What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
TOLMAN et al. v. CLARK COUNTY DRAINAGE DIST. et al.
No. 4835.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Dec. 13, 1932.
John G. Drennan, Robert N. Erskine, Carl B. Nusbaum, J. B. Ilugg, and M. Robert Sturman, all of Chicago, 111., for appellants.
Hugh G. Haight, C. R. Sturdevant, and W. J. Rush, all of Neillsville, Wis., H. M. Perry, of Black River Falls, Wis., and C. E. Buell and Frank W. Lucas, both of Madison, Wis., for appellees.
Before EVANS and SPARKS, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
EVANS, Circuit Judge.
Appellants, residents of Illinois, brought this suit against appellees, residents of Wisconsin, to obtain an accounting and to restrain and compel action protective of their asserted rights. Federal court jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and the amount involved, which exceeds $3,000.
The controverted issues arose out of the establishment of a drainage district comprising 98,000 acres of Wisconsin land located in Jackson and Clark Counties and the'sale of $172,000 of 6% bonds, the proceeds of which were largely used in paying for the nosessary ditch construction work, ete., in said district. Some of these bonds were purchased by appellants. There has been nothing paid on any of them for several years, and over half of those outstanding are in default. The evidence shows the venture to have been an ill-advised one, a speculative promotion reflecting on the judgment and the good faith of those who started it, and that the land, because of its location, is usable only for farm purposes and as such is well-nigh valueless; that the soil is extremely sandy and that its drainage did not materially increase its productivity or make it more valuable for farm purposes. The owners of the land included in the district have not only failed to pay, year after year, the assessments necessary to meet the bonds maturing or the interest charges, but general taxes as well have not been paid for several years. The general taxes which were delinquent at the time of the trial amounted to $124,638.-82, and the delinquent drainage charges or taxes with interest at the same time aggregated $185,856.53. There were outstanding tax certificates at the time of the trial on about ninety per cent of the total acreage. On sixty-six per cent of the total acreage the general taxes had been delinquent for more than five years.
The District Court dismissed the suit because “this court cannot furnish as satisfactory relief to the complainants and other bondholders as is provided by the simple and direct remedy of sale of lands for delinquent assessments under section 89.37 (4) (d) of the Wisconsin Statutes.” It, however, also made findings of fact on all the material issues in appellees’ favor.
In view of the provisions of the Wisconsin drainage district laws (chapter 89, Wisconsin Statutes) as construed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court (In re Dancy Drainage District, 193 Wis. 118, 213 N. W. 885; In re Dancy Drainage District, 199 Wis. 85, 225 N. W. 873; In re Cranberry Creek Drainage District, 201 Wis. 373, 230 N. W. 59; In re Cranberry Creek Drainage District, 202 Wis. 64, 231 N. W. 588), we conclude that appellants’ remedy is in the Wisconsin Circuit Court of Clark County wherein the drainage district proceedings are pending and which court has full jurisdiction over the commissioners and has power to grant all of the relief sought in this suit. That court has exclusive jurisdiction of the cause of action which appellants attempt to set forth in this suit, to-wit: an accounting by the drainage district commissioners to ascertain what moneys have been received, expended, etc.; what bonds have been issued, retired, etc.; what salaries the commissioners have received and the services they have rendered, their reasonableness, etc.; the advisability of directing said commissioners to make further assessments, as well as the propriety of restraining the taxing districts from enforcing the collection of general taxes against land in said district, etc.
A study of the Wisconsin drainage district laws leaves no doubt as to their general purposes, as well as the scheme by which those objects are to be attained. These laws provide for the establishment of a drainage district which includes land to be benefited by drainage and for the just apportionment of cost as well as the economical construction and maintenance of the drainage work in the district. The commissioners, appointed by the court, held positions in many respects similar to those of receivers or administrators who, under the direction of the court, act to promote the interests of all in the district. In order to finance the cost of construction, bonds are, or may be, issued and assessments levied by order of the court to meet the maturing obligations. The bonds, however, are not the personal obligation of the landowner or the commissioners, but the holders thereof may look to the land only for their security.
The whole scheme of chapter 89 of the Wisconsin Statutes (section 89.01 et seq.) contemplated the submission of all questions arising out of the creation and administration of the affairs of a drainage district to the circuit court of the county wherein the proceedings were commenced and wherein part or all of the land is situated. It is true, the statute did not in express language confer exclusive jurisdiction upon such circuit court. Instead of saying then that the said circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over all questions arising out of the creation or maintenance of. said drainage district, it would be better to say that the said court by virtue of said statute drew to itself the exclusive right to dispose of all such questions. 7 Ruling Case Law, p. 1086. It is inconceivable that another court should attempt or be permitted to perform the duties which are clearly imposed upon the court that created the district, appointed the commissioners and authorized the issuance of the bonds. The Circuit Court of'Clark County was the first eourt to assume jurisdiction of the subject matter and the federal district court properly refused to grant the'relief sought, all of which could have been obtained, if the facts warranted it, in the Circuit .Court of Clark County. Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, §§ 34, 35.
The decree is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99