What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, for the Use and Benefit of MOSHER STEEL COMPANY, and Mosher Steel Company, Plaintiffs, v. The FLUOR CORPORATION, Ltd., Defendant-Appellee, American Export Industries, Inc., Defendant-Appellant, et al.
No. 364, Docket 35091.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Dec. 15, 1970.
Decided Dec. 24, 1970.
Joseph Lotterman, New York City, for defendant-appellant.
Harold C. Warnock, Tucson, Ariz. (Bilby, Thompson, Shoenhair & War-nock, Tucson, Ariz., Raymond L. Falls, Jr., Cahill, Gordon, Sonnett, Reindel & Ohl, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Before MOORE, KAUFMAN and HAYS, Circuit Judges.
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge:
This complicated controversy, involving three tiers of contractors and subcontractors on a federal missile site construction project in Arizona, and centering around a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, was brought eastward when the appellee Fluor Corporation, Ltd. (“Fluor”) registered that judgment in the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
The appellant American Export Industries, Inc. (“AEI”) against whom execution was issued, moved for relief from the judgment upon the ground that it had already been satisfied, released and discharged. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 60(b) (5). AEI asks us to rule that Judge Metzner abused his discretion in holding that the Arizona district court was a more suitable forum to resolve the question, and accordingly denied AEI’s motion without prejudice to its presentation in the Arizona Court. Finding that the court below acted well within its discretion, we affirm.
A brief reference to the background may be helpful in viewing this conflict in perspective. Because of difficulties in the construction of a missile site near Tucson, Arizona in 1961-1962, Mosher Steel Co. (“Mosher”), a second-tier subcontractor, was awarded a judgment in excess of $200,000 against AEI (another second-tier subcontractor), the Union Tank Car Co. (“Union”) (a first-tier subcontractor), Fluor (the general contractor), and the sureties on Fluor’s Miller Act payment bond. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a, 270b. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the judgment was affirmed in all respects having any relevancy to this appeal. Fluor Corp. v. United States ex rel. Mosher Steel Co., 405 F.2d 823 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014, 89 S.Ct. 1632, 23 L.Ed.2d 40 (1969).
Soon after the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Fluor moved before the Arizona district court for an order decreeing that, in the event that Mosher satisfied its judgment against Fluor, Fluor would have a right to recover from both Union and AEI. AEI opposed this motion on a number of grounds. It contended among other things that the Mosher judgment would be extinguished for all purposes by Fluor’s payment, that Fluor was bound by the terms of a settlement between AEI and Union, and that Arizona law denied Fluor a right of subrogation against AEI. The Arizona district court denied Fluor’s motion without opinion.
Soon thereafter, Fluor apparently paid the Mosher judgment, and received in return an assignment of Mosher’s rights thereunder against AEI and the Union. Fluor then proceeded to register that judgment in the Southern District of New York. When execution was levied, AEI brought its Rule 60(b) (5) motion for relief, urging the same arguments it had presented — apparently successfully —to the Arizona district court in opposition to Fluor’s post-judgment motion.
At the threshold we address ourselves to a question the parties have not considered: whether the district court’s order is appealable. The question is apparently a novel one. Although in practical effect the denial of AEI's motion was similar to a nonappealable transfer of the case to another district, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), we believe that the more compelling analogy is to the ancient remedy of dismissal upon the grounds of forum non conveniens, which is appealable, see Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851, 71 S.Ct. 79, 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950); 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶110.13[6].
The powers of a district court to grant relief against a judgment registered there under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 have not been comprehensively delineated. That it may grant relief in certain circumstances seems clear. Hadden v. Rumsey Prods., 196 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1952); 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice H60.28[l]. New would argue, however, that the court of registration lacks discretion in appropriate circumstances to refer the parties to the court which rendered judgment. Again, the analogy to the federal courts’ traditional forum non conveniens procedures is persuasive. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). Here, AEI’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b) (5) raised virtually the same issues in the Southern District of New York as the District Court of Arizona had already considered in Fluor’s post-judgment motion. Comity among the district courts would obviously be furthered if these issues were referred back to the court which originally considered them. Moreover, because the Arizona court was already familiar with the issues, the interests of efficient judicial administration commend that court as an eminently suitable forum for further related proceedings.
Affirmed.
. The transfer of an action to a more convenient distinct pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) has largely supplanted dismissal upon grounds of forum non con-veniens. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 75 S.Ct. 544, 99 L.Ed. 789 (1955).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1