What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert NEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 79-2247.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 22, 1981.
William W. Deaton, Jr., Federal Public Defender, and R. Raymond Twohig, Jr., Asst. Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, N. M., for defendant-appellant.
R. E. Thompson, U.S. Atty., and Margo J. McCormick, Asst. U.S. Atty., Albuquerque, N. M., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and PICKETT and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); Tenth Circuit R. 10(e). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Albert Nez appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of assault with intent to commit rape in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and § 2031. In urging reversal, appellant contends that the trial court committed error by limiting cross-examination regarding the complainant’s prior sexual conduct.
We shall set forth the facts only as they are relevant to the issue presented. Late in the evening on May 21, 1979, the complainant was standing on the porch of her sister’s house, waiting for her sister to return. She was approached by two men, appellant and a juvenile named Lorenzo Henry. The two men grabbed complainant by the wrists, took her down to a nearby ditch and raped her.
Complainant returned to her sister’s home and, when confronted by her sister, stated that appellant and Lorenzo had “almost raped me.” In light of complainant’s demeanor and disheveled condition, the sister questioned her more extensively and learned that the rape had actually occurred.
Prior to cross-examination of complainant, appellant was provided with Jencks’ Act material which included a memorandum of an interview given by complainant to a Bureau of Indian Affairs investigating officer. In the memorandum, the investigator reported that the complainant “has had sexual intercourse two times prior since the age of 15. She described both as rapes and did not report the incidents to Police.” Cross-examination of complainant about the prior incidents was interrupted by an objection from the government. Defense counsel stated that:
The question derives from the statement that I just got, and there is a reference there were two prior rapes that this girl was involved with. I am not attempting to impugn her reputation by prior acts of sexual intercourse. I am attempting to show prior rapes that she alleges happened according to this statement.
I am attempting to ascertain the circumstances surrounding those, and how they compare with these.
In a subsequent conference out of the jury’s presence, defense counsel further asserted that the questioning:
was directed to the conversation between the witness and her sister. It was for the purpose of determining whether this witness has confided in her sister about the previous incidents, the two previous incidents.
The district court sustained the government’s objection and thereby precluded appellant from inquiring about the prior incidents on cross-examination. >
The issue presented by this case involves an analysis of Fed.R.Evid. 412, an issue of first impression in this court. Indeed, we have found little federal ease law which interprets this relatively new rule of evidence. We do note, however, that similar state provisions have come under attack recently.
Rule 412 governs the admission of a rape victim’s prior sexual behavior in criminal cases. Under the new rule, reputation or opinion evidence is never admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 412(a). Specific instances of the victim’s prior sexual behavior may be admissible under only three circumstances. First, such evidence may be admitted where the Constitution requires that the evidence be admitted. Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(1). This provision was apparently intended to obviate attacks on the facial constitutionality of Rule 412(b). Second, evidence of sexual behavior with persons other than the defendant may be admitted where the defendant claims that he was not the source of the semen or injury. Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(2)(A). Finally, evidence of the victim’s prior behavior with the defendant is admissible where relevant to the defendant’s claim of consent. Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(2)(B). Procedurally, Rule 412 requires that the defendant tender the proposed evidence in an in camera setting to establish the necessary foundation and to allow the court to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial impact. Fed.R.Evid. 412(c).
[I] In this case, appellant did not dispute the act of intercourse nor his involvement therein. In addition, the tendered testimony regarding the victim’s past sexual behavior did not encompass behavior with this appellant. The district court, therefore, properly concluded that the evidence was neither admissible under Rule 412(b)(2)(A) as relevant to the issue of who actually was the source of the semen or injury, nor under Rule 412(b)(2)(B) as past sexual behavior with the accused relevant to the issue of consent.
At no point during the in camera proceeding did appellant specifically offer the evidence pursuant to Rule 412(b)(1), as evidence constitutionally required to be admitted. Appellant’s purpose in seeking to cross-examine the complaining witness about her prior sexual behavior was not clear from the argument or testimony tendered to the trial judge. Appellant’s failure to clearly establish a proper purpose justified the district court’s limitation on the cross-examination.
It is only on appeal that the purpose is clarified to include the “motivation for bringing the charge,” as appellant would now characterize the evidence. He alleges that an inference of the victim’s motive to fabricate the charge is available from evidence showing that the victim would only allege rape when confronted with her actions, by persons in authority. Although the motive or bias of a witness is always a proper subject for examination, see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), this theory of admissibility was not proffered to the trial court. The attempt on appeal to bolster the necessary foundation is improper. See Fed. R.Evid. 103. Moreover, the tendered argument and testimony did not clearly relate to such a theory of admissibility.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly refused to admit the evidence.
AFFIRMED.
. The parties stipulated that the appellant is an Indian and that the acts occurred in Indian territory, thereby bringing the appellant within federal criminal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
. See, e.g., People v. McKenna, 585 P.2d 275 (Colo.1978); State v. Blue, 225 Kan. 576, 592 P.2d 897 (1979); Commonwealth v. Joyce, - Mass. -, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981); State v. Howard, 426 A.2d 457 (N.H.1981); State v. Jalo, 27 Or.App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 421 A.2d 257 (Pa. 1980); Virginia v. Green, 260 S.E.2d 257 (W.Va.1979). See also Annot., Constitutionality of “Rape Shield” Statutes Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim’s Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R. 4th 283 (1980).
. Fed.R.Evid. 412 provides in part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape or assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is—
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of—
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which rape or assault is alleged.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0