What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
THE CABO VILLANO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 7, 1927.)
No. 197.
1. Shipping <@=>131 — Damages for misdelivery is value of goods when and where they should have been delivered, less freight and customs duties.
Measure of damages for misdelivery of shipment is same at common law and in admiralty, and, in absence of special circumstances or valid limitation, is the market value of the goods at time when and place where they should have been delivered, less freight and customs duties.
2. Shipping <@=>132(5) — On appeal from decree for. damages for misdelivery of shipment, libel must make out case by fair preponderance of evidence.
On appeal from decree in suit in admiralty for wrongful delivery of shipment, appellate court is trier of facts, and libelant must make out his case by fair preponderance of credible evidence.
3. Shipping <@=>131 — In absence of proof of market value, damages for misdelivery will be based on agreed selling price to consignee, with interest.'
Where libelant, suing for wrongful delivery of shipment of automobiles, failed to prove market value at time and place delivery should have been made, damages for misdelivery will be allowed on basis of agreed price at which they were to be sold to consignee, with interest.
4. Damages <@=>67 — In admiralty, interest is discretionary.
In admiralty, allowance of interest is discretionary.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.
Suit by the Moline Plow Company, Inc., against the steamship Cabo Villano, her engines, etc.; Ybarra & Co., claimant. Decree for libelant (14 F.[2d] 978), and claimant appeals. Decree modified.
The libel counts on the wrongful delivery by the owners of steamship of certain Stephens automobiles shipped by libelant’s assignor to Seville, Spain, under order bills of lading. Intent was to sell the motor cars to one. Belmonte, of Seville, but he was to get the machines only on paying.the drafts attached to the hills of lading, both of which documents went through a New York bank to its correspondent in Seville.
For reasons now immaterial, the carrier did not deliver against surrendered bills of lading. Belmonte did not pay the drafts, and the cars were obtained by a stranger to the contract, on or about December 11, 1920.
Thereupon the shipper, through the Spanish hank, sued Belmonte in Spain on the drafts, and was ultimately defeated.
During this litigation no demand seems to have been made upon the carrier, but on or about November 22, 1923, the Spanish bank did exhibit to the carrier in Seville the bills of lading, and demand the cars, which, as is now admitted, had long before been misdelivered.
The cars not being forthcoming, this suit was begun in January, 1924. Libelant had decree, and the only matter now assigned for error is that the court below erred in assessing the damages.
Barnes, McKenna & Halstead, of New York City (Bernard C. McKenna, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Richards & Affeld, of New York City (Dickinson W. Richards and Joseph W. Zeller, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before HOUGH, MANTON, and SWAN, Circuit Judges.
HOUGH, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). It is now admitted that claimant must make libelant whole for the loss inflicted by the breach of the contract of carriage. To denounce the carrier’s act or omission as a conversion is probably accurate in terms of common law, but in the admiralty is only calling had names.
But the rules of law are the same in both jurisdictions, and are set forth in Scrutton, Bills of Lading, p. 439, and Carver (6th Ed.) § 721, viz.: “In the absence of special circumstances” or valid limitation, damages for nondelivery are “the market value of the goods” when and where they should have been delivered, less whatever the cargo owner would have been obliged to pay to get them; e. g., freight and/or customs duties. U. S. Willow, etc., Co. v. Compagnie Generale (C. C. A.) 271 F. 184. On the main point see Downing v. Outerbridge (C. C. A.) 79 F. 931; The St. Johns N. F. (C. C. A.) 280 F. 553, affirmed St. Johns N. F. Shipping Corp. v. S. A. Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio De Janeiro, 263 U. S. 119, 44 S. Ct. 30, 68 L. Ed. 201.
In the court below, libelant.offered evidence by commission to show a market value for Stephens cars in Seville and its neighborhood in 1920; claimant took no testimony on this point. Of libelant’s two “expert” Spanish witnesses, one thought the three lost ears had a market value of 45,000 pesetas, and the other put it as “about 75,000 pesetas purchase price, and about 90,000 pesetas selling price.” The District Court rejected the first witness, and accepted the lower figures of the second man, which at the then current rate of exchange gave damages of $9,750, or nearly $2,-500 more than libelant was willing to sell the cars for to Belmonte, with freight and insurance added.
We need not now inquire whether the fact that the losing cargo owner is a vendor, who fixed the price at which he was willing to part with his own goods, does or should introduce a “special circumstance” into the general rule above quoted, for we think the special circumstance shown is that there was no market value for Stephens cars in or near Seville at the time of misdelivery.
The ease is quite like Mallory v. Mitchell (C. C. A.) 291 P. 53, with this important difference: That ease was an action at law, where the findings of fact below could only be assailed by denying the competency, relevancy, or materiality of the evidence; while this is a suit in admiralty, where we are the triers of facts, and the libelant must make out his case by a fair preponderance of credible testimony.
We are of opinion that the witnesses as to a market for these cars proved, if they proved anything, that no market existed at the requisite time and place. A detailed discussion of their evidence would be of no utility.
Result is that there is no proof of value, except that fixed by the original parties to the intended sale as the amount of money for which the vendor was willing to part with its motor ears in Seville, which is agreed upon as $7,363.66.
While interest in admiralty is discretionary, we are not disposed to refuse libelant interest during tbe time spent in pursuing illusory remedies in Spain.
Let the decree be modified, by awarding as damages $7,363.66, with interest from date of misdelivery, December 11, 1920. Appellant will recover the costs of appeal; costs below will remain undisturbed. Mandate will issue accordingly.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1