What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. GAFNER AUTOMOTIVE & MACHINE, INC., Respondent.
No. 17486.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 16, 1968.
Robert M. Lieber, Atty., N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner; Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Geni Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Paul J. Spielberg, Robert M. Lieber, Attys., N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., on brief.
Walter S. Davis, Milwaukee, Wis., for respondent; Hoebreckx, Davis & Verge-ront, Milwaukee, Wis., of counsel.
Before PHILLIPS, CELEBREZZE, and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is a petition by the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of an order based on findings that respondent had violated Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by coercive interrogation, imposition of disciplinary rules in retaliation for union activity, threats of economic reprisal, and granting of improper economic benefits, and had violated Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the union representing a majority of an appropriate unit of nineteen of its employees. The Board’s Decision and Order, reported at 156 N. L.R.B. No. 63, directs respondent to cease and desist from specified unfair labor practices and to bargain with the union.
Respondent is a manufacturer of log loading machinery in Escanaba, Michigan. In November, 1964, certain of its employees became interested in union representation and approached union business agents to arrange for such representation. On November 23, nine employees met at the union hall with the business agents, but before any authorization cards were signed, the meeting was recessed until later in the evening. During the break, two other employees, Allgeyer and MaKosky, were solicited with regard to union membership, and, upon being told either that nine employees had signed up or intended to do so, executed authorization cards. When the meeting resumed, the employees were informed that the regular union initiation fee of $84 would be reduced to $25 for them. All nine then signed cards. On November 25, when the union was in possession of 12 signed cards, the membership of employee Koehler was solicited and an authorization card was obtained from him. He testified that he recalled being told that thirteen employees had already signed up. Respondent refused the union’s request to bargain on the basis of the signed authorization cards, and, in an election held on December 29, the union lost by a vote of ten to eight with three ballots challenged.
Soon after a union representative had spoken to respondent’s president on November 24 with regard to collective bargaining, respondent’s vice-president questioned a number of employees concerning their union membership. When told by one employee that he had not joined the union, the vice-president responded that he had better not. The next day, respondent’s president told the employees that he did not want them talking together on the job. He also suggested that part-time help would be eliminated if the employees chose to be represented by the union. At a Christmas party held ten days prior to the election, the employees were informed that they would be given hospitalization insurance as a Christmas present, and that they would be paid for their Christmas holiday.
Respondent contends that the findings by the Board of coercive interrogation, discriminatory discipline, threats of reprisal, and improper economic benefits, and the further finding that respondent’s refusal to bargain was not based upon a good faith doubt as to the union’s majority status, are unsupported by substantial evidence. Respondent also contends that, because of the reduction in the union’s initiation fee and because of misrepresentations made to certain employees, the authorization cards signed by these employees were invalid and the union therefore never succeeded in achieving majority status. We hold that the Board’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and we proceed to the matters of the union’s fee reduction and misrepresentations.
In N.L.R.B. v. Gilmore Industries, Inc., 341 F.2d 240, 13 A.L.R.3d 984 (6th Cir. 1965), we considered waiver of initiation fees and observed that waiver did not in and of itself interfere with an employee’s freedom of choice. The same would of course be true of a reduction in fees. We held in Gilmore that under the circumstances of that case, the waiver of fees invalidated the representation election, because the waiver was conditioned upon the outcome of the election and because the employees had been led to believe that they were receiving an economic benefit far greater than was actually the case. See N.L.R.B. v. Gorbea, Perez & Morell, S. en C., 328 F.2d 679 (1st Cir. 1964). In the instant case, the record does not indicate the presence of any of the factors found in Gilmore to have interfered with the employees’ exercise of free choice, but instead supports the finding of the Board that as a new group, the employees would be required to pay an initiation fee of only $25 instead of the customary fee of $84 and that the offer of such a reduction was not coercive. The Board found “The evidence does not disclose that the reduced rate was improperly limited or conditioned in any way as it appears to have been available to all of respondent’s employees without restriction.” We therefore find that the reduction in fees provides no basis for invalidating the authorization cards.
While misrepresentation by union organizers is not a matter to be condoned, we do not believe the statements made in this case with regard to the number of signed cards already obtained requires the invalidation of the cards of the employees so informed. It is not clear from the record whether Allgeyer and MaKosky were informed that nine others had signed up, or merely intended to. In any event, the solicitors had reason to believe that the nine who attended the meeting at the union hall desired membership, and if any misrepresentation was involved, it was insubstantial. Equally without significance was the statement to Koehler that thirteen other employees had . already signed, since those who had actually signed constituted a majority of the bargaining unit. Moreover, in none of these instances does the record suggest that the statements concerning the membership of other employees induced additional employees to join. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. N.L.R. B., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 365 F.2d 898, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Under the circumstances of this case, we find the Board’s remedial order to be an appropriate one, and enforcement is granted.
. Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, Local No. 328, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
. Respondent disputes the exclusion by the Board of two employees from the unit. We find no abuse of discretion by the Board in excluding these employees.
. The relevant testimony is as follows:
Q. Now, you mentioned that your regular initiation fee is $84, but for a new group you take them in at Twenty-Five?
A. That’s right.
Q. Did you tell the employees that that night? A. Xes.
Q. What did you tell them in connection with that? A. The regular initiation fee is $84. As a new group we’ll take them in at $25 as a reduced fee.
Q. Any indication given to the employees how soon they had to sign up to come in under the $25? A. I told them a certain amount down and given them a certain designated time to pay up the balance.
Q. Did you tell them what that time would be? A. If I recall, two weeks approximately.
Q. Two weeks. If they paid $10 down, you’d give them two weeks to pay another Fifteen; is that right? A. Approximately two weeks, yes.
Q. If they didn’t join then, it would cost them $84; isn’t that right? A. No, sir.
Q. What did you tell them? A. I said our fee is $84, and we’ll take you in as a new group for $25.
Q. All right. And they had two weeks to pay the Twenty-five bucks; is that right? A. That’s right.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1