What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON et al.
No. 8724.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
April 27, 1945.
Rehearing Denied May 11, 1945.
See, also, 53 F.Supp. 596.
John A. Nash, Albert I. Kegan, Voyle Clark Johnson, and Walter F. Dodd, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
J. Albert Woll, U. S. Atty., of Chicago, Ill., and Thomas M. Darnall and Tom C. Clark, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before EVANS, KERNER, and MIN-TON, Circuit Judges.
EVANS, Circuit Judge.
Appellants were each fined $1,000 upon conviction of a charge of violating the Federal Denture Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 420f. That Act makes it a criminal offense to send dentures, made from casts or impressions, through the mail or in interstate commerce, into a state which prohibits the taking of impressions by a person not licensed to practice dentistry, and the construction of such dentures by a person other than, or without the authorization or prescription of, a person licensed under the laws of such state to practice dentistry.
The indictment, containing eleven counts, charged defendants with sending such dentures to persons in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Indiana, the dentures having been constructed from impressions made by the recipients from materials furnished by defendants.
A jury trial was waived; a stipulation of essential facts was filed. The defendants’ motion to quash the indictment and demurrer was overruled by the trial court, which was followed by the imposition of fines and this appeal.
The pertinent portions of the Federal statute are set forth in the margin. Also we cite the applicable sections of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Indiana statutes.
The gist of appellants’ contentions is that there can be no violation of a valid statute where their customers make impressions of their own mouths, and appellants receive such impressions through the mail, and then construct the artificial teeth therefrom, and mail them back to the customer.
Secondly, it is argued, if such action be construed to violate the Acts quoted above, then the Acts must be condemned because no statute may constitutionally prevent a person from taking an impression of his own mouth. Thirdly, the statutes are unconstitutional because they unduly restrict the operation of a dental laboratory to making dentures from casts made by licensed dentists. It is argued such a statute is a denial of an individual’s right to do business. Appellants assert that they rely on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
We deem it unnecessary to dwell at length on any of appellants’ contentions. Conceding for the purpose of this appeal that no law which prohibits a person’s making an impression of his own mouth could be constitutional, appellants here went much further. In doing so, they ran directly into statutes which were valid.
We are not as willing as appellants to underestimate — or repudiate or censure— the value of a dentist’s services, nor the necessity for their state licensing to insure a reasonable standard of dental skill and knowledge. The states of Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin (inter alia) have seen fit, in the wisdom of their legislators, to protect their citizenry from the lay public’s practice of dentistry. The Federal Government has cooperated and endeavored to bolster the states’ policy by the passage of the Act prohibiting exportation of dentures to a state which prohibits dentures made by lay folks without expert dental supervision, from being made and sold.
Appellants fail to see, or profess not to see, the necessity for intelligent and skilled construction of artificial teeth. To the open-minded, the wisdom of this kind of legislation seems quite obvious. It falls within the category of legislation for the public health which is a prime, as well as a worthy, purpose of government. That the Federal Government, under its interstate commerce power may aid such state legislation, is not debatable. Such legislation is constitutionally unchallengeable.
The judgment is affirmed.
Federal statute: 18 U.S.C.A. § 420f.
“It shall be unlawful, in the course of the conduct of a business of constructing or supplying dentures from casts or impressions sent through the mails or in interstate commerce, to use the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce for the purpose of sending or bringing into, any State or Territory the laws of which prohibit—
“(1) the taking of impressions or casts of the human mouth or teeth by a person not licensed under the laws of such State or Territory to practice dentistry;
“(2) the construction or supply of dentures by a person other than, or without the authorization or prescription of, a person licensed under the laws of such State or Territory to practice dentistry; or,
“(3) the construction or supply of dentures from impressions or casts made by a person not licensed under the laws of such State or Territory to practice dentistry, any denture constructed from any cast or impression made by any person other than, or without the authorization or prescription of, a person licensed under the laws of the State or Territory into which such denture is sent or brought to practice dentistry.”
Wisconsin Statutes, 1943, Sec. 152.02; Burns Indiana Statutes, 1943, Sec. 63-522; Michigan Public Acts, 1939, No. 122, Sec. 14.629.
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 37 S.Ct. 180, 61 L.Ed. 326, L.R.A.1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845; Whitfield v. State of Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 56 S.Ct. 532, 80 L.Ed. 778; Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699, 37 A.L.R. 1407; Griswold v. President of United States, 5 Cir., 82 F.2d 922; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430; Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 36 S.Ct. 367, 60 L.Ed. 706.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0