What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ray M. BLAIN and Susie J. Blain et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America, the United States Department of Agriculture and the United States Department of Forestry Service, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 75-3376.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
March 28, 1977.
Terry J. Knoepp, U. S. Atty., Peter W. Bowie, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., Morton Hollander, Neil H. Koslowe, Atty., Civ. Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., argued, for defendants-appellees.
Walter S. Weiss, Barry Zalma, Long & Levit, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Before TRASK, WALLACE and SNEED, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs’ action against the United States for property damage was dismissed. They contend before us that the district judge erred in holding that a class claim filed by a non-plaintiff does not fulfill the administrative claim requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2675. We affirm.
The plaintiffs contend that in September 1970 there was a forest fire in the Cleveland National Forest, near San Diego, California, caused by the negligence of the United States. Plaintiffs are individuals who suffered real and personal property damage as a result of the fire and their subrogor insurance companies.
On November 17,1970, Arthur and Joann Preston filed a claim with the proper government agency demanding reimbursement for damage incurred as a result of the fire. The Preston claim states that it was submitted on behalf of “claimants and other parties” and that the owners of the damaged property, besides the Prestons themselves, were “other parties in class action.” The Prestons are not, and have never been, parties to this action.
On May 14, 1971, a written response to the Preston claim was made in which it was stated in part: “We have, however, given consideration to the claim, but only as it relates to Mr. and Mrs. Preston. They have no authority under the Tort Claims Act to file as a class. Each claimant must file his own claim separately.” The Prestons’ individual claim was also denied. The Prestons later instituted and settled their suit as individuals.
The plaintiffs instituted this action May 13, 1975, under The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80. None of them have filed claims with the proper federal agency as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675. Instead, plaintiffs allege that they are members of the class whose claim was submitted by the Prestons.
The government moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to meet the requirements of section 2675 by failing to file a claim within the required two-year period. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The claim requirement of section 2675 is jurisdictional in nature and may not be waived. Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1049 (3rd Cir. 1971); see Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970). Thus, failure to comply within the required time period results in the claim’s being forever barred. Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, supra, 420 F.2d 896; 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The district judge determined that the plaintiffs had not filed a valid administrative claim and, accordingly, granted the government’s motion.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the Department of Justice has established regulations prescribing the procedures by which administrative claims are to be presented. These regulations provide, among other things, that a claim for damages to property must be presented by the owner of the property or by the owner’s duly authorized agent or legal representative. 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(a).
The claim presented by the Prestons did not satisfy this requirement. While the Prestons purported to file their claim on behalf of “other parties in class action,” they supplied no evidence to the agency of any kind that they were authorized to present such a claim on behalf of these individuals. Thus, the plaintiffs in this case may not benefit from the Prestons’ claim. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Association of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 23-24 (3rd Cir. 1975); 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(e). Because plaintiffs have filed no valid claim, they have failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675 and the district court’s dismissal was not error.
As plaintiffs have failed to establish that a class claim was properly submitted on their behalf, we need not reach the question whether a class claim may ever qualify as a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675 or the question whether a vague and undocumented reference to “other parties in class action” would suffice to identify the class for purposes of submitting a class claim.
AFFIRMED.
. This section prohibits the institution of any suit based upon the alleged commission of a tort by the United States unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing .

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0