What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MITCHELL v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
February 3, 1925.)
No. 4219.
1. Criminal law @=>984 — Sentences running concurrently on two counts sustained, if one is good. .
Where sentences on several counts of indictment run concurrently, and sentence on any one count is sustained, it is. immaterial whether sentence on another count is good.
2. Poisons @=>9 — Indictment charging regis-' tered physician sold narcotics in violation of Harrison Act held! defective.
Indictment for selling narcotics in violation of Harrison Act (Comp. St. §§ 62S7g-6287q), alleging that accused was duly registered physician, but not alleging that his disposition of •narcotics was not in course of his professional practice, held defective.
3. Poisons @=>9 — Indictment charging sale of narcotics by physician held sufficient, without showing filling of prescription.
Indictment alleging that physician unlawfully sold, dispensed, and distributed morphine in issuing prescriptions not in course of his professional practice held sufficient, without alleging prescription was filled, since allegation of sale implies completed act.
4. Criminal law @=>32 — Physician punishable for issuing prescriptions for narcotics, though believing it was lawful.
If physician, who issued prescriptions for narcotics in violation of Harrison Act (Oomp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q), on production of certificate required by Tennessee statutes, was entitled to any leniency because of belief of leading physicians in his community that such method was lawful, it must come from Executive Department.
In. Error to tbe pistrict Court of tbe United States for tbe Middle District of Tennessee; Paul Jones, Judge.
T. A. Mitebell was convicted for selling narcotics in violation of tbe Harrison Act, and be brings error.
Affirihed.
A. M. Tillman, of Nashville, Tenn. (Tillman & McCall, of Nashville, Tenn., on tbe brief), for plaintiff in error.
Howard B. Shofner, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Nashville, Tenn. (A. Y. McLane, U. S. Atty., of Nashville, Tenn., on the brief), for the United States.
Before DENISON, MACK, and DONAHUE, Circuit Judges.
DENISON, Circuit Judge.
Mitchell, who was a physician, was convicted under five counts for selling narcotics in violation of the Harrison Act (Comp. St. §§ 6287g-6287q). He was sentenced to imprisonment for two years upon each count; but the sontenecs were to run concurrently. It follows that if the sentence upon any one count is sustained, it is practically immaterial whether it is good under another count. However, for such effect, if any, as it may have, we point out that we think counts 1 and 2 are insufficient, and that the convictions and sentences on both these counts must he set aside. They expressly allege that Mitchell was a physician, and was duly registered as such under the Harrison Act, and do not allege that his disposition of the narcotic stated was not made to a patient and in the course of the doctor’s professional practice. While it would not he neeessary to negative this matter of lawfully dispensing in the course of professional practice, if the counts had not already carefully shown that the respondent was a registered physician, yet, when this was made to appear, it then became neeessary to negative, not an exception to something already stated, or an exception found in the act, but an inference naturally to be drawn from the facts which had been stated; and, as it has been decided that the giving of a prescription is participating in the sale made by the filler, we cannot draw the necessary -inference of nonpreseription from the mere fact that the count alleged selling.
The other three counts are not open to this objection; nor are they defective because they do not allege that the prescriptions were filled. They say that respondent, being a physician, sold, dispensed, and distributed morphine in the following manner: That he issued a prescription therefor, not in the course of his professional practice. A doctor who issues a prescription, which is filled, thereby participates in or aids and abets a sale. The allegation of sale or delivery implies a completed act, and when it is said that there was _ a sale through a prescription, it is, in effect, said that the prescription was filled.
A violation of the law, as it has now been authoritatively construed in the Behrman Case, 258 U. S. 280, 42 S. Ct. 303, 66 L. Ed. 619, appears without dispute, by Dr. Mitchell’s own statement as a witness for himself. (See our recent decisions in the nobaxt and Simmons Cases, 299 F. 784, and 300 F. 321.) At the time of the passage of the Harrison Act, it was believed by at least some reputable physicians that morphine addiction was a disease; that it was proper, in the treatment of this disease and to relieve pain and suffering, to prescribe morphine in limited quantities for these addicts; that to furnish the addict with a limited quantity of morphine for recurrent self-administration, even when -the patient was not confined, was within the discretion of the physician; and that for a physician to furnish morphine in this way to an addict, when the physician in good faith believed it was necessary thus to treat the disease and relieve suffering, was a practice which was intended to be permitted by the express exemption found in the Harrison Act. In accordance with this idea, the Tennessee Legislature passed the law referred to in our former opinion (Simmons v. United States, 300 F. 322), intending to provide a system by which .physicians who desired to do this kind of professional business, would be measurably protected by what was, in effect, an official certificate that the morphine was necessary.
As the construction of the Harrison Act was developed by successive Supreme Court decisions, it became apparent that this method was not within the stated exception, and that the practices approved of by some reputable physicians and expressly contemplated by the Tennessee statute were ipso facto violations of the Harrison Act. Though the acts charged in the indictment were done some months after such ambiguity as there was in the statute had been finally clarified by the Supreme Court, this situation would seem not to have been generally understood in Nashville, as there were offers to show by many of the leading physicians of Nashville that the methods claimed by Dr. Mitchell to have been his methods under the theory of the Tennessee statute were then considered by the medical profession to he lawful and reputable. On the other hand, there is evidence which, if believed, would have justified the jury in finding’ that Dr. Mitchell did not in good faith preserve even the Tennessee restrictions; the jury did not specifically find on these subjects. If the defendant is entitled to any leniency on account of this situation, it must come from the Executive Department: This epurt must affirm the conviction and sentence, as to counts 3, 4, and 5.
In the Loewenthal Case, 274 F. 563, 565, our opinion does not show whether the indictment alleged respondent to be a physician.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0