What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Jack G. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, and Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Defendants-Appellees. Melva COX, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel Robert Cox, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, and Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Defendants-Appellees. Violet RICHARDSON, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph Ray Walter, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, and Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, Defendants-Appellees (two cases).
Nos. 14652-14655.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
May 28, 1962.
Schwenker, Teaford, Brothers & Bernard, Columbus, Ohio, Bernard Bernard, Columbus, Ohio, of counsel, for appellants.
Alexander, Ebinger, Wenger & Holschuh, Columbus, Ohio, John D. Holschuh, Columbus, Ohio, of counsel, for appellee.
Before CECIL and O’SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges, and BOYD, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
The defendant-appellee, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, delivered a railroad hopper car, owned by the defendant-appellee, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, to the Detroit Steel Corporation’s plant at Portsmouth, Ohio on July 20, 1957. The New York Central Railroad Company, the initiating carrier, had loaded the car with limestone and transferred it to the Baltimore & Ohio for delivery to the consignee, Detroit Steel Corporation, aforesaid. The limestone was unloaded on July 21, 1957 at Detroit Steel by its employees but the car was retained by the steel company for use within its plant area to haul slag from the “skull cracker,” where the slag had been crushed and screened, to the blast furnaces. The accident from which the four suits herein arose, occurred as the aforesaid car was thus employed on July 23, 1957. Jack G. Williams, Joseph Ray Walter and Daniel Robert Cox, employees of the Detroit Steel Corporation, were unloading the car when it tipped over on its side injuring Williams and Walter, who subsequently died from his injuries, and killing Cox instantly. Two of the suits herein were filed by the Administratrix of the estate of Joseph Ray Walter; one for the injuries sustained by him prior to his death and the other for his wrongful death. The four suits are consolidated by stipulation of the parties for the purpose of this appeal.
The plaintiff’s actions were based on the alleged negligence of the defendants in failing to properly inspect the car herein before delivering it to Detroit Steel and in supplying a defective car.
Motions for summary judgments were filed by the defendants under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. These motions were supported by interrogatories, depositions and affidavits. The facts disclosed by such interrogatories, depositions and affidavits, if not controverted, negatived any causes of action in the plaintiffs. Such facts were not controverted. The plaintiffs offered no counter affidavits or other evidence to support the allegations of their complaints, as they were satisfied to stand upon the broad allegations therein. The district court, upon the pleadings of the plaintiffs, and such interrogatories, depositions and affidavits aforesaid concluded that “no genuine issue of a material fact” was present, and therefore, the defendants were entitled to have their motions for summary judgment sustained. It is from this ruling that the plaintiffs appeal.
Nothing novel is presented in this appeal as the court has dealt on previous occasions with this identical problem in which we have sustained the action of the district courts. This court has held that where a motion for summary judgment is supported by an affidavit, which is uncontroverted, the trial court is warranted in sustaining the motion. Schaffer v. United States, 232 F.2d 632, C.A. 6th, 1956 (cases cited therein). In Appolonio v. Baxter, 217 F.2d 267, C.A. 6th, 1954, we said:
“ * * * mere formal denials or general allegations which do not show the facts in detail or with precision, are insufficient to prevent the award of summary judgment * * * ”
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in dealing with the problem in Bruce Construction Corporation v. United States for Use of Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 242 F.2d 873, 1957, said:
“ * * * when a movant makes out a convincing showing that genuine issues of fact are lacking, we require that the adversary adequately demonstrate by receivable facts that a real, not formal, controversy exists, and, of course, he does not do that by mere denial or holding back evidence.”
This statement was quoted with approval in the later case of Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 273 F.2d 572, C.A. 4th, 1960, cert. denied 362 U.S. 976, 80 S.Ct. 1060, 4 L.Ed.2d 1011.
We hold that where a moving party supports his motion for summary judgment by affidavit or other appropriate means, which are uncontroverted, a trial court is fully justified, within the purview of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in granting relief thereon. This case presents an excellent illustration of a proper application of the rule.
There being no reversible error the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1