What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Roscoe COTTON, Appellant, v. Bill ARMONTROUT, Acting Warden and John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Appellees.
No. 84-2642.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 17, 1985.
Decided Feb. 18, 1986.
Timothy Tryniecki, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
John J. Oldenburg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellees.
Before HEANEY, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
Roscoe Cotton appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He was convicted of first degree assault on the basis of eyewitness testimony, and is serving a life sentence as a persistent offender. His conviction was affirmed in State v. Cotton, 660 S.W.2d 365 (Mo.App.1983). Cotton argues that the identification testimony of the witnesses at trial should have been suppressed because the pretrial identification procedures were suggestive and created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. He also argues that the state court’s refusal to submit his instruction regarding eyewitness identification denied him his right to a fair trial. We affirm.
Evidence at trial indicates that Ingrid Smith and Annette Tatum, employees of the Ladies Center, were approached by Cotton one night as they were leaving work. He told them he was looking for a job. Smith told him that men were not employed at the center. Two weeks later Cotton walked into the Ladies Center and ordered Smith and Tatum onto the floor. As Tatum started to comply, Smith ran out the back door. Cotton’s gun then accidentally discharged and wounded Tatum. A delivery man, Maurice Trammell, reported seeing Cotton running from the area sometime later.
Tatum, Smith and Trammell identified Cotton in photographic arrays. Cotton also appeared in a showup, at which time Smith made a positive identification, and Tatum made a more tentative identification. Cotton had not been arrested at the time the showup occurred, but he was read his Miranda rights. The state trial court conducted a pretrial suppression hearing, and denied the motion to suppress. All three witnesses identified Cotton at trial. Cotton testified on his own behalf and stated he was not at the Ladies Center at the time in question, but he could not remember exactly where he was at the time.
Cotton argues that the showup was impermissibly suggestive because it indicated to the witnesses that he was the prime suspect. He argues, and to some extent we agree, that the showup was unnecessary in this case, and the police should have used a lineup. Cotton also argues that the pretrial photographic arrays were impermissibly suggestive because he was the only person in jail overalls in the photographs shown to Trammell. He argues that this suggestiveness spilled over to the other witnesses at the hearing on the motion to suppress, but fails to state how this occurred.
Suggestive pretrial procedures, without more, do not require a finding that due process rights are violated. The issue is whether the pretrial identification procedures created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, or whether the in-court identification had a reliable and independent basis. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 2254, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). When the state court’s factual findings are given proper deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we find there is sufficient evidence in the record to support them. See Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1540-42 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 148, 83 L.Ed.2d 86 (1984). The women had met Cotton on two separate occasions. Both gave descriptions of Cotton, which, although not perfect, fit his general appearance. Both women were able to pick Cotton out from the photographs. Smith gave a positive identification at the show-up, and Tatum, although more tentative, also identified Cotton at the showup as her assailant. Finally, the showup occurred only two weeks after the shooting incident. On the basis of these facts, we do not believe that the suggestive pretrial identification procedures created a substantial likelihood of misidentification.
Cotton also argues that he was denied a fair trial because the district court refused to submit his instruction on eyewitness identification. In United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 784 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099, 97 S.Ct. 1119, 51 L.Ed.2d 547 (1977), a similar issue was raised on direct appeal, and we suggested that an instruction on eyewitness identification should be given when identification of the defendant is based solely or substantially on eyewitness testimony. Although we did not specifically adopt the Telfaire model identification instruction, set forth in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C.Cir.1972), we noted it with approval. Dodge, 538 F.2d at 784. However, failure to give a Telfaire instruction concerning eyewitness identification is not constitutional error if the issue is adequately covered by other instructions. Here, instruction number one dealt with the credibility of the witnesses and instructed the jury on the ability and opportunity of the witnesses to observe and remember the crime. The other instructions made it clear that the state had the burden of proof to show beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was at the scene of the crime and committed the assault. The jury was sufficiently instructed on the issue of eyewitness identification, and therefore Cotton was not denied a fair trial.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. The Honorable William L. Hungate, United States District Judge, Eastern District of Missouri.
. These issues were addressed by the Missouri appellate court in the direct appeal of Cotton’s conviction. A motion for transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court was denied. Cotton, 660 S.W.2d at 365.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2