What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
James CAREY, Appellee, v. LOCAL BOARD NO. 2, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, Appellant.
No. 612, Docket 33418.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued May 9, 1969.
Decided June 16, 1969.
Jon O. Newman, U. S. Atty. for District of Connecticut, Hartford, Conn., for appellant.
John Griffiths, New Haven, Conn. (Karl Fleischmann, Hartford, Conn., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MOORE, FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Carey, the plaintiff-appellee herein, was graduated from college in June, 1965. . Following two years of graduate study at Oxford University in England, he entered Yale Law School in September, 1967. Throughout his undergraduate years, his period of study at Oxford and his first year at law school, Carey was classified II-S by his draft board, Selective Service Local Board No. 2 of Hartford, Connecticut. On June 11, 1968, Carey was re-classified I-A and upon appeal this classification was affirmed by the appeal board two months later. On October 14, 1968, while he was satisfactorily pursuing a fulltime course of instruction in his second year at Yale Law School, Carey was ordered to report for induction into the armed forces. Upon receipt of his immediate written request for deferral until the end of the academic year, Carey’s draft board, on October 23, 1968 postponed his induction, but only until February, 1969. On January 15, 1969, Carey wrote a second letter requesting deferment until the end of the academic year but the draft board denied this request.
On January 30,1969, Carey sought and obtained a temporary restraining order from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, enjoining the draft board from inducting him into the armed services. On February 13, Carey filed his complaint together with a motion for a preliminary injunction. A day later the appellant (local board) filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and both motions were orally argued before the district court. Shortly thereafter the district court, Blumenfeld, J., filed a memorandum of decision ordering the appellant to classify Carey I-S. On February 19,1969, judgment was entered in accordance with Judge Blumenfeld’s opinion and on March 13, 1969, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
For the reasons set forth in Marsano v. Laird, et al., 412 F.2d 65 (decided June 16, 1969), decided today by this court, we hold that Carey has a clear statutory right to a I-S classification and therefore affirm the order of the district court. In so holding, we also affirm the district court’s conclusion that Carey is not barred from relief by § 10(b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 because he has shown that he has a clear statutory right to his deferment involving no discretion on the part of the local board, and that the board’s action in denying the deferment contravened the express statutory command. Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968).
Affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 6