What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.

Opinion:
SGAMBATI v. UNITED STATES.
No. 142, Docket 21194.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Feb. 3, 1949.
Paul Kastenbaum, of New York City (Jacob Rassner and Jack Steinman, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
John F. X. McGohey, of New York City (Martin J. Norris, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before AUGUSTUS N. HAND, CLARK, and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
FRANK, Circuit Judge.
The only question here is whether the statute was tolled during the period of infancy. In Osbourne v. United States, 2 Cir., 164 F.2d 767, 768, we said: “Generally, where a statute creates a cause of action which was unknown at common law, a period of limitation set up in the same statute is regarded as a matter of substance, limiting the right as well as the remedy. Filing a complaint within the prescribed period is a condition precedent to recovery, and the cause of action is extinguished after the running of the period. The general rule, developed chiefly with respect to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, §§ 1-10, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60, has. been applied also to the period of limitations in the Jones Act, [46 U.S.C.A. § 688], which incorporates the period in the Employers’ Liability Act, and to the Suits in Admiralty Act. The practical results of the application of this rule have been that the period of limitation under any of the three statutes will control the time for bringing suit in a state court regardless of state statutes of limitations; that the period of limitation under any of these Acts will not be extended, as it would be in the case of an ordinary statute of limitations, ‘by a claimant’s disability to sue because of infancy or insanity or by a delay occasioned by the fraud of the defendant; and that the defendant cannot waive the defense of the period of limitations.” We see no reason to depart from that statement. The plaintiff could have sued by a next friend within the two years. New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S. 360, 37 S.Ct. 620, 61 L.Ed. 1194. The unusual ground for exception to the statutory period we found to exist in the Osbourne case (i. e., impossibility of access to the courts within the period) was absent here.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 8