What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Raymond CASIAS and Steve O. Casias, Appellants, v. Wayne K. PATTERSON, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary, Appellee.
No. 9886.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
July 19, 1968.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 28, 1968.
Samuel D. Menin, Denver, Colo. (Carl L. Harthun, Denver, Colo., was with him on the brief), for appellants.
James F. Pamp, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., and Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., were with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before LEWIS, SETH and HICKEY, Circuit Judges.
LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the District of Colorado denying appellants’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellants are state prisoners having been convicted of the crimes of possession of narcotic drugs in violation of CRS 1953, 48-6-2, and conspiracy to possess narcotic drugs in violation of CRS 1953, 40-7-36 by the District Court of the City and County of Denver. Concurrent sentences were imposed on each appellant for the offenses and the convictions were affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court, Casias v. People, 415 P.2d 344, cert. denied 385 U.S. 979, 87 S.Ct. 523, 17 L.Ed.2d 441.
The federal district court granted an evidentiary hearing but the case was submitted for consideration entirely upon the state court record. We have carefully reviewed that record.
Appellants assert a right to federal relief contending denial to them of constitutional rights in four regards: unlawful arrest followed by an unlawful search, denial of a speedy trial, denial of effective assistance of counsel, and, finally that the state failed to produce any evidence justifying conviction. The first three of these points were adequately treated by each of the respective courts involved in this protracted litigation and require only passing comment here.
The're is evidence that at the time of their apprehension, arrest warrants for escape from jail and for driving with a suspended license were outstanding for Steve and Raymond respectively. The evidence discovered and seized pursuant to a cursory search incident to the arrests was competent and a motion to suppress on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments grounds was properly denied by the court. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653. Refusal by the judge at trial to allow cross-examination attacking the validity of the arrests was proper since this had been established in the prior hearing and the right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment was not violated thereby. Though there was considerable delay in bringing the appellants to trial, it was still accomplished within the one-year requirement of Rule 48(b), Colo.R.Crim.P., and we can find no reason for disagreeing with the holding by the Colorado Supreme Court citing Jordan v. People, 155 Colo. 224, 393 P.2d 745, that the appellants failed to meet the burden of showing they were denied an expeditious trial and that they were prejudiced thereby. 415 P.2d at 347.
The sufficiency of the evidence to support a state conviction is not a subject cognizable under federal habeas corpus unless the record is so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to deny due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The test is whether the conviction rests “upon any evidence at all.” Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654; Martinez v. Patterson, 10 Cir., 371 F.2d 815. Although the evidence in this case might well be held not to meet the standards of quality and quantity sufficient to sustain a federal conviction we cannot say as a matter of law or fact that the record contains no probative evidence of guilt.
Appellants were stopped and arrested while driving an automobile on the streets of Denver. Raymond Casias was driving and Steve was a passenger. The search of the person of Steve produced a hypodermic needle and an eyedropper-type of syringe. Expert testimony indicated that the eyedropper contained a residue of dilaudid, a derivative of morphine and within the statutory proscription. The quantity of contraband found upon Steve was minute but Colorado has rejected the claim that the crime of possession is dependent upon quantity and is not concerned with “trifles.” Duran v. People, 145 Colo. 563, 360 P.2d 132.
Raymond, as stated, was the driver of the car and thus in actual possession of the vehicle. Found near him on the seat was a fire-blackened spoon which also was determined to hold a minute quantity of dilaudid. Possession of the spoon could be inferred to rest with Raymond.
The evidence of conspiracy between the two defendants to possess narcotics is very weak but, again, we cannot say such evidence is totally non-existent. Appellants were together, each in possession of the same prohibited drug and each in possession of crude but common instruments associated with the use and possession of narcotics. Due process is denied when conviction results without any evidence of guilt but not otherwise. Cf. Garner v. State of Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207.
Affirmed.
. The testimony indicated that the quantity was about a “thousandth of a gram” and erroneously termed it a “microgram.” The experts testified they were accustomed to working with this amount every day.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 4