What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CITY OF HIALEAH v. GROVES.
No. 8873.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 18, 1939.
Martin F. Whelan, Jr., and Mitchell D. Price, both of Miami, Fla., for appellant.
C. W. Peters, of Miami, Fla., for appellee.
Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denied April 24, 1939.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment for appellee in a suit against appellant for the principal and interest alleged to be due by the City on its bonds and coupons. The declaration was in four counts, two counts being on bonds of different issues, and the other two being on coupons alleged to have been attached to the bonds. The issues tried were those raised by appellant’s plea of non est factum.
Appellee proved the special charter act upon which it relied for the authority of the municipality to issue the bonds,- together with the ordinances authorizing the two issues involved. The ordinances complied with the charter and specified the forms and amounts of the bonds to be negotiated and the officers- to act in that behalf. Appellee then proved that the bonds and coupons complied in all respects with those provided for in the ordinances, and that the signatures appearing on the bonds were genuine; that the bonds were executed by the officers named therein; and that taxes had been duly levied to raise funds to pay both issues. The proof as to the coupons was that they corresponded to the bonds as to number, amount, etc., were in the form required by the ordinance, and bore the -facsimile signatures of the executing officers. No evidence was offered by - appellant to contradict this proof; whereupon the court found the facts as above, and adjudged the issues in favor of appellee.
Three propositions are urged as grounds for reversal. They are that the evidence was insufficient, in that it did not. show, first, that the bonds had been delivered, second, that appellee was the holder in due course, and third, that the coupons were genuine, having been detached from the bonds.
The bonds are negotiable instruments payable to bearer. As such, they are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, in force in the state of Florida. The section here involved (Section 6776, Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927) provides: “And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved.” Delivery of the bonds is presumed until the contrary is proved; and the proof, standing uncontradicted, made a prima facie case on this issue. S. K. S. Holding Co. v. Vans Agnew, 106 Fla. 830, 143 So. 599.
Lack or want of status as a holder in due course is not a defense to a negotiable instrument payable to bearer. Its only effect would be to let in defenses against the first holder, promisee, or obligee. Where such defenses are not asserted, no such issue is raised; and proof that the plaintiff is a holder in due course is not necessary. McCallum v. Driggs, 35 Fla. 277, 17 So. 407; Jones v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 110 Fla. 69, 147 So. 895; Durham v. Meyer, 114 Fla. 594, 154 So. 702. Under the foregoing authorities, the fact that appellee produced the bonds at the trial and surrendered them in evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to characterize him as the legal holder thereof.
However, proof that the unattached coupons corresponded to the bonds and satisfied the requirements of the charter and ordinances did not sustain the burden of proving that they were the valid obligations of appellant. If they were, they became so when negotiated along with bonds to which they were attached, each bond bearing the signatures of the executing officers. Proof of the genuineness of the bonds may be made by proving the acts of the negotiating officers pursuant to their authority, and such proof is undoubtedly sufficient for the coupons attached to the bonds. But where, the coupons do not bear the signature or signatures of the officer or officers issuing them, their validity depends entirely upon whether or not they were attached to the bonds when issued.. If the coupons were actually attached to the bonds when issued, and were not attached when produced in court, then sómeone, at some intervening time, must have detached them. Information as to who-detached the coupons is not readily available to the obligor; and, in the nature of the case, it would be unjust to indulge a presumption against it. Such information is, or should be, readily available to-a holder of the bonds; and, if the genuineness of the coupons is put in issue, it should work no unusual hardship upon' him to require proof of the one vital fact upon which it depends, that 'is, that the-coupons were detached from the bonds.
It follows that the judgment of the-district court must be affirmed in so far as-it awards recovery on the bonds and all coupons attached thereto. Since there was no proof that the unattached coupons were-attached to the bonds when issued, the-judgment must be reversed as to so much of the award as was based thereon.
The judgment of the district court is. affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded to the district court, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The costs of this appeal shall'be assessed against appellee.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0