What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. OLD DOMINION HOISTING SERVICE, Appellee. INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. KEMP-SMITH COMPANY, Appellee.
Nos. 13897, 13898.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Nov. 14, 1957.
Decided Jan. 9, 1958.
Mr. Justin L. Edgerton, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Charles E. Pledger, Jr., Randolph C. Richardson and -John F. Mahoney, -Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, -for appellant.
Miss Agnes A. Neill, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Edward Bennett Williams, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee in No. 13,897.
- Mr. John P. Arness, Washington, D. with whom Mr. George D. Horning, •Jr., Washington, D. C., was on,the brief, for appellee in No. 13,898.
Before Fahy, Washington and Burger, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a judgment declaring that appellant is obligáted, under the "loading and unloading” clause of its automobile liability policy, to defend a negligence action brought against appellees. The case was argued to the District Court on stipulated facts. The stipulation is as follows:
“Prior to August 24, 1954, defendant [appellant] issued a policy of automobile liability insurance in favor of the Park Transfer Company, a corporation engaged in the general trucking and hauling business in the District of Columbia, which policy was in full force and effect on August 24, 1954. In the course of such business, the Park Transfer Company has occasion to load and unload its vehicles, although in some instances these vehicles are loaded and unloaded by others.
“The Heron Todd Steel Construction Company, likewise a corporation doing business in the District of Columbia, was engaged in the construction of a bridge and underpass at or near the intersection of Benning Road and Kenilworth Avenue, N.E., in the District of Columbia on August 24, 1954. This bridge and underpass ran in a northerly and southerly direction under an existing overpass, which ran in an easterly and westerly direction. According to the specifications for the new structure, the bed of the bridge was to contain seven steel beams, laid parallel with one another and running in an easterly and westerly direction.
“Heron Todd hired two cranes to perform certain services in connection with this construction work. One crane was owned by plaintiff [appellee] Old Dominion Hoisting Service and operated by one Charles Robinson, an employee of plaintiff Old Dominion Hoisting Service. This crane had a sixty-foot boom. The other crane was owned by plaintiff [appellee] Kemp Smith Company and operated by one Ralph Rose, an employee of plaintiff Kemp Smith Company. This crane had a thirty-foot boom. Both plaintiffs are engaged in the business of renting cranes and crews in the District of Columbia.
“At all times material hereto, the Old Dominion crane was located immediately south of the existing overpass and immediately west of the new bridge and underpass. The Kemp Smith crane was located south of the new bridge and underpass.
“On the morning of August 24, 1954, a load of steel beams for the bed of the bridge was delivered to the construction site on a truck owned by the Park Transfer Company and operated by one Matthew Robinson, an employee of the Park Transfer Company. These beams were between sixty and seventy feet long and weighed approximately seven tons each. The Park Transfer truck was parked near the Old Dominion crane and south of it at all times material hereto.
“With the consent of the Park Transfer Company, the Old Dominion crane lifted the first beam from the Park Transfer truck by means of a steel cable. This cable had a loop or eye at each end. The cable was placed around the middle of the beam. One loop or eye was then passed through the other, forming a halter or noose around the beam. The free loop or eye was fastened to a large hook suspended from the boom of the crane.
“The Old Dominion crane picked up the beam in question from the Park Transfer truck and placed it upon the new structure roughly parallel with the existing overpass and somewhat north of the position which it was eventually to occupy. The beam remained in this location for approximately five minutes. During this interval the Old Dominion cable was moved to the east end of the beam, while a similar cable was placed around the west end of the beam and fastened to the Kemp Smith crane. This change was made because the supervisory personnel of Heron Todd believed that the Old Dominion crane could not continue to move the beam alone without coming into contact with certain wires suspended over the construction site.
“The two cranes then picked up the beam and commenced to move it in a southerly direction. Several employees of Heron Todd, including one Charles Albert Wagner, were guiding the beam by hand. While plaintiffs’ cranes were engaged in moving the beam toward the position which it was eventually to occupy in the new structure, but before the beam came to rest upon this structure, the boom of the Old Dominion crane came into contact with, or in close proximity to, a high tension wire owned and maintained by the Potomac Electric Power Company, resulting in the electrocution and death of said Charles Albert Wagner. This electrocution occurréd at approximately 8:25 a. m. on August 24, 1954.
“The decedent’s dependents elected to receive benefits under the District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., D.C.Code § 36-501 (1951 ed.) 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 note. Said benefits were paid by the National Surety Corp., a corporation duly licensed to engage and engaged in the insurance business in the District of Columbia, pursuant to a policy of insurance theretofore issued by it in favor of the Heron Todd Steel Construction Company.
“On March 8, 1955, the National Surety Corp., filed suit against Old Dominion and Kemp Smith, alleging the decedent’s electrocution and death were caused by the negligence of Old Dominion and Kemp Smith and demanding damages therefor; Said suit is presently pending [in the District Court] and bears the following caption: National Surety Corporation v. Old Dominion Hoisting Service and Kemp Smith Company, Civil Action No. 1006-55. Old Dominion and Kemp Smith have both made due demand upon defendant herein to assume the defense of said suit on their behalf and to pay any resulting judgment rendered against them, or either of them, which demand has been refused.”
In situations of this sort, two doctrines have competed for attention: the “complete operation” and the “coming to rest” doctrines. See Annotation, 1946, 160, A.L.R. 1259. The District Court concluded that under either doctrine the injury here occurred during the “unloading” of the Park Transfer truck, within the meaning of the policy. We agree.
We add that this holding should not be understood to mean that appellant’s policy necessarily provides the only coverage in this case. For example, should National Surety Corporation prevail in its suit against appellees, it may also be able to take advantage of such public liability policies as appellees may carry, though we do not decide the question. See Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Travelers Insurance Co., D.C.Minn.1954, 122 F.Supp. 197; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Church, D.C.N.D.Cal. 1952, 107 F.Supp. 683, affirmed sub nom. Canadian Indemnity Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 9 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 658; Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Machinery, Inc., La.App.1956, 90 So.2d 417; Mohawk Valley Fuel Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., Sup.Ct.1957, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 357.
Affirmed.
. This is not to suggest that the specific act engaged in when the event occurred might not be “unloading” and “construction” simultaneously.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1