What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MFA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earleaer KYLE, Defendant-Appellee, v. Eddie Mae KYLE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 79-3238.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 15, 1979.
Decided Nov. 3, 1980.
Ishmael C. Childs, Childs & Perry, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.
Fletcher C. Lewis, Johnson & Lewis, Ltd., Little Rock, Ark., for Earleaer Kyle.
Linda M. Pistner, Arter & Hadden, Cleveland, Ohio, for MFA.
Before KENNEDY and JONES, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Editor’s Note: The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit in Gullatte v. Potts, published in the advance sheets at this citation (630 F.2d 322), was withdrawn from bound volume at the request of the Court.
PER CURIAM.
This interpleader action was filed by MFA Life Insurance Company to determine who is entitled to the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of William Kyle. Appellant filed a motion to submit the appeal on briefs without oral argument. This motion is granted.
Two parties claim the proceeds of the insurance policy: Eddie Mae Kyle, decedent’s wife of forty-four days at the time of his death, and Earleaer Kyle, decedent’s wife of five and one-half years at the time of their divorce in 1977.
District Judge Robert M. Krupansky summarized the undisputed facts as follows:
On May 28, 1972, William Kyle and Earleaer were married in Augusta, Arkansas and lived together as husband and wife in Patterson, Arkansas .... Thereafter, on December 20, 1977, the Chancery Court of Woodruff County, Arkansas, entered a Decree of Divorce dissolving their marriage .... In said Decree, the Chancery Court also approved and incorporated a child custody and property settlement agreement executed by and between William Kyle and Earleaer. Said property settlement agreement made no reference to MFA life insurance policy No. L-135307, which had been issued previously to William Kyle, as insured, effective September 27, 1977, and under which Earleaer was the named beneficiary.
Subsequently, at an undisclosed date, William Kyle moved to Cleveland, Ohio, where he married Eddie Mae on January 21, 1978, and where he died on March 5, 1978. William Kyle died intestate and without giving written notice to MFA regarding a change of beneficiary.
Judge Krupansky held that since the property settlement between William Kyle and Earleaer Kyle was executed in Arkansas by then residents of Arkansas, Ohio conflict of law rules required that the district court look to Arkansas law to determine what effect, if any, this agreement might have on the rights of Earleaer Kyle to take the proceeds of the life insurance policy. As authority for this proposition, the court cited Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Cohen, 179 U.S. 262, 21 S.Ct. 106, 45 L.Ed. 181 (1900); Sheerin v. Steele, 240 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1957); Alropa Corp. v. Kirschwehm, 138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N.E.2d 655 (1941); McCormick v. Taft, 61 Ohio App. 200, 22 N.E.2d 510 (1938).
In granting the motion of Earleaer Kyle for summary judgment, Judge Krupansky held that Allen v. First National Bank of Fort Smith, 261 Ark. 230, 547 S.W.2d 118 (1977) is dispositive. In that case the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a former wife who is the named beneficiary of an insurance policy issued on the life of her then husband, later divorced, is not divested of her interest in the proceeds of the policy absent a provision to that effect in the property settlement agreement. The property settlement between Earleaer Kyle and William Kyle contained no such provision.
The life insurance policy which is the subject of this appeal contained this language:
Unless otherwise provided by endorsement hereon or attached hereto, the Beneficiary for insurance payable upon the death of the Insured shall be the Insured’s spouse if living, otherwise the Insured’s estate....
“Insured spouse” was defined by the policy as: “the wife or husband of the Insured named in the application for this policy.” Judge Krupansky ruled that these provisions of the life insurance policy required that Earleaer Kyle be awarded the proceeds of the policy since she was the wife of William Kyle at the time of the application for the policy and as she was the named beneficiary of that policy at the time of William Kyle’s death.
We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and in granting summary judgment to Earleaer Kyle.
Affirmed. The costs of this appeal are taxed against the appellant, Eddie Mae Kyle.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0