What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Cruz RODRIGUEZ SALGADO, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 5633.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
April 29, 1960.
Cruz Rodriguez Salgado, pro se, on brief for appellant on the merits and on memorandum in opposition to motion to dismiss.
Francisco A. Gil, Jr., U. S. Atty. and Raymond L. Acosta, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Juan, P. R., for appellee on motion to dismiss.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
WOODBURY, Chief Judge.
The United States has moved to dismiss this appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denying a motion under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to correct a sentence on the ground that the appeal is wholly without merit and frivolous. There is no dispute over the facts.
In 1947 the court below gave the appellant, Cruz Rodriguez Salgado, a six months’ sentence under § 2596 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 282, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2596, on his plea of guilty to the charge of acquiring marihuana in violation of § 2593(a) id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 2593(a). In March, 1957, he pleaded guilty in the same court to each of four counts of an indictment charging him and two others, inter alia, with offenses and conspiring to commit offenses •described in part II of subchapter A of Chapter 39 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended by the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 (70 Stat. 567) 26 U.S. C.A. § 4741 et seq., punishable under § 7237 of that code, as amended, 26 U.S. C.A. § 7237. The court postponed sentence and requested a pre-sentence investigation and report by its Probation Officer and in April, 1957, when Rodriguez appeared for sentence, the United States Attorney filed an information under § 7237(c) (2) of the 1954 Code setting forth Rodriguez’ prior conviction. Rodriguez in open court admitted his identity and that he was the person previously convicted and the court below sentenced him as a second offender to 10 years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
Rodriguez Salgado’s contention that his conviction in 1947 was not for a felony but only for a minor offense that is to say, a misdemeanor, for the reason that he was then sentenced only to six months imprisonment, is obviously fallacious. In the first place, it would make no difference whether the offense for which he was sentenced in 1947 under § 2596 of the 1939 Code, which provided the punishment for violating § 2593(a) id. constituted a felony or not, for offenses punishable under § 2596 are specifically listed in § 7237(c) (1) (F) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 among the prior offenses to be counted in determining second offenses under § 7237(b) id. In the second place, the offense described in § 2593(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 made punishable by § 2596 id. as it stood in 1947, carried as maximum penalties a fine of not more than $2,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both. Thus, regardless of the sentence actually imposed, the offense constituted a felony as traditionally defined. See 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 541 and Title 18 U.S.C. § 1(1).
Rodriguez Salgado’s other contention has to do with the provision of § 4774 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4774, as amended, providing that after the effective date of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, some of which he was charged with violating “shall not apply to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico unless the Legislative Assembly of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico expressly consents thereto in the manner prescribed in the constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for the enactment of a law.”
It is not and cannot successfully be contended that Congress lacks the power to extend the provisions of its legislation for the control of traffic in narcotic drugs to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Moreno Rios v. United States, 1 Cir., 1958, 256 F.2d 68, 71. Nor is it questioned that in July, 1956, the Legislative Assembly of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in accordance with local constitutional requirements, by Joint Resolution No. 1 approved by the Governor of the Commonwealth, expressly consented to the application to Puerto Rico of the sections listed in § 4774 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The contention is that by § 4774 the Congress delegated its power to enact federal law to the Legislative Assembly of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with the result that the joint resolution of July, 1956, to become law, would have to be submitted to the President of the United States in accordance with federal constitutional requirements for the enactment of federal legislation. The contention really needs no refutation. It is enough to say that in its joint resolution the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico was not enacting federal law. Congress did that in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Puerto Rican legislature in its joint resolution only consented to the application of a federal law by grace of Congressional permission and that certainly is purely local legislation.
Rodriguez Salgado’s remaining contention that he was entitled to be present in person in the court below at a hearing on his motion under Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is refuted by the fourth paragraph of the section which provides: “A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.”
Judgment will be entered affirming the order of the District Court.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1