What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Alvin H. FRANKEL, Administrator C. T. A. of the Estate of George Burgoyne, Deceased, Appellant, v. Walter R. STYER, Trading as Styer Refrigerator Body Co.
No. 16333.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Sept. 26, 1967.
Decided Nov. 22,1967.
See also D.C., 209 F.Supp. 509.
James A. Burgess, Jr., Katz, Kozay, Burgess & Black, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Jame J. McEldrew, Cole, McEldrew, Hanamirian & McWilliams, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before McLAUGHLIN, HASTIE and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HASTIE, Circuit Judge.
This is a diversity case under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Acts. Judgment below was for the defendant on a jury verdict. On this appeal, the administrator of the decedent’s estate contends that alleged trial errors necessitate a new trial.
The decedent, George Burgoyne, died while accidentally locked in the body of his truck which had been remodeled for him by the defendant, a contractor, to provide an insulated environment for refrigerated meats. All relevant events occurred in Pennsylvania.
One of the trial issues was whether the defendant was negligent in failing to install a safety release on the inside of the door of the remodeled body so that the accidental closing of the door would not deprive a person inside of a means of egress. As a part of his proof on this issue, the appellant sought to show that it was the custom and practice of the body construction trade to install safety releases on the inside of doors of insulated truck bodies. Such evidence is admissible when offered by a competent witness. Jemison v. Pfeifer, 1959, 397 Pa. 81, 152 A.2d 697. However, the trial judge ruled that the witness who sought to testify to the relevant custom and usage was not competent to do so.
The witness in question, Albert Golds-man, testified that he had been in the business of building commercial truck bodies for thirty-five years; that his company built about 100 such bodies a year, 15 per cent of them being of the insulated type, and that he had studied the literature concerning the construction of insulated bodies. However, Goldsman also testified that he had no more than a high school education and personally had never drafted any plans for body construction. Apparently because of this lack of formal training and professional or technical competence and experience, the trial judge found Goldsman incompetent to testify to the custom and usage in question.
This was error. Neither technical training nor personal competency as an engineer or an industrial draftsman was necessary to make such a long time operator of a body building business as Goldsman knowledgeable of and competent to inform the jury of any custom and usage that prevailed in the body building trade with reference to the incorporation of simple and obvious structures in truck doors. Cf. Churbuck v. Union R. Co., 1955, 380 Pa. 181, 110 A.2d 210; Hughes v. John Hanna & Sons, 1958, 187 Pa.Super. 466, 144 A.2d 617.
Error is also alleged in the failure of the court to permit Dr. M. E. Aaronson, an assistant medical examiner for the City of Philadelphia who had pronounced Burgoyne dead at the scene of his demise, to testify as a rebuttal witness. Because a blizzard had delayed Dr. Aar-onson’s arrival at the trial, the court permitted the plaintiff to introduce into evidence Dr. Aaronson’s official report stating that death was caused by suffocation. Subsequently, a physician called by the defendant testified that death was due to severe arteriosclerotic heart disease. In these circumstances, the appellant sought in rebuttal to call .Dr. Aaronson, who was a pathologist and in this case had performed an autopsy, to rebut the defense medical opinion and to rehabilitate his own opinion by more detailed explanation than appeared in his report. However, the court expressed the view that since the defense had agreed to let Dr. Aaronson’s report be admitted without cross-examination, to “call him back as an expert to refute these other witnesses * * * doesn’t seem quite cricket to me”.
We think the agreed use of Dr. Aaronson’s report in the plaintiff’s case in chief did not constitute a waiver of the privilege of calling him in rebuttal after an apparently contradictory opinion had been introduced by the defense. Moreover, the need to explain, if possible, the consistency of Dr. Aaronson’s opinion with the existence of an arteriosclerotic heart condition was created by the defendant’s medical testimony. In these circumstances, we think Dr. Aaronson was a proper and competent rebuttal witness and that he should have been allowed to testify. Cf. Schoen v. Elsasser, 1934, 315 Pa. 65, 172 A. 301.
For these reasons, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1