What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNIROYAL, INC., Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, Appellee, v. Philip MUMFORD, a/k/a Phil Mumford, d/b/a Market Tire Company, a Division of Allied Rubber Associates, Co., Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff, Appellant.
No. 18957.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 14, 1972.
Dom J. Rizzi, Marshall J. Cooper, Chicago, 111., for defendant and counter-plaintiff, appellant; Frank M. Greenfield, Chicago, 111., of counsel.
Paul H. LaRue, James E. Hastings, Chicago, 111., for plaintiff and counter-defendant-appellee ; Chadwell, Keck, Kayser & Ruggles, Chicago, 111., of counsel.
Before DUFFY, HASTINGS and KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judges.
KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal arose out of a suit brought by plaintiff and counter-defendant, appellee, Uniroyal, Inc. The parties ultimately agreed that judgment in favor of Uniroyal be entered for a stipulated amount. Defendant and counter-plaintiff, appellant, Philip Mumford, a/k/a Phil Mumford, d/b/a Market Tire Company, a Division of Allied Rubber Associated Company, filed a counterclaim charging wrongful and malicious actions by Uniroyal to cause Mr. Mumford’s two major customers to cease doing business with him, thus forcing his termination of his tire dealership under a franchise from Uniroyal.
The District Judge, trying the counterclaim, as amended, without a jury, made findings of fact and drew conclusions of law favorable to Uniroyal.
Mr. Mumford has appealed from dismissal of his counterclaim. We have studied the record. There was evidence to support the following set of facts.
Mr. Mumford who had been in the used tire business in Chicago, learned in July 1967 of the availability for sale of the assets of Market Tire Company, formerly operated by Uniroyal in Detroit as a commercial truck tire outlet. These assets included facilities for selling new tires, recapping tire casings and servicing truck tires. Uniroyal was willing to sell the physical assets or franchise a new operation. Mr. Mumford bought the assets. He examined the invoices and sales records of the failed operation by Uniroyal and discussed the possibility of reopening Market Tire (as an independent dealer under a Uniroyal franchise) with Leslie Wood, Uniroyal’s Detroit Sales District Manager, and Eugene Tower, then Uniroyal’s Regional Manager, shortly after which Mr. Mumford executed a franchise agreement.
In the course of the preliminary discussions, Mr. Mumford was shown Market Tire’s Bielfield Division customer list. Harry Bielfield had closed his own tire dealer business in 1963 and had become a contract salesman for Market Tire. Mr. Mumford retained him under his operation.
One conflict in the testimony apparently occurred with respect to discounts. The District Judge found that when Messrs. Wood and Tower discussed this matter with Mr. Mumford, it was agreed that for F. J. Boutell Co., an automobile hauling company, Market Tire would receive a 5% discount and Mr. Bielfield, a 4% discount from the list price of the tires, but no agreement that these discounts would become guaranteed “commissions” on any such prices as Market Tire and Mr. Bielfield might elect to charge their customers, which they were at liberty to set.
Market Tire could, at its option, pass on any part of these 4% and 5% discounts from list price to reduce its price to Boutell. It evidently did so in filling some of its last orders. There was testimony that it was common practice for commercial tire dealers to sell new tires at reduced profit to maintain the more profitable service and recapping business.
There was no undertaking by Uniroyal either (1) to sell directly to Boutell only at prices lower than those elected by Market Tire, or (2) to sell to Market Tire at unprofitable levels to enable Market Tire to retain Boutell as a customer if the latter were offered lower prices by competitors.
The two Uniroyal representatives also promised to assist where possible in meeting competitive market conditions subject to approval from their headquarters in New York, which in the past had sometimes withheld such approval.
At the time of these discussions, Uniroyal was shut down because of a strike in the tire industry. When the strike ended in August 1967, there was an in-dustrywide price increase. Mr. Mumford notified his customers of the approximately 5% increase on new tires, which all but Boutell paid.
For the remainder of 1967, Market Tire was filling a backlog of Boutell orders received prior to the price increase. As Market Tire had this backlog of orders received at the old price, it continued through 1967 to fill Boutell’s orders at the old lower prices. Uniroyal invoiced Market Tire at the former prices on tires sold to Boutell, granting an additional 5% discount from the new list price in accordance with its policy on tires ordered prior to the price increase.
In the fall of 1967, while Mr. Bielfield was ill and out of the city, Boutell’s buyer told Stephen Maleski, Uniroyal's Detroit District Manager of Automobile Sales, that he was dissatisfied with Market Tire and was interested in dealing directly with Uniroyal. Meanwhile Uniroyal was seeking New York Headquarters’ approval for price assistance to Market Tire on Boutell sales, which was denied.
Mr. Mumford testified that Boutell had asked him to meet Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company’s lower prices.
Invoices for 1968 did not include the prior price protection discount of the backlog orders of 1967. They showed only the 4% and 5% discounts mentioned above. Boutell ceased business with Market Tire after January 1968.
In March 1968, Uniroyal’s new district manager in Detroit, noting that no business was being done with Boutell, telephoned its buyer who reported attractive direct prices quoted by Goodyear and General Tire and Rubber Company approximately 5% lower than Uniroyal’s. In mid-April 1968, acting on this information, Uniroyal began direct selling to Boutell, meeting the competition’s prices. The franchise agreement did not prohibit such direct sales.
Sealtest Foods was a customer of the Bielfield Division of Market Tire Co. Mr. Wood had indicated that he had no objection to Mr. Mumford’s disposing of a $50,000 inventory of Dunlap Tires which had been brought from the prior operation in Chicago. Mr. Bielfield arranged for Sealtest to put Dunlap tires on their trucks in place of the Uniroyal tires Sealtest had been buying.
As a result of ill health Mr. Bielfield retired in the winter of 1967-68. Early in March 1968 Sealtest transferred its business to another Uniroyal tire dealer in Detroit. Although Mr. Mumford testified to the loss of Mr. Bielfield’s admittedly important sales efforts, he attributed the change by Sealtest to the direct intervention of the new Detroit District Manager, Gerald Labella. He testified that he asked Mr. Labella why the latter had taken Sealtest away and Mr. Labella had said Market Tire should have known better than to sell Sealtest Dunlap tires. In his testimony at the trial, Mr. Labella denied the implication that he had any power to effect the change. He testified that Sealtest had been using Uniroyal tires for many years and that he could only conjecture that the change had been a result of Sealtest’s wish to continue with Uniroyal tires. He denied ever speaking to any official of Sealtest or to any other dealer about taking over the Sealtest business and knew of no one in his organization who might have done so. The Trial Judge who heard and saw the witness evidently credited his statements.
In May 1968, Mr. Mumford closed Market Tire. Prior to disposing of the physical assets at auction, Uniroyal and Mr. Mumford agreed half the proceeds would be applied to Mr. Mumford’s account with Uniroyal.
It is Mr. Mumford’s view that after persuading him to leave his Chicago business, for which he had at the outset bought the assets of Market Tire, and enticing him to reopen as a Uniroyal franchise dealer, Uniroyal maliciously appropriated his two main accounts causing him to go out of business.
We are here faced with several issues of fact. The District Court found that Uniroyal did not induce the two customers to withdraw from Market Tire. Mr. Mumford asserts that these findings are unsupported by the record and against the manifest weight of the evidence. We cannot agree.
It is axiomatic that the Court will not set aside a trial judge’s findings of fact unless it finds them clearly erroneous, having due respect for the trial judge’s superior opportunity to judge issues of credibility. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 1969, 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L. Ed.2d 129.
We must look to the evidence most favorable to the District Judge’s findings and to such reasonable inferences as may be drawn therefrom. Lewis Mach. Co. v. Aztec Lines, 7 Cir., 1949, 172 F.2d 746, 748.
Mr. Mumford, as indicated, drew an inference of active solicitation from some comments made by Mr. Labella. The District Judge declined (reasonably) to draw that inference from the statements. There was no other evidence to support a finding of any active solicitation or inducement to meet the prerequisite of liability in Michigan for wrongful interference. Bahr v. Miller Brothers Creamery, 1961, 365 Mich. 415, 112 N.W.2d 463, 468.
When the two customers had ceased dealing with Market Tire, Uniroyal was not obliged to refrain from efforts to retain them as customers for Uniroyal.
After reviewing the record in the light of the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1