What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
George Anton BOMHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald REAGAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 74-3172.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Sept. 12, 1975.
George Anton Bomher, in pro per.
Carol A. Ronquillo (argued), San Diego, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Honorable Albert C. Wollenberg, Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
OPINION
Before HUFSTEDLER and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and WOLLENBERG, District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant alleged in the district court below and on this appeal several constitutional deprivations. His fundamental claim appears to be that summary tax collection procedures are constitutionally invalid as a violation of due process.
The- Franchise Tax Board sent several requests to appellant for payment of delinquent personal income taxes. Appellant declined to pay the taxes, asserting that he could only be required to pay if the tax debt were supported by a judgment of a court. The Franchise Tax Board, under the authority of California Revenue and Tax Code §§ 18906-18909, subsequently issued a warrant for collection of amounts due. The sheriff’s department executed the warrant by levy upon and sale of appellant’s automobile. This procedure, alleges appellant, deprived him of due process because he was not given prior notice and hearing in a court of law wherein the tax debt could be proven.
Summary tax collection procedures, which provide for subsequent judicial review, have been sustained against constitutional challenge since the case of Phillips v. Commissioner (1931) 283 U.S. 589, 51 S.Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289. The Court there held that such procedures neither deprived a taxpayer of due process nor amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority to the executive branch of government. Id., at 593-594, 597-598, 51 S.Ct. 608. The exception in tax matters to prior notice and hearing was more recently reaffirmed in Fuentes v. Shevin (1972), 407 U.S. 67, 90-92, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, reh. den. 409 U.S. 902. See Tavares v. United States (9th Cir. 1974) 491 F.2d 725, 726. The fact that a taxpayer disputes the tax debt, as appellant asserts he does here, does not alter the rule of Phillips. See Kalb v. United States (2d Cir. 1974) 505 F.2d 506, 510.
California revenue and tax law provides for subsequent judicial review in personal income tax matters by way of a suit in state court for a refund. California Revenue and Tax Code § 19081 et seq. A similar procedure was expressly held adequate as an alternative means of subsequent judicial review in Phillips, 283 U.S. at 597-598, 51 S.Ct. 608. Thus, appellant has not shown a constitutional deprivation based on the seizure and sale of his automobile. Since no constitutional deprivation could be found from the summary tax collection activities of appellees, there could be no actionable conspiracy. The district court committed no error in dismissing appellant’s complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986 for failure to state a claim. When a case is dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief, a pure question of law, no question of fact exists for a jury to try.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99