What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BRITE et al. v. W. J. HOWEY CO. et al.
No. 7893.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 19, 1936.
C. D. Rinehart, of Jacksonville, Fla., and H. C. Collins, of Leesburg, Fla., for appellants.
George C. Bedell, of Jacksonville, Fla., and C. E. Duncan and John S. Lavin, both of Tavares, Fla., for appellees.
Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.
The amended bill of appellants against appellees to rescind for fraud a sale of land and to recover the purchase price and other outlays was dismissed on a motion which contended, among other things, that information concerning the facts as to which deceit was claimed -was at all times available to appellants, and that, after actual knowledge, there was not prompt disaffirmance, but a delay sufficient to defeat rescission. Other grounds are disregarded on this appeal.
The sale occurred February 24, 1928. As a part of it, there were contracts whereby the land purchased would be planted in citrus fruit trees by an agency of the seller and cultivated for the purchasers until eight crops were raised, and whereby eleven crops of the fruit would be taken at a fixed price which was above the usual market. The deceit claimed is that it was represented “that the grapefruit grown upon said land would cure diabetes and possess other medicinal qualities and properties not common to grapefruit grown upon other lands in Florida; that the lands capable of producing such grapefruit were very limited in extent, being in fact confined to a small area near the town of Howey-in-the-Hills; that the land located in said area had a peculiar subsoil which would produce grapefruit having medicinal qualities, among said qualities being the ability to cure diabetes not contained in grapefruit produced on other lands located outside said area though nearby.” These representations, it is alleged, “were false and were known or should have been known to the said defendants, their officers and agents, to be false.” This is a doubtful allegation of willful fraud, but we assume it to mean that the representations, if not known to be false, were recklessly made. Appellants, being ignorant about grapefruit and soils, did not suspect the fraud until, on December 30, 1931, a false claim was made that they had broken their contract touching the cultivation of the lands and a notice was given that the fruit would not be taken and paid for as agreed. Thereupon appellants made investigation as to the medicinal qualities of the grapefruit, and an officer of the selling corporation admitted that a chemist had advised that there were no medicinal properties, and others advised appellants to the same effect and that the prices paid for the land and for its cultivation were excessive. It is alleged that in October, 1932, through an attorney at law, appellants “offered to the said defendants to reconvey the said land by a good and sufficient deed * * * if the defendants would return the sum of $11,000 paid as the purchase price of said land, but the said defendants refused to accept the said offer and said they would not repurchase the grove at any price.” There is no allegation of a notice oí a rescission for fraud or of any other communication except as above quoted. The bill was filed April 13, 1933, and prays for a decree of rescission and a recovery of everything paid for the land and for its cultivation.
Irrespective of any question of an earlier failure in diligence, the bill confesses that suspicion of the fraud was aroused in December, 1931, and knowledge of the truth reached soon afterwards. The exact date of full knowledge is not alleged, but, when ground for suspicion exists, neglect to learn what might be known is counted as knowledge. Foster v. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co., 146 U.S. 88, 99, 13 S.Ct. 28, 36 L.Ed. 899; Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 148 U.S. 360, 13 S.Ct. 585, 37 L.Ed. 480; Broderick’s Will, 21 Wall. 503, 504, 22 L.Ed. 599; Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 12 S.Ct. 862, 36 L.Ed. 719. When fraud in the making of a contract is discovered, the party defrauded has an election to rescind the contract or to stand upon it and sue for the damages caused by the deceit. He must, in order to rescind, promptly so elect and notify the opposite party and adhere to the position taken. Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55, 23 L.Ed. 798; McLean v. Clapp, 141 U.S. 429, 12 S.Ct. 29, 35 L.Ed. 804; Hoyt v. Latham, 143 U.S. 553, 12 S.Ct. 568, 36 L.Ed. 259; Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 24 S. Ct. 259, 48 L.Ed. 419; 6 R.C.L. “Contracts,” ;§§ 315, 317; Holmes v. Cummings (C.C.A.) 71 F.(2d) 364. If there be failure promptly to rescind, the contract stands affirmed, and only the remedy of damages remains. What action is prompt depends on circumstances. Less time can be taken to consider the rescission of a sale when market values ' are changing. The defrauded party cannot wait to see how the values will work out. In this case we judicially know that, due to the country-wide depression in progress in 1931 and 1932, land values were falling rapidly. Appellants should not have delayed ,to. decide whether they would keep the land or not. From December, 1931, to :October, 1932, was too long to wait. We doubt whether what was done at the latter date amounts to a notice of rescission. There was no mention of fraud or claim of right in it. It is described as an offer to resell, which was declined; and an offer to sell is an assertion of ownership. The bill which first unequivocally demanded a rescission was not filed until another six months had passed. It is not a question of laches, but of election. We think the right of rescission was lost, and only a possible remedy by damages at law is left.
Without prejudice to any remedy at law, the judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0