What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
OLIVER et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
No. 13309.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
June 24, 1946.
Igoe, Carroll, Keefe & Cobum, Richmond C. Coburn, and Thomas L. Croft, all of St. Louis, Mo., and Robert V. Niedner, of St. Charles, Mo., for appellants.
Adams, Adams & Adams and Arthur N. Adams, Sr., all of Kansas City, Mo., and Cobbs, Logan, Roos & Armstrong, Wm. H. Armstrong, and J. Terrell Vaughan, all of St. Louis, Mo., for appellee Kansas City Title Ins. Co.
J. Edward Williams, Acting Head, Lands Division, of Washington, D.C., and Harry C. Blanton, U. S. Atty., of Sikeston, Mo., and Roger P. Marquis and Miss Wilma C. Martin, Attys., Department of Justice, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee United States.
Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH, and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.
RIDDICK, Circuit Judge.
This is one of the so-called Weldon Springs cases which arose out of the efforts of the War Department to acquire by purchase a site in St. Charles County, Missouri, for the location of an ordnance plant. After having accepted approximately 270 contracts with individual landowners for the purchase of their lands, the War Department conceived the idea that the contracts were prohibited by statute, and acting upon this assumption caused condemnation proceedings to be instituted in the name of the, United States against all landowners whose contracts had not been fully executed. The appellants were parties to one of the contracts which the United States attempted to repudiate and were defendants in one of the ensuing condemnation proceedings. United States v. Certain Lands in St. Charles County, Mo., etc., D.C., 60 F.Supp. 741; Oliver et al. v. United States, 8 Cir., 155 F.2d 73.
The facts and questions of law common to all the condemnation actions may be found in the opinions of the Supreme Court and of this court in Muschany et al. v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 65 S.Ct. 442, 89 L.Ed. 744; United States v. Muschany et al., 8 Cir., 139 F.2d 661; and Oliver et al. v. United States, supra. It is enough to say here that the cases cited determined that appellants’ contract with the United States for the sale of their land was valid; that 'the purchase price stipulated in the contract fixed the amount of the award to be made in the condemnation action brought by the United States; that this purchase price included the sum which the appellants agreed to accept in payment for their lands, plus five per cent of that amount to cover the commission of an agent employed by the War Department to negotiate the purchase contracts, and plus one and one-half per cent of the same amount to cover the charges of the Kansas City Title Insurance Company for preparing at the landowners’ expense certificates of title and a deed showing good title in the United States upon conveyance by appellants to the United States; and that with the consent of all parties an arrangement, carried out in the settlement of all contracts not repudiated, was adopted whereby one voucher payable to the vendors was issued for the total of all items included in the stipulated purchase price.
After the decision of the Muschany case by the Supreme Court, the United States paid into the court the sum of $70,000, the purchase price stipulated in appellants’ contract, and judgment was entered fixing that sum as the award in the condemnation action. At the suggestion of the United States an order was also entered requiring claimants to a share in the award to file their intervening petitions. The Kansas City Title Insurance Company filed its intervention claiming a share in the award as the owner of one and one-half per cent of the amount stipulated in the purchase contract. This appeal is from the judgment of the District Court allowing the Title Company’s claim. The United States is not interested in the result.
In the District Court the Title Company introduced in evidence parts of the records in the Muschany and Oliver cases, supra, on which the conclusions and findings in those cases were made. The appellants offered no evidence. They objected to the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain appellee’s claim on the grounds: (1) that only those who have an estate in lands taken by condemnation may share in the award in the condemnation proceeding; and (2) that there was no diversity of citizenship as between appellee and appellants. They also contended that the evidence on behalf of appellee was not sufficient to show that appellants had agreed to pay, appellee for its services.
We think the evidence was sufficient to establish the employment of the appellee by the appellants for the examination and certification of appellants’ title to the land. Appellants were required by their contract for the sale of their land to employ the appellee for this purpose, and they are bound by the decision in the Muschany case, which was a test case for the determination of the validity and the interpretation of this contract.
Appellants’ objections to the jurisdiction of the District Court are without merit. In the ordinary condemnation case the award in favor of the owners of the land condemned stands in lieu of the land. In such cases it goes without saying that only those who had an estate in the land have an interest in the fund which takes its place. In the present case, however, the fund to be distributed by the court included not only compensation to the owners of the land, but in addition, funds payable by appellants to the Kansas City Title Insurance Company for its services to them. A Federal court having acquired possession of a fund in the course of a proceeding within its jurisdiction also has jurisdiction of the conflicting claims to ownership of the fund, regardless of the citizenship of the claimants. Loy v. Alston, 8 Cir., 172 F. 90, 95. By Rule 24(a) (3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, one claiming a share in a fund in court is entitled as of right to intervene in distribution proceedings for the protection of his interest. Appellants’ argument that Rule 24(a) (3) is not applicable in the present case, because of the provisions of Rule 81(a) (7) that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in proceedings for condemnation, must be denied because the present action does not involve proceedings for condemnation within the meaning of the Rule relied on. It is true that the funds to be distributed came into the hands of the court as the result of proceedings for condemnation. But those proceedings were terminated before the present action began.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1