What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
John L. BAILEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 21778.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 19, 1968.
Decided Oct. 10, 1968.
Mr. Arnold L. Yochelson, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellant.
Mr. Robert S. Bennett, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for ap-pellee.
Before Wilbur K. Miller, Senior Circuit Judge, and Danaher and Tamm, Circuit Judges.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge:
Convicted of narcotics violations, Bailey has here contended that his arrest was unlawful and that accordingly the search which disclosed his possession of narcotics was invalid. Additionally he argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suspend the trial and to conduct an inquiry into the issuance of the arrest warrant although he had made no pretrial motion to that end. We rule against him on both points.
The United States Commissioner on January 31, 1967 had issued a warrant for the arrest of Bailey on a charge of armed robbery. The warrant in abundant detail had been sworn to by witnesses possessed of personal knowledge of the facts set forth. At a routine police roll call, the fact of the issuance of the warrant was brought to the notice of Officers Whitman and Knusta. Later that day the officers, who had a photograph of Bailey, saw Bailey enter a restaurant whereupon they followed him, identified themselves, told Bailey that he was being arrested under the authority of the warrant, and then escorted him to the street. There one of the officers “patted” Bailey to determine whether or not he was armed. The officers attempted further search but were unsuccessful in that Bailey struggled and wrapped his arms and legs around a light pole. The officers then handcuffed him, within a few minutes took him to the 13th Precinct, booked him and contemporaneously searched appellant’s clothing. They found a glass bottle with 64 capsules containing heroin, a plastic bottle containing 44 similar capsules and $265.
On the face of the record the search at the police station of which Bailey complains, so closely related in time and place to the point of arrest was clearly reasonable.
But, appellant contends, the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to suspend the trial and to permit an inquiry into the basis for the issuance of the arrest warrant in the first place. He had filed no pretrial motion seeking to achieve any such result, although the arrest had been made on January 31, 1967, and the trial did not get under way until December 15th of that year. The trial judge ruled that the motion was untimely. “If you were going to raise this issue, you should have done it long ago.” There was no showing as to reasons why the defense could not earlier have moved. There was no basis for a claim that an earlier opportunity had not existed. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
We are thoroughly satisfied that there was no error, and the judgment of conviction must be
Affirmed.
. Bailey on August 28, 1968 was convicted of that very robbery.
. Fed.R.Grim.P. 4(e) (3) expressly provides for the procedure here followed.
. Surely the course thus followed was appropriate and reasonable. See Terry v. State of Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
. Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385, 392 (9 Cir. 1967); Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741, 744 (10 Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 968, 88 S.Ct. 1082, 19 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1968); Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831, 81 S.Ct. 46, 5 L.Ed.2d 59 (1960); cf. Yauss v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 370 F.2d 250 (1966).
. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) expressly provides, so far as is here pertinent, that any such motion “shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist * *
. Clearly there was no seasonable objection to the admission in evidence of the narcotics seized, and the defense motion pimply came “too late.” Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 112, 48 S.Ct. 77, 72 L.Ed. 186 (1927).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1