What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PARAMOUNT PEST CONTROL SERVICE, a Corporation, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 16512.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 14, 1962.
Avakian & Johnston, and J. Richard Johnston, Oakland, Cal., for appellant.
Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cecil F. Poole, U. S. Atty., Charles K. Rice, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Harry Baum, Joseph Kovner, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Lynn J. Gillard, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., and Thomas E. Smail, Jr., U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before STEPHENS, ORR and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges.
KOELSCH, Circuit Judge.
In this taxpayer’s suit for the recovery of federal income and excess profits taxes for 1953 and 1954, paid pursuant to the deficiency determination by the District Director of Internal Revenue, both parties made motions for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Government’s motion and the taxpayer has appealed.
Taxpayer is presently engaged in the structural pest control business in the San Francisco Bay Area; prior to 1953 it also maintained staffed and outfitted branch offices in other localities where it carried on business under its corporate name Paramount Pest Control Service, Inc.; during and between the years 1948 and 1953 it transferred all these outlying establishments to the various managers of those branches. There were-eight of these transactions, each of which was evidenced by a written agreement.
In computing its taxable income, taxpayer dealt with certain of the sums paid by the transferees as proceeds from the sale of capital assets, but the District Director, concluding that the transactions in fact were leases and not sales of the several businesses, held that the payments constituted ordinary income not eligible for preferred tax treatment.
The motion was submitted on the agreements, a stipulation of facts; and several affidavits filed by taxpayer. It appears frcm a memorandum opinion that the District Court, believing the parol evidence rule prevented a consideration of the affidavits, excluded them, and rested the judgment against the taxpayer solely upon the agreements and the facts appearing in the stipulation. Taxpayer urges a number of reasons why the affidavits should have been accepted by the court, but in our view of the matter only one need be discussed. Rule 56 (e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., permits the use of affidavits in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, but also requires that the facts stated in them be admissible in evidence upon a trial. Obviously then, it was incumbent upon the court to determine whether the proffered proof would be admissible in evidence, and if it clearly infringed upon the parol evidence rule then there was no alternative save to reject it. Ford v. Luria Steel & Trading Corp., 192 F.2d 880 (8th Cir.1951); conversely, however, if the extrinsic evidence would be admissible under some exception to that general rule then it should have been considered. Simpson Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 275, 179 F.2d 430 (1949).
The agreements purport to embrace both sales and leases; they contain numerous provisions commonly appearing in instruments of either kind; they provide for two types of payments: one, a liquidated installment payable monthly to apply on a stated amount designated the “purchase price” and which is allocated to the property that is sold, and the other in the nature of a continuing royalty also payable monthly and measured by a percentage of business receipts payable for the property that is licensed. In most of the agreements the “sold property” is referred to generally as all assets comprising the business, but elsewhere good will is expressly excluded from the sale; a further provision relating to the royalty payments contains the statement that those payments are the fee or rental for the licensed use of the name Paramount Pest Control Service.
Taxpayer, consistent with its contention that the transactions were in part sales and in part licenses, reported the installment payments as return of capital and the royalty payments as ordinary income, so that the deficiency resulted only from taxpayer’s failure to include the whole of the installments as taxable income. However, the District Director conceded after making the deficiency assessments, and by the stipulation filed in this suit acknowledged that insofar as the installment payments were attributable to a sale of tangible property of the branch businesses, they represented a return of capital.
If the amount of the “purchase price” designated in the several agreements reflected the approximate or agreed value of the property described in the provision to which the installment payments were related then the parol evidence rule would dictate the exclusion of the taxpayer’s affidavits, since the affiants’ statements were to the effect that the purchase price included not only the physical assets but also “running service contracts” and other items that make up good will (Grace Bros. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1949); Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo (1931), 211 Cal. 344, 295 P. 10), and to this extent the facts appearing in the affidavits conflicted with the further provision of the agreements allocating the royalties to that particular asset.
However, the stipulation before the court clearly demonstrates a vast difference exists in all eight transactions between the value of the property appearing to be sold and the sum of the installments required by each contract.
The hybrid character of the agreements themselves renders the intentions of the parties far from clear and we think requires a resort to extrinsic evidence to assist in discovering what the parties actually contemplated. The stipulated facts tend to fortify this conclusion for it is impossible to reconcile those facts with the agreements themselves which make the installment payments part of the purchase price and contain elaborate and separate provisions fully covering the matter of royalties. In short, we conclude the lower court erred in rejecting these affidavits.
But the Government also urges that the result would have been the same even if the proof had been received; it contends that “[a] 11 of the good will of the taxpayer’s service business was associated with its name, the lease of the name necessarily carried with it the good will. of the customers who knew the name.” It is apparent that the Government’s arguments rest upon a factual basis that must first be established before the asserted conclusion may follow. While trade-name and good will of the business are often one and the same thing the name is not necessarily the sole element of good will. In Grace Brothers v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 170, 176 (9th Cir. 1949) this court made an extended investigation of the nature and components of good will and concluded that “the good will may attach to (1) the business as an entity, (2) the physical plant in which it is conducted, (3) the trade-name under which it is carried on and the right to conduct it at the particular place or within a particular area, under a trade-name or trademark; (4) the special knowledge or the ‘know-how’ of its staff; (5) the number and quality of its customers”; and it has been held that the name under which a business was conducted may be excluded from a transfer of the remainder of the good will. Masquelette’s Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1956). As a question of fact, it must be determined whether there are other elements of good will which are transferred apart from the business name and if so, what kind of interest is passed in them.
Here the affidavits show the existence of a factual issue regarding the real nature of these transactions, a matter that can only be resolved upon a trial at which either party may submit evidence tending to proper construction of the agreements.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court with directions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
. For a statement of the parol evidence rule see Ford v. Luria Steel & Trading Corp., 102 F.2d 880 at 882 (8th Cir. 1951).
. The physical assets of the branches consisted both of inventory items (proceeds of which were ordinary income, Section 22, Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S. C.A. § 22) and of “property used in trade or business” proceeds of which under sections 117(j) (1) and (2) Revenue Code of 1950 as amended, are “considered” as long-term capital gain. The adjustment made necessary by virtue of the stipulation resulted in a slight reduction in the amount of the deficiency and since taxpayer had already paid the sum initially demanded by the District Director, the District Court, by amended judgment, awarded taxpayer the overplus and thus in fact ultimately rendered judgment for taxpayer (but in a sum far less than taxpayer sought to recover).
.These affidavits were made by all parties to, as well as the attorney who prepared, the agreements. Therein the affiants stated that the taxpayer intended to sell and the transferees to purchase the branch businesses as going concerns and that the figure designated in the agreements as “the purchase price” reflected not only the agreed value of the physical property belonging to each branch but also customer accounts and other items of good will which are referred to as “contracts”; they further stated that the consideration for this latter item was computed by multiplying by six the average gross receipts of the business for the twelve months immediately prior to the transfer, and they further said that although the agreements speak of the lease of good will, the parties meant the lease to extend only to the trade name.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1