What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.

Opinion:
Willie A. WOMACK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 21629.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 28, 1968.
Decided May 1, 1968.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied May 24, 1968.
Mr. Jerome H. Simonds, Washington, D. C., (appointed by this Court) for appellant.
Mr. Lawrence Lippe, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the opposition, for appellee.
Before Bastían, Senior Circuit Judge, and Burger and Wright, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After a direct appeal from his criminal conviction had been noted, appellant moved to hold that appeal in abeyance pending disposition by the District Court of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The motion filed below alleged denial of due process under the principles announced in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). The District Court refused a hearing on appellant’s allegations, holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a Section 2255 motion while a direct appeal was pending in this court. Appellant noted an appeal from this order and has moved for summary reversal.
We are of the view that there is no jurisdictional bar to the District Court’s entertaining a Section 2255 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal but that the orderly administration of criminal law precludes considering such a motion absent extraordinary circumstances. A motion under Section 2255 is an extraordinary remedy and not a substitute for a direct appeal. Moreover, determination of the direct appeal may render collateral attack unnecessary.
In the case at bar, the District Judge properly refused to entertain the Section 2255 motion. Although the trial was held prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stovall v. Denno, swpra, and the record on direct appeal may, therefore, be insufficient to warrant reversal of the conviction, this court may nonetheless remand for further proceedings if there appears to be a nonfrivolous Stovall claim. See Wright v. United States, No. 20,153 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 31, 1968). Since such an evidentiary hearing is all that appellant seeks by way of Section 2255, we think that an adequate remedy is available on direct appeal. Appellant would, of course, be free to renew his Section 2255 motion after disposition of the direct appeal, should relief still be necessary.
Motion for summary reversal denied.
. Where tlio District Judge concludes that the motion is or may be appropriate, he may follow the procedure outlined in Smith v. Pollin, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 178, 194 F.2d 349 (1952). See also Smith v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 28, n. 9, 283 F.2d 607 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 938, 81 S.Ct. 387, 5 L.Ed.2d 369 (1961).
. Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 117-118, 368 F.2d 822, 825-826 (1966).
. United States v. Brilliant, 274 F.2d 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 806, 80 S.Ct. 1242, 4 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1960) ; Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38, 41 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938, 80 S.Ct. 379, 4 L.Ed.2d 357 (1960); Bell v. United States, 265 F.Supp. 311 (N.D. Miss.1966), aff’d, 375 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 881, 88 S.Ct. 121, 19 L.Ed.2d 175 (1967). Cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942).
. The only factor in this case running in favor of granting a hearing is that more than seven months had elapsed since sentencing when the District Court refused to entertain the Section 2255 motion. More than seventeen months have now elapsed since appellant’s allegedly improper pre-trial identification. Much of the delay since the conviction is attributable to appellant’s seeking extraordinary relief rather than pursuing his direct appeal.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 8