What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SMITH v. UNITED STATES (two cases).
Nos. 6329, 6330.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 17, 1932.
See, also, 43 F.(2d) 173.
Henry E. Kahn, of Houston, Tex., for appellant.
H. M. Holden, U. S. Atty., of Houston, Tex.
Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denied June 29, 1932.
BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from convictions on two indictments charging violations of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA). The only error assigned is that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to appellant’s plea of immunity from prosecution. The facts as alleged in that plea as a bar to both indictments are these: A prohibition agent named Cheatham was indicted in a state court of Texas for transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of a statute of that state (Pen. Code 1925, art. 666). Upon Cheatham’s application, the ease against him was removed to the federal District Court, where it was prosecuted by the state attorney, and defended by the United States attorney, pursuant to 28 USCA § 76. Appellant appeared as a witness at that trial and testified for the prosecution, in obedience to a subpoena. On his direct examination he testified, without objection on his part, that he caused two other men to place in an automobile liquor which Cheatham later transported, and also that he was under indictment for violating the federal prohibition law. But none of his evidence even remotely related to the facts of the instant eases. On cross-examination, after his claim of privilege to refuse to answer was overruled, he made the general admission that he and the two men who put the liquor in the automobile for Cheatham to get were in the liquor business together.
The prohibition agent Cheatham was entitled to have the ease against him removed to the federal court. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 46 S. Ct. 185, 70 L. Ed. 449. But the removal merely changed the forum; the ease still remained a state case, and did not become one charging a violation of the National Prohibition Act. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. Ed. 648; Carter v. Tennessee (C. C. A.) 18 F.(2d) 850; Miller v. Kentucky (C. C. A.) 40 F.(2d) 820. Appellant’s rights as a witness were therefore precisely the same as they would have been had Cheatham’s ease been tried in the state court. Article 694 of the Penal Code of Texas provides that no person shall be excused from testifying against one accused of violating the state prohibition laws upon the ground that his testimony will tend to incriminate him, “but no person required to so testify shall be punishable for acts disclosed by such testimony.” The immunity thus conferred by the state statute does not protect a witness from prosecution by the United States, for violations of the National Prohibition Act, but such witnesses can only claim the immunity granted by the federal statute, 27 USCA § 47; Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 26 S. Ct. 73, 50 L. Ed. 234, 4 Ann. Cas. 689. It doubtless is true that the immunity granted by the just cited federal statute must, in order to comply with the Fifth Amendment, afford protection from prosecution in the state courts. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 585, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819. The section of the National Prohibition Act granting immunity (27 USCA § 47) meets this test, as it completely protects from prosecution any natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena of any court in any suit or proceeding growing out of any violation of that act, testifies concerning any transaction, matter, or thing under investigation. Although the language used is broad enough to include witnesses for the defense, it was clearly intended to protect only witnesses who appear in obedience to a subpoena and testify truthfully on behalf of the government. United States v. Ernest (D. C.) 280 F. 515; Brady v. United States (C. C. A.) 39 F.(2d) 312. Appellant was a witness, not for the United States, but for the state of Texas, and therefore he does not bring himself within the protection of the federal immunity statute. Besides, since his testimony in Cheatham’s ease had no relation or relevancy to the charges upon which he was tried and convicted, his plea of immunity presented no defense. Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 33 S. Ct. 226, 57 L. Ed. 450, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 128. It affirmatively appears that the government has not taken any advantage of him, or sought to punish him for anything he did in connection with the offense of which Cheat-ham was convicted, or to use any of his testimony in Cheatham’s case against him.
The judgments are affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1