What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "state government (includes territories & commonwealths)", specifically "judicial". Your task is to determine which specific state government agency best describes this litigant.

Opinion:
Ronald E. STEWART, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James A. RHODES, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 80-3662.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued June 17, 1981.
Decided Aug. 12, 1981.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 29, 1981.
Weick, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.
Allen Adler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for defendants-appellants.
Jean P. Kamp, Legal Aid Society of Columbus, Alvin J. McKenna/D. Michael Miller, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and WEICK and KEITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This action was commenced by several inmates at the Columbus Correctional Facility (“CCF”) on behalf of all persons incarcerated at the prison. The inmates charged CCF prison officials with: (1) the unlawful segregation of prisoners by race, and (2) the use of certain types of physical restraints on the inmates. The complainants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the CCF prison officials for the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
On July 13, 1979, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against the further use of physical restraints and the segregation of prisoners by race. CCF then perfected an interlocutory appeal of the injunction to this court.
In December 1979, before this court entered judgment on the appeal of the preliminary injunction, the parties signed a Consent Decree which incorporated the provisions of the July 13, 1979 order. After entry of the Consent Decree, the attorneys representing the plaintiffs moved for an award of attorney’s fees. The district court granted fees in the amount of $117,020.34 for approximately 1850 hours of work. The defendants then appealed the award of the fees to this court.
Both appeals, the appeal of the preliminary injunction and the appeal of the award of attorney’s fees, were consolidated for the purpose of oral argument. This court dismissed as moot the appeal of the preliminary injunction in our order issued from the bench on June 17, 1980.
We now hold that the district court’s award of attorney’s fees did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The defendants appealed the award alleging that the district court: (1) based its order for the payment of attorney’s fees on the expenditure of an unreasonable number of hours; (2) failed to make deductions where a substantial amount of duplication existed; (3) failed to reduce the award of attorney’s fees to reflect the fact that plaintiffs had caused or aggravated many of the conditions underlying their complaint; (4) improperly awarded plaintiffs’ counsel fees for the work of paralegals; (5) failed to order attorney’s fees based on a reasonable rate of compensation; and (6) failed to deduct a percentage of the requested attorney’s fees for failure to keep accurate and contemporaneous records.
This court has thoroughly outlined the criteria for determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney’s fees. Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 2999, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). The district court discussed and correctly applied the standards established in Northcross. The defendants have not raised any issues which were not raised below. The district court held an extensive hearing in which it addressed all of the issues. We find no error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court, Judge Robert M. Duncan, is AFFIRMED.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "state government (includes territories & commonwealths)", specifically "judicial". Which specific state government agency best describes this litigant?

Choices:
Judge (non-local judge; appellate judge)
Prosecutor/district attorney (non-local, e.g., special prosecutor)
Jail/Prison/Probation Official (includes juvenile officials)
Other judicial official
not ascertained

Answer: 2