What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, Appellant, v. EAST COAST ASPHALT CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
No. 19549.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
March 26, 1964.
Rehearing Denied June 10, 1964.
C. Shelby Dale, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for appellant.
Richard M. White, Miami, Harrison D. Griffin, Fort Lauderdale, Thomas H. Anderson, Earl D. Waldin, Jr., Miami, Fla., for appellees.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.
GEWIN, Circuit Judge.
This case is related to the case of Hardrives Co., Inc., et al. v. East Coast Asphalt Corp., et al. No. 19864, 5 Cir., 329 F.2d 868, and the case of United States v. South Florida Asphalt Co., et al. No. 19635, 5 Cir., 329 F.2d 860, both decided this same date. The conduct about which complaint is made is the violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. This appeal is from an order dismissing the complaint of the City wherein an injunction and treble damages were sought.
The record is not clear, but apparently the trial judge dismissed the complaint because he considered that the goods and materials alleged to be involved came to rest in the state of ultimate consumption prior to the sale of the same to the parties who finally utilized them; and that such fact eliminated the “in commerce” character of the goods.
The allegations of the complaint in this case are substantially the same as in the Hardrives case. This Court has repeatedly held that complaints in civil cases should not be dismissed unless it clearly appears that under no theory can the plaintiff be entitled to relief. Des-Isles v. Evans, 5 Cir., 200 F.2d 614; City of Daytona Beach v. Gannett, 5 Cir., 253 F.2d 771; Mannings v. Board of Public Instruction, etc., 5 Cir., 277 F.2d 370.
We think that this complaint alleges facts on which relief could be granted on two grounds, first this Court has held that contractors engaged in the construction of interstate highways and other facilities of interstate commerce are engaged “in commerce.” Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc., 5 Cir., 241 F.2d 663, 667, cert. denied 355 U.S. 825, 78 S.Ct. 33, 2 L.Ed.2d 39; Mitchell v. Hooper Equipment Co., 5 Cir., 279 F.2d 893. The Supreme Court has, of course, held likewise. Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 75 S.Ct. 860, 99 L.Ed. 1196. It is no argument to say that wage and hour cases are no authority for Sherman Act cases. Of course they are not necessarily authority to the extent> that they deny coverage. On the other hand, if they grant coverage on the basis of the employees actually being engaged in commerce then they are authority for what constitutes interstate commerce. Thus, we conclude that the allegation that the local conspiracy has artificially set prices for materials which its members sell or install for the construction of arteries of interstate commerce, is an adequate allegation of a conspiracy in interstate commerce.
Moreover, for the second point, we think the allegations of the manner in which the conspiracy, even though it be “local” in nature, affects commerce are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. In United States v. Employing Plasterers Assoc. of Chicago, 347 U.S. 186, 74 S.Ct. 452, 456, 98 L.Ed. 618, the Supreme Court said, in a criminal case:
“The complaint plainly charged several times that the effect of all these local restraints was to restrain interstate commerce. Whether these charges be called ‘allegations of facts’ or ‘mere conclusions of the pleader,’ we hold that they must be taken into account in deciding whether the Government is entitled to have its case tried.
“We are not impressed by the argument that the Sherman Act could not possibly apply here because the interstate buying, selling and movement of the plastering materials had ended before the local restraints became effective. Where interstate commerce ends and local commerce begins is not always easy to decide and is not decisive in Sherman Act cases. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 232 [68 S.Ct. 996, 1004, 92 L.Ed. 1328].”
We think that the conspiracy alleged in this case dealing with the type of business in which the appellees are engaged falls well within the reasoning vf this case.
See also United States v. Women’s Sportswear, 336 U.S. 460, 69 S.Ct. 714, 93 L.Ed. 805.
The judgment of dismissal was in error.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 9