What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. OVENS.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
June 8, 1926.)
No. 2407.
1. Aliens <3=68(5).
Under O. S. N. O. § 638, alien may appeal from decree of superior court denying application for citizenship.
2. Aliens <3=711/2-
United States, without appealing from order of naturalization illegally procured, may institute independent bill in equity for cancellation thereof.
3. Aliens <3=71 Zz.
Bill for cancellation of order of naturalization need not be brought in court where naturalization proceedings were had.
4. Aliens <3=711/2 — Estoppel <3=62(2) — Judgment <3=>646 — United States held not estopped from instituting bill in equity to cancel certificate of naturalization, nor was order denying motion to cancel certificate res judicata (Naturalization Act 1906, § 4, subd. 2, and sections II, 15 [Comp. St. §§ 4352, 4370, 4374]).
United States held not estopped from instituting independent bill in equity under Naturalization Act 1906, § 15 (Comp. St. § 4374), to cancel certificate of naturalization, issuance of which was illegal under section 4, subd. 2 (Comp. St. § 4352), by its failure to appeal from order denying motion in naturalization proceedings to cancel such certificate, nor. was such order res judicata on theory that motion was equivalent to suit in equity, in view of section 11 (Comp. St. § 4370).
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte; Edwin T. Webb, Judge.
Suit by the United States against David Ovens. Decree for defendant, and the United States appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
F. A. Linney, U. S. Atty., of Charlotte, N. C., and Frank C. Patton, of Morganton, N. C., Chas. A. Jonas, of Lincolnton, N. C., and Thomas J. Harkins, of Asheville, N. C., Asst. U. S. Attys.
T. L. Kirkpatrick and H. L. Taylor, both of Charlotte, N. C., for appellee.
Before WADDILL and ROSE, Circuit Judges, and WATKINS, District Judge.
ROSE, Circuit Judge.
The United States appeals from the refusal of the District Court to' cancel a certificate of naturalization issued to the appellee, David Ovens,, by the superior court of Mecklenburg county, N. C. The facts are not in dispute.
The appellee was born in Canada, and some time before the 28th of March, 1911, became a resident of the North Carolina county already named. On the day mentioned he declared his intention of becoming-a citizen of the United States, but did not file his application for naturalization until the 13th of July, 1918; that is, not until some time more than three months after the expiration of seven years from the making-of his declaration, and therefore subsequent to the time in which such application could be legally made at all. Section 4, subdivision 2, Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596 (Comp. St. § 4352). Nevertheless the superior court of MeeMenburg county, on the 21st of November, 1918, duly admitted him to citizenship and issued a certificate of naturalization to him. Some months later, the-United States, in that court and in the naturalization cause, moved that an order be entered canceling and declaring void the certificate in question. The motion was denied, and no appeal was taken. About three years later — that is, on April 14, 1922 — the United States filed in the District Court below the bill of complaint in the instant case. It alleges that the appellee’s certificate of naturalization had been unlawfully procured,, and that it should be set aside and canceled. He answered, and a hearing was duly-had.
After the facts already stated had been shown, the learned District Judge dismissed the bill, on the ground that the UMted States was estopped by the judgment of the superi- or-court of Meeklenberg county. There is no-question that, in the sense of the statute, the certificate of naturalization was illegally procured, and that the superior court erred in. admitting the appellee to citizenship. United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319, 38 S. Ct. 118, 62 L. Ed. 321; United States v. Morena, 245 U. S. 392, 38 S. Ct. 151, 62 L. Ed. 359. By the express provisions of the federal statute already cited, he was not entitled to apply for naturalization after the expiration of seven years from the date of his declaration of intention. In view of Tutun v. United States, 46 S. Ct. 425, 70 L. Ed. -, decided by the Supreme Court April 12, 1926, it is possible that the United States might have appealed from the order naturalizing him, in spite of the intimation or statement to the contrary in United States v. Ness, supra; and, of eourse, it is now certain that the appellee could have done so, had the lower court refused to admit him to citizenship. Tutun v. United States, supra; section 638, Consolidated Statutes of North Carolina 1919.
It is well settled, however, that, when an order for naturalization has been illegally procured, the United States may, without appealing from it, file an independent bill in ■equity for the cancellation of the certificate. This bill need not be lodged in the court in which the naturalization proceedings were had, but may bo brought in any court, state or federal, having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing the suit. United States v. Ness, supra; United States v. Morena, supra; United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 477, 37 S. Ct. 422, 61 L. Ed. 853. If such a bill had been filed in the superior court of Mecklenburg county, and if it had been there dismissed on its merits, and the order of dismissal had not been appealed from, or if, on appeal, it had been affirmed, doubtless, as against the government, the issue would have become res ad judicata; but no such bill in equity was filed in the state court.
The contention that the motion the government made in “the cause” — that is, in the naturalization proceedings — for an order canceling the certificate was the equivalent of the independent hill in equity provided for in section 15 of the Naturalization Act (Comp. St. § 4374), cannot be sustained. The statutory provision authorizing the filing of such a hill creates a new remedy, which in some respects is broader than that existing independently of statute, and in others is narrower in scope than the protection afforded the United States by section 11 of the Naturalization Act, 34 Stat. 599 (Comp. St. § 4370).
It follows that the United States was entitled to have the appellee’s certificate of naturalization canceled and declared null and void. The decree below must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree canceling the naturalization certificate in! question.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0