What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. Anne PICKARD, Respondent.
No. 9373.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 1, 1968.
Grant W. Wiprud, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Mitchell Rogovin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, and Jonathan S. Cohen, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., with him on the brief), for petitioner.
Leland E. Fiske, Dallas, Tex., for respondent.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and LEWIS, BREITENSTEIN, HILL, SETH, and HICKEY, Circuit Judges.
SETH, Circuit Judge.
This is a review of a decision of the Tax Court which held that the taxpayer was correct in her position that a lump sum payment received by her for an option to acquire her oil and gas leases was not includable in her income for the year of its receipt.
The record shows that the taxpayer acquired three five-year federal oil and gas leases covering some 6400 acres. She then entered into three agreements, each described as an “option,” which gave Pan American Petroleum Corporation the right to acquire the leases within a period of three years. Pan American paid taxpayer the sum of $172,800 for the options. This was paid in 1960 and is the subject of this litigation.
The agreements further provided if the options were exercised, an additional small cash consideration would be paid and taxpayer would also receive five per cent of the value of oil and gas produced and sold from the leases. The options were still in effect and not exercised at the end of 1960.
The taxpayer before the Tax Court took the position that the lump sum paid in 1960 would be ordinary income if the option was not exercised, but if the options were exercised the payment would be capital gain — part of the sales price of the leases. She urged that until the options were exercised, or expired, the proper tax treatment could not be determined, thus the payment was not includable in her 1960 return.
The commissioner on the other hand argued that the payment would be ordinary income in either event because if the option were exercised the sum would be a bonus for a lease or sublease. Thus he urged that the payment should have been reported since no capital transaction could ensue.
Thus the issue presented on this appeal is determined by whether or not the option if exercised would result in an economic interest being retained in the taxpayer and thus be placed in the sale category or lease category.
It would not seem necessary to discuss the origin of the concept of an “economic interest” in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 S.Ct. 225, 77 L.Ed. 489, nor its subsequent development, as there is an abundance of authorities and literature on the subject. The taxpayer here, in the event the option was exercised, and this is the only event that need be examined, was to receive ten dollars an acre and a royalty of five per cent. As to the retained interest, she looked solely and directly to production to make it of any value. This test was discussed by the Supreme Court at some length in Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 328 U.S. 25, 66 S.Ct. 861, 90 L.Ed. 1062, and Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 58 S.Ct. 616, 82 L.Ed. 897. The retained “economic interest” of taxpayer identifies the proceeds she received as subject to depletion and has come to identify them as being taxable as ordinary income. See our recent opinion in United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610, Tenth Circuit.
It would appear that the Tax Court in its consideration of the facts placed much emphasis upon the absence of any undertaking by Pan American to develop the properties. The Tax Court cites Helver-ing v. Elbe Oil Land Development Co., 303 U.S. 372, 58 S.Ct. 621, 82 L.Ed. 904, that this absence of such an obligation indicates that an outright sale took place. We do not so construe Elbe as so holding. The Supreme Court in Burton-Sutton appears to have limited Elbe to its particular facts, as did Comm’r v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 76 S.Ct. 395, 100 L.Ed. 347. Burton-Sutton did not create any exception to the economic interest rule dependent upon the presence of an agreement to develop. See United States v. White, supra.
The transaction before us is well within the typical “economic interest” rule and is one which could not have led to any tax result other than ordinary income. Hence the lump sum payment for the options should have been included in the taxpayer’s 1960 return.
The issue relating to a “finder’s fee” paid by the taxpayer to a third party is not fully developed in the record before us, and it should be further considered by the Tax Court in view of our opinion.
Reversed and remanded for such further proceedings as the Tax Court considers necessary.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1