What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CLEVELAND ADOLPH MAYER REALTY CORPORATION.
No. 10363.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 14, 1947.
SIMONS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I. Henry Kutz, of Washington, D. C. (Sewall Key, J. Louis Monarch, and Helen Goodner, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
Irwin N. Loeser, of Cleveland, Ohio (Irwin N. Loeser and Daniel W. Loeser, both of Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for respondent.
Before HICKS, SIMONS, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
HICKS, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, seeks a review of the decision of the Tax Court that there are deficiencies in income 'tax due by the taxpayer, Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corporation, the respondent, for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942, in the respective amounts of $677.63, $950.55 and $1021.19.
Upon its organization in 1938, the taxpayer acquired a building ‘which, conced-edly, had been constructed by its predecessor in 1915 at a cost of $131,565.96. Until December 21, 1939, the taxpayer and its predecessor had taken depreciation on the building' at- the rate of 3% annually upon a supposed cost of $165,000, excepting six months of the year 1915 and the full years of 1916, 1917 and 1921, when no depreciation was claimed and no deduction therefor allowed.
The 3% depreciation rate was figured on a thirty-three and a third year life for the building. As of January 1, 1940, the parties agreed that the allowance for depreciation should be based upon a fifty year life.
As indicated above, income taxes for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942 are here involved. Our question is: How to arrive .at an adjusted basis on December 31, 1939 for depreciating the remaining twenty-five years of the life of the building, in view of the three and a half years, when no depreciation was taken.
The Commissioner and the taxpayer deducted from the $131,565.96 cost the depreciation reserve which had been claimed for the years 1918-20 and for 1922-39, inclusive, at the rate of 3% on the supposed -$165,000 cost, but they failed to agree on the rate to be used in calculating the depreciation for the period for which none had been claimed or allowed. The taxpayer insisted that the calculation should be made at the rate of 2% upon the cost price of $131,565.96 since both parties agree that 'the building had a life of fifty years.
The Commissioner asserted that the 3% rate should be used, since depreciation is to be calculated on the facts known at the end of each year and since in the tax periods in question the building had a supposed life of thirty-three and a third years. If the 2% rate is used, the depreciation for the three and a half years (six months in 1915, all of 1916, 1917 and 1921) in which none was taken, would, on December 21, 1939, aggregate $9209.60 with a total recovered cost of $113,059.60. If the 3% rate is used, the aggregate would be $13,-814.43, with a total recovered cost of $117,-764.43. Under the taxpayer’s claim, unde-preciated cost on December 31, 1939, would be $18,406.36, and under the Commissioner’s insistence, $13,801.53. If the larger base is used the allowance for the tax years 1940, 1941 and 1942 would be larger and the tax less. The Commissioner, using the smaller base, determined deficiencies for 1940-1-2. The Tax Court, following its own decision in Mutual Fertilizer Co." v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1122, decided that the depreciation “allowable” for the years 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1921 should be computed at the revised rate of 2%; whereupon the Commissioner sought review. ■
The applicable statutes are Sec. 23(1) and Sec. 113(b) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code, (26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, §§ 23(1), 113(b) (1) (B). Sec. 23(1) provides in part:
“Sec. 23. In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
* * H* * * *
“(J) Depreciation. - A reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business * * * ” ,
Sec. 113(b) (1) (B)-reads in part:
“(b) Adjusted basis. "The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property, whenever acquired, shall-be the basis determined under subsection (a), adjusted as hereinafter provided.
“(1) General Rule. Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all cases be made—
******
“(B) in respect of any period since February 28, 1913, for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence, amortization, and depletion, to the extent allowed (but not less than the amount allowable) under this chapter or prior income tax laws. * * * ” (Italics ours.)
Treasury Regulations 103, Sec. 19.113(b) (1)-1 (and the same section in effect in T. R. Ill), provide in part:
“ * , * * A taxpayer is not permitted to take advantage in a later year of his prior failure to take any depreciation allowance. * * * The determination of the amount properly allowable shall, however, be made on the basis of facts reasonably known to exist at the end of such year or period. * * * ” (Italics ours.)
Treasury Regulations 103, Sec. 19.23(1)-5 providing “Method of computing depreciation allowance” (and the same section in éffect in T.R. Ill) provide in part:
“ * * * The reasonableness of any claim for depreciation shall be determined upon the conditions known to exist at the end of the period for which the return is made. * * *
"A taxpayer is not permitted wider the law to take advantage in later years of his prior failure to take. any depreciation allowance. * * * ” (Italics ours.)
The Commissioner insists that in utilizing the 2% rate, the Tax Court erroneously failed to apply the regulations. There is nothing in the Tax Court’s decision indicating that it considered the regulations at all.
In Mutual Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner, supra, the majority opinion made'no reference to the regulations and that it considered them at all appears only from a statement in the dissenting opinion of Judge Disney, to-wit, “As I view this situation, the .majority opinion disregards the regulation without.saying that it is invalid; # $ * »
In that case the majority opinion simply stated:
“The case is one in which a twenty-year useful life period1 was mistakenly applied in 1934 and it now appears that the proper life span was at all times thirty-three years. In the circumstances we think it must be held that the depreciation ‘allowable’ for -the years in question should be computed upon the longer useful life period.”
The opinion concluded:
“However, under the circumstances here present, the depreciation allowable for the open years on the basis of the shorter useful life should, we think, give way to that allowable under a computation based upon the corrected life span.”
The question whether the decision of the Tax Court is in accordance with law when tested by the provisions of the statutes, and especially of the regulations, is clearly presented. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 370, et seq., 65 S.Ct. 1232, 89 L.Ed. 1670; John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 66 S.Ct. 299; Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S. Ct. 239, 88 L.Ed. 248.
The statute, Sec. 113(b). (1) (B), has been in effect since 1932. Sec. 19,113 (b) (1)-1 has been included in the regulations since 1934 and Sec. 19.23 (l)-5 since 1921, during which time the statutory sections have been repeatedly re-enacted without change.
In Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83, 59 S.Ct. 45, 46, 83 L.Ed. 52, it was said:
“Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law.”
Moreover, it affirmatively appears that in considering the 1932 amendment to Sec. 113(b) (1) (B), the Senate Finance Committee, S.Rep. 665, 72nd Congress, 1st Sess., p. 29, approved the regulations. Its report appears in part:
“Your committee has not thought it necessary to include any express provision against retroactive adjustments of depreciation on the part of the Treasury as the regulations of the Treasury seem adequate to protect the interests of the taxpayers in such cases. These regulations require the depreciation allowances to be made from year to year in accordance with the then known facts, and do not permit a retroactive change in these allowances by reason of the facts developed or ascertained after the years by .which such allowances are made.” (Italics ours.)
Since no claim for depreciation was made in 1915-16-17 and 1921, no depreciation was “allowed.” The question presented therefore is, what depreciation was “allowable?” The answer is found in Sec. 19.113(b) (1)-1, T.R. 103, to wit:
“The determination of the amount properly allowable * * * shall be made on the basis of facts reasonably known to exist at the end of such year or period.”
This language refers to conditions known or existing at the time and not those ascertained years later, and the Tax Court gave no reason for disregarding the regulation and permitting conditions ascertained years later to control the rate and hence the amount of allowable depreciation for those years.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit in reversing the decision of the Tax Court in Commissioner v. Mutual Fertilizer Co., supra, 159 F.2d 470, 472, said:
“The error of The Tax Court lies in its majority’s view that it ‘now appears’, years after the end of the periods for which ‘allowable’ amounts' must be determined, that 33 years is and was the foreseeable useful life of the plant assets. The crucial factor is not what ‘now appears’, hut what ‘then appeared’ to he the useful life of the plant; that is, what reasonably was known and ascertainable at the end of each of such periods as to the reasonably foreseeable useful life of the plant.” (Italics ours.)
See also Goss & DeLeeuw Mach. Co. v. United States, D.C., 53 F.Supp., 853.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523, 525, 63 S.Ct. 1260, 1261, 87 L.Ed. 1561, 152 A.L.R. 871, in a discussion preliminary to its consideration of the main question, makes it abundantly clear that the amount ■“allowable” for depreciation must be taken ■“each year.” We quote:
“ * * * The basis upon which depreciation is to be ‘allowed’ is the cost of the property with proper adjustments for depreciation ‘to the extent allowed (but not less than the amount allowable) under this Act or prior income tax laws.’ That provision makes it plain that the depreciation basis is reduced by the amount ‘allowable’ each year whether or not it is claimed. * * * Moreover the basis must be reduced by that amount even though no tax benefit results from the use of depreciation .as a deduction. Wear and tearr do not wait cm net income. Nor can depreciation be .accumulated and held for use in that year in which it will bring the taxpayer the most tax benefit. Congress has elected to make .the year the unit of taxation. * * * Thus the amount ‘allowable’ must he taken each year. * * * ” (Italics ours.)
See discussion in United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 300, 301, 47 S.Ct. 608, 71 L. Ed. 1054; Kittredge v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 88 F.2d 632; United States Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 137 F.2d 511, 517. And if depreciation is to be taken each year, it must perforce be taken upon the basis of the understanding of value, .existing at that time (at the end of the accounting period), and not, as has been said in the light of “hindsight.”
The decision of the Tax Court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1