What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
OLD SOUTH LINES, Inc., v. McCUISTON.
No. 8273.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 29, 1937.
A. C. Wheeler and Chas. J. Thurmond, both of Gainesville, Ga., for appellant.
G. Fred Kelley, of Gainesville, Ga., and R. Beverly Irwin, of Atlanta, Ga., for ap-pellee.
Before FOSTER, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
The appellee was awarded damages for personal injuries sustained by her, when she slipped on a banana peeling, while travelling as a passenger from Winston-Salem, N. C., to Atlanta, Ga., on a bus operated by appellant. The latter assigns as error the failure of the court below to instruct the jury peremptorily to find for the defendant. No one saw the peeling on the floor before the accident, and it is not claimed that the carrier was at fault in putting it there. The appellee recognizes the burden on her to show its presence there long enough to give the carrier a reasonable opportunity to discover and remove it.
No presumption of fault on the part of the carrier arises here from the mere fact of injury. The burden is on the passenger, by substantial evidence, to prove facts from which a fair jury may reasonably infer that the injury was directly and proximately caused by the negligence of the carrier or its employees. Windham v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (C.C.A.) 71 F.(2d) 115.
With these basic principles in mind, let us examine the material facts in evidence favorable to the appellee. She boarded the bus at Winston-Salem between 8 and 9 o’clock on the morning of January 15, 1936, and got off at Charlotte to purchase a round-trip ticket from there to Atlanta. When she entered the bus again, around 11 o’clock, she noticed an elderly gentleman sitting two or three seats from the front, eating bananas. When the bus reached Gainesville, Ga., about 8 o’clock that night, the driver announced a five minutes stop; appellee got out and went to the restroom. When she returned and walked to her seat she noticed a magazine lying on the last seat of the bus. She is the sole witness as to what happened then, and her words are given full credence in discussing this assignment. The bus was not in motion. She walked back, picked up the magazine, and turned around to her seat, which was the second one from the rear. When she undertook to sit down, her foot hit a banana peeling right by the seat, and she fell, receiving serious physical injuries.
It is apparent that this case is controlled by Windham v. Atlanta Coast Line R. Co., supra, unless the mere fact of the man eating bananas near the front of the bus nine hours before the accident, coupled with the presence of a piece of banana peeling on the floor at the time of the injury, was sufficient to warrant the inference by a jury of fair and reasonable men that the peeling was thrown on the floor by the elderly gentleman and remained there until appellee slipped on it. Such an inference would be the result of mere speculation, and not a logical conclusion from any fact or facts in evidence. While the man was seen eating bananas, no one saw him throw the peeling on the floor or, in fact, saw the peeling. A fact once shown to exist is ordinarily presumed to continue until the contrary Appears, but obviously this presumption has no application to the activity of a man eating bananas. Liability cannot be imposed upon a carrier by a succession of inferences on an inference, as by inferring, first, that the banana was peeled in the bus; second, that the peeling was thrown on the floor; third, that it was removed by some unknown agency to the rear of the coach; and, fourth, that it remained there until appellee stepped on it. Much speculation might be indulged as to what the elderly gentleman did with the peeling of the banana he was eating, but one man’s guess is as good as another’s. Although the appellee did not testify that she saw it, we know that the banana once had a peeling; but there is no evidence as to when or where the peeling was removed or as to what became of it. Neither do we know that the elderly gentleman was the only person in the bus that ate a banana during the nine hours of that long trip.
It is true that some of the cases in denying recovery against railway companies have mentioned the fact that no bananas were seen on the train; but this is far from holding that the presence of bananas on a coach, either for sale or being eaten, is sufficient in itself to warrant a jury in finding against the carrier where a passenger has slipped on the peeling. Such a holding would render the carriers practical insurers in most cases, as it is well known that bananas are sold and eaten on nearly all trains.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1