What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph FREEDSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 78-2145
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 12, 1979.
John C. Emerson, Sp. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Richard L. Rosenfield, Flax & Rosenfield, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BROWNING and MERRILL, Circuit Judges, and BURNS , District Judge.
Honorable James M. Bums, District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted of conspiring with an unindicted coconspirator, Jackson, to submit false statements and documents to the Internal Revenue Service as part of a “money-laundering” scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. According to the government’s evidence, Jackson launched the scheme by suggesting to a prison acquaintance that appellant, Jackson’s former tax attorney, could “launder” the profits of crime. Jackson arranged a meeting between Jackson’s prison acquaintance (now an FBI informer), FBI agents posing as organized crime figures, and appellant. Appellant described a scheme in which he and Jackson would receive the tainted money, commingle it with trust accounts appellant claimed to manage, invest the commingled funds in commodities transactions, and return half the illegal monies to the agents’ nominees through sham salaries and commissions which would appear to come from legitimate trading in commodities. Negotiations among appellant, Jackson, and the agents continued over the next five months, and culminated in a meeting in San Francisco at which the agents handed appellant a suitcase containing one million dollars in funds to be “laundered.” After appellant had accepted the money, the agents announced their true identity.
Appellant’s principal defense was that he had no intention to carry out the scheme but intended to expose it to IRS and collect an informer’s reward.
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict because the scheme was so ludicrous and transparently impractical that a reasonable jury would necessarily entertain doubt as to his intent in dealing with the agents. We have examined the record and conclude there was more than adequate evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant meant to implement the “laundering” scheme as best he could.
Appellant complains because the trial court refused to give the standard entrapment instruction. There was no evidence that appellant’s participation in the conspiracy was induced by government agents. Jackson, not anyone associated with the government, involved appellant in the scheme. Jackson might have claimed entrapment; appellant could not. United States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 1972). There was no basis in the evidence for appellant’s suggestion that Jackson was an “unwitting agent” of the FBI who “ensnared” appellant to participate in the scheme. The evidence clearly established that Jackson acted as a principal lawbreaker, and not as an agent of law enforcement, in inducing appellant to conspire.
At oral argument, appellant advanced the additional theory that the jury could have believed appellant intended initially to turn his coconspirators in to the authorities and succumbed to the criminal intent to carry out the conspiracy only after being prodded by the agents and tempted by a half share in the proffered million dollars. There was no evidence before the jury to support this theory. Neither appellant nor any other witness intimated that appellant’s mental state changed as the conspiracy unfolded; to the contrary, appellant consistently maintained he did not intend at any time to consummate the conspiracy, while the government as consistently contended appellant planned to go through with the scheme from the start.
The trial court correctly determined that no genuine entrapment issue was presented for jury resolution. See United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1977).
The jury returned a verdict on the third day of deliberations. The judge who took the verdict ordered a poll. The fourth juror polled responded, weeping, “I voted yes [i. e., guilty] to man but no to God” and that she “wishfed] to say not guilty.” The judge halted the poll and, after a careful charge, sent the jury back for further deliberations.
Appellant contends that “returning the jury for further deliberation was inherently coercive.” The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in directing further deliberations rather than discharging the jury. Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(d). The judge could well have concluded that further deliberation might clarify the undecided jur- or’s state of mind and produce either a clear verdict or clear disagreement.
After an additional hour of deliberation, the jury returned a second guilty verdict. The trial judge agreed to and did poll each juror separately in chambers, but declined appellant’s request to ask in addition “whether there was, in fact, any undue influence” exerted on the weeping juror. The requested inquiry into the jury’s internal deliberations would have been improper. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). To the extent Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1967), survives adoption of Rule 606(b), it is not to the contrary. Unlike the ambiguous verdict in Cook, the final verdict here was not indefinite or qualified on its face; each juror, including the previously undecided juror, told the judge in the privacy of chambers that he agreed with the guilty vote.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0