What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Russell SHEPPARD, Appellant, v. Barney CORNELIUS, trading as Barney Coal Company, and Leckie Smokeless Coal Company, Appellees. Ray E. RHODES, Appellant, v. Joe COSTA, trading as Joe Costa Coal Company, and Leckie Smokeless Coal Company, Appellees.
No. 8486.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 28, 1962.
Decided April 26, 1962.
James K. Edmundson, Beckley, W. Va., for appellants.
Joseph M. Holt, Lewisburg, W. Va., and George Richardson, Jr., Bluefield, W. Va., for appellees.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, and HAYNSWORTH and BRYAN, Circuit Judges.
HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judge.
In these proceedings, filed under § 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the two plaintiffs assert a contractual claim to additional compensation by their employer. They had been paid at rates in excess of the minimum wages required by § 6 of the Act, but they contend that their employment was governed by the National Bituminous Coal Agreement of 1950, as amended, and they claim they should have been compensated at the higher rate specified in that agreement. They worked no more than forty hours in any week, so that the requirements of § 7 are not involved.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that there was no cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and no other basis of federal jurisdiction. We agree with the District Court.
By § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, an employer may be held liable to an employee for unpaid wages due to have been paid under §§ 6 or 7 of the Act. The action may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction. Section 6 of the Act is violated, however, only if the actual rate paid is less than the minimum specified in that section. There is a violation of § 7 if compensation for hours worked in any week in excess of the maximum number is at a rate less than one and one-half the regular rate. Where overtime compensation is involved, of course, it is necessary to determine what the regular rate is, and, to do so, reference must be had to the rates prescribed in any applicable collective bargaining agreement. Payment of contract rates is not required by § 6, however, for hours worked in any week if they do not exceed the maximum fixed by § 7. If, therefore, the plaintiffs' employment was governed by the National Bituminous Coal Agreement of 1950, they may have an action founded upon the contract for unpaid wages, but they have not shown a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Section 16 of that Act confers no jurisdiction upon this Court to adjudicate contractual claims for wages unless such adjudication is necessary to enforcement of the Act.
The plaintiffs seek to support the jurisdiction of the Court by reference to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. That Act, of course, permits actions in the District Courts of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy, by or against a labor organization representing employees, for violations of collective bargaining agreements. It is now settled that the United States District Courts have jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining contract at the instance of the recognized representative of the employees when the relief sought is additional compensation or benefits due the employees generally under other provisions of the •contract. Earlier, however, the Supreme Court had held there was no jurisdiction of an action brought by the recognized representative of the employees when the relief sought was additional1 compensation to individual employees alleged to be due under the terms of the collective agreement. The Supreme Court found no congressional intention “ * * * to open the doors of the federal courts to a potential flood of grievances based upon an employer’s failure to comply with terms of a collective agreement relating to compensation, terms peculiar in the individual benefit which is their subject matter and which, when violated, give a cause of action to the individual employee. * * * ” Enforcement of such rights was to be left to the individual employees.
Here, the employees’ representative, if there is one, is not a party to these actions. The Mine Workers are not here contending that they have a contract with the employers which the employers have violated. Jurisdiction, under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, to adjudicate claims by or against a labor organization representing employees does not extend to the claims of two employees asserting in their own names individual rights to additional compensation under a contract which they claim to be applicable.
Individual rights, individually asserted, though stemming from a collective employment agreement and solely dependent upon it, cannot be enforced under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. If there is substance in the rights asserted by these employees, the rights may be enforced through traditional actions brought in the state courts. There is no federal jurisdiction to enforce them.
Affirmed.
. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216.
. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206.
. 29 U.S.C.A. § 207.
. Sheppard v. Cornelius et al., D.C.S.D.W. Va., 194 F.Supp. 823.
. If there was a violation of § 7 of the Act, and the court determined that the contract rate was the regular rate within the meaning of that Section, the court would not be limited to an award of compensation for the overtime hour's worked. It could adjudicate the entire controversy by requiring payment of the contract rate for the first forty hours worked in each week and thus dispose of the entire controversy. When the court has jurisdiction of a federal claim under § 7 of the Act, it may proceed to adjudicate the closely related nonfederal contract claim for additional compensation during the first forty hours worked in any week. Manosky v. Betklehem-Hingham Shipyard, Inc., 1 Cir., 177 F.2d 529, 534. When there has been- no violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, however, § 16 of that Act confers no jurisdiction upon the court to award any relief.
. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185.
. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424; Textile Workers Union of America v. Cone Mills Corp., 4 Cir., 268 F.2d 920.
. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 489, 99 L.Ed. 510.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 5