What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BALTIMORE & ANNAPOLIS R. CO. v. CONTINO et al.
No. 6107.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 8, 1950.
Decided Dee. 18, 1950.
Frank L. Fuller, III, Baltimore, Md. (R. E. Fee Marshall and Marshall, Carey, Doub & Mundy, all of Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellant.
J. Richard Wilkins, Baltimore, Md., for appellees.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Upon the former appeal in this case, Contino v. The Baltimore & Annapolis R. Co., 4 Cir., 178 F.2d 521, we held that the Railroad Company was liable for negligence in respect to its participation in the construction and maintenance of an underpass on its line of less than normal clearance, without proper warning to the users of th-e highway. The responsibility for the erection of the crossing resided primarily with the State Roads Commission of Maryland, hut the Railroad participated in the project by approving the plans and sharing the cost; and since the Railroad and the Commission engaged in the enterprise jointly, it was held that the Railroad Company was liable for damage to a truck 12 feet in height which, due to the failure to illuminate, collided with the bridge in the nighttime. The Maryland statutes gave exclusive jurisdiction to the Commission to set up warning signs along the highways but the Railroad was nevertheless held liable since it joined in a construction which necessarily created an unreasonable risk unless suitable precautions to avoid accident were taken.
Upon the new trial, after the case was remanded to the District Court, the Railroad -endeavored to escape liability on a ground not broached or considered at the first trial. It offered to show that it was not in existence when the underpass was built; that at that time the road was being operated ¡by a predecessor corporation and that the property was sold at a receiver’s sale upon the condition that the purchaser should not be liable for any obligation or liability in respect to the property purchased, and that the appellant bought the property from the purchaser. This offer of proof was made as the basis for the contention that since the appellant had no share in the original ¡construction and no right to erect warning signs on the ■highways, it had no responsibility for the dangerous condition of the bridge which it uses in the operation of its line. The District Judge rejected this offer and rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $5180. This ruling was correct. We know of no authority for the proposition that a railroad corporation may -escape liability for a dangerous condition existing on its line by showing that the condition was initiated by the preceding owner. Liability springs from the acceptance of the situation and continued operation by the new owner in spite of th-e obvious danger. No duty rested upon it to purchase and operate the property if safe operation was impossible. Moreover, in the present instance ther-e is no showing that the overpass could not have been conspicuously marked and lighted so as to be visible to the traveling public without offending th-e Maryland statute. Indeed it was conceded in argument in this court that it lay within the power of the Railroad to place a light on its right of way at the crossing and its failure to do so is sufficient basis for an affirmance of the judgment. We do not mean by this holding to imply that the Maryland statute which directs the State Roads 'Commission and forbids others to erect and maintain warning signs along the public 'highways was intended to prevent a railroad from marking its roadbed where it makes a crossing above a public highway, or that the Railroad had no obligation to secure the erection of suitable warning signs by or with the consent of the State authority, for it may not be assumed that public officials would be unwilling to perform a simple duty to safeguard the public.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1