What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SEABOARD ALLIED MILLING CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNSECURED CREDITORS’ COMMITTEE, ADM Milling Company and Archer Daniels Midland Company, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 82-3607.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 14, 1983.
Landwehr, Hof & Smetherman, Ronald J. Hof, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Charles N. Malone, Baton Rouge, La., Edward M. Heller, New Orleans, La., for Unsecured Creditors’ Committee.
Joseph E. Friend, New Orleans, La., Seago, Patrick & Carmichael, Barry W. Miller, Baton Rouge, La., for ADM Milling Co. and Archer Daniels Midland Co.
Before GEE, GARZA and TATE, Circuit Judges.
GEE, Circuit Judge:
Seaboard Allied Milling Corp. (“Seaboard”) appeals the disallowance of its claims against Wolf Bakery (“Wolf”) by the bankruptcy court which was subsequently affirmed by the district court. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On February 28,1980, Wolf and Seaboard executed a security agreement and statement of assignment which assigned all accounts generated from Wolf’s Baton Rouge plant to Seaboard. The statement of assignment was recorded the next day.' Seaboard delivered flour to Wolf until July 1980, at which time Seaboard was paid in full. In November 1980, Seaboard resumed the sale and delivery of flour to Wolf, again generating a debt. Between that date and February 20, 1981, the date on which Wolf filed its bankruptcy petition, Wolf made no payments on its debt to Seaboard. Wolf owed Seaboard $99,950 when the bankruptcy petition was filed.
Seaboard filed a motion in bankruptcy court for adequate protection or, in the alternative, administrative expenses as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. Ill 1979). The bankruptcy court and the district court found that under Louisiana law appellant had not perfected its security interest in the accounts receivable. They relied on Air Compressors, Inc. v. Big Chief Constr. Co., 367 So.2d 413 (La.App.1978), cert. denied, 369 So.2d 465 (La.1979), which held that an assignment made prior to the recordation of the statement of assignment was not effective under the then existing statute.
After the district court rendered its decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued an opinion which reversed Air Compressors, Inc. In Agrico Chemical Co. v. E.K. Painting, Inc., 432 So.2d 253 (La.1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that:
the overall statutory scheme indicates that a valid assignment can be made before or after the statement of assignment is recorded. The contrary holding in Air Compressor (sic) v. Big Chief Const. Co. ... is expressly overruled.
Id. at 255.
Because of its reliance on Air Compressors, Inc. the district court did not reach the issues of adequate protection, 11 U.S.C. § 363 (Supp. Ill 1979), administrative expenses, 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. Ill 1979), or the state requirement of written evidence of the assignment, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 9:3105 (West Supp.1982). Consequently, we reverse the district court’s decision and remand for consideration of the above issues.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1