What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Richard O. CAIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. T. Wade MARKLEY, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 14802.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
May 26, 1965.
Rehearing Denied July 16, 1965
Richard 0. Cain, pro se and Lawrence Gunnels, Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Richard P. Stein, U. S. Atty., Edward F. Kelly, Asst. U. S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for appellee.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and DUFFY, SCHNACKENBERG, KNOCH, CASTLE, KILEY, and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.
SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Richard 0. Cain appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He was convicted on several counts for narcotics violations. Sentence was rendered on April 12, 1957, and petitioner is presently serving a ten-year sentence on the charge of unlawful sale of narcotic drugs in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a). Sentence was imposed by the federal district court for the Western District of Missouri. Petitioner is serving the sentence at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.
Petitioner filed a motion under section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in the Western District of Missouri, alleging that the information charging the offense for which he is now serving sentence was defective in that it failed to name the purchaser to whom he was charged to have sold the narcotics. The district court in Missouri denied petitioner’s motion. He did not appeal. He then applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court for the Southern District of Indiana, alleging that he was serving an invalid sentence because of the alleged defect in the information upon which he was convicted and sentenced. The district court denied the petition on the grounds that the court was without jurisdiction. Petitioner appeals from that dismissal.
Petitioner contends that the district court in Indiana, sitting in the judicial district in which he is imprisoned, had jurisdiction to entertain the application for a writ of habeas corpus despite the provisions of section 2255 and his abortive attempt to utilize that remedy. He argues that this is an instance when the remedy provided by section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective,” thus permitting recourse to habeas corpus. Petitioner contends that although the information under which he was convicted was held to be sufficient under the applicable law in the federal circuit where he was sentenced, it was deficient under the applicable law in the federal circuit where he is imprisoned. He argues that the law controlling in this circuit requires that an indictment or information supply the name of the purchaser of the narcotics allegedly sold in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a). Lauer v. United States, 320 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.1963.) The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has rejected the holding in Lauer and does not require disclosure of the identity of the alleged purchaser. Jackson v. United States, 325 F.2d 477 (8th Cir.1963). Because of this conflict petitioner claims that his section 2255 remedy in the Eighth Circuit was “inadequate or ineffective” since the controlling law there would hold his sentence valid, whereas a petition for habeas corpus brought in this circuit should effect his release since the controlling law here would render his sentence invalid.
It should be noted that since petitioner has brought the instant action, the conflict in authority between the two circuits has been resolved. This court recently overruled Lauer and held that an indictment or information need not supply the name of an alleged purchaser of narcotics. Collins v. Markley, 346 F.2d 230, decided May 11, 1965. We do not choose, however, to dispose of the instant appeal by relying upon our decision in Collins. Rather, we affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s argument that his section 2255 motion was inadequate and ineffective is based upon a mistaken interpretation of that section. Petitioner would have the section read that an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be entertained unless it appear “that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective.” This reading overlooks the fact that the inadequacy or ineffectiveness must relate specifically to a procedural deficiency in “test[ing] the legality of his detention.”
Petitioner’s section 2255 motion in the sentencing court was an adequate and effective remedy to test the legality of his detention inasmuch as that court considered and ruled on the identical issue presented in the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The fact that the motion was denied does not mean that it was an ineffective or inadequate procedural device. True, it did not effect petitioner’s release. The purpose of the statute, however, is not necessarily to end a prisoner’s detention, but rather “to test” its legality. The adoption of petitioner’s argument would mean that, because of a possible application of different legal principles by the court confronted with a habeas corpus petition and the court which has already ruled on a section 2255 motion, a prisoner would have the right in every instance to retest the legality of his detention.
For the foregoing reasons petitioner’s exclusive remedy was to file a section 2255 motion in the district in which he had been sentenced. The fact that the motion was unsuccessful because of the controlling law in that circuit does not render the section 2255 procedure “inadequate or ineffective.” If this were not the rule, “any adverse determination by one court of a section 2255 application would be reviewable by another court in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Stirone v. Markley, 345 F.2d 473, Seventh Circuit, decided April 8, 1965.
The order of dismissal is affirmed.
Court appointed counsel, Mr. Lawrence Gunnels of the Chicago Bar, is deserving of the court’s commendation and thanks for the excellent service he has rendered the petitioner in this appeal.
. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 reads in pertinent part; “An application for a writ of habeas corpus * * * shall not be entertained if it appears that * * * the court wliich sentenced him * * * has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1