What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
JOHN T. CLARK & SON OF MARYLAND, INC. and American Mutual Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.
No. 79-1133.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Dec. 7, 1979.
Decided May 6, 1980.
R. Roger Drechsler, Baltimore, Md. (Lord, Whip, Coughlan & Green, P. A., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for petitioners.
Mary A. Sheehan, U. S. Dept, of Labor, Washington, D. C. (Carin Ann Clauss, Sol. of Labor, Laurie M. Streeter, Associate Sol., Washington, D. C., on brief), for respondent.
Before WIDENER and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and HOFFMAN, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
WALTER E. HOFFMAN, Senior District Judge:
This petition is brought under Section 21(c), 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., (the Act). Petitioners, John T. Clark & Son of Maryland, Inc., and its insurance carrier, American Mutual Insurance Company (referred to collectively as employer), seek review of a final order of the Benefits Review Board affirming an administrative law judge’s award to a longshoreman, Jesse P. Parks, for permanent total disability. At issue is whether the employer’s liability should be limited by the special fund provision of Section 8(f) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 908(f).
Jesse Parks is presently sixty-six years old. He began working on the docks as a longshoreman in 1937, usually as a slingman who loaded and unloaded cargo. Parks has a rather extensive history of medical problems. When he was sixteen he sustained an eye injury, resulting in permanent total blindness in his right eye. In 1945 he injured his lower back such that it required surgery and a rather extensive layoff. He received compensation benefits for this injury. In 1968, while employed by Clark & Son, he fractured his right foot (for which he was compensated). From June 1973 until February 1974, Parks was disabled by a number of illnesses and medical problems unrelated to his employment, including pneumonia and an intestinal tumor which required surgical removal. In April of 1974, he was hospitalized for stomach blockage. Following his recovery, Parks returned to work on April 29, 1974.
On May 17,1974, Parks sustained an injury to his left elbow. As a result he underwent surgery to transplant the ulnar nerve. The parties agree that since the May 17th injury Parks has been permanently and totally disabled. According to medical evidence, at the time of his injury Parks was already suffering from an existing left arm impairment brought about by cervical spondylosis.
On the basis of testimony by Parks’ neurosurgeon, the administrative law judge found that Parks suffers an 80 percent impairment of his left arm, of which 80 percent is attributable to the May 17th injury. (In effect, then, the May 17th injury caused a 64 percent impairment of Parks’ left arm.) The administrative law judge determined that the 64 percent loss of use of his arm was sufficient, in and of itself, to totally disable Parks as a longshoreman. As the administrative law judge saw it, Parks’ previous disabling physical conditions did not contribute to the permanent total disability that resulted from his arm injury, and, therefore, employer was not entitled to the application of Section 8(f) of the Act. In a split (2-1) decision, with Chairman Smith dissenting, the Board upheld the findings of the administrative law judge. Parks v. John T. Clark & Son of Maryland, Inc., et al., BRB No. 77-478 (Jan. 10, 1979).
Upon review we find ourselves largely in agreement with Chairman Smith, at least insofar as he urges the application of Section 8(f). See id. (Smith, Chairman, dissenting). In our opinion, the conclusion that the May 17th injury could, by itself, support an award of permanent disability is not supported by substantial evidence. There was no testimony to the effect that the May 17th injury, of itself, would prevent Parks from working. The decisions of both the administrative law judge and the Board seem to disregard Parks’ cervical condition, which pre-existed the arm injury and which was a contributing factor in his total disability. On the basis of the evidence presented to the administrative law judge, the only reasonable conclusion is that Parks’ existing permanent partial disability combined with the May 17th injury to produce permanent total disability. Accordingly, the decision of the Benefits Review Board must be reversed.
REVERSED.
. Section 8(f) provides in pertinent part:
(f) Injury increasing disability:
(1) In any case in which an employee having an existing permanent partial disability suffers injury, the employer shall provide compensation for such disability as is found to be attributable to that injury . . . . If following an injury falling within the provisions of subdivision (c)(l)-(20) of this section, the employee is totally and permanently disabled, and the disability is found not to be due solely to that injury, the employer shall provide compensation for the applicable prescribed period of weeks provided for in that section for the subsequent injury, or for one hundred and four weeks, whichever is the greater. In all other cases of total permanent disability or of death, found not to be due solely to that injury, of an employee having an existing permanent partial disability, the employer shall provide in addition to compensation under paragraphs (b) and (e) of this section, compensation payments or death benefits for one hundred and four weeks only. .
. Where a subsequent injury and its effects are alone sufficient to cause permanent total disability the mere presence of a pre-existing disability will not warrant contribution from the special fund. Carpenter v. Potomac Iron Works, Inc., 1 BRBS 332, BRB No. 74-208 (Feb. 28, 1975). See Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, 618 F.2d 1082 at 1084 (4th Cir. 1980).
. Under the applicable standard of review for administrative decisions under the Longshoremen’s Act, we may reverse only where there was an error of law or when a finding of fact is unsupported by “substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 508, 71 S.Ct. 470, 472, 95 L.Ed. 483 (1951).
. We recently addressed this issue in Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, 618 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1980), a case factually similar to the present case. There we held that section 8(f) should be liberally applied in favor of the employer.
Section 8(f) is intended to encourage the employment of handicapped workers, by protecting an employer who hires a handicapped worker from paying total disability compensation for an injury that would have been a partial disability but for pre-existing conditions. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker’s Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, 542 F.2d 602 (3rd Cir. 1976). The ultimate purpose, of course, is to protect a handicapped applicant or employee from loss of employment. Lawson v. Suwanee Trust & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 69 S.Ct. 503, 93 L.Ed. 611 (1949); American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston v. Jones, 426 F.2d 1263 (D.C.Cir.1970). A liberal application of this section is, therefore, in keeping with Congressional design.
Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., at 1084.
Dr. Brager, the only live medical witness produced, stated the opinion that Parks was totally disabled as the result of a “combination of things”. He went on to list “a number of pre-existing and continuing medical problems, including chronic lung disease, the abdominal problems, the hypertension . . . the blindness in the right eye.” This does not amount to substantial evidence that Parks would be totally disabled solely as a result of the May, 1974 arm injury.
. When dealing with Section 8(f) the employer should not be required to bear the burden of showing that suitable alternate employment would have been available for claimant with his arm injury. Cf. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Salzano, 538 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1976) (In contexts other than Section 8(f) the employer may have the burden of showing opportunities for work once a disability is proven). Here, there was no evidence as to the availability of alternate employment. See Maryland Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., supra, at 1085.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2