What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Harry PORTNOY, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 6067.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
May 1, 1963.
Manuel Katz, Boston, Mass., with whom Paul T. Smith and Raymond J. Dowd, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellant.
William F. Looney, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Paul J. Redmond, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on brief, for appellee.
Before HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges, and GIGNOUX, District Judge.
HARTIGAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts following defendant’s conviction by a jury on a one count indictment charging him with a violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 111.
On May 11,1962 a grand jury returned an indictment alleging that defendant “on or about May 9, 1962 at a parking lot located on St. Botolph Street in Boston, Massachusetts, did forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate and interfere with United States Deputy Marshal William H. Baldwin, a person designated in Section 1114 of Title 18 of the United States Code while said William H. Baldwin was engaged in the performance of his official duties and on account of the performance of his official duties, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 111.”
Defendant pleaded not guilty and seasonably moved to dismiss the indictment because of a failure to allege that defendant was aware, at the time of the alleged offense, that Baldwin (1) “was an officer of the United States” and (2) “was engaged in the performance of his official duties.” This motion was denied.
The case proceeded to trial and following the close of the prosecution’s opening statement — wherein the prosecutor alluded to no prospective proof that the defendant knew the official status of Baldwin — defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The trial judge denied this motion also.
At the trial the Government offered testimony that the defendant had virtually run over — with his automobile — a Deputy United States Marshal who had tried to serve him with a subpoena. There was evidence from which a jury could properly have concluded that the defendant had been made aware of the official status of the Deputy Marshal and that he had deliberately plunged his car forward — heedless of the possibility of bodily harm to the Marshal — in order to avert being served.
In this court, defendant raises three contentions. Initially he argues that the indictment was fatally defective because of the failure to allege that defendant knew that Baldwin was a government officer engaged in the performance of his official duties. Second, it is argued that the trial judge erred in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal following the Government’s opening statement because of the prosecutor’s failure to state that the Government would prove that Baldwin was a Government officer engaged in the performance of his official duties. Finally, defendant urges that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
In our view there is no question that there was abundant evidence from which the jury properly could have found the defendant guilty as charged and, consequently, we pass quickly over the defendant’s argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.
The major issue posed by defendant is where an indictment alleging an assault on a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111, is deficient if it does not allege that the defendant was aware that his victim was a federal officer. The Government argues that scienter on the part of the defendant, as to the official character of the victim, is not an essential element of this type of offense. It argues that the gist of the offense resides in the fact that the defendant has engaged in a certain course of illegal conduct — malum in se — and the additional fact that the victim happens to be a federal officer is relevant only for jurisdictional purposes. In support of this argument, the Government relies largely on the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Bennett v. United States, 285 F.2d 567, 570 (1960), which squarely sustains the position for which the Government here contends.
The defendant, on the other hand, while recognizing the fact that Bennett is highly apposite, attempts to discredit the result on the basis that the holding is out of consonance with a significant line of cases starting with Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 13 S.Ct. 542, 37 L.Ed. 419 (1893), holding that knowledge of the official character of the officer is an essential element of the offense charged, and an indictment which failed to allege this element is fatally defective. See, e. g., Sparks v. United States, 90 F.2d 61 (6th Cir., 1937); United States v. Miller, 17 F.R.D. 486 (D.C.Vt.1955). Defendant further contends that the authority of Bennett is weakened by the faet that there the court failed even to mention its two prior rulings holding that seienter was an essential element of this type of offense. See, Hall v. United States, 235 F.2d 248 (5th Cir., 1956); Hargett v. United States, 183 F.2d 859 (5th Cir., 1950).
While it may be possible to reconcile these authorities, in our view, it is not essential for us to do so in the instant case. Rather, here we need not reach the question of whether an indictment which failed to allege scienter would be defective because in our view the present indictment did in fact fairly charge the defendant with knowledge of the marshal’s official status.
It is a cardinal principle of our criminal law that an indictment is sufficient which apprises a defendant of the crime with which he is charged so as to enable him to prepare his defense and to plead judgment of acquittal or conviction as a plea to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1895); United States v. Crummer, 151 F.2d 958 (10th Cir., 1945); United States v. Pope, 189 F.Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y.1960).
An examination of Section 111 shows that it defines the instant offense as assault upon a federal officer “while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties.” (Emphasis supplied). Following the words of the statute, the indictment in this case charged that the defendant assaulted the marshal “while (he) was engaged in the performance of his official duties and on account of the performance of his official duties * * We believe that an allegation averring that a defendant embarked upon a given course of conduct “on account of” —or for the reason that — his victim was performing official duties must necessarily imply the defendant’s knowledge or awareness of the cloak of officiality with which his victim was garbed at the critical moment. In other words, it is difficult for us to perceive how an assault could be made “on account of” the performance of the victim’s official duties, without knowledge that the victim either was performing, or had performed official duties which were indeed the impelling motive for the assault. See, Sparks v. United States, supra; see also, Parsons v. United States, 189 F.2d 252, 253 (5th Cir., 1951).
In sum, we believe that the instant indictment fairly apprised the defendant of all the elements of the offense with which he was charged and against which he had to defend. In this day, more than this an accused may not ask. As was stated in Parsons v. United States, supra: “The cynically technical approach which formerly enshrouded the consideration of even the plainest and simplest indictments, and, in many instances, made a mockery of simple justice, no longer governs their consideration.” Id. at 253.
There remains the question of whether the trial judge erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal following the Government’s opening statement because of the prosecutor’s asserted failure to state that the defendant knew that his victim was a federal officer.
We have carefully considered defendant’s contention but believe that where the indictment alleges the elements of the offense and the evidence adduced at the trial touches these elements, the defendant cannot claim prejudicial error for failure of the trial judge to acquit on the basis of a prosecutor’s opening statement.
Judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the district court.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1