What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Oscar GUEST, as Administrator of the Estate of Callie W. Beane, deceased, Appellant, v. Dr. C. S. BREEDIN and St. Mary’s Hospital and Training School for Nurses, a corporation, Appellees.
No. 7632.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 5, 1958.
Decided July 16, 1958.
Henry Hammer and Henry H. Edens, Columbia, S. C. (G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Anderson, S. C., on brief), for appellant.
William L. Watkins and John K. Hood, Jr., Anderson, S. C. (Earle M. Rice, Anderson, S. C., on brief), for appellees.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, SOPER, Circuit Judge, and MOORE, District Judge.
SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.
This is a suit for malpractice against a physician. The administrator of Callie W. Beane obtained a favorable verdict from the jury for injuries which allegedly caused the decedent’s death. The appeal is from an order of the District Judge granting the defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v. or, in the alternative, a new trial.
Beane died while on the operating table of a private hospital managed by the defendant, Dr. C. S. Breedin, and owned by his wife. A post mortem examination revealed that the decedent’s spinal cord had been crushed in the fracture of a vertebra. The question chiefly in dispute is whether the fracture occurred before death and caused the death, as the plaintiff claims, or whether Beane died naturally of “heart arrest” and the fracture occurred after death, in the mortuary, as claimed by the defendant.
The decedent, 57 years old, had for ten years suffered from osteoarthritis. The disease had progressed so far that his spine was curved almost to a half circle and wryneck drew his head down to the left. He entered the hospital for treatment by the defendant, and after a two-week stay was taken to the operating room on January 17, 1955. The defendant testified that he wanted to examine the patient’s neck muscles in a relaxed state to determine whether surgery, to relieve the wryneck, “was justifiable under the circumstances,” and, if justifiable, an operation was to be performed on the spot. Anesthesia was preferable because examination would be painful.
Beane himself “slid” from the stretcher on which he was wheeled into the operating room to the operating table. Anesthesia, sodium pentathol, was administered. The defendant and the nurses present at the operation testified that he manipulated Beane’s neck “gently.” One of them, however, said that while the doctor was manipulating the patient’s head and neck, Beane “sort of raised his knees” against the strap holding his legs to the table; he “rared his legs against that strap.” After approximately 45 minutes to one hour of examination, Dr. Breedin, according to the defense witnesses, announced that “it would be too big an operation to do at that stage,” and immediately thereafter Beane’s pulse “disappeared suddenly.” Stimulants failed to revive him, and he died about 11:30 a. m.
At 1:30 p. m. the body was removed to the mortuary. Douglas McDougald, funeral director, testified that neither he, nor anyone pursuant to instructions from him, performed any act of violence on it. Beane’s face was shaved by Charles Bannister, who embalmed the body. The embalming process involves pumping a fluid through an artery, displacing the blood through an opening made in a vein.
When Beane’s brother-in-law came to the mortuary about 5 p. m. that afternoon, however, McDougald moved a pillow under the decedent’s head, and the head moved. The brother-in-law found that it could be moved from side to side. The defendant suggests that in the process of adjustment, the neck was broken, but Bannister, like McDougald, denies this. Bannister testified that the body was shaped like a see-saw, and to fit it into the casket it was “adjusted” by leveling the legs and head to equal heights, with supports under them. If the neck had been broken before Bannister handled the body, he did not notice it.
The next day a pathologist and a radiologist performed an autopsy. They found that the third cervical vertebra was fractured and that this had crushed the spinal cord. There was also evidence of hemorrhage in the area, and, from its character and extent, their positive testimony was that the spinal cord was crushed before death and that this was the cause of death.
The plaintiff’s medical experts also testified that it would have taken considerable pressure to break the neck bones. Breedin admitted that the application of sufficient pressure to break the neck would, under the circumstances, have been “gross negligence” and “contrary to all standards of medical treatment.” He also admitted that Beane’s bones were not abnormally chalky or brittle. His insistence, however, was that he applied no excessive pressure; that Beane must have died from a “heart arrest” or an “angina,” which would not show in the autopsy; that, because of the curve in Beane’s spine, he would have sat eleven inches out of the casket, so that the people at the mortuary must have broken Beane’s vertebra trying to “adjust” him. It was the doctor’s further suggestion that the hemorrhage must have been caused by the force of the embalming fluid. The pathologist and the radiologist negatived this suggestion; they testified that what they found in the autopsy could have been caused only by the action of the heart and not after death in the embalming process.
This conflict, the jury, in the performance of their undoubted function, resolved by rendering a verdict for the plaintiff for $20,000. The Judge granted the defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v., or, in the alternative, a new trial. See, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 1940, 311 U.S. 243, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147. Essentially the bases for the motion in the alternative, though stated jointly, were in fact separate. The ground for the motion for judgment n. o. v. was that there was no competent evidence as to the defendant’s negligence sufficient to go to the jury, while the motion for a new trial rested on the contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
The above recital of the testimony, we think, shows an adequate basis for submission of the issues to the jury. See: 41 Am.Jur., “Physicians and Surgeons,” Sec. 79, p. 198; Smith v. Baker, 1934, 172 S.C. 75, 172 S.E. 767; Bessinger v. De Loach, 1956, 230 S.C. 1, 94 S.E. 2d 3; Cf.: Thomas v. Register, 1918, 110 S.C. 173, 96 S.E. 517; Dillishaw v. Bell, 1920, 115 S.C. 258, 105 S.E. 410; Green v. Shaw, 1926, 136 S.C. 56, 134 S.E. 226, 48 A.L.R. 243. The judgment n. o. v. should not have been extended. We are not prepared to say, however, that the District Judge exceeded the limits of judicial discretion in relying upon his appraisal of the weight of the evidence in granting the alternative motion for a new trial. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 1940, 310 U.S. 150, 247, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129; Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Davis Frozen Foods, 4 Cir., 1952, 195 F.2d 662.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1