What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT et al. v. KNOLL
No. 82-1889.
Argued January 14, 1985
Decided April 17, 1985
Charles Potash argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Harris F. Goldich.
Robert H. Chanin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, and Jeremiah A. Collins.
A brief for the State of Pennsylvania et al. as amici curiae urging reversal was filed by LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and Andrew S. Gordon and Allen C. Wars haw, Senior Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General of their respective States as follows: Michael A. Lilly of Hawaii, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, John D. Ashcroft of Missouri, Paul L. Douglas of Nebraska, Gregory H. Smith of New Hampshire, Rufus L. Edmisten of North Carolina, and Anthony Celebrezze of Ohio.
Per Curiam.
On April 21,1981, respondent commenced this action alleging, in part, that the petitioner School District discriminated against her on the basis of sex in failing to promote her to an administrative position. She sought equitable and compensatory relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for the alleged acts of discrimination which occurred in August 1979, May 1980, and September 1980.
The District Court dismissed the § 1983 claim because it was not brought within the 6-month limitations period which applies to
“[a]n action against any officer of any government unit for anything done in the execution of his office, except an action subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5522(b)(1) (1982).
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the “application of the six-month limitations period would be inconsistent with the policies and legislative history underlying §1983” and that “the six-year residuary provision of the limitations scheme should govern this dispute.” 699 F. 2d 137, 139 (CA3 1983). We granted certiorari, 468 U. S. 1204 (1984), and heard argument.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is now vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of our decision in Wilson v. Garcia, ante, p. 261, in which we have held that all § 1983 claims should be characterized for statute of limitations purposes as actions to recover damages for injuries to the person.
It is so ordered.
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3