What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Gregg A. TALLMAN, Appellant, v. Ronald W. REAGAN, Ed Meese, Otis Bowen and Richard Turner, Appellees.
No. 87-1586.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 17, 1986.
Decided May 10, 1988.
Gregg A. Tallman, pro se.
John Beamer, Asst. U.S. Atty., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Before McMILLIAN, FAGG and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Gregg A. Tallman appeals pro se from a final order entered in the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissing his complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Tallman’s action arises out of his application in 1982 for Social Security disability benefits after he was injured in an industrial accident. On August 20, 1986, Tallman filed the instant complaint claiming that Ronald Reagan, Otis Bowen, Ed Meese, Richard Turner, and the United States government deprived Tallman of his constitutional rights and his rights under the Social Security Act. Tallman argued, that at that point, several years had passed since his disability claim was initially filed and he had not yet been awarded benefits, due to appellees’ negligence in handling his application. Tallman alleged that the delay in receiving benefits caused his injury to worsen, and he sought actual and punitive damages in the amount of ten million dollars.
On November 14, 1986, the district court dismissed Tallman’s complaint. Tallman subsequently filed a “motion to amend judgment” (November 18, 1986), a “motion for continuance” (December 8, 1986), and a “motion for judgment” (April 2, 1987). On April 7, 1987, the same district court entered a final judgment in Tallman’s disability case, reversing the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny Tallman disability benefits and ordering the Secretary to pay Tallman benefits past due. On May 7, 1987, the court denied Tallman’s post-judgment motions in the instant action, and this appeal followed.
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “ ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ” Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). As we read Tallman’s pleadings, we understand his complaint as an attempt to state a Bivens-type constitutional tort action against the individual appellees, and an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, against the government.
Tallman’s complaint, however, is deficient in several respects. Only federal officials who actually participate in alleged violations are subject to a Bivens-type suit. Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 268 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 1205, 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983). Tallman did not allege that appellees Reagan, Meese or Bowen actually participated in, nor how appellee Turner may have contributed to, the alleged violations. Tallman’s complaint alleged at the most gross negligence on the part of appellees, which does not implicate the due process clause. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), precludes a FTCA action “to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.” Cf. Marin v. HEW, Health Care Fin. Agency, 769 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir.1985) (FTCA action for damages caused by negligently tardy processing of cost reports barred), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061, 106 S.Ct. 808, 88 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986). Finally, we note that in Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 104 S.Ct. 2249, 81 L.Ed.2d 88 (1984), the Supreme Court held that Congress, in enacting the Social Security Act, had repeatedly rejected the “imposition of mandatory deadlines on agency adjudication of disputed disability claims.” Id. at 119, 104 S.Ct. at 2257.
Although we are sympathetic to Tallman in that it took several years before he was finally awarded benefits, his complaint in the instant action failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. The Honorable William C. Stuart, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
. The record indicates that Assistant United States Attorney Richard Turner represented the Secretary of Health and Human Services in Tallman's action for judicial review of the Secretary’s decision to deny benefits.
. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for damages against federal officials for violation of one’s fourth amendment rights. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), this right was extended to actions arising under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1