What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HOLYOKE WATER POWER CO. v. AMERICAN WRITING PAPER CO., Inc.
No. 3293.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1938.
Bentley W. Warren, of Boston, Mass. (Samuel Williston, of Cambridge, Mass., Nathan P. Avery and James M. Healy, both of Holyoke, Mass., and Donald C. Starr, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellant.
Claude R. Branch, of Boston, Mass. (Charles P. Curtis, Jr., of Boston, Mass., Russell L. Davenport, of Holyoke, Mass., and Charles Ryan, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
MORTON, Circuit Judge.
This case arises between the same parties, and involves the same water-power system and the same underlying contracts and leases, as were before this court in Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 90 F.2d 509, C.C.A.1. It is unnecessary to restate the facts. We held that the grants of mill powers “carried a right to use the specified amount of water for power or other industrial uses.” Page 513. This conclusion was based on a very careful consideration of the history of the enterprise and the underlying grants, and we see no occasion to modify our views.
The questions now before us involve the rights of the defendant as owner or lessee in the use of certain millsites and mill powers originally granted by the plaintiff. The essential facts are simple. The defendant has installed on certain millsites hydroelectric generators driven by the mill powers appurtenant to such sites. The electric current so made is used for driving machinery located on other millsites than those on which the generators and water wheels stand. This the plaintiff contends the defendant has no right to do.
Some thirteen sites are involved and more than forty mill powers. While there is general similarity in the terms of the grants, they are not identical. In some of them it is expressly provided that the mill power shall be “used only in and upon” the specified millsite; in others, the same understanding may be inferred; all the mill powers are appurtenant to millsites. In the view which we take differences in the wording of the grants are not important. Taking the case in the aspect most favorable to the plaintiff, viz., that of a mill power granted as appurtenant to a given site with a proviso that the mill power shall be used only in and upon that site, may the defendant install hydroelectric machinery and use the current elsewhere?
At common law water powers have long been regarded as sui generis. As early as Luttrel’s Case, 4 Coke 86, it was held that where a water power had been acquired by prescription the owner might thereafter use it as he saw fit; the same is true of water powers obtained under the mill acts. If the defendant is prohibited from using the mill powers in the way in which it is using them, the restriction must be found in the grants. Nowhere in any of the agreements and grants of the mill powers in question is there any restriction on such use, unless it is to be found in the provi-' sipns making each of the powers appurtenant to some site — which standing alone would certainly have no' such effect — and requiring a power to be “used only in and upon” the site to which it is appurtenant. The plaintiff’s case rests on the contention that the mill powers are not being “used,” within the meaning of the grants, on the site where the water wheels and generators are located, but on other sites where the electric current from the generator is applied to motors, to lights, or to other industrial uses.
When these grants were made, “using” a water power meant in common speech using it to run a water wheel. It is still the ordinary meaning of the phrase. “The use of water for power according to common understanding means its application to a water wheel.” Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Whiting & Co., 276 Mass. 528, 537, and 538, 177 N.E. 568, 572. In Utah Power Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 52 S.Ct. 548, 76 L.Ed. 1038, the plaintiff contended that its hydroeléctric plant merely converted into electric energy the power of the falling water; that the stream of falling water continued, in effect, in the form of electricity across the state line; and that the state had therefore no right to tax it — a contention resembling the one now made. It was held untenable. The court said:
“Electrical energy -has' characteristics clearly differentiating it from the various other forms of energy, such as chemical energy, heat energy, and the energy of falling water. Appellant here, by means of what are called generators, converts the mechanical energy of falling water into electrical energy. Thus, by the application of human skill, a distinct product is brought into being and transmitted to the places of use. The result is not merely transmission; nor is it transmission of the mechanical energy of falling water to the places of consumption ; but it is, first, conversion of that form of energy into something else, and, second, the transmission of that something else to the consumers. * * *
“We think, therefore, it is wholly inaccurate to say that appellant’s entire system is purely a transferring device. On the contrary, the generator and the transmission lines perform different functions, with a result comparable, ,so far as the question here under consideration is concerned, to the manufacture of physical articles of trade and their subsequent shipment and transportation in commerce.” Sutherland, J., 286 U.S. 165, at pages 179 and 180, 52 S.Ct. 548, 551, 76 L.Ed. 1038.
In Duncan v. New England Power Co., 225 Mass. 155, 113 N.E. 781, a hydroelectric generating plant was held to be “a watermill” within the meaning of the Massachusetts Mill Acts. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688, a different question was presented, and some phrases in the opinion support the plaintiff’s view; but we do not think the Ashwander decision was intended to overrule the Pfost Case on the point under discussion, or ought to be so considered. On a question of this character, involving the construction of agreements relating to real estate, we are probably bound by the opinion of the state court, supra. In any event, we agree with it. We think a water power is "used” where it is applied to a water wheel or some similar apparatus, and that the use which is made of the power of the water wheel is not significant on the question before us.
To summarize: The plaintiff sold a specified amount of water under a specified head to be used on a specified site. There was no attempt to define or restrict the purposes for which the power derived from the water might be used. It may be that when the grants were made both parties envisioned mill buildings erected oh the 'mill-sites, containing machinery suitable for operation by the appurtenant mill power; but the grants were not limited to such a situation. The expression “using a mill power on” a certain site carried no such restriction, nor is any such restriction fairly inferable as necessary for the protection of the plaintiff’s rights. As suggested in- the Pfost Case, supra, many uses of power involve the transformation of energy from one form to another. Where this occurs, power is used. The provision now relied: upon by the plaintiff may well have been inserted in order to prevent the transfer of. mill powers from one site to another by means'- of canals —which might affect the plaintiff’s- security for rentals.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, with costs.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1