What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Kal W. LINES, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of John Muska, Individually and doing business as John Muska Company, Bankrupt, Appellant, v. The BANK OF CALIFORNIA, Appellee.
No. 26296.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Oct. 10, 1972.
Burton I. Meyer (argued), of Glicks-berg, Kushner & Goldberg, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
John C. Till (argued), of Currie, Les-back, Hannig & Ferrari, Redwood City, Cal., for appellee.
Before BROWNING, CARTER and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The bankrupt gave appellee’s predecessor in interest a chattel mortgage on personal property to secure a loan. A financing statement was filed with the Secretary of State pursuant to section 9401(c) of the California Commercial Code to perfect the security interest. The trustee contends that the security interest is invalid because the financing statement did not contain the residence address of the debtor as required by section 9402(1) of the Code.
The referee rejected this contention after an evidentiary hearing, for the following reasons. The financing statement contained all of the other information described in section 9402(1), including the creditor’s name and address, the debtor’s name, mailing address, trade name, and the address of his chief place of business, and a description of the mortgaged property. The mortgaged property was machinery and equipment located at the debtor’s chief place of business, at the address given in the financing statement. If the debtor had sought credit on the basis of ownership of this property, the prospective creditor would want to know whether the particular property was subject to any prior security interest, and the financing statement would have given notice of the bank’s interest. In the circumstances of this case the debtor’s residence address was not important, as it might have been if the mortgaged property had been located at the residence address. The referee suggested that the residence address might also be important where the mailing address was a post office box and the identity and location of the debtor was difficult to ascertain. Here, however, the debtor’s mailing address was the address of his principal place of business, where the property in question was located.
The referee noted that section 9402(5) of the Code provides that:
“A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading.”
The referee concluded that “the omission of the residence address in this statement was not misleading to any degree.”
The district court denied the trustee’s petition for review, holding “that there was ample evidence to support Referee Gillard’s decision that there could have been no misleading by the financing statement.”
Appellant argues that, contrary to a long-established California rule of statutory construction (see Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161, 181 (1864)), the referee and the district court have nullified the express words of section 9402 that provide that when the debtor is an individual the financing statement “shall also set forth . . . the address of his residence.”
It is an equally time-honored rule of California law that statutes are to be construed to effectuate the Legislature’s purpose and that the construction should be of the whole statute. Smith v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47 (1856).
In this instance, “the statutory scheme is designed to provide a system whereby a potential creditor will be able to ascertain whether the potential debtor’s property is burdened with security interests.” In re Thomas, 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir., 1972).
The finding of the referee and the district court that in all the circumstances of this case the omission of the debtor’s residence address could not have been misleading to creditors was not clearly erroneous. The district court was not clearly wrong in concluding that the Supreme Court of California would hold that the financing statement “substantially compl[ied] with the requirements” of section 9402(1) within the meaning of section 9402(5). See Rooney v. Mason, 394 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1968).
Affirmed.
. The referee observed that the California Legislature and Secretary of State gave greater significance to the mailing address than to the residence address. Section 9403(4) of the Code provides that the filing officer shall note in the index of financing statements only “the file number and the mailing address of the debtor (or assignor or seller) given in the statement.” The official forms to be used by a prospective creditor in requesting information as to financing statements from the Secretary of State requires the insertion of the name and mailing address of the debtor, not his residence address.
. The trustee argues that since the official form of financing statement approved by, the Secretary, of State provided that the residence address is to be given “if . . . different than” the mailing address, the absence of a residence address would have misled a prospective creditor into believing that the debtor, John Muska, lived at his stated mailing address, although in fact he did not.
Since the address given as Muska’s mailing address was also that given as the address of Muska’s chief place of business, it is unlikely that a prospective creditor would have been misled in the respect suggested. In any event, to invalidate the financing statement the error must be “seriously misleading,” and it is difficult to see how a prospective creditor could have been prejudiced by the mistaken assumption that Muska resided in his place of business, where the mortgaged property was also located.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1