What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
Robert W. KNIGHT, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. The TOWN OF GLOCESTER, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants.
No. 86-2129.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued Sept. 10, 1987.
Decided Oct. 16, 1987.
Robert G. Flanders, Jr., with whom Flanders & Medeiros Inc., James T. Murphy, Margaret L. O’Hara and Hanson, Curran & Parks, Providence, R.I., were on brief, for defendants, appellants.
Charles Cavas with whom William A. Poore and Hodosh, Spinella & Angelone, Providence, R.I., were on brief, for plaintiff, appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, GARTH, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOWNES, Circuit Judge.
Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
BOWNES, Circuit Judge.
This case involves an attempt by the district court to cut through a Gordian knot of statutory regulations in which plaintiffappellee Robert Knight was entangled. Unfortunately, the cutting of the knot also severed some basic legal principles.
Plaintiff was discharged from the Glocester, Rhode Island, Police Department because he could not attain the status of a certified police officer under the pertinent Rhode Island statute. Knight brought suit in federal court alleging jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (violation of civil rights). The gravamen of the complaint is that he had an express or implied contract of employment with the town as a police officer and that he was discharged without cause and in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law.
The only issue on appeal is whether the district court’s order “directing the town to take all reasonable steps to enroll Officer Knight in the Police Academy” can stand. We find that it cannot.
The Facts
Plaintiff started his police career in 1972 as a volunteer constable appointed by the Town Council. He was appointed a permanent part-time patrolman in March of 1975. In November of 1976, he was promoted to sergeant as a part-time officer. Plaintiff became a full-time police officer in June of 1980.
Rhode Island General Laws § 42-28-29 (1984 & Supp.1986) provides:
Sponsorship of school candidates by city or town. — Candidates meeting the physical, mental and educational requirements of this chapter shall be admitted to the school only upon the request of the appointing authority in the city or town of which the prospective candidate is a resident, and every such application by the appointing authority shall be accompanied by a statement that the candidate has prospects, within the reasonable future, of a permanent appointment to the police force of the city or town sponsoring him; provided, however, that any member of any police department of any city or town accepting the provisions of §§ 42-28-25 to 42-28-31, inclusive, shall be eligible for training and retraining in the school.
The next section provides:
42-28-30. Certifícate of completion of training course. — Upon the satisfactory completion of the prescribed course of training the superintendent shall issue to each candidate a certificate of merit and shall forward to the appointing authority certification of the candidate’s qualifications for appointment.
Both plaintiff and the town officials understood that these statutory provisions meant that Knight had to complete a training course at a municipal police training school. See R.I. Gen.Laws § 42-28-25. Plaintiff submitted an application to the Rhode Island Municipal Police Academy in August, 1981. The application was rejected in part because the Town, by appointing Knight a permanent officer before he went to the Academy, had waived its right to send him. Additionally, Knight failed to get a chest X-ray properly and no age-limit waiver had been obtained from the Town.
Plaintiff reapplied on November 1, 1981, under the aegis of a newly appointed Police Chief, Richard B. Tooher. The Chief endorsed the application and requested a waiver of the age requirement. This application was also rejected; the reasons for the rejection were excluded as hearsay. Chief Tooher then tried unsuccessfully to get plaintiff admitted to the City of Providence Police Academy.
The Chief then had plaintiff submit a third application to the Rhode Island Municipal Police Academy. The Chief communicated with the executive director of the Academy and its commission on Standards and Training in aid of plaintiff's application. Plaintiff failed the first three portions of the physical agility test, a prerequisite for admission to the Academy. He left the test site without trying to complete the balance of the test and informed the Academy director that he would not take another test.
Because plaintiff was not a certified police officer, he could not sign arrest and search warrants. Plaintiff was supended from his duties with pay and benefits on February 4, 1985. After suspension, Chief Tooher and the Town Solicitor requested that the Academy waive its physical agility test requirements for plaintiff. This request was rejected. The Town Solicitor tried to get plaintiff admitted to the Providence Police Academy, but with no success.
The Chief decided that plaintiff should be dismissed from the police force because he could not be admitted to a municipal police training school and become a certified police officer. A letter recommending his discharge was delivered to plaintiff on February 19, 1985. Plaintiff asked for a hearing under the Rhode Island Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights. R.I.Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-1 to .6-15. The hearing committee ruled that because plaintiff was not a certified permanent police officer, he was not entitled to a hearing on the merits. Plaintiff appealed this ruling to the Rhode Island Superior Court pursuant to R.I.Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-12. That appeal is still pending. After unsuccessfully trying to file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement, plaintiff commenced this action in federal court. It is agreed that plaintiff had an exemplary record as a police officer.
The District Court’s Findings and Rulings
The court found, as a matter of law, that plaintiff “had no expectation of permanent employment by the Town of Glocester.” This ruling meant that there was no basis for the civil rights action. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Chongris v. Board of Appeals of Town of Andover, 811 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir.1987); Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts University, 793 F.2d 419, 421 (1st Cir.1986). Plaintiff did not appeal this ruling.
The court then went on to state:
It is perfectly clear to me, however, that the plaintiff has applied for equitable relief; and it is perfectly clear to me that this plaintiff has not been fairly treated in these circumstances, that fairness and equity require that the town do something to seek to remedy the situation____ I’m going to enter an order directing the town to take all reasonable steps to enroll Officer Knight in the police academy.
Equity and The Law
Although we can understand why the court attempted to find a way out of this Catch 22 situation, its solution is proscribed by the rule that equity must follow the law. “But courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded or the law violated.” Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Co., 338 U.S. 621, 631, 70 S.Ct. 392, 397, 94 L.Ed. 393 (1950). “Generally [equity’s] jurisdiction depends upon legal obligations, and its decrees can only enforce remedies to the extent and in the mode by law established.” Rees v. City of Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 121, 22 L.Ed. 72 (1873). The principle that equity follows the law has long been recognized in Rhode Island.
The maxims, that every right has a remedy, and that where the law does not give redress equity will afford relief, however just in theory, are subordinate to positive institutions, and cannot be applied either to subvert established rules of law, or to give the courts a jurisdiction hitherto unknown.
Greene v. Keene, 14 R.I. 388, 395 (1884).
Moreover, it would appear that the Town had made reasonable efforts to get plaintiff admitted to a Municipal Police Academy. Finally, we note that plaintiff did not join the Academy as a party to this action.
Therefore, that portion of the order of the district court granting equitable relief to plaintiff is vacated. So ordered.
No costs on appeal.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 39