What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Alan GERNANNT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 28550
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 15, 1970.
Edward J. Witten, Jacksonville, Fla. (Ct.Appted.), for appellant.
John L. Briggs, U. S. Atty., Joseph W. Hatchett, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., for appellee.
Before WISDOM, THORNBERRY, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We have directed the Clerk to place the ease on the Summary Calendar.
The only issue that this case presents for review is whether there was a basis in fact for denying David Alan Gernannt’s request for classification as a conscientious objector. We hold that there was, and affirm the district court.
David Alan Gernannt appeals from his conviction of knowingly and willfully refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces of the United States. 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(a). When ordered to report for induction, Gernannt was classified I-A. He reported to the induction station and submitted to pre-induction processing, but refused to take the symbolic step forward. Thereafter he was indicted, convicted upon a jury trial and sentenced to a five year term of imprisonment.
In the district court and on appeal Gernannt asserted as a defense to the criminal charge against him that his Selective Service file reflected no basis in fact to support the I-A classification, that he was entitled to be classified I-O, a conscientious objector, and that therefore the order of induction was an invalid order.
In Robertson v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 440, 445, rev’g en banc, 1968, 404 F.2d 1141, we stated:
The scope of review in draft cases is very limited, and the range of review is the narrowest known to the law. The courts do not sit as super draft boards, substituting their judgments on the weight of the evidence, nor should they look for substantial evidence to support such determinations. Decisions of local boards are final and the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by local boards is justified, for their decisions made in conformity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no “basis in fact” for the classification which it gave the registrant.
Dickinson v. United States, 1953, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132, clarifies what is meant by a “basis in fact.”
Local boards are not courts of law and are not bound by traditional rules of evidence; they are given great leeway in hearing and considering a variety of material as evidence. If the facts are disputed the board bears the ultimate responsibility for resolving the conflict — the courts will not interfere. Nor will the courts apply a test of “substantial evidence.” However, the courts may properly insist that there be some proof that is incompatible with the registrant’s proof of exemption.
346 U.S. at 396, 74 S.Ct. at 157, 98 L.Ed. at 138.
The “basis in fact” concept was again discussed in the context of determining a registrant’s conscientious objector classification in Witmer v. United States, 1955, 348 U.S. 375, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428. The Court said:
[T]he ultimate question in conscientious objector cases is the sincerity of the registrant in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form. In these cases, objective facts are relevant only insofar as they help in determining the sincerity of the registrant in his claimed belief, purely a subjective question. In conscientious objector cases, therefore, any fact which casts doubt on the veracity of the registrant is relevant. It is “affirmative evidence * * * that a registrant has not painted a complete or accurate picture. * * * [citations omitted].”
348 U.S. at 381-382, 75 S.Ct. at 396, 99 L.Ed. 434. The ultimate question is the registrant’s sincerity. Objective facts are relevant therefore only insofar as they help determine the subjective question of the sincerity of the registrant’s belief. See Riles v. United States, 5 Cir. 1955, 223 F.2d 786.
Gernannt’s selective service file listed four persons who could supply information as to the sincerity of his professed convictions against participation in war. The letters submitted by these people, however, cast doubt on Gernannt’s professed convictions against war, both as a conscientious objector and as a Jehovah’s Witness.
The selective service file also included a completed conscientious objector form which was submitted by Gernannt. With regard to his religious training and belief Gernannt stated that the nature of his belief which formed the basis of his conscientious objector claim, along with his sources of training and public expression, were all based on his regular attendance at meetings and on door-to-door missionary work. There is evidence in the file, however, that tends to refute appellant’s contention that he regularly attended meetings and engaged in door-to-door talks. Moreover, Gernannt’s mother testified on direct examination that her son had not been an active practitioner in the Jehovah’s Witnesses religion for a number of years.
It cannot be said therefore that there was no basis in fact for classifying Gernannt I-A. There is evidence in the record and in Gernannt’s stated beliefs to support an inference of his insincerity in objecting, on religious grounds, to participation in war in any form.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. See Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 5 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 526, Part I; Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 5 Cir. 1969, 409 F.2d 804, Part I, and Fifth Circuit Hule 18.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1