What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES.
No. 7117.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued Oct. 4, 1938;
Decided Nov. 7, 1938.
John Edgar Chadwick and J. Frank O’Brien, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
David A. Pine, U. S. Atty., and Roger Robb, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before GRONER, C. J., and MILLER and VINSON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was indicted for perjury and convicted in the District Court. He seeks a reversal, first, because the trial court refused to declare a mistrial for alleged misstatements of a juror on his voir dire; second, because the court imposed sentence under the District of Columbia perjury statute instead of under the Federal statute.
The facts relied upon to. sustain’the first point are the following: When twelve prospective jurors were in the box, the district attorney arose and stated to them that the defendant was represented by Mr. Ehrlich and Mr. Burnett; that the government was represented by himself and Mr. Jackson; and that the government expected to call ■.witnesses whom he would ask to stand as he called th'eir names. He then called the names of numerous witnesses and, turning to the jury box, said, “I will ask you wheth■er you know any of the people whose names I have called, including Carpenter, the defendant; and any of the witnesses, or any of the people who are involved in the case in which the perjury is charged to have been committed?” There was no response. After a jury had been selected and impaneled and a considerable portion of the evidence for the government heard, counsel for defendant went to the bench and in the presence of counsel for the government asked the court to declare a mistrial and continue the case on the ground that a juror, Kaufman, knew and was known to them and had testified some four or five years previously in a case in which one of them had sought to impeach Kaufman’s veracity. Both of counsel stated that when the jury was selected, they did not recognize the juror as the witness in the former case, and were not sure of his identity until the midday recess. Counsel did not then allege or attempt to show any bias on the part of the juror against either counsel or defendant, nor was there anything to show that the juror had recognized counsel any more than counsel had recognized him. On the showing made Judge Adkins denied the motion.
There was a verdict of guilty, and on a motion for a new trial, based on the same grounds, the juror was called for examination. He testified that when sworn as a juror he had no recollection of the former case; that only upon having his mind refreshed did he recall having met the attorneys for the defendant at or about that time, but that he did not consider that he knew cither of them; that he had never had any business dealings or' transactions with either; and that he did not understand the question .asked upon his examination as requiring him to make an affirmative reply, since he knew the attorneys only as he would know any lawyer who appeared in court; and that neither the case which was tried in 1933 nor anything else had caused him to have any hard feelings or prejudice against either of counsel.
We think the trial judge was right .in refusing to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Obviously, the fact that a juror may know counsel is not of itself sufficient ground to challenge him for cause. Nor is the fact that a juror was involved with counsel in litigation a sufficient ground. On the other hand, of course, it is the duty of every juror to answer questions affecting his qualifications honestly, and if he conceals a material fact which, if disclosed, would probably have induced- counsel to strike him from the jury, a new trial should ordinarily be ordered. But that is not this case. Here there is no evidence to show that the juror purposely failed to answer the questions of counsel or that he deliberately concealed his acquaintance with them. The opportunities of counsel to know the juror were equal to those of the juror to know counsel, and so far as appears neither recognized the other-.
In view of the facts as outlined above and the lack of showing of bias or prejudice, we think the motion for new trial was properly overruled; and since we have already passed upon the other point adversely to the appellant, in the companion case of O’Brien v. United States, 69 App.D.C. 135, 99 F.2d 368, certiorari denied 59 S.Ct. 95, 83 L.Ed. ___, there is nothing further to consider, and the judgment consequently is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0