What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
C. L. TYRRELL, as Trustee of the Estate of Roy E. Shoaff Drilling Co., Inc., Bankrupt, Appellant, v. DOBBS INVESTMENT CO. (formerly known as Dobbs GM Diesel, Inc.), Appellee.
No. 7660.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 23, 1964.
Arthur J. Seifert, Denver, Colo. (John W. Low, Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellant.
Thomas J. Kerwin, Denver, Colo. (Martin J. Harrington and Hodges, Silver-stein, Hodges & Harrington, Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MURRAH, PHILLIPS and LEWIS, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
The Roy E. Shoaff Drilling Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Drilling Company, was adjudicated a bankrupt on June 8, 1960. Thereafter, Tyrrell, the duly qualified and acting Trustee of the bankrupt estate, commenced the instant action to recover the value of two diesel engines alleged to have been transferred by the Drilling Company to Dobbs Investment Co., hereinafter referred to as Dobbs, as a preference under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. The parties filed a joint motion requesting the court to determine in advance of trial the issue of whether the security instrument through which Dobbs claimed title to the engines was “filed” so as to perfect the transfer of the engines within the meaning of § 60, sub. a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, and if it was so filed, the date on which such filing was perfected.
The trial court found and decreed that the security instrument was filed so as; to perfect the transfer of the engines; within the meaning of § 60, sub. a(2)r and that it was filed with the County Clerk of Kimball County, Nebraska, between April 4, 1960, and April 13, 1960. The Trustee has appealed.
The parties stipulated the facts considered by the trial court on their joint motion for ruling in advance of trial. Such stipulation, the exhibits attached thereto, and the uncontroverted facts set forth in the pretrial order disclose the following facts:
On March 23, 1960, Roy E. Shoaff, the president, director, and sole stockholder of the Drilling Company, executed an instrument designated as a chattel mortgage, and hereinafter referred to as the security instrument, giving Dobbs a security interest in the two diesel engines. The face of the security instrument contains a detailed description of the two* engines, the amount secured, the down payment made, the unpaid cash balance,, the financing charge, the total of the unpaid cash balance and the financing charge, the number, amount and due dates of the installment payments to be made by the debtor, a mortgage granting clause, the date of execution, the name and signature of the debtor and the name and signature of the creditor.
The security instrument further contained the following provisions:
“The Mortgagor understands and agrees that the provisions on the reverse side hereof, hereby incorporated by reference, constitute a part, of this chattel mortgage.
“The within chattel mortgage is; hereby assigned to Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corporation under the provisions of the ‘Seller’s-(Mortgagee’s) Assignment Recommendation and Guaranty’ on the reverse side hereof read by the undersigned and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein.”
The assignment to Yellow Manufacturing Acceptance Corporation, hereinafter referred to as YMAC, was duly executed by Dobbs.
The reverse side of the security instrument contained the terms of the assignment to YMAC and a list of 15 provisions or conditions of the security transaction dealing with possession and use of the engines, insurance requirements, penalties for late payment of installments, repossession, warranty, assignment, and prepayment.
The engines were to be installed on a drilling rig owned by the Drilling Company and covered by a security instrument to Mid-Continent Supply Co. On March 30, I960, Mid-Continent and the Drilling Company executed a “Consent and Waiver” agreeing that regardless of the manner in which the engines were installed on the rig they would not lose their character as separate personal property, could be removed from the rig at any time, would remain subject to the terms of the security instrument of Dobbs, and that Mid-Continent would not gain any interest in the engines.
On April 4, 1960, YMAC mailed a true copy of the face of the security instrument, a true copy of the Consent and Waiver, a check in the amount of $2 in payment of the filing fee, and a letter requesting that the two documents be filed, from its office in Denver, Colorado, to the ■“County Clerk, Banner County, Kimball, Nebraska.”
Kimball, Nebraska, is the county seat of Kimball County. Harrisburg, Nebraska, is the county seat of Banner County. Kimball County was the proper place for filing the security instrument.
On April 13, 1960, nine days after the documents were mailed, YMAC received them back from the County Clerk of Banner County, Nebraska, with a notation on the bottom of YMAC’s forwarding letter that liens on motor vehicles can be filed only on the certificate of title of the vehicle.
On April 14, 1960, YMAC mailed the two documents to the County Clerk, Kim-ball County, Kimball, Nebraska, with a letter explaining that the diesel engines were not motor vehicles and requesting that the documents be filed. The two documents were filed by the County Clerk of Kimball County on April 19, 1960, and the parties have stipulated that he received them on or about April 19, 1960.
Thereafter, the true copy of the Consent and Waiver was retained in the records of the County Clerk of Kimball County, but the true copy of the security instrument was, by error, returned by mail to YMAC. It was received by YMAC on April 20, 1960.
In June, 1962, the true copy of the face of the security instrument was found in YMAC’s files and returned to the County Clerk of Kimball County.
We think that although the security instrument is designated a chattel mortgage, in fact it more closely resembles a conditional sales agreement, but regardless of the nature of the security instrument, we are of the opinion that the security transaction was perfected under Nebraska law on April 19, 1960, when the Clerk of Kimball County received and filed the true copies of the face of the security instrument and the Consent and Waiver. The information contained on the face of the security instrument was sufficient to apprise third persons of the exact interests of the parties, the amount due, a complete description of the engines, and the number and amount of the installment payments from which the due date could be determined, and that was sufficient compliance with the filing statutes of Nebraska relating to chattel mortgages and conditional sales contracts, respectively.
Furthermore, the validity of the filing of the security instrument was not affected by the failure of the Deputy County Clerk to retain it in the records of the Office of the County Clerk.
We now turn to a consideration of whether the transfer was “for or on account of an antecedent debt” under the provisions of § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 96, provides in part as follows:
“ § 96. Preferred creditors
“(a)(1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
“(2) For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee. * * *
“(7) Any provision in this subsection a to the contrary notwithstanding if the applicable law requires a transfer of property other than real property for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration to be perfected by recording, delivery, or otherwise, in order that no lien described in paragraph (2) of this subsection could become superior to the rights of the transferee therein, * * * the time of transfer shall be determined by the following rules:
“I. Where * * * (B) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time or where such stated period of time is more than twenty-one days, and compliance therewith is had within twenty-one days after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of the transfer.
“II. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph I of this paragraph, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of compliance therewith, * * *.”
Under § 60, supra, if the security instrument was filed within 21 days of the date of its execution, i. e., the date of the transfer, as the trial court found, then the transfer will be deemed to have been made at the time of such execution and the transaction does not give Dobbs a voidable preference.
The Trustee contends that the court erred in finding that the security instrument was perfected by filing within 21 days of the date of its execution, because there was no proof that the County Clerk of Kimball County received the documents for filing during that period. We agree.
Dobbs argues that due to the fact that the documents carried the specific address, “Kimball, Nebraska,” the Post Office would have disregarded the “Banner County” portion of the address and would have delivered the documents to “County Clerk * * * Kimball, Nebraska,” but there is no evidence in the record from which it can be determined what the Post Office did, except that at some time between April 4, 1960, and April 13, 1960, the documents were in the hands of the County Clerk of Banner County, from which it could as reasonably be inferred that the Post Office delivered the documents to the County Clerk of Banner County, as that the County Clerk of Kimball County received them and forwarded them to the County Clerk of Banner County.
In order to sustain the position of Dobbs, it would be necessary to infer that the documents were first delivered to the County Clerk of Kimball County, and that the County Clerk of Kimball County then mistakenly delivered or forwarded the documents to the County Clerk of Banner County. Neither of such inferences can be legitimately drawn from the facts. Inferences may be drawn only from facts in evidence. They may not be based upon mere speculation, guess, or conjecture as to what might have happened.
Further, Dobbs’s argument requires the pyramiding or imposition of one inference upon another to establish the facts necessary to its case. That is not permissible and amounts to mere speculation.
Nor is Dobbs aided by the fact that a period of nine days elapsed between the time YMAC mailed the documents and the time it received them back from the County Clerk of Banner County. The further facts that the documents took five days to reach the County Clerk of Kimball County the second time they were mailed by YMAC, and that the copy of the security instrument which was erroneously returned by the Deputy Clerk to YMAC took only one day to reach YMAC allows a reasonable inference that the mail schedule between Denver, Colorado, and the Panhandle of Nebraska varies considerably, but such facts do not reasonably allow an inference that the County Clerk of Kimball County received the documents at any time between April 4, 1960, and April 13, 1960, and then forwarded them to the County Clerk of Banner County.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
. Gillespie v. Brown, 16 Neb. 457, 20 N.W. 632, 634; Nebraska Revised Statutes, 1943, § 36-301.
. Nebraska Revised Statutes, 1943, § 36-207.
. Perkins v. Strong, 22 Neb. 725, 36 N.W. 292; Deming v. Miles, 35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665, 666; Watkins v. Bugge, 56 Neb. 615, 77 N.W. 83, 84; Powers v. Spiedel, 84 Neb. 630, 121 N.W. 968, 969.
. Waters v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 10 Cir., 156 F.2d 470, 472-473.
. Tucker v. Traylor Engineering & Manufacturing Co., 10 Cir., 48 F.2d 783, 786; Gas Service Co. v. Hunt, 10 Cir., 183 F.2d 417, 420; Franks v. Groendyke Transport, 10 Cir., 229 F.2d 731, 735.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0