What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
FLEITMANN v. BURNET, Com’r of Internal Revenue.
No. 5656.
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
Argued Feb. 17, 1933.
Decided April 3, 1933.
Howe P. Cochran, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
G. A. Toungquist, Sewall Key, Morton K. Rothschild, C. M. Charest, and Bruce A. Low, all of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.
GRONER, Associate Justice.
The appeal in this ease involves income taxes for the year 1918 in the amount of $23,-945.57, of which $3,895.67 have been paid, and is taken from the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
The board found the facts substantially as follows: On February 7, 1924, the commissioner notified the taxpayer that he proposed to assess $42,702.50 additional tax for 1918. He asked for a waiver of the statute of limi- ' tations as a condition of not making this as-sessineat. The taxpayer protested the assessment and sent in a waiver dated February 18, 1924, extending the period of assessment and collection for one year. The proposed tax was nevertheless assessed March 8, 1924, and in that same month the taxpayer filed a claim for an entire abatement. The first waiver carried tbe period of extension to February 18, 1925. Subsequent waivers were filed as follows: February 18, 1926; November 18, 1926; December 15, 3927; October 17,1928; September 27, 1929. Tbe board found that in each instance tbe waiver was requested by the respondent and that it was pursuant to these requests that waivers were signed and sent in by the petitioner. Petitioner, however, contends that the waivers were invalid in that they were not personally signed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The waivers in question, as in the case of Fleitmann & Crimmins, Executors, v. Commissioner, 62 App. D. C. 88, 65 F.(2d) 176 (decided this day), were signed in the commissioner’s name by subordinates in the department who were duly authorized in respect thereto by their immediate superiors, who in. turn had been delegated that authority by the commissioner. There was a rule of the department which required all waivers received from taxpayers to be referred to the head of the division in which the ease was ihen under consideration, and this head of Ihe division was required to determine whether the waiver was acceptable.
The head of division referred to was always some one who had been specifically authorized by the commissioner in writing to sign his name. The practice of the department under this rule was to have the head of division pass upon the acceptability of the waiver and then to authorize a subordinate to sign the commissioner’s name in evidence of approval. In the ease of Fleitmann & Crimmins, Executors, v. Commissioner, supra, we said we would assume, nothing appearing to the contrary, that the rule had been duly observed, and held that the signing of the commissioner’s name was a ministerial act and that when a duly authorized deputy had exercised the discretionary authority to accept or reject the waiver, the mere physical act of signing the waiver was no more than carrying out in a ministerial way the discretion which had already been exercised, and was, therefore, a valid act. All of the reasons which we set out as sustaining the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in that case apply in this, and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat them.
An additional point made by petitioner in this case is that as to the second and third waivers a statement in the commissioner’s letter to the effect that the period of limitations was about to expire was in point of fact incorrect since the period had already expired, but we think this cannot change the result. The fact that the statute of limitations was then available to the taxpayer does not invalidate subsequently executed waivers. See Stange v. United States, 282 U. S. 270, 51 S. Ct. 145, 75 L. Ed. 335. Besides this, there is nothing to show that the taxpayer in executing these subsequent waivers was induced or misled by the commissioner’s letter. As a matter of fact, he succeeded as a result of this in having a tax liability then fixed at forty-two thousand and odd dollars reduced nearly 50 per cent.
The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2