What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Richard DYKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Larry R. MEACHUM, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 85-1725.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Feb. 27, 1986.
Richard Dyke, pro se.
Before LOGAN, MOORE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
In accordance with 10th Cir.R. 9(e) and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a), this appeal came on for consideration on the briefs and record on appeal.
This is an appeal by a prisoner at the Lexington Correctional Center in Oklahoma, seeking review of a decision by the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissing his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as legally frivolous.
Plaintiff sought an injunction against the director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to require him to reclassify plaintiff to minimum security status at Lexington. Plaintiff alleged that before the promulgation of a new classification system he would have been eligible for reclassification after serving ten percent of his sentence. Under the new system, however, plaintiff must serve twenty percent of his sentence before he is eligible for reclassification. Plaintiff argued that the new classification system violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
To violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the new classification system “must be a penal or criminal law, retrospective, and disadvantageous to the offender because it may impose greater punishment.” Paschal v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir.1984) (footnotes omitted) (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)).
The change that defendant challenges relates to the internal administration of a prison. In a similar instance the Eighth Circuit found that a change in a prison regulation resulting in the double celling of prisoners was not an ex post facto law. See Glynn v. Auger, 678 F.2d 760, 761 (8th Cir.1982). The Augur court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 35 S.Ct. 507, 59 L.Ed. 905 (1915), in which the Court explained that the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed “to secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislative action, and not to obstruct mere alteration in conditions deemed necessary for the orderly infliction of humane punishment.” Id. at 183, 35 S.Ct. at 508. Cf. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (“The question in each [ex post facto] case, where unpleasant consequences are brought to bear upon an individual for pri- or conduct, is whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation.”). We conclude that in the absence of any showing of a punitive intent, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not bar a prison from changing the regulations governing their internal classification of prisoners. See 10th Cir.R. 17(b).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 1