What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ANDERSON et al. v. W. L. OAKES MFG. CO.
No. 4435.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
June 23, 1952.
D. C. Johnston, Oklahoma City, Okl. (W. A. Daugherty, Tulsa, Okl., and D. I. Johnston, Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellants.
Paul L. Washington, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and BRATTON and HUXMAN, Circuit Judges.
HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.
While other parties were involved in this action in the trial court, the controversy presented by this appeal is between G. Fred Anderson, Harry M. House, and Patterson Steel Company, a corporation, doing business together as Industrial Construction Company, herein referred to as Industrial, and W. L. Oakes Manufacturing Company, herein referred to as Oakes. So far as material to the issues, the facts may be briefly summarized as follows: Industrial obtained a contract for the construction of a housing project in Norman, Oklahoma, consisting of 244 identical apartment units. Under contract with Industrial, Oakes agreed to furnish listed items consisting of fabricated closets, shelving, door jambs, and buffets for installation in each of the units for a consideration of $39,535.52. Oakes furnished all the material called for by the contract and was paid $34,315.50 on the contract price. Oakes claims that in addition to the material called for in the contract it furnished extra material of a value of $7,-590.96. It also paid sales taxes in the sum of $839.99, which admittedly were Industrial’s obligations. Industrial acknowledged liability for the balance due under the contract and also for the sales taxes, so the only item in dispute is the one for these extras. The questions are whether these items were furnished and, if so, whether Oakes may have the benefit of the Oklahoma Material-man’s Lien Law. 42 O.S.A. § 141 and 42 O.S.A. § 143.
Industrial contends that there is a complete failure of testimony to support the trial court’s finding that the extra material was in fact furnished. With this we cannot agree. The testimony on behalf of Industrial on the one hand and on behalf of Oakes on the other is in irreconcilable conflict. No useful purpose would be served by-detailing all the evidence which leads us to conclude that the trial court’s finding in this respect finds support in the record. Admittedly a great deal of extras or material, in addition to that called for in the contract, were furnished as shown by invoices in the record. Industrial contends that some of the material furnished by Oakes was defective and was returned for reprocessing and that this accounts for the additional invoices. Oakes concedes that some material was returned for reprocessing but testified that no such material was included in the extra invoices. If Oakes’ testimony is to be accepted as it was by the trial court, the reprocessed material does not account for the material represented by these additional invoices. The trial court’s finding with respect to this fact issue finds support in the record and will, therefore, not be disturbed on appeal.
The further contention is made that under the Oklahoma Lien Law it is necessary not only to show that the material was furnished but also that it actually was used in the building upon which the lien is asserted, and that Oakes failed to show that the material in question went into the building. De Bolt v. Farmers’ Exchange Bank, 51 Okl. 12, 151 P. 686, is cited to sustain this contention, but an examination of that case does not support this broad statement. There the uncontradicted evidence showed that the material furnished for the purpose of constructing a second story of a bank building, to be used as a lodge room, was diverted in large part by the contractor and was used elsewhere; that there was no evidence to show that any substantial part of the material was in fact used for the construction of the second story. Under these facts the court held that the lien claimant had failed to show that the material was used on the job. The court did recognize •the general principle that the furnishing of the material upon the premises and the construction of the improvement prima facie established that the material was used. The opinion of the court also makes it clear that it is not required that one claiming a lien maintain a checker on the premises to see that every piece of material furnished for the job actually goes into the improvement. Thus the court said: “In order for the plaintiff to foreclose a materialman’s lien, it is incumbent upon him to show that the material furnished went into the building. Rockel on Mechanics’ Liens, § 22. Yet, when it is shown that the material was sold to be used in the building, that it was delivered to the builder upon the premises where the building is to be erected, and that the building was actually erected, and where there is some testimony showing that some of the material was used in the building, then a prima facie case is made out.” Such is the case before us. This material was specifically prefabricated and designed for use in these apartments alone. It was delivered on the job and there is ample evidence that it was used in the building. There is no showing that any of it was delivered to other jobs. In these respects the case differs from De Bolt, supra, upon which appellant relies.
Affirmed.
. 42 O.S.A. § 141. “Any person who shall, under oral or written contract with the owner of any tract or piece of land, perform labor, or furnish material for the erection, alteration or repair of any building, improvement or structure thereon * * * shall have a lien upon the whole of said tract or piece of land, the buildings and appurtenances.”
42 O.S.A. § 143. “Any person who shall furnish any süch material or perform such labor as a sub-contractor, or as an artisan or day-laborer in the employ of the contractor, may obtain a lien upon such land, or improvements, or both, from the same time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as the original contractor, for the amount due him for such material and labor; * *
. The De Bolt case was followed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Guest v. Shamburger, 120 Okl. 164, 251 P. 97; Rich v. State, Okl.Cr., 284 P. 903; and Goff v. Long-Bell Lumber Co., 142 Okl. 194, 286 P. 1.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1