What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MURRAY v. NED et al.
No. 2626.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Feb. 19, 1943.
Rehearing Denied March 24, 1943.
Second Petition for Rehearing Denied June 12, 1943.
Reuel W. Little, of Madill, Okl., for appellant.
William H. Landram, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Muskogee, Okl. (Norman M. Littell, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Cleon A. Summers, U. S. Atty., and Charles N. Champion, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Muskogee, Okl., and Norman MacDonald and S. Billingsley Hill, Attys., Dept, of Justice, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellees.
Before PHILLIPS, HUXMAN, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
On or about June 23, 1931, Willie Tom, a full-blood Mississippi Choctaw Indian, enrolled as such opposite Roll No. 927, died intestate, seized of certain lands which had been allotted to him as a homestead, The land descended to his heirs-at-law who were full-blood Mississippi Choctaw Indians. On October 24, 1931, all the heirs of Willie Tom, except one Moses Johnson, by warranty deed conveyed their undivided 15/16ths interest in the land to Frank Ned, a full-blood Mississippi Choctaw Indian, enrolled opposite Roll No. 264. The deed was duly approved by the county court of Marshall County, Oklahoma, that court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased allottee, Willie Tom. Frank Ned did not use restricted funds to purchase the undivided 15/16ths interest in the land and the deed did not contain any provision restricting alienation.
Frank Ned died intestate on or about November 11, 1939, and his interest in the land descended to his heirs-at-law, all of whom were full-blood Mississippi Choctaw Indians.
On November 19, 1941, Bessie Pistubbee, one of the heirs of Frank Ned, undertook to convey by warranty deed her undivided 3/16ths interest in the land to John O. Murray. The last-mentioned deed was not approved by the county court of Marshall County, nor by any other county court. On December 27, 1941, Murray commenced this action in the District Court of Marshall County seeking a decree determining the heirs of Willie Tom and Frank Ned and quieting Murray’s title to a 3/16ths interest in the land. It was removed by the United States under the provision of the Act of April 12, 1926, 44 Stat. 239, 241, to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The United States filed a complaint in intervention in which it alleged that the deed to Murray was void because not approved by the county court of Marshall County, Oklahoma. From a judgment adjudging the deed to be void, Murray has appealed.
Section 9 of the Act of May 27-, 1908, as amended by the Act of April 12, 1926, 44 Stat. 239, reads as follows:
“The death of any allottee of the Five Civilized Tribes shall operate to remove all restrictions upon the alienation of said allottee’s land: Provided, That hereafter no conveyance by any full-blood Indian of the Five Civilized Tribes of any interest in lands restricted by section 1 of this Act acquired by inheritance or devise from an allottee of such lands shall be valid unless approved by the county court having jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of the deceased allottee or testator * *
That section continued qualified restrictions as to lands passing to full-blood Indian heirs or devisees of an allottee on the death of the allottee.
The Act of January 27, 1933, 47 Stat. 777, in part provides:
“ * * * no conveyance of any interest in land of any full-blood Indian heir shall be valid unless approved in open court after notice in accordance with the rules of procedure in probate matters adopted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in June of 1914, * * * ” § 8.
The single issue presented is whether the latter Act reimposes restrictions on land from which restrictions have been removed, when the land descends to full-blood Indian heirs.
In explaining the need for the quoted provision of the. Act of January 27, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior, in a letter to Honorable Edgar Howard, Chairman, Committee on Indian Affairs, said:
“The last provision of section 2 of the inclosed draft, which is the only matter included that was not contained in S. 6169 as passed by the House during the last session of Congress, we deem a wise one and worthy of enactment. Experience has shown that hasty sales are frequently consummated by Indian heirs of varying degrees of competency, immediately following the death of an ancestor, and serious questions are later raised as to the interests of heirs; titles are attacked, and much costly litigation ensues.”
It will be observed that § 9 of the Act of May 27, 1908, as amended, embraces only full-blood Indian heirs and devisees of allottees and that the language of the quoted provision of the Act of January 27, 1933, embraces all full-blood Indian heirs. Had the Congress merely intended to lay down a procedure to be followed in obtaining approval of deeds by full-blood Indian heirs and devisees of allottees, required by § 9, supra, it is reasonable to assume that it would have made express reference to § 9 and would have included devisees as well as heirs. Instead, it used the sweeping language “any full-blood Indian heir.” We think when due consideration is given to the purposes of the enactment as stated in the letter of the Secretary, and the broad sweep of the language employed, the quoted provision of the Act of January 27, 1933, must be construed to impose restrictions against alienation upon lands passing by descent to full-blood Indian heirs. We so held in Whitchurch v. Crawford, 10 Cir., 92 F.2d 249, 253, and McCurtain v. Palmer, 10 Cir., 121 F.2d 1009, 1010.
The power of Congress constitutionally, to reimpose such restrictions is no longer open to question.
Accordingly, we conclude that when the land passed to the full-blood Indian heirs of Frank Ned, it became restricted against alienation and that the deed to Murray, not having the requisite approval, is void.
The judgment is affirmed.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Owens, 10 Cir., 78 F.2d 768, 775; Holmes v. United States, 10 Cir., 53 F.2d 960, 961; Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235, 238, 39 S.Ct. 442, 63 L.Ed. 954; Harris v. Bell, 254 U.S. 103, 41 S.Ct. 49, 65 L.Ed. 159.
McCurdy v. United States, 246 U.S. 263, 273, 38 S.Ct. 289, 62 L.Ed. 706; Brader v. James, 246 U.S. 88, 96, 38 S.Ct. 285, 62 L.Ed. 591; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 286, 31 S.Ct. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738; Whitchurch v. Crawford, 10 Cir., 92 F.2d 249, 253; Hickey v. United States, 10 Cir., 64 F.2d 628, 629, 631.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1