What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FALK et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 4766.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
March 6, 1933.
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1933.
G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key and J. Louis Monarch, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and C. M. Charest, Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Philip A. Bayer, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Charles F. Fawsett, of Milwaukee, Wis., and R. S. Doyle, of Washington, D. C., for petitioners.
Before ALSCHULER and EVANS, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.
LINDLEY, District Judge.
This petition to review a decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals involves seven applications of as many beneficiaries of a trust agreement for relief from assessments for deficiency in income taxes for each' of the years 1922 to 1926, inclusive. These deficiencies arise out of the Board’s refusal to allow the petitioners certain sums for depletion of the trust property. The amount of the sums deducted for such purpose and disallowed by the Board is not in controversy, and the sole question is whether petitioners were entitled to deduct the said items in making up their tax returns.
On November 29, 1916, the Pfister Land Company, a corporation, by authorized action, conveyed to' trustees certain mineral property, with authority, to sell, mortgage or lease tho same. After paying state and municipal taxes and the expenses of administration, the trustees were obligated to pay to petitioners as beneficiaries all income from the trust property. The land was then subject to a mining lease which continued until after the close of the period involved.
During the years in question, the trustees collected the royalties provided in the lease and paid the same to the beneficiaries, without deduction of any sort except the taxes aforesaid and the comparatively small expenses of the trustees in administering their trust. In reporting the' income thus received, petitioners deducted the depletion items, which the Board refused to allow.
The pertinent revenue statutes of 1921, 1924, and 1926 (Revenue Act 1921, § 234 (a) (9), 42 Stat. 256, and Revenue Acts 1924, 1926, § 234 (a) (8), 26 USCA § 986 (a) (8) and note), provide that, in computing net income, there shall be allowed as a deduction in the ease of mines, “a reasonable allowance for depletion,” which ordinarily is deducted by him who pays the tax. The evidence discloses that the mineral body was exhausted before the lease expired. Nothing of value remained for the trustees or the beneficiaries.
In Merle-Smith v. Commissioner, 42 F.(2d) 837, 840 (C. C. A. 2d), certiorari denied, 282 U. S. 897, 51 S. Ct. 182, 75 L. Ed. 791, the court, having to do with a similar situation, said:
“The petitioners have a property right and interest, within the decision of Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U. S. 179, 5 S. Ct. 407, 28 L. Ed. 908, as real as that of the lessee referred to in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., supra [267 U. S. 364, 45 S. Ct. 274, 69 L. Ed. 660], Their interest in the ore body is as direct as the interest of the lessor, which is contingent upon the fulfillment by the lessee of the obligations under its lease. Included in the-current payment of royalties is a sum representing the value of each ton of ore removed. As stated in the Lynch Case, allowance is to be made ‘to every one whose property right and interest therein has been depleted,’ and it would therefore seem that these petitioners should be allowed deductions for depletion which their property interest sustained by reason of the mining operation.
“The government accedes to the doctrine that in all mining operations there is some depletion. But whose ore is depleted is put into question. If the petitioners have any property interest in the corpus, it is being depleted. Certainly, they who receive the income, the title owners of the corpus of the trust, the trustees, might have a depletion allowance. These petitioners who have the property right to which we have referred, receive the royalties without deduction. The statutes provide for depletion. The trustees merely pass on the royalties received in the percentages the will requires of them. The terms of the trust require that the entire royalties be paid currently to the beneficia^ ríes. No depletion reserve was to be set aside or retained by the trustees. * * *
“A reasonable allowance for depletion should have been made to each of the peti.tioners, in computing their income for the years in question.”
We do not understand- that the reason for the decision was that there was a remainder interest in the beneficiaries. Indeed, Judge Hand, in his concurring opinion, expressly disclaimed any intention to place the decision upon such ground.
Even though the existence of a right of remainder in the beneficiaries was material to the conclusion of the court in the ease cited, it could hardly be said to be so here. In the instant ease, the only thing of value was the mineral; all this passed to the beneficiaries, and nothing of value remains in any one to which the depletion could be said to be applicable. Their beneficial interest being the ore body, and their income having come entirely from the exhaustion of the same, it follows that they should be credited with the depletion or exhaustion of their capital assets. As said in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364, 45 S. Ct. 274, 276, 69 L. Ed. 660:
“Obviously, as the process goes on, this property interest of the lessee in the mines is lessened from year to year, as the owner’s property interest in the same mines is likewise lessened. There is an exhaustion of property in the one case as in the other; and the extent of it, with the consequent deduction to be made, in each case is to be arrived at in the same way, namely, by determining the aggregate amount of the depletion of the mines in which the several interests inhere, based upon the market value of the product, and allocating that amount in proportion to the interest of each severally considered.”
The depletion items represent the exhaustion of capital mineral assets, that is, the raw materials, all of which were exhausted within the period of the leasehold term and the proceeds, all of which passed to the beneficiaries. The trustees were permitted by law to pass on to their beneficiaries all royalties and retained nothing subject to tax. There was no title or interest in them against the exhaustion of which depletion would accrue. When Congress saw fit to place the beneficiaries in the category of owners to the extent that they might rightfully receive the proceeds of sale and taxed them thereon, it surely intended to pass on to them also the depletion of their capital assets as a reduction from the taxes assessed against the proceeds of sale thereof.
The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is reversed, with directions to allow the deductions claimed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99