What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary Lewis GALLOP, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 82-1144X.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Sept. 7, 1982.
Decided Dec. 8, 1982.
Michael Martin, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Seattle, Wash., for defendant-appellant.
Sally Gustafson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BROWNING, Chief Judge, TUT-TLE and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.
Honorable Elbert Parr Tuttle, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Gallop appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1708 for possessing money orders stolen from the mail. He argues there was insufficient evidence that the theft occurred while the money orders were still in the mails, i.e., after they had been mailed, but before they had been delivered; and that certain evidence seized from his person should have been suppressed.
Mailing and Non-Receipt
In determining whether the government has met its burden of showing mailing and non-receipt, the jury is entitled to “make common sense inferences from the proven facts.” United States v. Gardner, 454 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir.1972), quoting United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.1958). While the evidence in this case was weaker than the evidence in Gardner, we believe it was sufficient to allow the jury to infer mailing and non-receipt. The government produced two “Transaction in Difficulty” forms prepared by Safeway reciting the dates the money orders were mailed first class by American Express from New York, and reporting that the agent at the Safeway store in Seattle did not receive them. While records prepared by the addressor would have been stronger evidence of mailing, the jury could infer mailing from the “Transaction in Difficulty” forms viewed in light of the fact that the money orders did appear in Seattle. In addition to Safeway’s report of non-receipt, testimony that difficulties ceased once Safeway arranged to have the money orders delivered directly inside the store rather than to its rural-type mail box further supports the jury’s conclusion that the money orders were stolen from the mail, not after receipt.
Motion to Suppress
When Gallop’s motion to suppress was last before this court, United States v. Gallop, 606 F.2d 836 (9th Cir.1979), the court assumed that Gallop’s arrest, and therefore the search of his wallet incident to arrest, could be legal only if the search of Connors’ purse was legal. Id. at 838-39. The court went on to hold that the search of Connors’ purse was a valid inventory search, and that the evidence found gave the police probable cause to arrest Gallop, id. at 840, making the search of Gallop’s wallet a valid search incident to arrest. See United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 943-44 (9th Cir.1980). In this appeal, Gallop argues that under the Supreme Court’s recently announced test for' retroactivity in fourth amendment cases, United States v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982), the case of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), should be applied retroactively in this case to hold the inventory search illegal. See United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.1981). We do not reach this issue, however, because we conclude that under Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), there is a prior question as to whether Gallop had a privacy interest in Connors’ purse.
In Rawlings, the Supreme Court considered facts similar to those in the present case; the appellant’s arrest was based on evidence found in a search of his companion’s purse. The Court held that an illegal search of the purse violated the appellant’s fourth amendment rights only if he had a privacy interest in the purse. We must apply Rawlings to this case because, under United States v. Johnson, supra, the Court’s fourth amendment decisions are to be applied retroactively to cases still pending on direct appeal unless they represent “a clear break with the past.” -U.S. at ---, 102 S.Ct. at 2586-90. Rawlings does not represent such a break. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 104-06, 100 S.Ct. at 2561-62; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75, 89 S.Ct. 961, 966-67, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).
Under Rawlings, Gallop’s arrest, and the search of his wallet incident to the arrest, were legal unless he can show he had a privacy interest in Connors’ purse. The existence of a privacy interest is a question of fact. We remand to give Gallop “an opportunity to demonstrate, if [he] can, that [his] own Fourth Amendment rights were violated.” United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2554, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).
AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2