What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
William SAWYER, Appellant, v. Maurice H. SIGLER, Warden of the Nebraska State Penitentiary et al., Appellees. Carl BECKER, Appellant, v. Maurice H. SIGLER, Warden of the Nebraska State Penitentiary et al., Appellees.
Nos. 71-1047, 71-1048.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
June 29, 1971.
Donald E. Endacott, Lincoln, Neb., filed briefs for appellants.
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Neb., and C. C. Sheldon, Asst. Atty. Gen., filed brief for appellees.
Before MATTHES, Chief Judge, GIBSON, Ciruit Judge, and HENLEY, District Judge.
Chief Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
These two appeals from orders entered by the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska were submitted without argument and have been considered together. We affirm.
Appellants, William Sawyer and Carl Becker, are both inmates of the Nebraska State Penitentiary at Lincoln, Nebraska. In early 1970 they filed separate petitions in the District Court alleging that they, as inmates, were being deprived by State authority and under color of State law of rights protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Jurisdiction was invoked on the basis of 42 U.S.C.A., § 1983, read in connection with 28 U.S.C.A., § 1343(3).
Specifically, appellants complained that they were being denied needed medical attention and treatment. They also complained of a policy enunciated by ap-pellee, Sigler, to the effect that inmates of the Penitentiary would not be awarded either statutory good time or meritorious good time with respect to periods of confinement during which they were not working even though their idleness was due to illness or physical debility or disability.
Appellants were allowed to prosecute their petitions for relief in forma pau-peris, and counsel was appointed to represent them. Their petitions, along with a similar one filed by a third inmate, were consolidated for purposes of hearing. The District Court held a full evi-dentiary hearing, and in connection with its orders filed a memorandum opinion incorporating its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sawyer v. Sigler, D.C.Neb., 320 F.Supp. 690 (1970).
In the case of Sawyer the District Court found that in general his claim of lack of proper medical attention had not been sustained. However, the Court found that requiring him to take needed medication in a particular form which nauseated him amounted to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment as carried forward into the Fourteenth and ordered the Warden to permit Sawyer “to receive and consume in pill or capsule form, such medication as may be prescribed by any physician employed by the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, except where such physician in writing declares that the medication is reasonably effective to accomplish the desired medical purpose of that medication in crushed or liquid form.”
The claim of appellant Becker that he had unconstitutionally been deprived of needed medical attention and services was rejected in its entirety.
On the question of the Warden’s policy with respect to good time, the District Court held unconstitutional that part of the policy which denied statutory good time to convicts who due to illness or disability were unable to work but upheld the policy as it related to meritorious good time.
Appellants appeal from those portions of the orders adverse to them. Appel-lee did not take cross appeals.
Consideration of the opinion of the District Court convinces us that the Court in passing upon the claims of appellants applied correct legal standards, including constitutional standards, and that the findings adverse to appellants have adequate support in the record.
Although perhaps unnecessary for our decision here, we note that the District Court may have approached the outer limits of constitutional requirements in granting to Sawyer the limited relief that was granted to him in connection with the form of his medication. We make this observation because we wish to emphasize our frequently expressed view that the federal courts, whether in habeas corpus or in section 1983 contexts, should not be unduly hospitable forums for the complaints of either State or federal convicts; it is not the function of the courts to run the prisons, or to undertake to supervise the day-to-day treatment and disciplining of individual inmates; much must be left to the discretion and good faith of prison administrators. That is not to say, of course, that the federal courts should not exercise their jurisdiction in proper cases, but the exercise of it should be sparing. See: Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (1971); Wilwording v. Swenson, 8 Cir., 439 F.2d 1331 (1971); Burns v. Swenson, 8 Cir., 430 F.2d 771 (1970); Cates v. Ciccone, 8 Cir., 422 F.2d 926 (1970); Jackson v. Bishop, 8 Cir., 404 F.2d 571 (1968).
Throughout these proceedings appellants have been represented without charge by Mr. Donald E. Endacott of Lincoln under appointment by the District Court. We take this opportunity to thank him for his services.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0