What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernestine A. LUTHER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 74-3178.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
July 30, 1975.
Kirkpatrick W. Dilling, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Herbert Hoffman, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KOELSCH, CHOY and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Mrs. Luther was convicted of smuggling merchandise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545, and she appeals. We affirm.
Mrs. Luther was stopped at the primary inspection area at the port of entry in San Ysidro. She failed to make any declaration in response to the routine question by the customs officer. An inspection of her car then revealed 3,600 Wobe-mugos laetrile capsules of German origin in the trunk. Her car keys were taken from her and she was directed to wait in the secondary inspection area.
She was questioned there by Special Agent Nadel, who had been informed by telephone of the incident concerning Mrs. Luther. He knew that Mrs. Luther had failed to declare the medicine as required, and that the medicine was unauthorized for entry because of its foreign label. Upon viewing the Wobe-mugos capsules, however, he determined that they were of such little value that he would only make an administrative seizure. Holding the bag containing the capsules, he questioned Mrs. Luther over the public counter in the inspection area to verify her identification and her possession of the undeclared medicine. He then offered Mrs. Luther a receipt and told her she could leave. Mrs. Luther chose to remain while a call was made to see if Wobe-mugos were authorized by the Food and Drug Administration. Upon learning that the capsules would be held she obtained her car keys and left.
The next day Agent Nadel learned that the quantity of laetrile possessed by Mrs. Luther was worth $1,200. Surmising that a seizure of some importance had taken place, he obtained a warrant and arrested Mrs. Luther at her home. Only at that point were Miranda warnings given.
Appellant urges that when questioned at the secondary inspection office at the port of entry in San Ysidro, she was deprived of her freedom of action in a significant way and was in custody as conceived in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). She contends that statements obtained at that time were inadmissible because no Miranda warning was given her. We hold that the interrogation was not custodial in nature for the purposes of Miranda and, consequently, that the testimony of Agent Nadel was properly admitted.
By “custodial interrogation” the Miranda Court meant questioning initiated after a person was taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. In this circuit an objective reasonable man test is employed in determining whether a person is in custody. The factors to be considered are the language used to summon him, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and pressure exerted to detain him. If the person reasonably believes that he cannot leave freely, he is considered in custody and a Miranda warning is required. Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1397 (9th Cir. 1969).
Applying these rules to the present case, we find that the temporary detention was not significant. Mrs. Luther was summoned from among the other persons in the secondary inspection area when Agent Nadel held up her capsules and asked to whom they belonged. The physical surroundings were a public counter. Rather than the compelling atmosphere of apprehension and arrest, it is plain that at most an administrative seizure was taking place and that the agent was merely filling out a form to that end. Her car keys were held pending the identification check, but any deleterious effect of this is negated by the fact that she was not charged or arrested and was told that she could leave. We hold that where a person is not charged, arrested, or otherwise confronted with guilt, there is an atmosphere of mere administrative routine, and the person is told she is free to go, the circumstances do not amount to a deprivation of freedom in a significant way and are not equivalent to the compelling atmosphere to which Miranda was directed. We do not consider the agent’s belated intent to arrest; we instead examine the actual circumstances at the time of the confrontation and gauge their effect on the person under the “reasonable man” test. Lowe v. United States, supra.
Appellant cites Chavez-Martinez v. United States, 407 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 858, 90 S.Ct. 124, 24 L.Ed.2d 109 (1969), for the proposition that Miranda warnings should have been given to Mrs. Luther because probable cause existed. Implicit to the holding in Chavez is the element of custody. The suspect was confined under guard in the customs office, confronted with her concealment of heroin, and arrested on the spot. Contrary to this, Mrs. Luther was free to wander the customs area, was unconfronted with a charge of smuggling, and was told in good faith that she could leave.
Appellant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Appellant failed to make a motion for judgment of acquittal at trial. Such a failure operates to waive the benefits of the motion unless the appellate court finds that a manifest miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Beckett v. United States, 379 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1967). Finding no such result here, we do not consider appellant’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence.
We do not consider appellant’s other arguments because they were raised for the first time in her reply brief. Only a miscarriage of justice would compel the consideration of such untimely contentions. Again, we find no such injustice resulting here.
Affirmed.
. Wobe-mugos is a potent laetrile medicine coveted by some cancer victims. It is unlicensed in this country.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0