What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David Joseph RAWLS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 27183
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 23, 1970.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 27, 1970.
Richard H. Gill, Montgomery, Ala. (Ct. Apptd.), for appellant.
Ira DeMent, U. S. Atty., F. E. Leonard, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., for appellee.
Before BELL, AINSWORTH and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a jury conviction in a Dyer Act case, 18 U.S.C. § 2312. The issues are centered around sufficiency of the evidence.
Pursuant to Rule 18 of the Rules of this Court, we have concluded on the merits that this case is of such character as not to justify oral argument and have directed the clerk to place the case on the Summary Calendar and to notify the parties in writing. See Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 409 F.2d 804, Part I (5th Cir. 1969); and Huth v. Southern Pacific Company, 417 F.2d 526, Part. I.
Appellant was charged with transporting in interstate commerce a stolen motor vehicle from Atlanta, Georgia to Macon County, Alabama. The government introduced evidence from which the jury could conclude that the truck in question was stolen in Atlanta on February 8, 1968. Other evidence in the government’s direct case, viewed most favorably to the government, included the following. Alabama State Troopers pursued and stopped the truck near Tuskegee, Macon County, Alabama, later on the same day. Appellant was driving the truck and John Munnerlyn was a passenger. The trooper charged appellant with reckless driving and driving without a license. The truck was carried to Tuskegee and placed at the Macon County jail and subsequently identified as the stolen vehicle. The defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the government’s case, was overruled.
The defense called Munnerlyn as a witness. His testimony was equivocal and in part contradictory to a statement given by him to the FBI. But it included testimony that he had stolen the truck and that appellant took over the driving on the outskirts of Atlanta to relieve Munnerlyn, who was drunk, after which Munnerlyn passed out, and that Munner-lyn did not even know when the truck crossed from Georgia to Alabama. It also included Munnerlyn’s admission that on February 9 he had told an FBI agent he had been drinking with appellant and had told appellant he was going to steal a car. The defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal was renewed at the conclusion of the evidence and was again denied.
The defendant lost the benefit of appellate review of the initial denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal by presenting evidence which supplied deficiencies in the government’s case. United States v. Wallace, 417 F.2d 522 (5 Cir. 1969). The appellant launches a full-scale attack on this rule. 8 Moore, Federal Practice, j[ 29.05, presents the arguments pro and con. We are not prepared to overturn the established rule of this circuit on this issue.
When the motion was renewed it was properly denied. It has been held regularly and repetitively that unexplained possession of a vehicle recently stolen in another state permits, although it does not require, inferences that the possessor knew the vehicle was stolen and that he transported it in interstate commerce, e. g., Beufve v. United States, 374 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1967). Appellant urges that allowing the inferences to be drawn from unexplained possession is contrary to the rule that in a circumstantial evidence case the evidence must be such that the jury might reasonably find that it excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt, e. g., Riggs v. United States, 280 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1960). Whatever effect, if any, this argument might have in another case, in this case it overlooks that there was direct evidence in the form of Munnerlyn’s testimony, and the jury was entitled to choose between the differing versions he gave.
Affirmed.
. The jury can infer possession from the act of operating the vehicle. Some of Munnerlyn’s testimony tended to characterize appellant as the “mere hitchhiker” who troubled Judge Brown in Barfield v. United States, 229 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1956). But as discussed supra, there was other evidence tending to show appellant was much more deeply involved.
. Of course, it is for the jury to decide whether, when explanations are offered by a defendant for his possession, they are to be accepted as credible. Beufve, supra; Broom v. United States, 342 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1