What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MEDES v. HORNBACH.
(Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted May 5, 1925.
Decided June 1, 1925.)
No. 4187.
1. Livery stable and garage keepers <§=>7 — Evidence held to make prima facie case against garage keeper for damages to stored automobile.
Evidence showing use of car by employee of garage where it was stored, without knowledge or consent of owner, and resulting damage, helé sufficient to make prima facie case against garage owner for damages.
2. Livery stable and garage keepers <§=7 — Ordinary care required of garage keeper.
Keeper of storage garage chargeable only with ordinary care in employment of trustworthy servants, and in safe-keeping of cars, and is not insurer, or liable if car is stolen from garage without negligence on his part.
In Error to Municipal Court of District of Columbia.
Action by Earl E. Medes against Harry E. Hombaeh, trading as the Forest Hall Garage. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
J. W. Tomlinson, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error.
T. E. Lodge, of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
This was an action for damages, begun in the municipal court by the plaintiff in error as plaintiff below, upon the claim that the defendant at the time in question operated a certain garage for the storage of automobiles for pay, that plaintiff rented space of the defendant and left his automobile therein in defendant’s charge, that it was then the duty of the defendant to keep plaintiff’s automobile at the garage, and not permit it to go out without plaintiff’s consent, but that nevertheless the defendant or his agent or servant permitted file automobile to be taken from the garage without authority from plaintiff, and that it was then injured and damaged in the sum of $630, for which and other damages plaintiff prayed judgment.
The defendant pleaded, among other things, that the automobile was taken from the garage by an employee of the defendant, acting without the scope of his employment, and without the knowledge, consent, or authority of the defendant, and in violation of his orders and instructions.
The case was tried by the trial judge sitting in the ease as judge and jury. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence the defendant filed a motion for a “directed verdict,” upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case against the defendant, and had failed to prove any damage sustained by him resulting from any act or acts of the defendant. The court sustained the motion upon the ground stated therein, and rendered judgment for the defendant. The record is now before us for review.
The evidence for the plaintiff tended to prove that he was the owner of a certain automobile valued at about $600; that he rented storage space for it at the defendant’s garage at an agreed monthly rental; that at defendant’s request he left the key to the automobile in the car, so that it could be moved about in the garage, if necessary; that on a certain morning he went to the garage to get the car, and found that it had been taken out by one Carl Clarence Cook, the night man at the garage, without plaintiff’s knowledge or consent; that later he found it down town turned over and badly damaged, that Cook was then under arrest, and the car was held by the police as evidence against him. The plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to show the extent of the damage done to the car, and also other damages Suffered by him by being deprived of its use at that time.
The defendant, as already stated, introduced no evidence. It is true that certain letters were appended as exhibits to his answer, but they were not placed in evidence.
We think that the plaintiff’s evidence made out a prima facie case for a recovery against the defendant, and called for, evidence upon his part in support of his plea.
It is the duty in general of one operating a garage in which automobiles are kept in storage for pay to exercise ordinary care by the employment of trustworthy servants and otherwise for the safe-keeping of the cars in his charge. On the other hand, he is not an insurer of their safety, and if a stored ear is stolen from the garage without negligence upon his-part, he is not in general liable to the owner for the loss. This rule likewise applies, should the thief be an employee of the person operating the garage, if the theft occurs without the connivance or negligence of the employer. Nevertheless, when the proof establishes that a stored car, while in charge of the garage keeper, has been taken out and used by an employee of the latter, without the knowledge or consent of the owner, and has been damaged by such use, such proof, standing alone and unexplained, is sufficient to make out a prima facie case for a recovery by the plaintiff. Knights v. Piella, 111 Mich. 9, 69 N. W. 92, 66 Am. St. Rep. 375; Hadley v. Orchard, 77 Mo. App. 141; Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260, 31 Am. Rep. 467; Staley v. Colony Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 163 S. W. 381; Colburn v. Art Ass’n, 80 Wash. 662, 141 P. 1153, L. R. A. 1915A, 594; Travelers’ Indemnity Co. v. Fawkes, 120 Minn. 353, 139 N. W. 703, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331; Handley v. O’Gorman, 45 R. I. 242, 121 A. 399.
We think that, under the rules just stated, the evidence in this ease made out a prima facie case for a recovery by the plaintiff, and that it was error for’the lower court to render judgment upon it for the defendant.
The judgment is reversed, at the cost of the defendant in error, and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1