What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Steven Wayne JOHNSON, Appellant.
No. 92-1393SI.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 13, 1992.
Decided Oct. 16, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 17, 1992.
D. William Thomas, Des Moines, Iowa, argued, for appellant.
John D. Griffith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, argued, for appellee.
Before FAGG, Circuit Judge, LAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and LARSON, Senior District Judge.
The HONORABLE EARL R. LARSON, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Steven Wayne Johnson appeals his jury conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). We affirm.
The following facts are undisputed. Johnson flew to Des Moines, Iowa one morning and checked into a motel. Several individuals briefly visited Johnson during the day, including one group that brought a grocery sack to Johnson’s room and left with a small box. That evening, Johnson checked out of the motel and went to the airport to fly to Tucson, Arizona. Johnson purchased both of his one-way tickets with cash and checked no luggage. With Johnson's consent, police officers searched Johnson at the airport. The officers found $10,390 in small bills concealed in Johnson’s pants and a plastic bag containing 5.98 grams of cocaine in his underwear. Johnson told the officers the cocaine was “personal use stuff.” The cocaine was in compacted form, however, and not ready for personal consumption. The officers also found a slip of paper with handwritten numbers and words in Johnson’s wallet.
At Johnson’s trial, a police detective testified Johnson’s activities and the amount and denominations of currency found on him were consistent with drug trafficking. The detective testified the cocaine appeared to be a chunk from a larger compaction. The detective interpreted the slip of paper as a disguised accounting of drug sales. The detective also testified he had seized cocaine and drug scales from one of Johnson’s motel visitors two months before Johnson’s arrest.
Johnson contends 5.98 grams of cocaine is not an excessive quantity to possess for personal use, and thus, the evidence was insufficient to show he intended to distribute cocaine. We disagree. Although there is no direct evidence, Johnson’s intent to distribute “may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as a large sum of cash, and a quantity of a controlled substance.” United States v. Knox, 888 F.2d 585, 588 (8th Cir.1989).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and giving the Government the benefit of all reasonable inferences, United States v. Gordon, 923 F.2d 123, 125 (8th Cir.1991), we conclude the jury could reasonably find that Johnson intended to distribute cocaine. Although the quantity of cocaine in Johnson’s possession was small, the jury could infer Johnson’s intent to distribute from his activities on the day of his arrest, the large sum of cash he possessed, the compacted form of the cocaine, and the coded slip of paper. See id. at 125-26 (possession of one ounce of cocaine along with additional evidence of ongoing pattern of drug dealing supported inference of intent to distribute); United States v. Trotter, 889 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir.1989) (possession of nine grams of cocaine and large sum of money with cocaine traces supported an inference of intent to distribute), rev’d on other grounds, 912 F.2d 964 (1990) (adopting panel’s decision on sufficiency question).
Johnson next contends the district court improperly admitted evidence of Johnson’s earlier convictions for possession of a narcotic drug for sale and of marijuana with intent to deliver. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). According to Johnson, his earlier convictions were irrelevant, not reasonably close in time, and more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. The district court admitted Johnson’s convictions for the limited purpose of showing Johnson’s knowledge and intent and gave the jury a limiting instruction at the close of the evidence. Having carefully considered the record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in admitting this evidence under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Burk, 912 F.2d 225, 228-29 (8th Cir.1990).
Finally, Johnson contends the Government violated his procedural due process rights by prosecuting him in federal court when he could have been tried in state court. Johnson argues he would have received a significantly shorter sentence in state court than the 262 month sentence he received under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Because Johnson raises this contention for the first time on appeal, we will reverse only for plain error. See United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir.1991).
“The fact that the federal government prosecutes a federal crime in a federal court that could have been ... prosecuted as a state crime in a state court does not itself violate due process.” United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 1388 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194, 79 S.Ct. 666, 670, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959)), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1428, 113 L.Ed.2d 480 (1991). This is so even if the defendant faces a harsher sentence in federal court. Id. We thus conclude Johnson’s federal prosecution did not violate due process.
Accordingly, we affirm.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1