What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ROYAL INS. CO., Ltd., v. VANSELUS et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
March 4, 1926.)
No. 3620.
Insurance <§=>150 — Rider providing that insurer shall not be liable for loss while obligation given for premium remains past due and unpaid invalid in view of Wisconsin standard insurance policy, requiring five days’ written notice of cancellation.
Suspension of insurance clause providing nonliability of company while any note or obligation given for premium remained past due and unpaid, added to Wisconsin standard insurance policy by rider, is ineffective, in view of clause of policy requiring five days’ written notice of cancellation.
Page, J.( dissenting.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Wisconsin.
Action by M. F. Yanselus and another against the Royal Insurance Company, Limited. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Robert J. Folonie, of Chicago, 111., for plaintiff in error.
W. T. Doar, of New Richmond, Wis., for defendants in error.
Before ALSCHULER, EYANS, and' PAGE, Circuit Judges.
EYAN A. EYANS, Circuit Judge.
Yanselus, one of the plaintiffs, secured fire insurance from the defendant fire insurance company covering his farm buildings, and thereafter suffered a loss which was fixed by the jury at $8,814.10. The larger part of this sum ($6,220) was payable to the eoplaintiff,. the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, as mortgagee.
Defendant does not here question its liability to the mortgagee, but denies liability to Yanselus because of the provisions of a certain promissory note, signed by the assured and which accompanied the application for insurance, the substance of which was incorporated in a rider attached to the policy. It reads as follows:
“And it is hereby agreed that, in case of nonpayment of this note at maturity, this company shall not be liable for loss during such default, and the policy for which this note was given shall lapse until payment is made to the company at its western department at Chicago, and in the event of nonsettlement for the time expired, as per terms of contract, the whole amount of the note may be declared earned, due, and payable, and may be collected by law. In case of loss under said policy before maturity of the notes, this note shall immediately become due and payable, and shall be deducted from the amount of said loss. Given in payment for a policy of insurance, and, if transferred before or after maturity, shall remain subject to the defenses.”
The note was not paid. No notice of its maturity was given, and eight days after such date the loss occurred. A local banker, agent of defendant, was at the time the insurance was effected securing a loan from the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company at the instance of Yanselus, and when the policy arrived it was, without being exhibited to the insured, Immediately forwarded to the mortgagee. The policy contained this provision:
“It is expressly agreed that this company shall not be liable for any loss or damage that may occur to the property herein mentioned, while any promissory note or obligation, or part thereof, given for the premium, remains past due and unpaid. * * * In case of loss prior to the maturity of any note given as a consideration, the company may deduct said note in its settlement of claim.”
Assured had, at the time this application was made, other insurance on the premises, which was canceled, and he was credited on the new premium ($277.81) with the unearned premium ($73.16) of the old policy. The promissory note was for the balance, $204.65. The policy was a Wisconsin standard insurance policy, which among other provisions contained one entitled, “Cancellation of Policy.” It read as follows:
“This policy shall be canceled at any time at the request of the insured, in which case the company shall, upon demand and surrender of this policy, refund the excess of said premiums above the customary short rates for the expired time. This policy may be canceled at any time by the company by giving to the insured a five days’ written notice of cancellation with or without tender of the excess of paid premium above the prorata premium for the expired time, which excess, if not tendered, shall be refunded on demand. Notice of cancellation shall state what said excess premium (if not tendered) will be refunded on demand.”
The trial court in disposing of the ease, said in part: “The standard policy law contemplates a suspension or a termination by the company only upon notice, and by the insured only upon a return of such part of the premium as has been paid, on a short rate basis.”
Defendant’s position is that the Wisconsin standard insurance policy contains an “added clause” provision which authorized the addition of a clause such as here under consideration reads: “The extent of the application of insurance under this policy and of the contribution to be made by this company in ease of loss or damage, and any other agreement not inconsistent with or a waiver of any of the conditions or provisions of this policy may be provided for by agreement in writing added hereto.”
It seems that the narrow and precise question we are called upon to determine is whether the “note clauses” attached to the policy as a rider contained an agreement inconsistent with the cancellation provision of the standard policy.
The policy, by its express terms, insured Vanselus “for the term of three years from the 18th day of September 1922, at noon, to the 18th day of September, 1925.” It also provided for a method of cancellation by the insured, and another method of cancellation by the insurer. The latter could only cancel by giving to the insured a “five days’ written notice.” Was such a clause inconsistent with another that provided: “The company shall not be liable for any loss * * * that shall occur * * * if the promissory note “ * * or part thereof given for the premium, remains past due and unpaid” ? .
It is urged by defendant that the added ■clause was not a cancellation clause, but a mere suspension agreement, and inasmuch as the Wisconsin standard policy permitted riders defining the extent to which the insurance shall apply, and the amount to be paid or contributed in case of loss, without restriction, it was perfectly legal to add to this agreement a clause limiting liability.
Grant that the rider added to the policy is better described as a suspension clause than a cancellation clause, may it not, however, be in part both? Cancellation and suspension are different terms and have different meanings; but, if they deal with or relate to a termination of liability under a fire insurance policy, are they not to that extent necessarily covering identical subject-matter? True, there may be a renewal of liability under a suspension clause and not under the cancellation clause, but we are concerned with the narrow issue — the cessation of liability (for either a short or a long time) and how it may be accomplished.
The Wisconsin standard policy required a notice in writing and to be given five days before liability could be terminated. The insured could, after five days’ written notice was given, avoid the loss of fire protection by paying the premium note, or he could secure other insurance. If no such notice were given, a loss might occur when the insured, through ovex-sight and forgetfulness, had neglected to make the premium payment. He might have been ignorant of tlxe termination of his insurance protection. It was to avoid the consequences of that neglect and carelessness, to which all men are inore or less subject, that the written notice of termination of liability was required in this standard policy. It is of vital importance, and should not be limited or restricted by any other clause of doubtful or uncertain meaning.
No case has been called to our attention where the precise question has been decided, and we have found none exactly in point. Plaintiff cites Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. School Dist. No. 62, 174 P. 514, 70 Okl. 300. But defendant properly calls to our attention the apparent absence of the “added clause” provision of the standard policy and the absence of all discussion in the opinion respecting its effect on the cancellation clause. We conclude that a suspension of insurance clause in a Wisconsin standard insurance policy cannot be upheld which provides for a termination of the insurance without a five days’ written notice to the assured.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1