What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases.

Opinion:
MULCAHEY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, v. CATALANOTTE.
No. 435.
Argued March 27, 1957.
Decided June 3, 1957.
Roger D. Fisher argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and J. F. Bishop.
Louis M. Hopping argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, ante, p. 685, and presents similar questions. Respondent, an alien who entered the United States in 1920 for permanent residence, was convicted in 1925 of .a federal offense relating to illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. At that time there was no statute making that offense a ground for deportation. He was taken into custody in May, 1953, and, after administrative proceedings, was ordered deported under §241 (a) (11) and (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provides, inter alia, for the deportation of any alien “. . . who at any time has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs .
Respondent petitioned the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court, after hearing, denied the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed, 236 F. 2d 955, holding — principally on the basis of its earlier decision in United States v. Kershner, 228 F. 2d 142, this day reversed by us, sub nom. Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, ante, p. 685 — that inasmuch as respondent’s conviction in 1925 of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs was not a ground for deportation prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, respondent had a “status” of nondeportability which was preserved to him by the savings clause in § 405 (a) of that Act. We granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 915.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, see ante, p. 690.]
As we have said in Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, ante, p. 685, § 405 (a) by its own terms does not apply to situations “otherwise specifically provided” for in the Act. Section 241 (a) (11) and §241 (d) specifically provide for the deportation of an alien notwithstanding that the offense for which he is being deported occurred prior to the 1952 Act. Section 241 (a) (11) makes an alien deportable if he has “at any time” been convicted of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. And §241 (d) makes §241 (a) (11) applicable to all aliens covered thereby “notwithstanding . . . that the facts . . . occurred prior to the date of enactment of this Act.” It seems to us indisputable, therefore, that Congress was legislating retrospectively, as it may do, to cover offenses of the kind here involved. The case is, therefore, “otherwise specifically provided” for within the meaning of § 405 (a). The Court of Appeals was in error in holding to the contrary, and its judgment is
Reversed.
The sale of a quantity of cocaine hydrochloride and possession and purchase of 385 grains thereof.
66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251.
Section 241 (a) (11) and (d) of the Immigration and Nationality-Act of 1952 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who—
“(11) is, or hereafter at any time after entry has been, a narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of a violation of any law or regulation relating to the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs ....
“(d) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, the provisions of this section shall be applicable to all aliens belonging to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a), notwithstanding . . . (2) that the facts, by reason of which any such alien belongs to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a), occurred prior to the date of enactment of this Act.”
66 Stat. 280, 8 U. S. C. § 1101, Note. Section 405, so far as here material, provides “Nothing contained in this Act, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, shall be construed to affect . . . any status . . . existing, at the time this Act shall take effect ...”
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585; Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32; United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 521; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580; Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302.

Question: What is the ideological direction of the decision?

Choices:
Conservative
Liberal
Unspeciﬁable

Answer: 0