What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
CLAUSON v. DRUMMOND et al.
No. 4252.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Feb. 24, 1950.
For original opinion, see 172 F.2d 221.
Theron Lamar Caudle, Assistant Attorney General, Ellis N. Slack, Robert N. Anderson and Leland T. Atherton, Special Assistants to the Attorney General, and Alton A, Lessard, United States Attorney, and Edward J. Harrigan, Assistant United States Attorney, both of Portland, Me., on the brief for appellant.
William B. Mahoney and Drummond & Drummond, of Portland, Me., on the brief for appellees.
Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and MAHONEY and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Upon consideration of motion by appellees, filed January 24, 1950, asking this court to recall its mandate of February 12, 1949, and to direct the District Court “to reconsider this cause in the light of Section 7 of the Technical Changes Act of 1949, Public Law 378, 81st Congress, Chapter 720, 26 U.S.C.A. § 811(c), U.S. Cong. Ser. P. 2729, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Commissioner v. Church’s Estate, 335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322; Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 69 S.Ct. 301",
And it appearing that the granting of such motion would be superfluous and unnecessary, since the judgment of this court did not direct the entry of judgment for appellant but merely reversed the judgment of the District Court on the law as it then stood, and the mandate of this court “commanded that such further proceedings be had in said cause, in conformity with the aforesaid judgment of this court, as according to right and justice, and the laws of the United States, ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding”, thereby leaving the District Court free to consider the applicability of a supervening Act of Congress before entering a final judgment upon remand,
Now, therefore, without determining whether this court has power to recall its mandate issued at a prior term of court, it is ordered that the motion for recall of mandate be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 7