What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
HENRY v. UNITED STATES.
No. 17.
Argued October 20-21, 1959.
Decided November 23, 1959.
Edward J. Calihan, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Kirby W. Patterson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Wilkey and Beatrice Rosenberg.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner stands convicted of unlawfully possessing three cartons of radios valued at more than $100 which had been stolen from an interstate shipment. See 18 U. S. C. § 659. The issue in the ease is whether there was probable cause for the arrest leading to the search that produced the evidence on which the conviction rests. A timely motion to suppress the evidence was made by petitioner and overruled by the District Court; and the judgment of.conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on a divided vote. 259 F. 2d 725. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari, 359 U. S. 904.
There was. a theft from an interstate shipment, of whisky at a terminal in Chicago. The next day two FBI agents were in the neighborhood investigating it. They saw petitioner and one Pierotti walk across a street from a tavern and get into an automobile. The agents had been given, by the employer of Pierotti, information of an undisclosed nature “concerning the implication of the defendant Pierotti with interstate shipments.” But, so far as the record shows, he never went so far as to tell the agents he suspected Pierotti of any such thefts. The agents followed the car and-saw it enter an alley and stop. Petitioner got but of the car, entered a gangway leading to residential premises and returned in a few minutes with some cartons.. He placed them in the car and he and Pierotti drove off. . The agents were unable to follow the car. But later they found it parked at the same place near the tavern. Shortly they saw petitioner and Pierotti leave the tavern, get into the car, and drive off.- The car stopped in the same alley as before; petitioner entered the same gangway and returned with more cartons. The agents observed this transaction-from a distance of some 300 feet and could not determine the size, number or contents of the cartons. As the car drove off the agents followed it and finally, when they met it, waved it to a stop. As he. got out of the car, petitioner was heard to say, “Hold it; it is-the G’s.” This was followed by, “Tell him he [you] just picked me up.” The agents searched the car, placed the cartons (which bore the name “Admiral” and were addressed to an out-of-state company) in their car, took the merchandise and petitioner and Pierotti to their office and held them for about two hours when the agents learned that the cartons contained stolen radios. They then placed the men under formal arrest.
The statutory authority of FBI officers and agents to make felony arrests without a warrant is restricted to offenses committed “in their presence” or to instances where they have “reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing” a felony. 18 U. S. C.' § 3052. The statute states the constitutional standard, for it is the command of the Fourth Amendment that no warrants for either searches or arrests shall issue except “upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be .seized.”
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history. The general warrant, in which the name of the person to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion. Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing of “probable cause” before' a magistrate was required. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted June 12, 1776, rebelled against that practice:
“That general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be. commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.”
The Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776), Art. XXIII, was equally emphatic:
“That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants — to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special — are illegal, and ought not to be granted.”
And see North Carolina Declaration of Rights (1776), Art. XI; Pennsylvania Constitution (1776), Art. X; Massachusetts Constitution (1780), Pt. I, Art. XIV.
That philosophy later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even “strong reason to suspect” was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived to this day. See United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 593-595; Johnson v. Unitéd States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-15; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486. Its high water was Johnson v. United States, supra, where the smell of opium coming from a closed room was not enough to support an arrest and search without a warrant.’ It was against this background that two scholars recently wrote, “Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic human right of liberty.”
Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307. On the other hand, good faith on the part-of the arresting officers is not enough. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known, to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642, 645. And see Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25, 28; United States v. Di Re, supra, at 592; Giordenello v. United States, supra, at 486. It is important, we think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is innocent. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 156. And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made ■ with probable cause. Carroll v. United States, supra, at 155-156. This immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without jeopardizing the privacy or security of the citizen. We turn then to the question whether prudent men in the shoes of these officers (Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 175) would have seen enough to permit them to believe that petitioner was violating, or had violated the law. We think not.
The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to the concession here, that the arrest took place when the federal agents stopped the car. That is our view on the facts of this particular case.- When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was complete. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether at or before that time they had reasonable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. The fact that afterwards contraband was discovered is not enough. An arrest is not justified by what the subsequent search discloses, as Johnson v. United States, supra, holds.
It is true that a federal crime had been committed at a terminal in the neighborhood, whisky having been stolen from an interstate shipment. Petitioner’s friend, Pierotti, had been suspected of some implication in some interstate shipments, as we have said. But as this record stands, what those shipments were and the manner in which he was implicated remain unexplained and undefined. The rumor about him is therefore practically meaningless.- On the record there was far from enough evidence against him to justify a magistrate in issuing a warrant. So far as the record shows, petitioner had not even been suspected of criminal activity prior to this time. Riding in the car, stopping in an alley, picking up packages, driving away — these were all acts that- were outwardly innocent. Their movements in the car had-.no tnarkof fleeing men or men acting furtively. The case might bé different if the packages had been taken from a terminal or from an interstate trucking platforim’. But they were not. As we have said, the alley where the packages were picked up was in a residential section. The fact that packages have been stolen does not make every man who carries a package subject to arrest nor the package subject to seizure. The police must, have reasonable' grounds to believe that the particular' package carried by the citizen is contraband'. Its shape and design might-at times be adequate. The weight of it and the manner in which it is carried' might at times be enough. But there was nothing to indicate that the cartons here in issue probably contained liquor. The fact that, they contained other contraband appeared only some hours after the arrest. What transpired at or after the time the car was stopped- by the- officers is, as. we have said, irrelevant to the narrow issue before us. To repeat, • an. arrest is not justified by what the. subsequent search discloses. Under our system suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment- teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest.
The faict that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough. Carroll v. United States, supra, liberalized the rule governing searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that decision merely relaxed the requirements for a warrant on- grounds of practicality. It did not dispense with the need for probable caüse.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Declared illegal by the House of Commons in 1766. 16 Hansard, Parl. Hist. Eng. 207.
Quincy’s Mass. Rep. 1761-1772, Appendix, p. 469.
Frisbie v. Butler, Kirby’s Rep. (Conn.) 1785-1788, p. 213.
Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn (Pa.) 38; Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40; Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329.
Conner v. Commonwealth, supra, note 4, at 43.
Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale - and Rescue, 47 Geo. L. J. 1, 22.
Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Semiannual Bull., 1957), pp. 64, 65, shows 1956 arrest statistics for 1,025 cities in the United States, including 26 cities over 250,000 .population/and 458 cities under 10,000 population.
The report states that 111,274 were arrested on suspicion (but not in connection with any specific offense) and subsequently released without prosecution. This was at the rate of 280.4 per 100,000 inhabitants.
The grand total of persons arrested — both for a specific offense (but excluding traffic offenses) and on suspicion alone — and released without being held for prosecution was 264,601. This was at the rate of 666.7 per 100,000 inhabitants.
An alternative theory that the arrest took place at a subsequent time was discussed by the Government only to make clear that it would press that position on the facts of another case now pending here, No. 52, Rios v. United States.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 0