What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. FORTIER et al.
No. 14.
Argued October 10, 1951.
Decided December 11, 1951.
Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge and Samuel D. Slade.
Stanley M. Brown argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for Fortier, respondent. With Mr. Brown on the brief was Meyer Green for Marino et al., respondents.
Briefs of amici curiae supporting respondents were filed by Alvan J. Goodbar for Doernhoefer; and by John G. Simms.
Per Curiam.
The United States brought this action under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to compel restitution of allegedly excessive prices charged by respondents in the sale of two houses. The District Court entered judgment for respondents, 89 F. Supp.708, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 185 F. 2d 608. We granted certiorari, 341 U. S. 925.
Maximum sales prices for the two houses had been stipulated by respondents in securing the permission to build required under Priorities Regulation 33. Statutory authority for that regulation had been repealed before the sale of respondents’ houses, except for a proviso continuing in full force and effect priorities for building materials issued under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing’ Act of 1946. The Government views the maximum prices stipulated by respondents as a condition of construction authorization and priorities assistance that survived repeal under the proviso. We reject this view.
The 1946 Act contained detailed authorization for price restrictions on houses and for priorities on building materials. When that Act was repealed in 1947, Congress provided for veterans’ preferences in the sale and rental of housing and for rent ceilings on certain accommodations constructed with the assistance of priorities secured under the 1946 Act. Congress addressed itself to the problem of veterans’ housing, but refrained from imposing any price restrictions on the sale of houses. Congress having indicated a contrary purpose, we will not impose such restrictions by implication.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Minton took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
50 U. S. C. App. § 1821 et seq.
10 Fed. Reg. 15301, as amended, 11 Fed. Reg. 6598. Respondents ' were required to comply with this regulation by Veterans’ Housing Program Order No. 1, 11 Fed. Reg. 3190.
50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1881 (a), in repealing the 1946 Act, provided:
“That any allocations made or committed, or priorities granted for the delivery, of any housing materials or facilities under any regulation or order issued under the authority contained in said Act, and before the date of enactment of this Act [June 30, 1947], with respect to veterans of World War II, their immediate families, and others, shall remain in full force and effect.”
Respondents’ houses were not sold until November and December, 1947, months after repeal of the 1946 Act. As a result, no “penalty, forfeiture, or liability” had been incurred under the 1946 Act which would survive repeal under the general saving clause, 1 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) § 109. Compare United States v. Carter, 171 F. 2d 530 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1948).
50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 1884 (a); id., § 1892 (c) (1) (B) (3) (A).

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0