What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.

Opinion:
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Phillip ELLIOTT, et al., Defendants, Charles O. Farrar, Receiver-Appellee, Kenneth J. Davis, Linda J. Davis, Leroy H. Moeller, As Personal Representative of the Estates of Adolph Hagstrom, Squire J. Kingston, Elizabeth Woods, Caroline Estelle, Lynnis H. McClain, Ted Masco, Anita K. Hailey, Earl Setterblade, Lloyd Schutzman, Shirley Schutzman, Albert C. Heil, Melvin Burkhardt, Rosa Ella Burkhardt, Howard Dore, Ruth Dore, Gerald J. Braun, Christie Braun, Monica Brooke Braun, C. Albert Ducharme Trust and Catherine F. Ducharme Trust, Seaton F. McDaniel, Josephine McDaniel, Trudy and Sidney Kleiner, Claimants-Appellants. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Phillip ELLIOTT, et al., Defendants, Charles O. Farrar, Receiver-Appellee, Melvin Burkhardt and Rosa Ella Burkhardt, Movants-Appellants.
Nos. 89-5457, 89-5528.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 25, 1993.
Merrill N. Johnson, Naples, FL, for K. Davis.
Kathleen Monahan, Miami FL, for L. Moeller.
Frank P. Murphy, Naples, FL, for S. Kingston.
Mark A. Ebelini, Ft. Myers, FL, for H. Dore.
Before FAY and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
In the initial opinion in this case, Securities and Exchange Com’n v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir.1992), we retained jurisdiction over a single unresolved issue in order to certify a question to the Florida Supreme Court. Claimants Howard Dore, Ruth Dore, Gerald J. Braun, Christie Braun, and Monica Brooke Braun had challenged the district court’s finding that tax certificates which they held as collateral for a loan made to defendant Charles Elliott were general intangibles under Article 9 of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, Ch. 679 Fla.Stat. (1991). Applying the Uniform Commercial Code, the district court concluded that the claimants had not perfected a security interest in the certificates such that the Receiver had a superior claim to taxes paid on the property identified in the certificates.
Not wishing to presume to decide a previously unresolved issue of Florida law, we submitted the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
Does a Florida tax certificate represent an interest in land for purposes of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, so that Article 9 does not govern the creation of a security interest therein by virtue of § 679.104(10) [Florida Statutes (1991) ?] 953 F.2d 1556.
The Florida Supreme Court accepted the question and answered it in the affirmative. Securities and Exchange Com’n v. Elliott, 620 So.2d 159 (1993). The court explained that plain language in Fla.Stat. 679.104(10) and 679.102(2) excluded tax certificates, as liens on real property and statutory liens, from Article 9 of the U.C.C.
As the response of the Florida Supreme Court is contrary to the finding of the district court, the judgment of the district court with regard to claimants’ tax certificates is REVERSED and this issue is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the determinations of this court and the Florida Supreme Court.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 7