What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
George LANGE, Appellant, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 82-2461.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 28, 1983.
Decided April 1, 1983.
Herschel H. Friday, Elizabeth J. Robben, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Charles L. Honey, Prescott, Ark., for appellant.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and FAGG, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by plaintiff George Lange from the district court’s judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (Mo Pac). On appeal, Lange contends that the district court erred in permitting him to be cross-examined on payments he received from a collateral source. We affirm.
This is a diversity case arising out of a back injury Lange sustained during the course of his employment in Emmet, Arkansas. The accident occurred while Lange was opening a railroad car owned by Mo Pac. Lange brought this negligence action against Mo Pac alleging failure to maintain the railroad car in a reasonably safe condition.
On direct examination by his attorney Lange testified that he returned to work immediately after undergoing surgery for the back injury because he had to support his family and had no savings or disability income to fall back upon. The defense counsel objected to this testimony, but the trial court ruled that it was permissible to show why the plaintiff returned to work so quickly. Prior to cross-examination of Lange defense counsel obtained a ruling from the trial court that the availability of disability benefits could be shown on cross-examination. Thereafter, defense counsel elicited testimony from Lange showing that he applied for workmen’s compensation benefits several months after the surgery and received a lump sum payment retroactive to the date of the.surgery in May, 1981 at the rate of $140.00 per week.
Ordinarily payments received from collateral sources are not allowed to be introduced into evidence. Hannah v. Haskins, 612 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir.1980). However, when the plaintiff makes specific reference to collateral source payments on direct examination, the scope of permissible inquiry is set by the direct examination and the usual rules on cross-examination apply. 612 F.2d at 375. “Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.” Fed.R.Evid. 611(b). The permissible scope of cross-examination rests in the trial court’s discretion. 612 F.2d at 376.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has also approved the introduction of evidence on collateral source payments when it is relevant to some issue in the case. The payments become relevant when the plaintiff’s direct testimony misleads the jury on some issue in the case and cross-examination of the plaintiff on evidence of collateral source payments is necessary to rebut the testimony. York v. Young, 271 Ark. 266, 608 S.W.2d 20, 21-22 (Ark.1980) (In action for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision, plaintiff’s testimony that he had not repaired his truck after the collision due to lack of funds could be rebutted on cross-examination by evidence of plaintiff’s insurance coverage.).
The evidence concerning Lange’s receipt of workmen’s compensation benefits was relevant to test the credibility of plaintiff’s assertion that he had to return to work immediately after the surgery because he had no' disability income. See Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3d Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013, 88 S.Ct. 1262, 20 L.Ed.2d 162 (1968). It was also necessary to protect the full range of inquiry allowed by cross-examination, a fundamental part of the adversary system. 612 F.2d at 376. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing cross-examination of plaintiff on the issue of benefits.
Affirmed.
. The Honorable H. Franklin Waters, Chief Judge, United States District Court, Western District of Arkansas.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 0