What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LYON v. HARKNESS.
No. 4078.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Nov. 9, 1945.
Angus M. MacNeil and MacNeil & Maloney, all of Boston, Mass., and Samuel A. Margolis, of Manchester, N. H., for appellant.
Ernest R. D’Amours, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court of the United States for the District of New Hampshire discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioner to custody imposed upon him by virtue of a warrant issued by the Governor of New Hampshire in extradition proceedings. The court below discharged the writ on the basis of findings (1) that the petitioner had made no application for any judicial- remedy afforded by the State, (2) that no good reason appeared for his failure to do so, and (3) that no exceptional circumstances or peculiar urgency existed to justify departure from the rule requiring recourse in the first instance to the appropriate State courts. These findings do not appear to be challenged and in our opinion fully support the order made.
The jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus given to the Supreme Court, district courts, and the justices and judges of those courts respectively, and to the judges of circuit courts of appeal by 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 451, 452, is limited by § 453, Id. to cases in which the petitioner is either being held, broadly speaking, under federal authority, or else “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States.” The petitioner here is in state custody, and he alleges that he is being so held in violation of rights guaranteed to him by the federal Constitution. Thus the court below had jurisdiction. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249, 250, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868; State of Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499, 500, 501, 21 S.Ct. 455, 45 L.Ed. 639. But it did not have to exercise this jurisdiction and it will not ordinarily do so until all available state remedies have been exhausted. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406, and cases cited; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116, 117, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572, and cases cited. See also House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46, 65 S.Ct. 517.
In Ex parte Hawk, supra [321 U.S. 103, 115, 64 S.Ct. 450], the Supreme Court stated the general rule as follows: “Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only after all state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this Court by appeal or writ of certiorari have been exhausted.” To be sure the petitioner here was not being held “under a state court judgment of conviction for crime”, but was being held under executive process of a state of asylum for delivery to a demanding state there to answer a charge of crime. But we regard this as a distinction without a difference so far as application of the rule is concerned.
We concede that the rule is usually stated as above, that is, as applicable when a petitioner is being held under state judicial process after a criminal conviction. But this statement of the rule does not necessarily limit its application to that particular situation because in all the cases in which it is so stated the petitioner in fact was being so held. And we see no reason for applying the rule only when petitioners for habeas corpus in a federal court have actually been convicted of crime in a state court, nor do we find any case holding or even suggesting that it should only be then applied. On the other hand, although we do not find any case directly in point, we do find one applying it when a petitioner for habeas corpus in a federal court was being held, after extradition, in the demanding state awaiting trial (Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 16 S.Ct. 297, 40 L.Ed. 406), and in this case the Supreme Court concluded its opinion with the statement (160 U.S. 247, 16 S.Ct. 303): “There could be no better illustration than this case affords of the wisdom, if not necessity, of the rule established by the decisions of this court above cited, that a prisoner in custody under the authority of a state should not, except in a case of peculiar urgency, be discharged by a court or judge of the United States upon a writ of habeas corpus, in advance of any proceedings in the courts of the state to test the validity of his arrest and detention. To adopt a different rule would unduly interfere with the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction of the several states, and with the performance by this court of its appropriate duties.”
Furthermore, support for our conclusion is found in the reason for the rule which is that “It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the Federal courts by which a person under an indictment in a state court, and subject to its laws, may, by the decision of a single judge of the Federal court, upon a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of the custody of the officers of the state, and finally discharged therefrom.” Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 7, 26 S.Ct. 229, 231, 50 L.Ed. 343, cited with approval in Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 182, 27 S.Ct. 459, 51 L.Ed. 760. It seems to us just as delicate a matter to take one out of the custody of an officer of an asylum state before rendition as to take one out of the custody of an officer of a demanding state after he has been returned there to await trial under an indictment. Federal jurisdiction is just as delicate and interferes just as much with the criminal jurisdiction of the several states in one situation as it does in the other.
The order of the District Court is affirmed.
The record does not disclose that the petitioner-appellant ever sought or was granted a certificate of probable cause for his appeal under 28 U.S.C.A. § 466, but we do not consider this omission fatal to our jurisdiction because the above section requires such a certificate only when the “detention complained of is by virtue of process issued out of a State court” and the detention here complained of is by virtue of process issued by a State chief executive.
In New Hampshire ample provision is made for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus. New Hampshire Constitution, Part Second, Art. 91; Revised Laws of New Hampshire, 1942, c. 406; Id., c. 437, §10.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0