What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
GONDECK v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., et al.
No. 919,
October Term, 1961.
Certiorari denied June 11, 1962.— Rehearing denied October 8, 1962
Rehearing and certiorari granted and case decided October 18, 1965.
Arthur Roth for petitioner.
Leo M. Alpert for respondents.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner’s husband, Frank J. Gondeck, was killed as a result of a jeep accident on San Salvador Island outside a defense base at which he was employed. The accident took place in the evening as Gondeck and four others were returning from a nearby town. The Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, United States Department of Labor, awarded death benefits to petitioner in accordance with the terms of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1958 ed.), as extended by the Defense Base Act, 55 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1651 et seq. (1958 ed.). In support of the award, the Deputy Commissioner found, among other things, that, although Gondeck had completed his day’s work, he was subject to call for emergencies while off duty and was returning from reasonable recreation when the accident occurred. The District Court set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s order, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 299 F. 2d 74. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Gondeck was subject to call, id., at 75, but found no benefit to the employer in Gondeck’s trip, and “no evidence that furnishes a link by which the activity in which Gondeck was engaged was related to his employment.” Id., at 77.
On June 11, 1962, we denied certiorari. 370 U. S. 918. On October 8, 1962, we denied a petition for rehearing. 371 U. S. 856. We are now apprised, however, of “intervening circumstances of substantial . . . effect,” justifying application of the established doctrine that “the interest in finality of litigation must yield where the interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of our rules.” United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98,99. Subsequent to our orders in the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld an award to the survivors of another employee killed in the same accident. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. O’Hearne, 335 F. 2d 70. In upholding the award, the court cited our decision in O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504. In a subsequent case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit itself expressed doubt whether its decision in the present case had been consistent with Brown-Pacific-Maxon. O’Keeffe v. Pan American World Airways, 338 F. 2d 319, 325. The court also noted that, “The Gondeck case stands alone, except for a per curiam opinion.” Id., at 325. This Court reversed that per curiam judgment last Term, O’Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U. S. 359, so that the present case now stands completely alone.
In O’Keeffe we made clear that the determinations of the Deputy Commissioner are subject only to limited judicial review, and we reaffirmed the Brown-Pacific-Maxon holding that the Deputy Commissioner need not find a causal relation between the nature of the victim’s employment and the accident, nor that the victim was engaged in activity of benefit to the employer at the time of his injury or death. No more is required than that the obligations or conditions of employment create the “zone of special danger” out of which the injury or death arose. Since the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the Brown-Pacific-Maxon standard in this case, and since, of those eligible for compensation from the accident, this petitioner stands alone in not receiving it, “the interests of justice would make unfair the strict application of our rules.” United States v. Ohio Power Co., supra, at 99.
We therefore grant the motion for leave to file the petition for rehearing, grant the petition for rehearing, vacate the order denying certiorari, grant the petition for certio-rari, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Clark,
joining in the judgment.
I fully agree with my Brother Harlan “that litigation must at some point come to an end” and “that this decision holds seeds of mischief for the future orderly administration of justice . . . .” But with Cahill v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 351 U. S. 183 (1956), on our books, no other conclusion can be reached.
Up until Cahill I thought that successive petitions for rehearing would not be received by the Court under its Rule 58 (4). This rule took the place of the old “end of Term” rule of Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 415 (1882), abolished by the Congress in 1948, 28 U. S. C. § 452 (1958 ed.). Indeed, I doubted that the Court had the power to grant a successive petition for rehearing under a factual situation, as here, where a petition for certiorari had been denied over three years ago, 370 U. S. 918 (1962); a petition for rehearing had been denied, 371 U. S. 856 (1962); the mandate had issued more than three years before; and where petitioner had, about the same date, cancelled her appeal bond and been discharged of all liability thereunder. In Cahill, however, the Court through the device of a “motion to recall and amend the judgment” permitted a successive petition not only to be received but granted, despite the fact that the judgment thereby reopened had been previously paid. This paved the way for the grant of a successive petition for rehearing in United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U. S. 98 (1957), to make its judgment conform with this Court’s decision that same Term in United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 352 U. S. 306 (1957), a companion case of Ohio Power in the Court of Claims.
The vice, of course, is the granting of successive petitions for rehearing in violation of Rule 58 (4), which was done for the first time in Cahill. It makes no difference that the rejection of finality be to correct alleged errors of our own or those below. Nor does it matter that the errors be corrected in the same Term, as in Cahill, or four Terms later, as here. In each instance the action violates Rule 58 (4) and that is the basis of my position.
I, too, as my Brother Harlan said in Ohio Power, “can think of nothing more unsettling to lawyers and litigants, and more disturbing to their confidence in the evenhand-edness of the Court’s processes, than to be left in . . . uncertainty ... as to when their cases may be considered finally closed in this Court.” At p. Ill (dissenting opinion). However, Cahill opened up this practice. It may be that Ohio Power and the present case are more objectionable on their facts, but they merely condone Cahill’s original vice. Until we can gain the vote of the majority to the contrary we are stuck with the practice. The outlook for this appears dim. We can only hope that this rule of “no finality,” which the Court varnishes with the charms of reason, will be sparingly used, or overruled by Congress, as was the “end of Term” rule. I, therefore, join in the judgment of the Court.
U. S. Supreme Ct. Rule 58 (2).
“Consecutive petitions for rehearings, and petitions for rehearing that are out of time under this rule, will not be received.”
Mr. Justice Black, joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself, dissented.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 30