What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
C. BREWER PUERTO RICO, INCORPORATED (Substituted for Fajardo Sugar Company), Respondent, Appellant, v. Florencio CORCHADO et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees. CENTRAL COLOSO, INC., Respondent, Appellant, v. Guillermo GABRIEL et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees. CENTRAL SOLLER, INC., Respondent, Appellant, v. Ramon COLLAZO et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees.
Nos. 5903-5905.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 6, 1962.
Decided June 11, 1962.
Gonzalo Sifre and Sifre & Ruiz-Suria, San Juan, P. R., on briefs for appellants in Nos. 5903 and 5904.
F. M. Susoni, San Juan, P. R., on brief for appellant in No. 5905.
Vincente Geigel Polanco, San Juan, P. R., on brief for appellees in Nos. 5903-5905.
Before MAGRUDER, ALDRICH and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Sitting by designation.
MAGRUDER, Circuit Judge.
These three cases involve the same point and were heard together. They relate to claims by the plaintiff employees for the statutory overtime compensation.
Since the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $5,000, this court has jurisdiction of the appeals. However, on such appeals we are admonished that we should not reverse the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in a matter of local law unless that court’s determination is “inescapably wrong” or “patently erroneous.” Sancho Bonet v. Texas Co., 308 U.S. 463, 60 S.Ct. 349, 84 L.Ed. 401 (1940); De Castro v. Board of Commissioners, 322 U.S. 451, 64 S.Ct. 1121, 88 L.Ed. 1384 (1944).
There is no doubt that, as applied to the sugar industry in Puerto Rico, both the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Commonwealth laws are applicable to some extent, but the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided these cases solely by interpreting the provisions of the local laws. No question is raised by appellants as to the correctness of the decision of the court that these cases should be governed by the local laws, either because of 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(c),. providing that the overtime provisions of the federal statute are inapplicable to employees engaged in the processing of sugar cane into sugar, or because of the provisions of 29 U.S.C.A. § 218. At any rate the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held, in judgments rendered May 17, 1961, that the cases are governed by the principles laid down in Laborde v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 81 P.R.R. 468 (1959), also decided solely on the ground of the local law.
The courts of the United States have had enough trouble with the so-called Belo type of case, perhaps due to the lack of precision by the legislature in defining what is meant in § 207(a) by “regular rate” of pay. See Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 228 F.2d 291 (C.A. 1st, 1955). We could not possibly hold that a determination by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on the matter of its local law is “inescapably wrong.”
Judgments will be entered affirming the judgments of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1