What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Aguida E. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
No. 17060.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Oct. 21, 1968.
Decided Dec. 27, 1968.
Richard M. Goldman, Stein, Bliablias & Goldman, Newark, N. J., for appellant.
Alfred L. Ferguson, III, McCarter & English, Newark, N. J. (Eugene M. Haring, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for appellee.
Before HASTIE, Chief Judge and SEITZ and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HASTIE, Chief Judge.
The appellant is the beneficiary of a $30,000 insurance policy issued by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company on the life of her late husband, Richard Johnson. She brought this action against the insurer in a New Jersey state court to recover the face amount of the policy. Because of diversity of citizenship the action was properly removed to the United States District Court. On a motion of the defendant insurer for summary judgment, the court entered judgment dismissing the action. 273 F.Supp. 589. The widow has appealed.
Certain facts were admitted or established without dispute by the complaint and answer, answers to interrogatories and answers to requests for admissions. The complaint alleges that “the insured died as a result of his own acts while insane.” Answers to interrogatories show that the insured was an officer of the merchant marine who returned from a voyage to find that his wife, the appellant, had sued him for divorce. A few days later he was brought into court and ordered to stay away from his wife. The same evening he went to his home, spread fuel oil around a room and on his clothes and set fire to the premises and his clothing. He died of resulting burns. He left two notes, written in crayon and lipstick at the scene of his death. Both were short and apparently addressed to his wife. One accused the wife of concern only for herself, mentioned their five children and asked “why don’t you have a little common sense think of what you are doing * * * ” The other said merely: “95% of our time and money is spent making things appear what they are not.”
The present dispute centers upon the following provision of the insurance policy:
“ * * * If, within two years from the date of issue, the Insured dies as a result of suicide, while sane or insane, the liability of the company will be limited to an amount equal to the premiums paid, without interest.”
The insured died within two years of the date of issue.
The parties agree that the insurance policy was a New Jersey contract, the validity and interpretation of which are to be determined by the law of that state.
In one branch of her argument the appellant seems to contend that “suicide while insane” is a self contradictory and, therefore, meaningless phrase, so that the attempted exception must fail in all cases of self destruction by a mentally deranged person. She claims support for that contention in Ruvolo v. American Casualty Co., 1963, 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.2d 204. However, the policy in the Ruvolo case excepted “death * * * caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured”, without any mention of conduct while insane. Since the exception did not explicitly cover this contingency, the court construed it strictly and decided that self destruction while insane was not “intentional” within the meaning of the policy exception. However, such an interpretation cannot reasonably be made where a policy excepts “suicide, while sane or insane”, since on its face that language plainly comprehends all purposeful self destruction, whether the suicidal intent and conduct shall emanate from a sane mind or a deranged one.
We find no case that holds an exception of suicide while insane to be meaningless or wholly ineffective. See Annotation, 9 A.L.R.3d 1015. Courts have disagreed upon the circumstances in which self destruction by an insane person may properly be characterized as suicide while insane. With Christensen v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1944, 197 Ga. 807, 30 S.E.2d 471, 153 A.L.R. 794, contrast Tritschler v. Keystone Mut. Benefit Assn., 1897, 180 Pa. 205, 36 A. 734. But under the arguable interpretation most favorable to the insured the exception covers self destruction purposefully accomplished in accordance with an intention or design conceived by a- deranged mind.
It follows that summary judgment was improper in the present case only if the record established a disputable issue of fact whether the insured, in his admitted derangement, was attempting to take his life when he immolated himself. Of course a deranged person can believe that he is immortal, or that fuel oil is water, or, on some other irrational basis, that saturating his clothes with fuel oil and applying a lighted match will not kill him. Or his mental disorder may be so extreme that he has no comprehension whatever of what he is doing. Any such showing would negate intentional self destruction. However, no such claim appears here. While the complaint alleges that Johnson died at his own hand while insane, neither the complaint nor any other filing in this case suggests that Johnson’s acts, obviously well adapted to self destruction, were not so intended. The record contains a summary of Johnson’s actions during the days immediately preceding his death. There is no evidence that he did not know what he was doing. Even the notes he wrote before setting himself afire seem to have been calculated final words of bitterness and recrimination directed to his wife.
Moreover, in answering interrogatories concerning the decedent’s mental state when he took his life, the plaintiff candidly stated that “the conclusion that decedent was insane at the time he took his life is in the area of expert evaluation, arrived at by a licensed and qualified psychiatrist following his examination into all of the facts concerning decedent’s death and his life prior thereto.” At the defendant’s request, the court ordered the plaintiff to supply a more specific answer, but the plaintiff failed to do so. However, in answer to another interrogatory, she admitted that she had no knowledge that the defendant ever consulted with or received treatment by any psychiatrist.
Thus, the appellant has admitted that her only basis of judgment concerning the mental state of the insured when he killed himself is the opinion of one psychiatrist who never observed the insured. Moreover, even when instructed to give a more specific statement of her contention as to the mental state of the insured, she refrained from stating or offering to prove that the insured did not understand or intend the normal consequences of his conduct. Indeed, the appellant’s brief suggests that the insured may have been impelled by an irresistible impulse to take his own life. But that conclusion would affirmatively establish that self destruction was the very result intended, albeit by a deranged mind.
In these circumstances the court below, in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ruled that “plaintiffs [sic] have offered no allegation, let alone specific factual contentions which could support a reasonable conclusion that the decedent was unaware of the fatal consequences of his acts; indeed, such a contention would beggar credibility in light of the stipulated circumstances of his death.” 273 F.Supp. at 593. We think this conclusion and the judgment to which it led were proper.
The judgment will be affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0