What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DABAH v. SIMMONS.
No. 225, Docket 22638.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued April 14, 1953.
Decided June 11, 1953.
Nathan Tolk, New York City, for appellant.
Milton H. Reuben, New York City, for appellee.
Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from — petition to review — an order of the district court affirming an order of a referee, denying a bank-rapt’s discharge on two grounds: , (1) that he failed to keep proper books and records, and (2) that he swore falsely at the first meeting of his creditors. We shall consider only the first ground. The bankrupt was what is known as a “free lance motion picture editor”: that is, one to whom producers sent moving picture films when first made, for him to cut down, piece together and conform to their requirements. He testified that about ten per cent of his employment was on a “piece-work,” and the rest upon a weekly, basis. The producers always treated him as an employee when on a weekly basis and withheld the federal tax upon what they paid him; not so, upon his “piece-work.” However, when he produced a copy of his federal tax return for 1951, it appeared that only as to about one-fifth of his total receipts had he claimed credit for any tax withheld at the source, and that only two out of thirteen producers had withheld any tax. The referee found that, if he had received more than the “withholding slips” that these producers sent him, he had “failed to keep records touching 80 per cent of his earnings for that year. If he received others and did not produce them, concealment or destruction is the only inference warranted.”
A witness for the objecting creditor contradicted the bankrupt by saying that in the industry, with which he was familiar, such men as the bankrupt were regarded as independent contractors, and did not get. “withholding slips” from the producers; but apparently the referee accepted the bankrupt’s testimony. An opposite conclusion would have convicted the bankrupt of false swearing; but, taking his version, there was certainly a discrepancy between his tax return and the facts. For example, he did not explain why he produced from the same producer one slip for $71.60, as to an item of $400, and no slip for an item of $1585. Nor did he account for the absence of any slips whatever in the case of ten other items aggregating more than $1000. His testimony as a whole was extremely confused and improbable, particularly when he said that he kept his income tax returns and withholding slips in odd cans left about in the laboratory where he worked. Finally, the referee was not satisfied with his explanation of the disappearance of the copies of his federal income- tax returns for 1949 and 1950.
We can see no reason why a .bankrupt, as taxpayer is not as much bound to the U. S. under § 14, sub. c(2) to keep financial'records from which his “financial condition” can be “ascertained” as he is. bound to any other creditor. Simmons was earning a substantial income, on which in one way or another he paid nearly $600' of taxes in 1951; and it was his duty to preserve means by which the tax could be checked. We do not mean that the preservation of his “withholding slips” was an inevitable necessity — arguendo, we may assume that an adequate journal of receipts' and expenses might serve; but it does seem to us that the referee was right in thinking that more was necessary than to leave his affairs so much at loose ends. Since 1938 it has not been necessary to prove any intent to conceal in order to satisfy this specification. We are to remember that “a discharge of a bankrupt from his debts is a privilege or favor that has been granted by Congress upon such terms as it has seen fit to impose”. Even as res integra, we should think it not “justified” to keep so little record on which one’s, income could be checked; and, as we have held, the decision of the referee is controlling unless we are quite sure that it was wrong.
Order affirmed.
FRANK, Circuit Judge, concurring im the result.
. § 32, sub. c(2), Title 11 U.S.C.A.
. Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 4 Cir., 176 F.2d 216, 211.
. Klein v. Morris Plan Industrial Bank, 2 Cir., 132 F.2d 869, 811, 144 A.L.R. 1278.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1