What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Travis Dee PLUNK, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 71-1421.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 25, 1972.
H. T. Etheridge, Jr., Jackson, Tenn. (Court-appointed), on brief, for defendant-appellant.
Robert F. Colvin, Memphis, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee; Thomas F. Turley, Jr., U. S. Atty., Larry E. Parrish, David C. Porteous, Asst. U. S. Attys., Memphis, Tenn., on brief.
Before EDWARDS and CELE-BREZZE, Circuit Judges, and KEITH, District Judge.
Honorable Damon J. Keith, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals from conviction for possessing and operating a still, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5601(a) (1) and 5601(a) (4) (1970).
On appeal appellant presents only one issue, namely, whether or not the District Court erred in allowing government witnesses to testify to initials which they had placed on a propane gas tank and on a tractor at the time they had seen these objects in the vicinity of a still which they had under surveillance. Subsequent to surveillances, government agents had secured an arrest warrant for defendant and a search warrant for his home. At trial, however, it was noted that the affidavit for the search warrant was dated March 20, 1970, whereas the warrant was actually procured and issued and dated March 12, 1970. On the basis of this error, the District Judge held the search warrant to be invalid, but he received in evidence an agent’s identification of his initials on the gas tank and the tractor as of the time of the arrest of defendant, when these objects were in defendant’s yard on the theory that the testimony was derived from “plain view.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468-473, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
Our review of this record indicates that there was more than sufficient evidence, totally unrelated to any search, for the jury to convict appellant of possessing and operating the still in question.
Further, the agent’s testimony concerning the tractor and its prior use in the operation of the still, and the propane gas tank and its prior use in relation to the still, and the fact that both were indeed in plain view in defendant’s yard was all obviously admissible.
Although no government appeal is brought to us from the District Court’s invalidation of the search warrant, we observe that nothing in this record indicates any possibility of prejudice arising from the error in dating of the affidavit for the search warrant, nor (in the absence of briefing on this point) is there any explanation tendered for it except typographical error. Under these circumstances normally we would be inclined to apply the “commonsense and realistic” rule of United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
Since, however, this issue is not brought to us, we examine the record with the assumption that the search warrant was invalid and find real difficulty in holding that the agent’s testimony concerning the existence of the initials on the gas tank and the tractor at the time he examined both in defendant’s yard, could be justified under the “plain view” theory. In one instance he had to move the equipment; in the other instance he had to look underneath the tractor.
We are convinced, however, that on the total facts of this case, the admission of the testimony pertaining to the existence of the initials on the pieces of equipment (which were already identified as being in defendant’s yard after they had been seen at the site of the still operation) was only a small bit of cumulative evidence of guilt. On this whole record we can say beyond reasonable doubt that if the admission of this evidence was error, it was harmless. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed.2d 705 (1967).
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1