What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Harold Eugene HUFFMAN, Appellant, v. Maurice H. SIGLER, Warden, Appellee.
No. 17909.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Nov. 10, 1965.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 29, 1965.
Harold Eugene Huffman, in pro. per.
Clarence A. H. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Neb., for appellee.
Before JOHNSEN, VOGEL and MATTHES, Circuit Judges.
JOHNSEN, Circuit Judge.
The appeal is dismissed as being without any question of substance for review.
Review is sought by a Nebraska prisoner of the findings made by the District Court upon his federal habeas corpus claims, arrived at after a full evidentiary hearing, on admittedly effective representation by appointed counsel, with the question of credibility being controlling of the result.
On appraising appellant’s testimony and that of two other criminal offenders in his behalf, against the testimony adduced by the State and in relation to the situation involved, Judge Van Pelt felt called upon to declare that “petitioner has completely failed in sustaining his burden”. The court’s unpublished memorandum sets out analysis and demonstration, which it is unnecessary to repeat here.
Findings of a court which are controlled by the question of credibility and are without basis to contend otherwise that they are lacking in substantial evidentiary support do not provide substance for review. Cf. Reid v. Miles Construction Co., 8 Cir., 307 F.2d 214, 218; Ciccarello v. Graham, 5 Cir., 296 F.2d 858, 860; Hagan v. Goldberg, 9 Cir., 291 F.2d 249, 251.
The cases in which this situation has come most frequently to occur are collateral attack proceedings engaged in by prisoners as a matter of legal pursuit and institutional preoccupation. Appeals in such cases from determinations which have clearly turned on credibility evaluation have always been futile, and they are entitled to be dealt with as frivolous. Only, as suggested above, if the testimony credited does not, together with the circumstances shown, provide a substantial evidentiary basis for the facts found can findings so made be attacked. The findings here cannot be contended to be thus vulnerable.
Beyond the review sought on the District Court’s findings of fact, appellant also makes the contention that the court erred in holding that there had been no violation of due process from the county attorney’s having been permitted to amend the information, after appellant had pleaded guilty, changing the alleged date of the breaking and entering involved from “on or about the 31st day of May A.D. 1963”, to “on or about the 29th day of May A.D. 1963”.
Request for leave to- make the amendment was prompted by appellant’s declaration, after he had entered his plea of guilty, that the burglary had in fact occurred during the night of May 29th, the day before Memorial Day, and not in the morning of May 31st, the day it was discovered. The court observed from the bench that the amendment was unnecessary, but it granted leave to make the change by interlineation, which was done in appellant’s presence.
Neither under federal law nor under Nebraska law is the exact time of the commission of an offense regarded as a substantive element in the charge or proof thereof, unless the statute involved makes it so or is clearly intended to have that effect. Cf. Cwach v. United States, 8 Cir., 212 F.2d 520, 529; Gorton v. State of Nebraska, 117 Neb. 556, 221 N.W. 689, 690. In fact, Neb.R.R.S.1943, § 29-1501, expressly provides that “No indictment [or information] shall be deemed invalid * * * for omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed in any case where time is not of the essence of the offense; nor for stating .the time imperfectly; * * * nor for any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits”.
Since no substantive element was involved in the allegation of when the offense was committed, the granting of leave to change the date thereof, to one which was within the period of limitations and before the filing of the information, could not constitute a violation of due process without some prejudice having been occasioned to appellant thereby. Nor could there be contended to be a voiding of the information by alteration on the part of the court and county attorney, such as would have been caused to exist as to a grand jury indictment at early common law, since the instrument was one which had been drawn and filed by the county attorney. As a matter of fact, it seems clear that the inaccuracy was one to which appellant, who was an experienced felony pleader, called attention because he preferred to have it corrected.
Appeal dismissed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1