What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Terry Lynn DUFF; Rose Ella Weese, mother and next friend of Dennis Wayne Weese, a minor; Rose Ella Weese, an individual; and Duane Henry Weese, Costello Means, father and next of kin of Merle C. Means, deceased; and Max McCall, guardian of the estate of Jimmy Shideler, a minor, Appellants, v. ALLIANCE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
No. 6723.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 7, 1961.
Howard K. Berry, Sr., Oklahoma City, Okl. (Collins, Moore & Sellers, Sapulpa, Old., Green & Feldman, Tulsa, Okl., Jack B. Sellers, Drumright, Okl., Charles A. Shadid, Oklahoma City, Okl., Wallace & Wallace, Sapulpa, Okl, Berry & Berry, Oklahoma City, Okl., were with him on the brief), for appellants.
Dan A. Eogers, Tulsa, Okl. (Philip N. Landa, Tulsa, Okl., was with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before MUEEAH, Chief Judge, and LEWIS and BEEITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
This is an action brought by the Alliance Mutual Casualty Company under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, to determine that company’s rights and duties under a policy of automobile insurance issued to one Marvin O’Kelley as the name insured. The determinative question is whether Terry Lynn Duff, driver of the insured vehicle at the time of an accident giving rise to claims' of liability brought by the other appellants, was driving the insured car with the implied permission of the named insured, Marvin O’Kelléy. The trial court held that Duff’s use of the vehicle was without the permission of the named insured and that the company had no con■tractual obligation to defend the actions pending against Duff. This appeal chailenges such finding and our review is limited to a determination of whether the record indicates the finding to be clearly erroneous. Rule 52, F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A.
The subject policy designates as insureds under the contract:
• (1) The named insured and any resident of the same household,
(2) Any other person using such automobile, provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of the named insured
The insured vehicle was a 1955 Pontiac and was one of two automobiles available for family use in the 0 Kelley household. On February 21, 1960, the Pontiac was driven to work by Pete 0 Kelley, ^ a son of the named insured, It is undisputed that Peie had authority to take the car as need required and that his use was permissive upon the particular occasion. While at work, Pete loaned the vehicle to Duff who, as indicated, was involved in an accident. The parties agree that Duff had the actual and unqualified permission of the son Pete to drive the car but did not have the actual permission of the named insured, Marvin O’Kelley. Appellants contend that the intimate relationship between the O’Kelley and Duff families, viewed in the light of the Oklahoma Safety Responsibility Act, 47 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 501-542, makes a finding of implied consent mandatory under the evidence and requires a reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
For at least five or six years prior to the subject incident Duff and Pete O’Kelley had been intimate friends, neighbors and schoolmates. They had, to a great degree, enjoyed the free run of each other’s homes and had shared the many associations of teen-age boys. After obtaining their drivers’ licenses at age 16 they were each allowed use of their respective family cars and each boy had allowed the other to drive upon frequent occasions. The close friendship continued through the years as evidenced by the fact that Pete O’Kelley was best man at Duff’s wedding.
On February 21, 1960, Duff was home from a college that he was attending at Stillwater, Oklahoma. On that afternoon he visited at work with Pete O’Kelley and told Pete that his ride back to Stillwater had disappointed him and asked to borrow ® -^edey car hunt up another ride- Pete twice loaned him the car for that purpose. During the second period that Duff was in possession of the car he was involved in the accident premising the controversy,
The testimony of Marvin O’Kelley, owner of the car and named insured, forms the basis for the- trial court>s. finding. Mr. O’Kelley had never discussed with his son Pete the matter of allowing others to drive his car. He had no knowledge of any instance when Pete had loaned the car and did not know that Duff had been given possession of the car upon the day of the accident. He wag we¡¡ aware 0f the fact that his son and were close friends of several years’ standing,
Such testimony is ample evi- ’ dence to support the judgment. The intimate friendship of the O’Kelley and Duff families does not, as a matter of law, carry with it the implied permission to borrow the family car absent knowledge ‘ of the existence of such a practice. And, since the particular purpose for which Duff borrowed the car and the actual use made of the car were not to serve any - purpose, benefit, -or advantage to either Mr. O’Kelley or his son, the case falls squarely within the rule set forth in Samuels et al. v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 10 Cir., 150 F.2d 221, 223, 160 A.L.R. 1191:
“It has generally been held that where A, the owner of an automobile, gives general permission to B to use the automobile and B gives permission to C to use the automobile solely for C’s purpose, benefit, or advantage, and the automobile is involved in an accident while being so used by C, such use is not with the permission of the named insured.”
We find no merit in appellants’ contention that the subsequent passage of the Oklahoma Safety Responsibility Act, 47 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 501-542, requires a re-examination of Samuels or a modification of the clear limitation placed upon coverage in the wording of the policy of insurance. The act does of course reflect a public policy to afford financial protection to injured parties by requiring insurance in certain instances from the operators of motor vehicles. But the act does not provide for compulsory insurance from all drivers and the subject policy was not purchased or issued with the compulsion of the act. The policy was voluntarily carried by Mr. O’Kelley. In such case the Oklahoma Supreme Court considering a case of non-coverage, has held, U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty v. Walker (Okl.1958), 329 P.2d 852, 853:
“A policy of automobile liability insurance, voluntarily carried by an operator who has never been required to furnish proof of financial responsibility under provisions of the safety responsibility act, and not certified as such proof, is not ‘required by said law’ and the insurer is not precluded from relying on policy defenses because of the provisions of 47 O.S. 1951, § 521.”
The judgment is affirmed.
. On one specific occasion about three years prior Mr. O’Kelley had specifically .allowed Duff to borrow a pick-up truck. This was the only instance that the witness could recall of such an incident.
. The Act provides, 47 Okl.St.Ann. § 521:
“Requisites of motor vehicle liability policy
“(a) A ‘motor vehicle liability policy’ as said term is used in this Act shall mean an owner’s or an operator’s policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in Section 19 or Section 20 as proof of financial responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise provided in Section 20, by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as insured.
“(b) Such owner’s policy of liability insurance:
I. shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted; and
II. shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or mother vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance * *
Compare the broader provisions of North Carolina which require the policy to:
“Insure as insured the person named, and any person using or responsible for the use of the motor vehicle with the permission, express or implied, of the named insured, or any other person in laioful possession." (Emphasis added.)

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 5