What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LEVINE v. AETNA INS. CO.
No. 119.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Dec. 6, 1943.
Feltenstein & Rosenstein, of New York City (Sidney J. Feltenstein, of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Duncan & Mount, of New York City (Frank A. Bull, of New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Before AUGUSTUS N. HAND, CHASE, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The defendant insured Sandy and LaGrou under its marine policy covering protection and indemnity risks on a motorboat on which the plaintiff’s intestate was a passenger for hire at the time of an accident which occurred on Lake Owasco, Cayuga County, New York, and resulted in decedent’s death from drowning. The plaintiff, as administrator, recovered a judgment against Sandy and LaGrou in the sum of $7,735.70, and upon being unable to satisfy it brought this action against the insurance company, which the defendant resisted on the ground that the assured, who owned the motor-boat, were guilty of breaches of the following express warranties contained in the policy:
“Warranted all vessels be equipped with search lights.”
“Warranted in charge of a competent operator at all times when operated.”
“Warranted that the assured has complied with all Federal Regulations pertaining to the carrying of passengers for hire.”
The trial judge submitted to the jury the following two questions as to which it was to render a special verdict:
(1) Do you find from the evidence that the operator of this boat was competent?
(2) Did the fact that the motor-boat was not equipped with a searchlight or spotlight at the time of the accident in any way. contribute to the accident?
The jury answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. Thereupon the defendant’s counsel moved to set aside the verdict and for a direction of a general verdict in its favor. The court set aside the special verdict in answer to the second question because the motor-boat, in violation of the covenant of warranty, was allowed to proceed without a searchlight on the trip during which the accident occurred, and directed a general verdict for the defendant, on which judgment for the latter was entered. We think it clear that the judgment was proper and should be affirmed.
The motor-boat “You’re Right” started on her last voyage without the searchlight, which had been on board on the prior trip. This was because it had been knocked loose and was thereafter disconnected by the pilot and given to one of the owners who placed it in a building on shore. To proceed on the trip without a searchlight was a breach of warranty and in itself discharged the Aetna Insurance Company from liability irrespective of whether any causal relation existed between the absence of the light a-nd the happening of the particular accident. It was no excuse for neglecting to comply with the condition under which liability upon the policy would arise that the owners of the motorboat had originally equipped the vessel with a searchlight. To comply with the condition they should have had the searchlight on board and available at the time when, they undertook the night trip on which the accident occurred.
We should add nothing to the careful opinion of Judge, Abruzzo were it not for the fact that special questions were unnecessarily left to be answered by the jury upon a record in which it conclusively appears that there was a warranty that the vessel • should be equipped with a searchlight and that the assured were guilty of a breach of that warranty. Under the circumstances, it would make no difference whether the failure to comply with the warranty contributed to the accident or not. Compliance with the warranty was a condition precedent to liability and afforded a complete defense irrespective of any question of causation. Gaines v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 188 N.Y. 411, 415, 81 N.E. 169, 11 Ann.Cas. 71; Donley v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 184 N.Y. 107, 113, 76 N.E. 914; Cogswell v. Chubb, 1 App. Div. 93, 96, 36 N.Y.S. 1076, affirmed 157 N.Y. 709, 53 N.E, 1124; Cary v. Home Ins. Co., 199 App.Div. 122, 191 N.Y.S. 529; Henjes v. Ætna Ins. Co., 2 Cir., 132 F.2d 715; 718; Shamrock Towing Co. v. American Ins. Co., 2 Cir., 9 F.2d 57, 60; Snyder v. Home Ins. Co., D.C., 133 F. 848, affirmed 2 Cir., 148 F. 1021.
The provisions of Section 150, Subdivision 2, of the- New York Insurance Law, Consol. Laws, c. 28, that: “No breach of warranty shall avoid an insurance contract or defeat recovery thereunder unless such breach materially increased the risk of loss, damage or injury within the coverage of the contract”, in no way affected the liability of the appellant. The policy upon which this action was brought was a marine policy and for that reason was excepted from the provisions of Section 150, Subdivision 2, by Subsection 3, which reads as follows: “3. Nothing contained in this section shall affect the express or implied warranties under a contract of marine insurance in respect to,, appertaining to or in connection with any and all risks or perils of navigation, transit,, or transportation, including war risks, on,, over or under any seas or inland waters, nor shall it affect any provision in an insurance contract requiring notice, proof or other conduct of the insured after the occurrence of loss, damage or injury.”
Inasmuch as the warranty that the vessel was equipped with a searchlight was a condition of liability under the marine policy, the' action must fail. But there would be no liability on the part of the insurance company, under Subdivision 2 of Section 150 even if the policy had not been marine; for, while the obstruction in Lake Owasco which caused the sinking of -the motor-boat and the drowning was under water and hence would not have been seen' by a searchlight, yet even though the absence of a searchlight might not have contributed to the particular accident there can be no doubt that a searchlight would have been a safeguard against running aground and an aid to the navigator of the vessel in ascertaining his bearings, and its absence materially increased the risks of the insurer.
In view of the clear breach of the warranty as to a searchlight, it is unnecessary to discuss the other warranties which the defendant claims to have been broken.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1