What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. KELLY et al.
No. 209.
Argued November 30, 1951.
Decided January 2, 1952.
Saul R. Gamer argued the cause for thé United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, Paul A.' Sweeney and Herman Marcuse.
Henry J. Fox argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court of Claims awarded judgment to respondent, a per diem employee of the Government Printing Office, for premium pay and gratuity pay for work performed by him on certain holidays during World War II. 119 Ct. Cl. 197, 96 F. Supp. 611. Thus, respondent was held entitled to the aggregate of:
1. His regular compensation for the days worked;
2. Fifty per cent of his regular compensation as premium pay;
3. A full day’s compensation as gratuity pay.
The.Government sought review of that part of the judgment which awarded gratuity pay to respondent and others like him, and we granted certiorari, 342 U. S. 808.
Respondent’s compensation was fixed by a wage agreement which provides in pertinent part:
“Holiday Rate. Employees required to work on a legal holiday or a special holiday declared by Executive Order shall be paid at the day rate plus 50 per cent for all the time actually employed in addition to their gratuity pay for the holiday as provided by ' law . . . .”
By a 1938 Resolution, the applicable law during the period in question, Congress provided that whenever per diem employees were “relieved or prevented from working solely because of the occurrence of” holidays declared by statute or executive order, “they shall receive the same pay for such days as for other days on which an ordinary day’s work is performed.” The question thus presented is whether the Resolution somehow precludes the awarding of the gratuity pay which the agreement seems to grant.
The 1938 Resolution amended the Act of 1895 which had been consistently administered ag providing for gratuity pay in addition to regular compensation'if.tibe employee worked on a holiday. The Government contends that Congress intended to repeal the earlier statute in this respect, and that the Resolution provided gratuity pay only for holidays on which an employee is “relieved' or prevented from working.”
We think this argument misses the point. The 1938 Resolution established the holidays for which gratuity pay v/as to be allowed. It was silent on the subject of gratuity pay for holidays on which work was performed, and we may even assume that it did not provide gratuity pay for those days. But the wage agreement is not silent on the subject. It provides that when an employee works on a holiday he is to receive regular compensation, premium pay, and gratuity pay “for the holiday a# provided by law.” The holidays “as provided by law” are the days provided for in the 1938 Resolution. Nothing in the Resolution prohibits such a wage agreement, and, indeed, the Government concedes this fact. Merely because the'Resolution itself may not award gratuity pay for holidays worked is no ground for vitiating a wage agreement which does.
The Government points to the 1943 Presidential Directive to federal agencies, under which all holidays except Christmas were to be considered as regular workdays for the duration of the war, and urges that the Directive indicated a policy against the payment of gratuity pay for holidays worked. Clearly, the Presidential Directive was not intended to abrogate the wage agreement.
We need not stop to consider the anomalous results which would stem from the Government’s position. Since the agreement provided for gratuity pay for holidays worked, respondent was entitled to such pay. Accordingly, the judgment below is
Affirmed.
The parties have stipulated that - the' disposition of the claim of -respondent K.elly will be determinative of claims filed by 613 other employees of the Printing Office.
52 Stat. 1246, 5 U. S. C. § 86a.
28 Stat. 601, 607, § 46.
8 Comp. Dec. 322 (1901); 13 Comp. Dec. 40 (1906); 3 Comp. Gen. 411 (1924).
See Digest of Provisions of Law Fixing Pay for Employees in the Executive Branch of die Federal Government (U. S. Civil Service Commission, 1945), at p. 94, note 2; H. R. Rep. No. 514, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix, p. 94, note 2.
Thus, under the Government’s view an employee who worked five hours on a- holiday would receive his regular compensation plus premium pay, or seven and one-half hours’ pay; if he stayed home all day, he would receive eight hours’ pay.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3