What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
David Lee HELMICK, Appellant, v. H. C. CUPP, Warden, Appellee.
No. 24102.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 18, 1971.
Phillip D. Chadsey, argued, Portland, Or., for appellant.
Jacob B. Tanzer, argued, Sol. Gen., Lee Johnson, Or. Atty. Gen., David H. Blunt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, Or., for appellee.
Before HAMLEY, KOELSCH and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Habeas corpus. We agree with the district court that petitioner Helmick was not denied due process because three arresting sheriff’s deputies, one of whom testified as a witness for the prosecution, drove the jurors to the scene of the crime, after being designated by the trial judge as bailiffs for that purpose. The facts in this ease relevant to the matter differ materially from those in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965), a decision upon which Helmick relies.
Here, as the record discloses, the association between the deputies and the jurors was casual and short lived, for the deputies simply were chauffeurs on a trip which lasted no more than forty-five minutes; conversely in Turner the contact was not “a brief encounter but a continuous and intimate association throughout a three day trial — an association which gave these witnesses an opportunity, as Simmons put it, to renew old friendships and make new acquaintances among the members of the jury.” 379 U.S. at 473, 85 S.Ct. at 550. And, what is more important, here the deputy’s testimony did not concern the crime itself but was directed to matters about which there was no real issue — i. e., the authenticity of the signature on Helmiek’s confession and the victim’s age; thus the deputy testified in substance that he and the other two deputies witnessed Helmick sign the instrument and that the girl was 17 years old; however, in Turner, the testifying deputies were “[t]he two principal witnesses for the prosecution”; [379 U.S. at 467, 85 S.Ct. at 547] and their testimony “was not confined to some uncontrovert-ed or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution. On the contrary, the credibility which the jury attached to the testimony of these two key witnesses must inevitably have determined whether Wayne Turner was to be sent to his death.” 379 U.S. at 473, 85 S.Ct. at 550.
As Turner makes clear, the Court declared no per se rule that mere contact or association between a witness for the prosecution and a member or members of the jury constitutes the trial unfair in the constitutional sense; more must appear to affect the validity of a conviction. In Turner, the “more” was present in the form of the great likelihood that, because of the association, the jury gave undue credence to material witnesses and undue weight to their testimony; here, even if the assumption is indulged that the jurors favored this deputy, nevertheless his testimony was not harmful; nor do other facts or circumstances appear to create an aura of probable prejudice.
We must disagree with appellant’s contention that “due process requires that a court in passing on the question of voluntariness of a confession, make express findings of fact concerning all, not just some, disputed issues of fact bearing on the voluntariness of the statement.” Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the case relied upon by appellant for this proposition, dictates no such requirement. The Court was primarily concerned with procedures; it declared that a jury must not hear a confession until and unless the trial judge, after a full hearing, has first made a judicial determination that it was voluntarily given. But the Court also indicated that the determination, both of the ultimate fact and the underlying facts, need not be express, but might be implied from the record. Thus, the Jackson court, recognizing the constitutional validity of “the orthodox rule, under which the judge himself solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession, or those following the Massachusetts procedure, under which the jury passes on voluntariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the issue against the accused,” [378 U.S. at 378, 84 S.Ct. at 1781] pointed out that in either instance “the judge’s conclusions are clearly evident from the record since he either admits the confession into evidence if it is voluntary or rejects it if involuntary. Moreover, his findings upon disputed issues of fact are expressly stated or may be ascertainable from the record.” 378 U.S. at 379, 84 S.Ct. at 1782. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967) is to the same effect.
In the instant case, the state court record, introduced as an exhibit in the district court, discloses that the trial judge followed the Massachusetts procedure. And the record also shows that, at the conclusion of the in camera hearing, at which both Helmick and the State were freely permitted to adduce proof on the issue of voluntariness, the judge orally announced “It will be the ruling of the Court that the alleged confession was voluntarily made after the defendant had been effectively warned of his constitutional rights to remain silent. * * *” This express declaration by necessary implication demonstrates “with unmistakable clarity” [Sims v. Georgia, supra, 385 U.S. at 544, 87 S.Ct. 639] that the judge resolved the underlying factual issue against Helmick.
In this condition of the record the district court might have dispensed altogether with an evidentiary hearing and accepted as valid the state judge’s conclusion. Nevertheless, the district court conducted an entirely new hearing and independently found all issues against petitioner. Thus, even if the trial judge’s determination had lacked specificity, the defect was rendered immaterial.
The judgment denying the writ is affirmed.
. At the habeas corpus bearing in the district court, the witness-deputy testified that no mention of the case was made at any time, although one of the jurors did ask him for information about a traffic law which he was unable to give. True, neither of the two non-testifying deputies was called, but we are not prepared to speculate that either may have committed some gross impropriety while carrying out the trial court’s order. See Bowles v. Texas, 366 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1966).
. The failure of the trial judge to give any instruction on burden of proof on the issue of voluntariness of the confession or to give a detailed instruction setting out factors constituting volun-tariness raises no federal question. The trial judge’s determination fully protected Helmick’s constitutional rights. Jackson v. Denno, supra.
. We read Jackson v. Denno not as a denial of jurisdiction of a federal habeas corpus court to hear and determine the issue of voluntariness of a confession, but simply as a recognition of a general policy that the matter should be decided in the state court.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1