What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL LTD., a Barbados corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Glenn W. TURNER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 82-3036
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
May 31, 1983.
Charles S. Dale, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
Kendell Wherry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Orlando, Fla., Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup, William S. Esta-brook, III, Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Tax Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, FAY and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal arising from consolidated proceedings to foreclose various mortgages and federal tax liens on real property owned by Glenn W. Turner. Properties International Limited (PIL), assignee of one of the mortgages, was sanctioned by the district court for failure to comply with various discovery orders. These sanctions included dismissal of PIL’s complaint seeking foreclosure of its mortgage, declaration that the mortgage was unenforceable, cancellation of PIL’s tax sale certificate on the property, and striking of PIL’s answer to the Government’s supplemental complaint seeking foreclosure of its tax liens on the property. PIL appeals imposition of these sanctions and we affirm.
FACTS
Mr. Turner and his former wife, Alice A. Turner, own two tracts of land. The larger tract is encumbered by a first mortgage originally held by First State Bank of Miami. The smaller tract is not encumbered by a specific mortgage but has numerous tax sale certificates outstanding against it. The entire property is encumbered by a second mortgage held by the JAR/T Trust, an entity which the Government contends is controlled by Mr. Turner. The entire property is also encumbered by federal tax liens of over $1.1 million against Mr. Turner.
PIL, a Barbados corporation, gained an interest by purchasing the note and mortgage held by First State Bank and a tax sale certificate on the smaller tract. PIL sought to substitute itself for First State Bank in these proceedings and the bank sought to dismiss its case. The district court refused to permit this substitution because it had no assurance that PIL would submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, and PIL had not provided information about the persons who controlled the corporation. The Government suspects that PIL is owned or controlled by Mr. Turner or his associates. If true, PIL could not be permitted to enforce the mortgage. PIL later agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the district court, but it did not and has not disclosed whether Mr. Turner or anyone associated with him has an interest in the corporation.
After the court refused to allow this substitution, various depositions, interrogatories, court hearings and orders sought information of the true nature of PIL. PIL failed to supply witnesses at depositions, incompletely answered interrogatories and failed to cooperate with Government discovery or the district court. The Government filed motions for sanctions against PIL and seeking cooperation with discovery. A magistrate held a hearing on the motion to impose sanctions. As a result, the magistrate made a Report and' Recommendation to the district court, recommending that the sanctions be imposed... In its report, the magistrate made the following findings:
1. ) That on April 10, 1981, Properties [PIL] failed to appear for a deposition duly noticed by the United States.
2. ) That Properties has failed to respond to the 6th set of interrogatories served by the United States on April 28, 1981.
3. ) That Properties failed to file objections or seek a protective order in response to the discovery initiatives of the United States.
4. ) That the explanation of Properties; that it was impossible to identify the proper individual to appear for the April 10, 1981 deposition, and that Barbadian law permits directors of a corporation to refuse to disclose financial documents; is insufficient, at this late date, to justify or explain its willful failure to provide or permit discovery.
The district court then held a hearing and adopted the findings of the magistrate. Instead of imposing the requested sanctions, the district court ordered PIL to provide the Government with complete discovery. Again, PIL failed to cooperate. The district court held another hearing on the motions for sanctions and a motion for entry of default judgment. In accordance with the findings made at that hearing, a judgment was entered in the form of a Rule 37(b) judgment and provided for: (1) dismissal with prejudice of PIL’s foreclosure suit; (2) striking of PIL’s answer to the Government’s supplemental complaint in the Government’s foreclosure action; (3) a declaration that PIL’s note and mortgage on the property are unenforceable; (4) the cancellation of PIL’s tax sale certificate on the property; and (5) a declaration that any judicial foreclosure sale of the property be made free and clear of any interest held by PIL.
DISCUSSION
PIL’s first argument is that the sanctions imposed by the district court are unjustifiably harsh. The district court reached its conclusions after four hearings on PIL’s conduct in the case (two before the magistrate and two before the district judge). It is settled law that the imposition of sanctions for failure to provide discovery rests with the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned absent abuse of that discretion. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976); Phillips v. Insurance Co. of North America, 633 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1981); Morton v. Harris, 628 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1980); Marshall v. Segona, 621 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.1980). There is ample evidence to support the sanctions in this case. PIL repeatedly failed to provide witnesses at depositions and hearings, and incompletely replied to interrogatories. The district court’s findings of PIL’s “willful failure” and “flagrant refusal” are well-supported conclusions. Bonaventure v. Butler, 593 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.1979); Factory Air Conditioning Corp. v. Westside Toyota, Inc., 579 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.1978). Certainly, there has been no abuse of discretion. PIL must bear the consequences of their refusal to cooperate.
Second, PIL argues that the Government did not comply with the procedures required by Rule 37(b) Fed.R.Civ.P. and, therefore, they are not entitled to sanctions under that rule. Specifically, PIL contends that the Government never moved for an order to compel discovery. Review of the record reveals that their contention is not correct. The Government did move for an order directing PIL to comply with their discovery requests. Record at 693. Further, Rule 37(b) provides that sanctions may be imposed where a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” There is no requirement that the opposing party move for this order — only that it be issued and disobeyed. Here, on May 6, 1981, the district court ordered PIL “to provide the United States . ..' with complete discovery.” Record at 1007. When PIL failed to comply, the sanctions of Rule 37(b) were properly brought to bear.
PIL’s third argument is totally without merit. They contend that sanctions cannot be imposed because the Government “failed to pursue other sources of information available to it.” The Government clearly has pursued discovery from other parties in the case. Further, discovery may be had from all parties, United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), and is properly sought in this case.
Similarly, PIL’s argument that the note and mortgage are still in the possession of First State Bank and, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction since the bank is no longer a party to this litigation is without merit. PIL asserted that the note and mortgage had been assigned as the basis for their being substituted for the bank in the action in the first place. They may not now complain of court action consistent with their representations.
The action of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1