What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
MOYD et al. v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION. GAFFNEY et al. v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION.
Nos. 5804, 5805.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit
Oct 27, 1948.
Zach McGhee and Isadore S. Bernstein, both of Columbia, S. C., for appellants.
N. A. Turner, of Columbia, S. C. (Edward A. Harter, Jr., of Columbia, S. C., on the brief), for appellee.
■ William S. Tyson, Sol., and Bessie Margolin, Asst. Sol., both of Washington, D. C., William A. Lowe, of Chicago, 111., and Sidney S. Berman, of Washington, D. C, and Beverley R. Worrell, Regional Atty., United States Dept, of Labor, of Birmingham, Ala. for Administrator of Wage & Hour Division, United States Dept, of Labor, amicus curiae.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
These are appeals in cases instituted under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. '§ 201 et seq., for the recovery of wages and overtime compensation. Plaintiffs are shoe shine boys who shined shoes in the men’s rest room of the bus terminal of the defendant Atlantic Greyhound Corporation, at Columbia, S. C. The defendant was admittedly engaged in the operation of passenger buses in interstate commerce and maintained this terminal in connection with its business. The plaintiffs were paid no wages but were allowed to retain all amounts received by them for shining shoes. They performed no services for defendant except that they were required to keep clean the rest room in which they operated. They worked in three daily shifts of eight hours each. Their earnings from shining shoes and tips amounted on the average to from $8.00 to $10.00 per day each, according to the findings of the special referee appointed by the trial judge, and were far in excess of the minimum wages prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act, with time and a half allowed for overtime.
There is grave doubt as to whether plaintiffs can properly be said to have been engaged in commerce (See McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 87 L.Ed. 1538) or to have been employees of defendant (See Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 4 Cir., 141 F.2d 324) within the meaning of the Act. We need not go into these questions, however, since it is clear that recovery was properly denied on the ground that the amounts received by plaintiffs for shoe shining and tips was far in excess of any sums to which they would have been entitled as wages and overtime compensation under the Act. Plaintiffs deny that the tips received by them should be considered as wages within its meaning, but the point is definitely ruled by our decision in Southern Railway v. Black, 4 Cir., 127 F.2d 280.
Contention is made that plaintiffs are at least entitled to overtime compensation on the theory that their wage rate should be computed on the basis of tips received and that overtime compensation should be allowed on this basis as their regular wage rate. It is settled, of course, that overtime compensation should be allowed on wages actually received, even though such wages are in excess of the minimum wage prescribed by the Act with time and a half for overtime on the minimum. Bay Ridge Operating Company v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 68 S.Ct. 1186; Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682. In this case, however, there was no regular rate of pay, and the right to recover wages and overtime compensation must be determined under the minimum wage provisions of the Act, as was done in Southern Railway v. Black, supra. Defendant may “credit against the obligation to pay statutory excess compensation the amount already paid to each respondent which is allocable to work in those excess hours.” Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, supra [334 U.S. 446, 68 S.Ct. 1202]. When that is done in this case, no right of recovery remains. There is nothing in law or in common sense which requires that the compensation from shoe shining and tips received from the entire period of service be treated as normal wages so as to provide a basis for recovering overtime compensation for the hours worked in excess of the maximum work week.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1