What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
BURKE, dba RANCH ACRES LIQUORS, et al. v. FORD et al., dba ALL BRANDS SALES CO., et al.
No. 632.
Decided December 11, 1967.
Robert S. Rizley for petitioners.
Irvine E. Ungermctn for respondents.
Per Curiam.
Petitioners, Oklahoma liquor retailers, brought this action under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1, to enjoin an alleged state-wide market division by all Oklahoma liquor wholesalers. The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that there had in fact been a division of markets — both by territories and by brands. The court nevertheless entered judgment for the wholesalers because, among other reasons, it found that the interstate commerce prerequisite of the Sherman Act was not satisfied. The Court of Appeals affirmed upon the sole ground that “the proof was entirely insufficient to show that the activities complained of were in or adversely affected interstate commerce.” 377 F. 2d 901, 903.
There are no liquor distilleries in Oklahoma. Liquor is shipped in from other States to the warehouses of the wholesalers, where it is inventoried and held until purchased by retailers. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the liquor “came to rest” in the wholesalers’ warehouses and that interstate commerce ceased at that point. Hence, they concluded that the wholesalers’ division of the Oklahoma market did not take place “in interstate commerce.” But whatever the validity of that conclusion, it does not end the matter. For it is well established that an activity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce. United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U. S. 186; Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219.
Recognizing this, the District Court went on to find that the wholesalers’ market division had no effect on interstate commerce, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court of Appeals held that proof of a state-wide wholesalers’ market division in the distribution of goods retailed in substantial volume within the State but produced entirely out of the State was not by itself sufficient proof of an effect on interstate commerce. We disagree. Horizontal territorial divisions almost invariably reduce competition among the participants. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U. S. 350. When competition is reduced, prices increase and unit sales decrease. The wholesalers’ territorial division here almost surely resulted in fewer sales to retailers — hence fewer purchases from out-of-state distillers — than would have occurred had free competition prevailed among the wholesalers. In addition the wholesalers’ division of brands meant fewer wholesale outlets available to any one out-of-state distiller. Thus the state-wide wholesalers’ market division inevitably affected interstate commerce.
The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Me. Justice Harlan concurs in the result.
Between $44 and $45 million in wholesale purchases in 1964.
The Court of Appeals stressed the fact that unit sales to the wholesalers increased (885,976 cases to 891,176 cases) from 1963 to 1964 while the market division was in effect. But if there had been free competition among the wholesalers — all other things being equal — presumably sales to them would have increased even more.
The increase in liquor sales noted by the Court of Appeals was 0.6%; during the same period total personal income in Oklahoma increased from $4,880 million to $5,220 million, an increase of 7.0%. Table 1, Survey of Current Business, p. 30, Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce (August 1967). Adjusting for concurrent price inflation (see Table 8.1, Survey of Current Business, p. 42 (July 1967)), the increase in real personal income was approximately 5.7%.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3