What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR et al. v. AMERICAN SASH & DOOR CO. et al.
No. 27.
Argued November 8-10, 1948.
Decided January 3, 1949.
Herbert S. Thatcher and H. S. McCluskey argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief were J. Albert Woll, James A. Glenn, J. H. Morgan and George Pennell.
Donald R. Richberg argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Evo De Concini, Attorney-General of Arizona, Perry M. Ling, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles L. Strouss and J. L. Gust. G. H. Moeur was also of counsel for appellees.
An amicus curiae brief in support of appellees was filed on behalf of the States of Florida, by J. Tom Watson, Attorney General; Michigan, by Eugene F. Black, Attorney General; North Dakota, by P. O.Sathre, Attorney General; Tennessee, by William F. Barry, Solicitor General; Utah, by Grover A. Giles, Attorney General; and Wisconsin, .by Grover L. Broadfoot, Attorney General, Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Attorney General, and Beatrice Lampert, Assistant Attorney General.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.'
This case is here on appeal from the Supreme Court of Arizona under § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (now 28 U. S. C. § 1257). It involves the constitutional validity of the following amendment to the Arizona Constitution, adopted at the 1946 general election:
“No person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain employment because of non-membership in a labor organization, nor shall the state or any subdivision thereof, or any corporation, individual or association of any kind enter into any agreement, written or oral, which excludes any person from employment or continuation of employment because of non-membership in a labor organization.”
The Supreme Court of Arizona sustained the amendment as constitutional against the contentions that it “deprived union appellants of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment and protected against invasion by the State under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution”; that it impaired the obligations of existing contracts in violation of Art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution; and that it deprived appellants of due process of law, and denied them equal protection of the laws contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. All of these questions, properly reserved in the state court, were decided against the appellants by the State Supreme Court. The same questions raised in the state court are presented here.
For reasons given in two other cases decided today we reject the appellants' contentions that the Arizona amendment denies them freedom of speech, assembly or petition, impairs the obligation of their contracts, or deprives them of due process of law. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. and Whitaker v. North Carolina, ante, p. 525. A difference between the Arizona amendment and the amendment and statute considered in the Nebraska and North Carolina cases has made it necessary for us to give separate consideration to the contention in this case that the Arizona amendment denies appellants equal protection of the laws.
The language of the Arizona amendment prohibits employment discrimination against non-union workers, but it does not prohibit discrimination against union workers. It is argued that a failure to provide the same protection for union workers as that provided for non-union workers places the union workers at a disadvantage, thus denying unions and their members the equal protection of Arizona's laws.
Although the Arizona amendment does not itself expressly prohibit discrimination against union workers, that state has not left unions and union members without protection from discrimination on account of union membership. Prior to passage of this constitutional amendment, Arizona made it a misdemeanor for any person to coerce a worker to make a contract “not to join, become or remain, a member of any labor organization” as a condition of getting or holding a job in Arizona. A section of the Arizona Code made every such contract (generally known as a “yellow dog contract”) void and unenforceable. Similarly, the Arizona constitutional amendment makes void and unenforceable contracts under which an employer agrees to discriminate against non-union workers. Statutes implementing the amendment have provided as sanctions for its enforcement relief by injunction and suits for damages for discrimination practiced in violation of the amendment. Whether the same kind of sanctions would be afforded a union worker against whom an employer discriminated is not made clear by the opinion of the State Supreme Court in this case. But assuming that Arizona courts would not afford a remedy by injunction or suit for damages, we are unable to find any indication that Arizona’s amendment and statutes are weighted on the side of non-union as against union workers. We are satisfied that Arizona has attempted both in the anti-yellow-dog-contract law and in the anti-discrimination constitutional amendment to strike at what were considered evils, to strike where those evils were most felt, and to strike in a manner that would effectively suppress the evils.
In Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U. S. 1, this Court considered a challenge to the National Labor Relations Act on the ground that it applied restraints against employers but did not apply similar restraints against wrongful conduct by employees. We there pointed out, at p! 46, the general rule that “legislative authority, exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach.” And concerning state laws we have said that the existence of evils against which the law should afford protection and the relative need of different groups for that protection “is a matter for the legislative judgment.” West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 400. We cannot say that the Arizona amendment has denied appellants equal protection of the laws.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Murphy dissents.
American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 189 P. 2d 912.
Ariz. Code Ann. § 56-120 (1939).
Ariz. Sess. Laws (1947) e. 81, p. 173.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 1