What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ROBINSON v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 6125.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
March 17, 1933.
A. J. Levin, of Detroit, Mich. (Butzel, Levin & Winston, of Detroit, Mich., and Frederick L. Pearce, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
J. Louis Monarch, of Washington, D. C. (G. A. Youngquist, Sewall Key, Wm. Cutler Thompson, C. M. Charest, and Frank T. Horner, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Before MOORMAN, HICKENLOOPER, and SIMONS, Circuit Judges.
MOORMAN, Circuit Judge.
Bernard Wurzburger and Ms wife, Laura Wurzburgor, were residents of Michigan from 1910 until his death on July 10, 1926. Prior to September 8, 1916, the effective date of the first federal estate tax (39 Stat. 777), they acquired two pieces of real estate as tenants by the entirety. Upon the death of the husband the Commissioner assessed an estate tax against the properties. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed (21 B. T. A. 1373), and the petitioner, executor of the husband’s estate, appeals, contending that section 302 (e) (h) of the Revenue Aet of 1924 (43 Stat. 304, 305 (26 USCA § 1094 note) is unconstitutional, in so far as it requires the inclusion in the gross estate of a decedent of the value of real estate acquired by a decedent and spouse as tenants by the entirety prior to September 8, 1916.
“Tho clear language of the 1924 statute repels the notion that it has no application to joint tenancies created prior to September 8, 1916.” Gwinn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 287 U. S. 224, 53 S. Ct. 157, 158, 77 L. Ed.- (December 5, 1932). Whether its application in the present case is within the limitations of the Constitution depends upon the existence of a taxable event after September 8> 1916, to which it may attach. The death occurred after that date, and if it was a “generating source of definite accessions to the survivor's property rights,” then the tax was constitutionally levied. Sueh was held to he the effect of the death of the joint tenant in the Gwinn Case and in Third National Bank v. White, Collector, 53 S. Ct. 290, 77 L. Ed. -. In the latter ease, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals [58 F.(2d) 1085] sustaining a'judgment of the District Court applying the tax to a tenancy created prior to 1916 [45 F.(2d) 911],
The petitioner relies upon a statement in the Gwinn Case to the effect that under the laws of California the estate could have been terminated by conveyance by either party, through proceedings for partition, or by involuntary alienation by execution. The Third National Bank Case he seeks to distinguish upon tho authority of a brief filed in that ease, citing Massachusetts eases holding that the rights of tho wife in property held by the entirety are subordinate to those of her husband.
It does not seem necessary to examine into the details of the rights of tenants by the entirety under the laws of Massachusetts and California as compared with those in Michigan. The law of Michigan is that prior to the- death. of one tenant neither can convey “without the .other joining in the conveyance.” Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 184, 55 N. W. 664, 665, 35 Am. St. Rep. 595. In Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 503, 504, 50 S. Ct. 356, 359, 74 L. Ed. 991, 69 A. L. R. 758, it was said': “Before the death .of. the husband- (to take the Tyler Case, No. 428) the wife had the right to possess and use the whole property, but, so also, had her husband; she could not dispose of the property except with her husband’s concurrence; her rights were hedged about at all points by the equal rights of her husband. At his death, however, and because of it, she, for the first time, became entitled to exclusive possession, use and enjoyment; she ceased to hold the property subject to qualifications imposed by the law relating to tenancy by the entirety, and became entitled to hold and enjoy it absolutely as her own; and then, and then only, she acquired the power, not theretofore possessed, of disposing of the property by an exercise of her sole will. Thus tlje death of one of the parties to the tenancy became the ‘generating source’ of important and definite accessions to the property rights of the other.”
It is also the law of Michigan that an estate by entirety cannot be devised. Webber v. Webber, 217 Mich. 178, 185 N. W. 761. Upon the death-, therefore, of the decedent, his wife for the first time ceased to hold her interest in the property subject to the disabilities' and qualifications imposed by the grant and became entitled to exclusive possession, use, and enjoyment of the whole property. This was,a definite accession to her propei*ty rights under the rulings in the Tyler 'and Gwinn Cases. Cf. O’Shaughnessy v. Commissioner, 60 F.(2d) 235, 237 (6 C. C. A.).
The second question involved in the case relates to a bank deposit in the joint names of the decedent and his wife, payable to both or either or the survivor. The Revenue Act, section 302 (e), 26 USCA § 1094 note, requires that there be included in the estate of a decedent the entire amount of joint bank deposits, “except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged” to the. survivor. No evidence was offered tending to show that any part of this deposit belonged to Laura Wurzburger. The contention is that, in- the absence of proof that it did or did not belong to her, the presumption of equal ownership created by the Compiled' Laws of Michigan, 1915, § 8040, must prevail, Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243, 246, 190 N. W. 698. It is accordingly contended that one-half of the amount on deposit should have been excluded from decedent’s gross estate. But the Revenue Act provides that all of the amount of such deposit shall be included in the decedent’s estate, except such part as may be shown to have originally belonged to the survivor. This provision cannot, we think, be vitiated by a state court decision construing a state statute as giving rise to a presumption. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 S. Ct. 48, 70 L. Ed. 183; Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333, 49 S. Ct. 337, 73 L. Ed. 720. As said in New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 372, 38 S. Ct. 535, 536, 62 L. Ed. 1167, “the question of burden of proof is a matter of substance and not subject to control by laws of the several states.” Commissioner v. Olds (C. C. A.) 60 P. (2d) 252, 254, is not to the contrary. All that was held there was that the Board of Tax Appeals had the right to receive evidence that would have been admissible in the courts of the state where the contract was to be performed.
The order of the Board is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1