What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.

Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.

Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name.

Opinion:
HILLSIDE DAIRY INC. et al. v. LYONS, SECRETARY, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, et al.
No. 01-950.
Argued April 22, 2003
Decided June 9, 2003
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Parts I and III of which were unanimous, and Part II of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 68.
Roy T Englert, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were Lawrence S. Robbins, Charles M. English, Jr., Wendy M. Yoviene, and Nicholas C. Geale.
Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCollum, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Mark B. Stern.
Mark J. Urban argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Bruce F. Reeves and Mark J. Urban, Deputy Attorneys General, and Andrea Hackett Henningsen.
Together with No. 01-1018, Ponderosa Dairy et al. v. Lyons, Secretary, California Department of Food and Agriculture, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Nevada et al. by Brian Sandoval, Attorney General of Nevada, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Mike McGrath of Montana, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Christine Ó. Gregoire of Washington, and Peggy A. Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for Continental Dairy Products, Inc., et al. by Benjamin F. Yale; and for the Dairy Institute of California by Thomas S. Knox.
John J. Vlahos filed a brief for Western United Dairymen as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In most of the United States, not including California, the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk is regulated pursuant to federal marketing orders. Those orders guarantee a uniform price for the producers, but through pooling mechanisms require the processors of different classes of dairy products to pay different prices. Thus, for example, processors of fluid milk pay a premium price, part of which goes into an equalization pool that provides a partial subsidy for cheese manufacturers who pay a net price that is lower than the farmers receive. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 189, n. 1 (1994).
The California Legislature has adopted a similar program to regulate the minimum prices paid by California processors to California producers. In the cases before us today, out-of-state producers are challenging the constitutionality of a 1997 amendment to that program. They present us with two questions: (1) whether § 144 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 917, 7 U. S. C. § 7254, exempts California’s milk pricing and pooling regulations from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause; and (2) whether the individual petitioners’ claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause is foreclosed because those regulations do not discriminate on their face on the basis of state citizenship or state residence.
I
Government regulation of the marketing of raw milk has been continuous since the Great Depression. In California, three related statutes establish the regulatory structure for milk produced, processed, or sold in California. First, in 1935, the State enacted the Milk Stabilization and Marketing Act, Cal. Food & Agric. Code Ann. §§61801-62403 (West 2001), “to establish minimum producer prices at fair and reasonable levels so as to generate reasonable producer incomes that will promote the intelligent and orderly marketing of market milk . . . § 61802(h). Then, California created requirements for composition of milk products in the Milk and Milk Products Act of 1947. §§ 32501-39912. The standards created under this Act mandate minimum percentages of fat and solids-not-fat in dairy products and often require fortification of milk by adding solids-not-fat. In 1967, California passed another milk pricing Act, the Gonsalves Milk Pooling Act, §§ 62700-62731, to address deficiencies in the existing pricing scheme. Together, these three Acts (including numerous subsequent revisions) create the state milk marketing structure: The 1935 and 1967 Acts establish the milk pricing and pooling plans, while the 1947 Act governs the composition of milk products sold in California.
While it serves the same purposes as the federal marketing orders, California’s regulatory program is more complex. Federal orders typically guarantee all producers the same minimum price and create only two or three classes of end uses to determine the processors’ contributions to, or withdrawals from, the equalization pools, whereas under the California scheme some of the farmers’ production commands a “quota price” and some receives a lower “overbase price,” and the processors’ end uses of the milk are divided into five different classes.
The complexities of the California scheme are not relevant to these cases; what is relevant is the fact California processors of fluid milk pay a premium price (part of which goes into a pool) that is higher than either of the prices paid to the producers. During the early 1990’s, market conditions made it profitable for some California processors to buy raw milk from out-of-state producers at prices that were higher than either the quota prices or the overbase prices guaranteed to California farmers yet lower than the premium prices they had to pay when making in-state purchases. The regulatory scheme was at least partially responsible for the advantage enjoyed by out-of-state producers because it did not require the processors to make any contribution to the equalization pool on such purchases. In other words, whereas an in-state purchase of raw milk resold as fluid milk required the processor both to pay a guaranteed minimum to the farmer and also to make a contribution to the pool, an out-of-state purchase at a higher price would often be cheaper because it required no pool contribution.
In 1997, the California Department of Food and Agriculture amended its plan to require that contributions to the pool be made on some out-of-state purchases. It is the imposition of that requirement that gave rise to this litigation. Petitioners in No. 01-950 operate dairy farms in Nevada; petitioners in No. 01-1018 operate such farms in Arizona. They contend that the 1997 amendment discriminates against them. In response, the California officials contend that it merely eliminated an unfair competitive advantage for out-of-state producers that was the product of the regulatory scheme itself.
Without reaching the merits of petitioners’ constitutional claims, the District Court dismissed both cases and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 259 F. 3d 1148 (2001). Relying on its earlier decision in Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman, 146 F. 3d 1177 (1998), the court held that a federal statute enacted in 1996 had immunized California’s milk pricing and pooling laws from Commerce Clause challenge. It also held that the corporate petitioners had no standing to raise a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and that the individuals’ claim under that Clause failed because the 1997 plan amendments did not, “on their face, create classifications based on any individual’s residency or citizenship.” 259 F. 3d, at 1156. We granted certiorari to review those two holdings, 537 U. S. 1099 (2003), but in doing so we do not reach the merits of either constitutional claim.
II
In some respects, the State’s composition standards set forth in the 1947 Act exceed those set by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). For example, California’s minimum standard for reduced fat milk requires that it contain at least 10 percent solids-not-fat (which include protein, calcium, lactose, and other nutrients). Cal. Food & Agric. Code Ann. §38211 (West 2001). Federal standards require that reduced fat milk contain only 8.25 percent solids-not-fat. See 21 CFR §§131.110, 101.62 (2002). Some of California’s standards were arguably pre-empted by Congress’ enactment of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 2353, which contains a prohibition against the application of state quality standards to foods moving in interstate commerce. See 21 U. S. C. § 343-l(a). The District Court so held in Shamrock Farms Co. v. Veneman, No. Civ-S-95-318 (ED Cal., Sept. 25, 1996). In response to that decision, California sought an exemption from both the FDA and Congress. See Shamrock Farms, 146 F. 3d, at 1180. Before the FDA acted, Congress responded favorably with the enactment of the statute that governs our disposition of these cases. That statute, § 144 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, provides:
“Nothing in this Act or any other provision of law shall be construed to preempt, prohibit, or otherwise limit the authority of the State of California, directly or indirectly, to establish or continue to effect any law, regulation, or requirement regarding—
“(1) the percentage of milk solids or solids not fat in fluid milk products sold at retail or marketed in the State of California; or
“(2) the labeling of such fluid milk products with regard to milk solids or solids not fat.” 7 U. S. C. § 7254.
Thereafter, Shamrock Farms brought another suit against the Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture challenging the validity of both the State’s compositional standards and its milk pricing and pooling laws. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that § 144 had immunized California’s marketing programs as well as the compositional standards from a negative Commerce Clause chai-lenge. Shamrock Farms, 146 F. 3d, at 1182. In adhering to that ruling in the cases before us today, the Ninth Circuit erred.
The text of the federal statute plainly covers California laws regulating the composition and labeling of fluid milk products, but does not mention laws regulating pricing. Congress certainly has the power to authorize state regulations that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 (1946), but we will not assume that it has done so unless such an intent is clearly expressed. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U. S. 82, 91-92 (1984). While § 144 unambiguously expresses such an intent with respect to California’s compositional and labeling laws, that expression does not encompass the pricing and pooling laws. This conclusion is buttressed by the separate California statutes addressing the composition and labeling of milk products, on the one hand, and the pricing and pooling of milk on the other. See supra, at 62-65 and this page. The mere fact that the composition and labeling laws relate to the sale of fluid milk is by no means sufficient to bring them within the scope of §144. Because §144 does not clearly express an intent to insulate California’s pricing and pooling laws from a Commerce Clause challenge, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on § 144 to dismiss the challenge.
III
Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution provides:
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”
Petitioners, who include both individual dairy farmers and corporate dairies, have alleged that California’s milk pricing laws violate that provision. The Court of Appeals held that the corporate petitioners have no standing to advance such a claim, and it rejected the individual petitioners’ claims because the California laws “do not, on their face, create classifications based on any individual’s residency or citizenship.” 259 F. 3d, at 1156. Petitioners do not challenge the first holding, but they contend that the second is inconsistent with our decision in Chalker v. Birmingham & Northwestern R. Co., 249 U. S. 522 (1919). We agree.
In Chalker, we held that a Tennessee tax imposed on a citizen and resident of Alabama for engaging in the business of constructing a railroad in Tennessee violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The tax did not on its face draw any distinction based on citizenship or residence. It did, however, impose a higher rate on persons who had their principal offices out of State. Taking judicial notice of the fact that “the chief office of an individual is commonly in the State of which he is a citizen,” we concluded that the practical effect of the provision was discriminatory. Id., at 527. Whether Chalker should be interpreted as merely applying the Clause to classifications that are but proxies for differential treatment against out-of-state residents, or as prohibiting any classification with the practical effect of discriminating against such residents, is a matter we need not decide at this stage of these cases. Under either interpretation, we agree with petitioners that the absence of an express statement in the California laws and regulations identifying out-of-state citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment is not a sufficient basis for rejecting this claim. In so holding, however, we express no opinion on the merits of petitioners’ Privileges and Immunities Clause claim.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The history and purpose of federal regulation of milk marketing is described in some detail in Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 172-187 (1969).
Because processors of fluid milk typically manufacture some other products as well, their respective pool contributions reflect the relative amounts of those end uses. Each processor’s mix of end uses produces an individual monthly “blend price” that is multiplied by its total purchases. Under federal orders the term “blend price” has a different meaning; it usually refers to the price that the producer receives. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 189, n. 1 (1994).
After the 1997 amendment, processors whose blend price exceeds the quota price must make contributions to the pool on their out-of-state purchases as well as their in-state purchases.

Question: Who is the petitioner of the case?

Choices:
attorney general of the United States, or his office
specified state board or department of education
city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit
state commission, board, committee, or authority
county government or county governmental unit, except school district
court or judicial district
state department or agency
governmental employee or job applicant
female governmental employee or job applicant
minority governmental employee or job applicant
minority female governmental employee or job applicant
not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable
retired or former governmental employee
U.S. House of Representatives
interstate compact
judge
state legislature, house, or committee
local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough
governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact
state or U.S. supreme court
local school district or board of education
U.S. Senate
U.S. senator
foreign nation or instrumentality
state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of
state college or university
United States
State
person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime
advertising business or agency
agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor
airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes
airline
distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages
alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked
American Medical Association
National Railroad Passenger Corp.
amusement establishment, or recreational facility
arrested person, or pretrial detainee
attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association
author, copyright holder
bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company
bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization
establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store
water transportation, stevedore
bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines
brewery, distillery
broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm
construction industry
bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle
business, corporation
buyer, purchaser
cable TV
car dealer
person convicted of crime
tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband
chemical company
child, children, including adopted or illegitimate
religious organization, institution, or person
private club or facility
coal company or coal mine operator
computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software
consumer, consumer organization
creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company
person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial
defendant
debtor
real estate developer
disabled person or disability benefit claimant
distributor
person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector
drug manufacturer
druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy
employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of
employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan
electric equipment manufacturer
electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company
eleemosynary institution or person
environmental organization
employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.
farmer, farm worker, or farm organization
father
female employee or job applicant
female
movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of
fisherman or fishing company
food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard
foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity
franchiser
franchisee
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization
person who guarantees another's obligations
handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to
health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor
heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be
hospital, medical center
husband, or ex-husband
involuntarily committed mental patient
Indian, including Indian tribe or nation
insurance company, or surety
inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder
investor
injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related
juvenile
government contractor
holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor
magazine
male
medical or Medicaid claimant
medical supply or manufacturing co.
racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant
minority female employee or job applicant
manufacturer
management, executive officer, or director, of business entity
military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist
mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company
mother
auto manufacturer
newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service
radio and television network, except cable tv
nonprofit organization or business
nonresident
nuclear power plant or facility
owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels
shareholders to whom a tender offer is made
tender offer
oil company, or natural gas producer
elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly
out of state noncriminal defendant
political action committee
parent or parents
parking lot or service
patient of a health professional
telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company
physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society
public interest organization
physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee
pipe line company
package, luggage, container
political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official
indigent, needy, welfare recipient
indigent defendant
private person
prisoner, inmate of penal institution
professional organization, business, or person
probationer, or parolee
protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer
public utility
publisher, publishing company
radio station
racial or ethnic minority
person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination
racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution
realtor
journalist, columnist, member of the news media
resident
restaurant, food vendor
retarded person, or mental incompetent
retired or former employee
railroad
private school, college, or university
seller or vendor
shipper, including importer and exporter
shopping center, mall
spouse, or former spouse
stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder
retail business or outlet
student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution
taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only
tenant or lessee
theater, studio
forest products, lumber, or logging company
person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent
trucking company, or motor carrier
television station
union member
unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant
union, labor organization, or official of
veteran
voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)
wholesale trade
wife, or ex-wife
witness, or person under subpoena
network
slave
slave-owner
bank of the united states
timber company
u.s. job applicants or employees
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service

Answer: 80