What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous", specifically "fiduciary, executor, or trustee". Your task is to determine which of the following specific subcategories best describes the litigant.

Opinion:
RUPP v. COMMERCE GUARDIAN TRUST & SAVINGS BANK.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 5, 1929.
No. 5097.
Stuart S. Wall, of Toledo, Ohio (Denman, Miller & Wall, of Toledo, Ohio, on the brief), for appellant.
Donald F. Melhorn, of Toledo, Ohio (Marshall, Melhorn, Marlar & Martin, of Toledo, Ohio, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MOORMAN, MACK, and HICK-ENLOOPER, Circuit Judges.
MOORMAN, Circuit Judge.
On April 26, 1926, the Lake Erie Milling Company was indebted to appellee on promissory notes in the sum of $18,000. None of these notes was due. One of them had been recently renewed upon assurance by the milling company that it would use the insurance which it had received for the destruction of its plant for rebuilding and re-establishing its business. Appellee learned that the company was diverting this fund to other purposes, and on the morning of April 26th applied a checking balance of $3,559.36, which the company then had in appellee’s bank, to the note which it had recently renewed for the company upon the assurance referred to. Later in the day the milling company deposited $1,274.08 with the bank, which the bank at once applied to the note in question, and the following day, on April 27th, it deposited $720 with the bank, which the bank applied to one of the other notes which it held. The milling company was wholly insolvent at this time. Ten days later it was adjudged a bankrupt, and the trustee brought this suit against the bank to recover as an unlawful preference the three amounts that the bank received.
The cheeking balance, which was first applied to the indebtedness, must be treated separately from the two later applications. This balance was accumulated in the bank in the usual course of business and was not built up or deposited for the purpose of giving a preference to the bank. At the time it was applied to the indebtedness of the milling company that company was insolvent. We have no doubt of. the right of the bank to make the application upon that basis. New York County National Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 48 L. Ed. 380; Studley v. Boylston National Bank of Boston, 229 U. S. 523, 33 S. Ct. 806, 57 L. Ed. 1313; Fourth Nat. Bank of Wichita, Kan., v. Smith (C. C. A.) 240 F. 19. And it was immaterial to the existence of this right that the debts were not due, as under section 68a of the Bankruptcy Act (11 USCA § 108(a) the right of set-off is preserved as to provable debts, whether due or not. Germania Sav. Bank Trust Co. v. Loeb (6 C. C. A.) 188 F. 285.
The other two sums were paid in after the hank account had been closed by the application of the balance existing on the morning of April 26th. They were not accepted by appellee for deposit, but were taken by it — regardless of the purpose of the bankrupt — with the intention of applying them to the indebtedness of the bankrupt. A bank cannot accept funds offered for deposit, and claim the rights attaching to them as such, when they were in fact accepted for and were immediately applied to a wholly different purpose. Under such circumstances they take on the characteristics of the thing for which they were used. As to those two items, therefore, the trustee should have recovered.
The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new decree consistent herewith.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "miscellaneous", specifically "fiduciary, executor, or trustee". Which of the following specific subcategories best describes the litigant?

Choices:
trustee in bankruptcy - institution
trustee in bankruptcy - individual
executor or administrator of estate - institution
executor or administrator of estate - individual
trustees of private and charitable trusts - institution
trustee of private and charitable trust - individual
conservators, guardians and court appointed trustees for minors, mentally incompetent
other fiduciary or trustee
specific subcategory not ascertained

Answer: 1