What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alvaro GALLEGO, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 90-1109.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard May 7, 1990.
Decided May 9, 1990.
Raymond E. Gillespie, Cambridge, Mass., for defendant, appellant.
Joseph M. Walker, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Atty., was on brief, for the U.S.
Before TORRUELLA, SELYA and CYR, Circuit Judges.
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
This is a single issue sentencing appeal. Defendant-appellant Alvaro Gallego objects to the district court’s fixing of a criminal history category (CHC) and the consequent effect of that choice on the applicable guideline sentencing range.
The facts are these. Shortly before the subject offense was committed, defendant pled guilty in state court to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 90, § 24 (1969 & Supp.1989). He was fined $300 (the DUI fine), payable on or before June 16, 1989. At the time of the subject offense (June 7, 1989), the DUI fine was not yet due and remained unpaid. The district court added two points in computing defendant’s CHC because defendant perpetrated the offense of conviction while under a criminal justice sentence. See U.S. S.G. § 4Al.l(d) (in determining an offender’s CHC, court should “[a]dd points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status”). This increase boosted defendant into Category II and upped the high end of the guideline range to 71 months. The offense of conviction carried a mandatory minimum term of 60 months in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court proceeded to impose a sentence of 68 months.
We need not linger long over this appeal. The sentencing guidelines are perfectly clear that a fine is a “criminal justice sentence.” See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a) (defining “prior sentence” to mean “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea [or otherwise], for conduct not part of the instant offense”). In this instance, the DUI fine was not payable until a date subsequent to the commission of the offense of conviction. Thus, defendant’s preexisting obligation to the criminal justice system had not been completed when he committed the new offense. The district court therefore applied the guidelines appropriately.
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the judge followed the letter of the guidelines. We believe he followed the spirit as well. We also think that the applicable guideline, so construed, is neither impermissible nor constitutionally infirm. See generally United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1015 (1st Cir.1990) (“Congress’ power to control judicial sentencing discretion includes the power to specify the factors a court may consider in setting a sentence.”).
We need go no further. The judgment and sentence must be
Affirmed.
. Sentences (including fines) imposed in respect to certain non-felony offenses are specifically exempted. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). It is undisputed that the crime underlying the DUI fine does not fall within this, or any other, exempt category.
. The two point increase in this case was not imposed for nonpayment of the DUI fine. Rather, because the fine was not due and payable until June 16, 1989, Gallego was "under a criminal justice sentence” on June 7. Thus, cases such as Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2072-73, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) (probation may not automatically be revoked for failure to pay a fine or make restitution; court must find a willful refusal to pay or failure to make good faith effort to acquire necessary resources), relied on by appellant, are inapposite.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1