What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BAYLESS v. UNITED STATES.
No. 12684.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Feb. 8, 1945.
Donald H. Latshaw, of Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Otto Schmid, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Kansas City, Mo. (Maurice M. Milligan, U. S. Atty., of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before GARDNER, WOODROUGH, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is taken from a judgment on jury verdict rendered July 15, 1943, convicting the appellant of a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 408, the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, committed on the 8th day of September, 1937, and sentencing him to‘ five years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively after another twenty year sentence for another crime which we considered in Bayless v. United States, 147 F.2d 169.
The record shows that prior to the trial of this case appellant duly filed his plea in bar in which he alleged that he had been arraigned upon the indictment herein on the 31st day of January, 1938, and had then pleaded guilty thereto and had then been sentenced to imprisonment on account of the crime charged in the indictment for the term of five years, being the maximum imprisonment under the statute. That it was a condition of the sentence of 1938 that it should be served concurrently with another sentence of twenty years then being imposed upon appellant for another crime. That the appellant had been subjected to imprisonment pursuant to the five year sentence so rendered against him on account of the crime charged against him in the present indictment and had served the full measure of the imprisonment therein prescribed, having remained incarcerated under said sentence in the federal penitentiaries at Leavenworth and Alcatraz Island 'from February 1, 1938, until the 8th day of. May, 1943. That on said 8th day of May, 1943, he was discharged from imprisonment at Alcatraz pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus, and taken before the court at Kansas City to answer to the same indictment for the same violation of the Dyer Act. That the attempt of the government to subject the appellant to trial upon this indictment for the identical offense for which he had suffered the full punishment prescribed in the sentence rendered thereon was contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the constitution and constituted double jeopardy, forbidden by the amendment, and that he was entitled to be discharged from any further proceedings under this indictment.
The allegations of the plea in bar appear not to have been traversed by the government, and from the record as a whole it appears that they are true. Nevertheless, the plea in bar was overruled and the trial upon the indictment herein .to which the appellant was thereupon subjected resulted in his conviction and fhe imposition of a new sentence to five more years’ imprisonment from which he appeals.
We are satisfied that the plea in bar stated a complete defense to the further prosecution of appellant under the indictment herein and the plea in bar should have been sustained.
Though it appears that while appellant was imprisoned in Alcatraz he obtained a writ of habeas corpus which discharged him from imprisonment in May, 1943, the record before us does not include the habeas corpus proceedings. But from February 1, 1938, up until February 1, 1943, appellant was serving the other longer sentence for his other crime concurrently with his five-year sentence under the present indictment. We may assume that as appellant was held under two sentences up to February 1, 1943, probably both were alleged in his petition for habeas corpus. But obviously after February 1, 1943, when he had completed five years’ imprisonment, appellant would not knowingly invite inquiry into the validity of the sentence that he had then completely served. The five-year sentence on its face had ceased to afford grounds for detaining him in prison, and upon that fact appearing, the- judge in the habeas corpus proceedings would have no occasion to inquire into the validity of the sentence. Whether valid or invalid, it had served the purpose of a valid sentence and had caused the maximum imprisonment for the .crime to be served and all questions as to whether it ought -to have been rendered or not were entirely moot.
It is the theory of the government that the action of the court in the habeas corpus proceedings operated to avoid the former plea of guilty and the five year sentence rendered thereon and to restore the prosecution for trial. But that action was not taken until more than three months after the full five year term of imprisonment had been served and after the sentence had been fully executed, according to the uncontradicted allegations of the plea in bar. The habeas corpus proceedings could not, therefore, justify such restoration of the prosecution.
So far as we have been able to discover, this appeal presents the only instance in our history where a man who has been sentenced and has served the maximum imprisonment for a crime has then been brought back and in the face of that record retried on the same charge and sentenced to serve the maximum over again. We do not sanction the precedent.
On the record before us we hold that the judgment and sentence appealed from undertake to punish the appellant twice for the same offense, contrary to the Fifth Amendment, and are erroneous. The judgment is reversed with direction to set aside the verdict and recall any commitment that may have issued under the sentence.
Reversed with directions.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0