What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. GROMAN.
No. 5779.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Nov. 30, 1936.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 1937.
Robert H. Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and Joseph M. Jones, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Egbert Robertson and James C. Spence, both of Chicago, Ill. (Robertson, Crowe & Spence, of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for respondent.
Before EVANS, Circuit Judge, and LINDLEY and BRIGGLE, District Judges.
EVANS, Circuit Judge.
The Commissioner appeals from a ruling of the Board which held that the stock under consideration, received by respondent, was not taxable to him as gain because received in the course of a reorganization.
The Facts. Respondent was a stockholder in the Metals Refining Company, an Indiana corporation. The Glidden Company is an Ohio corporation. On January 29, 1929, the Glidden Company and all the stockholders of Metals Company entered into an agreement whereby all the stock of the Metals Company was to be transferred to a third company (Metals Refining Co. of Ohio), an Ohio corporation, to be formed by the Glidden Company. The consideration to the stockholders of Metals Company for the trarisfer was '$153,036.66 cash; 5276 shares of 7% prior preferred stock of the Glidden Company at $105 per share; and 5000 shares of 6% cumulative preferred stock of the new company.
Each shareholder of the Indiana corporation, of which respondent was one, received the percentage of this total consideration that his stock holdings bore to the total outstanding stock of said Indiana company. Glidden Company paid cash for the common stock of the new Ohio company. It did not receive any of the preferred stock of this company. The Indiana company was dissolved. Its assets were valued at $1,207,046.66. It is admitted that the cash received by stockholders was taxable and also that respondent’s proportion of the 5000 shares of the preferred stock of the new Ohio Company by him received was not taxable. The issue is limited to respondent’s proportion of 5276 shares of preferred stock of Glidden Company.
Did the Board of Tax Appeals correctly hold that the Glidden Company was a party to a reorganization within the meaning of section 112 (i) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1928?
The pertinent reorganization sections are:
“§ 112. (a) General rule. Upon the sale or exchange of property the entire, amount of the gain or loss determined under section 111, shall be recognized, except as hereinafter provided in this section. * * *
“(b) * * * (3) Stock for stock on reorganization. No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
“(4) Same — Gain of corporation. No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization. * * *
“(5) (c) Gain from exchanges not solely in kind. — (1) If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (b) (1), (2), (3), or (5) of this section if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such paragraph to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property.
“(2) If a distribution made in pursuance of a plan of reorganization is within the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection but has the effect of the distribution of a taxable dividend, then there shall be taxed as a dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) shall be taxed as-a gain from the exchange of property. * * *
“(i) Definition of Reorganization. As used in this section and sections 113 and 115—
“(1) The term ‘reorganization’ means (A) a merger or consolidation (including the .acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the properties of another corporation), or (B) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred, or (C) a recapitalization, or (D) a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected.
“(2) The term ‘a party to a reorganization5 includes a corporation resulting from a reorganization and includes both corporations in the case of an acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the. voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation.
“(j) Definition of control. As used in this section the term ‘control’ means the ownership of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.” (26 U.S.C.A. § 112(a), (b) (3), (4) (c) (1,2) and note (g) (1,2) note, (h) and note.)
The recent decisions of the courts which have passed upon similar questions reject the respondent’s contention that he was within the exemption of the reorganization section. In other words, thq [following cases, while not exactly in point, are persuasive. Bus & Transport Securities Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 391, 56 S.Ct. 277, 80 L.Ed. 292; G. & K. Manufacturing v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 389, 56 S.Ct. 276, 80 L.Ed. 291; Ballwood Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 84 F.(2d) 733.
Determinative of the question before us is the answer to the question, Was Glidden a party to1 reorganization whereby the Indiana Company transferred its stock to the Ohio Company and the latter paid the stockholders of Indiana Company in cash, preferred stock of Ohio Company, and preferred stock of Glidden Company?
We see no reason for extending the meaning of the term “party” as it appears in section 112 (i) (2) (26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (g) (2) note). To hold otherwise would be to usurp legislative functions. Congress has defined a party to a reorganization so as to permit a taxpayer to avoid what would otherwise be taxable income. It could have refused to allow such deductions altogether. Having exempted “gains” through reorganization, it could and did define reorganizations. In so doing it used the term “a party” referring to those who were in the reorganization. We must hold respondent to the definition which Congress specifically gave to the word “party.” It would, we think, be a forced construction to assume that under such circumstances there were parties other than those defined by the statute. Respondent relies upon the exemption of the statute, but declines to abide by the Congressional definition of essential terms.
The conclusion here reached is confirmed if we view the transaction from another approach. Let us assume that we have a taxpayer who owns stock in a corporation which he sells to another corporation. He is paid partly in cash, chiefly in preferred stock of a third corporation, and the balance in preferred stock of a corporation which buys his stock. The price received is in excess of the cost of the stock to him. Is his gain taxable?
There can be no question about the correctness of an affirmative answer save for an alleged exception or exemption from the tax law due to the reorganization provision of the act. The cash received, of course, is not exempt. The taxpayer does not question the tax upon the cash by him received. The Government concedes the soundness of the taxpayer’s claim of exemption so far as the stock of the acquiring corporation is concerned. In the face of this concession this item like the cash item is out of the picture. As to the stock of a third company, even though it be a parent company, there seems no reason for exempting it any more than could be advanced for exempting the cash. Instead of preferred stock of the third company, it might have been bonds of the third or a fourth company, or real estate or physical personal property. The reason for exempting the stock of the purchasing company does not apply.
Our conclusion, however, is based not upon the reasons for Congressional action, but upon the fact that Congress, in exempting gains derived through the transfer of stock which transfers are but a part of reorganizations, saw fit to define with particularity the terms “reorganization” and “parties to reorganization.” As we apply these definitions to the facts before' us, we are impelled to the conclusion that the Glidden preferred stock was not exempted.
The order is reversed, with directions to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0