What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Warren E. WESTON et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. George A. STUCKERT, Jr., et al., Defendants, Appellees.
No. 6209.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Heard Feb. 5, 1964.
Decided April 8, 1964.
Ruben Rodriguez Antongiorgi, San Juan, P. R., with whom Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, P. R., was on brief, for appellants.
Rafael Martinez Alvarez, Jr., San Juan, P. R., for appellees.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and MARIS and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
By special designation.
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment of the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissing an action in which they sought to establish a resulting or constructive trust in land in St. John in the Territory of the Virgin Islands which had been conveyed by George A. Stuckert, Sr., the father of plaintiff Mildred Stuckert Weston, to her brother, defendant George A. Stuckert, Jr.
It is a rule of the conflict of laws which is followed in Puerto Rico as well as elsewhere that the effect of a conveyance of land is governed by the law of the situs of the land. This rule applies to the determination of the question whether as the result of certain transactions a trust in land has been created.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Second, states that a resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes to be made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the beneficial interest therein, unless the inference is rebutted or the beneficial interest is otherwise effectively disposed of.
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution, Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts states that where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.
[4] The restatements express the common law of the Virgin Islands on the subject. It was, therefore, necessary for the plaintiffs to prove facts which would support the conclusion that either a resulting or a constructive trust had arisen as the result of the conveyance in question in order to secure such relief as the district court was competent to give them.
Findings of fact which the district court made may be summarized as follows:
George A. Stuckert, Sr. and his wife Mildred E. Stuckert had three children, George A. Stuckert, Jr., one of the defendants, Mildred Stuckert Weston, one of the plaintiffs whose husband, Warren E. Weston, is the other plaintiff, and Margaret Stuckert Merritt named as a defendant but as to whom the amended complaint was dismissed without prejudice. On July 18, 1951 Stuckert, Sr. for $2,000.00 acquired 30.34 acres of land in the Cruz Bay Quarter of the island of St. John in the Virgin Islands, being the land (less .81 acre subsequently sold) which is here in controversy. On April 16, 1956, Stuckert, Sr. conveyed the land in controversy to his son, defendant George A. Stuckert, Jr., for a consideration of $2,000.00 which Stuckert, Sr., both in the deed and by answer to an interrogatory, acknowledged that he had received from his son, plus other good and valuable considerations. Mrs. Stuck-ert, although then seriously ill, joined in the deed, thereby waiving her inchoate right of dower under the then existing law of the Virgin Islands. Execution of the deed was witnessed by three persons, one of whom was Margaret Stuckert Merritt, the sister of plaintiff Mildred Stuckert Weston. No part of the $2,-000.00 purchase money was furnished by either of the plaintiffs. Mrs. Stuckert died on April 24, 1956, 8 days after the execution of the deed in controversy. Stuckert, Sr., however, lived for more than 5 years thereafter. He died 3 weeks after having suffered a stroke in July 1961. The plaintiffs live in Pennsylvania but defendant George A. Stuckert, Jr. has always remained in Puerto Rico, sharing the care of his father with his other sister Margaret Stuckert Merritt for a period and then taking exclusive charge of him. Stuckert, Sr., while alive, and his son, defendant George A. Stuck-ert, Jr., entertained a scheme for the subdivision of the St. John land and a formal project to this end was commenced. The land was subdivided and some two acres were in fact sold.
_ . J7 In addition to the testimony of the plaintiffs and defendant George A. Stuckert, Jr., a large number of documents * . 1 , , . ., ,, were introduced m evidence, mostly cor- , . m , . . TSf w \ T PÍal,? Mddred Stuekert Weston her father, and her brother, defendant George A. . , T m , * , Stuekert, Jr. The district court found . that this correspondence did not show by a preponderance of the evidence, clearly and satisfactorily, that George A. Stuckert, Jr. took the St. John land for the benefit of all three children of his father, as the plaintiffs contended, or that his father intended that he should take title in trust for his sisters Margaret and Mildred. The court, on the contrary, found as a fact that Stuekert, Sr. had by a valid deed, for a fair and reasonable consideration, sold the land to defendant George A. Stucker-t, Jr. and that no trust in favor of plaintiff Mildred Stuekert Weston resulted from the conveyance. The court accordingly concluded that the title of defendant George A. Stuekert, Jr. to the land in controversy was valid and not subject to any trust. Judgment was thereupon entered dismissing the action and the present appeal followed.
The exact bases of the claim of the plaintiffs that the conveyance to defendant George A. Stuckert, Jr. operated to establish a resulting or constructive trust in favor of himself and his two sisters are somewhat difficult to understand, Apparently they contend that the correspondence establishes either that Stuckert, Sr. intended that his son should hold the land in trust for all three children (a resulting trust), or that the conveyance was a fraud upon defendant Mildred Stuckert Weston as a prospective heir of her father with respect to which she is entitled to restitution of some sort (a constructive trust). In any event we cannot say, after a careful study of the record, that the district court erred in finding that the conveyance in question - was a valid one for a consideration which Stuckert, Sr. regarded as fair and reasonable. Nor can we say that the court erred in concluding that the evidence did n()t egtabligh & satisfactory preponderance that Stuckert, Sr. intended the conveyance to be m trust for his daughters.
The correspondence between plaintiff Mildred Stuckert Weston in Pennsylvania and her father and brother in Puerto Rico was undoubtedly somewhat ambiguous and capable of differing and, indeed, conflicting inferences. But a reading of it leaves one with the distinct impression that the basic concern of Stucker was with his own old age income and security rather than with the future interests of his two daughters. And in fhis connection it appears that it was certainly not the plaintiffs, but defendant George A. Stuckert, Jr. to whom he conveyed the land, who provided Stuckert, Sr. with care and took charge of him after the conveyance and up to the time of death. The promise of such future care may well have been the other good and valuable considerations” which the deed recited.
, , The argument with respect to the facts hag covered a wide range_ No useful pur. poge would be gervedj however, by recounting in further detail the evidence in this unfortunate controversy between brother and sister. It is enough to say, as we have, that the findings of the district court are not clearly erroneous and that they fully support the court’s eon-elusion that the action should be dismissed.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 220, 221; 31 L.P.R.A. § 10.
. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 239; Schwartz v. District Court, 1952, 73 P.R.R. 800, 811.
. Restatement, Trusts 2d § 404.
. Restatement, Restitution § 160.
. 1 V.I.C. § 4.
. The district court had no power by its ' decree to create an equitable interest in land in the Virgin Islands as the amended complaint sought to have it do, Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 240, but, if the facts had warranted, the court could have made a decree in personam against the defendants directing them to make such conveyance or other restitution to the plaintiffs as justice might require. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 97. The amended complaint also prayed for relief in personam of this character.
. The rights of dower and curtesy have been abolished in the Virgin Islands in the estates of persons who died after September 1, 1957, 15 V.I.C. § 83.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0