What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. WALDMAN’S ESTATE.
No. 64, Docket 22084.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Feb. 14, 1952.
Decided April 14, 1952.
Augustus N. Hand, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Theron Lamar Caudle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, A. F. Prescott and George D. Webster, Assts. to the Atty. Gen., Helen Goodner, Washington, D. C., for the petitioner.
Philip Steinman, New York City, for respondent.
Before AUGUSTUS N. HAND, CHASE and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
CHASE, Circuit Judge.
Isidore Waldman formed a partnership with Jack Schoenfield and Sidney Portnow which did business in New York under the firm names of Larolaine Dress Co., and Larolaine Juniors Co., and which was engaged in such business on November 22, 1945, the date of his death. He had reported his income for taxation on the calendar year, cash basis and the partnership had filed its information returns on the basis of fiscal years ending on June 30th.
The partnership agreement provided that upon the death of a partner “his executors or administrators or the person or persons to whom he bequeathed his interest in the partnership shall have the right to continue as partner or partners in business in the place and stead of the deceased partner or they may sell their interest in the partnership as herein provided. The election of the representatives to continue in the partnership shall be made by giving notice in writing of such election to the surviving partners at the office of the partnership within two months after the death of the deceased partner. Thereupon the said personal representative shall succeed to all the rights of the deceased partner to share in the profits or surplus of the business, but shall take no part in the management of the affairs of the partnership-, and shall receive no salary.”
Philip Steinman qualified as executor under the will of the decedent and, a few days after Mr. Waldman died, the bank in which the partnership kept its account was instructed to pay checks .only when they were signed by the executor and at least one of the surviving partners. Otherwise, the partnership business was carried on by the surviving partners as before.
On January 2, 1946, the executor, by letter to the surviving partners, advised them of his election under the above provision of the partnership agreement “to continue as a partner in the business formerly conducted between yourselves and Isidore Waldman."
On January 7, 1946, the attorney for the surviving partners wrote the executor a. letter in which, after stating reasons, he said, “Accordingly, I advise you on behalf of Messrs. Schoenfield and Portnow that we regard your notice as ineffective for any purpose whatsoever and herewith express our rejection of your election to continue the interest of the decedent in the partnership of which he was a member at the time of his death.”
On January 10, 1946, the executor and the surviving partners agreed that the partnership “shall be dissolved as at January 31, 1946” and that the executor would sell the entire interest of the deceased in the partnership “as at January 31, 1946” to the surviving partners in equal shares. Part of the purchase price was to be paid on or .before January 31, 1946 and the executor’s signature on partnership checks was to be required until such payment was made. This sale of the decedent’s interest in the partnership was carried out in accordance with the agreement.
The executor filed an income tax return for the decedent for the period between January 1, 1945 to the date of his death, November 22, 1945, but which included the decedent’s share in the partnership income only for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945. The Commissioner determined a deficiency by including $13,056.33 which was stipulated to be the decedent’s share in the partnership income from the end of the fiscal year in 1945 to the date of his death. The Tax Court held this inclusion to be erroneous and whether it was is the issue now presented. So far as we can see, the circumstances in this case differ from those in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 493, 58 S.Ct. 673, 82 L.Ed. 975 in which Commissioner v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 2 Cir., 89 F.2d 692 was affirmed, only in that this partnership agreement expressly provided for an election by the representative of a deceased partner to continue his interest at risk in the business and Congress has since passed Sec. 126 of Title 26 U.S.C. which in subdivision (a)(1) provides that,
“The amount of all items of gross income in respect of a decedent which are not properly includible in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date of his death or a prior period shall be included in the gross income, for the taxable year when- received, of:
“(A) the estate of " the decedent, if the right to receive the amount is acquired by the decedent’s estate from the decedent; * *
This, however, is merely a statutory change to prevent the escape from taxation of gross income which, pursuant to other provisions of the tax laws, is not to be taken into account in computing the net taxable income of a decedent for the taxable period in which he died, and does not change the law under which the determination of what items “of gross income in respect of a decedent” are “properly includible in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date of his death”. Consequently, it does not appear to us that Sec. 126 of Title 26 U.S.C. affords any ground whatever for distinguishing this case from Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra. On the contrary, it is Sec. 188, I.R.C., 26 U.S.C. § 188 which, as construed in that case, does control. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court was moved to decide that case as it did because then a contrary decision would have allowed income earned by a decedent in his lifetime to escape taxation altogether. We do not so read that opinion. Whatever was said as to nontaxability otherwise was merely an observation and not stated as a reason for the decision which was based upon an analysis of the applicable law which is equally applicable now to require the same result in this case.
Neither does the fact that this partnership agreement contained provisions for the election by the executor to continue to have the deceased partner’s interest remain at the risk of the business prevent the dissolution of the partnership at the date of the deceased partner’s death. Darcy v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 66 F.2d 581; certiorari denied 290 U.S. 705, 54 S.Ct. 372, 78 L.Ed. 606; New York Partnership Law, Sec. 62, subd. 4, McK.Consol.Laws, c. 39. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra, cannot, therefore, be distinguished on that score. It may bé noted, moreover, that the surviving partners repudiated the executor’s fight to make such an election after he had attempted to exercise it.
Nor, did the sale of the decedent’s interest “as at January 31, 1946” affect the liability of the decedent for income faxes upon his distributive share of the partnership income earned before he died. That liability was not related to the arbitrary choice of the date which the parties to the sale of his partnership interest made “as at” which they would take into account profits in arriving at the price to be paid for that interest.
The petitioner relies upon Henderson’s Estate v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 155 F.2d 310, Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 3 Cir., 182 F.2d 921, and Commissioner v. Mnookin’s Estate, 8 Cir., 184 F.2d 89, as did the Tax Court, and we make no attempt to distinguish them but, with deference, reach the contrary decision which we think Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra, requires.
Decision reversed.
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
I dissent on the reasoning of the Third Circuit set forth in the opinion of Judge Hastie in Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 3 Cir., 182 F.2d 921.
. E. g. Sec. 42(a) I.R.C., 26 U.S.C. § 42(a).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1