What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WALLS v. GUY.
(Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted December 8, 1924.
Decided March 2, 1925.)
No. 4118.
1. Property <§=>9 — Title to premises held sufficiently established to support action for negligence.
In action for negligence in construction of basement in manner causing building to collapse, proof of plaintiff’s possession, supplemented by defendant’s admission of plaintiff’s ownership involved in contract and his conduct in regard thereto, held to create presumption of ownership in plaintiff sufficient to sustain action, in absence of any evidence to contrary.
2. Judgment <§=>266 — Motion in arrest on ground not apparent on record held properly denied.
In action against contractor for negligence causing collapse of building, defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment on ground that plaintiff had divested himself of title to premises before contract was made, unsupported by face of record, held properly denied.
3. Judgment <§=>266 — Motion in arrest appropriate only to reach defects apparent on record.
Motion in arrest of judgment is appropriate only where errors or defects are apparent on face of record, and will not be entertained where affidavits or statements of counsel or other proof is required to sustain it.
Appeal from Supreme Court of District of Columbia.
Action by Nathaniel L. Guy against Norris Walls. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
G. C. Gertman, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
B. L. Gaskins, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN,. Chief Justice, - ROBB, Associate Justice, and HATFIELD, Judge of the United States Court of Customs Appeals.
HATFIELD, Acting Associate Justice.
The appellee, Nathaniel L. Guy, brought suit in the court below as plaintiff against the appellant, Norris Walls, as defendant, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, by reason of the failure of defendant to properly carry out the terms of a contract entered into by the parties for the construction of a basement or cellar, under -a certain dwelling house occupied by plaintiff.
It is alleged in the amended declaration that the defendant held himself out to the public and to plaintiff as being possessed of great skill and experience in the business of the construction of cement basements, and that he had been engaged in such business-for a long period of time prior to the 24th day of January, 1920; that on the 24th day of January, 1920, plaintiff was in lawful possession of a dwelling house situated in the District of Columbia, of the value of $5,-000; that the house was used by himself and family as a residence; that on that date he-entered into a contract with defendant, by the terms of which it was agreed by the defendant that he would construct a cement basement or cellar under the building for a reasonable compensation to be paid by plaintiff ; that in accordance with the terms of the-agreement the defendant entered upon the work of constructing a basement and made a large excavation under the building; that by reason of the negligence of defendant, and the unworkmanlike manner in which ha performed his duties in excavating thereunder, the building collapsed and fell into the-excavation made by the defendant, and was-wholly demolished and destroyed, the plaintiff being thereby deprived of the use and' enjoyment thereof. Plaintiff asked damages-for the value of the building in the sum off $5,000, for the recovery of $4,000, money-expended in restoring the building, and $1,-000 expended in procuring “other and necessary habitations and dwellings for himself' and family.”
On the trial of the ease the plaintiff testified that he was in lawful possession of the property; that he’ entered into a contract •with the defendant for the construction of a cement basement under the dwelling house;, that the defendant made a large excavation thereunder and continued with the work until the building collapsed. Plaintiff and other witnesses testified that prior to the damage complained of the building was of the value of. $3,000 to $4,000. Evidence was introduced tending to prove that the collapse of the building was due to the negligent manner in which the defendant performed his work.
The plaintiff rested his case without the introduction of evidence as to the other claims of damage made in the amended declaration. The defendant moved the court for a directed verdict on two grounds: First, that the plaintiff had failed to offer evidence tending to prove that he was the owner of the damaged building; second, that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that the collapse of the building was due to the negligent manner in which the defendant had done the work entrusted to him. The court overruled the motion. Exceptions were taken to the ruling of the court.
The defendant submitted evidence for the purpose of controverting the claim of negligence and to prove that the work in connection with the construction of the basement had been properly performed. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,000. The defendant’s motion for a new trial was overruled, as was his motion in arrest of judgment, and judgment was entered on the verdict of the jury.
It is urged by the appellant that in order to recover damages for the destruction of the building, on evidence of its value, it was necessary for the plaintiff to have established that he was the owner thereof. The case of California Dry Dock Co. v. Armstrong et al. (C. C.) 17 F. 216, is cited as authority for appellant’s position. The court held in that ease, which was an action in trespass, that, if leased premises are injured by a stranger, he is liable to the tenant for injury to the possession, and to the owner of the freehold for any injury thereto; that the right of the tenant is distinct from that of the owner, and satisfaction of the claim of the one is no bar to the action of the other.
The question of ownership of the premises was not in issue in that ease. It was alleged in the declaration and admitted by the defendant tha.t plaintiff was the owner of a leasehold estate in the lands, and was not the owner of the freehold. In this case we are confronted with an' entirely different situation. The amended declaration contains an averment that plaintiff was in lawful possession of the premises. This was substantiated by evidence on the trial.
The defendant by his plea, the general issue, denied that plaintiff was in lawful possession of the premises. The defendant did not introduce' evidence on that question on the trial of the case, nor did he offer any evidence as to ownership of the property. Had he desired to raise the question of ownership, he might have done so by plea to the amended declaration, and by the introduction of proper evidence on the trial.
Proof of possession of the premises by the plaintiff, supplemented by the admission of the defendant, which is involved in the contract and in his conduct iu regard thereto, of plaintiff’s ownership of the premises, or his right to contract in regard thereto, created the presumption that plaintiff was the owner of the freehold, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary was sufficient proof of title to maintain the action. Bradshaw v. Ashley, 180 U. S. 59, 21 S. Ct. 297, 45 L. Ed. 423.
The defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, in which it was alleged: First, that the allegation of lawful possession of the premises contained in the amended declaration, was not sufficient averment of ownership; second, that plaintiff had divested himself of title to the premises and was not the owner of the freehold at the time the contract was entered into by the parties, nor since that time. The motion was supported by an affidavit of counsel for defendant, in which among other things it was stated that counsel had not discovered that plaintiff was not the owner of the premises until after the trial of the case. A deed of trust from plaintiff to his wife under date of November 3, 1917, was attached to the affidavit.
A motion in arrest of judgment is appropriate for errors or defects which are apparent on the face of the record. It is not appropriate, and will not be entertained, where affidavits, statements of counsel, or other proof is required to sustain it. Brown v. Massachusetts, 144 U. S. 573, 12 S. Ct. 757, 36 L. Ed. 546.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1