What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL REPERTORY THEATRE FOUNDATION, Appellant, v. FORD THEATRE SOCIETY.
No. 71-1344.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 14, 1972.
Decided Oct. 10, 1972.
Mr. Bardyl Rifat Tirana, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Paul Martin Wolff, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. David N. Webster, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, McGOWAN and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
WILKEY, Circuit Judge.
We are called on here to construe a contract between the National Repertory Theatre Foundation (Foundation) and Ford’s Theatre Society (Ford), whereby Ford agreed to reimburse the Foundation for producing a series of plays in Ford’s theatre. Expenses incurred by the Foundation in producing the plays were to be assigned to one of five specified categories: “general and administrative,” “subscription campaign,” “production,” “theatre break-in,” and “operating.” The contract specified maximum amounts to be paid under each of the five headings and established criteria for determining what types of expenses should be placed in each category.
In accordance with the procedure specified, at the end of the contract term the Foundation’s accountants submitted for certification to Ford’s accountants itemized lists of expenditures allegedly incurred under the contract. After examining this demand for payment, Ford’s accountants determined that some of the expenditures did not fit within the definitions provided in the contract and advised Ford that it should not pay them. The Foundation thereupon brought suit for the disputed expenses, alleging that under the contract its accountants were authorized to make a final and binding determination of what expenses were payable by Ford. Ford denied this, alleging that under the terms of the contract its accountants were given the power to determine what expenses were chargeable to what category and were to be paid by Ford. After receiving testimony on what the parties intended under the contract, the District Court decided that Ford’s accountants were to have the power to make a final determination.
We hold that by the unambiguous terms of the contract neither the accountants of Ford nor those of the Foundation were intended to have the authority to make a final determination of what amounts were payble under the agreement.
A brief description of the contract’s structure and contents is necessary. Paragraph 3 of the contract contains five subparagraphs — -one subparagraph each defining and establishing criteria for allocating expenses into the five categories. The first subparagraph deals with “general and administrative” expenses, and states that these expenses are to be “defined in accordance with the accounting practice of [the Foundation’s] accountants . . . .” This language is omitted from the four remaining subparagraphs dealing with the other four categories of expenses, nor is there wording providing differently at this same place in the other four subparagraphs. Language at the beginning of paragraph 3 implies that payment under any of the five categories will be “in the manner set forth in paragraph 5, after certification by [Ford’s accountants] according to recognized accounting principles .”
Paragraph 5 of the contract deals with the four categories of costs other than “general and administrative” costs; i.e., the four categories that in paragraph three were not specifically described as to be “defined in accordance with the accounting practice of [the Foundation’s] accountants . . . .” With regard to each of these four categories, paragraph 5 states that “[the Foundation] will submit for certification at the office of [Ford’s] accountants according to the definition^] set forth in paragraph 3 and general accounting principles, a summary schedule [of expenses] . . . .”
Pointing to the difference between what Ford’s accountants are to do under paragraph 3 and what they are to do under paragraph 5, Ford makes the following analysis. Ford concedes, with apparent magnanimity, that under the language of paragraph 3 the Foundation’s accountants are to have absolute discretion as to what expenditures will be allocated to the “general and administrative” category. The remaining four categories of expenses, however, are not to be “defined” by the Foundation’s accountants. Rather, they are to be determined and paid according to the provisions of paragraph 5, which states that Ford’s accountants are to “verify” the expenditures “according to the definitions set forth in paragraph 3 . . . .” Ford argues that this authority to “verify” the accounts according to the definitions of the four types of expenses means that Ford’s accountants are to have the power to determine if payments are actually owing under the contract. In essence, Ford argues’that its accountants’ authority to “verify” the bills presented by the Foundation’s accountants is synonymous with the power to act as a binding arbiter of what amounts are payable.
Ford’s analysis of the contract is correct in part. The language of paragraph 5 makes it crystal clear that the Foundation’s accountants were not intended to be the final arbiters of what expenses must be paid by Ford. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Ford’s accountants are entitled to decide finally what expenses must be paid under the four categories enumerated in paragraph 5. Paragraph 5 merely requires Ford to pay “immediately” if the expenses submitted by the Foundation are “verified” by Ford’s accountants. It does not say, however, that in the final analysis Ford will be excused from paying demands if they are not “verified.” Paragraph 5 no more makes Ford’s accountants an arbiter of who must pay in conflicts between the parties than does paragraph 3 make the Foundation’s accountants the arbiter.
A rather decisive argument against making either set of accountants a final arbiter under either the first or the last four categories is that it sets up a theoretical and practical conflict within the corners of the contract. If the Foundation’s accountants have the power to determine what is “general and administrative” expenses under the first category, they have the power to determine what is not “general and administrative” expense. By parity of reasoning, if Ford’s interpretation is accepted, Ford’s accountants would have the same power of classification, in or out, for the last four categories.
The practical — and completely unacceptable — result is illustrated here. Two of the several types of expenses rejected by Ford’s accountants are salaries of ticket takers and ushers at Ford’s Theatre in Washington. The Foundation’s accountants have said these are not “general and administrative” under category one (which appears to deal almost exclusively with expenses incurred at the Foundation office in New York City); Ford’s accountants have said they do not fit within either of the last four categories, and have refused to “verify” them. There would appear to be nothing more obviously an expense of a theater production than ticket takers and ushers, yet the theory of accountants as final arbiters rules out its payment under any classification.
The truth is that in this, as in virtually every other business contract, the parties did not intend to set up any accountants as being the final arbiters of whether disputed amounts are due. We find no statement or suggestion anywhere in the contract that the parties intended to grant such an extraordinary power to their respective accountants. Indeed, the language and structure of the contract compels the conclusion that the parties expected their accountants to perform the type of service that accountants ordinarily perform for businessmen. The Foundation’s accountants were supposed to prepare a list of expenses that they believed payable under the definitions provided in paragraph 3. Ford’s accountants under paragraph 5 were supposed to check these proposed lists of expenses and contest any of them that they did not believe were covered under the contract. This is exactly what the two sets of accountants did in this ease. Once an issue was raised by the accountants regarding whether an amount was due, it became a legal question whether the contested amount was actually due under the contract.
This legal issue must be resolved by the District Court just as any other dispute under a contract is adjudicated. Upon remand the court should develop evidence, either before the court or by reference to a special master, on whether the contested expenses do in fact fit under any of the definitions given in paragraph 3.
The decision of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded for a determination of whether the disputed expenses are payable under the definitions provided in the contract.
So ordered.
. The Foundation’s accountants were recognized specialists in accounting for the theatre industry, a fact upon which the Foundation relies heavily in its interpretation of the contract. Under the analysis we make here this fact is of no decisive import, except that it in some degree cuts against the other party’s (Ford’s) accountants being set up as a “final arbiter” as to what were legitimate expenses and as to which category they belonged in this theatre venture.
. The text of the contract is reproduced in the Joint Appendix, Vol. I, at 110-20.
. Paragraph 3(a), Joint App., Vol. I, at 111.
. Paragraph 3(b)-(e), Joint App., Vol. I, at 112-14.
. Paragraph 3, Joint App., Vol. I, at 111 (emphasis added).
. Emphasis added. The language cited in the text appears in each of the three subparagraphs of paragraph 5. These three subparagraphs deal with the four categories of expenses other than “general and administrative.” Paragraph 5(a)-(c), Joint App., Vol. I, at 116-17.
. Ford’s graciousness in admitting that the Foundation’s accountants were to be the final arbiters of what was payable under the “general and administrative” category is less than sheer generosity. Ford had already paid out the maximum amount payable under that category and could not have been called on to pay more, even if the Foundation’s accountants “defined” additional expenses as being “general and administrative.”
Ford’s analysis that the Foundation’s accountants would be the final arbiters of “general and administrative” expenses bolsters its argument that Ford’s accountants were to be the final arbiters of all other expenses. If it. is admitted that certain language in the contract provides that one set of accountants are the arbiters of “general and administrative” expenses, there develops a certain superficial logic favoring the argument that the other set of accountants are to be the arbiters of all other expenses.
This logic is based on the assumption that, if some of the expenses are to be determined by accountants, then all of the expenses are to be determined by accountants. Since paragraph 5 makes it clear that the Foundation’s accountants are not to determine expenses other than “general and administrative,” it would follow that Ford’s accountants must have been intended to determine them.
It is unnecessary to decide whether the Foundation’s accountants were intended to be the final arbiters of what were “general and administrative” expenses since none of the payments under that section are being contested here. We believe, however, that the Foundation’s accountants were not intended to be the final arbiters of what were “general and administrative” expenses. Admittedly, paragraph 3 provided that the Foundation’s accountants were to “define” the expenses payable under that subsection. This grant of authority was followed in the subparagraph, however, with a long description of how these expenses were to be defined. If the Foundation were to have had absolute discretion over what was to be paid under the “general and administrative” heading, the precise definitions given under that subsection would have been unnecessary. It is more logical to conclude that the power granted the Foundation’s accountants to “define” what were “general and administrative” expenses was substantially similar to their duties under the other four categories of expenses.
. The Foundation’s argument that its accountants were to be the final arbiters of contract disputes was not actually based on the language of the contract. Rather, the Foundation’s position rested on the testimony of various parties to the contract. They testified that their understanding had been that Ford’s accountants were simply supposed to “check the arithmetic” of the expenditures submitted by the Foundation’s accountants. See Appellant’s Brief at 27-32. This testimony is irrelevant, since we find that the contract was unambiguous on its face and that it clearly did not provide for the Foundation’s accountants to be the final arbiters of contract disputes.
In any case, this testimony relied on by appellant is not inconsistent with our reading of the contract. It may well have been that one of the primary reasons Ford insisted on having its own accounting firm review the Foundation’s bills was to “check the arithmetic.” This does not mean, however, that the contractors could not have granted an additional power to Ford’s accountants, i. e., the power to “verify” the expenditures “according to the definitions set forth in paragraph 3 This additional power granted by paragraph 5 clearly indicates that Ford’s accountants were not limited to checking arithmetic.
. The introductory portion of paragraph 5 reads as follows:
The amounts described in paragraph 3 in excess of advance payments described in paragraph 4 will be paid by [Ford] immediately after written certification by' . . . [Ford’s accountants]
Paragraph 5, Joint App., Yol. I, at 116

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0