What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
SWANN et al. v. ADAMS, SECRETARY OF STATE OF FLORIDA, et al.
No. 973.
Decided February 25, 1966.
D. P. S. Paul, P. D. Thomson, Neal Rutledge, Richard F. Wolfson, Thomas C. Britton and Stuart Simon for appellants.
Earl Faircloth, Attorney General of Florida, and Edward D. Cowart and Sam Spector, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
Per Curiam.
We previously remanded this case to the District Court for further proceedings in light of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and the other cases relating to legislative reapportionment decided with Reynolds. 378 U. S. 553. The District Court deferred action until the conclusion of the legislative session which convened on April 6, 1965, stating that it would reconsider its decision should the Florida Legislature fail to effect a valid reapportionment by July 1, 1965.
A reapportionment law was passed by the legislature on June 29, 1965. On July 6 the appellants filed a joint petition asking the District Court to declare the newly enacted plan unconstitutional and proposing an alternative plan. The District Court did not take action until October 5 when it ordered oral argument for November 2, 1965. On December 23 the District Court concluded that the newly passed reapportionment plan failed to “meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution as construed and applied in Reynolds v. Sims . . . .”
Although the District Court concluded that the plan did not comport with constitutional requirements, it approved the plan (making only minor changes) on an interim basis. Its approval was limited to the period ending 60 days after the adjournment of the 1967 session of the Florida Legislature.
We have no occasion to review the District Court’s determination that the legislative reapportionment plan fails to meet constitutional standards. Indeed, Florida does not contend that the District Court erred in this regard, having conceded below that the plan was constitutionally deficient. We hold, however, that in approving the plan on an interim basis, the District Court erred. This litigation was commenced in 1962. The effect of the District Court’s decision is to delay effectuation of a valid apportionment in Florida until at least 1969. While recognizing the desirability of permitting the Florida Legislature itself to determine the course of reapportionment, we find no warrant for perpetuating what all concede to be an unconstitutional apportionment for another three years.
We reverse and remand to the District Court so that a valid reapportionment plan will be made effective for the 1966 elections.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart would affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2