What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1228, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. FREEDOM WLNE-TV, INC., Defendant, Appellant.
No. 84-1821.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard March 6, 1985.
Decided April 22, 1985.
Arthur M. Brewer, Baltimore, Md., with whom William J. Rosenthal, Earle K. Shawe, Baltimore, Md., Charles Hieken, Waltham, Md., and Shawe & Rosenthal, Baltimore, Md., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Joseph G. Sandulli, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff, appellee.
Before COFFIN and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges, and RE, Judge.
Chief Judge, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
COFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Freedom WLNE-TV, Inc. (Freedom) appeals from a district court order compelling it to submit to binding arbitration the question of whether Freedom’s contract with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1228, AFL-CIO (the Union), by its own terms, continues in effect beyond its stated expiration date. 590 F.Supp. 1228. The issue, one of contract interpretation, was appropriately referred, in the first instance, to the arbitrator for determination. Accordingly, we affirm.
Freedom and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement (the Agreement) on November 16, 1982 which was to remain in effect through August 15, 1983, and from year to year thereafter “unless changed or terminated in the manner hereinafter made and provided.” Art. 22.1. The contract required the party wishing to terminate the Agreement to notify the other in writing at least 60 days prior to the expiration date. The Agreement further provided that, “[pjending and during the negotiation of a new contract or amendments to this contract, business of the Employer shall continue in accordance with all the terms of this contract.” Negotiations to renew the contract began in May, 1983, when the Union advised Freedom of its desire to amend the current contract, and apparently continued through at least mid-September with each side proposing, although never agreeing upon, different versions of an extension agreement.
On September 22, 1983, the Union filed a grievance which challenged Freedom’s alleged use of non-union employees for certain broadcasting work. Freedom refused to process the grievance because it concerned work which was undertaken after the expiration of the contract. The Union filed a subsequent grievance on September 28, claiming that Freedom’s refusal to process the earlier grievance unilaterally terminated the contract. Freedom again declined to process the grievance. On October 3, the Union sought to arbitrate the question, “[t]o what extent the contract, by its own terms, (Article 22) continues in effect beyond August 15, 1983 and what is the proper remedy.” Freedom refused arbitration claiming that its obligation to arbitrate, like its obligation to process grievances, expired with the contract on August 15 due to the parties’ failure to reach an extension agreement.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ordered Freedom to submit to binding arbitration. It is from that order that Freedom appeals.
Discussion
There is no duty to submit labor disputes to arbitration absent a contractual agreement between the parties to be so bound. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). Generally it is up to the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the parties have entered into a contract which imposes the duty to arbitrate, id., and whether that contract is still binding upon them, see e.g., Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Service Employees Union, 605 F.2d 1290, 1295 (2d Cir.1979); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 508 F.2d 1309, 1313 (8th Cir.1975). Where, however, the determination of whether a contract is still in effect depends solely upon construction of the collective bargaining agreement, the issue of contract termination may appropriately be decided by the arbitrator. Corallo v. Merrick Central Carburetor, Inc., 733 F.2d 248, 253 (2d Cir.1984); Rochdale Village v. Public Service Employees, 605 F.2d at 1296-1297.
Parties to a collective bargaining agreement are contractually bound to arbitrate only disputes which properly come within the scope of the agreed upon arbitration clause. It is our task, therefore, to determine whether the arbitration clause in this Agreement governs disputes regarding the termination of the contract.
We are guided in our analysis of the scope of the arbitration clause by the Second Circuit’s decision in Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Public Service Employees, 605 F.2d at 1295-1296:
“If a court finds that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration disputes ‘of any nature or character,’ or simply ‘any and all disputes,’ all questions, including those regarding termination, will be properly consigned to the arbitrator: ‘With that finding the court will have exhausted its function, except to order the reluctant party to arbitration.’ In dealing with a narrower arbitration clause, a court’s inquiry is not so circumscribed, and it will be proper to consider whether the conduct in issue is on its face within the purview of the clause. For example, if an arbitration clause covers only employee grievances, the court should not compel arbitration of questions of contract termination. But if the arbitration clause covers disputes as to contract interpretation, and the termination is alleged to have occurred on a basis ‘implicit in [the] contract,’ the termination question is arbitrable.”
The arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement between Rochdale and the Union covered “any and all disputes” arising under the agreement, but did not cover disputes collateral to the agreement. Id. at 1296. The court found, therefore, that the issue of contract termination based on application of the contract’s duration clause was arbitrable because it involved interpretation of that contractual provision, whereas the question of termination by a separate agreement was properly to be decided by the court.
Freedom and the Union contracted to a broad arbitration clause which applies to “[a]ll problems arising out of grievances or out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or the performance of any party under it.” We believe that this arbitration clause reflects the parties’ agreement to arbitrate any dispute involving construction of the substantive provisions of the contract, United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 571, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1364, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960) (Brennan, J. concurring), and covers the question submitted in this case. The Union asked the arbitrator to determine the extent to which the Agreement’s open-ended duration clause continued the Agreement in effect. By its own phraseology, this question exclusively addressed an issue of contract interpretation and was appropriately referred to the arbitrator for determination.
As we find all remaining arguments unpersuasive, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
. On the record before it the Second Circuit concluded that it was possible that the parties had entered into a collateral agreement to terminate their contract. The court identified correspondence between the parties which indicated an October 31 termination date, and noted each party's claim during state court proceedings that the contract was terminated on that date. Freedom concedes that it did not argue below that there was a collateral agreement between it and the Union to terminate the contract.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1