What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
The NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COMMUNITY BANK, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 88-5767.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 7, 1989.
Decided April 25, 1989.
Holly J. Fujie, Rosen, Wachtell & Gilbert, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Robert M. Westberg, Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, Los Angeles, Cal., Joseph A. Hearst, Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Andrew J. Valentine, Asst. Gen. Counsel, The Northern Trust Co., Chicago, III, of counsel.
Before SCHROEDER, FLETCHER and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff in this action is the beneficiary of a letter of credit issued by West Coast Bank, a bank which was put into FDIC receivership before the expiration of the letter of credit. After the FDIC refused to honor West Coast Bank’s obligations on the letter, the plaintiff filed this action against the bank that had confirmed the letter of credit, defendant Community Bank.
A question of first impression in this case arises under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and the International Chamber of Commerce’s Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) concerning the roles of issuing and confirming banks and the obligations of the banks and the beneficiaries. The question is whether those provisions mean as a matter of law that the confirming bank must honor the letter of credit only if the beneficiary makes a presentment to the confirming bank, in addition to the issuing bank, before the expiration date of the letter of credit. The district court held that those provisions impose no such duty on the beneficiary. We affirm.
The background facts are as follows: On December 10, 1981, the Northern Trust Company received an irrevocable standby letter of credit for $66,000 from West Coast Bank of Encino. The letter of credit provided that “[t]his Letter of Credit is available by your drafts at sight on West Coast Bank, Encino, California ...” On December 15, 1981, Community Bank wrote to Northern Trust to inform Northern Trust that it had confirmed the letter of credit, stating simply “[w]e confirm this letter of credit.” The letter of credit carried an expiration date of December 31, 1985.
On April 27, 1984, West Coast was declared insolvent and placed under the receivership of the FDIC. On November 1, 1985, Northern Trust presented its sight draft, the original letter of credit and supporting documents to West Coast for payment. Northern Trust was then informed that West Coast was in receivership. In the following weeks Northern Trust made repeated demands upon West Coast either to pay the letter of credit or to return the documents. On January 6, 1986, the FDIC wrote to Northern Trust and stated that it would not honor the letter of credit.
On February 19, 1986, Northern Trust demanded payment on the letter of credit from Community Bank. On March 4,1986, Community Bank informed Northern Trust that it would not honor the letter of credit because Northern Trust had not made a timely demand for payment. Northern Trust filed suit in the district court on April 30, 1987 for wrongful dishonor of its letter of credit. Northern Trust moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
The district court found that Community Bank’s confirmation of the letter of credit constituted an undertaking by Community Bank to make payment, provided that Northern Trust complied with the terms of the letter. The letter called for payment by Community Bank if timely demand was made upon West Coast. As the district court further found, there was no provision in the letter of credit which required Northern Trust to make any separate, independent presentment of the draft, letter of credit and supporting documents to Community Bank. The district court concluded that, as Northern Trust had fully complied with the terms of the letter of credit by making timely presentment to West Coast, Community Bank was obliged to pay the draft.
In arguing on appeal that it was not obligated to pay on the letter of credit in the absence of an independent timely presentment to Community Bank, Community Bank relies on California Commercial Code section 5107(2), which provides:
A confirming bank by confirming a credit becomes directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation as though it were its issuer and acquires the rights of its issuer.
That provision, however, is silent as to any requirement of independent presentment. Community Bank would like us to interpret section 5107(2) to mean that Community Bank, in acquiring “the rights of its issuer” somehow acquired the right to insist upon an independent presentment. Since presentment was made to West Coast Bank in accordance with the terms of the letter of credit, however, West Coast Bank had no right to insist on further presentment, and Community Bank could not succeed to a non-existent right.
The letter of credit stated that it was subject to the International Chamber of Commerce Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP). Community Bank also relies on Article 3(b) of the UCP which provides:
[Wjhen an issuing bank authorizes or requests another bank to confirm its irrevocable credit and the latter does so, such confirmation constitutes a definite undertaking of the confirming bank in addition to the undertaking of the issuing bank, provided that the terms and conditions of the credit are complied with.
UCP, Article 3(b). That provision, however, does no more than require that the beneficiary comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.
None of the cases touching upon either of these provisions suggest that they require independent presentment to a confirming bank as a matter of law. What is clear is that the banks can contractually require independent presentment by including such a requirement in the terms of the letter of credit and confirmation documents themselves. In Barclays Bank v. Mercantile National Bank, 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.1973), for example, an independent presentment was made to the confirming bank because such presentment was required by the terms of the confirmation. The confirmation in that case provided: “We hereby confirm the letter of credit and undertake to honor any drafts presented to us on or before expiration date of the letter of credit....” Barclays Bank, 481 F.2d at 1227 n. 3 (emphasis added). See also H. Harfield, Bank Credits and Acceptances 324-25 (5th ed. 1974) (forms for confirmed irrevocable credits which allow the parties to specify a requirement of independent presentment). The parties in this case could have specified a requirement of presentment to the confirming bank, but they did not do so. In the absence of such a contractual agreement, independent presentment is not required. This principle is fully consistent with the provisions of the UCC and the UCP.
Because the parties in this case did not provide for a requirement of timely presentment to the confirming bank, all that was required of the beneficiary was compliance with the presentment terms of the letter of credit, i.e., timely presentment to West Coast Bank. This was done.
AFFIRMED.
. Cal.Comm.Code § 5107(2) is identical to Uniform Commercial Code § 5-107(2).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1