What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MEDICAL LAUNDRY SERVICE, A DIVISION OF OPLCO, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, BIRMINGHAM; S. Richardson Hill, both as an individual and in his capacity as President of the University of Alabama (“UAB”); Dennis Sanchez, both as an individual and in his official capacity as Assistant Director of the Department of Pharmacy at UAB; Vance Alexander, both as an individual and in his official capacity as Associate Director of the Department of Pharmacy at UAB; Herman Lazarus, both individually and in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Pharmacy at UAB; James E. Moon, both individually and as Administrator of the University of Alabama Hospitals; Bob Cummings, both individually and as Associate Director of Purchasing at UAB; Clark Taylor, both individually and in his official capacity as Associate Administrator for Operations at UAB; Lester Elliot, both individually and in his official capacity as Supervisor of the Linen Service Department at UAB; Martin Novak, both individually and in his official capacity as Assistant Administrator for Operations of UAB; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 86-7852.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
March 23, 1988.
Fred McCallum, Jr., Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Richard Patrick Carmody, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.
Ina B. Leonard, Office of Counsel, Katherine S. Weed, Birmingham, Ala., for Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, et al.
Leura J. Garrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., amicus for the State of Ala.
Before RONEY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The issue to be addressed in this opinion is whether plaintiff has a legally protected property interest, which is a prerequisite to plaintiffs procedural due process claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to establish a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of property, plaintiff must show that its contract with the state constitutes a protected property interest.
Plaintiff Medical Laundry Service held a contract with the University of Alabama in Birmingham for provision of laundry services to University hospitals in Birmingham. The contract was terminated by the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama approximately one month after performance under the contract had begun. Plaintiff brought suit against the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama and hospital officials (hereafter referred to collectively as the “State”) for violation of plaintiffs procedural and substantive due process rights under § 1983. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment on both counts. We find no merit in plaintiffs substantive due process claim and affirm without further discussion the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim.
The scope of plaintiff’s property interest under § 1983 is defined by state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of the State of Alabama provides: “That the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” The State argues that plaintiff cannot enforce its contract, Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 288 Ala. 20, 256 So.2d 281 (1971), and thus plaintiff has no enforceable property interest. Without a property interest, plaintiff’s procedural due process claim would fail. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).
The district court, adopting this argument, entered summary judgment for defendant. We reverse.
Although the Alabama Constitution makes the instant contract unenforceable “in any court of law or equity,” Alabama has established a Board of Adjustment with jurisdiction to hear such claims. Section 41-9-68(a) of the Code of Alabama provides in relevant part:
When claims are ... presented to the board of adjustment ... it is directed to determine the amount of the ... damage arising from contract ... and to award and find the person entitled to payment and the amount, if any, which should be paid....
Section 41-9-69 provides:
The board of adjustment in its findings of facts and its findings and awards as to the amount of payment may also find the agency, commission, board, institution or department of the state of Alabama which inflicted the injury or damage complained of, if it finds there is injury or damage done to persons or property, and may adjudge and find that said damage shall be paid out of the appropriation made to the agency, commission, board, institution or department of the state of Alabama whose employees, servants, agents or instrumentalities inflicted the damages and injuries complained of; provided, that the board of adjustment may order the payment of any claim out of any fund or funds appropriated for the purposes of this division.
Section 41-9-72 provides:
The treasurer of the state of Alabama is authorized and directed to pay the warrants of the comptroller, drawn pursuant to the findings and awards of the board of adjustment out of any money in the treasury of the state of Alabama as directed by such findings and awards.
Although the plaintiff cannot enforce its contract in any court of law or equity, Alabama has provided an administrative procedure to “adjust” plaintiff’s contract claim. The State argues that the remedy afforded by the Board of Adjustment is a mere privilege, a matter of legislative grace. John E. Ballenger Construction Co. v. State Board of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 377, 175 So. 387 (1937). However, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the State’s proposed distinction between a “right” and a privilege. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571, 92 S.Ct. at 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the Court stated: “[T]he court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between ‘rights’ and ‘privileges’ that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process.” In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the Court held:
We have made clear in Roth, supra [408 U.S.] at 571-72 [92 S.Ct. at 2706], that “property” interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, “property” denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by “existing rules or understandings.”
We conclude that the provisions whereby the Board of Adjustment “adjusts” claims is just such a set of rules securing plaintiff’s interest in the instant contract. The fact that the Supreme Court of Alabama has referred to the Board of Adjustment procedures as a mere matter of grace, Ballenger, supra 175 So. at 390, does not alter our conclusion. The language of the Alabama statute directs the Board of Adjustment to determine the amount of damage and directs the treasurer of the state of Alabama to pay pursuant to the awards of the Board. Ala. Code § 41-9-68(a), § 41-9-72 (1975). The State has referred us to no authority suggesting that the Board of Adjustment makes determinations in a completely arbitrary manner, and we see no reason to assume that it does.
With respect to plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed. With respect to plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
. The law is clear that decisions of the Board of Adjustment are not appealable. Moody v. University of Alabama, 405 So.2d 714 (1981). The fact that its decisions are not appealable does not mean that the Board does not conduct its business in a fair and reasoned manner. In fact, it is directed to follow as a guide the rules of negligence and workmen's compensation, when applicable. See Ala.Code § 41-9-68(a).
. Other issues, including res judicata, collateral estoppel and the application of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), were neither addressed by the district court nor briefed on appeal, and therefore should be addressed initially on remand.
With respect to Chief Judge Roney’s dissent, we agree that a breach of contract is not, in and of itself, a constitutional violation. Although contract rights can be property, a breach of contract by a state does not necessarily amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Because we have had no briefing about what process was due to this plaintiff on the termination of the contract or whether Alabama provided due process or denied due process to this plaintiff, we leave it to the district court on remand to consider those questions.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1