What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Florence QUEEN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 18035.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 20, 1964.
Decided June 29, 1964.
Mr. William B. Bryant (appointed by this court), Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. David Epstein, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Victor W. Caputy, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Bajzelon, Chief Judge, and Fahy and Wright, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (decided May 18, 1964) on review of a conviction of a federal offense, secured in part by the admission at trial of incriminating statements of the petitioner, the accused, the Court held that his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment had been violated by the admission of the statements:
“We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used j against him at his trial evidence of his own incrimininating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.”
377 U.S. at 206, 84 S.Ct. at 1203.
The opinion states that the most elemental concepts of due process of law contemplate that an indictment be followed by trial in a courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of the law. The Court contrasted these elemental concepts of due process with the use at trial of incriminating statements obtained after indictment and prior to trial in such extra-judicial proceedings as secret interrogation by the police.
In the present case also the convictions were obtained by use at trial of self-incriminating statements of the accused elicited by extra-judicial secret police interrogation prior to trial. It is true appellant had not been indicted; but other circumstances present in this case compel the same result as in Mas-siah. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 S.Ct. 1758. These circumstances are as follows:
Appellant had been arrested March 14 and taken the next day before a United States Commissioner. He admitted her to bail and continued the proceedings to allow her to obtain counsel, as she requested opportunity to do. On the continued date, March 28, she reappeared, as of course she was required to do, at the offices of the Commissioner, but without counsel. The police officer who had arrested her approached her in the witness room where she was awaiting appearance before the Commissioner. With two other officers he escorted her into another room, he says with her assent, to be questioned, alone with the officers. He also said he advised her of her right not to make a statement and that if she did so it might be used against her. He testified, however, that he knew she had asked for the continuance to obtain a lawyer, and he asked her if she had obtained counsel, to which she replied either that she had obtained a lawyer, was in the process of obtaining one, or was going to do so. He was not sure which of these answers she gave. He said he talked to her to try to get to the truth of the matters involved in the charge: “I didn’t feel that she had told me the truth on the 14th,” the date of the arrest, “so I wanted to talk to her on this occasion to find out the whole truth if I could.”
In the course of this secret interrogation, in the absence of counsel, and during the continuance granted for the very purpose of enabling counsel to be obtained, the self-incriminating statements were elicited. The result of this intervention by the officers was to frustrate the right of the accused to have the assistance of counsel until by reason of these extra-judicial proceedings such assistance would be rendered fruitless if the statements thus obtained could be used to convict. For this reason, and notwithstanding the absence of an indictment, the case clearly comes within the reasoning which led to the exclusion of the evidence in Massiah and Escobedo. And see Ricks v. United States, 118 U.S. App.D.C.-, 334 F.2d 964.
Reversed and remanded.
. She had been so advised by the Commissioner on the 15th.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0