What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Jane J. SMITH, Executrix of the Estate of Michael J. Smith, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Lawrence B. Mulloy, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-3177.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 11, 1989.
W.F. Maready, Petree, Stockton & Robinson, G. Gray Wilson, Winston-Salem, N.C., for Jane J. Smith.
Gary W. Allen, Torts Branch/Civ. Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., John W. Adler, Adler, Kaplan & Begy, Michael McQillen, Catherine Tinker, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Gary W. Takacs, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., for U.S.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, COX, Circuit Judge and MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
RONEY, Chief Judge:
Navy Commander Michael J. Smith was one of the crew members killed aboard the space shuttle Challenger when it exploded about 74 seconds after its launch on January 28, 1986. In this negligence action, Jane J. Smith, as executrix of her husband’s estate, sued the United States and Lawrence B. Mulloy, the Manager of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's [NASA] Rocket Booster Program at Marshall Space Flight Center, for damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs initially sued, but have now settled with the manufacturer. The district court, relying on Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) and its progeny, granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the claims against the Government and the individual defendant. For the purpose of the motion to dismiss, it was assumed the complaint accurately alleges that the accident was caused by the failure of the aft field joint on the right-hand solid rocket motor. We affirm.
As for plaintiffs claims against the United States, we affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the district court in Smith v. Morton Thiokol, (M.D.Fla.1988), 712 F.Supp. 893 (N.D.Fla.1988). Although plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred in failing to grant her discovery against the United States, since it is clear from the face of the complaint that this action is barred, there was no reversible error in prohibiting plaintiff from discovery against the United States.
In a subsequent order, the district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the claim against defendant Lawrence B. Mulloy, a civilian employee of NASA, a Government agency. Without discussion, the court held that the Feres doctrine bars suit on a state law tort claim against civilian government employees when injury to a person in military service occurs during activity incident to military duty, citing Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972, 102 S.Ct. 2234, 72 L.Ed.2d 845 (1982), and Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044, 100 S.Ct. 732, 62 L.Ed.2d 730 (1980).
Even though Feres addressed the issue of sovereign immunity, courts, relying on the same policy reasons that bar suit against the Government for tort claims arising out of military service, have applied the Feres doctrine to immunize military defendants in their individual capacities. The Supreme Court has relied on Feres to bar claims of constitutional violations raised under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) against individual defendants, both military, and civilian.
The Circuit courts have held that state law claims as well as federal law claims are so barred, both as to military employees, and as to civilian employees. It is of no consequence that plaintiff seeks recovery not only on behalf of Smith’s estate but on behalf of herself and the three minor children. We follow these cases which emphasize the activity in which the plaintiff was involved, an activity “incident to service,” as the controlling factor, not the status of the tortfeasor. Thus, the district court properly held that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against defendant Mulloy.
Subsequent to the district court’s order in this case, Congress passed legislation that provides an additional reason for dismissing plaintiffs claims against Mulloy. On November 18, 1988, Congress passed the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563. The new law, which is retroactive, provides that the exclusive remedy for individuals allegedly harmed by common law torts committed by Government employees acting within the scope of their employment is through an action against the United States under the FTCA. This new legislation apparently would apply to this case, foreclosing plaintiffs suit against Mulloy in his individual capacity.
AFFIRMED.
. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983).
. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987).
. Mattos v. United States, 412 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir.1969) (parents of deceased soldier barred from suing fellow servicemember); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir.1966) (medical malpractice suit against army physician brought under state law barred), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923, 88 S.Ct. 247, 19 L.Ed.2d 274 (1967).
. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (3d Cir.1981) (en banc) (suit barred against Government officials for intentional torts), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972, 102 S.Ct. 2234, 72 L.Ed.2d 845 (1982); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (9th Cir.1979) (negligence action against civilian FAA Air Traffic Controllers prohibited), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044, 100 S.Ct. 732, 62 L.Ed.2d 730 (1980); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1143 (4th Cir.1975) (negligence suit against civilian stable employees of the Marines barred).
.See Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3rd Cir.1976) (army surgeon immune from suit brought by representative of deceased’s estate under both a survival and wrongful death claim), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 1339, 51 L.Ed.2d 600 (1977).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1