What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WOO FOO WONG v. WIXON.
No. 9629.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Feb. 14, 1941.
Walter F. Lynch, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Atty., Robert B. McMillan and Louis R. Mercado, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of San Francisco, Cal. (A. J. Phelan, of San Francisco, Cal., U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, on the brief), for appellee.
Before WILBUR, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
The appeal is from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Claiming to be the son of a native-born citizen, appellant, a Chinese, applied for admission at the port of San Francisco. To the immigrant inspector who met him on board ship he presented an affidavit, executed by the alleged father, stating that appellant was his son. Apparently not being satisfied that appellant was “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land” the inspector ordered his temporary removal to the immigration, station for examination by a Board of Special Inquiry. The Board, after a hearing, found that appellant had not proved the relationship alleged and ordered his exclusion. An appeal was made to the Secretary of Labor, and on recommendation of the Board of Review the appeal was dismissed and appellant held for deportation.
The sole contention here relates to what is claimed to be faulty procedure leading up to the exclusion order. It is said that the statute requires “a preliminary examination” in addition to the usual inspection aboard ship, and that such an examination is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the Board of Special Inquiry. The point was not made during the progress of the proceeding before the immigration authorities, although that was the time and place to complain if appellant felt he had been in any way prejudiced. Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721.
In any event the point has no merit. The Immigration Act of 1917, § 15, provides, in part, that “Upon the arrival at a port of the United States of any vessel bringing aliens it shall be the duty of the proper immigration officials to go or send competent assistants to the vessel and there inspect all such aliens, or said immigration officials may order a temporary removal of such aliens for examination at a designated time or place, but such temporary removal shall not be considered a landing * * It is provided by § 16 that “every alien who may not appear to the examining immigrant inspector at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for examination in relation thereto by a board of special inquiry.” And § 17 provides that the Board of Special Inquiry “shall have authority to determine whether an alien who has been duly held shall be allowed to land or shall be deported.” 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 152, 153.
We see nothing wrong with the procedure followed here. The immigration authorities pursued the course outlined by the statute.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0