What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON et al. v. RILEY et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
February 17, 1927.)
No. 4890.
I. Master and servant <@=»286(I7) — Negligence in failing to provide safe place for em- - ployee, injured when pipe supporting platform parted, held for jury.
In suit against employers for alleged negligence in failing to provide safe place for employee, who was killed when pipe supporting platform, suspended 35 feet above bridge, while driving rivets in steel superstructure, parted and precipitated employee to floor, evidence held sufficient to require submission of case to jury.
2. Master and servant <@=>125(6) — Employer is chargeable with knowledge disclosed by ordinary care as to safety of place.
Employer is chargeable with knowledge aS to safety of place constructed for employee to work as ordinary care would have disclosed.
3. Master and servant <@=>286(3) — Whether employer used ordinary care in determining safety of place is question for jury.
Ordinary care of employer in determining safety of place constructed for. employee to work is to be measured by risk involved, and is question of fact for jury, except where there is no room for fair difference of opinion among reasonable men.
Foster, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi; Edwin R. Holmes, Judge.
Suit by Mrs. G. A. Davidson and others against S. J. Riley and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error.
Reversed, and remanded for a new trial.
S. L. Gwin and C. B. Snow, both of Greenwood, Miss., and P. E. Everett and J. M. Forman, both of Indianola, Miss., for plaintiffs in error.
R. C. McBee, of Greenwood, Miss., and Grover McCormick, of Memphis, Tenn., for defendants in error.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and FOSTER, Circuit Judges.
BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit against the employers of Earl Davidson to recover damages for his death, which it is alleged was caused by their negligent failure to provide him a safe place to work. At the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial court ruled that it was insufficient to prove the negligence alleged, and directed a verdict for defendants. Plaintiffs assign error, and seek to reverse the judgment entered on that verdict, upon the ground that the evidence submitted by them was sufficient, prima facie and unexplained, to sustain a verdict and judgment in their favor.
Defendants had a contract for the construction of a highway bridge aeross the Yazoo river. In order to provide a place for workmen to stand while they were’ engaged in driving rivets in the steel superstructure, a platform was swung from one side of the bridge to the other, about 35 feet above the floor, and made fast by ropes attached at eaeh end to overhead beams on eaeh side of the bridge. The sills or supports of the platform consisted of 3-ineh iron pipe plaeed about 8 feet apart, upon which plank were laid crosswise, and held in place-by pegs or pins on both sides of eaeh pipe. The platform was 32 feet long, and at least one of the pipes used as a sill or support was made up of two pieces, which were-joined together, at or near the middle, by cutting threads in the ends and screwing them into a cuff or .sleeve. It was built under the supervision of defendants, and had been in use for about 10 days, during which time three riveters had been working on eaeh side-of the bridge and at each end of the platform. The bridge was 28 feet wide, so that the ropes which held up the platform were tied to it 2 feet away from the ends, thus making an unsupported span of 28 feet.
Davidson, the deceased, took the place of one' of the riveters on the morning of his-death. While he and the other two members-of his crew were preparing to move the platform, and after they had taken out the pegs or pins which held the planks in position, Davidson approached the middle portion of the platform, and when he did so the threads which held the two joints of pipe, together pulled out and the pipe sagged down. As a consequence Davidson was precipitated to the floor of the bridge, and then into the river, a total distance of about 70 feet, and was instantly killed. It was admitted that more than six men had been on the platform during the period it- had been in-use, but not that they- had been any distance-away from the ends,1 which were supported by the ropes tied to the overhead beams, and one of the riveters, who testified for plaintiffs, on cross-examination, gave it as his opinion, based on experience, that 3-inch pipe was strong enough to make the platform safe.
In our opinion there was sufficient evidence, -in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by defendants, to require the submission of the easeMo the jury. Defendants-undertook the construction of the platform, and the question does not arise whether they would be liable if they had put into use a platform made by a reliable manufacturer and furnished ready for use, or had imposed upon their employees the duty of providing a platform or other appliance or instrumentality. Defendants are chargeable with such knowledge as ordinary eare- would have disclosed. Lahatt on Master and Servant, § 1054. Ordinary care is to be measured by the risk involved, and is a question .of fact for the -jury, except where there is no room for a fair difference of opinion among reasonable men. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485.
In this case, the jury could reasonably have arrived at the conclusion that it was the duty of defendants to make a test, so as to ascertain the strength of the jointed pipe which gave way. 20 R. C. L. 34. Whether a single uncut piece of pipe was strong enough would depend in great degree on its length. Twenty-eight feet is a long span, and it could reasonably have been concluded by the jury that the span was too long to be considered safe without a test, or that the possible weakening of the pipe by the cutting of threads would, in the judgment of a prudent employer, have rendered a test necessary. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that an employer, who puts a jointed pipe into use, without testing it, as a support for the weight of employees who are ■required to work at a dangerous height, fails to exercise ordinary care and diligence. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, § 197. The fact that the ends of the platform had previously held up a greater weight is of no -.significance, for ' they were supported by ropes attached to the overhead beams, and does not tend to support the inference that the middle of the jointed pipe had been subjected to any substantial test. There was no evidence of any other test, and certainly no adequate test had been made, for the inevitable result would have been that the pipe would have given way.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
ROSTER, Circuit Judge, dissents.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99