What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.

Opinion:
RANDOLPH v. UNITED STATES.
No. 9545.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.
Argued Nov. 25, 1947.
Decided Dec. 8, 1947.
Mr. M. Edward Buckley, Jr., of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. C. Frank Reifsnyder, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. George Morris Fay, United States Attorney, Arthur J. McLaughlin, Assistant United States Attorney, and Sidney S. Sachs, Assistant United States Attorney, all of Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. John D. Lane, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, WILBUR K. MILLER, and PRETTYMAN, Associate Justices.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant has been convicted under an indictment which charged that he sold a certain narcotic drug “not in the original stamped package and not from the original stamped package.” Appellant contends that this does not sufficiently charge the statutory offense of selling a narcotic drug “except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package.” 26 U.S.CsA. Int.Rev.Code, § 2553(a). But the indictment plainly excludes both of the statutory exceptions. The particular language in which it does .so is immaterial.
Appellant contends that evidence which was seized during a search should have been excluded, because of an asserted conflict between the affidavit on which the search warrant was based and the affiant!s subsequent testimony at the trial. We need not consider the effect of such a conflict, for none exists. The affidavit states, as though on personal knowledge, that appellant “did unlawfully sell” narcotic drugs “on or about the 8th day of August 1946”; and the only testimony at appellant’s trial that tended in any degree to show that the' affidavit was not in fact made on personal knowledge was affiant’s testimony that he did not “see” appellant “on the 8th of August, 1946.” [Italics supplied.]
Since the affidavit was not based on mere information and belief the Schencks case, 55 App.D.C. 84, 2 F.2d 185, has no bearing on this case.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 8