What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
M. Wharton YOUNG, Appellant, v. ALBERT PICK HOTELS, a corporation, Appellee.
No. 17250.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 9, 1963.
Decided May 29, 1963.
Mr. James J. Laughlin, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Peter R. Celia, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Richard W. Galiher and William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, Magruder, Senior Circuit Judge for the First Circuit, and Fahy, Circuit Judge.
Sitting by designation pursuant to Section 294(d), Title 28, U.S.Code.
MAGRUDER, Senior Circuit Judge.
The complaint charges that the plaintiff, a citizen of the District of Columbia but temporarily resident in India, was invited to give a lecture before a scientific convention at the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago, Illinois; that he had duly reserved a room accommodation at the said hotel but that when he arrived there he was denied such accommodation because of his color. It was alleged that appellant was even denied the use of the toilet facilities in the hotel, which he had requested in order to prepare for the lecture. As a result of the defendant’s breach of its contract, the plaintiff suffered damages by way of embarrassment and mental distress before his colleagues. In the complaint it was alleged also that plaintiff’s baggage was checked at the Pick-Congress Hotel, that it contained scientific notes and slides which were to be used in the lecture, and that the defendant through “negligence” had lost such baggage. None of the clothing and articles of personal property was returned to the plaintiff.
The caption in the complaint describes the defendant as “Albert Pick Hotels a corporation Pick-Lee House 15th & L Streets, N. W. Washington, D. C.” The motion to quash the service stated that Pick-Lee House, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and known as Lee House, Inc., “named as a defendant in the above entitled cause,” appeared specially and moved through its counsel for the quashing of the service of process which had been made upon the assistant manager of the Pick-Lee House, 15th and L Streets, N. W., Washington, D. C. Accompanying the motion were two affidavits, one filed by Morrison Worthington, who described himself as the secretary of the Central Plotel Company and assistant secretary of the Pick-Congress Corporation which operated the defendant hotel as the lessee of the Central Hotel Company. He affirmed that Lee House, Inc., a Delaware corporation, doing business as the Pick-Lee House, 15th and L Streets, N. W., in the District of Columbia, “is not a subsidiary or parent corporation of Pick-Congress Corporation, the corporation which operates the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago, Illinois”. The Pick-Congress Corporation is an Illinois corporation. According to the complaint, the activities violating the plaintiff’s right took place in Chicago, Illinois.
The second affidavit was filed by the manager of the Pick-Lee House in Washington, D. C., who affirmed that Pick-Lee House in Washington, D. C., is owned by “Lee House, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, by whom I am employed, and that in my capacity as Manager I have no authority of any kind to act as an agent for the corporation known as Lee House, Inc., for the acceptance of service of process, for it, or for any other corporation,” nor has the assistant manager, Mr. Richard Frank, any such authority.
If in fact the defendant was “doing business” in the District of Columbia, it would not matter, as stated in Mr. Worthington’s affidavit, that Pick-Lee House, Washington, D. C., is neither a subsidiary nor a parent corporation of the Pick-Congress Corporation. Nor does it matter, as stated in the other affidavit, that neither the manager nor the assistant manager of the Pick-Lee House in Washington, D. C., has the authority to accept service for the Illinois corporation. Service upon a sufficiently representative member of the defendant corporation doing business within the District of Columbia would be an adequate service. See St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. of Texas v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 S.Ct. 245, 57 L.Ed. 486 (1913). But service upon the assistant manager of the Washington hotel would not be adequate service. As was pointed out by the appellee to the court below, service of process has been “attempted upon the wrong party”; hence the service of' process was asked to be quashed. But. the Pick-Lee House, a Delaware corporation, was not named as the party defendant in the case and therefore had no-standing as a party to make such a motion.
Appellant introduced no evidence-at all to support the jurisdiction or to contradict what was said in the affidavits. His counsel argues that the court below had before it, and we are asked, erroneously, to take judicial notice, that at the time appellant made his reservation an advertisement appeared in the Washington classified telephone directory which stated that reservations could be made at all the Albert Pick Hotels in the country, including the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago, Illinois, by a phone call directed to 15th and L Streets, N. W., the “Washington sales office” of the Albert Pick Hotels. It is said in appellant’s brief but not otherwise in the record that “after the appellant had his tragic experience the advertising in the local telephone directory was modified and diluted.”
We think appellant should have introduced this advertisement in the evidence, showing that the named defendant consented to its insertion. If this is true, there would be evidence in the record tending to show that the Illinois corporation is “doing business” in Washington, D. C., in such manner as to render its subject to service of process, at least in respect to obligations arising out of the actions of its salesmen in the District of Columbia. The complaint is silent upon whether the contract with the Illinois corporation was made through the “Washington sales office” or not. See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); W. H. Elliott & Sons Co., Inc. v. Nuodex Products Co., Inc., 243 F.2d 116, 122 (C.A.1st, 1957) (concurring opinion). In view of the lack of standing of the Pick-Lee House, Inc., a Delaware corporation, to make the motion to quash as a party, we have concluded that appellant should be allowed to introduce evidence to this effect.
A judgment will be entered reversing the order of the District Court quashing the service in this case, and remanding the case to that Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1