What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
STANDARD COFFEE CO., Inc., v. TRIPPET et al.
No. 9070.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 20, 1939.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1940.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. ,
Robert G. Payne, of Dallas, Tex., for appellant.
S. A. Crowley, of Fort Worth, Tex., and Jake Tirey, of Waco, Tex., for appellees.
Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
McCORD, Circuit Judge.
On July 28, 1938, Joseph Dennis Trip-pet was killed when the car he was driving collided head-on with a truck owned and operated by Standard Coffee Com-' pany, Incorporated. The accident occurred on a hill on the highway between Lufkin and Nacogdoches, Texas. The upgrade was such that drivers could not see approaching cars until they were within-a short distance of the crest of the hill. The driver of the Standard Coffee Company truck had driven left of the center of the highway in order to pass a car and as he neared the hilltop he met Trip-pet’s vehicle and the collision resulted.
Fay H. Trippet, the mother of the deceased boy, filed suit for damages against the Standard Coffee Company. Commercial Standard Insurance Company was the compensation insurance carrier for the employer of Joseph Trippet and had assumed its full statutory liability on account of his death. For that reason it joined with Mrs. Trippet in the suit against Standard Coffee Company. The case was tried to a jury which found for Mrs. Trippet and assessed damages in the sum of $7,500.
Standard Coffee Company, the appellant, contends that the evidence shows as a matter of law that its truck driver was not acting in the course of his employment at the time, of the accident, and that its motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.
The pertinent facts are these: R. B. McAdams, the driver of the truck, lived in Lufkin, Texas. He was an employee of Standard Coffee Company and was in charge of the company’s Lufkin Branch. He testified that he worked the trade in his territory by going from house to house in the various communities, and that his duties consisted of delivering coffee and other company products to customers and getting new orders for future deliveries. The truck he used belonged to Standard Coffee Company and its name was painted on the truck body. This truck had been placed in McAdams’ exclusive possession by the company.
On Thursday, July 28, 1938, McAdams left Lufkin and went to Nacogdoches to work the trade there. He called on a number of his customers in Nacogdoches that morning and around noon started driving back to Lufkin. It was on this return trip that the accident occurred.
The Standard Coffee Company vigorously contends that McAdams was without authority to return to Lufkin; that he was to spend all day Thursday and Thursday night in Nacogdoches and on Friday go to Timpson, Texas.
McAdams, the driver of the Standard Coffee Company truck, did not testify, but his deposition was introduced in evidence. This deposition included testimony that at the time of the accident he was returning to Lufkin to get his electric razor. The plaintiff thereupon introduced his prior contradictory statement to the effect that he was returning to Lufkin to “pick up some special blend coffee”.
The Texas authorities support the general rule that where a servant turns aside from the master’s business for some purpose wholly disconnected with his employment, or to engage in an affair of his own, 'the master is not liable for his actions. Bresnan v. Republic Supply Co., Tex.Civ.App., 63 S.W.2d 1105; Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Currie et al., 100 Tex. 136, 96 S.W. 1073, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 367; Branch v. International & G. N. Ry. Co., 92 Tex. 288, 47 S.W. 974, 71 Am.St.Rep. 844; Southwest Dairy Products Company, Inc. v. De Frates, et al., 132 Tex. 556, 125 S.W.2d 282, 122 A.L.R. 854.
Here the case is different. When the plaintiff introduced proof that the truck involved in the accident was the property of Standard Coffee Company and that it was being operated by an employee of that company, a presumption was raised that the employee was operating the tru,ck within the line and scope of his employment and in the ordinary discharge of his duties. This is settled Texas law. Globe Laundry v. McLean, Tex.Civ.App., 19 S. W.2d 94; Harper v. Highway Motor Freight Lines, Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 448; Alfano v. International Harvester Co., Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 466; Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Kitts, Tex.Civ.App., 152 S.W. 464.
Such a presumption, however, may be rebutted by evidence which is clear, positive, and unequivocal, and when such evidence is introduced the plaintiff’s prima facie case fails. Hudson v. Ernest Allen Motor Co., Tex.Civ.App., 115 S.W.2d 1167; Alfano v. International Harvester Co., Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 466; Gregg v. De Shong, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 893; Robb v. Bartels, Mo.App., 263 S.W. 1013; Houston News Co. v. Shavers, Tex.Civ. App., 64 S.W.2d 384; Texas News Co. v. Lake, Tex.Civ.App., 58 S.W.2d 1044.
In the case at bar McAdams was the only person who knew the true purpose of the trip to Lufkin. He testified that he was going back after a razor. The day was Thursday and he would return to his home on Saturday and one may conclude that he would not stand in need of the razor to any great extent until he returned home. Moreover, this statement about driving over forty miles for a razor was certainly discredited by the introduction of his prior written statement' "that he was going back to “pick up some special blend coffee”. The jury had the right and may have discredited his testirrfony as being inherently improbable. Cf. American Casualty Co. v. Windham et al., 5 Cir., 107 F.2d 88; American Jurisprudence, Vol. 20, par. 1183.
The rebutting testimony was not so clear, positive, and unequivocal as to warrant, as a matter of law, -the overturning of the presumption arising from the ownership and operation of the automobile. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case we think it clear that the issues raised were properly submitted to the jury, and that the Court rightly refused to give a directed verdict for the defendant or to set aside the jury’s modest verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1