What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Robert P. ANDERSON et al., Appellees.
No. 8134.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 30, 1966.
See also 34 F.R.D. 518.
Kathryn H. Baldwin, Atty., Dept, of Justice (John W. Douglas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lawrence M. Henry, U. S., Atty., Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with her on the brief), for appellant.
Benjamin E. Sweet, Denver, Colo. (Ralph E. Crandell, Denver, Colo., with him on brief), for appellees.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and PICKETT and HICKEY, Circuit Judges.
HICKEY, Circuit Judge.
The First National Bank of Englewood, Colorado (Bank) loaned $250,000.-00 to U. S. Durox Corporation of Colorado (Corporation). In order to induce the Bank to make the loan to the Corporation, the appellees, directors of the Corporation, executed an unconditional guarantee to the Bank, its successors or assigns.
After default on the obligation, the Bank assigned the note together with all collateral including the unconditional guarantees to the Small Business Administration (SBA), who had joined with the Bank in a participating loan.
The directors, who guaranteed the loan, were ousted. A new board was elected and application for reorganization made under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.
The ousted directors and the assignee, SBA, objected to the reorganization. Nevertheless, an amended plan which ordered liquidation of the assets was approved by the Bankruptcy Court.
SBA, a secured creditor under the plan, bid $250,000.00 for the property under an order of the court to sell the property for cash. After the sale had been approved, SBA applied to the court to permit it to pay $8,000.00 in cash and set off its secured obligation of $242,000.00 as full payment of the property purchased. The Bankruptcy Court refused to allow this method of payment, because it did not provide the necessary cash to pay the cost of administration of the reorganization attempt. The court agreed to permit SBA to set off a portion of the amount secured if it would pay $124,500.-00 in cash to the trustees. This amount was the estimated total of the priority claims in the Chapter X proceeding which included the costs of administration. SBA complied and received title to the property free and clear of all liens or claims against the debtor corporation.
The SBA then filed this action against the guarantors, who had induced the loan by their guaranty, claiming $113,668.87 on the guaranteed portion of the loan plus accruing interest as the deficiency.
The accountings contained in the record are confusing and do not afford an accurate accounting. The. trial court adjudged the liability to be the amount of principal balance plus interest as of February 6, 1959 (the date of the petition in bankruptcy); the costs and expenses of preservation, including insurance on the property (and interest on the amount of premium), repair of the property and local property taxes; and expenses directly connected with the auction sale including auctioneers. From the sum of these amounts is to be deducted the amount of $250,000.00 to determine the deficiency for which guarantors are now liable. Nowhere in the record can such an accounting be found.
The SBA appeals from this judgment complaining that the cost of administering the Chapter X proceedings is a charge which should be made against the guarantors and should be included in the liability adjudged by the trial court.
It is uncontroverted that: (1) SBA succeeded as assignee of the secured beneficiaries; (2) that SBA succeeded 'as secured creditor of the mortgage and the note; (3) that SBA became the creditor of the corporation for the balance due on the note; (4) that the guaranties are unconditional agreeing to pay the balance due on the note to the bank or its assignee without requiring the bank or its assignee to pursue or exhaust their rights or remedies against the debtor. The guaranties also provide that when the principal, interest and all other sums payable in accordance with the terms of the note of the debtor are due, payment will be made. The note provides, “the term indebtedness * * * shall mean the indebtedness evidenced by this note, including principal, interest, and expenses, whether contingent, now due or hereafter to become due and whether heretofore or contemporaneously herewith or hereafter contracted. The indebtedness shall immediately become due and payable, without notice or demand, upon * * * the filing of a petition * * * under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 * *
The question then is the effect of the participation of SBA in the bankruptcy proceedings, wherein it purchased the property and agreed to pay administrative costs to the trustee, upon the guarantors’ obligation.
Taking a broad and more comprehensive view of the entire proceedings, it becomes patent that these bankruptcy transactions can have little effect on the guaranties. Section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that guarantors are not released from liability by a discharge of the bankrupt. Therefore, the reorganization proceedings and the sale to SBA do not have the effect of releasing guarantors from their obligations. The section, however, does not authorize the secured beneficiaries to incur additional expenses by engaging in proceedings other than for collection from the guarantors.
The trial court properly found, “On the basis of data now before the Court it is not possible to determine exactly the amount of the guarantors’ liability on a deficiency. The guarantors’ liability consists of: (1) The amount of principal balance as of February 6, 1959, plus interest thereon; (2) the costs and expenses directly attributable to preservation of the collateral, including insurance of the property (and interest on the amount of the premium), repair of the property, and local property taxes; * * * »
“The law is settled that a guaranty is a collateral agreement to pay a debt or perform a duty for another in case of default which may be enforced separately from the primary obligation. It is not necessary to proceed against the primary debtor. An unconditional guaranty is one whereby the guarantor agrees to pay or perform a contract upon default of the principal without limitation. It is an absolute undertaking to pay a debt at maturity or perform an agreement if the principal does not pay or perform, (citations omitted). A definition of conditional and unconditional contracts of guaranty and the liability of guarantors under them is well stated by this court in Pavlantos v. Garoufalis, [10 Cir.] 89 F.2d 203, 206, where it is said: * * * ‘An absolute guaranty is an unconditional undertaking on the part of the guarantor that the person primarily obligated will make payment or will perform, and such a guarantor is liable immediately upon default of the principal without notice. * * *’”
“As pointed out in Woodstock Bank v. Downer, 27 Yt. 539, supra, it was not necessary to bring an action against the maker of the bonds to charge defendants on their guaranty, nor do we think it was necessary to appear in the bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff could have proceeded against defendants without an action against the cement company, and without appearing in the bankruptcy proceedings.”
As indicated, supra, the SBA had a clear cause of action against the guarantors immediately after the default occurred and at the time the bankruptcy proceedings were filed.
SBA’s participation in the Chapter X proceeding was unnecessary to protect their interest, therefore, the guarantors would not be liable for unnecessary costs incurred in the administration of the attempted reorganization. “As a general rule, a guarantor, even under a conditional guaranty, is not liable for the costs of a suit which was instituted unnecessarily * * * ” Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the guarantors were responsible for the obligations represented by the note at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed is sustained by the law and the evidence, and they cannot be charged with the unnecessary expense of the administration of the Chapter X bankruptcy.
Affirmed.
. 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1953).
. 6A Collier, Bankruptcy, § 11.18 at 694 (1965).
. United States v. Anderson, 226 F.Supp. 932, 940 (1964).
. Joe Heaston Tractor & Imp. Co. v. Securities Accept. Corp., 243 F.2d 196, 199 (10 Cir., 1957); Duke v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 209 F.2d 204 (4 Cir., 1954).
. Walker v. McNeal, 134 Okl. 111, 272 P. 443, 447 (1928).
. Supra, note 4 and contents of note instrument.
. 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 58 at 1215 (1943).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0