What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
SMITH v. MISSISSIPPI.
No. 667.
Argued April 30, 1963.
Decided May 13, 1963.
Morris B. Abram argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Melvin L. Wulj, Rowland Watts, Norman Dorsen. and William L. Higgs.
G. Garland Lyell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Joe T. Patterson, Attornev General of Mississippi.
Per Curiam.
The petitioner was convicted of rape by a jury in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Mississippi, and sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. - Miss. —, 139 So. 2d 857. We granted petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in jorma pauperis, and his petition for certiorari which presented several claims of alleged denial of rights secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. 371 U. S. 939! After oral argument and study of the record, we have reached the conclusion that the record is not sufficient to permit decision of his constitutional claims. The writ kiherefore dismissed as improvidently granted, without prejudice to an application for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2241 after exhaustion of any state remedies still open to him. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 435.
Upon the effective date of our action today, the stay of execution granted October 5, 1962, by Mr. Justice Black expires of its own terms. We see no reason, however, to continue the stay in effect. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court, see —r Miss. —, 145 So. 2d 688, reserved to the State the right, upon this Court’s disposition of the writ of certiorari, to apply for an order fixing a new execution date, we assume that that court will not act on application of the State without affording petitioner an opportunity to pursue with due diligence any available state remedies and, if necessary, the remedy in federal habeas corpus.
Writ dismissed.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0