What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Leon OSHER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 290, Docket 73-1929.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 17, 1973.
Decided Oct. 17, 1973.
Daniel L. Meyers, New York City, for defendant-appellant.
Alan R. Kaufman, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Paul J. Curran, U. S. Atty., for the Southern District of New York, Douglas F. Eaton and S. Andrew Schaffer, Asst. U. S. Attys., on the brief), for appellee.
Before KAUFMAN, Chief Judge and LUMBARD and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial before Judge Gagliardi, Leon Osher was convicted on two counts of an eight count indictment charging mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. He was acquitted on the remaining six counts. The district court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment on count one, and three years probation to be served thereafter on count three. We affirm the judgment in all respects.
Although appellant raises a number of issues, we deem it necessary to treat only one question extensively. Osher asserts the Government failed as a matter of law to prove under either count that the mailing was, in the language of the statute, “for the purpose of executing” the fraudulent scheme.
The evidence disclosed that by means unknown, Osher came into the possession of a Bank Americard shortly after it was issued to Lewis Sandler on April 6, 1972, by the B. T. Credit Company (“B.T.”), a subsidiary of Bankers Trust Company. Count one charged that Osher impersonated Sandler and used the card on April 14 and 15, 1972, to purchase goods and services from various merchants in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The vendors presented the charge receipts for payment at the Barnett National Bank of Jacksonville, Florida. The bank, on April 21, mailed the vouchers to B.T. in New York City for collection. This constituted the only mailing alleged or proven with respect to count one. Count three charged that Osher used the card to obtain merchandise, again in Fort Lauderdale, on April 14. The indictment charged and the Government proved that the Barnett National Bank mailed B.T. the charge slips relating to these transactions on April 26.
Appellant contends that these mailings could not be “for the purpose of exeeuting” the fraud because the scheme was completed when he obtained the goods and services. The argument is made that the means by which the merchants and banks collected upon the vouchers was wholly irrelevant to the perpetration of the fraud. Reliance is placed upon Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 80 S.Ct. 1171, 4 L.Ed.2d 1277 (1960), and Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 65 S.Ct. 148, 89 L.Ed. 88 (1944).
We are precluded from accepting this line of reasoning by the established law of this circuit. United States v. Madison, 458 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 859, 93 S.Ct. 145, 34 L.Ed.2d 105 (1972); United States v. Chason, 451 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 1291, 31 L.Ed.2d 479 (1972); United States v. Kellerman, 431 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957, 91 S.Ct. 356, 27 L.Ed.2d 266 (1970). In Kellerman we held that the sale of stolen or forged credit cards constitutes conspiracy to commit mail fraud since the only value the card has lies in the ability of the holder to induce others to advance credit upon it; this, we said, must ultimately involve utilization of the mails in the collection process. A fortiori, the individual who uses the card fraudulently violates § 1341, and we so held in Madison and Chason. These decisions control the disposition of the present appeal.
The majority of the circuits which have considered the question are in accord with this view. United States v. Ciotti, 469 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Kelly, 467 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1970); see United States v. Kelem, 416 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 952, 90 S.Ct. 977, 25 L.Ed.2d 134 (1970). We are aware that a minority rule to the contrary has recently appeared. United States v. Maze, 468 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 963, 93 S.Ct. 2145, 36 L.Ed.2d 683 (1973); United States v. Lynn, 461 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1972). Although the Supreme Court in Maze has granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits, we shall adhere to what we believe is the sounder view, as expressed by this Court and by the majority of the Courts of Appeals.
We have considered appellant’s other contentions, and they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0