What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. You will be asked a question pertaining to issues that may appear in civil law issues involving government actors. The issue is: "Did the court support the decision of an administrative law judge? Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed".

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL TANK & EXPORT CO.
No. 5726.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 10, 1930.
Charles L. Redding, U. S. Atty., of Savannah, Ga., and F. F. Toomey, Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, of Washington, D. C. (George Noble Jones, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Savannah, Ga., C. M. Charest, Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Wright Matthews, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, Wm. B. Waldo, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, all of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for the United States.
Gordon C. Carson, Alexander A. Lawrence, and Edmund H. Abrahams, all of Savannah, Ga., for appellee.
Before BRYAN and FOSTER, Circuit Judges, and SIBLEY, District Judge.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
In this case the material facts are substantially these: On March 14, 1919, appellee filed with the collector of internal revenue at Atlanta a tentative return on form 1031-T for tho year ending December 31, 19.18, showing an estimated tax due of $14,000, accompanied it with a cheek for $3,500 to cover one-fourth of the estimated tax, and requested an extension of time of forty-five days for filing a completed return. On May 1, 1919, a consolidated return was filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the American Naval Stores Company and the National Tank & Export Company, appellee herein. The consolidated return did not state separately the income and invested capital of each corporation. This return was made on the annual basis for the year 1918. The National Tank & Export Company kept its books on the fiseal year basis, the year ending April 30th. The consolidated return covered only eight months of the year ending April 30, 1919. The return showed no tax due by appellee. The Commissioner declined to allow the consolidated return, and a separate return was filed for appellee on September 28, 1922, covering its fiscal year from May 1,1918, to April 30, 1919, inclusive. In January, 1925, an additional tax of $11,096.70 was assessed against appellee. On April 1, 1925, a credit of $3,386.66, an overpayment for the taxable year 1917, was applied against the deficiency. Appellee paid the balance under protest and brought suit in the District Court to recover eight-twelfths of tho tax assessed, conceding that recovery of the balance was barred. The court found that petitioner was not entitled to file a consolidated return with the American Naval Stores Company, but we are not called upon to review that phase of the court’s finding. However, the court held the assessment was barred by the limitation of five years imposed by section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1083) and subsequent acts, holding that it began to run with the filing of the consolidated return, and referred to the tentative return as aiding in reaching this conclusion. Judgment was entered for appellee.
It is settled that the filing of the tentative return did not start the running of the statute of limitations. Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co. v. U. S., 280 U. S. 453, 50 S. Ct. 215, 74 L. Ed. 542.
In Willingham Loan & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A.) 36 F.(2d) 49, we had oeeasion to consider the effect of the filing of separate returns covering parts of the taxable year, and held that the statute began to run whenever the taxpayer filed returns with the Commissioner that would show facts upon which an assessment for the taxable period could be made. Necessarily, the converse is true. In this case the consolidated return did not show the separate capital and income of each corporation, and was not a complete return for appellee, as it covered only eight months of its taxable year. The Commissioner therefore had not sufficient faets before him upon which to base an assessment. The assessment was in time. Paso Robles Merc. Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev. (C. C. A.) 33 F.(2d) 653.
It follows that the judgment of the district court must be reversed.

Question: Did the court support the decision of an administrative law judge?

Choices:
No
Yes
Mixed answer
Issue not discussed

Answer: 3