What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Felix ARANEDA and Jose Chirino, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 90-2271
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 13, 1990.
Robert G. Turner, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellant Araneda.
David R. Bires, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellant Chirino.
Henry K. Oncken, U.S. Atty., Terry Clark, Asst. U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before REAVLEY, KING and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On Friday, February 2, 1990, six persons, including Felix Araneda and Jose Chirino, had their first appearance before a magistrate regarding charges that they conspired to possess with intent to deliver twenty kilograms of cocaine. The Government moved to detain five of the accused persons, including Araneda and Chirino. The Assistant United States Attorney stated that he had “talked with some of the defense lawyers,” and they had tentatively agreed to have the detention hearing at 2:00 p.m. on Monday, February 5. The court asked two of the accused persons, who are not identified in the record, if they could obtain counsel by that time. They replied affirmatively. The magistrate set the detention hearing for that time.
On February 5, shortly before 11:00 a.m., the magistrate conducted a hearing to appoint counsel for one of the accused persons. The attorney for another of these persons was also present. Araneda and Chirino apparently were not present and were not represented at that hearing. After reminding the magistrate that the detention hearing for all of these accused persons was set for 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, the Assistant United States Attorney stated that he had no objection if the newly-appointed attorneys needed more time to prepare for the detention hearing, but he would “sure like to do them all at the same time since we have six Defendants.... ” The two defense attorneys present requested a re-setting of the detention hearing, but one of them mentioned that he “can’t speak for everyone else.” The magistrate postponed the detention hearing for all five accused persons until Wednesday, February 7. Counsel for Araneda and Chirino advise that a court clerk telephoned their offices and left messages that the court had cancelled the detention hearing set for 2:00 p.m. on February 5 and continued it until 2:00 p.m. on February 7.
At that detention hearing, counsel for Araneda and Chirino stated that they and their clients had been prepared to proceed on the detention hearing as it was originally set for February 5, that they did not move for continuances, and that they now objected to the proceeding on February 7 as outside the time limits set by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The magistrate overruled the objection without explaining the basis of his ruling. After receiving testimony by proffer and otherwise, the magistrate ordered the detention of three of the accused persons, including Araneda and Chirino.
Chirino and Araneda appealed to the district court judge. The district court quoted the pertinent statute, which provides that a detention hearing:
shall be held immediately upon the person’s first appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a continuance. Except for good cause, a continuance on motion of the person may not exceed five days, and a continuance on motion of the attorney for the Government may not exceed three days.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The district court held that section 3142(f) had not been violated. The district court stated that “it was reasonable for [the magistrate] to reschedule” the detention hearing until February 5, that the “continuance from February 5 to February 7 was upon the motion of defendants Ivy and Chamorro, and that the February 7 hearing occurred within five days from the first appearance.” The district court also noted that no one objected to the re-setting of the detention hearing until it began on February 7. Chirino and Arane-da filed timely notices of appeal.
I. TIME LIMITS
This court upholds a district court’s detention order “ ‘if it is supported by the proceedings below,’ a narrow standard of review that [this court] recently equated to the abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 1262, 1263 (5th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir.1985)). Araneda and Chirino do not challenge the delay from February 2 until February 5 because it was within the permissible time for an extension sought by the Government. The record amply supports the district court’s determination that the continuance from February 5 until February 7 was sought by accused persons who have not appealed. The question presented is whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that the continuance from February 5 to February 7 did not violate section 3142(f) as to Araneda and Chirino.
Nothing within section 3142(f) indicates that a continuance sought by one person affects the rights of someone else who is similarly charged. The language of that statute implies the opposite. It states that the detention hearing shall be held immediately upon the person’s first appearance, with some exceptions, including the following: “a continuance on motion of the person may not exceed five days.” Section 3142(f) (emphasis added). By analogy, the Speedy Trial principles also support this construction of section 3142(f). See United States v. Velasquez, 890 F.2d 717, 719 (5th Cir.1989). Accordingly, we conclude that delaying a detention hearing for one accused person who has not moved for a continuance because others, similarly accused, have exercised their right to request a continuance violates the right of the nonmovant under section 3142(f) to a prompt detention hearing.
That is not the end of the matter, however, as respects Araneda and Chirino. Both acknowledge that their counsel were advised by court personnel of the continuance of the detention hearing to December 7. Neither counsel objected or indicated, by motion or otherwise, that Araneda and Chirino wanted to proceed with the hearing scheduled for December 5. Under the circumstances, the magistrate could reasonably conclude that although they had not formally filed a motion for an extension to December 7 (as they were entitled to do under section 3142(f)), they had acquiesced therein. Cf. United States v. Madruga, 810 F.2d 1010, 1014 (11th Cir.1987) (“Unless a defendant objects to the proposed hearing date on the stated ground that the assigned date exceeds the three-day maximum, he is deemed to acquiesce in up to a five-day continuance.”).
II. MERITS
Araneda’s sole argument on the merits is that he rebutted the presumption that he is a flight risk. Chirino does not present an argument on the merits.
Pretrial detention is warranted if the Government shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused person poses a serious flight risk. See Fortna, 769 F.2d at 249, 252. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), a rebuttable presumption arises that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of a charged person if a judicial officer finds probable cause to believe a Controlled Substances Act violation has occurred for which a maximum penalty of ten years or more is prescribed. Araneda does not contest the application of this rebuttable presumption; instead, he argues that he overcame it.
Araneda’s proffered evidence indicates the following: He is married, and his wife lives in Tampa, Florida. He has two children. He owns a home and a business in Tampa. He has worked in the carpet business in the Houston, Texas area for approximately the last five years. He has not shown significant ties in the Southern District of Texas. Although the basis for the district court’s ruling is somewhat unclear, we hold that even if the district court relied upon a determination that Araneda failed to overcome the presumption, he has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in making that determination.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2