What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL R7-23, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT, Department of the Air Force, Intervenor.
No. 86-1080.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 26, 1989.
Decided Jan. 26, 1990.
Gordon P. Ramsey, Boston, Mass., for petitioner.
Pamela P. Johnson, Atty., Federal Labor Relations Authority, with whom William E. Persina, Acting Solicitor, Federal Labor Relations Authority, was on the brief, for respondent. Ruth E. Peters and Steven H. Svartz, Attorneys, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance.
Marilyn S.G. Urwitz, Attorney, Dept, of Justice, with whom William Kanter, Washington, D.C., and William C. Owen, Attys., Dept, of Justice, were on the brief, for intervenor.
Before MIKVA, EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS.
STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
A local union of the National Association of Government Employees appeals from an order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority upholding the Air Force’s decision to change the working hours of one of its employees at Scott Air Force Base. The union and the Air Force had bargained to impasse, and the union contends that the Air Force was required after impasse to maintain the status quo pending ultimate resolution of the dispute. The Authority found, however, that the union failed to take the steps needed to trigger that duty. Department of the Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, 33 FLRA 532 (1988). We uphold that finding and therefore affirm the FLRA’s decision. As a result, we need not reach the other claims raised by the parties.
Robert Porter runs the battery shop at Scott Air Force Base, exchanging fresh batteries for worn out ones. Before the Air Force’s change of his hours, he worked from 3 AM until 11:30 AM. In September 1981, the Air Force undertook to improve the overall efficiency of its operations at Scott. As part of that effort, it decided that it could enhance both efficiency and safety by changing Porter’s hours to 7 AM to 3:30 PM, when there would be more people around who would need batteries and who could help Porter in case of an accident (he was then the only employee working in the battery shop). Porter objected because of the loss of a nightpay differential. The local union bargained with the Air Force on his behalf, but without success. At a meeting on December 1, 1981, the union and the Air Force agreed that they were at an impasse. 33 FLRA at 534.
By letter dated December 23, 1981, the Air Force notified the union that it intended to implement the change effective January 10, 1982. The union responded the same day with a letter of its own, saying that it “ha[d] no choice but to notify the FSIP [Federal Service Impasses Panel] and the FMCS [Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service] that we desire to have their services in this matter.” Record Appendix (“R.A.”) 15. The same day the union also sent letters to both the Mediation Service and the Impasses Panel, “requesting]” the former to “provide your services” and notifying the latter of the situation and of its desire that management maintain the status quo “during the impasse procedures.” R.A. 16-17. The Air Force changed Porter’s working hours as planned on January 10, 1982.
Had the union properly invoked the services of the Impasses Panel, any Air Force failure to maintain the status quo (to the extent consistent with its functions) would have been, under the Authority’s rulings, an unfair labor practice in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1), (5) and (6). Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 18 FLRA 466, 469 (1985); see also U.S. Customs Service, 16 FLRA 198, 200 (1984). The purpose of this requirement is to facilitate use of the impasse resolution procedures, “thereby fostering stability” in federal labor-management relations. Department of the Treasury, 18 FLRA at 469.
The status quo duty depends, however, on some party’s having properly invoked the services of the Impasses Panel. This requires filing a fairly simple request form, on which the applicant is to state such basic information about the dispute as the identity of the parties, the issues at impasse, the positions of the parties, and an account of negotiation and mediation sessions held. See 5 CFR § 2471.1-.5 (1988). The union did not comply with these requirements, as it quite rightly concedes in its brief. It failed to provide either the required form or its substantive content, and its single brief letter to the Impasses Panel did not even request its services. Nor did the union follow the letter up even after the Air Force sent a reminder that it planned to change Porter’s hours on January 10, 1982. We have no hesitation in affirming the Authority’s conclusion that the union did not adequately invoke the services of the Panel, especially in light of the deference we owe the Authority’s orders in these cases. See National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 848 F.2d 1273, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1988) (quoting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983)); American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. FLRA, 815 F.2d 718, 719 & n.. 10 (D.C.Cir.1987).
Had the Air Force unduly jumped the gun, by ordering the change before the union had a reasonable opportunity to seek the aid of the Impasses Panel, the Authority would have excused its noncompliance with the request procedures. It found, however, that the 18-day period between December 23, 1981 and January 10, 1982 provided a reasonable opportunity. See 33 FLRA at 545-46. Its decision here is both reasonable and perfectly consistent with it’s previous ones on the subject. See, e.g., Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval Supply Center, 31 FLRA 1088, 1093 (1988) (11 days notice sufficient); Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, 16 FLRA 217, 230-31 (1984) (“more than a week” sufficient); U.S. Customs Service, 16 FLRA at 200 (six days notice sufficient); U.S. Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command, 5 FLRA 288, 294 (1981) (eight days sufficient).
The Authority also rejected the union’s argument that its letter to the Mediation Service triggered a duty on the part of the Air Force to maintain the status quo. It left open whether the duty might arise once the Mediation Service started “working” to resolve an impasse, 33 FLRA at 547, but found that in any event the letter was not enough. Although the union letter to the Mediation Service requested its help “as soon as possible,” R.A. 16, it did not inform the Service of the January 10 deadline or provide any details of the dispute. Also, the union sent no follow-up letter, despite the Air Force’s reminder. The Mediation Service never contacted either of the parties involved. The Authority found no duty to maintain the status quo under these circumstances, and petitioner offers no reason why we should interfere with that judgment. See Order Denying Request for General Ruling, 31 FLRA 1294, 1297 (1988) (whether status quo must be maintained once parties have bargained to impasse depends on “many factors and the evaluation of the facts in each case”).
We note the union’s assertion that 5 U.S.C. § 7119 makes invocation of the help of the Mediation Service a prerequisite to seeking the aid of the Impasses Panel. Nothing in the language of § 7119 appears to impose such a requirement, and the union reveals no other source. Accordingly we do not pass on how the existence of such a requirement might affect the Authority’s ruling.
The decision of the Authority is
Affirmed.
. In particular, we express no view on whether the Authority adequately justified its change of position on what constitutes a “tour of duty" under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) (1988).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0