What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SIW OI et al. v. NAGLE, Commissioner of Immigration.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
May 24, 1926.)
No. 4802.
1. Aliens <©=>25 — Native-born citizen and merchant cannot invoke advantages conferred on Chinese merchants in determining whether daughter, adopted while traveling in China, was admissible.
Native-born citizen of the United States, though a merchant, cannot invoke advantages conferred on Chinese merchants under treaties in determining whether daughter, adopted while traveling in China, was admissible.
2. Aliens <@=>25 — Agreement of native-born citizen, while traveling in China, to adopt girl as daughter, held insufficient to show adoption, in absence of showing of law or custom of China.
Agreement of native-born citizen, while traveling in China, to adopt Chinese girl as his daughter, held insufficient to show adoption, in absence of proof of law or custom of China with respect to adoption.
3. Aliens <S=>25 — Chinese wife of native-born citizen held properly excluded as accompanying alien, where orphan girl, brought to United States by citizen and wife, was excluded and found helpless from infancy (Immigration Act I9Í7, § 18 [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4289'Aj]).
Where American-born citizen married in China and returned, bringing with him his wife and a Chinese orphan, held, that child being denied admission and found helpless from infancy, within Immigration Act 1917, § 18 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4289%j), wife was properly excluded as accompanying alien.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Second Division of the Northern. District of California; Adolphus F. St. Sure, Judge.
Application by Siw Oi and another for writ of habeas corpus against John D. Nagle, as Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of San Francisco, Cal. From a judgment 'denying the writ, petitioners appeal.
Affirmed.
Stephen M. White, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellants.
Geo. J. Hatfield, U. S. Atty.,. and T. J. Sheridan, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before GILBERT, HUNT, and RUD-KIN, Circuit Judges.
GILBERT, Circuit Judge.
On October 10, 1923, Siw Kwai Wing, a native-born citizen of the United States and a merchant therein, married in China Young Shoop Yin, his third wife. In 1924 he returned to the United States, bringing with him his said wife and Siw Oi, a Chinese orphan girl nine years of age. He was admitted as a citizen of the United States. His wife sought admission as the wife of a citizen, and admission was sought for the minor child as the adopted daughter of a citizen. Upon a hearing before a board of special inquiry, it was shown that while in China a clansman of Siw Kwai Wing brought the said child to him, and that he agreed to adopt her as his daughter. No papers were executed, and no legal form of adoption was followed. All that was done was that, on leaving China, Siw Kwai Wing brought with him on his way to the United States a young girl, the possession of whom had been surrendered to him a fortnight before. It was the decision of the board that the child was not admissible, and that, in view of her tender age, it would be necessary to hold the accompanying foster mother as an “accompanying alien.” Thereafter, having found that the child was helpless from infancy within the meaning of section 18 of the Immigration Act of 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4289i?4j), the board held that the accompanying alien must also be excluded.
For the appellants it is said that the question here presented is whether an adopted daughter, whose father is by occupation a merchant, is admissible. We are unable to agree that the occupation of the alleged foster father enters into the consideration of the question. His citizenship, by virtue of his birth in the United States, confers upon him rights no greater than those possessed by any other American citizen. He cannot invoke the advantages conferred upon Chinese merchants under treaties between the United States and China, or statutes based thereon. Weedin v. Mon Hin, 4 F(2d) 533; Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U. S. 346, 45 S. Ct. 539, 69 L. Ed. 985.
Reduced to its simplest terms, the problem here concerns the right of an American citizen while traveling in China to take into his possession a Chinese child, unrelated to him, and without form or ceremony bring it into the United States. It is not necessary to inquire what would have been his right, had he legally adopted the child.. ]i¥hat may be the law or custom of China with regard to adoption is not shown. While in the United States there is no common law on the subject, each individual state requires that appropriate writings be made and recorded, and in most states it is required that judicial sanction be had. White v. Kwock Sue Lum (C. C. A.) 291 F. 732. Clearly the proof here is insufficient to show adoption. We think, also, that Young Shoop Yin was propely excluded as an accompanying alien.
The judgment of the court below, denying the writ of habeas corpus, is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0