What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HOWE et al. v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION.
No. 10486.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 4, 1945.
Rehearing Denied May 7, 1945.
Edward Starin, of Seattle, Wash., for petitioners.
W. T. Kelley, Chief Counsel, Joseph J. Smith, Jr., Asst. Chief Counsel, and Jno. W. Carter, Jr., Sp. Atty., Federal Trade Commission, all of Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before GARRECIÍT, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
GARRECHT, Circuit Judge.
The petitioners, Phil Howe, David A. Howe, and Joanne B. Howe, trading as Howe and Company, are and have been engaged in the sale and distribution of cosmetic preparations. The preparations when sold are transported from their place of business in Seattle, Washington, to various other states of the United States and in the District of Columbia. For the purpose of inducing the purchase of the cosmetics, the petitioners use the trade name “Hollywood” and the legend under that “Favorite of the Stars.” Of the some twenty items sold by the petitioners, only three are obtained from sources in Hollywood, although more than 52% of the firm’s purchases consist of the three items manufactured in Hollywood, and as to such items the trade name is not inhibited.
The Federal Trade Commission after considering the evidence found that the word “Hollywood” when used to designate cosmetic preparations is associated by a substantial portion of the purchasing public with the motion picture industry and is understood as indicating that the cosmetics are manufactured there and are used by Flollywood stars, which is further strengthened by use of the legend “Favorite of the Stars.” The Commission found that the use of the word “Hollywood” was deceptive and misleading, and concluded such deception to constitute unfair practice within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
An order was issued to cease and desist from using the word “Hollywood” to designate any product which is not in fact manufactured in Hollywood, California, or using the words, “Favorite of the Stars.” The other matters contained in the order have been complied with and are not in issue here.
The petitioners have asked this court to review the order of the Federal Trade Commissiom
If the findings are supported by evidence, they are conclusive, and the order must be affirmed. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(c).
Witnesses testified that the label “Howe’s Hollywood, favorite of the Stars” gave the impression that it was a Hollywood preparation and was endorsed by the stars of motion pictures. Two other witnesses testified that they would interpret it to mean that the product was used by the movie stars. Another testified that Hollywood is one city in the world most every one knows and it is outstanding because of the motion picture industry, and the label “Hollywood, favorite of the Stars” could only mean that it was a product of Hollywood and used and preferred by the stars. There was other testimony that the legend “Favorite of the Stars” meant certain Hollywood actresses favored it. Another witness said “that the word ‘Hollywood’ used in connection with any ■ aid to beauty or cosmetics has more significant meaning than the word ‘Hollywood’ used in other lines of products and has more value.”
A great many witnesses testified on behalf of the Commission and on behalf of the petitioners. To some of these witnesses the word “Hollywood” had no particular significance. However, a substantial portion of the purchasing public and persons in the cosmetic trade associated the label with the motion picture colony and thought the cosmetics were manufactured there. There was also evidence that a Hollywood origin in a cosmetic product was a business asset. The evidence showed also that the preparations in question were not recognized by the actresses of Hollywood as being of superior quality.
In the case of Stanley Laboratories, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 138 F.2d 388, this court found that the use of the words “M.D.” in marketing a douche was a deception attempting to capitalize on the prestige of the medical profession. In the cosmetic field, a parallel endorsement would be that of actresses of Hollywood. It was reasonable therefore to find the advertisement misleading and deceptive, and where there is a rational basis for the conclusion of the administrative body, our duty is ended.
The motion to insert after the words “Hollywood, California” in the order, the parenthetical sentence: (The term “Hollywood, California,” as used herein, means the entire city of Los Angeles, California, and those adjacent or contiguous independent municipalities which are generally regarded as comprising the Los Angeles metropolitan area, such as Culver City, Beverly Hills, Glendale and Santa Monica.), is hereby granted and the order as amended is affirmed and must be so enforced.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0