What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
The UNITED STATES v. Philip Henry OLECK and David Bedell. Appeal of David BEDELL.
No. 89-3461.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 10, 1989.
Decided Jan. 25, 1990.
David Bedell, Elgin, Fla., pro se.
Paul J. Brysh, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before BECKER, GREENBERG and VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents the same question as that posed in the companion case, United States v. Gozlon-Peretz, 894 F.2d 1402 i.e. whether the district court had authority to impose a term of supervised release for a sentence imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) for an offense committed after October 27, 1986, the date of enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), but before November 1, 1987, the effective date of ADAA section 1004. Appellant David Bedell was convicted under § 841(b)(1)(B) for an offense committed on July 1, 1987. He was sentenced on December 8, 1987, to a term of five years of imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. Bedell argues that neither special parole nor supervised release was available for offenses committed on that date.
Bedell differs from appellant Gozlon-Peretz in that Gozlon-Peretz was convicted under § 841(b)(1)(A), not § 841(b)(1)(B). This difference could be seen as crucial because the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984) (“the Act”), apparently inadvertently, left out both special parole and supervised release for the newly created § 841(b)(1)(A) offenses. Bedell was sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(B), which contained a special parole term. Thus, as the fourth, fifth, and eleventh circuits have done, see United States v. Byrd, 837 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1988), United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 860 (4th Cir.1988), and United States v. Smith, 840 F.2d 886 (11th Cir.1988), we could rule that because special parole was available in § 841(b)(1)(B), and because it is not clear when Congress meant the ADAA amendments to the Act to go into effect, Bedell should be sentenced to a special parole term. However, for the reasons set forth in Gozlon-Peretz, we believe that the correct reading of the ADAA is that supervised release replaced special parole in §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (B) and (C) as of the date of the ADAA’s enactment, October 27, 1986. Therefore, we hold that supervised release was the proper sentence. The government, after a change of position, apparently agrees with that result in this case.
The judgment of sentence will be affirmed.
. Section 1002 of the ADAA replaced old §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (B) and (C) with new provisions that included supervised release terms, not special parole terms. 100 Stat. 3207-2 to 3207-4 (1986). Section 1004(a) of the ADAA substituted "supervised release” for all remaining "special parole” offenses. Section 1004(b) explicitly linked section 1004's effective date to the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act, November 1, 1987. See 100 Stat. at 3207-6.
. Appellant contends that he should be treated as having violated § 841(b)(1)(A) because he was charged with distribution of over 500 grams of cocaine. Section 841(b)(1)(A) carries a higher penalty. However, we can decide the case only on the basis of the charge in the indictment. Bedell can hardly complain that he was charged with an offense that carries a lesser penalty.
. The § 841(b)(1)(B) under which Bedell was sentenced was the exact same provision as the “old” (pre-Act) § 841(b)(1)(A). The Act redesig-nated old §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) as new §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and (C), respectively. 98 Stat. at 2068.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1