What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FIDELITY-PHENIX INS. CO. et al. v. CHICAGO TITLE & TRUST CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
April 10, 1926.)
No. 3662.
1. Insurance <@=>268.
Breach of express warranty in marine policy of insurance bars recovery whether or not it caused the loss.
2. Insurance <@=>272 — Insurer held not liable on marine policy on vessel “warranted passenger steamer,” which was not used, licensed, nor lawfully equipped for carrying passengers (Comp. St. § 8260).
A provision in a marine policy, “warranted passenger steamer,” bars recovery on the policy for her loss, where at no time between issuance of the policy and her loss was she used or licensed to carry passengers and she was not equipped with water-tight bulkheads as required of passenger steamers by Comp. St. § 8260.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Hlinois.
Suit in admiralty on a marine insurance policy by the Chicago Title & Trust Company, receiver, against the Eidelity-Phenix Insurance Company and others. Decree for libelant, and respondents appeal.
Reversed.
John S. Lord, George L. Wire and Charles L. Cobb, all of Chicago, Ill. (D. Roger Englar and Henry N. Longley, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellants.
Charles E. Kremer, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before ALSCHULER, PAGE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
Libel on a marine insurance policy issued by the appellants upon the steamer Norland.
The policy covered .the period from September 8, 1922, to September 8, 1923. On November 12, 1922, while proceeding from Chicago to Milwaukee, partially loaded with freight, the steamer sprang a leak, the pumps gave out, and she went to the bottom — a total loss. The policy contained the following:
“Warranted passenger steamer.
“Warranted confined to Lake Michigan and tributaries but including trip from Boston, Mass., to Chicago and/or Milwaukee by a port or ports with privilege of stopover at Buffalo for the purpose of alterations.”
The steamer was bought in New York in August, 1922, insured there, and brought to Chicago in October. The principal defense is a breach of the warranty that the steamer was a passenger steamer. In the view we take of this question it will not be necessary to notice other contentions. The rule is that a breach of an express warranty in a policy of insurance bars a recovery whether it caused the injury or not. Arnold on Marine Insurance and Average (10th Ed.) vol. 2, §§ 632, 633; 38 Corpus Juris, p. 1064. This warranty is an express warranty as to an existing fact. It is expressed in the body of the policy, written in the face of it, is part of the contract, and must be strictly and fully true or the policy cannot be enforced. The authorities hold that an express warranty is a condition precedent, the burden of which- rests upon the assured.
“The terms of the policy constitute the measure of the insurer’s liability, and, in order to recover, the assured must show himself within those terms. * * The compliance of the assured with the terms of the contract is a condition precedent to the right Of recovery.” Imperial Eire Ins. Co. v. County of Coos, 151 U. S. 452, 14 S. Ct. 379, 38 L. Ed. 231; McLoon v. Commercial Mutual Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 472, 97 Am. Dec. 116, 1 Am. Rep. 129.
But the decision of this ease does not turn upon where the burden of proof lies. The evidence upon the character of the steamer is all one way. The material facts as to her construction, equipment, and use are not disputed. At no time from her purchase in August, 1922, to the time when she sank was she used or licensed to carry passengers. From her arrival at Chicago she was licensed to and carried only freight. In outward appearance (a photograph of her appears in the record) she must have been constructed so as to carry some passengers. Many steamers on the Great Lakes carry both passengers and freight. Appellee insists she was a passenger steamer because she was equipped to carry passengers. After reciting the arrange- , ments for the convenience and comfort of passengers, appellee in its brief says:
“She was therefore perfectly equipped, not only for day passengers or excursion passengers, but for carrying passengers on night trips. She had the staterooms, the cabins, and dining rooms for both sexes; every convenience, with boats and life preservers in sufficient number and capacity to care for the passengers.”
This equipment, plus the picture, is the whole of the evidence upon which we are asked to-hold that she was a passenger steamer. Witnesses on both sides were asked to say whether she was „a passenger or freight steamer. Some said passenger, some said freight, and some said passenger and freight. These answers were mere conclusions or opinions of the witnesses upon the question, which was for the court to decide, and cannot aid, much less control, th'e solution of it.
A statute of the United States (Comp. St. § 8260) provides:
“Every sea-going steamer, and every steamer navigating the great northern or northwestern lakes, carrying passengers, the-building of which shall be completed after the 28th day of Augmst, 1871, shall have not less than three water-tight cross bulkheads, such bulkheads to reach to the main deck in single-' decked vessels, otherwise to the deck next below the main deck, to be made of iron plates, sustained upon suitable framework, and to be properly secured to the hull of the vessel. The position of such bulkheads and the strength of material of which the same shall be constructed shall be determined by the general rules of the board of supervising inspectors.”
The general rules and regulations prescribed by the board of supervising inspectors provide:
“Every sea-going steamer, and every steamer navigating the great northern and northwestern lakes, carrying passengers, shall have not less' than three water-tight cross bulkheads. Such bulkheads shall reach to the main deck in single-decked vessels, otherwise to the deck next below the main deck. Por wooden hulls they shall be fastened to suitable framework, which framework must be securely attached to the hull and caught. For iron hulls they shall be well secured to the framework of the hulls and strengthened by stanchions of angle iron placed not more than two feet from center to center. One of the bulkheads must he placed forward and one abaft the engines and boilers.
“The third or collision bulkhead must be placed not nearer than five feet from the stem of the vessel. Iron bulkheads must be made not less than one quarter of an inch in thickness, and wooden bulkheads must be of equal strength and covered with iron plates not less than one sixteenth of an inch in thickness.”
No steamer can engage in carrying passengers on the Great Lakes unless she is equipped with three water-tight cross bulkheads. The evidence shows that the Norland, which was built in 1890, did not have three water-tight cross bulkheads. She had no water-tight bulkheads at all. Bulkheads are measures of safety against the danger of sinking. Requirements for safety of passengers would appear to be more important than those for their convenience and comfort. But we are not concerned with the relative importance of these requirements. Whatever other equipment she may have or be required to have, a steamer, to be qualified to engage in carrying passengers, must be equipped with bulkheads as the statute and the regulations require. If not so equipped, she cannot lawfully do that for which a passenger steamer is intended — cannot carry passengers. The evidence shows that it was not intended to use this vessel as a passenger steamer. Libelant’s witness Larsen, who was sent to bring the steamer from New York, testified that when he took her over he turned her cabins into crew’s quarters and tore out some of the bulkheads.
The evidence shows that this steamer was not intended to he and was not used or licensed to carry passengers; that she was intended to be and was used and licensed to carry freight only; that she was not equipped in important particulars as passenger boats are by law required to be equipped, and was not in fact a passenger steamer.
A breach of the warranty clearly appearing, the decree is reversed, with directions to dismiss the libel.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99