What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Weldon Kelley LORRAINE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Appellees.
No. 71-1069.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 18, 1971.
Weldon Kelley Lorraine, pro se.
C. Nelson Day, U. S. Atty. and Glenn J. Mecham, Asst. U. S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah.
Before PICKETT, BREITENSTEIN and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Lorraine was sentenced to a term of imprisonment on June 9, 1970, after his conviction by a jury of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113. We were without jurisdiction to entertain his direct appeal because of an untimely notice of appeal. United States v. Lorraine, No. 666-70, unpublished (10th Cir. March 30, 1971). An opinion affirming on direct appeal the conviction of two co-defendants is being filed with this opinion. See United States of America v. Lujan, 444 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1971).
By motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Lorraine alleged that he had been denied adequate assistance of counsel at trial, and challenged the court’s instructions to the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence. Relief was denied without a hearing. The court held that the bare conclusionary statements without factual allegations cannot avail against the court’s observation at the trial of the representation of the defendant by his counsel. Under the circumstances of this case, we agree.
Lorraine’s attack on his trial representation is directed to counsel’s failure to file certain motions, that he committed tactical errors, that he lost interest in the case for personal and financial reasons, and that he failed to interview witnesses with evidence favorable to Lorraine without specifying the content of the alleged favorable evidence.
As noted by the district court, these claims are conclusionary statements with no supporting factual allegations and therefore insufficient. See Atkins v. Kansas, 386 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1967) and Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1965).
We recently held that the competency and qualification of a lawyer before the court are a matter of which the trial court had judicial knowledge and of which it could take judicial notice. Mitchell v. United States, 432 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1970).
The burden on an appellant to establish a claim of ineffective assistance is heavy, and neither hindsight nor success is the measure. Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1970). It does not mean victorious or flawless counsel. Brady v. United States, 433 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1970). The representation must have been such as to make the trial a mockery, sham, or farce, Basker v. Crouse, 426 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1970), or resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights. Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1967); Criser v. United States, 319 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1963). The instant allegations do not meet these tests.
Lorraine challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The question is not whether the evidence was sufficient, in a collateral attack, but whether the verdict of guilty was so devoid of evidentiary support as to raise a due process issue. Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1970); Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970); Martinez v. Patterson, 371 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1966); Hall v. Crouse, 339 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 941, 85 S.Ct. 1777, 14 L.Ed.2d 704 (1965). We have the trial transcript before us and are satisfied that there is ample evidentiary support.
Finally, collateral relief is not available to set aside a conviction on the basis of erroneous jury instructions unless the error had such an effect on the trial as to render it so fundamentally unfair that it constitutes a denial of a fair trial in a constitutional sense. Linebarger v. Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 938, 89 S.Ct. 1218, 22 L.Ed.2d 470 (1969). See also Ortiz v. Baker, 411 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 279, 24 L.Ed.2d 234 (1969); Martinez v. Patterson, supra; Poulson v. Turner, 359 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 905, 87 S.Ct. 219, 17 L.Ed.2d 136 (1966); Hilliard v. United States, 345 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1965); Carrillo v. United States, 332 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1964).
This case was assigned to the summary calendar upon docketing in this court and Lorraine was informed that he could submit papers addressing the underlying merits, which he has not done. Nonetheless, we have carefully and thoroughly reviewed the files and records in this cause and are convinced that the judgment of the district court was correct
Accordingly, we affirm.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1