What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Joseph JAKALSKI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 13394.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
June 1, 1962.
Joseph Jakalski, for appellant.
James P. O’Brien, U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Atty., of counsel.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, DUFFY and KNOCH, Circuit Judges.
HASTINGS, Chief Judge.
Petitioner (appellant) moved for correction of his allegedly illegal sentence under Rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. The district court denied the motion, and petitioner appeals.
Petitioner appears in this appeal pro se. He did not request appointment of counsel or request that he be permitted to present his own oral argument. Petitioner not being present at the time this case was assigned for oral argument, the Government waived argument and this appeal was ordered taken on the record and briefs without oral argument.
On February 8, 1951, a jury found petitioner guilty of killing two persons in the commission of a violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113. On February 23, 1951, petitioner was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for 199 years. Further facts concerning petitioner’s trial, conviction and sentencing may be found in two prior opinions of this court, affirming denials of relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. United States v. Jakalski, 7 Cir., 267 F.2d 609 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936, 80 S.Ct. 759, 4 L.Ed.2d 751; United States v. Jakalski, 7 Cir., 237 F.2d 503 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939, 77 S.Ct. 817, 1 L.Ed.2d 761.
It is petitioner’s contention on this appeal that his sentence is illegal because he was not given an opportunity to speak in his own behalf before sentence was imposed, as required by Rule 32(a), F.R.Cr.P. In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962), the Supreme Court had before it the question of whether a convicted prisoner who was not given the opportunity to speak in his own behalf before sentencing may attack such error collaterally under Rule 35, F.R.Cr.P. The Court held in the negative and' stated:
“[T]he narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence. The sentence in this ease was not illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect.” Id. at 430, 82 S.Ct. at 472.
Apart from not being given an opportunity to speak, petitioner makes no claim that his sentence is illegal. The decision in Hill is controlling. We hold that petitioner’s conviction and sentence are not subject to collateral attack under Rule 35, F.R.Cr.P. for failure to afford petitioner the right to address the court before sentencing under Rule 32(a), F.R.Cr.P.
The Supreme Court decided Hill on January 22, 1962. On February 19, 1962, Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962), was decided and the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hill, stating:
“For the reasons stated in Hill v. United States, ante, 368 U.S. p. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, we hold that the failure of the District Court specifically to inquire at the time of sentencing whether the petitioner personally wished to make a statement in his own behalf is not of itself an error that can be raised by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Machibroda v. United States, supra at 489, 82 S.Ct. at 511.
Assuming, without deciding, that petitioner’s Rule 35 motion may be treated as a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, he is entitled to no relief. In Hill, the Supreme Court also decided that in the absence of other aggravating circumstances a claim such as petitioner’s is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.
Petitioner attempts to show that in his case there were aggravating circumstances. " He alludes to the fact that he was not standing before the bench, although admittedly present in court, when sentence was imposed and lists the matters, of which the judge was already aware, that he would have called to the court’s attention. The record shows that at the time of sentencing petitioner was personally present in court and was represented by counsel who made an extended statement in his behalf before sentence was pronounced. There is no showing that petitioner made any attempt to address the trial court at that time. We hold that there are no aggravating circumstances in this case that would subject petitioner’s conviction and sentence to collateral attack under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 because of a violation of Rule 32(a), F.R.Cr.P.
In the court below, petitioner set forth as an independent ground for his motion the fact that he was not called to stand before the bench during sentencing. Petitioner did not urge this point on appeal. However, it is clearly not cognizable under a Rule 35 motion or a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962).
The order of the district court appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. Rule 35 provides in pertinent part:
“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”
. Rule 32(a) provides in pertinent part:“Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.”
. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 provides in pertinent part:
“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
* * * * *
“If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1