What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Betty L. PRICE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 83-5932.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 19, 1985.
Decided July 11, 1985.
John W. Peck, Senior Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.
Nan Shelby Calloway, argued, Bowling Green, Ky., Mark D. Pierce, Saladino, Carneal & Pierce, Paducah, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant.
Ronald E. Meredith, U.S. Atty., David T. Gray, James Kerr, argued, Louisville, Ky., for defendant-appellee.
Before ENGEL and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Betty L. Price appeals from the summary judgment granted by United States Magistrate W. David King of the Western District of Kentucky which affirmed the denial by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) of widow’s insurance benefits for Price.
On January 10, 1980, Price filed an application for widow's insurance benefits based upon disability pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(e). Price claimed she was disabled as a result of high blood pressure, obesity, a ventral hernia, uterine prolapse, and cystocele. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Price then requested a de novo hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (AU).
On August 29, 1981, the AU held that claimant Price was not under a disability. The AU found that Price established the existence of obesity, hypertension with cardiac decompensation, uterine prolapse, ventral hernia, and cystocele. Nevertheless, he concluded that these impairments were not equivalent in severity and duration to any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Appendix 1 of Subpart P which follows section 404.1599. The AU’s decision became the final decision of the Secretary when the Appeals Council approved the decision on October 8, 1981.
On review of the final decision of the Secretary pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Magistrate King granted summary judgment finding substantial evidence on the record to support the AU’s decision. Magistrate King found that Price’s weight, which fluctuated between 208 and 227 pounds, did not equal or exceed the threshold weight of 236 pounds as listed in section 10.10 of 20 C.F.R. Appendix 1 of Sub-part P. In addition, Magistrate King found that Price’s obesity and ventral hernia were medically remediable by Price losing weight. Price appeals contending that there is not substantial evidence on the record to support the finding that she was not disabled.
Section 402(e) of the Social Security Act provides disability benefits to a widow if (1) she is the widow of a wage earner who died fully insured, (2) she is between the ages of fifty and sixty, (3) she is disabled, and (4) her disability is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. A widow is required to satisfy a stricter standard of disability than a wage earner. Wokojance v. Weinberger, 513 F.2d 210, 212 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 856, 96 S.Ct. 106, 46 L.Ed.2d 82 (1975). A widow is not under a disability unless “her physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a level of severity which under regulations prescribed by the Secretary is deemed to be sufficient to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Moreover, the widow’s inability to work must be based solely upon medical considerations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1577 (1984). A wage earner, on the other hand, need only show that his impairment prevents him from performing any substantial gainful activity, which can be based upon such non-medical factors as age, education and work experience. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). This stricter test of disability for widows does not deprive widows of equal protection of laws. Wokojance, 513 F.2d at 212.
Section 423(d)(2)(B) authorizes the Secretary to set standards of severity for alleged disabilities which will be deemed to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity. Reynolds v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 707 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.1983). The Secretary has exercised that authority. An individual cannot qualify for widow’s disability benefits unless specific clinical findings show that she suffers from an impairment listed in the Appendix to 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, or clinical findings show that she suffers from one or more unlisted impairments that singly or in combination are the medical equivalent of a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1578 (1984); Wokojance, 513 F.2d at 212.
Section 10.10 of 20 C.F.R. Appendix 1 of Subpart P provides that a person may be disabled because of obesity if that person’s weight is equal to or greater than an enumerated value and the person suffers from one of five additional ailments. Price asserts that her obesity was accompanied by hypertension. Section 10.10 provides that a woman who is 60 inches in height must weigh 230 pounds and have hypertension with diastolic blood pressure persistently in excess of 100mm. Price fails to meet these impairment standards.
Price’s height is at least 60 inches. There are, however, no clinical findings that Price’s weight exceeded 230 pounds. Her highest reported weight was 227 pounds on June 31, 1980; her lowest weight was 208 pounds on July 81, 1980. In addition, Price’s diastolic blood pressure varied from 130 to 90. The lower readings followed Dr. Hunt’s treatment of Price for hypertension. In short, Price has failed to meet the listed impairments.
A widow will also be considered disabled if she suffers from one or more unlisted impairments that singly or in combination are the medical equivalent of a listed impairment. The Secretary found that Price’s impairments were not equivalent in severity to any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Appendix 1 of Subpart P. The Social Security Act mandates that “[t]he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a particular conclusion. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938); Beavers v. Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.1978).
Price asserts that her obesity and hypertension in combination with her ventral hernia, uterine prolapse and cystocele is medically equivalent to a listed impairment and renders her unable to engage in any gainful activity. There is substantial evidence in the record that Price can perform some gainful activity. First, the record shows that Price is well oriented and is able to manage her own affairs. Dr. Amble reported that Price has “bright normal intelligence when compared with the norms of her age group” and “may well have the capacity for much more complex employment demands [than routine and repetitious tasks].” Joint Appendix at 81-83. Price testified that she lives alone and does her own housework. Id. at 25, 28. With respect to Price’s ailments, Dr. Bradford reported that the uterine prolapse was minimal and the cystocele was small. Id. at 75. Price testified that a very snug girdle seems to handle and control the hernia. Id. at 28, 74. Dr. Hunt, Price’s treating physician, reported that standing and bending would put more pressure on her female organs and vagina, but sitting for long periods of time would not have any effect on the hernia or cystocele. Id. at 93-94. Although not free from physical problems, Price has failed to meet the strict standards for widow’s benefits that she cannot engage in any gainful activity.
Whether Price met the strict standard for widow’s benefits is a close question. The question being close, however, persuades us that we should not disturb the findings of the AU. Although the AU’s findings of fact could have been stated with more particularity, we are not persuaded that his findings are legally insufficient. Our conclusion as to the adequacy of the findings and as to disability might well be different if claimant were a wage earner subject to the more liberal substantial gainful activity test. In our circuit, when a claimant cannot perform his previous work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to bring forth evidence of available employment compatible with claimant’s limitations. Vaughn v. Finch, 431 F.2d 997, 998 (6th Cir.1970). In these cases, more particular findings may be necessary. See Zblewski v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.1984). Price’s appeal, however, does not raise these issues, and we do not decide them. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of benefits.
. Price testified that she was 61 inches in height. Dr. Amble states in his report that she is 6OV2 inches, and Dr. Bradford states in his report that she is 60 inches in height. If Price measured 61 inches in height, she would be required to weigh 236 pounds to meet the listed weight requirement.
. Cystocele is a large protruding vaginal wall resulting from childbirth.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2