What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kevin DIXON a/k/a Kevin E. McElroy a/k/a Mac Attack, Appellant.
No. 89-2706.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 27, 1990.
Decided Dec. 21, 1990.
Lee Lawless, Public Defender, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Steven Holtshouser, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Kevin Dixon of one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I.
Dixon, with co-conspirators, set up a drug distribution operation in St. Louis. Police officers obtained search warrants for rooms 204 and 212 in the hotel from which Dixon and his cohorts conducted their enterprise. Before executing the warrant, the officers observed Dixon leave room 212, walk down an exterior hallway, and enter room 204. As Dixon later left the hotel, the officers stopped him and a co-conspirator and took them directly back to room 212. The officers found underneath the bed in room 204 numerous bags of white powder later identified as cocaine.The officers arrested Dixon in room 204 and searched him incident to his arrest. They recovered cocaine from his coat pocket.
Count II of the indictment charged Dixon and two others with possession of cocaine in excess of 500 grams with the intent to distribute, in reference to the cocaine found underneath the bed in room 204. Count III charged Dixon alone with possession with the intent to distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine, reflecting the drugs found in Dixon’s pocket. Dixon challenges the indictment as multiplicitous.
II.
The term “multiplicity” refers the charging of a single offense in several counts. The vice of this practice is that multiple sentences may result. Likewise, it may suggest to the jury that the defendant committed more than one crime. United States v. Kazenbach, 824 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir.1987). See 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 142, at 469, 475-76 (1982).
The government argues that it charged Dixon separately for the cocaine in his pocket and the cocaine underneath the bed in compliance with our opinion in United States v. Rich, 795 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir.1986). In Rich, police found cocaine in the defendant’s suitcases at the airport and later in his home—at two separate and distinct locations and times, with different intended criminal transactions. Rich is not analogous to the facts of this case, where Dixon possessed separate packages of cocaine of the same purity, in the same hotel room location, at the same time.
We found in United States v. Wright, 704 F.2d 420, 423 (8th Cir.1983), that possession of two distinct quantities of illicit drugs, within the same room but in two different containers, constituted only one offense. We perceive Dixon’s situation to be equivalent to that in Wright. Dixon held one small quantity of cocaine in his pocket of the same purity as the bulk of the drugs. Dixon intended the sample in his pocket not as the object of an independent transaction, but as a specimen of the larger criminal enterprise. We agree with Dixon that his contemporaneous possession of both quantities of cocaine constituted only one offense and that the indictment should therefore have charged only one count of possession.
III.
Dixon challenges the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the search warrant. Dixon argues the affidavit did not adequately report the reliability and veracity of the informant and lacked independent corroboration of the information. We disagree. The affidavit described the informant’s past reliability, demonstrated by information that “led to at least 3 felony narcotics arrests with warrants issued and a large amount of drugs seized.” This was sufficient. See United States v. Skramstad, 649 F.2d 1259, 1262 (8th Cir.1981). Moreover, the officers verified the registration of the conspirators at the hotel in the names the informant furnished and observed movement between the two rooms the informant implicated.
The order denying the motion to suppress evidence and the judgment entered on Count I are affirmed. The judgment entered on Counts II and III is reversed and the case is remanded with directions that the government be required to elect to dismiss either Count II or Count III of the indictment, following which the district court shall resentence Dixon on the remaining counts.
. The Honorable Edward L. Filippine, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0