What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Seymour BUXBOM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, INC., a California corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 83-6020.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 8, 1984.
Submitted May 2, 1984.
Decided Aug. 3, 1984.
Sprague Wheeler, Maxwell, Wright & Wheeler, Pasadena, Cal., Blake Andrew Watson, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Richard Cross, Best, Best & Krieger, Riverside, Cal., Barbara E. Karshmer, Frampton, Karshmer & Kesselman, Fresno, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Before BROWNING, GOODWIN, and KENNEDY, Circuit Judges.
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:
Naegele appeals from summary judgment granted to Buxbom on a claim under 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1982). Because of recent action taken by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, we now reverse with instructions to enter judgment against Buxbom and to dismiss the action.
In March of 1978, the Morongo Band of Indians and Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company entered into a ten-year agency agreement under which Naegele would construct and maintain billboards on a portion of the Morongo reservation. The Band paid Naegele $60,000 to be used for the construction of the billboards; Naegele paid the Band $60,000 for the privilege of being the Band’s agent and an additional $250,000, representing advance payment of ten annual fees of $25,000 each. The agreement had not been approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs before these payments, and Buxbom brought suit against Naegele under the qui tarn provision of 25 U.S.C. § 81. Buxbom sought a declaration that the agreement was void for failure to secure the BIA’s approval and that pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 81, the $60,000 received by Naegele from the Band should be forfeited, with Buxbom taking half and the United States taking the other half.
The agreement between the Band and Naegele was submitted to the Bureau of Indian Affairs in late 1983, after Naegele had filed their notice of appeal from the summary judgment. On February 3, 1984, just prior to oral argument, the BIA approved .the agreement retroactive to 1978 under 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1982).
Buxbom admits that the BIA has the power to approve the agreement retroactively and that the approval precludes a judgment in this case that the agreement between the Band and Naegele is void. See Indian Contracts — Approval Of, 15 Op.Att’y.Gen. 585, 590 (1876). Cf. Lykins v. McGrath, 184 U.S. 169, 171-73, 22 S.Ct. 450, 451-452, 46 L.Ed. 485 (1902) (upholding retroactive approval by the Secretary of conveyance of interest in land under the predecessor of 25 U.S.C. § 415); Lomax v. Pickering, 173 U.S. 26, 31-32, 19 S.Ct. 416, 418-419, 43 L.Ed. 601 (1899) (same); Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U.S. 310, 315, 12 S.Ct. 860, 862, 36 L.Ed. 716 (1892) (same); Wishkeno v. Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Operations), 11 I.B.I.A.. 21, 28-32 (Interior Bd.Indian App.1982) (same). Buxbom nonetheless presses the suit to recover half of the $60,000 forfeiture.
We conclude that the BIA’s retroactive approval of the agreement deprives Buxbom of an action under section 81. Buxbom argues that its rights under section 81 vested in 1978 when the $60,000 consideration passed from the Band to Naegele.. But section 81 provides that “[n]o agreement shall be made ____ unless ---- [i]t shall bear the approval of the Secretary;” it does not provide that “no consideration shall be paid prior to approval by the Secretary.” Thus, section 81’s statutory penalty attaches only if the agreement at issue was made without BIA approval. Since the BIA’s recent approval of the agreement is effective nunc pro tunc, Buxbom’s claim that the agreement violates section 81 must fail.
This result does not run afoul of due process restrictions on the power of courts or administrative agencies to forgive statutory penalties. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 82 S.Ct. 289, 7 L.Ed.2d 240 (1961). The general principle ennunciated in St. Regis does not displace the more specific rule approved by the Supreme Court that the BIA may retroactively approve agreements between Indians and non-Indians. Lykins, 184 U.S. at 171-73, 22 S.Ct. at 451-452.
In light of our disposition, we do not consider whether the agreement between the Band and Naegele is a lease subject to section 415 or a contract subject to section 81. The effect of the BIA’s approval is the same in either event.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1