What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
MOORE et al. v. OGILVIE, GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, et al.
No. 620.
Argued March 27, 1969.
Decided May 5, 1969.
Richard F. Watt argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Richard L. Mandel and Ira A. Kipnis.
John J. O’Toole and Richard E. Friedman, Assistant Attorneys General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellees. With them on the brief was William J. Scott, Attorney General.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas,
announced by Mr. Justice Brennan.
This is a suit for declaratory relief and for an injunction, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2201, 2202, brought by appellants who are independent candidates for the offices of electors of President and Vice President of the United States from Illinois. The defendants or appellees are members of the Illinois Electoral Board. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, §§ 7-14. In 1968 appellants filed with appellees petitions containing the names of 26,500 qualified voters who desired that appellants be nominated. The appellees ruled that appellants could not be certified to the county clerks for the November 1968 election because of a proviso added in 1935 to an Illinois statute requiring that at least 25,000 electors sign a petition to nominate such candidates. The proviso reads:
“that included in the aggregate total of 25,000 signatures are the signatures of 200 qualified voters from each of at least 50 counties.” Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, § 10-3 (1967).
A three-judge District Court was convened, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, which, feeling bound by MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S. 281, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 293 E. Supp. 411. The case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
On October 8, 1968, the same day the case was docketed, appellants filed a motion to advance and expedite the hearing and disposition of this cause. Ap-pellees opposed the motion. On October 14, 1968, we entered the following order:
“Because of the representation of the State of Illinois that ‘it would be a physical impossibility’ for the State ‘to effectuate the relief which the appellants seek,’ the ‘Motion to Advance and Expedite the Hearing and Disposition of this Cause' is denied. Mr. Justice Fortas would grant the motion.” 393 U. S. 814.
Appellees urged in a motion to dismiss that since the November 5, 1968, election has been held, there is no possibility of granting any relief to appellants and that the appeal should be dismissed. But while the 1968 election is over, the burden which MacDougall v. Green, supra, allowed to be placed on the nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls future elections, as long as Illinois maintains her present system as she has done since 1935. The problem is therefore “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 515. The need for its resolution thus reflects a continuing controversy in the federal-state area where our “one man, one vote” decisions have thrust. We turn then to the merits.
MacDougall v. Green is indistinguishable from the present controversy. The allegations in that case were that 52% of the State’s registered voters were residents of Cook County alone, 87 % were residents of the 49 most populous counties, and only 13% resided in the 53 least populous counties. The argument was that a nominating procedure so weighted violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Today, in contrast, 93.4% of the State’s registered voters reside in the 49 most populous counties, and only 6.6% are resident in the remaining 53 counties. The constitutional argument, however, remains the same.
Five members of the Court held in MacDougall that a State has “the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls not available to the former.” 335 U. S., at 284. Three members of the Court dissented on the ground that the nominating procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause. One member of the Court voted not to exercise this Court’s jurisdiction in equity to resolve the dispute.
While the majority cited Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, as their authority for denying relief and while a few who took part in Colegrove put this type of question in the “political” as distinguished from the “justiciable” category, 328 U. S., at 552, that matter was authoritatively resolved in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 202. When a State makes classifications of voters which favor residents of some counties over residents of other counties, a justiciable controversy is presented. 369 U. S., at 198-204.
When we struck down the Georgia county-unit system in statewide primary elections, we said:
“How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote — whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 379.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, held that a State in an apportionment of state representatives and senators among districts and counties could not deprive voters in the more populous counties of their proportionate share of representatives and senators.
“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” 377 U. S., at 555.
We have said enough to indicate why MacDougall v. Green is out of line with our recent apportionment cases. The use of nominating petitions by independents to obtain a place on the Illinois ballot is an integral part of her elective system. See People v. Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9, 18, 77 N. E. 321, 323. All procedures used by a State as an integral part of the election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgment of the right to vote. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 314-318; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 664.
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112, is not relevant to the problem of this case. There each councilman was required to be a resident of the borough from which he was elected. Like the residence requirement for state senators from a multi-district county (Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433), the place of residence did not mark the voting unit; for in Dusch all the electors in the city voted for each councilman.
It is no answer to the argument under the Equal Protection Clause that this law was designed to require statewide support for launching a new political party rather than support from a few localities. This law applies a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely settled counties and populous counties alike, contrary to the constitutional theme of equality among citizens in the exercise of their political rights. The idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government.
Under this Illinois law the electorate in 49 of the counties which contain 93.4% of the registered voters may not form a new political party and place its candidates on the ballot. Yet 25,000 of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters properly distributed among the 53 remaining counties may form a new party to elect candidates to office. This law thus discriminates against the residents of the populous counties of the State in favor of rural sections. It, therefore, lacks the equality to which the exercise of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.
MacDougall v. Green is overruled.
7 Reversed.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 1