What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL CREDIT SERVICE, a Division of Lucas County Credit Bureau, Inc., Respondent.
No. 79-1212.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Jan. 6, 1981.
Elliott Moore, Allison Brown, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B., Stephen Mayer, Washington, D.C., Bernard Levine, Director, Region 8, N.L.R.B., Cleveland, Ohio, Allison Brown, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Frederick R. Post, Lubisky & Post, Toledo, Ohio, for respondent.
Before LIVELY and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and MARKEY, Judge.
Honorable Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on the application of the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its order issued against International Credit Service, a division of Lucas County Credit Bureau, Inc., of Toledo, Ohio on February 12, 1979, and reported at 240 N.L.R.B. No. 102. The Board found the company violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to execute the collective bargaining agreement, by unilaterally implementing employee wage increases, by engaging in direct dealing with the employees, and by refusing to furnish within a reasonable time wage information requested by the Union. The order requires the company to cease and desist from engaging in those unfair labor practices, and from in any way interfering with, restraining, or coercing the employees in the exercise of the rights under the Act. Affirmatively the company was ordered to execute the written agreement.
The NLRB certified the Toledo Printing Pressman and Assistants’ Union No. 55, an affiliate of the International Printing & Graphic Communications Union, AFL-CIO in March, 1977. Negotiations on a collective bargaining contract began shortly thereafter. The Union’s chief negotiator was Fred Larson, an International Representative. The employer was represented by the President of the company, J. W. Orrin. The record establishes that at the initial bargaining session Orrin acknowledged his authority to represent the company. He stated he chose not to have his attorney present. Orrin testified and claims here he made it clear that negotiations were not to be considered final until his attorney had reviewed the contract. Mr. Larson testified that Orrin merely requested he be allowed to submit the final agreement to his attorney at the conclusion of the bargaining sessions.
After the negotiations were completed and Orrin was in possession of the contract and a set of office rules in the form of a separate document, incorporated by reference in the contract as requested by Orrin upon learning the office rules had been left out of the contract, the papers were sent to the attorney. The union members became impatient with the delay in signing the documents and threatened to strike. Orrin expressed concern over the contents of certain articles in the contract, stating some contained substantive terms not agreed upon during the negotiations.
Larson suggested wage increases be implemented to avert the strike, subject to approval by the employees. The employees rejected the wage increase. Orrin initiated the wage increase without employee approval. The employees went on strike. Or-rin continued to refuse to sign the contract and the office rules. A meeting was held and the contract was reviewed point by point. Orrin continued to insist discrepancies existed and refused to sign.
The existence of an agreement is a question of fact, and it is the Board’s function to determine whether the employer refuses to sign and honor the bargain produced by the negotiations. N.L.R.B. v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 361, 89 S.Ct. 541, 544, 21 L.Ed.2d 546 (1969); N.L.R.B. v. Truck-drivers Union No. 100, 532 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859, 97 S.Ct. 160, 50 L.Ed.2d 137 (1977); Arco Electric Company v. N.L.R.B., 618 F.2d 698, 699 (10th Cir. 1980). We should enforce the Board’s order if we find substantial evidence supports the finding that an agreement was reached. Adams Potato Chips, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 430 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1970). Upon careful review of the record, we do not believe that a final agreement was ever reached by the parties in this case. Discrepancies between notations made by Orrin and the agreement in its final form are too apparent to satisfy us that certain substantive terms in the contract are reflective of agreements made during the bargaining session. However, it is our further conclusion that the company did engage in the other unfair labor practices cited. We therefore deny enforcement of the order insofar as it directs the company to execute the written agreement, but enforce it in all other respects.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1