What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
RICHMOND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSION.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Argued October 11, 1929.
Decided November 4, 1929.
Rehearing Denied.
No. 4925.
Stanton C. Peelle, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Paul D. P. Spearman and Bethuel M. Webster, Jr., all of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the Federal Radio Commission denying appellant’s application for an extension of time for the construction of a radio broadcasting station at Roanoke, Va.
It appears that in August, 1927, appellant applied to the commission for a construction permit to erect a radio station at Roanoke, Va. The application was granted, and a permit was issued in April, 1928. The permit stated that the maximum power of the station should be 250 watts, and that its frequency would be assigned later. It required that construction of the station should he commenced at once, and should be completed by May 31,1928.
It is provided by section 21 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (47 TTSCA § 101), that such a permit becomes automatically forfeited if the station is not ready for operation within the time specified in the permit, or within such further time as the licensing authority may allow, unless prevented by causes not under the control of the grantee. The same section provides that upon the completion of any station for the construction of-which a permit has been granted, and upon it being made to appear to the licensing authority that all the terms, conditions and obligations set forth in the application and permit have been fully met, and that no cause or circumstance arising or first coming to the knowledge of the licensing authority since the granting of the permit would, in the judgment of the licensing authority, make the operation of such station against the publie interest, the licensing authority shall issue a license to the lawful holder of the permit for the operation of the station.
The permit in question was not actually received by appellant until May 2,1928. On May 7th appellant by personal interview undertook to secure the necessary equipment for the station from the Radio Corporation of America, but on May 11th it was indicated by that company that it could give no definite date for the delivery of the equipment. On the following day appellant opened negotiations with the Graybar Electric Company for the equipment, and a contract therefor was signed by the parties as of that date. On May 14th appellant informed the commission of these facts and applied for an extension of time for the completion of the station. On June 1st the commission extended the time until- July 1st, and afterwards granted a second extension until September 1st. The uncontradieted evidence is to the effect that during this time appellant was making diligent efforts to complete the station within the specified time, but owing to delays caused by contractors, by engineering difficulties, and by weather conditions, construction was not completed by September 1st.
On September 15th appellant applied to the commission for an extension of time until October 31st for the completion of the station. This application was heard on evidence by the commission, and a rehearing also was had. At the conclusion thereof one of the five commissioners refused to vote at all upon the application; two of the commissioners voted to grant the extension; the remaining two commissioners voted to deny it. Inasmuch as the application did not receive a majority of the votes east, it was regarded as denied, and an order was entered to that effect. This appeal was then taken.
We are convinced by a review of the record that it was the duty of the commission to grant the application. The evidence, without substantial contradiction, discloses that the applicant had acted, not only in good faith, but also with diligence, in its efforts to construct the station within the time allowed by the permit, and that the completion thereof! was prevented by causes not under its control. The evidence includes the affidavit of the sales manager of the Graybar Electric Company, Inc., with whom appellant had contracted as early as May 12th for the purchase of the broadcasting equipment, and the development of plans and specifications for the erection of the station. The affidavit contains the following statement:
“We know from our experience in the manufacture and installation of radio equipment and radio broadcasting stations that it was impossible for the Richmond Development Corporation to complete the necessary construction work in accordance with the complete plans and specifications furnished by us prior to September 1, 1928, which we lare advised was the date of the expiration of their construction permit. The equipment and plans for the proposed station at Roanoke, Va., call for the most up-to-date station and most modem equipment which can be secured, and should prove, when completed, capable of giving first-class service, both to the city of Roanoke and the surrounding territory.”
The evidence discloses that prior to September 1st appellant had expended about $7,000 in the erection of buildings for the station, and had incurred expenses sufficient to increase its total expenditures to more than $30,000. If appellant is denied the privilege of completing the station, it will suffer a heavy loss in consequence. On the other hand, it cannot be contended that the public interests have suffered any loss or prejudice by reason of the delay in the completion of the station, and, if allowed to proceed with the construction, appellant agrees “to make every human effort to push it through to the earliest possible completion.”
Furthermore, in our opinion, the record discloses no cause or circumstance arising or first coming to the knowledge of the commission since the granting of the permit which would make the operation of such station against the public interest. It is manifest that the opposition to appellant’s application is largely based upon the claim that when the construction permit was first granted there already was an efficient broadcasting station in Roanoke, and that there was no public need for another station; also that the erection of a second station in Roanoke would tend to deprive other cities in Virginia of their just and equal righto in broadcasting. This argument, however, is answered by the fact that all of these conditions were well known to the commission and must have been considered by that body, when it granted the construction permit and the extensions thereof. Consequently they do not constitute a “cause or circumstance arising or first coming to the knowledge of the licensing authority sinee the granting of the permit.” With reference to the alleged injustice which may result to other cities from the operation of this station, if completed, it may be noted that prior to the date, of appellant’s permit the competing Roanoke station was not using all of its time, and when the commission made an allocation on September 1, 1928, it provided that the two stations should share time. This allocation was rescinded when it came to the attention of the commission that appellant’s station had not been completed within the prescribed time. But it does not appear that such an allocation cannot be made without injustice to other cities, if the station should hereafter be completed.
It is therefore the decision of this court that the appellant was on September 1, 1928, and still is, entitled to an extension of time reasonably sufficient to enable it to complete the construction of the broadcasting station in question. The decision appealed from is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the Federal Radio Commission, to carry the present decision into effect.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1