What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NICHOLAS, Collector of Internal Revenue, v. FIFTEENTH STREET INV. CO.
No. 1796.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 19, 1939.
F. A. Michels, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen (James W. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewal; Key and J. L. Monarch, Sp. Assts. to Atty Gen., and Thomas J. Morrissey, U. S. Atty., and Ivor O. Wingren, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellant.
Horace Phelps, of Denver, Colo. (James D. Benedict and Horace F. Phelps, both of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit instituted by the Fifteenth Street Investment Company, a corporation, hereinafter called the taxpayer, against Ralph Nicholas, Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Colorado, under section 24 (20) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (20), to recover income taxes paid for the years 1932 and 1933. The taxpayer owned a parcel of real estate situated in the City of Denver. In March, 1929, the property was leased to Mountain States Theater Corporation for the succeeding twenty-five years. In August, 1930, the taxpayer completed the construction of a building on such real estate at a cost of $262,500. In addition to the amount thus expended by the taxpayer, the lessee, with the permission of the taxpayer but without obligation to do so, expended $134,164.40 for unseverable and permanent improvements to the building. The title to such improvements was at all times vested in the taxpayer, and no part of the expenditures which the lessee made for them was in lieu of rent. The depreciable life of the building following the agreed determinative period of the lease was sixteen and one-half years. In May, 1933, the lease was prematurely terminated by the default of the lessee, and the exclusive possession of the property was unconditionally surrendered to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer included in its income tax return for the year 1932 the amount of $2,-355 as the aliquot part for one year of the value of the improvements paid for by the lessee and paid the tax thereon. No part of the value of the improvements made by the lessee was included in the return of the taxpayer for the year 1933. On examination of the facts, the Commissioner increased the income of the taxpayer in the sum of $49,106.66 as representing the depreciated value of the improvements made by the lessee remaining after the termination of the lease. A deficiency in taxes was imposed and paid. Claims for refund were submitted and denied. This suit followed. The court determined that the taxpayer did not realize any taxable gain in the years in question resulting from the improvements made by the lessee. 23 F.Supp. 863. Judgment was rendered for the taxpayer, and the collector appealed.
Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, 178, 26 U.S.C.A. § 22 (a), is relied upon to sustain liability for the taxes in controversy. The section provides that gross income shall include gains, profits, and income derived from dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of such property or of any interest therein; also gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever. But the power of the Congress to lay and collect taxes on income is confined to that which is actually and essentially income; and income, as thus used, means the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined. The taxing power in respect to income cannot by legislative definition be extended beyond that scope. That which is not actually and essentially income cannot by definition be subjected to such a tax. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570.
The improvements for which the lessee paid enhanced the value of the property, but the enhancement did not constitute realized income to the taxpayer during the years in question. It constituted an addition to capital instead of realized income within the meaning of the statute. Such an enhancement in value can result in realized income to the taxpayer only through increased rentals from the property after cancellation of the lease, or through the sale of the property. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267, 59 S.Ct. 186, 83 L.Ed. 167; Hewitt Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 880, 98 A.L.R. 1201.
Reliance is also placed upon Article 63, Treasury Regulations 77, promulgated under the Act. It provides, in substance, that where a lessee erects or makes improvements in a building in pursuance of an agreement with the lessor, and such building or improvements are not subject to removal by the lessee, the lessor may at his option report as income at the time when such building or improvements are completed the fair market value thereof, or he may spread over the life of the lease the estimated depreciated value, of such building or improvements at the termination of the lease and report as income for each year of the lease the aliquot part thereof; and that if for any reason other than a bona fide purchase from the lessee by the lessor, the lease is terminated so that the lessor comes into possession or control of the property sooner than the time originally fixed for the termination of the lease, the lessor shall be deemed to have derived additional income for the year in which the lease is thus terminated to the extent that the value of the building or improvements at that time exceeds the amount previously reported as income on account of the erection of such building or improvements. The function of Treasury Regulations is to further the administration of Revenue Acts. As previously stated, the enhancement in the value of the property resulting from the improvements for which the lessee paid did not constitute realized income to the taxpayer during the years in question within the meaning of the statute. The regulation did not make it so. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, supra.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1