What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Robert J. ALDERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TANDY CORPORATION, d/b/a Radio Shack, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 82-3019.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 5, 1983.
Eugene S. Zimmer, Anthony B. Askew, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael C. Addison, Tampa, Fla., for defendant-appellee.
Before TJOFLAT and HILL, Circuit Judges, and SIMPSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:
Robert J. Alderman brought suit in the district court against Tandy Corporation for patent infringement and violation of a trade secret agreement. The jury rendered a verdict against Alderman on the trade secret claim but returned an advisory verdict in Alderman’s favor on the infringement claim. The judge disregarded the advisory verdict and entered judgment against Alderman on both claims. Aider-man moved for a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. on the . trade secret count; he appeals from the district judge’s denial of those motions. We find no error in the district judge’s actions. Alderman did not move for a new trial at the district court, and we conclude that, given the procedural posture of this case, we cannot now order a new trial on our own motion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
Robert J. Alderman is a self-trained inventor with an interest in radios and electronics. In the early 1970’s, Alderman became interested in the possibility of applying the principle of controlled carrier circuitry to citizen’s band radios such as “walkie-talkies.” Controlled carrier circuits regulate the intensity of the carrier, or radio signal, transmitted by the radio. Alderman succeeded in developing a circuit that limits the radio’s broadcast of unmodulated carrier during the time when no information is being impressed on the carrier signal. In practical terms, the circuit prolongs the life of the batteries in walkie-talkies by reducing the power used to broadcast unmodulat-ed carrier.
On July 5, 1974, Alderman filed a patent application covering his controlled carrier circuit. The patent office granted his patent on November 15, 1977. During the intervening three years, Alderman contacted several corporations in an effort to market his invention. He received a response from Dr. Frank Roberts, product development manager at Radio Shack (a division of Tandy). Alderman contacted Roberts and subsequently met with him to demonstrate the circuit. Radio Shack was interested in the circuit and eventually developed product samples through a Japanese manufacturer. After obtaining approval of the circuit from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Radio Shack marketed the circuit as a part of its TRC-205 walkie-talkie.
The dispute between Radio Shack and Alderman centers on Radio Shack’s use of the controlled carrier circuit without paying compensation to Alderman. Alderman contends that Radio Shack used the circuit in the TRC-205 without his permission while negotiating as to the amount of compensation it would pay him. Radio Shack contends that Alderman did not and does not deserve compensation because the circuit was not novel or a new invention. Both parties introduced expert testimony at trial in support of their positions, and the jury found for Radio Shack.
I
Alderman contends that the district judge erred by failing to direct a verdict and by failing to enter judgment n.o.v. as to the trade secret claim. (Alderman does not challenge the judgment on the patent' claim.) Under Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc), we must determine whether “substantial evidence” supported Radio Shack’s case such that a reasonable juror could vote against Aider-man. Id. at 374. If so, we must affirm the decision of the district judge to deny Alderman’s motions.
In K & G Oil Tool Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Service, 117 U.S.P.Q. 54 (Tex.1958), the Supreme Court of Texas stated the test for determining the existence of a trade secret:
A trade secret may be a device or process which is patentable; but it need not be that. It may be a device or process which is clearly anticipated in the prior art or one which is merely a mechanical improvement that a good mechanic can make. Novelty and invention are not requisite for a trade secret as they are for patentability.
Id. at 55. Nevertheless, as the court stated in Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir.1971), the secret “must possess at least that modicum of originality which will separate it from everyday knowledge .... ”
Alderman argues that the testimony at trial clearly supports his position that, although the principle of controlled carrier had been known for some time, the improved circuit that he developed constituted a trade secret. He contends that Radio Shack introduced no substantial evidence tending to rebut this position. Radio Shack relies on the testimony of its expert, Nathan Sokul. At trial, Sokul stated that Alderman had simply used the principle of controlled carrier, which was common knowledge, to design a circuit constructed with modern transistors instead of vacuum tubes. He stated unequivocally that the substitution was obvious. This testimony constituted substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that Alderman’s circuit lacked the requisite “modicum of originality.” Though Alderman introduced expert testimony tending to rebut Sokul’s conclusion, we cannot hold that the rebuttal evidence entitled Alderman to a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. Weighing the evidence is the function of the jury, not of this court.
II
Even though we cannot conclude that the district court erred in denying Alderman’s motions for a directed verdict and judgment n.o.v., we find this case troublesome. In its verdict, the jury found that Radio Shack had infringed Alderman’s patent (the advisory portion of the verdict), but the jury also found that the evidence did not support Alderman’s trade secret claim. The degree of novelty required to find a valid patent exceeds the degree of novelty necessary to find a trade secret. Thus, the jury’s verdict is self-contradictory. We believe that the contradiction demonstrates a jury malfunction and afforded Alderman valid grounds to move for a new trial. Alderman did not make such a motion before the district court, however, and he did not request a new trial in his appeal. On our own motion, we requested briefs addressing the propriety of this court is nevertheless granting Alderman a new trial. After considering the problem, we conclude that it would be improper for us to do so.
In his supplemental brief, Alderman cites cases in which appellate courts have granted new trials under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d). In these situations, the appeals courts have determined as a matter of law that the appellant is entitled to judgment n.o.v. See Slaughter v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 417 F.2d 21 (3d Cir.1969); Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp. v. Bean, 146 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.1945). In such a case, it is proper for either a trial court or an appellate court to exercise its discretion and give the appellee another chance instead of ordering judgment to be entered for the appellant. When the trial court cannot conclude that judgment n.o.v. is warranted, however, it is improper for that court sua sponte to order a new trial.' Peterman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. Co., 493 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947, 94 S.Ct. 3072, 41 L.Ed.2d 667 (1974); Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212 (D.C.Cir.1957). We see no reason why this court should sua sponte grant a new trial when it would be improper for the district court to have done so.
In this case, Alderman clearly had an opportunity to move for a new trial, but he chose not to do so. He urges this court to grant judgment n.o.v. on the trade secret claim and order an entry of judgment in his favor of approximately $60,000, the amount of damages found by the jury on the patent claim. Like Aesop’s pup “who dropped his bone to grab one seen in reflection,” In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 542 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc) (Hill, J., dissenting), rev’d, 430 U.S. 723, 97 S.Ct. 1439, 52 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977), Alderman decided to abandon his new trial claim for an unsuccessful claim for judgment n.o.v. He has lost his gamble.
We realize that the decisions in Peterman and Jacobs have been criticized. See 5A Moore’s Federal Practice § 50.12; Jackson v. Wilson Trucking Corp., 243 F.2d 212, 217-22 (D.C.Cir.1957) (Burger, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, we find this situation to be an inappropriate one for us to order a new trial on our own motion. Alderman easily could have joined a motion for a new trial with his motion for judgment n.o.v. He chose not to do so. He cannot complain that some unexpected shift in events has made his decision unpalatable in retrospect. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(d) (appeals court orders judgment n.o.v. for appellant; appellee can request new trial). Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
. This is a diversity case in which Texas law supplies the rules of decision.
. Even if we were to reverse the district court and order judgment n.o.v. for Alderman, we could not “tack” damages in this manner. Damages for patent infringement are measured differently than damages for breach of a trade secret agreement.
. Some of the criticisms of those cases do not apply here because in those cases the district court sua sponte granted a new trial.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1