What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LEWIS v. HUDSPETH, Warden.
No. 1790.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 27, 1939.
Jesse A. Hall, of Leavenworth, Kan., for appellant.
Summerfield S. Alexander, U. S. Atty. (Homer Davis, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
On May 29, 1934, appellant was charged in an indictment containing two counts, involving offenses under Section 101, Title 18 U.S.C.A., which provides:
“Whoever shall receive, conceal, or aid in concealing, or shall have or retain in his possession with intent to convert to his own use or gain, any money, property, record, voucher, or valuable thing whatever, of the moneys, goods, chattels, records, or property of the United States, which has theretofore been embezzled, stolen, or purloined by any other person, knowing the same to have been so embezzled, stolen, or purloined, shall be fined * * *(Italics supplied)
Appellant was found guilty by jury on both counts and duly sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years on the first count and five years on the second count, the sentence imposed on the second count to commence at the expiration of that on the first count.
On February 22, 1935, the appellant was delivered into the custody of the respondent as warden of the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, the appellee herein, where he has since been confined.
It appears that he has served five years less 480 days allowed by Section 710, Title 18 U.S.C.A., and less 117 days industrial good time allowed by Section 744a et seq., Title 18 U.S.C.A., his sentence beginning February 12, 1935. The actual time served prior to the time of suing out the writ of habeas corpus is three years and five months, constituting the serving of a five-year term under the statute.
It is contended that said counts state the same offense, operating as double punishment, and that habeas corpus is the proper remedy to raise the question.
In determining whether the same transaction constitutes two or more distinct offenses, the test is ,as to whether each offense requires proof of any fact which the other does not. Chrysler v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 81 F.2d 975; Belt v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 82 F.2d 18; Norton v. Zerbst, Warden, 10 Cir., 83 F.2d 677; Weeks v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 85 F.2d 996; Casebeer v. United States, 10 Cir., 87 F.2d 668; Tanchuck et al. v. United States, 10 Cir., 93 F.2d 534; Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 377, 26 S.Ct. 688, 50 L.Ed. 1057, 6 Ann.Cas. 362; Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342, 31 S. Ct. 421, 55 L.Ed. 489; Morgan, Warden of U. S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 35 S.Ct. 712, 59 L.Ed. 1153; Albrecht et al. v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 250, 71 L.Ed. 505.
Two counts of an indictment charging separate and distinct federal offenses, the court having jurisdiction of the accused and of the offenses charged, and the sentences imposed being authorized by statute, on habeas corpus inquiry may not be made as to whether the proof supported the charges. Norton v. Zerbst, Warden, supra; Watkins v. Zerbst, Warden, 10 Cir., 85 F.2d 999; Murphy v. United States, 7 Cir., 285 F. 801; United States ex rel. Poch v. Hill, 3 Cir., 71 F.2d 906, certiorari denied Poch v. Hill, 293 U.S. 597, 55 S.Ct. 120, 79 L.Ed. 690.
Said Section 101, Title 18, U.S.C.A., includes two distinct offenses.
To convict the accused on the first count of feloniously retaining the possession of the stolen property, it was not necessary to prove that the accused knew the property was stolen at the time he received it, it being sufficient to establish that he retained it knowing of its stolen character.-
To convict under the second count, it was essential to prove that the accused received and concealed the property, knowing the same was stolen at the time he received and concealed same.
The statute makes it a crime (1) to conceal or receive property, knowing the same was stolen, and (2) to retain property, knowing that the same was stolen, different proof being required as to the two counts.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1