What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Shahid El Hussein MUHAMMAD o/c Maynard Prater, Relator-Appellant, v. Hon. Vincent R. MANCUSI, as Warden of Attica State Prison, Attica, New York, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 809, Docket 33951.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued May 25, 1970.
Decided Oct. 22, 1970.
Edmund R. Schroeder, Morton E. Grosz, Milton Adler, New York City, for appellant.
Brenda Soloff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before WATERMAN, FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The one issue presentéd by this appeal from the denial, without a hearing, of appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Metzner, J., is whether an examination at the FBI headquarters in New York City of a briefcase and wallet which were in defendant’s possession at the scene and time of his arrest in the public lobby of a bank was unconstitutional as an “unreasonable search.”
Following a robbery of money orders from a camera store located in the Bronx, the FBI was informed by a bank employee that appellant was in a branch office of the bank and was seeking to cash suspect money orders. Two FBI agents went to the bank forthwith and, upon ascertaining that the money orders in question were ones taken in the camera store robbery, there arrested appellant, made a limited search of his person, and took from him a briefcase he had been carrying. Appellant was taken directly to FBI headquarters where he was questioned, and his personal effects, including the briefcase, were examined. The briefcase contained 44, and his wallet 4, of the stolen money orders.
At appellant’s trial in state court for the camera store robbery, the money orders discovered by the search at FBI headquarters were, over objection, introduced into evidence as those stolen from the camera store. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to serve a term of from 15 to 30 years in prison. After appealing his conviction without success to the state appellate courts certiorari review was denied by the United States Supreme Court, Muhammad v. New York, 392 U.S. 944, 88 S.Ct. 2288, 20 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1968).
Appellant recognizes that the warrant-less search of the briefcase and the seizure of the money orders would have been proper if the search had been conducted at the time of his arrest in the lobby of the bank, but he claims, relying upon the rule in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), reaffirmed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), that the Government was foreclosed from searching it and seizing its contents without a warrant after he and the briefcase had been removed from the scene of the arrest.
This contention is entirely frivolous. Nothing could be more consistent with a decent regard for the preservation of appellant’s right to human dignity than the act of the officers here in not publicly overhauling appellant's personal effects in the lobby of the bank. Officers may indeed promptly conduct more thorough searches of an arrested person and of the personal effects in his possession at the time of his arrest at a more convenient place than the spot of arrest. We have so held in the past subsequent to Preston, e. g., United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F.2d 337 (2 Cir. 1967); United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d 184 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 862, 87 S.Ct. 116, 17 L.Ed.2d 88 (1966). And, in accord with an able opinion of Judge Coffin of the First Circuit, United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 491-493 (1 Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037, 90 S.Ct. 1355, 25 L.Ed.2d 648 (1970), demonstrating that the reasoning of the above cases, and numerous other cases like them, has not been overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), we now hold here, subsequent to Chimel.
Moreover, we do not find Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) apposite. Here the challenged search is a search of a suspect’s person and of his personal effects in his immediate possession at the time of his arrest when there was probable cause to effect that arrest. The examination of appellant’s briefcase at the FBI headquarters presents no‘different constitutional issue than a search there of his suit pockets, or hatband, would present.
The order below is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1