What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.

Opinion:
AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSN., NEW JERSEY BRANCH, et al. v. NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
No. 72-691.
Decided January 15, 1973
Per Curiam.
On December 21, 1971, the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced the adoption of Rule 1:21-7, effective January 31, 1972, establishing a graduated schedule of maximum contingent fees applicable to tort litigation conducted by New Jersey attorneys. Appellants, representing members of the New Jersey bar, brought this action to enjoin the enforcement of the rules on the grounds that they violate several provisions of the Constitution, including the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial judge convened a three-judge court. 28 U. S. C. § 2281.
After hearing argument on the merits, the District Court pointed out that:
“ [Essentially the case poses a dispute between a state’s highest court and those persons authorized by that court to practice law in the state. The relationship between the parties thus is an extremely delicate one. Under such circumstances federal courts generally have considered it appropriate, before attempting any direct federal intervention at the outset, first to permit the state courts to process the dispute. Cf. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82, 85-87 (1970).”
The court added that “[a]s was true in Reetz the initial issue is whether the state constitution authorized the enactment challenged.” The court therefore granted defendant-appellee’s motion to dismiss.
By timely motion under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 59 (e), appellants sought an order amending the judgment by either
“(A) Retaining jurisdiction, but staying proceedings in this Court pending determination of the issues of state law in the courts of New Jersey, or until efforts to obtain such a determination have been exhausted; or
“(B) Ordering that the dismissal be without prejudice, so that the suits for determination of the federal constitutional issues may be reinstituted after exhausting state recourse with respect to state law issues.” Jurisdictional Statement 10.
The motion was denied and appellants brought this appeal.
“[AJbstention 'does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise.’ ” England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 416 (1964), quoting from Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959). For that reason, we have held that a dismissal on grounds of abstention so as to permit a state court to pass on an issue of state law must not be with prejudice. Doud v. Hodge, 350 U. S. 485 (1956); Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498 (1972). The proper course is for the District Court to retain jurisdiction pending the proceedings in the state courts. Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, supra, at 512-513; Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 244-245, n. 4 (1967). Although the District Court may have intended its judgment of dismissal to be without prejudice to the right of appellants to litigate their federal claims in federal court at the conclusion of the state proceeding, the court did deny appellants’ motion for an amendment to the judgment making clear that no prejudice would attach. The motion should have been granted. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Rule 1:21-7 provides in part:
“(c) In any matter where, a client’s claim for damages is based upon the alleged tortious conduct of another, including products liability claims, and the client is not a subrogee, an attorney shall not contract for, charge, or collect a contingent fee in excess of the following limits:
“(1) 50% on the first $1000 recovered;
“(2) 40% on the next $2000 recovered;
“(3) 33%% on the next $47,000 recovered;
“(4) 20% on the next $50,000 recovered;
“(5) 10% on any amount recovered over $100,000 . . . .”
Appellee maintained below, as it maintains before this Court, that a three-judge court need not have been convened because the constitutional question presented is insubstantial. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962). It insists, however, that if the claim is substantial then it must be heard by a court of three judges, 28 U. S. C. § 2281. In view of the posture of the case on this appeal, we do not, of course, express any view on the merits of the question presented.
The validity of the District Court’s decision to abstain is not at issue on this appeal.
“It is better practice, in a case raising a federal constitutional or statutory claim [where the doctrine of abstention is applied], to retain jurisdiction, rather than to dismiss . . . .” Zwickler, supra, at 244 n. 4.

Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?

Choices:
Conservative
Liberal
Unspeciﬁable

Answer: 1