What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
NOLAN, ADMINISTRATOR, et al. v. TRANSOCEAN AIR LINES.
No. 107.
Argued January 12, 16, 1961.
Decided February 20, 1961.
Robert A. Dwyer argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Edward M. O’Brien and Harry S. Wender.
William J. Junkerman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was James B. McQuillan.
Per Curiam.
This action was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover damages for the wrongful death of Jasper W. Hall, a resident of South Carolina, who was killed in California in the crash of an airplane operated by defendant-respondent Transocean Air Lines. Plaintiffs, petitioners here, are the decedent’s South Carolina-appointed administrator, decedent’s widow, and decedent’s minor child, who sues through the widow, her mother, appointed her guardian ad litem by the District Court. Federal jurisdiction was predicated solely on diversity of citizenship — the administrator being a New York resident, the widow and child South Carolina residents, the airline a California corporation with its principal place of business in California— and the substantive basis of the claim was California’s Wrongful Death Statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377, made applicable by the New York choice-of-law rules, see Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N. Y. 130, 61 N. E. 2d 412, which govern this diversity action. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487. The defendant, by its answer, set up the Statute of Limitations, and subsequently moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was time-barred. Enforcing the one-year limitations period deemed controlling under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340, brought into operation by New York’s “borrowing statute,” N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 13, the District Court held that the Statute had run as to the widow, and hence that the child and the administrator were also barred under the California doctrine, announced by California District Courts of Appeal in Sears v. Majors, 104 Cal. App. 60, 285 Pac. 321, and Haro v. Southern P. R. Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P. 2d 441, that where one beneficiary of a wrongful death claim is time-barred, all beneficiaries are time-barred, the cause of action being “joint.” 173 F. Supp. 114. There was no decision on this precise point by the Supreme Court of California; that court had left Sears and Haro undisturbed. See also Gates v. Wendling Nathan Co., 27 Cal. App. 2d 307, 81 P. 2d 173; Glavich v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 44 Cal. App. 2d 517 112 P. 2d 774 (dictum). The District Court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 276 F. 2d 280. We granted certiorari. 363 U. S. 836.
The writ brought here several points decided adversely to petitioners below. We need discuss only one issue, for its determination disposes of the case. The Sears and Haro cases, regarded by the District Court and the Court of Appeals as controlling the effect upon a claim for wrongful death of the running of the Statute of Limitations upon one but not upon another of the decedent’s heirs (the latter being under a limitations-tolling disability), were decided in 1930 and 1936, respectively, and Gates in 1938, by California District Courts of Appeal. In December 1959, the Supreme Court of California, en banc, decided Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P. 2d 12, which, in a considered dictum construing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 352, stated: “If the cause of action were a joint one, the statute would be tolled as to both. Tf an action not severable is not barred as to one of the parties on account of his infancy at the time the cause of action arose, it is not barred as to either of the other parties.’ ” Id., at 208-209, 347 P. 2d, at 22.
This case was handed down after the District Court’s ruling granting summary judgment for respondent in the present litigation, and only shortly before argument in the Court of Appeals. It was not brought to the attention of, and was not considered by, that court. Inasmuch as the view expressed therein by the highest court of California may be decisive of an issue critical to petitioners’ claims, and inasmuch as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is charged with mandatory appellate review in the present case, that court should decide what relative weights, as authoritative sources for ascertaining California law, the New York Court of Appeals would accord to the Sears-Haro line (direct holdings of District Courts of Appeal between 1930 and 1938) and to Leeper (a considered, relevant dictum of general scope by the California Supreme Court in 1959). We set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for reconsideration of the case in light of the new factor introduced by Leeper v. Beltrami, supra.
So ordered.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 5
2