What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Jessie McDONALD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John DOE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 84-3412
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 20, 1984.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 24, 1985.
Oestreicher, Whalen & Hackett, David Oestreicher, II, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Lee, Martiny, Caracci & Bono, Metairie, La., Lloyd F. Schroeder, II, New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees.
Before RUBIN, RANDALL and TATE, Circuit Judges.
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, confers the right to recover attorney’s fees on a party who prevails in an action to enforce provisions of the federal civil rights laws. This statute does not, however, authorize an award of fees to a party who recovers on a pendent state claim but loses on his civil rights claim. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court denying attorney’s fees to such a plaintiff.
Jessie McDonald sued the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, two of his deputies, and other parties, alleging that he had been falsely arrested for and charged with first degree murder, without probable cause. He alleged both violation of his federal constitutional right to due process of law, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and negligent injury, a state law tort. After trial, the jury responded to interrogatories that the defendants had not violated McDonald’s constitutional rights, but that one defendant had been negligent in violation of state law. The jury fixed the damages due McDonald, reduced by his own contributory negligence. The court thereafter denied McDonald’s claim for attorney’s fees and entered judgment only for the amount of the jury award. The verdict is not appealed and the only issue before us is McDonald’s claim for fees.
In Maher v. Gagne the Supreme Court described the circumstances in which the plaintiff may qualify for a fee award when he succeeds on a non-fee federal statutory claim joined with a fee-generating federal constitutional claim that is not decided. If both claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative fact,” the Court noted, the plaintiff may be considered the prevailing party if the constitutional claim is sufficiently substantial to support the invocation of federal jurisdiction. This approach acknowledges the reluctance of federal courts to decide constitutional questions if a nonconstitutional claim is dispositive. “Congress’ purpose in authorizing a fee award for an unaddressed constitutional claim was to avoid penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are properly reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a non-constitutional claim is dispositive.” “Congress,” the Court said, “did not intend to have that authority [given the courts to award attorney’s fees] extinguished by the fact that the case was settled or resolved on a nonconstitutional ground.” Following the reasoning of Maher v. Gagne, most courts have held that § 1988 authorizes awarding fees to plaintiffs who succeed on pendent state law claims that are related to undecided but substantial constitutional claims.
The Court last term, in Smith v. Robinson, considered again the standards for awarding fees to a plaintiff in whose favor the court decides a non-fee federal claim without ruling on one or more joined federal fee-type claims. While that decision is not directly applicable to the joinder of state-law with federal claims, the considérations involved are relevant. The court affirmed the principle that a prevailing party who asserts substantial but unaddressed federal claims is entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988. However, due regard must be paid also to the relationship between the claims. The claim for which fees are awarded must be “reasonably related to the plaintiff’s ultimate success.” If so, the district court may “assume that the plaintiff has prevailed on his fee-generating claim and ... award fees appropriate to that success.”
A pendent state law claim may be joined with a federal claim only if both arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. The mere fact that the district court permits joinder demonstrates a relationship between the issues. Therefore, were the fee-generating federal claim undecided, the rationale of Maher v. Gagne and Smith v. Robinson would be applicable, and fees would be due to the plaintiff as prevailing party. That reasoning does not apply when the court has no basis to assume that the plaintiff might possibly have succeeded. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 was adopted because the actions in which fees are allowed vindicate rights based on the federal constitution or federal statutes. If it is determined that no constitutional right was violated, the predicate for the award of fees vanishes. There is neither the likelihood nor even the possibility that the court simply avoided a constitutional law decision.
This circuit, in Raley v. Fraser, has recently held that the plaintiff does not, therefore, prevail for fee purposes under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when his constitutional claim is decided adversely to him even though he obtains recovery on a pendent state law claim, joining the other circuits that have considered the question and have unanimously reached the same conclusion. Consequently, we affirm the district court decision and deny McDonald’s claim for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
For these reasons the judgment is AFFIRMED.
. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986, and 2000d; 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
. 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980).
. Id. at 133 n. 15, 100 S.Ct. at 2576 n. 15, 65 L.Ed.2d at 663 n. 15.
. Smith v. Robinson, — U.S. —, —, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3467, 82 L.Ed.2d 746, 762 (1984), (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 7).
. Id. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 3466, 82 L.Ed.2d at 761.
. See, e.g., State of New York v. 11 Cornwell Co., 718 F.2d 22, 25 n. 3 (2d Cir.1983) (en banc); Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied sub nom., Dallas County, Texas v. Williams, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3115, 77 L.Ed.2d 1369 (1983); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1978); Allen v. Housing Authority, 563 F.Supp. 108, 110 (E.D.Pa.1983).
. — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984).
. Id. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 3467, 82 L.Ed.2d at 762.
. Id. at —, 104 S.Ct. at 3467, 82 L.Ed. at 762 (footnote omitted).
. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
. See cases cited supra note 6.
. 747 F.2d 287 at 290-292 (5th Cir.1984).
. See Gagne v. Town of Enfield, 734 F.2d 902, 904 (2d Cir.1984); Russo v. State of New York, 672 F.2d 1014, 1022-23 (2d Cir.1982); Reel v. Arkansas Dep't of Corrections, 672 F.2d 693, 697-99 (8th Cir.1982); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 356-58 (3d Cir.1982); Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090, 1095 (4th Cir.1981); Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir.1980); Huffman v. Hart, 576 F.Supp. 1234, 1235-38 (N.D.Ga.1983); see also Redd v. Lambert, 674 F.2d 1032, 1034-37 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that § 1988 attorney’s fees should not be awarded when the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, bars the plaintiff from obtaining § 1983 relief).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1