What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Harry LEVEY and Leona Levey, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. FIRST VIRGINIA BANK, Defendant-Appellant, and Arthur Rupley, IV, Defendant.
No. 87-1546.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 3, 1988.
Decided April 25, 1988.
Robert Louis Deichmeister (Fagelson, Schonberger, Payne & Arthur on brief), for defendant-appellant.
Charles M. Rust-Tierney (Philip J. Hirschkop, Bernard J. DiMuro, Hirschkop & Associates on brief), for plaintiffs-appel-lees.
Before HALL and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
ERVIN, Circuit Judge:
The Levey’s, judgment creditors of Arthur Rupley, IV, sought to satisfy their judgment by attacking a spendthrift trust set up for Rupley by his grandmother. The district court ruled that the corpus of the trust is protected against Rupley’s creditors; however, the income from the trust is not so protected. The Trustee appeals the decision as it pertains to the income. Finding no error below, we affirm.
I.
Arthur Rupley, IV, borrowed and refused to pay $50,000.00 from Harry and Leona Levey in 1981. Understandably concerned, the Leveys filed suit and obtained judgment in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County against him for the principal amount owed, consequential damages, interest and attorneys fees. Feeling frustrated in their attempts to find some asset upon which to satisfy their judgment, the Leveys attacked a trust created for Rupley.
Rupley is the sole beneficiary of a trust created on April 6, 1979, by Mildred G. Rupley, his grandmother. The Trustee of the trust is First Virginia Bank, appellant herein. The trust agreement contains separate provisions relating to the income generated by the trust and the corpus of the trust. As to the income, Article 3(a) of the agreement provides: “Until grantor’s grandson shall attain 40 years of age, the trust shall pay to or apply for the benefit of Grantor’s grandson in quarterly or more frequent installments, all of the net income arising from said trust.” Jt.App. at 16. Article 3(b) restricts the payment of the principal of the trust as follows: “Until Grantor’s grandson attains the age of 40, the trustee shall pay to or expend for the benefit of Grantor’s grandson so much of the principal hereof as the trustee, in its sole discretion, shall deem necessary for the support, maintenance, general welfare and education of the Grantor’s grandson.” Id. Based on this language, the district court split the income from the corpus, and ruled that the income is vulnerable to creditors. Upon review, we can find no error in this decision.
II.
Spendthrift trusts are permitted in Virginia under section 55-19 of the Virginia Code. That provision reads in pertinent part:
§ 55-19. Estates in trust subject to debts of beneficiaries; exception for spendthrift trust.
Estates of every kind holden or possessed in trust shall be subject to the debts and charges of the persons to whose use or to whose benefit they are holden or possessed, as they would be if those persons owned the like interest in the things holden or possessed as in the uses of trusts thereof; but any such estate, not exceeding $500,000.00 in actual value may be holden or possessed in trust upon condition that the corpus thereof and income therefrom, or either of them, shall be applied by the trustee to the support and maintenance of the beneficiaries without being subject to their liabilities or the alienation by them, but no such trust shall operate to the prejudice of any existing creditor of the creator of such trust.
The statutory language protects the corpus of a spendthrift trust, the income of a trust, or both, from the beneficiaries’ creditors only if the monies of the trust are to be used for the support and maintenance of the beneficiary. Alderman v. Virginia Trust Co., 181 Va. 497, 25 S.E.2d 333, 340 (1943).
It is clear from a reading of the trust agreement involved in this case that the income monies are not disbursed only for the support and maintenance of Rupley. Rather, the income is to be paid to him without any exercise of discretion on the part of the bank as Trustee: “[T]he trust shall pay ... all of the net income” to Rupley. In this regard, the cases cited by the bank for the proposition that the trust is protected as a spendthrift trust are distinguishable. Each of the cases cited by the bank holds that for an entire trust to be invulnerable to creditors, both the income and the corpus of the trust can be paid to the beneficiary only for support and maintenance. Alderman, 25 S.E.2d at 342; Sheridan v. Krause, 161 Va. 873, 172 S.E. 508 (1934); Rountree v. Lane, 155 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.1946); and In re Hersch, 57 B.R. 667 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1986). In this case, the income of the trust is unprotected.
The bank argues that language apart from that found in Article 3 sections (a) and (b) supplies the missing language that the income is to be used for Rupley’s support and maintenance. The bank refers us to the language found in Article 3(f):
“To the full extent allowed by law, any principal or income payable by the trustee under this agreement shall not be pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated, assigned, transferred or sold or in any manner whatsoever accelerated nor shall any principal or income in any manner be subject to or liable in the hands of the trustee for the debts, contracts, obligations, liabilities, or engagements of any beneficiary or be subject to any assignment, or any other voluntary or involuntary alienation or disposition.
Jt.App. at 17. This language from Article 3(f) does not evidence an intent by the settlor to make the income payable to Rupley only as his support and maintenance needs require; rather, it speaks to the ability of Rupley to alienate the principal or income from the trust. Under Virginia law, a spendthrift trust has three defining characteristics: First, the trust must provide for the support and maintenance of its beneficiary; second, the settlor must intend to protect the trust from the beneficiary’s creditors; and third, the settlor must intend to prevent the beneficiary’s voluntary or involuntary alienation of trust property. In re Hersch, 57 B.R. at 668-69. Article 3(f) speaks to the third requirement of a spendthrift trust, not the first. As such, we conclude that the income of the trust is not limited to the support and maintenance of Rupley and is therefore unprotected as against creditors like the Leveys.
The statute and the case law from Virginia contemplate that either or both the income and the corpus of a trust can be denominated “spendthrift” if all requisite elements are present. In this case the corpus is so protected, the income is not. The district court correctly ruled that the income from the trust is subject to the judgment creditors’ claim.
AFFIRMED.
. Because we resolve the case favorably toward the Leveys, we need not address their further argument that the Trustee is equitably estopped from denying their claim.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1