What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Basil W. SMITH, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant Cross-Appellee, v. SNAP-ON TOOLS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant.
No. 86-4943.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 11, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1988.
Orma R. Smith, Jr., Smith, Ross & Trapp, Corinth, Miss., for Smith.
L.F. Sams, Jr., W. Scott Collins, Mitchell, McNutt, Bush, LaGrone & Sams, Tupelo, Miss., for Snap-On Tools Corp.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, GEE, and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:
Basil Smith, a resident of Mississippi, made a ratchet by combining parts of two existing tools. Hoping to see his ratchet made available for sale, he brought it to the attention of Snap-On Tools, Inc., a corporation with its principal place of business in Wisconsin, by showing the ratchet to an independent dealer, then submitting a tool suggestion form to corporate headquarters. Snap-On began manufacturing and selling the ratchet without paying any part of the proceeds to Smith. Smith brought a diversity action against Snap-On, claiming that the ratchet was a trade secret, that he submitted the ratchet in confidence to Snap-On, that Snap-On misappropriated the trade secret, and that Snap-On was liable in damages to him for the misappropriation. The district court, applying Wisconsin law, held that Snap-On had misappropriated Smith’s trade secret and awarded Smith damages in the amount of two and one-half percent of Snap-On’s gross sales from the ratchet plus pre-judgment interest. Smith appealed the damage award, seeking to recover Snap-On’s profits rather than a reasonable royalty. Snap-On cross-appealed, contending that the district court erred 1) in holding that the device was a trade secret; 2) in holding that a confidential relationship existed between Smith and Snap-On; 3) in holding that Smith’s claim was not barred by laches or the statute of limitations; 4) in awarding pre-judgment interest; 5) in awarding a reasonable royalty measure of damages for as long as Snap-On manufactured and marketed the tool rather than merely for the period during which Snap-On enjoyed a competitive advantage because it was able to produce the tool before its competitors could duplicate the model they saw on the market. Because the record does not support the finding that there was a confidential relationship between Smith and Snap-On, we reverse.
Wisconsin law prescribes two essential elements in a cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets: an actual trade secret and a breach of confidence. The essence of the tort of trade secret misappropriation is the inequitable use of the secret. Even when a trade secret exists, a person who learns the secret legitimately, without any duty of confidentiality, is free to use it.
Wisconsin therefore follows trade secrets law as set out in § 757 of the Restatement of Torts. Under the Restatement, “[o]ne who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if ... his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him.” As the comment to this provision states, the proprietor of a trade secret may not unilaterally create a confidential relationship without the knowledge or consent of the party to whom he discloses the secret. No particular form of notice is necessary, however; the question is whether the recipient of the information knew or should have known that the disclosure was made in confidence.
Smith concedes that he never explicitly requested that his disclosure to Snap-On be held in confidence. Nonetheless, he argues, Snap-On knew or should have known that the disclosure was confidential. According to Smith, a “special relationship” existed between himself and Snap-On, based on the fact that he, as a relatively unsophisticated individual, submitted his invention to Snap-On, a large corporation. Under the circumstances, Smith contends, the manufacturer should have known that he, as the inventor, expected compensation even if he did not request it.
The district court accepted this argument, and found that Snap-On had clothed its independent dealer, Jackie Clark, to whom the disclosure was actually made, with apparent authority to accept tool submission suggestions from people like Smith. Pointing out the discrepancy in the circumstances of Smith, a mechanic with little education, and Snap-On, a large corporation, the court concluded that a special relationship between Smith and Snap-On existed from the time of the initial disclosure to Clark and that Snap-On knew or should have known that an inventor does not submit his invention to a manufacturer to appropriate without compensating the inventor.
This does not reflect Wisconsin law. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that, when parties are dealing at arm’s length, one party’s disclosure of an alleged trade secret to another does not automatically create a confidential relationship. Although the case in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin announced this holding involved two corporations, we see no reason to believe that it would have applied a different rule if the inventor had been an individual rather than a corporation.
Under certain circumstances, courts have found liability for misappropriation of trade secrets in cases involving implied confidentiality between an inventor and a manufacturer. When a manufacturer has actively solicited disclosure from an inventor, then made use of the disclosed material, the manufacturer may be liable for use or disclosure of the secret in the absence of any expressed understanding as to confidentiality. In this case, however, Smith disclosed the invention on his own initiative, without any prompting from Snap-On. Alternatively, courts have imposed liability when the disclosing inventor did not specifically request confidentiality from the manufacturer, but did make clear that the disclosure was intended as part of a course of negotiations aimed at creating a licensing agreement or entering into a similar business transaction. These cases are also distinguishable because Smith did not indicate that he wanted any pecuniary recompense for his suggestion. In fact, Smith testified that he did not mention compensation to Jackie Clark because he did not believe Clark was authorized to discuss such matters. When Smith sent Snap-On a tool suggestion report describing the ratchet shortly after the initial disclosure to Clark, he did not in any way indicate that he wanted compensation, and indeed wrote on the suggestion form, “I would like to be able to buy a nice new shiney [sic] one from the Snap-On truck.” In none of his dealings with Snap-On over the next two years did Smith ever request confidentiality or indicate that he expected or desired any commercial arrangement based on his submission of the ratchet suggestion to Snap-On.
In February, 1978, more than two years after Smith showed the ratchet to Clark, Smith’s lawyer sent a letter to the supervisor of Snap-On’s Product Management Division in which he asked that Smith receive compensation. Reliance on confidentiality, however, must exist at the time the disclosure is made. An attempt to establish a special relationship long after an initial disclosure comes too late.
Because there was no confidential relationship between Smith and Snap-On, Snap-On violated no obligation to Smith by manufacturing the ratchet. We therefore REVERSE.
. Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 109 Wis.2d 290, 325 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1982); Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp., 33 Wis.2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 529, 533-34 (1967).
. RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis.2d 105, 267 N.W.2d 226, 231 (1978).
. Id.
. Id.; Abbott Laboratories, 33 Wis.2d 445, 147 N.W.2d at 533-35.
. Restatement of Torts § 757(b) (1939).
. Id. comment j.
. RTE, 84 Wis.2d 105, 267 N.W.2d at 232; Restatement of Torts § 757(b) comment j (1939).
. RTE, 84 Wis.2d 105, 267 N.W.2d at 232.
. Id., 267 N.W.2d at 228.
. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 372, 376 (7th Cir.1953).
. Id.; Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir.1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913, 72 S.Ct. 360, 96 L.Ed. 683 (1952); Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co., 80 F.2d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir.1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 673, 56 S.Ct. 938, 80 L.Ed. 1395 (1936).
. RTE, 84 Wis.2d 105, 267 N.W.2d at 233.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0