells were created by the S. S. Acadia, a passenger steamer 407 feet long owned by the libellee, which was negligent in running on a course too near the tow at a speed of nineteen knots through the water. From an interlocutory decree against it, the libellee has appealed.
The speed and course of the Acadia have been established by positive evidence which leaves little possibility of error. She had Execution Light abeam at 12:11 p.m. on her eastbound trip up the sound at a distance of between five and six hundred feet. She then laid, her course by autogyro compass 51 degrees true and held it until Captains Island was abeam at 12:-37 when she changed it to 71 degrees true. She held that course until the gas buoy at Lloyds Neck was abeam at 12:52 when she changed to 73 degrees true. Her speed was uniform throughout this period, as already stated.
The position of the tow cannot be determined with anything approaching such accuracy. The trial judge apparently had difficulty with that and some of his findings seem to be conflicting. He finally put the distance between the Acadia and the tow when they passed each other at “less (han a mile and probably something between a quarter of a mile and a mile”. It has been found to have been within “about a quarter or three-eighths of a mile of the Matimicock buoy” when the Acadia passed. The nearest the Acadia’s course took her to' that buoy is about one mile. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the somewhat elastic finding of the trial judge as to the distance at which the Acadia passed the tow is to be taken at toward the longer limit of somewhat less than a mile and the weight of all the evidence about it places the distance at not less than three quarters of a mile.
Decision turns on whether it was negligent to pass the tow at the above mentioned distance and speed in water of the depth stated, negligence being the basis of legal liability for swell damage with the burden to prove it on the libellant. The New York, 2 Cir., 167 F. 315. In The Majestic, 2 Cir., 48 F. 730 a large steamer was held for swell damage to a tow but the passing was “considerably nearer than half a mile” (page 731) and the tow was in water described as shallow. In The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, D.C., 171 F. 574 the swells were also caused by a large ocean-going steamer to the injury of a tow in Greenville Channel. But neither these nor other cases are close enough on the facts to this one to be of much help.
It was fairly proved that the Acadia would raise a wave of about three feet at her maximum speed of 23 knots and one of about two feet at her speed on this occasion. It would run out to nothing in a mile and would, of course, be well level-led down at three-quarters of a mile. While there was some evidence introduced by the libellant that the swells were from six to eight feet high when they reached the tow, this in view of all the evidence is simply incredible. Much of the damage claimed, especially that to the keelsons, could hardly have been caused by swells. And the absence of proof of broken towing bitts is rather significant. It is, indeed, most unlikely that all of the claimed damage could have been caused as the libellant contends. But, however that may be, this record does not contain fair proof that in water so deep the captain of the Acadia was bound to foresee that, at the speed he was running, his ship would cause swells that would endanger the safety of a seaworthy tow passed at least three-quarters of. a mile away: Consequently, negligence in respect to speed and closeness of passing was not shown. And nothing else approaching negligence was proved.
Decree reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1