What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clarence Blount AYERS, Jr., Appellant.
No. 81-5164.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Dec. 9, 1981.
Decided March 10, 1982.
Lee E. Knott, Jr., Washington, D. C. (McMullan & Knott, Herman E. Gaskins, Jr., Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellant.
Michael E. Karam, Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Samuel T. Currin, U. S. Atty., Raleigh, N. C., John F. Murray, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup, Robert E. Lindsay, Tax Div., Dept, of Justice", Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellee.
Before BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
Clarence Blount Ayers, Jr., appeals from a judgment convicting him of evading income taxes for the calendar years 1974 and 1975 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Ayers claims the count pertaining to 1974 was barred by the statute of limitations. He also contends that the evidence introduced on both counts was insufficient to sustain the verdict. We affirm.
Ayers filed his 1974 return on February 24,1975. He was indicted on March 4,1981. Both parties agree that the six year statute of limitations provided by 26 U.S.C. § 6531(2) is applicable. Both agree that the due date of Ayers’s return governs the commencement of the period of limitation, but they disagree over whether the return was required to be filed by March 1 or April 15, 1975. Ayers asserts that as a farmer who did not file a declaration of estimated tax by January 15, 1975, as directed by 26 U.S.C. § 6073(b), he was required by § 6015(f) to file his return no later than March 1, 1975. Consequently, he says, the March 4, 1981, indictment was returned beyond this six year period of limitation. The government contends that Ayers’s return was due April 15, 1975, and that the indictment was timely.
The flaw in Ayers’s argument is in his interpretation of § 6015(f). This section does not govern the date on which a return must be filed. It simply states that a farmer’s return filed by March 1 may also serve as a timely declaration of estimated tax that otherwise should have been filed by January 15. The time for filing a tax return, as distinguished from a declaration of estimated tax, is governed by § 6072(a). This section provides that “returns made on the basis of the calendar year shall be filed on or before the 15th day of April following the close of the calendar year . . .. ”
Section 6531, which imposes the six year limitation, states: “For the purpose of determining the periods of limitation on criminal prosecutions, the rules of section 6513 shall be applicable.” Section 6513(a) provides that “any return filed before the last day prescribed for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day.” For Ayers’s calendar year return the last day was April 15, 1975. See 26 U.S.C. § 6072(a). Accordingly, for the purpose of determining the period of limitations, Ayers’s return is deemed to have been filed on April 15, 1975. See United States v. Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 225, 88 S.Ct. 926, 928, 19 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1968); United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1346 (2d Cir. 1971). Because the indictment returned on March 4, 1981, was within the six year period of limitation, the district court correctly denied Ayers’s motion to dismiss the count pertaining to 1974.
Ayers did not maintain accurate books and records, and he made expenditures without depositing all of his proceeds from farming and fertilizer sales in his bank account. Therefore, the government relied on a method of proof that utilizes both bank deposits and currency expenditures. The record demonstrates that the government complied with the requirements of a bank deposit and currency expenditure theory of prosecution. See United States v. Boulet, 577 F.2d 1165, 1167-72 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 213, 217 (7th Cir. 1975). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as required by Giasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), we conclude that the prosecutor proved all of the elements of the offense of tax evasion. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1010, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965).
AFFIRMED.
26 U.S.C. § 6015(f) provides in part: “If on or before .. . March 1, in the case of [a farmer], of the succeeding taxable year the taxpayer files a return, for the taxable year for which the declaration is required ... such return shall be considered as such declaration ...”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1