What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, Ltd., Appellant, v. FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD et al., Appellees.
No. 12914.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 20, 1956.
Decided May 3, 1956.
Mr. Warner W. Gardner, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Alfred L. Scanlan, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Edward H. Hickey, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., at the time the record was filed, Edward D. Ransom, Gen. Counsel, Federal Maritime Board, and Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept, of Justice, were on the brief, for appellees.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, BAZELON and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff (appellant), American President Lines, Ltd., a subsidized shipping operator, filed this action for a declaratory judgment against the defendants (appellees), the Federal Maritime Board and its individual members. The complaint sought a judgment that the term “capital necessarily employed in the business,” contained in General Order 31 issued under § 607(d) of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, must be used by appellees rather than the definition of that term contained in General Order 71, as amended, in computing the net amount of the subsidy inuring to appellant under its operating-differential subsidy contract with the United States for the period January 1, 1947 to September 30, 1948.
The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction upon the ground, among others, that Congress had given appellant “a clear remedy” in the Court of Claims which “unquestionably has the right to consider and determine the validity of the action of the Board, * * * Since we agree, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other grounds relied upon by the District Court.
Affirmed.
. D.C.1955, 133 F.Supp. 100, 103.
. Appellant contends that its Court of Claims remedy is inadequate because that court cannot relieve it of the obligation to maintain an unnecessarily high special reserve fund under § 607(c) of the Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 1177(c). Diminution of the fund is required by the statute to have the approval of the Board. In the face of a judgment by the Court of Claims determining that the definition in General Order 71 is invalid, the Board would be arbitrary in the extreme to withhold approval of a withdrawal from the fund solely on the basis of the definition. Wo agree with Judge Morris that, if tbe Court of Claims should uphold appellant’s view of the definition, appellant “would receive the complete relief it seeks, even as to those funds which it is required to deposit in the special reserve fund.” Id. at page 103.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1