What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter OLIVER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 84-5984.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued May 7, 1985.
Decided June 28, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 5,1985.
Robert Rose (argued), Bartlett, Tenn., for defendant-appellant.
W. Hickman Ewing, Jr., U.S. Atty., Memphis, Tenn., Joe A. Dycus (argued), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before MARTIN, and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Walter Oliver, Jr. (Oliver) appealed his jury conviction on one count of knowingly depositing in the U.S. mails a threat to injure a person, Christine Broad-nax (Broadnax) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 and § 2.
The hostility between Broadnax and Oliver began in 1980 when Broadnax, after living with Oliver for approximately seven months, requested that he permanently remove himself from her apartment. Oliver complied, but carried off a number of pieces of personal property which belonged to Broadnax. Broadnax insisted that he return the property and Oliver retaliated by burning her automobile. Oliver was sentenced to jail for this vandalism.
While incarcerated in 1981, Oliver mailed threatening letters to Broadnax. The letters were composed in Oliver’s printing or cursive writing style. In 1982, Oliver was charged in a 15-count indictment stemming from the 1981 threats. Oliver pled guilty to two counts of the indictment and the remaining counts were dismissed. He was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Memphis (FCI Memphis) as a result of his 1982 guilty plea when he was charged with mailing a threatening letter to Broadnax’s former husband in December, 1988. He was convicted of that offense and he initiated this appeal.
Oliver charged that the trial court caused him “extreme prejudice” when it corrected an erroneous jury instruction. The record discloses that prior to the close of the government’s proof, the trial judge permitted both attorneys to review the proposed jury instructions. Neither attorney objected to the instructions. In his summation, Oliver’s attorney relied upon the jury instructions to advise members of the jury that the court would instruct them that the United States was required to prove that Oliver “caused the communication to be delivered by the Postal Service” as an element of the offense charged. Oliver’s counsel urged in his final argument that the letter to which the indictment referred had never been delivered and, therefore, no offense had been committed.
When the court initially charged the jury, it instructed that the United States had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “First, that the Defendant deposited in any Post Office or authorized depository for mail matter to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service or cause to be delivered by the Postal Service a communication____” (emphasis supplied). The court also instructed the jury that it was not necessary for the government to prove that Oliver personally wrote the letter or placed it in the mail “so long as he is shown to have caused the communication to be delivered by the Postal Service.” (emphasis supplied).
Before the jury commenced its deliberations, the U.S. Attorney advised the court that the above section of the jury instruction was incorrect, as applied to the instant case, because Oliver was not charged with causing the letter to be delivered, since delivery of a threatening communication constituted a separate and distinct offense under 18 U.S.C. § 876. Rather, pursuant to the indictment at bar, Oliver was accused of depositing the letter in the mail for delivery. The trial court advised the attorneys that it would reinstruct the jury to correct the error of law. Oliver’s attorney immediately objected by protesting that the proposed procedure was untimely and that he could not reargue to the jury without prejudicing his client’s defense since the closing argument had been tailored to the challenged section of the initial jury instruction.
When the trial court determined that the jury should be re-instructed, it presented the attorneys the option of rearguing their respective positions in light of the revised instructions or, in the alternative, the court proposed to explain the reason for the modification of the instruction to the jury. Oliver’s attorney continued to object to the suggested procedure. The trial judge thereupon proceeded to explain to the jury the inaccuracy in the initial instructions, and articulated a proper instruction to the jury.
In his brief to this court, Oliver charges “that after closing argument and said argument being made and tailored specifically to the charge as provided by the Court to the defense attorney, the appellate’s attorney had no way ... to change horses in mid-stream and [thus the procedure utilized] ... was extremely prejudicial to the defendant.”
A primary reason for requiring the trial court to provide copies of its purposed jury instructions to counsel prior to closing argument, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, is to permit counsel to “effectively plan their arguments to the jury.” United States v. Shirley, 435 F.2d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Bass, 425 F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir.1970)). In the instant case, defense counsel expressly tailored his closing argument upon the alleged failure of the government to prove a critical element of the crime, i.e. that the letter had in fact been delivered, as directed by the original jury charge. When the court subsequently omitted that element as a prerequisite for conviction, the defense attorney was left with the impossible task of rearguing to the jury points which he had conceded during his first argument.
While it is certainly proper for the court to recharge a jury to correct possible misunderstandings which could arise as a result of inadequately defining the elements constituting the crime charged, United States v. Egenberg, 441 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994, 92 S.Ct. 530, 30 L.Ed.2d 546 (1971), the substantial prejudice resulting from the recantation in the instant case is more closely analogous to the situation addressed in Schultz v. Yeager, 293 F.Supp. 794 (D.N.J.1967), affd, 403 F.2d 639, 641 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 1309, 22 L.Ed. 562 (1969).
In Schultz, the state prosecutor made numerous comments in his closing argument on defendant’s failure to testify on his own behalf. The court instructed the jury that defendant’s absence as a witness could give rise to an inference that defendant refused to testify because he could not truthfully deny the facts supporting the criminal charges against him. After the jury commenced deliberating, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion wherein it directed that a defendant’s failure to testify could not be cited as inferring guilt. The trial judge in Schultz recalled the jury and instructed its members to disregard the court’s previous statements as to defendant’s decision not to testify on his own behalf. The defendant was convicted, but a federal court ultimately granted his petition for habeas corpus, concluding that the corrected instruction was legally insufficient to cure the prejudice which had resulted from the original instruction.
In sum, the prejudice to defendant from the erroneous jury instruction in the case at bar is similar to that in Schultz because, in both cases, the discovery of the error was so untimely that a curative instruction would not have rendered it harmless.
The case is therefore Reversed and Remanded for a new trial.
. For example, a letter designated at trial as Exhibit 22B stated that Oliver would turn Memphis upside down to find Broadnax to “destroy" her. Exhibit 22C threatened “you will not live too long 198? Mary Move away. I will not miss next time.” In other letters, Oliver threatened Broadnax’s son.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1