What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Edgar C. TUTTLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 74-1042.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued Sept. 11, 1974.
Decided Oct. 16, 1974.
Galen Ross, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael Kimmel, Atty., Dept, of Justice (Carla A. Hills, Asst. Atty. Gen., C. Nelson Day, U. S. Atty., and William Kanter, Atty., Dept, of Justice, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before BREITENSTEIN, SETH and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
The issue is the constitutionality of the provisions of the Social Security Act requiring that a disability applicant have not less than 20 quarters of covered employment during the 40-quarter period preceding his disability. The district court upheld the Act. We affirm.
Plaintiff on November 5, 1970, applied for a period of disability under § 216 (i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i), and for disability insurance benefits under § 223, 42 U.S.C. § 423. The period of disability freezes rights of disabled workers to old age and survivors benefits during periods of disability. Disability insurance payments are payable to a disabled worker.
To be entitled to the period of disability, the worker must' have had “not less than twenty quarters of coverage during the forty-quarter period which ends” with the quarter in which the disability occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (3)(B)(i). Disability insurance benefits are payable to a disabled worker beginning with any month in which he is under disability “if he had not less than twenty quarters of coverage during the forty-quarter period which ends with the quarter in which such month occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(l)(B)(i).
Plaintiff claims that he became disabled on March 13, 1954, at age 41. He had earned social security credits for only 19 calendar quarters of work in the 40-quarter period ending March 31, 1954. The Secretary denied allowance of the period of disability and payment of disability insurance benefits because plaintiff failed to meet the earnings requirements of the Act.
Plaintiff argues that the 20/40 requirement unconstitutionally denies him equal protection and due process. Whether a Social Security Act classification is attacked on equal protection grounds, see Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231, or on due process grounds, Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, the test is whether “the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.”
The Secretary says that the 20/40 requirement promotes two legitimate objectives. The first is assurance of a self-supporting program. This is the intent of Congress. See S.Rep.No. 1987, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1954, p. 3733; and H.Rep.No.92-231, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1972, p. 5111. The Supreme Court has recognized that a “State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of its insurance program.” Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256. The stated principle applies also to the federal government. The 20/40 requirement tends to make the system self-supporting by assuring some substantial contribution to the system before the onset of disability.
The second objective is the provision of benefits to those who have depended on their employment income. Legislative history supports the government. S.Rep. No. 2388, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1958, p. 4229, in reference to the earning requirements, says that “it is reasonable and desirable that there be reliable means of limiting such protection to those persons who have had sufficiently long and sufficiently recent covered employment to indicate that they probably have been dependent upon their earnings.” See also S.Rep. No. 1987, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess., 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1954, p. 3729. The 20/40 requirement rationally screens out those who have not established a substantial attachment to the labor force because they do not have a reasonably long, as well as recent, record of covered earnings.
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to the benefits because he is dependent on his earnings. The argument is not persuasive. A classification does not offend the Constitution “because in practice it results in some inequality.” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed.2d 369, cited in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, a social security case.
Plaintiff says that once a worker is covered he cannot be denied benefits and, hence, any classification based on earnings is unconstitutional. Congress determines entitlement to benefits. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the Act creates either property or contract rights. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231. Our concern is with the rationality of the 20/40 requirements. Because they have a rational base and are free from invidious discrimination, they do not violate the Constitution. See Stanton v. Weinberger, 10 Cir., 502 F.2d 315.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0