What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James Milford DUNCAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 73-3820.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 10, 1974.
George Peach Taylor, Univ. of Alabama, University, Ala., (Court-appointed) , for petitioner-appellant.
William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., Herbert H. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Birmingham, Ala., for respondent-appellee.
Before TUTTLE, WISDOM and GEE, Circuit Judges.
WISDOM, Circuit Judge:
This appeal in forma pauperis by a state prisoner is from the denial of a habeas corpus petition without a hearing and without a response by the State. The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the United States Magistrate for dismissal of the petition. The case raises the question whether time served on death row during pendency of an appeal is required to be credited for parole consideration on a life sentence imposed following reversal and remand of the sentence of death. We hold that the petitioner-appellant is entitled to the credit for the time spent in the state penitentiary pending his appeal. North Carolina v. Pearce, 1969, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; Wilson v. North Carolina, 4 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 284.
James M. Duncan, petitioner-appellant, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death on June 4, 1963. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama.. During the pendency of the appeal, he was incarcerated in the state penitentiary. On June 30, 1965, the Supreme Court reversed because of the admission of evidence illegally seized without warrant. Duncan v. State of Alabama, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So.2d 840 (1965). After remand, Duncan entered a plea of guilty, and in October 1965 was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Title 42, Section 8, Code of Alabama (1940) (Recomp.1958) provides that state prisoners serving a life sentence are eligible for consideration for parole at the expiration of ten years imprisonment. Credit for the two years served by the petitioner-appellant in the state penitentiary during the pen-dency of his appeal would have made him eligible for consideration for parole in June 1973 rather than October 1975.
The constitutional basis for crediting appeal-time detention on the sentence imposed after remand by an appellate court is the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.
Simpson v. Rice (North Carolina v. Pearce) arose in the Middle District of Alabama. The state circuit judge had vacated the prisoner’s sentence, under Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, and imposed a new sentence without giving him credit for the time served on the original sentence. Chief Judge Frank Johnson, relying on the due process clause, ruled that credit must be given for time served. 274 F.Supp. 116 (D.C. Ala., 1967). This Court affirmed, adopting Chief Judge Johnson’s opinion as its own. Simpson v. Rice, 5 Cir. 1968, 396 F.2d 499. The Supreme Court approved the requirement of credit for time served on the original sentence but based its holding on the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. Simpson v. Rice, decided sub nom United States v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
“We hold that the constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment already exacted must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense. If, upon a new trial, the defendant is acquitted, there is no way the years he spent in prison can be returned to him. But if he is reconvicted, those years can and must be returned — by subtracting them from whatever new sentence is imposed.”
395 U.S. 711, 718, 719, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2077.
In Wilson v. North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit dealt with facts very similar to those in the instant case. Wilson, convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment, was successful on appeal. He was tried again, and again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He sought credit for the time pursuing appeals and awaiting trials in determining when he could be considered for parole. North Carolina law, like Alabama law, allows a life termer to be eligible for consideration for párole “when he has served ten years of his sentence”. North Carolina authorities, apparently like Alabama authorities, consider the ten year period to run from the date of the last sentencing. The North Carolina Attorney General, like the Magistrate and Court below, argued that a life sentence cannot be reduced by any crediting of previous imprisonment since the sentence lasts for the prisoner’s natural life. Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., for the court, held, however:
“In accordance with Pearce” the Board of Paroles must include in computing the statutory period of ten years “the length of time Wilson was imprisoned from the date of his first conviction to the date his sentence began to run following affirmance of his second appeal.”
438 F.2d at 287.
We agree with Wilson v. North Carolina. The credit for time served by a life-termer will not shorten his life sentence, but it will shorten time for consideration of his parole. Whether he will be granted parole rests in the sound discretion of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Duncan may not be entitled to parole, but he is entitled to consideration for parole.
On appeal, the State now contends that Title 42, Section 8, Code of Alabama, 1940, Recompiled 1958, is interpreted by the State so as to give every state prisoner consideration for parole at any time after sentencing by unanimous vote of the Board of Pardons and Paroles; after one-third or ten years of the sentence, a simple majority can grant parole. Duncan insists that the argument runs counter to the prevailing practices of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. Moreover, if the State’s interpretation of the statute were correct, every prisoner now serving in state custody and every criminal awaiting transfer to the state penitentiary system would be able to apply for parole now and be entitled to a hearing in accordance with current rules and practices. A considerable number of hearings will be required in the immediate future if consideration is given to all prisoners as soon as they have been sentenced.
Even if Title 42, Section 8 does not preclude from consideration for parole any convict, no matter how long the sentence nor the length of time se:rved, it is a practical advantage to have to gain only two votes from the three man board, rather than to be required to secure a unanimous vote from the Board.
We have considered all of the other arguments the State has raised. We find them lacking in merit.
The judgment of dismissal is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court to require the Board of Pardons and Paroles to credit Duncan’s prison service with the time spent during imprisonment on “death row” and to grant the petitioner a hearing in the usual manner and under the same rules and regulations applying to all prisoners who have completed service of ten years on a life sentence. The propositions advanced by the State of Alabama in this Court, abuse of writ, prior consideration by the Board of this petitioner, and lack of controversy between the parties because of the yet-to-be proved fact of such prior consideration may be inquired into by the district court upon proper answer by the State injecting these issues into the ease. If the State elects to present such issues, a full hearing should be held in the district court, and the district judge should consider the propriety of appointing counsel to represent the petitioner at that hearing.
. The Alabama Parole Statute provides that “the [parole] board shall not grant a parole to any prisoner who has not served at least one-third or ten years 'of his sentence, whichever is the lesser, except hy a unanimous affirmative vote of the hoard”, (emphasis supplied). Title 42, Section 8, Code of Alabama, 1940, Recompiled 1958.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1