What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilbert L. DOZIER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 82-3419.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 23, 1983.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 11, 1983.
Boren, Holthaus & Perez, James E. Boren, Baton Rouge, La., Thomas B. Rutter, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant-appellant.
Stanford O. Bardwell, Jr., U.S. Atty., Stan Lemelle, Asst. U.S. Atty., O.E. Jack Roberts, Baton Rouge, La., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before GARZA, RANDALL and GAR-WOOD, Circuit Judges.
GARZA, Circuit Judge:
On January 30, 1980, Gilbert Dozier was charged, in a five count indictment, with violations of the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. On September 23, 1980, a guilty verdict was returned on counts one, two, three and five of the indictment. On count one Dozier was sentenced to five years imprisonment and fined $25,000. On count two he was given five years imprisonment to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed on count one. On count three the court suspended imposition of a sentence of imprisonment and placed Dozier on five years probation “to commence upon his release from prison.” And on count five the court suspended the imposition of a sentence. Execution of the entire sentence was suspended pending appeal, and Dozier remained free on bail.
On April 8,1982, an opinion was rendered by this court affirming Dozier’s conviction. On May 27, 1982, the government filed a motion to revoke the appeal bond and to revoke the probation of the defendant, an arrest warrant was issued and executed, and Dozier was held without bond. On June 4, 1982, the mandate was issued by this court; and on June 5,1982, a stay order was issued by the United States Supreme Court. On June 8, a supplemental and amended motion to revoke probation was filed. On June 9, 1982, the Supreme Court entered an order vacating the June 5 stay. A probation revocation hearing was conducted from June 21 through June 24,1982, and on June 24, 1982, the district court revoked Dozier’s probation. The court imposed a prison term of eight years under count three of the original indictment to be served consecutively to the two other prison terms and specified that the defendant was to serve a minimum of eighteen months on count three before parole eligibility. On count five a suspended ten year term of imprisonment was imposed, and the defendant was placed on probation for a period of five years to commence upon the defendant’s release from prison.
The motion to revoke probation charged Dozier with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342, 1502 and 1503. In brief the facts supporting the charges are as follows: Dozier solicited Huey P. Martin to influence, by any means necessary, members of the petit jury in Dozier’s trial to write and mail letters to the trial court claiming jury misconduct; Martin, in turn, solicited the help of George Davis in accomplishing this task; Davis and Martin reached a financial agreement with Dozier for carrying out this scheme in which Martin and Davis would equally share $50,000 a year for five years; Dozier supplied Martin and Davis with a list of jurors; one of the jurors was subsequently contacted; and the juror wrote the desired letter.
Dozier argues that the district court erred in revoking the sentence of probation given for his conviction on count three of the indictment. He argues that the trial court does not have the power to revoke a defendant’s probation before the defendant has commenced service of the term of probation. We disagree. This court has held on several occasions that a trial court may revoke a term of probation before the defendant begins service of the term of probation. United States v. Cartwright, 696 F.2d 344, 347-349 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Tucker, 524 F.2d 77, 78 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966, 96 S.Ct. 1462, 47 L.Ed.2d 733 (1976); United States v. Ross, 503 F.2d 940, 941 (5th Cir.1974).
Dozier also contends the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the defendant’s request for recusation. The defendant points to four separate incidents which he claims- require recusal. First, Agent Phipps told the trial judge that Dozier had solicited the assistance of Martin to get jurors to write letters stating that there had been jury misconduct. According to Phipps, Judge Polozola advised him that Dozier’s case was still on appeal before the Fifth Circuit and instructed him to preclude contact with the trial jurors. Second, on April 21, 1982, Phipps contacted the trial judge and advised him that a confidential informant (Davis) was under “considerable pressure” and requested the judge’s permission to bring the investigation to a logical conclusion. The judge authorized Agent Phipps to continue the investigation and contact a juror. Third, Rev. Jimison of Baton Rouge had a meeting with the judge in connection with an unrelated matter and also discussed one of the juror’s remarks to him concerning possible jury misconduct. Fourth, the juror eventually solicited contacted the judge to see if it was permissible for her to talk with Agent Phipps. The judge told her she could, but did not have to, talk with Phipps.
The statutory provisions impose a reasonable man standard for determining whether a judge should recuse himself. Parliament Insurance Company v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1982). Applying this standard, we see no impropriety in the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself. Dozier was free on bond when the information complained of was related to the judge, and the information, at least to some extent, was relevant to the district court’s supervision of that bond. Furthermore, and most importantly, we can see no prejudice or bias which the trial judge developed as a result of this information.
Next, Dozier contends that the government engaged in such outrageous conduct that the lower court erred in finding a violation of probation and in revoking probation. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find this contention to be totally without merit.
Finally, Dozier contends that the district court erred in finding he had committed the crimes of conspiracy and attempted burglary. All that is required for the revocation of probation is enough evidence to satisfy the district judge that the conduct of probationer has not met the conditions of probation. United States v. MacKenzie, 601 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018, 100 S.Ct. 673, 62 L.Ed.2d 649 (1980). Since Dozier’s solicitation of Martin to contact jurors serves as an adequate basis for the discretionary action of the district court, it is unnecessary for us to decide this claim of error advanced by the defendant. United States v. Brown, 656 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156, 102 S.Ct. 1029, 71 L.Ed.2d 313 (1982).
Finding no reversible error, the revocation of probation is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. After being contacted by Martin, Davis contacted Agent Phipps of the F.B.I. Agent Phipps in turn contacted the trial judge. From this time forward, Davis kept Agent Phipps informed of Dozier and Martin’s activities. Reciprocally, Phipps kept the district court informed concerning the progress of the investigation.
. At oral arguments a question arose concerning the status of the appeal of this case when the probation revocation hearing was held. The court asked the parties to file supplemental briefs on the question of whether, assuming the mandate of this court had been stayed by the United States Supreme Court, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Dozier’s probation. The record reveals, however, the stay granted by the Supreme Court was vacated before the hearing. Since the district court reacquires jurisdiction of a case when the mandate is issued, United States v. Cook, 592 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 2847, 61 L.Ed.2d 289 (1979), the district court regained jurisdiction when the stay was vacated. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction when the hearing was held.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1