What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GRIP NUT CO. v. SHARP.
No. 8554.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Nov. 8, 1944.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1944.
Francis' Heisler and Stanley F. Evans, both of Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Russell Wiles and George A. Chritton, both of Chicago, for appellee.
Before EVANS, MAJOR, and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
KERNER, Circuit Judge.
The amended complaint alleged a controversy arising under the patent laws of the United States in that defendant charged plaintiff with an infringement of Patents Nos. 2,008,229; 2,024,070 ; 2,024,071; 2,-047,455; 2,021,279; 1,976,694; and 2,024,-069, and plaintiff averred that defendant had asserted that certain products sold by plaintiff were covered by United States Letters Patent which are defendant’s personal property. Plaintiff denied that it has infringed any patents belonging to defendant and prayed for a declaratory judgment confirming plaintiff’s right to continue its manufacture free from any claim of infringement by defendant. The complaint was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but on appeal the judgment of dismissal was reversed, 7 Cir., 124 F.2d 814. Pending appeal, Minnie E. Sharp asserted she owned Patents Nos. 1,976,694 and 2,024,069. An amendment and supplement to the complaint was filed joining Minnie E. Sharp as a party defendant.
On March 18, 1942, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, stating inter alia, that “defendant has not at any time prior to the filing of this action or during the prosecution of the same, and does not now h(old any right, title or interest to patents covering products made or marketed by complainant corporation”; that Patents Nos. 1,976,694 and 2,024,069 were the property of the estate of William E. Sharp, deceased ; that since he is not an heir [legatee] of the deceased, he had not and could not charge their infringement and he never would charge plaintiff with infringing these patents. The motion to dismiss was denied and defendant was ordered to answer the complaint within twenty days.
Thereafter on April 6, 1942, defendant filed his verified answer, in which he denied that he had ever charged plaintiff with selling or manufacturing any article that infringed upon any patent belonging to him; alleged that plaintiff never manufactured or sold any article under five of the patents mentioned in the complaint, and particularly denied that the plaintiff owned or was licensed to manufacture or sell any product under Patents Nos. 1,976,694 and 2,024,069.
After the issues were joined, defendant informed the court of his impending call to the armed forces of the United States and asked for an early trial, but no order setting the case for trial was entered until October 28, 1942, when the court ordered the case set for trial on February 1, 1943. In the meantime, defendant had entered upon the performance of his military duties and on December 28, 1942, he advised the court through his attorney that it would be impossible, because of his service in the United States Army, to attend the trial of the case on the date set for trial. Thereafter, because'defendant was a member of the military forces, the case was continued from time to time. On November 1, 1943, plaintiff suggested to the court “as a way to get the case into a condition where the court could force a trial and could put pressure on John H. Sharp to get leave from the army and attend as a witness,” the case “could be expedited if it were disposed of on the pleadings as to John H. Sharp.” The court adopted the suggestion, and solely upon the pleadings, entered a decree, that is to say, a summary judgment.
No opinion was rendered and, apart from the general statement presently to be noted, the court made no findings. The decree recited that “Defendant * * * in his motion to dismiss, in his answer, and in the answer of Minnie E. Sharp which he has adopted by reference, disclaims all title to and rights under any patents covering plaintiff’s operations.
“The Court, therefore, finds the plaintiff has not infringed any patents of John H. Sharp or any rights owned by him arising under patents and is free and clear of all liability to John H. Sharp for patent infringement,” and enjoined defendant “from threatening or suing * * * for patent infringement or claiming or asserting that plaintiff has infringed any patents owned by him Or any rights owned by him arising under patents.” The decree also ordered that plaintiff shall recover its costs. To reverse the decree, defendant appeals.
In support of the decree plaintiff argues that the pleadings conclusively proved that prior to the commencement of the instant suit, defendant claimed Patents Nos. 1,976,-694 and 2,024,069 were his personal property and that he demanded that plaintiff cease its manufacture and sale of its products covered by the patents in question; that when defendant disclaimed all interest in any patents covering any products sold by plaintiff, the proper disposition of the case, as to him, was to enjoin him from making like infringement charges in the future.
It is then argued that Minnie E. Sharp in her answer alleged that on December 6, 1940, three days before the commencement of this suit, John H. Sharp had written a letter to plaintiff in which he claimed that the patents in question were his personal property and demanded that plaintiff discontinue the manufacture and sale of its products covered by the patents. It is then claimed that the record discloses that John H. Sharp adopted the answer of Minnie E. Sharp, including the admission that he had claimed the patents as his personal property, thus admitting that he claimed that the patents in question were his personal property. Our study of defendant’s answer discloses that defendant in his answer, in answer to the first and second paragraphs of the amendment and supplement to the complaint, stated that he “refers the court to the answer of his co-defendant.” Even so, since defendant denied that plaintiff owned or was licensed to manufacture or sell any products under Patents Nos. 1,976,-694 and 2,024,069, there yet remained the question of whether the plaintiff was in fact the owner of the patents in question.
Upon this state of the record, the court in entering the decree, did so in violation of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, which provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Here, the amended complaint alleged that plaintiff was the owner of thev-jpatents. This was a material fact. This allegation was specifically denied by defendant’s answer. Thus, there was an issue of fact. Because there was such an issue of fact presented by the pleadings, the court erred in entering the decree.
The decree of the District Court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1