What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America ex rel., George CLAYBORN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Frank J. PATE, Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 14204.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 8, 1964.
Ronald M. Glink, Chicago, Ill., George Olayborn, pro. per., for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Edward Berman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., William C. Wines, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for appellee.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and KILEY and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner’s appeal from an adverse ruling in a habeas corpus proceeding raises the question: whether the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the allegation that his constitutional rights were violated in that a coerced confession was used in his conviction; his “illiterate” and unsound mind resulted in inability to understand the nature of the charge against him; and he was represented by incompetent counsel. We think the answer is no.
Petitioner pled guilty to murder in October, 1948, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In a post-conviction proceeding before the sentencing judge in 1955, issues of fact upon the same questions now raised were decided adversely to petitioner. Writ of error was denied him by the Illinois Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied him by the1 United States Supreme Court.
We have read the entire record which includes the Illinois Supreme Court opinion, and the transcript of proceedings at the post-conviction hearing which includes the judgment of conviction and excerpts from testimony. Ten witnesses, including the attorneys at the original trial, testified at the post-conviction hearing. Petitioner was represented by counsel. The court was careful to direct counsel to examine petitioner with respect to his various claims. It heard a play-back of the record of petitioner’s confession on a “Sound scriber.” The record of petitioner’s arraignment was introduced showing that he was advised of the consequences of his plea and the trial court’s finding that he “understands and comprehends” the nature of the charge against him; and there was introduced the transcript of his testimony subsequently in a separate mitigation hearing.
We see no merit in the contention that petitioner did not receive a “full and fair” hearing upon the points made in this petition for habeas corpus, or that these issues were not “actually reached and decided,” as required by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313-314, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963).
We find no basis for petitioner’s claim that the record shows that he received inadequate representation at his trial, thus requiring the district court’s hearing evidence .on the issue.
We appointed Attorney Ronald M. Glink, a member of the bar of Illinois, to represent petitioner. Mr. Glink’s service was in the highest tradition of the American bar. We commend him on his services.
Judgment is affirmed.
. Clayborn v. Illinois, 364 U.S. 874, 81 S.Ct. 118, 5 L.Ed.2d 96 (1960).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1