What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Martin F. FEENEY, Petitioner, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent, Appellee.
No. 7072.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
April 18, 1968.
Martin F. Feeney, pro se.
Paul F. Markham, U. S. Atty., and Herbert N. Goodwin, Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
In 1954 petitioner was charged" with four others in two indictments — kidnaping a prison guard in the course of a prison break and transporting him across state lines, and transporting a motor vehicle across state lines knowing the same to have been stolen. He was charged individually in a third indictment with unlawful flight with intent to avoid confinement after a state conviction for robbery. The three indictments were tried together and the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. Thereafter he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment on the kidnaping charge and to concurrent terms of five years on the other two convictions to begin on and after completion of the sentence in the kidnaping case. This court affirmed the convictions. Feeney v. United States, 221 F.2d 959 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 852, 76 S.Ct. 94, 100 L.Ed. 758 (1955).
In 1967 petitioner brought the instant motion, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate the three sentences. The district court vacated the sentence imposed on the unlawful flight conviction but denied the motion as to the other two. On appeal petitioner complains that the district court erred in not vacating all three sentences. He asserts that prior to imposing sentence, the trial court did not offer him the right to allocution as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a) and secondly that the court’s charge was erroneous and prejudicial.
A § 2255 proceeding is a collateral remedy available to a petitioner only when some fundamental right is denied and not as a routine review at the behest of a defendant who is dissatisfied with his sentence. Dirring v. United States, 370 F.2d 862 (1st Cir. 1967). It is established that failure on the part of the trial court to follow the formal requirements of Rule 32(a) is not of itself an error that can be raised by collateral attack. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). Petitioner alleges that the court’s failure to afford him an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf before sentence was imposed occurred amid “aggravating circumstances” which take the case out of the holding in Hill. We do hot agree. A careful examination of the record on appeal does not reveal any such circumstances. The trial court did not affirmatively deny petitioner an opportunity to speak and it does not appear that the court was “either misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant circumstances.” See Hill, supra at 429, 82 S.Ct at 472.
Nor is petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous and prejudicial a basis for § 2255 relief. The issue of the trial court’s instructions is a matter for appeal and is not within the scope of § 2255. West v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 90, 326 F.2d 633 (1963). While it is true that the district court at the trial of this action, committed an unusual error, in that it directed the jury to find the defendant guilty on the third indictment, this conviction has now been set aside and we do not agree that the error warranted a § 2255 attack on the convictions under the other indictments.
Affirmed.
. In 1954 this rule provided in pertinent part: “Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.”
. There the Court stated at 429, 82 S.Ct. at 472: “Whether § 2255 relief would be available if a violation of Rule 32(a) occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances is a question we therefore do not consider.”

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1