What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America v. Marvin W. THORNE, Appellant.
No. 72-1780.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 30, 1975.
Decided Dec. 17, 1975.
Michael A. Kramer, Alexandria, Va., for appellant.
James M. Hanny, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry and Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. U.S. Attys., were on the brief for appellee.
E. W. Cole, Washington, D.C., filed a brief amicus curiae.
Before TAMM and WILKEY, Circuit Judges, and LUMBARD, Senior Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Marvin W. Thorne and Jerome Fortney were charged in a seven-count indictment with two counts of armed robbery (22 D.C.Code §§ 2901, 3202), two counts of robbery (22 D.C. Code § 2901), two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (22 D.C.Code § 502), and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon (22 D.C.Code § 3214(a)), all growing out of the May 19, 1971, robbery of a gasoline station and an off-duty employee of that station who was sleeping in a nearby automobile. Appellant was tried alone 2before a jury and was convicted on all counts. The trial court, the Honorable William B. Jones presiding, sentenced appellant to a prison term of eight to twenty-four years on each of the armed robbery counts, three to ten years on each of the assault counts, and one year on the count charging possession of a dangerous weapon. Appellant raises only two claims of any substance in this appeal. First, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury with a precautionary instruction relating to “an informer’s testimony” respecting the testimony of Fortney, the government’s principal witness, rather than with an instruction relating to the testimony of an accomplice. Secondly, appellant claims that the trial court improperly sentenced him as an adult in violation of the provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010. We find no merit in either of appellant’s claims and, accordingly, we affirm his conviction on all counts.
Appellant’s argument that the court erred in denying his request for an instruction on informer’s testimony is premised on the contention that Fortney occupied the dual status of accomplice and informer. We reject this contention. The definition of “informer” upon which appellant relies was not included in the 1966 version of the Criminal Jury Instructions available to the trial judge. Even if that definition had been available, we believe that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in concluding that Fortney was more properly considered an accomplice than an informer. Moreover, we believe the comments of the trial judge and the instruction given adequátely cautioned the jurors and informed them of Fortney’s interest. During Fortney’s testimony, the court announced that
the witness Fortney has entered a plea of guilty in this court yesterday and was promised that the Government would move to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment at the time of sentence on the plea of guilty to armed robbery.
In other words, he plead guilty to armed robbery and at the time of sentence, which isn’t yet, the Government will move to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment.
Tr. 134. It was made clear to the jury that Fortney’s promise to testify was one of the conditions demanded in return for dismissal of the remaining counts against him. Counsel for appellant cross-examined Mr. Fortney concerning his motive for testifying. In addition, the court, sua sponte, then gave the following cautionary instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen, you just heard the testimony of Jerome Fortney. Jerome Fortney in law is known as an accomplice. An accomplice is anyone who knowingly and voluntarily cooperates with, aids, assists, advises or encourages another in the commission of a crime regardless of his — that is, the accomplice’s — degree of participation.
Accomplices in the commission of a crime are competent witnesses and the Government has the right to use them as a witness. The testimony of an accomplice should be received with caution and scrutinized with care. You should give it such weight as in your judgment it is fairly entitled to receive.
You should consider the motives of an accomplice in testifying and the circumstances under which his testimony is offered. You may convict a person accused of crime upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice only if you believe that the testimony of the accomplice proves the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Tr. 146-47.
Under the circumstances, we find no reversible error in the decision of the trial judge refusing to instruct the jury concerning informer’s testimony.
Appellant’s second contention, that the trial judge failed to make the requisite findings that appellant would not benefit from sentencing under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010, requires no elaborate discussion. The Supreme Court enunciated the standard by which courts are to make this determination in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). The Court held that § 5010(d) requires that, before a sentencing judge may incarcerate a youthful offender under an adult sentence, he must make a finding on the record that the offender would not benefit from sentencing under subsections (b) and (c). This finding need not be accompanied by reasons, however, because the purpose of the “no benefit” finding is designed merely to ensure that the sentencing judge was aware of the Act and that the youth offender before him was eligible for the treatment it provided. Id. at 442-43, 94 S.Ct. 3042.
The requirement of the “no benefit” finding was designed to insure that the sentencing judge exercised his discretion in choosing not to commit a youth offender to treatment under the Act. ■
Once it is clear that the sentencing judge has considered the option of the treatment under the Act and rejected it, however, no appellate review is warranted.
Id. at 443, 94 S.Ct. at 3052. The record clearly demonstrates that the trial judge met this standard and properly exercised his discretion to sentence appellant as an adult. Having made the requisite “no benefit” finding, the trial judge was under no obligation to justify further his decision not to sentence appellant under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
For these reasons, we conclude that appellant’s claims are without merit and, accordingly, we affirm.
So ordered.
. The day before appellant’s jury trial Fortney pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment (armed robbery) and was subsequently sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b). The remaining' charges against Fortney were dismissed. Apparently, appellant was offered the same disposition prior to his trial. Tr. 171; Gov’t Br. at 6 n. 7.
. The requested instruction is now embodied in Instruction No. 2.23, Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia (2d Ed. 1972), and provides in relevant part:
An informer’s testimony should be examined by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. You should scrutinize it closely to determine whether it is colored in such a way as to place guilt upon the defendant in order to further the witness’ own interest. You should (receive such testimony with suspicion and) act upon such testimony with caution.
.
He (informer) is one whose services are availed of by the Government to obtain introduction to persons suspected of violating the law or to obtain other similar information for pay, or for immunity from punishment, or for personal advantages or vindication.
Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, Instruction No. 2.23 (2d Ed. 1972).
. When counsel for appellant requested the instruction on informer’s testimony, the court replied:
I don’t think he is an informer here. He is an accomplice. He testified that he confessed his own guilt and he said in this case joined in this robbery with me was Thorne. He is not an informer something like in the narcotics business.
I think that this witness Fortney is probably considered an accomplice. I think that the instruction given, which is Standard 17 in the red book, with the modification that comes from the case of Steth [Stith] v. United States [124 U.S.App.D.C. 81, 361 F.2d 535 (1966)] [is appropriate] ....
Tr. 147-48.
. The court repeated this instruction during its general charge to the jury. Tr. 317-18.
. The prosecutor made the following statement in the presence of the jury:
[THE PROSECUTOR] Mr. Fortney, you remember yesterday at the time that you pleaded guilty to armed robbery—
[MR. FORTNEY] Yes, sir.
[THE PROSECUTOR] — and I stated to the Court that one of the conditions the Government set was that we were willing to let you plead to armed robbery in return for — if you plead to armed robbery we would dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment at the time of sentencing with the additional condition that you testify as you had previously agreed?
[MR. FORTNEY] Yes, sir.
Tr. 138.
. The “no benefit” requirement is articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d):
If the court shall find that the youth offender will not benefit from treatment under subsection (b) and (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
. At the time of sentencing, Judge Jones stated:
I concluded that Marvin W. Thome would not benefit from the Youth Corrections Act. I agreed with the Board of Parole and the Youth Center that he has a degree of sophistication and he has become deeply involved in streetwise activity.
I cannot believe that Mr. Thome with this degree of sophistication would benefit from the Youth Corrections Act and I do not think that those who are over there with some hope for their rehabilitation will be benefited by having Mr. Thorne in the population.
S.Tr. 9-10 (emphasis added).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0