What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, v. STANDARD SHIPBUILDING CORPORATION, Albert Conway, William A. Young, and Alfred A. Stein, as Receivers of the Property of Defendant Standard Shipbuilding Corporation, Defendants-Appellees, and Shooters Island Shipyard Company, Complainant-Appellee.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
February 27, 1925.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1925.)
No. 3201.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Joseph L. Bodine, Judge.
Walter G. Winne, U. S. Atty., of Hackensack, N. J. (Chauncey G. Parker and John, M. Emery, both of Newark, N. J., of counsel), for appellant.
William St. John Tozer and White & Case, all of New York City (Joseph M. Hartfield andl Jeremiah M. Evarts, both of New York City, of counsel), for Shooters Island Co.
Conover English, of Newark, N. J., for Standard Co.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
WOOLLEY, Circuit Judge.
, The main question in this case concerns the priority of liens of two mortgages given by the Standard Shipbuilding Corporation, — one to Shooters Island Shipyard Company covering after-acquired property and the other to the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation covering the same property. This question is one of law and its solution depends on other questions of law, — whether the mortgage to the Shipping Board, the second in point of time, is a purchase money mortgage or is based on an equitable lien. These questions in turn rest on questions of fact to be decided according as the evidence proves or does not prove that certain large advances of money made by the Fleet Corporation to the Standard Shipbuilding Corporation in the early period of the war were made under an agreement between them that the advances should be secured by a first mortgage and, that pursuant to this agreement negotiations were continuously conducted until finally the mortgage in question was given the Shipping Board for that purpose. The District Court found for the Shipping Board and awarded priority of lien to its mortgage. On appeal this court thought differently and, on an opinion reported in 293 F. 706, was about to issue its mandate reversing the decree below when the Shipping Board appeared and represented that it had newly discovered evidence which, if heard, would compel a "different judgment. Hesitatingly this court remanded the case for further proofs. On the remission the newly-acquired evidence was taken. The learned trial judge was of opinion that it did not alter the judgment of this court and entered a decree accordingly. The ease is here on the Shipping Board’s appeal. We shall not review the testimony, nor shall we do .more than say that the new evidence, supplementing the old, fills several gaps which theretofore existed in the record and, quite contrary to what was expected, ■ fortifies the previous judgment of this court by establishing that the mortgage was not given the Shipping Board in pursuance of an agreement to secure the original money advances but to secure further advances with which to finish uncompleted work. The decree below is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1