What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
ROBINSON v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 7386.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Nov. 19, 1934.
Robert T. Jacob, of Portland, Or., for petitioner.
Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key, M. II. Eustace, and Carlton Fox, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before WILBUR, SAWTELLE, and GARRE CHT, Circuit Judges.
WILBUR, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner seeks a review of the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals approving the determination by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of a deficiency of $3,597.28 in the income tax of petitioner for the year 1927.
Petitioner, a resident of Portland, Or., acquired in 1917 all of the capital stock of the Molalla Electric Company at a cost of $45,000 and sold the same to the Portland Electric Power Company in February, 1927. The selling price of the stock was $87,500, $17,500 of which was paid in cash. The deferred payments were evidenced by sixteen notes totaling $70,000, four of which, totaling $17,500, became duo on March 1st of each of the years 1928, 1929, 3930, and 1931. During the year 1927, petitioner purchased some real estate and gave the eight notes due March 1, 1928, and March 1, 1929, totaling $35,000, as part payment therefor and petitioner guaranteed payment of the same.
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to return the income from the sale of his stock in the Molalla Company upon the installment basis under section 212 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (26 USCA § 953 (d) and assigns as error the holding of the Board of Tax Appeals that “the petitioner, having in said taxable period received in cash and property as initial payment more than one fourth the purchase price at which he sold his Molalla Electric Co. stock, is not entitled, in our opinion and we so determine, to have his tax on the profit computed on the installment basis, as contended by him.”
This holding of the Board of Tax Appeals is based upon the proposition that by giving the notes for $35,000 as part payment for the real estate during the same taxable year, the petitioner to that extent received an interest therein as part of the initial payment for his stock in the Molalla Company within the meaning of section 212 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1926, supra.
The question here involved has recently been decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second'Circuit in a similar case [Du-ram Building Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Rev., 66 F.(2d) 253, 254] contrary to the conclusion reached by the Board of Tax Appeals. The Circuit Court of Appeals in Duram Building Corp. v. Commissioner, supra, stated:
“Therefore, as we interpret section 212 (d), the privilege of reporting upon the installment basis depends upon the transactions between the vendor and purchaser of the land during the taxable period; it is not made conditional upon what disposition the vendor may make of the purchaser’s evidences of indebtedness by transactions with third parties during the taxable period in which the land was sold. Such transactions are separate and independent and will themselves he the basis for a return of profit or loss.”
Respondent now concedes that petitioner is entitled under the provisions of section 212 (d), supra, to return the ineome from the sale of his stock on the installment basis as held in Duram Building Corp. v. Commissioner, supra. However, respondent contends that the transaction in 1927 whereby petitioner transferred eight of these notes maturing March 1, 1928, and. 1929, aggregating $35,-000, at their face value, as part payment for real estate, resulted in a gain or profit to petitioner and should be included in petitioner’s income tax return for 1927. This, respondent claims, is such a transaction as is referred to in the Duram Case as “separate and independent and will themselves be the basis for a return of profit or loss” and results in this case in a realization of the gain from the transaction to the extent that such gain was included in the installment notes transferred. This also is conceded by the petitioner as a correct application of the law where the exchange of the installment notes is made without recourse. But he contends that there was no gain or loss realized or determinable from this second transaction during 1927, the taxable year in question, because the petitioner guaranteed the payment of the notes so transferred and thus he did not realize upon these notes nor divest himself of liability for their payment.
In Shubin v. Comm’r of Int. Rev., 67 F. (2d) 199, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the fact that the seller, who received the proceeds of a second mortgage put upon the property by the purchaser, remains secondarily liable on the mortgage indebtedness is not sufficient to prevent the proceeds received from being considered as a payment at the time of the.transaction. We agree with the conclusion reached in that ease and therefore hold that even though petitioner remained liable as guarantor on the notes transferred, the gain included in the installment notes (transferred) for the real estate at their face value should have been included in petitioner’s income tax return for the year 1927.
Petitioner also claims error in the amount fixed by the Commissioner and affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals as the cost to him of the stock in the Molalla Electric Company. The amount fixed by the Commissioner and affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals was the original purchase price of $45,000. Petitioner was president and general manager of the Molalla Company from 1917 to '1927 at a salary of $250 per month until 1921 when it was increased to $300 per month. During this period petitioner was entitled to $33,600 in salary and claims to have drawn only $24,297.20, leaving a balance of $9,302.80 which he claims was left with the company and invested in its business and therefore should be added to the cost of the Molalla Company stock to him. During the year 1923 petitioner sold certain real estate for $1,400, which amount he claims was turned over to and used by the Molalla Company as were the proceeds of certain life insurance owned by petitioner in the amount of $1,598.22. Petitioner contends that since these last two amounts were turned over to and used by the Molalla' Company and not returned to him in the form of dividends or otherwise, these amounts should also be added as part of the cost to him of the Molalla Company stock. The record does not contain any of the evidence on these matters and we cannot in view of that fact disturb the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals that the record before it did not justify the claims so made by the petitioner and that the cost of the stock was $45,000.
The order of the Board of Tax Appeals is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2