What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HOSKINS COAL & DOCK CORPORATION v. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK CO.
No. 7117.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
April 20, 1940.
Rehearing Denied June 15, 1940.
Robert Branand, Jr., and Arne B. Hummeland, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
W. S. Oppenheim, Earle E. Ewins, and Edward S. Price, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before SPARKS, MAJOR, and TREA-NOR, Circuit Judges.
MAJOR, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment, based upon a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, for damages to its dock caused by defendant’s mooring thereto, its scow, in November, 1936. The principal error relied on is the failure of the District Court to allow defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Plaintiff is the lessee of a dock which is located on the Ogden Slip in the Chicago River near the Outer Drive bridge. Defendant was engaged in construction work on the bridge. It moored its scow to the dock, on or about November 14, 1936, and for the purpose of this decision it is admitted by the defendant that it was without right to so moor its scow, although it was customary for craft to use the plaintiff’s dock, with plaintiff’s knowledge and without objection on its part.
The evidence is in sharp conflict as to the condition of the dock at the time of the mooring in question. Defendant asserts that the dock’s structure was then defective and bulged in one place, extending two or three feet out into the water, and defendant offered in evidence photographs taken before the time of the alleged injury, to substantiate its contention that the dock was then defective.
Plaintiff’s evidence is to the effect that it had reconditioned the superstructure of the dock, immediately upon the execution of the lease, and had removed the soft fill of the dock and was replacing it with hard fill, consisting of brick-bats and asphalt. It had completed about 95% of this refill job and but two places, several feet long at the dock’s edge, remained unfilled. They were awaiting asphalt debris from torn-up streets, to fill in the surface of the two holes which were about eighteen inches in depth. At these holes, the timbers were exposed, and it is plaintiff’s theory of the case that defendant’s men tied their scow to these unreinforced timbers and pulled them away from the dock structure. Thus was caused the damage complained of. There is no occasion to relate the extent of the damages as the amount awarded is not in dispute.
Defendant claims that its scow was tied, not to the exposed timber, but to “deadmen” located near the. dock specifically for such purpose. There is evidence, however, which sustains plaintiff’s theory as to the manner in which the scow was fastened to the dock and plaintiff’s theory in this respect must be accepted for the purpose of this appeal.
Indulging in such' assumption, a more serious question arises as to whether the manner in which the scow was fastened to the dock was the proximate cause of the damage complained of. Defendant contends that there is no substantial evidence in support of plaintiff’s theory- — that it is just as reasonable to conclude that the damages were occasioned from some other -cause. We are not convinced, however, that the jury was not justified in finding in favor of plaintiff’s contention. Viewing the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff, as we are bound to.do, it discloses that defendant’s boat was 110 feet long; that the dock was bulged in two places at the points where the scow was fastened to the timbers of the dock. It is significant that this condition was discovered the morning following the day when the scow was thus fastened. Prior to that time, the dock was in normal condition. Defendant ridicules the idea that any force or power existed by which the scow could have produced such a situation. There was evidence, however, to the effect that the water in the Ogden Slip rises and 'falls like a tide (also referred to as a “surge” or “current”). On at least one other occasion this surge had been known to pull boats from their moorings and damage the dock to which they were fastened.
We conclude the cause was properly submitted to the jury and we would not be justified in disturbing the verdict. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1