What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. v. PENN MUTUAL INDEMNITY CO.
No. 9203.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 3, 1947.
Decided March 18, 1947.
Henry S. Ambler, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Peter.P. Zion, of Philadelphia, Pa. (Albert H. Friedman, of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BIGGS, GOODRICH, and MCLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.
GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.
This case involves a controversy between two corporations which issue automobile insurance. It is in federal court on grounds of diversity of citizenship. All the facts have a Pennsylvania setting and legal questions presented by the case are matters to be determined by Pennsylvania law.
American Automobile Insurance Company (hereafter called American) issued an automobile insurance liability policy to George Wasilindra. It appears that the insured was required to have a “Financial Responsibility Insurance Certificate”, as provided by the Pennsylvania statute, before he could have his motor vehicle operator’s license reinstated. The policy which American issued to Wasilindra contained a “Financial Responsibility Insurance Certificate” endorsement. It also contained an endorsement called “Drive Other Automobiles — Broad Form” which read: “Insurance shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance available to the insured, either as an insured under a policy applicable with respect to the automobile or otherwise, against a loss covered hereunder.”
Penn Mutual Indemnity Company (hereafter called Penn Mutual) issued a policy of automobile liability insurance to James W. Pender. In one paragraph, “IV. Definition of Insured”, appears a statement that “ * * * The provisions of this paragraph do not apply (a) to any person or organization with respect to any loss against which he has any valid or collectible insurance.”
Pender loaned his automobile to Wasilindra. Wasilindra had an accident in which two of his passengers were hurt. They obtained judgment against Wasilindra. Neither of the insurance companies evidently being willing to pay voluntarily, one of the plaintiffs issued an attachment against American and recovered a judgment which was affirmed on appeal by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. American having paid now seeks to be indemnified by Penn Mutual, setting up the “excess insurance” provision which was in the policy and which has already been quoted. It does not claim that Pender, the owner of the bailed car, is liable for the negligence of his bailee, as it could not successfully claim under Pennsylvania law. It argues that the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision did not pass upon the question of the liability of the insurance corporations between themselves and that all that was settled by that decision was that as against an injured third party the company which furnished Wasilindra the “Financial Responsibility Insurance Certificate” must pay for the harm done by Wasilindra’s negligence in automobile management. But as to the defendant, Pender’s insurance company, it urges the terms of its policy.
The defendant, in its turn, points to the limitation in the definition of “insured” which we have already mentioned. Each company happily points to language in the policy which it has issued which tends to relieve it from liability in this type of case.
The parties have not been able to find for us any authority in Pennsylvania or elsewhere directly deciding the point involved in this suit. Neither have we been able to locate anything independently.
There are some strong analogies, however, which support the result reached by the District Court. It is clear that Wasilindra was the actual tortfeasor and the party primarily liable for the injury to his passengers. Tt is well settled in many instances that where one who is primarily liable has paid an obligation, he cannot come back against a secondary party for contribution or indemnity even though an injured third party might proceed against either one of them. Thus an abutting occupier is liable for a sidewalk injury and has no recourse against the municipal corporation or any other secondarily liable party. Likewise, an agent which has had to pay for a tort he has personally committed cannot make his principal reimburse him for such payment. Nor can the principal debtor who has paid compel reimbursement from a surety.
These situations, we think, are in point here. The insurance company which issued the certificate guaranteeing Wasilindra’s solvency to the world was in the position of guaranteeing a principal obligor. When called upon to pay, as it was by the Superior Court’s decision, it was doing just what it had undertaken to do, that is, making good Wasilindra’s default. We see no reason in legal analogy or in equity why, upon paying as it promised to pay, it should be permitted to pass the loss on to someone else, whether or not that someone might have been compelled to pay the injured party. There is no authority that so holds and we believe that a denial of recovery is within the general approach to the problem by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania even though the exact point was not necessary to be decided.
Affirmed.
Uniform Automobile Liability Security Act of May 15, 1933, P.L. 553 § 2, 75 P.S. § 1254.
This fact appears in Polonitz v. Wa-silindra, 1944, 155 Pa.Super. 62, at page 64, 37 A.2d 136, at page 137.
No question of “excess” insurance arises here since the amount of recovery against Wasilindra was insufficient to exhaust either policy.
Polonitz v. Wasilindra, 1944, 155 Pa.Super. 62, 37 A.2d 136.
Hildock v. Grosso, 1939, 334 Pa. 222, 5 A.2d 565; Blackman v. Venturi, 1933, 110 Pa.Super. 382, 383, 168 A. 808; Note 100 A.L.R. 920 (1936).
The Court said “We express no opinion on tlio question of the liability of the two insurance companies inter se”. Po-lonitz v. Wasilindra, 1944, 155 Pa.Super. 62, 67, 37 A.2d 136, 138.
Bruder v. City of Philadelphia, 1931., 302 Pa. 378, 153 A. 725.
Restatement, Agency § 440 (1933), and Pennsylvania Annotations thereto; 2 Am.Jur. 233 (1936).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1