What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Claude E. BRODY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Leonard B. BRODY, Jr., Appellant.
Nos. 73-1189, 73-1190.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 13, 1973.
Decided Oct. 11, 1973.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 27, 1973.
See also, D.C., 357 F.Supp. 910.
Gary Eldredge, and William C. Hopkins, II, Kansas City, Mo., for appellants.
Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before GIBSON and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Talbot Smith, Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
The defendants, Claude E. Brody and Leonard B. Brody, Jr., brothers, were charged in a two-count indictment with willfully possessing an unregistered shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d) and with transportation of two sawed-off shotguns in interstate commerce for the purpose of committing a bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b). The jury returned a guilty verdict on the “possession” count, [§ 5861(d)] and a not guilty verdict on the “transportation” count for both defendants. The District Court sentenced each defendant to ten years imprisonment on the first count.
On appeal, the defendants filed identical briefs, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, that an instruction given by the District Court in response to a question by the jury concerning the time of the offense was prejudicial, and that the District Court erred in denying a motion to suppress the sawed-off shotgun found in Claude Brody’s automobile.
The defendants’ three arguments merit brief discussion. First, the “sufficiency of the evidence” contention rests on a claim that two Government witnesses testified unreliably concerning defendants’ possession of the shotgun on dates other than July 7, 1972 (the day of defendants’ arrests). One of these two witnesses informed the police that the shotgun could be found in Claude Brody’s car. The defendants do not contend that the shotgun was not found in Claude Brody’s car. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the jury’s verdict, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support the convictions. United States v. Holt, 427 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1970); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 108 (8th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1119, 89 S. Ct. 995, 22 L.Ed.2d 124 (1969).
The defendants also argue that the District Court gave an improper instruction to the jury. During the jury’s deliberations, the jury gave the bailiff an envelope containing the following question:
“Does Count One of the Indictment mean at the time of the arrest or possession of the gun at any previous time covered by the evidence at trial ?”
The District Court and all counsel agreed that the court should respond to the question with a written instruction, which was given as follows:
“Count One of the indictment in this case charges that the offense charged therein was committed ‘on or about the 7th day of July, 1972.’ The proof need not establish with certainty the exact date of the alleged offense. It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged.”
The defendants objected to this instruction, contending it purportedly interjected prejudicial new issues into the case, for it allowed the jury to convict based upon evidence of possession of the shotgun by defendants on days other than July 7, 1972, the day of defendants’ arrests. The Government responds that the grand jury indictment “charged not simply ‘on July 7’ but ‘on or about’ July 7,” and that such a charge encompasses possession on days other than the actual arrests. We agree with the Government’s position and further note that this instruction is commonly approved. Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467, 470-471 (5th Cir. 1969); Yaw v. United States, 228 F.2d 382, 383 (9th Cir. 1955); Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 14.02 (2d ed. 1970).
Last, defendants contend that the District Court should have suppressed the evidence of the shotgun due to an illegal search and seizure of Claude Brody’s automobile. The defendants claim that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest defendants or search the automobile. We have reviewed the record and think that there was adequate probable cause to support the warrantless search of the automobile. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
Judgment of convictions affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1