What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BREWER et al. v. NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION.
No. 3644.
Circuit Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 25, 1948.
O. B. Martin, of Oklahoma City, Okla. (Andrew Fraley, of Oklahoma City, Okla., on the brief), for appellants.
Clyde Watts, of Oklahoma City, Okla. (Looney, Watts, Ross, Looney & Smith, of Oklahoma City, Okla., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, HUXMAN, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing appellants’ cause of action on the ground that appellants’ amended complaint and the opening statement of their counsel did not state a cause of action against appellee. The sole question is whether the amended complaint and the opening statement of counsel, if established, were sufficient to show that one Roy C. Davis and Roger W. Davis were employees within the provisions of a Blanket Honesty Insurance Policy issued by appellee defining “employee” or “employees” as those “in the regular service of the insured in the ordinary course of the Insured’s business, and who are compensated by salary, wages, and/or commissions, and whom the Insured has the right to govern and direct at all times in the performance of such service * * * but not to mean brokers, factors, commission merchants, consignees, contractors, or other agents or representatives of the same general character.”
The amended complaint, so far as material, alleged substantially these facts:
That on December 15, 1946, appellants engaged Roy C. Davis and Roger W. Davis as employees to work for them pursuant to an oral contract under which they were to solicit orders for building materials in the State of California, which materials were to be furnished by appellants and were to be transported from Oklahoma City and delivered to customers in California obtained by the employees; that the employees were to make collections on the sale and delivery of the merchandise in California and transmit the collected funds to appellants; that all costs and expenses incident to the sale and delivery of the merchandise were to be deducted and fifty per cent of the net proceeds remaining was to be paid to the employees as their compensation; that it was orally agreed that appellants would govern and direct said employees in the performance of said contract and generally govern, direct and supervise their activities in the sale and delivery of the building materials handled by them under said agreement. The complaint then alleged defalcations which would make appellee liable under the bond if the Davis brothers were employees.
The amended complaint further alleged that the parties operated under the oral contract from December 15, 1946, to December 28, 1946, and that on December 28, 1946, a written contract was executed by the same parties. A copy of the written contract attached to the complaint, while executed December 28, 1946, recites that it was entered into on December 15, 1946. The pertinent provisions of the written contract are set out in footnote one. It thus appears that the written contract covers the identical period of time covered by the alleged oral contract. It also covers the same business transactions and contemplates the same course of business between the same parties as those provided for under the alleged oral contract.
It is competent for the parties to agree that a written contract shall take effect as of a date earlier than that on which it was executed, and when this is done, the parties will be bound by such agreement.
15 O.S.A. § 137, provides that: “The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to he written or not. supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter, which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.”
In Seal Oil Company v. Roberson, 175 Okl. 140, 51 P.2d 801, 80S, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said: “ * * * that under such facts the written contract is the sole depository of the agreement of the parties on all matters which were the objects of their negotiations, and such contract cannot be altered, varied, contradicted, enlarged, narrowed, nor added to by parol testimony * * * ”
See also cases collected under'Note 2 and Note 3, 15 O.S.A. § 137. It follows that we must look to the written contract alone to determine whether the Davis brothers were employees under the provisions of the policy in question. An examination of the appended contract clearly indicates the absence of an employer and employee relationship between the parties thereto.
The trial court correctly concluded that the contract did not establish the relationship of employer and employee. The Davis brothers were not employees of appellants either under the definition of “employees” in the contract or under the principles laid down in the decisions. There is a complete absence of those elements stressed in the decisions as essential to the creation of such a relationship. A casual reading of the contract makes this manifest and we shall not again detail those elements and discuss them at length. It is sufficient to say that the Davis brothers were not employees of appellants. The contract contemplated a business venture, the exact nature of which is not necessary to define, in which the parties combined their mutually beneficial facilities, as they hoped, for a common gain or profit. The facts clearly distinguish this case from that of United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 745, upon which appellants place strong reliance.
Affirmed.
“Whereas: The Company has, (1) valuable connections with various material dealers in this region, and (2) the easb or credit with which to obtain largt quantities of building materials and other saleable merchandise, and (3) the organization to handle, (a) the purchasing of these various materials and merchandise, and (b) accounting for the various phases of the work resulting from the purchasing, handling, selling, delivery, etc., and,
“Whereas: The company agrees to furnish these facilities in fulfillment of this agreement, and,
“Whereas: Mr. Davis has (a) control of or owns transportation consisting of trucks capable of hauling large quantities of merchandise and (b) the organization to operate this transportation and (c) the connections and organization to dispose of merchandise and building materials in various parts of the U. S., and (d) agrees to use these facilities in fulfillment of this agreement, and,
“Whereas: It appears that by combining the facilities and resources of The Company and Mr. Davis, as listed above, and using these facilities and resources to obtain, sell, deliver, and collect for merchandise, a substantial profit may he realized.
“Now, Therefore: The parties agree to combine these facilities and resources and use this combination to obtain, handle, sell, transport, collect for and disburse collections received from the sale of Building materials and/or other kinds of merchandise. It is agreed between the parties that The Company is to obtain the materials and/or merchandise and handle the accounting in connection with the entire transaction; and that Mr. Davis is to receive and load the materials and/or merchandise on his truck and transport same to its destination, collect the money for the cargo and return the money to the Company for distribution.
“All moneys received from the sale of materials and/or merchandise shall be disbursed as follows:
“First. All invoices for the materials making up the load or loads shall be paid.
“Second. That portion thus remaining shall be divided equally between The Company and Mr. Davis. The Company shall pay, from its share, all expenses of accounting and financing in connection with the obtaining, selling, collecting, and disbursement. Mr. Davis shall pay, from his share, all expenses of operation, maintenance, and repairs of his transportation, salaries of truck drivers aud swampers and any other expense incident to delivery, selling and collection * * *
“This agreement covers only that business and transactions resulting from deals made to obtain materials and merchandise in Oklahoma for delivery to other states or vice versa and does not include any of the business conducted by the Paul Brewer Company including construction, sales and engineering and prefabricated buildings in Oklahoma * * * ”
13 C.J. § 132, page 308; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 61, page 410; Wright v. Prudential Ins. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 195, 80 P.2d 752; American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Hecht & Co., 137 Ky. 261, 125 S.W. 697, 129 S.W. 340.
See the following cases: Jones v. Goodson, 10 Cir., 121 F.2d 176, 179; United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 745; United States v. Albert Silk d/b/a Albert Silk Coal Co., 10 Cir., 155 F.2d 356; Texas Company v. Higgins, 2 Cir., 118 F.2d 636; Grace v. Magruder, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 53, 148 F.2d 679; Drumright Gas Engine Co. v. Sherrill, 173 Okl. 147, 46 P.2d 921; and cases cited therein.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1