What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
RANEY et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE GOULD SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.
No. 805.
Argued April 3, 1968.
Decided May 27, 1968.
Jack Greenberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were James M. Nabrit III and Michael Meltsner.
Robert V. Light argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Herschel H. Friday.
Louis F. Claiborne argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Poliak, Lawrence G. Wallace, and Brian K. Landsberg.
Me. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question of the adequacy of a “freedom-of-choice” plan as compliance with Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (Brown II), a question also considered today in No. 695, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, ante, p. 430. The factual setting is very similar to that in Green.
This action was brought in September 1965 in the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Injunctive relief was sought against the continued maintenance by respondent Board of Education of an alleged racially segregated school system. The school district has an area of 80 square miles and a population of some 3,000, of whom 1,800 are Negroes and 1,200 are whites. Persons of both races reside throughout the county; there is no residential segregation. The school system consists of two combination elementary and high schools located about 10 blocks apart in Gould, the district’s only major town. One combination, the Gould Schools, is almost all white and the other, the Field Schools, is all-Negro. In the 1964-1965 school year the schools were totally segregated; 580 Negro children attended the Field Schools and 300 white children attended the Gould Schools. Faculties and staffs were and are segregated. There are no attendance zones, each school complex providing any necessary bus transportation for its respective pupils.
The state-imposed segregated system existed at the time of the decisions in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 349 U. S. 294. Thereafter racial separation was required by School Board policy. As in Green, respondent first took steps in 1965 to abandon that policy to remain eligible for federal financial aid. The Board adopted a “freedom-of-choice” plan embodying the essentials of the plan considered in Green. It was made immediately applicable to all grades. Pupils are required to choose annually between the Gould Schools and the Field Schools and those not exercising a choice are assigned to the school previously attended.
The experience after three years of operation with “freedom of choice” has mirrored that in Green. Not a single white child has sought to enroll in the all-Negro Field Schools, and although some 80 to 85 Negro children were enrolled in the Gould Schools in 1967, over 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-Negro Field Schools.
This litigation resulted from a problem that arose in the operation of the plan in its first year. The number of children applying for enrollment in the fifth, tenth, and eleventh grades at Gould exceeded the number of places available and applications of 28 Negroes for those grades were refused. This action was thereupon filed on behalf of 16 of these children and others similarly situated. Their complaint sought injunctive relief, among other things, against their being required to attend the Field Schools, against the provision by respondent of public school facilities for Negro pupils inferior to those provided for white pupils, and against respondent’s “otherwise operating a racially segregated school system.” While the case was pending in the District Court, respondent made plans to replace the high school building at Field Schools. Petitioners sought unsuccessfully to enjoin construction at that site, contending that the new high school should be built at the Gould site to avoid perpetuation of the segregated system. Thereafter the District Court, in an unreported opinion, denied all relief and dismissed the complaint. In the District Court’s view the fact that respondent had adopted “freedom of choice” without the compulsion of a court order, that the plan was approved by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and that some Negro pupils had enrolled in the Gould Schools “seems to indicate that this plan is more than a pretense or sham to meet the minimum requirements of the law.” In light of this conclusion the District Court held that petitioners were not entitled to the other relief requested, including an injunction against building the new high school at the Field site. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 381 F. 2d 252. We granted certiorari, 389 U. S. 1034, and set the case for argument following No. 740, Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City of Jackson, post, p. 450.
The Court of Appeals suggested that “no issue on the adequacy of the plan adopted by the Board or its implementation was raised in the District Court. Issues not fairly raised in the District Court cannot ordinarily be considered upon appeal.” 381 F. 2d, at 257. Insofar as this refers to the “freedom-of-choice” plan the suggestion is refuted by the record. Not only was the issue embraced by the prayer in petitioners’ complaint for an injunction against respondent “otherwise operating a racially segregated school system” but the adequacy of the plan was tried and argued by the parties and decided by the District Court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals went on to consider the merits, holding, in agreement with the District Court, that “we find no substantial evidence to support a finding that the Board was not proceeding to carry out the plan in good faith.” Ibid. In the circumstances the question of the adequacy of “freedom of choice” is properly before us. On the merits, our decision in Green v. County School Board, supra, establishes that the plan is inadequate to convert to a unitary, nonracial school system. As in Green, “the school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a 'white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.” Id., at 441-442.
The petitioners did not press in the Court of Appeals their appeal from the denial of their prayer to have the new high school facilities constructed at the Gould Schools site rather than at the Field Schools site. Due to the illness of the court reporter there was delay in the filing of the transcript of the proceedings in the District Court and meanwhile the construction at the Field Schools site was substantially completed. Petitioners therefore modified their position and urged in the Court of Appeals that respondent be required to convert the Gould Schools to a completely desegregated high school and the Field site to a completely desegregated primary school. The Court of Appeals rejected the proposition on the ground that it “was not presented to the trial court and no opportunity was afforded the parties to offer evidence on the feasibility of such a plan, nor was the trial court given any opportunity to pass thereon.” 381 F. 2d, at 254. Since there must be a remand, petitioners are not foreclosed from making their proposal an issue in the further proceedings.
Finally, we hold that in the circumstances of this case, the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint was an improper exercise of discretion. Dismissal will ordinarily be inconsistent with the responsibility imposed on the district courts by Brown II. 349 U. S., at 299-301. In light of the complexities inhering in the disestablishment of state-established segregated school systems, Brovm II contemplated that the better course would be to retain jurisdiction until it is clear that disestablishment has been achieved. We agree with the observation of another panel of judges of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in another case that the district courts “should retain jurisdiction in school segregation cases to insure (1) that a constitutionally acceptable plan is adopted, and (2) that it is operated in a constitutionally permissible fashion so that the goal of a desegregated, non-racially operated school system is rapidly and finally achieved.” Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F. 2d 483, 489. See also Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F. 2d 178.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with our opinion in Green v. County School Board, supra.
It is so ordered.
Compare the developing views of the feasibility of “freedom-of-choice” plans expressed by various panels of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F. 2d 14; Clark v. Board of Education, 374 F. 2d 569; Kelley v. Altheimer, 378 F. 2d 483; Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F. 2d 178; and Jackson v. Marvell School District No. 22, 389 F. 2d 740.
The Court of Appeals, while denying petitioners’ request for relief on appeal, did observe that
“there is no showing that the Field facilities with the new construction added could not be converted at a reasonable cost into a completely integrated grade school or into a completely integrated high school when the appropriate time for such course arrives. We note that the building now occupied by the predominantly white Gould grade school had originally been built to house the Gould High School.” 381 F. 2d, at 255.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 116