What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SMALLWOOD v. UNITED STATES.
No. 7088.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 19, 1933.
Leonard Brown, of San Antonio, Tex., for appellant,
W. R. Smith, Jr., U. S. Atty., of San Antonio, Tex.
Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
The appellant and his wife were con-vieted under an indictment containing three counts, each of which charged them with a violation of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA). As to the imprisonment imposed on the wife, the execution of the sen-tenee was suspended, and she was released upon probation, and did not appeal. Nothing is complained of except the action of the court in overruling an objection of the accused to all the evidence offered by the gov-eminent, on the ground that the same was obtained by an unlawful search of the dwelling of the accused, and in denying motions to exclude such evidence upon the above stated ground, one of which motions was made upon the conclusion of the evidence offered by the government, and the other upon the conclusion of all the evidence submitted.
The evidence submitted by the government included testimony to the following ef-feet: Premises known as 246 Ridge drive are located about seven miles northwest of San Antonio, in Bexar county, Tex., in a sparsely settled locality, the house fronting west and near to a road running north and south, that house being between three hundred and four hundred yards from any other house. After receiving information of the violation of the National Prohibition Act on the above-mentioned premises, two federal prohibition investigators, on March 17, 1933, went in an automobile to the vicinity of those premises and parked their car on a road at a point between three hundred and four hundred yards from .that house and watched that place from about 11 o’clock in the forenoon until about 12 o’clock that night. About 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon they saw a ear which had been parked near the entrance of that house leave the place, and they followed it until it stopped at a grocery store in San Antonio and until it returned to said premises in about thirty minutes, when they saw two men carry six sacks of sugar to the basement door on the south side of the house. That night the two officers left their ear and walked through an open field to a point about seventy-five or one hundred yards from the house where they found a Role in the ground which was filled with whisky mash which had been cooked, that hole being surrounded by mesquite brush, and saw a pipe which ran from that hole to the house. In the afternoon of the next day, March 18th, the two officers returned to the plaee where they had parked their ear the day before. That night they saw an automobile with two women in it make two trips from the house, staying away on each trip thirty minutes. The officers drove by the house on the road in front of it and as they passed the house smelled a strong odor of mash m a state of fermentation. At about 3 o’clock in the afternoon on March ^ the two officers returned and parked tbeir car at the place where they parked it the day before. After they saw a man go m the basement door of the house they drove ps^t the house and as they passed it they smelled a strong odor of cooking whisky mash> which indicated the presence of a still making whisky. They then drove into the driveway leading to the house, and, after blowing the horn of their automobile, remained therein. Appellant’s wife came to the door of the house and out on the porch. One of the officers asked her if she lived there, and she said she did. Upon one of the offieers telling ber that they were federal ofdecrs sbe went back into the house. In a fow s“ünds she returned, and, upon one of *be °fficers asking her if her husband was there, she said he was not. Upon being asked lf the tw° cars whleh were Parked m the ¿nveway near the basement door of the house were hers, she said: ^ Yes. ^ Upon being asked if she was cooking whisky she said: Yes' ’ Thereupon one of the officers said he wanted to look into the basement, whereup011 sbe went into the house. Then the officers £°t otlt the car_ and walked to the door of the basement, which was open, and through the open door they saw in the basement a number of barrels containing mash, bottles containing what appeared to be whisky, and a hose leading from one of the mash barrels np through a trapdoor in the top of the basement and a ladder going up to that door, One of the officers entered the basement room and went up the ladder, and, looking through the opening, saw appellant’s wife standing by the side of a still which was in operation, and he told her that she was under arrest, In that place the officers found two stills, one of which then was in operation, whisky running out of the coil, 1,350 gallons of whisky mash, 222% gallons of whisky, and other artides used in making and storing whisky, After the two officers looked through the open ‘door of the basement and saw what was therein, as above stated, one of them went around to the back door of the house, and saw the appellant lea-p over the back fence and run through an open' pasture. That officer pursued the appellant and arrested him. In the basement room and the two rooms above it, there was nothing but the stills, mash, whisky, and things used in the manufacture and storage of whisky. Another part o£ the house was used as a dwelling.
The evidence as to the officers finding cooked whisky mash in a hole into which led a pipe from the house in which the accused resided was not subject to objection on the ground stated. The protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their “persons, houses, papers and effects” does not extend to such a place as the one where the hole containing whisky mash was found. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 44 S. Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898.
According to above referred to testimony, before the officers entered the house through an open door, by means of their senses they were apprised of the fact that the house then was occupied by one or more persons engaged in the commission of a eontinuing felony. It fairly may be said that the arrests of the accused were made for offenses committed in the presence of the offleers. Hawkins v. Lutton, 95 Wis. 492, 70 N. W. 893, 60 Am. St. Rep. 131; 5 Corpus Juris, 416. A warrant is not required to justify an arrest for an offense committed in the presence of the arresting officer and the contemporaneous search of the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime .as to its fruits or the means by which it was committed. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 30, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A. L. R. 409; Vecchio v. United States (C. C. A.) 53 F.(2d) 628, 629. Such search as was made of the part of the building which was the seene. of criminal' acts then being ... , , ., committed was permissible because it was incident to arrests made for offenses committed in the presence of the arresting officers.
All the evidence submitted, by the government not being subject to objection or to be excluded on the ground stated, the above-mentioned rulings were not erroneous. °
Though the -judgment is not subject to be reversed because of error committed by the trial court, we take notice of the fact that, since the judgment was rendered, the appeal therefrom was taken, and the ease was submitted in this court, the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution has become' effective, and of the effect on the judgment of such repeal. The power of Congress to create and authorize the punishment of the offenses charged in the indictment was conferred by the repealed amendment. An effect of the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, without any saving clause, was to repeal the statute creating the offenses charged in the indictment. When, during the pendency in an appellate court of a criminal ease, the statute creating the ?rimef charf®d 13 rePealed ^hout any savthe appellate court must dispose f ^ case ]^der the law in force when the decmmn is given, üiough to do so requires the re™rsal °f ^dgment which was right ^en rendered. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503, 32 S. Ct. 542, 56 L. Ed. 860; Metzger Motor Car Co. v. Parrott, 233 U. S. 36 34 S. Ct. 575 58 L. Ed. 837; Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281, 3 L. Ed. 101; Hartung v. People, 22 N. Y. 95; Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322, 71 Am. Dec. 596; 4 C. J. 1119. In support of statement to the above effect in the opinjon in the case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis, supra, the court eitcriminal cases, including the case of Hartung v. People, supra, in whieh'the rule stat-ea was applied. A result of the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment being that Si judgment of conviction on the charges made the indictment is unauthorized by the law now in existence, the judgment appealed' from jg reversed and annulled,
Reversed

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0