What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the race or ethnic identity of this litigant as identified in the opinion. Names may be used to classify a person as hispanic if there is little ambiguity. All aliens are coded as "not ascertained".

Opinion:
Charles S. COLEMAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 16880.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 26, 1962.
Decided Dec. 20, 1962.
Mr. David R. Peasback (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. Daniel A. Rezneck, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Nathan J. Paulson, Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time of argument, were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. John R. Schmertz, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. at the time of argument, also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before Edgerton, Washington, and Bastían, Circuit Judges.
EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Coleman was a passenger in the car involved in the Sheriff Road robbery and killing. Facts are stated in our opinion in Jackson v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. -, 313 F.2d 572 (1962).
The police questioned Coleman on six or seven separate occasions, and as far as appears could have questioned him again at will, before they arrested him at 6:45 p. m. on January 17, 1961. They took him across town to a police station and locked him in a room. Between 7:30 and 8:00 p. m. he was interrogated and made a non-incriminatory statement about his whereabouts at the time of the crime. He was again locked up alone from 8:00 to about 8:45. Three officers then arrived who ha<J been called for the admitted purpose of questioning him. Questioning was resumed, and a “ ‘threshold’ ” confession was obtained at 8:50. From 9:10 to 10:50 p. m. it was reduced to writing. He was then “booked”. He was not brought before a magistrate until 10:00 a. m. the next day.
There was unnecessary delay. As long ago as 1946 we said that “both by law and practice” a prisoner may be brought before a committing magistrate “at any hour.” Akowskey v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 354, 158 F.2d 649, 650. We recently said: “[N]ot only a magistrate, but an Assistant United States Attorney, are, and were * * * available to the police twenty-four hours a day.” Jones v. United States, 113 U.S. App.D.C. 256, 307 F.2d 397, 399 (1962). Cf. Ginoza v. United States, 279 F.2d 616 (9th Cir., 1960). If because of some extraordinary circumstance no magistrate were available, it would not follow that questioning could continue. The time between arrest and confession was not, as we said it was in the Heideman case, “consumed only by the questions * * * and by the preparing of papers, booking, photographing, fingerprinting and transportation * * Heideman v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 128, 131, 259 F.2d 943, 946 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 959, 79 S.Ct. 800, 3 L.Ed. 2d 767 (1959). The delay was “of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession.” Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). Since the confessions were obtained during an unnecessary and therefore unlawful detention they should have been excluded. F.R.Crim.P. 5(a); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943). Other cases are cited in our opinion in Tatum v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. -, 313 F.2d 579. Failure to exclude the confessions was prejudicial error and the judgment must be reversed. Jones v. United States, supra.
Since there must be a new trial, we consider claims of error based on the contention that there was no evidence that appellant aided or abetted in the shooting and that, therefore, he could not be guilty of murder in the second degree. These claims must be rejected. “All those who assemble themselves together with an intent to commit a wrongful act, the execution whereof makes probable in the nature of things a crime not specifically designed, but incidental to that which was the object of the confederacy, are responsible * * * for the acts of each, if done in pursuance of, or as incidental to, the common design.” Turberville v. United States, 112 U.S.App. D.C. 400, 402-403, 303 F.2d 411, 413-414 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946, 82 S.Ct. 1596, 1607, 8 L.Ed.2d 813 (1962). The jury could reasonably regard the shooting as incidental to the common design of robbery. The court did not instruct specifically on “common purpose”, but the general instructions on aiding and abetting were adequate and counsel for Coleman did not object to them.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. Quoting 1 Wharton, Criminal Law § 258 (12th ed. 1932).
1. “A confession [made] during a period of necessary delay in arraignment is not inadmissible because that period was followed by a period of unnecessary delay.” See Lockley v. United States, 106 U.S. App.D.C. 163, at 166, 270 F.2d 915, at 918 (1959).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the race or ethnic identity of this litigant as identified in the opinion?

Choices:
not ascertained
caucasian - specific indication in opinion
black - specific indication in opinion
native american - specific indication in opinion
native american - assumed from name
asian - specific indication in opinion
asian - assumed from name
hispanic - specific indication in opinion
hispanic - assumed from name
other

Answer: 0