What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SCHICK v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS et al.
No. 5884.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 16, 1931.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1931.
Claude L. Johnson, of New Orleans, La. (Claude L. Johnson and James F. Pierson, both of New Orleans, La., on the brief), for appellant.
Michel Provosty, City Atty., and Henry B. Curtis, Asst. City Atty., both of New Orleans, La., for appellees.
Before BRYAN, FOSTER, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, who is a citizen of the United States, domiciled in the city of New Orleans, and engaged in that city in the business of transferring and storing household goods, office furnishings and effects, and other light commodities, filed his bill in equity praying that an injunction be issued restraining the enforcement against himself of provisions of an ordinance of that city, adopted March 6, 1928, which, omitting its title, reads as follows:
“Section 1. Be it ordained by theo Commission Council of the City of New Orleans, that it is hereby made the duty of all persons, firms or corporations owning or operating within the City limits of New Orleans, any dray, moving van, furniture car, transfer wagon, express wagon, or any other vehicle who shall haul or move, or cause to be hauled or moved, household goods or personal effects other than baggage of any person in the City of New Orleans, which person is changing the place of his or her abode, to make report thereof to the Chief Police, which report shall .be made within one day thereafter on a blank form which is hereinafter described.
“Section 2. Be it further ordained, that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation causing the removal of any property herein described, to give the owner or operator of any vehicle employed to haul such property, a fictitious name, or refuse to give the correct name of the owner or party in possession of such property, so as to wilfully deceive such operator as to same.
“Section 3. Be it further' ordained, That the form or blank to be filled in by the person in Section 1 herein, shall be as follows:
------ Moved from......Moved to...... (Signed) ...... (Owner of Vehicle) Date Moved......Date filed with Chief of Police
“Section 4. Be it further ordained, that it shall be the duty of the Chief of Police to keep in a well bound book, open for inspection at the Police Station, all such certificates or blanks alphabetically indexed, as required by Section 3 hereof, provided the entire expense and cost of executing and carrying out the provisions of this Section shall be free of • cost to the City of New Orleans, except the expense of furnishing said book, blank or certificate.
“Section 5. Be it further ordained, that any person, firm or corporation violating the provisions of Sections one and two of this ordinance shall, upon conviction thereof before any Court of competent jurisdiction, be fined not more than $25.00 and imprisoned not more than ten days, or both, at the discretion of the Court.”
Provisions of that ordinance were challenged on the grounds that they violate rights secured to the appellant by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, by imposing the additional involuntary labor upon appellant of obtaining information required to make prescribed reports and of making such reports under penalty of fine, and imprisonment for failing to do so, and by arbitrarily depriving him of his property without due process of law; by arbitrarily and wrongfully depriving him of the equal protection of the law, and by abridging and infringing his right and privilege of managing and controlling his private business for his own benefit and use in a. way not inconsistent with law and good morals. Upon the submission of the cause for final decree on the bill and answer, and upon a stipulation as to facts, which showed, in addition to above stated facts, that that ordinance imposed upon appellant and others engaged in similar business duties and obligations to do prescribed things and in so doing to incur expenses which were not required prior to the adoption of that ordinance, the court rendered a decree denying the prayer of appellant’s bill and dismissing the cause.
The ordinance in question requires nothing of the appellant except that, when he shall haul or move, or cause to be hauled or moved, household goods or personal effects other than baggage of any person in the city of New Orleans, which person is changing the place of his or her abode, he make report thereof to the chief of police within a prescribed time and on a prescribed form or blank furnished at the expense of the city of New Orleans, to be filled in by one making such report. The appellant has no standing to complain of that ordinance in so far as it made provision as to any one other than himself doing or omitting to do anything, as appellant could not be affected by the enforcement of such provision of the ordinance.
The “police power” includes the power to adopt regulations designed and reasonably adapted to promote the general prosperity by safeguarding contract or property rights, or to protect the public generally, or a class or classes of citizens, from fraud or criminal misconduct. Chicago B. & Q. Railway Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage Com’rs, 200 U. S. 561, 592, 26 S. Ct. 341, 50 L. Ed. 596, 4 Ann. Cas. 1175; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 596, 37 S. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; Marrs v. City of Oxford (D. C.) 24 F.(2d) 541, 547. That the city of New Orleans is vested with police power was decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in a ease in which the validity of the ordinance now in question was adjudged. City of New Orleans v. Schick, 167 La. 674, 120 So. 47. Persons having business relations with residents of a large city, or having liens upon or other property interest in household goods or personal effects other than baggage in the possession or custody of such residents, may be prejudicially affected by the clandestine moving of such household goods or personal effects when such a resident is changing his or her abode. Such a report as the ordinance in question provides for may be a means of preventing the successful concealment of household goods or personal effects stolen or fraudulently obtained or intended to be fraudulently concealed. It is for the branch of the government which is vested with the police power to determine whether such a regulation as that provided for by the ordinance in question should or should not be adopted as a means of preventing or aiding in the detection of crime, or for the protection of contract or property rights of a class or classes of citizens; that regulation being such a one as reasonably may be considered to be appropriate to promote the accomplishment of the purposes mentioned. Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 49 S. Ct. 430, 73 L. Ed. 856. The business of moving household goods or personal effects is subject to reasonable regulations under the police power. Lawson v. Connolly, 175 Mich. 375, 141 N. W. 623, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1152; Wagner v. St. Louis, 284 Mo. 410, 224 S. W. 413, 12 A. L. R. 495.
We conclude that the court did not err in sustaining the ordinance in question against the attack made by appellant’s bill.
The decree is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1