What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
NEMEC v. UNITED STATES.
No. 12810.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Sept. 5, 1951.
F. E. Nemec, in pro se.
Harvey Erickson, U. S. Atty., Frank R. Freeman, Asst. U. S. Atty., Spokane, Wash, for appellee.
Before HEALY, Circuit Judge, and FEE and SOLOMON, District Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Nemec was indicted, tried and convicted by a jury for defrauding numerous Washington investors by the sale of alleged mining claims in California through false and fraudulent representations. He was sentenced to a total of four years on counts involving conspiracy, mail fraud and two offenses under the Securities Act of 1933, § 17, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q. The conviction was affirmed. 9 Cir., 178 F.2d 656. He made- a motion in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, which was the Trial Court, to vacate judgment and sentence, which was denied. He again appeals.
He contends that the indictment was insufficient. The failure of the indictment to state crimes was raised before trial by a demurrer, which was overruled. The point was not raised upon appeal, but was necessarily passed upon. The judgment on affirmance became final. Furthermore, each count of the indictment has been reexamined and found to state a crime. The final claim is that the Court did not have jurisdiction of certain counts because the evidence did not show that the letter was posted within the District although posted within the State of Washington. The constitutional objection did not lie, therefore, and the matter could have been waived. The point was not urged upon appeal. The second count was thus objected to. Since this count was drawn under the mail fraud statute, the objection is not good, as that statute permits trial in the District where the letter is received. The fourth count can also be construed as one under the mail fraud statute. After judgment, this is sufficient.
The Court had jurisdiction of the indictment and of the person of the defendant. The Judge had the power to impose a sentence of five years upon at least one count of the indictment. A sentence of a total of four years was imposed. There is no question, this sentence would have been valid if no counts were specified, even if one count were absolutely void for lack of jurisdiction. In any event, it is a question of the intention of the Trial Judge. In denying the motion to vacate the sentence, Judge Driver held “that this Court had jurisdiction to impose such sentence and that said sentence was not in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” We hold that it is of no consequence what counts the judgment specified, so long as there was conviction on a valid count capable of bearing the sentence imposed.
Appellant then claims that it was double jeopardy to permit conviction on two counts upon the same evidence. This point has no substance. The immemorial practice has been to join conspiracy and substantive counts and to sustain convictions of each.
The order is affirmed.
. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0