What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
BENNETT et al. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 7169.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Decided Feb. 27, 1939.
On Petition for Rehearing and Stay of Mandate May 3, 1939.
Harry T. Whelan and W. B. O'Con-nell, both of Washington, D. C., for appellants.
David A. Pine, U. S. Atty., and William Hitz, Jr., and Charles B. Murray, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Washington, D. C.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and STEPHENS and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.
EDGERTON, Associate Justice.
Appellants were convicted of the felony of transporting stolen goods in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 415, 18 U.S.C.A. § 415.
Officers seated in a Washington restaurant saw Mr. Strohecker, a real estate dealer, stop at a booth in which defendants were seated, saw defendant James Bennett hand articles of jewelry to Stro-hecker, and saw Strohecker examine them. The officers did not know defendants, but apparently knew Strohecker. Strohecker presently told the officers that he did not know defendants either; that “they” were from New York, and had a lot of jewelry which they had offered to sell him; that the price was ridiculous, and that he therefore believed it was “hot.” Within the next few days the officers, without a warrant, twice arrested defendant Eula Mae Bennett. After the first arrest she was searched. The second arrest was in her hotel room, which she opened to admit the officers, On both occasions jewelry which later proved to be stolen was found in her possession.
Appellants dispute the sufficiency of the evidence, and also assign as error “admitting in evidence property illegally seized.” We need not consider whether the seizures were illegal, for appellants should have asserted their supposed rights in that regard before trial. The Supreme Court has held that “except where there has - been no opportunity to present the matter in. advance of trial * * * a court, when engaged in trying a criminal case, will not take notice of the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of papers or other articles of personal property, which are material and properly offered in evidence. * * * ” It will not “halt in the orderly progress of a cause and consider incidentally a question which has happened to cross the path of such litigation and which is wholly independent of it. In other words, in order to raise the question of illegal seizure, and an absence of probable cause in that seizure, the defendants should have moved to have the whisky and other liquor returned to them as their property and as not subject to seizure or use as evidence.” Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 111, 112, 48 S.Ct. 77, 79, 72 L.Ed. 186.
Appellants contend there is .no proof that a bracelet stolen in Connecticut was transported, as charged, from New York. They drove fsom New York to Washington, and then had the bracelet in Washington. It may be inferred that they .brought it from New York, and not on some possible previous trip from Connecticut to Washington through Vermont, Canada, and Pennsylvania, or by sea. There is no basis for appellant’s contention- that Section 415 is limited to transportation for commercial purposes.
The evidence against James Bennett was so strong that we do not discuss it. It pointed to him not only as transporter but as thief. He was seen close to the time and place of one of the thefts, and the circumstances of the several thefts were ' strikingly similar. The evidence against Eula Mae Bennett was somewhat •less strong, 'but the following testimony tended to fasten both interstate transportation and guilty knowledge upon her. -She lived with James, in New York, as his wife. She made the trip to Washington with him in his car. In Washington he offered stolen jewelry for sale, in her presence, at .prices which suggested that it was “hot.” A ring and wrist watch stolen in New York were in her possession in Washington. She gave the- police conflicting explanations of her possession of the ring; it was given her by Bennett, and it was given her by a doctor. She exercised her right to refuse to testify, and so the jury had the testimony of the police on this point without contradiction or explanation. Bennett gave, her the ring, at least, before the trip to Washington. When he gave it to her, he laid several rings on a table and she selected that one as the prettiest of the lot. The trip to Washington was followed almost immediately by the transaction in the restaurant and the interviews with the police. What she knew then, she probably knew during the journey. It is probable that if Eula Mae had not previously, and therefore during the trip, been in James’s confidence, he would not have offered the stolen jewelry for sale, at “hot” prices, in her presence. In our opinion the evidence as a whole justified the jury in finding beyond reasonable doubt that Eula Mae Bennett, as well as James Bennett, transported stolen articles in interstate commerce, knowing them to have been stolen.
According to police testimony Eula Mae Bennett was arrested, without a warrant, for “investigation,” and was held on that, “charge” for “quite some time.” Investigation is not .a charge. It may be that the police had probable cause to believe her guilty of a specific felony, and that her arrest was therefore lawful: we do not find it necessary to pass upon that point; But we deem this an appropriate time to say that confinement without a charge violates one of the important rights of the citizen.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 3