What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
BAKER v. UTECHT et al.
No. 13430.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
April 28, 1947.
Writ of Certiorari Denied June 16, 1947.
See 67 S.Ct. 1744.
Albert Baker, pro se.
J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen. of Minnesota, and Ralph A. Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH, and JOHNSEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks his release by habeas corpus from the Minnesota state prison, where he is under conviction and sentence 'by a court of that State for the offense of sodomy. The District Court denied his application for a writ.
The only substantial federal question raised by the application is appellant’s charge that he was convicted without due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that he was not given a public trial. It appears that the trial court ordered the court room cleared during the testimony of the prosecuting witness, a girl 13 years old, and that of her mother, as to the circumstances of the alleged offense. It is not claimed that appellant or his counsel made any objection to the order at the time, and appellant took no appeal from the judgment of conviction to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Two and a half years- later, appellant sought to raise the question, with some others, by an application to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. He then filed a similar application in the District Court of Washington County, Minnesota, where a writ was issued, but the writ was discharged on a hearing and appellant was remanded to custody. He appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, where appellee filed a motion to quash, under Minnesota practice, to test the sufficiency of the allegations of the application to justify any issuance of the writ. The Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the motion to quash, State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 221 Minn. 145, 21 N.W.2d 328, and appellant then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was denied, Baker v. Utecht, 327 U.S. 810, 66 S.Ct 971, 90 L.Ed. 1034.
The opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court considered appellant’s contention on its legal merits and held, 21 N.W.2d at page 332, that, if there was in fact a denial of the right of public trial, it was not in the circumstances of the situation such a deprivation of due process as to make the conviction invalid in a collateral attack. The Court pointed out that appellant was admittedly represented by counsel throughout the proceeding and that he “had available an effective remedy through appeal” from his conviction. It further said: “If he had been denied the constitutional right to the benefit of counsel, * * * then we would have had an entirely different situation, in that his right of due process might have been nullified through his ignorance as a layman in not knowing how to assert his right of appeal in a timely and proper manner. The purpose of the guarantee of the right to counsel is to protect accused from a conviction resulting from his own ignorance of legal and constitutional rights. * * * Without the benefit of counsel, the accused, ignorant of his rights, would in effect stand deprived of the protective mantle of due process of law. The failure to provide counsel, unless intelligently waived, is a failure to complete the court and, as a violation of the due process clause, terminates the court’s jurisdiction and stands as a bar to a valid conviction.
* * * By contrast, however, the denial of the right to a public trial [in a part of the proceeding’], where the accused enjoys the benefit of competent counsel at every stage of the proceeding, does not ipso facto involve a violation of the due process clause and operate as a jurisdictional bar to a valid judgment of conviction. In the latter case, the court is complete and the accused enjoys ample corrective processes through appeal.”
We have previously indicated that the United States Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court on appellant’s petition for certiorari. In the situation presented, no reason appears why the District Couit on this application for habeas corpus should assume jurisdiction to re-examine the question thus previously adjudicated. The Supreme Court has several times said that, where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of an alleged violation of federal constitutional rights and the United States Supreme Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state court’s decision, a federal court wilt not ordinarily re-examine the questions so adjudicated, on an application for habeas corpus. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118, 64 S.Ct. 448, 450, 88 L.Ed. 572; Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230-232, 44 S.Ct. 519, 521-522, 68 L.Ed. 989.
The District Court therefore did not err in refusing to issue a writ for the purpose of re-examining whether there was a denial of a public trial under such circumstances as to make the conviction invalid in a collateral attack.
The order dismissing the application is affirmed.
Appellant argues also that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a “public trial” equally was violated, but “The Sixth Amendment of the' national Constitution applies only to trials in federal courts.” Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 453, 461, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1256, 86 L.Ed. 1595, and cases there cited.
In the number of applications that are now being made to the federal courts for habeas corpus, there is need to remind that, where a defendant has had the opportunity but lias failed to appeal from a conviction, not every violation of a federal constitutional right is such a deprivation of due process as will, like the denial of effective assistance of counsel, vitiate the eonviction and make it subject to collateral attack in habeas corpus. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 445, 64 S.Ct. 660, 677, 88 L.Ed. 834.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1