What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.

Opinion:
MANDEL, GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND, et al. v. BRADLEY et al.
No. 76-128.
Argued February 23, 1977
Decided June 16, 1977
George A. Nilson, Deputy Attorney General of Maryland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Robert A. Zarnoch, Assistant Attorney General.
Jon T. Brown argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees.
Per Curiam.
Candidates for statewide or federal office in Maryland may obtain a place on the general election ballot by filing with the State Administrative Board of Election Laws a certificate of candidacy 70 days before a political party’s primary election and then by winning the primary. Alternatively, under provisions of the Maryland Election Code, a candidate for statewide or federal office may qualify for a position on the general election ballot as an independent by filing, 70 days before the date on which party primaries are held, nominating petitions signed by at least 3% oí the State’s registered voters and a certificate of candidacy. Md. Elec. Code Ann. §7-1 (1976 and Supp. 1976). In Presidential election years this filing date occurs approximately 230 to 240 days before the general election. In other years it occurs about 120 days before the general election. §§1-1 (a)(8), 5-2, 7-1.
Appellee Bruce Bradley decided in the spring of 1975 to run as an independent candidate for the United States Senate in 1976, a Presidential election year. Starting in the fall of 1975 Bradley collected signatures on nominating petitions. The requisite number was 51,155. On March 8, 1976, the deadline for filing, Bradley submitted 53,239 signatures and filed a certificate of candidacy for the Senate seat. However, on April 15, 1976, the State Administrative Board of Election Laws determined that only 42,049 of the signatures were valid and denied him a place on the ballot.
Two weeks later, Bradley and the other appellees — petition signers and other voter supporters of Bradley — filed the instant suit, alleging that the procedures mandated by § 7-1 of the Md. Elec. Code (1976 and Supp. 1976) constitute an unconstitutional infringement of their associational and voting rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They complained that Maryland’s early filing date made it more difficult for Bradley to obtain the requisite number of signatures than for a party member to win a primary and sought, inter alia, an injunction against future enforcement of the offending provision of Maryland’s election procedures. A three-judge District Court agreed with the appellees that the early filing deadline of § 7-1 (i) (Supp. 1976) was an unconstitutional burden on an independent candidate’s access to the ballot and ordered the appellants to give Bradley 53 days after the party primaries to gather the requisite number of signatures.
The court based its holding on our summary affirmance in Tucker v. Salera, 424 U. S. 959 (1976), aff’g 399 F. Supp. 1258 (ED Pa. 1975). In Salera, a three-judge court declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law setting the deadline for an independent candidate to gather signatures to obtain a place on the ballot 244 days before the general election in a Presidential election year. Under the Pennsylvania law, independents had to submit signatures of only 2% of the largest vote cast for any candidate in the preceding statewide general election, but they had to gather the required signatures within a 21-day period prior to the filing deadline. In declaring the Pennsylvania statute invalid, the three-judge court relied, not on the short period for signature gathering (which it thought was valid under Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724 (1974)), but solely on the early deadline for submission of the necessary signatures. The court. found that the deadline substantially burdened ballot access of independents by requiring them to obtain the necessary signatures at a time when the election issues were undefined and the voters were apathetic. It also rejected various countervailing state interests that had been urged. This Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the three-judge court in Salera.
The three-judge court in this case viewed this Court’s summary affirmance in Salera as controlling precedent for the proposition that early filing dates, such as that employed in Maryland, are unconstitutionally burdensome on the independent candidate’s access to the ballot, and therefore decided in favor of the appellees. We noted probable jurisdiction, 429 U. S. 813 (1976).
The District Court erred in believing that our affirmance in Salera adopted the reasoning as well as the judgment of the three-judge court in that case and thus required the District Court to conclude that the early filing date is impermissibly burdensome. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 (1975), held that lower courts are bound by summary actions on the merits by this Court, but we noted that “[a]scertaining the reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real substance.” Id., at 345 n. 14. Because a summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only, the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely from the opinion below.
“When we summarily affirm, without opinion, ... we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached. An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.” (Footnote omitted.) Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 391-392 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring).
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions. After Salera, for example, other courts were not free to conclude that the Pennsylvania provision invalidated was nevertheless constitutional. Summary actions, however, including Salera, should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved.
Here, the District Court ruled that legally “Salera decides the issue before us, and as the latest expression of the Supreme Court, we are bound to follow it.” App. to Jurisdictional Statement 12a. The precedential significance of the summary action in Salera, however, is to be assessed in the light of all of the facts in that case; and it is immediately apparent that those facts are very different from the facts of this case. There, in addition to the early filing date, signatures had to be gathered within a 21-day period. This limited time enormously increased the difficulty of obtaining the number of signatures necessary to qualify as an independent candidate.
This combination of an early filing deadline and the 21-day limitation on signature gathering is sufficient to distinguish Salera from the case now before us, where there is no limitation on the period within which such signatures must be gathered. In short, Salera did not mandate the result reached by the District Court in this case.
Because of its preoccupation with Salera, the District Court failed to undertake an independent examination of the merits. The’ appropriate inquiry was set out in Storer v. Brown, supra, at 742:
“[I]n the context of [Maryland] politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the [ballot access] requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not. We note here that the State mentions only one instance of an independent candidate’s qualifying . . . but disclaims having made any comprehensive survey of the official records that would perhaps reveal the truth of the matter.”
In Btorer itself, because the District Court had not applied these standards in adjudicating the constitutional issues before it, we remanded the case “to permit further findings with respect to the extent of the burden imposed on independent candidates.” 415 U. S., at 740. There is no reason here for doing any less. The District Court did not sift through the conflicting evidence and make findings of fact as to the difficulty of obtaining signatures in time to meet the early filing deadline. It did not consider the extent to which other features of the Maryland electoral system — such as the unlimited period during which signatures may be collected, or the unrestricted pool of potential petition signers — moderate whatever burden the deadline creates. See Developments in the Law— Elections, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1111,1142-1143 (1975). It did not analyze what the past experience of independent candidates for statewide office might indicate about the burden imposed on those seeking ballot access. Instead, the District Court’s assumption that the filing deadline by itself was per se illegal- — as well as the expedited basis upon which the case necessarily was decided — resulted in a failure to apply the constitutional standards announced in Storer to the statutory provisions here at issue.
The application of those standards to the evidence in the record is, in the first instance, a task for the District Court. We therefore vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Bradley successfully gathered the requisite number of signatures, obtained a place on the ballot, ran, and lost. This case is nonetheless not moot. Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 737 n. 8 (1974).
In Storer v. Brown, supra, as the District Court noted, the 24-day limitation was not by itself enough to invalidate the statute, but we clearly recognized that the limitation, when combined with other provisions of the election law, might invalidate the statutory scheme. 415 U. S., at 742-743. The District Court in this case erred in reading Storer v. Brown as holding irrelevant the limited period of time in which signatures must be gathered.
The appellees filed this action on April 30, 1976. The three-judge court was convened and heard argument on May 12, and it announced its decision on May 17.
There is evidence in the record that in both 1972 and 1976 — the only years in which the early deadline was effective — no candidate for statewide office succeeded in qualifying for the ballot. There is also evidence tending to substantiate the appellees’ contention that there existed a variety of obstacles in the way of obtaining support for an independent candidate far in advance of the general election. Without intimating any ultimate view on the merits of the appellees’ challenge, we have no doubt that it has sufficient substance to warrant a remand for further proceedings.
The District Court will be free on remand to- consider the appellees’ argument that the “technical and administrative requirements of the petition signing process” are an unconstitutional burden on ballot access — a question never reached in view of the decision for the appellees and Bradley’s ultimate success in qualifying for the ballot.

Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?

Choices:
Conservative
Liberal
Unspeciﬁable

Answer: 0