What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. COLONIAL MOTOR INN, INC., and Maurice Shear, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 7794.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard March 1, 1971.
Decided March 10, 1971.
John D. Dwyer, Boston, Mass., with whom Lawrence R. Cohen and Newton H. Levee, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Everett C. Sammartino, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.
A corporation, and Shear, the present appellant, were indicted for making a false statement for the purpose of influencing the Small Business Administration to grant a loan to the corporation. The specific statement was that the corporate defendant owed one John J. Shea $10,000 for work and improvements. As a result of its making the loan, the Small Business Administration forthwith paid $10,000 to Shea. At the trial the government called a Mrs. Lowery, who described herself as being, at the time in question, Shea’s business manager and right hand. She testified that Shea was deceased, and that after his death Shear had admitted to her that Shea had never done the work. There was evidence that Shea did not keep the money, but paid it over to a company in which Shear was interested.
On cross-examination defendant inquired whether the witness “file[d] Mr. Shea’s income tax for him?” Upon the government’s objection, defendant stated that the purpose was to test the credibility of the witness. At the bench the defendant made an offer of proof that Shea did not keep income tax records, and that the witness was afraid that if it was determined that Shea did the work and was paid, both she and Shea’s estate would be in trouble. “There were fraudulent income tax returns.” The court ruled that this was “an ingenious argument, but [not] proper inquiry to impeach credibility.”
Thereafter the government argued to the jury as follows:
“You can judge Mrs. Lowery’s testimony. What reason would she have to lie? She has nothing to gain or lose from this whole affair. Nothing at all. Not one thing.”
The defendants were convicted, and Shear appeals.
This is an unusual case, for what the defendant was attempting to show was, in effect, a prior consistent statement, normally a way of supporting a witness, not of attacking him. However, the matter went deeper. What defendant was really seeking was to demonstrate that the witness had, by virtue of her participation in Shea’s business affairs, a personal motive for denying Shea’s entitlement to the money. If Shea had in fact done the work, the receipt of the payment would have been a taxable transaction, possibly subjecting her to penalty if not reported, whereas if he had merely acted as a conduit any violation of the income tax law in failing to report the transaction might have been technical and de minimis.
When a witness’ interest is obvious, the extent of permissible cross-examination must be, short of clear abuse, in the discretion of the court. In the case at bar if the witness had been Shea himself, cross-examination on the subject of the tax consequences of admitting a taxable receipt might well have been excluded as superfluous, his interest being self-evident. The issue here was different. On the record, the witness had no apparent concern in whether Shea was owed the money or not. The court's refusal to let the defendant show otherwise was precisely what permitted the government to ring the changes on her lack of motive to falsify, an argument that could not have been made had the jury realized that if in fact Shea had earned the money, and was liable for a tax thereon, the witness could not admit it without exposing herself to prosecution for income tax violation. Cf. United States v. Lester, 2 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 329; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Dixon, 5 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 899, 904; Terminal Transport Co. v. Foster, 5 Cir., 1947, 164 F.2d 248, 249.
The defendant’s so-called offer of proof left something to be desired, had a strict offer of proof been called for. This, however, was cross-examination and no offer of proof, as such, was needed. All that was necessary in response to the court’s question was an explanation of the general purpose of the inquiry. This was sufficiently accomplished.
Reversed; new trial ordered.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0