What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FREEMAN UNITED COAL MINING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Betty STONE, Widow of Huie Stone, Respondent, and Director, Benefits Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor, Party in Interest.
No. 91-1754.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 28, 1992.
Decided Feb. 24, 1992.
Kathryn S. Matkov, argued, Gould & Ratner, Chicago, Ill., for Freeman United Coal Min. Co.
Harold B. Culley, Jr., argued, Raleigh, Ill., for Betty Stone.
Eileen N. McCarthy, Dept, of Labor, Appellate Litigation, Barbara J. Johnson, Roscoe C. Bryant, III, Lawrence W. Rogers, Dept, of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Washington, D.C., John H. Secaras, Sol. Gen., Dept, of Labor, Chicago, Ill., for Office of Workers’ Compensation Program.
Linda M. Meekins, Benefits Review Bd., Dept, of Labor, Washington, D.C., for Benefits Review Bd.
Before BAUER, Chief Judge and POSNER, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
COFFEY, Circuit Judge.
Freeman United Coal Mining Company (Freeman Coal) seeks review of a decision by the Benefits Review Board of the United States Department of Labor (BRB) granting survivor’s benefits to Betty Stone (claimant), widow of former Freeman Coal miner Huie Stone (miner), under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. We reverse.
I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Huie Stone labored at one of Freeman Coal’s mines for fifteen years before dying of a heart attack at work on March 17, 1981. His widow, Betty Stone, filed for survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act on March 21,1981. The death certificate listed the immediate cause of the miner’s death as an acute myocardial infarction. The certificate also noted two conditions causing the heart attack: (1) a healed myocardial infarction (Mr. Stone had survived two heart attacks), and (2) pigmented pulmonary fibrosis (black lung). Doctor A.J. Venables, the Board-certified pathologist who signed the death certificate, later conducted an autopsy to determine if the miner had black lung, finding that he had. Doctor Venables then sent histologic slides of lung tissue and lymph node to Dr. Eggleston, another Board-certified pathologist and professor and Director of Surgical Pathology at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, who was an agreed-upon neutral medical expert acting at the request of the Administrative Law Judge (AU). Doctor Eggleston found no substantial evidence of coal worker’s pneumoconiosis (CWP), stating that the miner’s death could be “largely, if not entirely, attributed to his severe coronary arteriosclerosis and the resulting left-sided congestive heart failure.” A third Board-certified pathologist, Dr. Echols A. Hansbarger, also examined the autopsy slides and available medical records and reached similar conclusions, writing that “Mr. Stone died as a result of Atherosclerotic Coronary Heart Disease,” and “Since Mr. Stone did not suffer from Coal Worker’s Pneumoconiosis or any other Occupational Pneumoconiosis of the Lung, it obviously could have had no impact on his demise.”
In his first decision the AU denied benefits because there was no evidence that the miner had been totally disabled by pneumo-coniosis at the time of death. The AU wrote that “no physicians stated that decedent’s disability was due to pneumoconio-sis. Moreover, the coroner’s certificate of death and Claimant’s testimony establish that decedent died of a heart attack.” Decision and Order Denying Benefits, at 8. The BRB remanded the case, however, because the AU had failed to consider the claim under 20 C.F.R. § 718.308, which applied because the complaint had been filed before January 1, 1982.
Reconsidering the evidence under § 718.-303, the AU awarded benefits. Section 718.303(a)(1) creates a presumption that a miner with ten years of experience died due to CWP if: (1) there were multiple causes of death, and (2) it is medically infeasible to determine which disease caused death or the extent to which a respirable disease contributed to death. Because the death certificate listed multiple causes of death, including CWP, the AU found the first part of the presumption satisfied. As to the infeasibility of determining the actual cause of death, the AU relied on Dr. Vena-bles’s autopsy report, wherein he found CWP but did not describe its impact. This silence was deemed substantial evidence of the infeasibility of determining the true cause of death. The AU gave controlling weight to Dr. Venables’s opinion because he had access to the miner’s body, while doctors Eggleston and Hansbarger only reviewed the autopsy slides. Accordingly, because of the minimal weight given to the consulting experts’ opinions, the AU also held that Freeman Coal could not rebut the presumption of total disability due to CWP. 20 C.F.R. § 718.303(b). The BRB affirmed the AU’s decision in all respects, finding that he had applied the correct legal standard in invoking the presumption and in weighing the medical evidence.
II. DISCUSSION
Though this is an appeal from the BRB’s decision, we actually review the AU’s decision, which must be affirmed if rational, in accord with the law, and supported by substantial evidence. Peabody Coal Co. v. Helms, 859 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir.1988). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla. It is such relevant evidence as a rational mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). Substantial evidence may be less than a preponderance of the evidence, however, and “a reviewing body may not set aside an inference merely because it finds the opposite conclusion more reasonable or because it questions the factual basis.” Smith v. Director, OWCP, 843 F.2d 1053, 1057 (7th Cir.1988).
The initial question before us is whether the AU acted properly in invoking the interim presumption of disability under § 718.303(a). This presumption arises when there are multiple causes of death and it is medically infeasible to discern the role respirable disease played in causing death. In this case the death certificate listed a heart attack as the immediate cause of death, but named black lung as a minor contributing cause. The AU thought this was enough to show that there were multiple causes of death, but this finding is not supported by substantial evidence, and was therefore erroneous. For starters, both Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Hansbarger, Board-certified pathologists with qualifications at least equal to Dr. Venables’s, found that the miner did not even have CWP. This conclusion is bolstered by several facts. First, throughout his long history of medical treatment for his heart problems, Mr. Stone never complained of respiratory trouble to his doctors, and he never filed a formal complaint with the Department of Labor. Additionally, no doctor ever diagnosed Mr. Stone as having CWP or any other respirable disease, or even found the symptoms of res-pirable disease. Finally, x-rays taken less than a year before Mr. Stone’s death showed no signs of CWP. See AU’s Decision and Order Denying Benefits, pp. 4-6 (summarizing x-ray evidence). Contrast this with the fact that the death certificate clearly listed the cause of death as a heart attack, that the miner had suffered two prior heart attacks weakening the muscle, and that he had longstanding cardiac disease, and it seems clear that neither CWP nor any other respirable disease caused or contributed to Mr. Stone’s death. The overwhelming weight of the evidence, then, precludes invoking the § 718.303 presumption, as the claimant cannot show that there were multiple causes of death, much less that one of those causes was a respira-ble disease.
The AU, however, discounted the opinions of Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Hansbar-ger, invoking the presumption by relying instead on the autopsy report and death certificate completed by Dr. Venables. Though AUs have discretion in weighing conflicting medical evidence, they are still required to at least consider all of the relevant evidence presented. Wetherill v. Director, OWCP, 812 F.2d 376, 382 (7th Cir.1987). Under Wetherill, an AU may not disregard the conclusions of a qualified physician absent a valid legal basis or countervailing clinical evidence. Id. Nothing in the record suggests that access to the body enhances the accuracy of diagnoses based on autopsy evidence, so the AU’s proffered ground does not support his preference for Dr. Venables’s opinion. Further, it cannot be said that Dr. Venables’s opinion provides countervailing clinical evidence, as he fails to discuss what, if any, role CWP played in the miner’s death. Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Hansbarger, on the other hand, plainly found that Mr. Stone’s heart trouble, culminating in his third heart attack, was the sole cause of death. We cannot agree with the AU’s decision to ignore this evidence.
In light of all of the evidence presented, we find that the claimant failed to meet the requirements for invoking the § 718.303 presumption. The record reveals that the sole cause of death was a heart attack, and no one ever thought Mr. Stone had CWP or any other respirable disease until Dr. Vena-bles found it in an autopsy — and his findings were directly contradicted by two qualified experts. Therefore the ALJ’s decision to invoke the § 718.303 presumption is not supported by substantial evidence, and the decision of the BRB awarding benefits is
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1