What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
KUCZYNSKI v. UNITED STATES.
No. 8589.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Nov. 3, 1944.
Frank Kuczynski, of Springfield, Mo., pro se.
B. Howard Caughran and Paul A. Pfister, U. S. Atty., both of Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee.
Before EVANS, SPARKS, and MAJOR, Circuit Judges.
EVANS, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves a judgment which denied what appellant calls his “Extraordinary Motion for a Petition for a Writ of Error.”
Appellant is at present detained in the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, at Springfield, Missouri. He had been sentenced, on a plea of guilty, to the charge of possessing and making plates for counterfeiting, to a term of IS years. The sentence was imposed October, 2, 1931. Two years later, on November 1, 1933, he was examined by a Board of Medical Examiners at the Leavenworth Penitentiary, and found to be insane and was transferred to his present place of confinement. He filed petitions for habeas corpus and mandamus in the Federal District Court in Missouri, in February, 1943. The District Court caused an independent investigation to be made of the applicant’s sanity at that time and received a report which affirmed his continued insanity. The denial of the petitions for habeas corpus and mandamus resulted in an appeal by the petitioner to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which rendered a thorough opinion on the same issues which are here raised, particularly the issue wherein appellant claims that he cannot be denied his right to “good time” deductions from the sentence because of the determination of his insanity.
The statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 876, passed May 13, 1930, provides that upon a determination of insanity and removal to a mental institution, the prisoner shall there “be kept until, in the judgment of the superintendent of said hospital, the prisoner shall be restored to sanity or health or until the maximum sentence, without deduction for good time * * * shall have been served.”
Appellant complains that he cannot be deprived of his statutory right to “good time,” and that with good time credit, he would now be free because his sentence has been fully served.
Appellant raises many other points — not being fully advised of his right to counsel, defective sentence, defective prison warrant, and the fact that the District Court refused to permit his petition in these proceedings to be filed in his criminal case and ordered it filed as a civil suit.
The trial court furnished petitioner with counsel in the instant matter, and made findings and conclusions in support of his denial of the petition. He stated: “ * * * the presiding Judge of this court who was - the same Judge as the one who is now presiding in this cause, asked the said Frank Kuczynski whether or not he had an attorney to represent him and upon being informed that he did not have an attorney in court to represent him, the Court thereupon asked the said Frank Kuczynski whether or not he desired the Court to appoint an attorney for him but said Frank Kuczynski said he did not want or need an attorney as he well understood the charges pending against him. * * * Kuczynski * * * at the time of the entry of his plea of guilty to the charges contained in said indictment, understandingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to the advice and assistance of counsel.”
We deem it unnecessary, in view of the opinion of the Eighth Circuit in Kuczynski v. Cox, 141 F.2d 321, and of the decisions in Douglas v. King, 110 F.2d 911, 127 A.L.R. 1200, and Estabrook v. King, 119 F.2d 607, to do more than state we are in accord with the conclusions there reached. In other words, we are of the opinion that the Federal statute in existence at the time of the imposition of sentence, which deprives an insane prisoner of the right to deduction from his sentence for good time, is not invalid as an ex post facto law.
The other contentions of appellant were, in our opinion, correctly disposed of by the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1