What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Charles Quenn BLACKWELL, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 29376
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 7, 1970.
Charles Q. Blackwell, Jr., pro se.
U. S. Atty., Walker P. Johnson, Jr., Macon, Ga., for respondent-appellee.
Before BELL, AINSWORTH and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Quenn Blackwell, Jr. appeals pro se from the denial of his motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S. C. § 2255. The District Court denied Blackwell’s motion without a hearing. We conclude that a hearing was not necessary to the disposition of Blackwell’s claims and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
In 1967, Blackwell was convicted in two separate cases (Nos. 3060 and 3061) in the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. In No. 3060, he was convicted on five counts of an indictment. Count one charged him with conspiring to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and to travel in interstate commerce to carry on the unlawful activity of arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The other four counts charged violations of sections 1341 and 1952. Blackwell was sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. In No. 3061, Blackwell was convicted of violating section 1341. On this conviction he was sentenced to a two-and-one-half-year term of imprisonment, this sentence to run concurrently with the sentences imposed in No. 3060. Both convictions were affirmed on Blackwell’s direct appeal to this Court. Blackwell V. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 405 F. 2d 625.
In his section 2255 motion, Blackwell alleges: (1) that he never entered into a conspiracy; (2) that he never was a party to an agreement to perform the unlawful acts charged; (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (4) that he was placed twice in jeopardy by being tried for three offenses that, in actuality, were but one offense; (5) that he was forced to present evidence incriminating him to the grand jury under compulsion of subpoena; and (6) that an FBI agent testified at trial regarding a coerced oral confession made by Blackwell, in the absence of a prior judicial determination of the voluntariness of that confession.
Blackwell’s first five allegations were raised by him on his direct appeal, were considered by this Court, and were decided adversely to petitioner. Having carefully reviewed the records in this case, we conclude that to permit Blackwell to initiate a collateral attack on grounds already rejected by this Court would merely result in the purposeless duplication of the review process. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not err in refusing to redetermine these five issues. E. g., Hayes v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 23. See also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963); Houston v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 419 F.2d 30, 32.
In his final allegation, Blackwell claims that he was coerced into making an oral confession in that an FBI agent continued to question him after petitioner refused to sign a Miranda warning-and-waiver form. Section 2255 requires the District Court to grant a hearing on a petitioner’s motion “unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” E. g., Aeby v. United States, 5 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 717. Nowhere in the records of either No. 3060 or No. 3061 is mention made of any confession given by Blackwell to an FBI agent. In No. 3060, no FBI agent testified at all. In No. 3061, the only FBI agent who did testify not once referred to Blackwell or any statements made by Blackwell. Petitioner, therefore, has no basis for contending that his constitutional rights were violated by the introduction as evidence of a coerced confession. His motion and the files and records of this case show conclusively that he was not entitled to relief in the District Court. An evidentiary hearing on his motion, therefore, was not required. E. g., Gill v. United States, 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 1353, 1355; Holland v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 213. We have fully considered Blackwell’s other contentions on this appeal and find them to be without merit.
Affirmed.
. We have concluded on the merits that this case is of the character that does not justify oral argument. Therefore, we have directed the Clerk to place the case on the Summary Calendar and to notify the parties of this action in writing. 5 Cir. R. 18.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1