What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In the Matter of ALLEN UNIVERSITY, an educational corporation chartered by the State of South Carolina, Debtor.
No. 73-1897.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 9, 1974.
Decided May 16, 1974.
Gerald M. Finkel, Columbia, S. C. (Stanley H. Kohn, Kohn & Finkel, Columbia, S. C., on brief), for appellants.
David W. Robinson, Columbia, S. C. (Robinson, McFadden, Moore & Pope, Columbia, S. C., on brief), for appellees.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.
WIDENER, Circuit Judge:
On May 21, 1973, creditors of Allen University filed in the district court a petition under 11 U.S.C. § 526 asking that Allen University be reorganized under the provisions of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676. The district court dismissed the petition on the basis that, since Allen was not a “moneyed, business, or commercial corporation” within the intendment of 11 U.S.C. § 22(b), an action could not be maintained against it for involuntary reorganization under Chapter X.
In this appeal, petitioners contest both the district court’s holding that an eleemosynary educational corporation may not be the subject of involuntary reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, and also the court’s finding that Allen University is not a “moneyed, business, or commercial” corporation. We affirm both aspects of the decision of the district court.
Allen University is a nonprofit, eleemosynary educational institution operating a four-year college in Columbia, South Carolina. It is controlled and primarily supported by the African Methodist Episcopal Church of South Carolina. Indeed, a majority of its Board of Trustees is composed of ministers and representatives of this church. The Board is elected by the church conference. The petitioners in this appeal are, for the most part, teachers and employees of Allen University who are owed back wages. They claim that the university is insolvent and has preferentially paid other creditors. They also contend that the normal provisions of Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act are not adequate and, consequently, that the university is in need of reorganization under Chapter X in order to continue its educational work and pay its debts.
In Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1943), we held that the eligibility of a corporation for relief under Chapter X depends in the first instance on its eligibility to be adjudged a bankrupt in ordinary bankruptcy. Thus, voluntary petitions may be filed under Chapter X by corporations which can be adjudicated bankrupt on voluntary petitions; involuntary petitions may be filed against corporations against which involuntary petitions in ordinary bankruptcy can be filed. We see no reason to depart here from our previous holding.
11 U.S.C. § 506, which defines the term “corporation” for the purposes of Chapter X, states that “ ‘corporation’ shall mean a corporation, as defined in this title, which could be adjudicated a bankrupt under this title. . . . ” [Emphasis added.] 11 U.S.C. § 1 provides, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, that “[p]ersons shall include corporations except where otherwise specified. . . . ” 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) provides that “[a]ny person, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation or a building and loan association, shall be entitled to the benefits of this title as a voluntary bankrupt.” Thus, under this provision, in a proper case, it would seem an eleemosynary educational institution could be adjudged a bankrupt in a voluntary proceeding.
Because this proceeding is involuntary, however, we must look to subsection (b) of 11 U.S.C. § 22. The statute there provides that “[a]ny natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, except a building and loan association, a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, owing debts to the amount of $1,000 or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default or an impartial trial and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this title.” Consequently, in order to be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt under Chapter XI, or to be involuntarily reorganized under Chapter X, a debtor corporation must fall within the definition of “moneyed, business, or commercial.” Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943); accord, In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass’n., 20 F.Supp. 979 (E.D.Mich.1937); contra, In re Maryvale Community Hospital, Inc., 307 F.Supp. 304, 306 n. 4 (D.Ariz.1969), aff’d per curiam, 456 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1972).
By judicial interpretation, the phrase “moneyed, business, or commercial corporation” has acquired a meaning which limits it to corporations organized for profit. See Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1943). Although Allen University has been chartered as a corporation, as the petition alleges, there is neither capital stock in the corporation nor a return of capital to investors outstanding. Indeed the record discloses no investors. Moreover, although it may be true, as the district court found, that the University carries on a number of activities, some of which could, standing alone, be characterized as commercial in nature, including the operation of a day-care center and University apartments, offering of certain printing services to the public, leasing of two houses in Columbia, and the operation of Reed Center in Charleston, these activities are only ancillary to the institution’s main purpose of education. We are of opinion that such ancillary activities do not bring Allen University within the realm of a “moneyed, business, or commercial corporation.”
Accordingly, the district court property sustained the plea to the jurisdiction, and its decision is
Affirmed.
. Accord, 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2.07 [2] (14th Ed.1972); 11 Remington on Bankruptcy §§ 4416, 4424 (1961 rev.).
. Similarly, the fact that, according tb its charter, Allen University may sue and be sued should not be determinative of its status as a “moneyed, business, or commercial corporation,” since, under general South Carolina law, charitable corporations may sue and are subject to suit. S.C.Code Ann. § 12-758 (Cum.Supp.1971).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99