What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
YOUNG v. MATTHEWS, United States Marshal.
No. 10012.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit
Argued Feb. 9, 1949.
Decided March 7, 1949.
Mr. M. Edward Buckley, Jr., of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. L. Clark Ewing, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. George Morris Fay, United States Attorney, and Oliver O. Dibble and John D. Lane, Assistant United States Attorneys, all of Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, PRETTYMAN, and PROCTOR, Circuit Judges.
EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from an order discharging a writ of habeas corpus.
Jackson Satterwhite was murdered in Asheville, North Carolina, in 1926. Appellant was afterwards arrested in South Carolina on a different charge. North Carolina authorities were notified of his arrest and declined to ask for his return. In 1940 he was arrested in the District of Columbia. Again North Carolina authorities were notified and declined to ask for his return. At various times he returned voluntarily to North Carolina.
In 1948 he was arrested for a misdemean- or in the District of Columbia. North Carolina authorities forwarded an indictment, returned in 1948, charging him with Satterwhite’s murder and demanded his extradition as a fugitive from justice. A hearing was held and a warrant issued.
Appellant then sued out this writ of ha-beas corpus. At the hearing on the writ a cousin of appellant, as well as appellant himself, testified that appellant was not in North Carolina but in Gaffney, South Carolina, at the time of the murder. Appellant’s sister, who was Satterwhite’s wife, gave corroborative testimony. There was no testimony that appellant was in North ■Carolina at the time of the murder. Nevertheless the court found that he was there at that time, and discharged the writ.
We think the court erred. It relied on the rule that “when a person is held in custody as a fugitive from justice under an extradition warrant, in proper form, and showing upon its face all that is required by law to be shown as a prerequisite to its being issued, he should not be discharged from custody unless it is made clearly and satisfactorily to appear that he is not a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States.” McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 112, 28 S.Ct. 58, 62, 52 L.Ed. 121; South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 53 S.Ct. 667, 77 L.Ed. 1292; Ellison v. Splain, 49 App.D.C. 99, 261 F. 247. But one who was not in the demanding state at the time of the crime cannot be a fugitive from justice. Hyatt v. People of State of New York ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 23 S.Ct. 456, 47 L.Ed. 657; Biddinger v. Com’r of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 135, 38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193; Levy v. Splain, 50 App.D.C. 31, 267 F. 333. We think the testimony of appellant and his witnesses, together with the failure of the North Carolina authorities to produce any opposite testimony, clearly and satisfactorily shows that appellant was not in North Carolina when Satterwhite was murdered.
Reversed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0