What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion.

Opinion:
JOHNSON v. VIRGINIA.
No. 715.
Decided April 29, 1963.
Roland D. Ealey and Herman T. Benn for petitioner.
Reno S. Harp III, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The petitioner, Ford T. Johnson, Jr., was convicted of contempt of the Traffic Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, and appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court, where he was tried without a jury and again convicted. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia refused to grant a writ of error on the ground that the judgment appealed' from was “plainly right,” but the Chief Justice of that court stayed execution of the judgment pending disposition of this petition for certiorari.
The evidence at petitioner’s trial in the Hustings Court is summarized in an approved statement of facts. According to this statement, the. witnesses for the State testified as follows: The-petitioner, a Negro, was seated in. the Traffic Court in a section reserved for whites, and when requested to move- by the bailiff, refused to do so. The judge then summoned the petitioner to the bench and instructed him to be seated in the right-hand section of the courtroom, the section reserved for Negroes. The petitioner moved back in front of the counsel-table and remained standing with his arms folded, stating that he preferred standing and indicating that he would not comply with the judge’s order. Upon refusal to obey the judge’s further direction to be-seated, the petitioner was arrested for contempt.' At no time did he behave in a boisterous or abusive manner, and there was no disorder in the courtroom. The State,, in its Brief in Opposition filed in this Court, concedes that in the section of the Richmond Traffic Court reserved for spectators, seating space “is assigned on the basis of racial designation, the seats on one side of the aisle being for use off Negro citizens and the seats on the other side being for the use of white citizens.”
It is clear from the totality of circumstances, and particularly the fact that the petitioner was peaceably seated in the section reserved for whites before being summoned tó the bench, that the "arrest and conviction rested entirely on the refusal to comply with the segregated seating requirements imposed in this particular courtroom. Such a conviction cannot stand, for it is no longer open to question that .a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities. See, e. g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877; Turner v. Memphis, 369 U. S. 350. State-compelled segregation in a court of justice is a manifest violation of the State’s duty to dény no one the equal protection of its laws.
Reversed and remanded.

Question: What type of decision did the court make?

Choices:
opinion of the court (orally argued)
per curiam (no oral argument)
decrees
equally divided vote
per curiam (orally argued)
judgment of the Court (orally argued)
seriatim

Answer: 1