What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. STEINBRECHER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17658.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
May 25, 1970.
Rehearing Denied July 31, 1970.
Ronald P. Alwin, Martin S. Gerber, Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Thomas A. Foran, U. S. Atty., Michael P. Siavelis, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, 111., for appellee; John Peter Lulinski, Michael B. Nash, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel.
Before KILEY, CUMMINGS and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
KERNER, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Richard E. Steinbrecher was indicted on two counts for aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2) codefendant John Laures in obtaining loans on real estate in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006. Laures’ plea of nolo contendere was accepted prior to trial. Defendant Steinbrecher entered a plea of not guilty, waived his right to a jury trial and was found guilty on both counts. From this conviction, he appeals.
John Laures was president of the Crystal Lake Savings and Loan Association (Crystal) in 1962 and 1963. Steinbrecher was an attorney who represented Laures in various business transactions. On September 22, 1962, upon the recommendation of Laures, Crystal made a loan to Frank Howard, Jr. of $225,000 to purchase a piece of real estate located at 3345 N. Marshfield, Chicago, Illinois, from Howard Hurwith at a price of $125,000. Hurwith testified that he never met Howard but negotiated the sale with Laures. Crystal issued a check for $55,000 to the mortgagee and a check for the remainder, $160,000, was issued to Howard and the defendant Steinbrecher as escrowee. The check, endorsed by the defendant, was deposited in the bank account of defendant’s law firm and from this account various disbursements were made by Steinbrecher: $70,000 was paid to Hurwith and the balance of the money was used to pay personal loans of Laures. The defendant Steinbrecher also prepared Laures’ 1962 income tax return which reported income on the Marshfield property.
Crystal made another loan to Frank Howard on July 12, 1963, for the purpose of purchasing a parcel of real estate located at 3334 W. Ainslie Street, Chicago, Illinois, on the recommendation of Laures. The purchase price of the property was $128,805 and the amount of the loan was $255,000. The negotiations with the owner of the property were made by the defendant Steinbrecher. The loan proceeds check was endorsed by the defendant and deposited in his firm’s account. Again all disbursements from the loan were made by Steinbrecher with the excess funds being used to pay off the personal obligations of Laures. Steinbrecher prepared Laures’ 1963 income tax return which included reported rental income from both the Marshfield and Ainslie properties.
Howard testified that Laures was his neighbor and that Laures had asked him to hold certain properties in his name in order that Laures could get a better price. Laures did not testify at the trial.
Steinbrecher took the witness stand and said that he lacked knowledge of any unlawful acts. It was his impression that Howard purchased the real estate for himself. While the facts create some suspicion, he claims that he verified Howard’s participation by calling a trust officer at the bank which was the trustee for the parcels of real estate. The reported conversation between Steinbrecher and the trust officer was stricken as hearsay and no attempt was made to have the trust officer testify.
Defendant contends that this court should reverse because the evidence is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We disagree. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Essentially, the issue that the defendant raised is that the district judge should have believed the defendant and not the government witnesses. However, the credibility of the witnesses is for the trial judge to determine and we think the evidence supports his verdict. Glasser v. United States, supra.
The defendant Steinbrecher complains that the government failed to produce the statements of co-defendant Laures which were in its possession as requested under F.R.Crim.P. 16(b), and as a result Steinbrecher was unable to call Laures to testify. The government admitted that there were two reports which embodied Laures’ oral statements, but the government has supplemented the record here with a stipulation signed by Steinbrecher’s trial attorney reciting that the government had shown the attorney these statements. There is no evidence that the government has any other statements in its possession and, therefore, we find that the defendant has not been deprived of any evidence that might have been helpful.
No other errors have been raised and thus the conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. There is a conflict in the evidence as to -whether or not Howard endorsed the check.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0