What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Michael SHANE, Appellant, v. STATE OF IOWA, Lou Brewer, Warden, and Richard Turner, Attorney General, Appellees.
No. 78-1285.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 16, 1978.
Decided Aug. 22, 1978.
W. H. Gilliam, Gottschalk, Patterson & Gilliam, Waterloo, Iowa, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Thomas D. McGrane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Before LAY, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
LAY, Circuit Judge.
Michael Shane, an Iowa state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the federal district court.
Shane was charged with the crime of robbery with aggravation, in violation of Section 711.2 of the Iowa Code. His motion to suppress testimony concerning his pretrial identification and the introduction into evidence of guns seized during a warrant-less search of his motel room was denied by the state court after a hearing. Shane was convicted by a jury, and appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court, raising as the only ground of error admission of the guns into evidence. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the search and seizure of the guns as incident to a valid arrest and affirmed the conviction. State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1977). Shane raised both the search and seizure and the pre-trial identification issues as grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court found federal review of the search and seizure issue precluded under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), and denied the claim that the pre-trial identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive on the merits. We affirm the denial of the petition. We do not, however, reach the identification issue, since we find the petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies as to this claim.
Shane did not present the pre-trial identification issue to the Iowa Supreme Court on his direct appeal. In addition the record makes clear that he has not filed an application for post-conviction relief in the state court. In the absence of clear showing that the Iowa Supreme Court will not entertain Shane’s due process claim if it is fairly presented, we may not disregard as futile the requirement that Shane exhaust state remedies. See Eaton v. Wyrick, 528 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1975); Cage v. Auger, 514 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1975). Cf. Graham v. Hutto, 557 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1977).
We agree with the district court that Shane fully litigated the search and seizure issue at trial and on direct review. Relitigation of that issue in a federal forum is precluded under the doctrine of Stone v. Powell, supra. Contrary to the assertions of Shane’s counsel, federal courts do not have discretionary authority in a habeas corpus proceeding to correct a state court’s erroneous application of Fourth Amendment principles. Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S.Ct. 2930, 53 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1977); Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038, 98 S.Ct. 775, 54 L.Ed.2d 787 (1978); Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1977). When it is clear that a state prisoner has been provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts, he “may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, supra, 428 U.S. at 494, 96 S.Ct. at 3052. We find that Shane had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim and therefore do not reach its merits.
The district court’s judgment of dismissal is affirmed.
. The Iowa Post Conviction Procedure Act prohibits an application for relief based upon a ground not raised on appeal, unless the court finds “sufficient reason” for the failure to raise it or to raise it adequately. Iowa Code § 663A.8 (1975). Although the Iowa Supreme Court has construed the Act strictly in order to prevent its use as a substitute for appeal, Snyder v. State, 262 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 1978), it has found sufficient reason in the past for failure to raise an issue on direct appeal. See, e. g., State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 411 (Iowa 1977); Zacek v. Brewer, 241 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1976). Federal relief will not, of course, be precluded if the Iowa Supreme Court should decide that their review of the identification procedures issue is procedurally barred by Shane’s failure to raise it on direct appeal. Harris v. Brewer, 434 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1970). Such a decision would be relevant, however, to the federal question of whether Shane has deliberately bypassed state procedures. Cain v. State of Missouri, 518 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1975).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0