What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
AEROMOTIVE METAL PRODUCTS, INC., Appellant, v. W. Willard WIRTZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Appellee.
No. 17935.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 14, 1963.
George O. Bahrs and Robert J. Scol-nik, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Kenneth C. Robertson, Regional Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, San Francisco, Cal., Charles Donahue, Solicitor of Labor, Bessie Margolin, Associate Solicitor of Labor, Jacob I. Karro, Associate Solicitor of Labor, and Isabelle R. Cappello, Attorney, United States Department of Labor, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before POPE, BROWNING and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Aeromotive Metal Products, Inc. appeals from a judgment in favor of the Secretary of Labor in an action brought under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The judgment was on behalf of certain employees of appellant and is for unpaid wages and overtime compensation. The question is-whether a fifteen minute mid-morning rest period must be counted as hours of employment and paid for as such.
The rest period involved was originally instituted at the request of the employees at appellant’s Seattle, Washington plant in 1952. The year here involved is 1958-59. At the time that the employees involved were hired, they were given no choice as to whether to take the fifteen-minute uncompensated mid-morning rest period. It was a company rule that no productive work would be done during this period and that no employee would receive pay for this time. The plant was located in the industrial part of Seattle and the nearest commer•cial area was not within a fifteen-minute walking distance. Occasionally, employees would do personal errands, but this was not easy to do, and their homes were not accessible to them within the •fifteen-minute period. The majority of •the employees spent the fifteen-minute period in the immediate vicinity of the plant, smoking, having refreshments, ■etc. The Court found that the employees were free to spend the fifteen-minute ■period in such activities as they might ■desire, provided they returned promptly .at the end of the period. It was also found:
“The granting of such rest periods by employers to employees is a general practice in the industry. Actual production did not increase at the Seattle plant of the defendant after initiating the midmorning rest period nor were there any fewer mistakes nor was there any less absenteeism or employee turnover. The employees felt better after the rest period, and the granting of this rest period by defendant improved defendant’s employer-employee relationships.”
Among its conclusions of law is the following :
“The rest period of 15-minute duration was not under such conditions as would permit the employees to make beneficial personal use of this time. Such rest period was predominantly for the benefit of the employer.”
Essentially, it is appellant’s position that the Court’s conclusion that the rest period was predominantly for the benefit of the employer, is not supported by the finding quoted above. It relies upon Mitchell v. Greinetz, 10 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 621, 61 A.L.R.2d 956 and Mitchell v. Turner, 5 Cir., 1960, 286 F.2d 104. Its position is that a Court cannot determine that such a rest period is primarily for the benefit of the employer in a case in which, as here, production did not increase after the initiation of a rest period.
We do not think that either case cited stands for the proposition that appellant asserts. On the contrary, it seems to us clear that in each case the Court felt that the trial court should consider all of the facts in determining whether the rest period was predominantly for the benefit of the employer. The record here shows that the Court did consider all of the facts, and we think its determination, whether it should be considered a conclusion of law or a finding of ultimate fact, is fully supported by the record.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1