What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MANLEY BROTHERS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America and Interstate Commerce Commission, Respondents.
No. 76-1102.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Submitted April 6, 1977.
Decided April 29, 1977.
James F. Schouman, Dearborn, Mich., for petitioner.
Charles W. Chapman, Washington, D.C., for intervenor Ann Arbor.
Fritz R. Kahn, Gen. Counsel, I. C. C., Peter A. Fitzpatrick, Christine N. Kohl, Edward Levi, Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Robert B. Nicholson, Edward E. Lawson, Washington, D.C., for respondents.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and WEICK and CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court on a petition to review and set aside certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission entered in Investigation and Suspension Docket No. 8808, Sand, Yuma, Michigan to Cleveland, Ohio. The Commission found a proposed multiple-car rate of $3.10 per net ton of sand, filed jointly by the Intervenor Ann Arbor Railroad Company and the Penn Central Transportation Company, to be just and reasonable.
By schedules filed to become effective December 7, 1972, Ann Arbor and Penn Central proposed jointly to establish the multiple-car rate on certain types of sand moving on their lines from Yuma, Michigan, to Cleveland, Ohio, subject to an aggregate minimum of 20 cars holding at least 75 tons each, all shipped on the same day under one bill of lading from one consignor at one location at one origin to one consignee at one location and destination. The tariff also provided, in general, for a maximum weight per car of 95 percent of the marked capacity of the car. Protests to this rate were filed by Petitioner Manley Brothers and two others not parties to this proceeding. Sargent Sand Company and Ford Motor Company appeared before the Administrative Law Judge in support of the challenged rates.
In a comprehensive opinion, the Administrative Law Judge held the proposed rate to be “just and reasonable, and otherwise lawful.” He found no evidence of unjust discrimination under 49 U.S.C. § 2, or undue preference or prejudice under 49 U.S.C. § 3(1). The initial decision and recommended order of the Administrative Law Judge were approved by the Commission. The petitions of Manley Brothers and others for reconsideration were denied.
In the present proceeding, it is contended by Manley Brothers that the rate itself is unduly destructive and will have the impact of disrupting traffic patterns throughout the area. Petitioner urges that the rate be declared unjust and unreasonable and the decision reversed. The case was submitted to this Court on briefs by stipulation of the parties.
Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and the entire record, the Court concludes that the challenged decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, and that there is a rational basis between the facts found and the conclusion reached by the Commission. Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282, 286-287, 54 S.Ct. 692, 78 L.Ed. 1260 (1934). We further conclude that the Commission did not err in holding that the challenged rate is not unjust or unreasonable under 49 U.S.C. § 1(5), that the rate does not result in unjust discrimination against the petitioner in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 2 and that the rate does not effect any undue or unreasonable preference for, or any prejudice against, any party within the prohibitions of 49 U.S.C. § 3(1).
Accordingly, the petition for review is dismissed and all the relief sought by the petition is denied.
. Subsequently Ann Arbor filed for bankruptcy and now is being operated, for the most part, by the State of Michigan. Penn Central is now a part of Conrail.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1