What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. BRUBAKER.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 12, 1929.
No. 5114.
Norman A. Emery, of Youngstown, Ohio (Harrington, De Ford, Huxley & Smith, of Youngstown, Ohio, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
Lewis D. Houck, of Cleveland, Ohio (Payer, Minshall, Kareh & Kerr, of Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before HICKS, HICKENLOOPER, and KNAPPEN, Circuit Judges.
HICKS, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit for personal injuries, controlled by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65; title 45, c. 2, § 51, U. S. C. (45 USCA § 51). Plaintiff in error challenges the denial of its motion to direct a verdict. This is the only matter presented here.
Defendant in error, herein called plaintiff, was one of a crew of freight handlers, engaged in transferring a large and heavy crated electric motor from a freight car to the platform of a freight station. To accomplish this, plaintiff and his fellows had balanced the crate upon the steel plow and frame of an ordinary two-wheel freight truck, with the forward end of the crate extending some two or three feet beyond the plow of the truek. They had pulled the truck, thus loaded, to the station platform, and in the process of unloading they had lowered the front of the truek until the lower front edge of the crate rested on the platform. The crate was about 5 feet long, 3% feet wide, and 4 feet high, and, including the motor, weighed about a ton and a half. While it was in the position indicated, the crew undertook to .lower it to the platform in the following manner:
Three of them manually further elevated the upraised end while plaintiff and two others forced down the handles of the truck, lever fashion, thus assisting- the operation by raising the plow of the truek. When the raised end of the crate had thus been further elevated, those having hold of it held it suspended, while plaintiff and his fellows raised the truek handles and pulled the truek back somewhat, and again lowered the handles. As the men holding the crate gradually lowered it, the plow would again engage with the underside of the crate. The intention was to repeat this operation until the truek was entirely removed and the crate- safely lowered; but either while the truck was being placed, or had been placed, in position to again receive the crate when lowered, the handles of the truek being down, the crate came down with unexpected force upon the plow, forcing it down and the handles of the truck up against the plaintiff, to his injury.
It is clear that the injury resulted from the impact of the crate upon the plow, but this does not of itself justify the verdict in plaintiff’s favo-r. Proof of negligence upon the part of plaintiff’s fellow workmen is esr sential, and we can And no evidence of it. Plaintiff did not see the crate fall. Depner. one of the crew, attempted no explanation of it, and no other member of the crew was called as a witness. There is no proof that either of the men voluntarily released his hold upon the crate, as charged in the amended petition, or exerted less than his utmost physical strength to support it, or lowered it in any unusual manner, or was otherwise guilty of any fault.
If in the natural course of the- operation, the force of the impact of the crate upon the plow was greater than that anticipated .by plaintiff and his fellows, or if this was occasioned by withdrawing the truek somewhat further than was expected by those holding the crate, the result can be characterized as nothing more than a normal incident to the work in hand and as a risk assumed; but the impact of the crate upon the plow, standing alone, is not evidence that the men handling it were lacking in due care. Southern Railway Co. v. Derr, 240 F. 73, 74 (C. C. A. 6); Cincinnati,Co. v. So. Fork Co., 139 F. 528, 533, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 533 (C. C. A. 6). Upon the argument, counsel for plaintiff disclaimed the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There must be some other fact or circumstance connected with the occurrence which will afford a substantial basis for an inference of negligence (cases supra), and, in our opinion, the record discloses no such evidence and justifies no conclusion beyond mere guess or conjecture. The record is entirely silent as to how or why, or with clearness when, the impact took place, or that it was not an ordinary incident of the work which the men were engaged in. For sueh lack of any substantial evidence to support plaintiff's petition, the motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained.
tfhe judgment is therefore reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1