What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
BOYCE MOTOR LINES, INC. v. UNITED STATES.
No. 167.
Argued December 4, 1951.
Decided January 28, 1952.
Archie O. Dawson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief -were.Joseph C. Glavin and A. Harry Moore.
Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States.' With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney and Beatrice Rosenberg.
Leander I. Shelley and Russell F. Watson filed a brief for the Port of New York Authority, as amicus curiae, supporting the United States.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner is charged with the violation of a regulation promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission under 18 U. S. C. § 835. The. Regulation provides:
“Drivers of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, inflammable compressed gas, or poisonous gas shall avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings.”
The statute directs that “[w]hoever knowingly violates” the Regulation shall be subject to fine or imprisonment or both.
The indictment, in counts 1, 3, and 5, charges that petitioner on three separate occasions sent one of its trucks carrying carbon bisulphide, a dangerous and inflammable liquid, through the Holland Tunnel; a congested thoroughfare. In each instance, the truck was en route from Cascade Mills, New York, to Brooklyn, New York. On the third of these trips the load of carbon bisulphide éxploded in the tunnel and about sixty persons were injured. The indictment further states that “there were other available and more practicable routes for the transportation of said shipment, and . . . the [petitioner] well knew that tlm transportation of the shipment of carbon bisulphide . . . into the . . . Holland Tunnel was in violation of the regulations promulgated ... by the Interstate Commerce Commission . . ." There is no allegation as to the feasibility of prearrangement of routes, and petitioner is not charged with any omission in that respect.
The District Court dismissed those counts of the indictment which were based upon the Regulation in question, holding it to be invalid on the ground that the words “so far as practicable, and, where feasible” are “so vague and indefinite as to make the standard of guilt conjectural.” 90 F. Supp. 996, 998. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the Regulation, interpreted in conjunction with the statute, establishes a reasonably certain standard of conduct. 188 F. 2d 889. We granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 846.
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its violation. But few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with-which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.
In Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 (1932), these principles were applied in upholding words in a criminal statute similar to those now before us. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous court, there said:
“ ‘Shortest practicable route’ is not an expression too vague to be understood. The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary, terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. . . . The use of common experience as a glossary is necessary to meet the practical demands of legislation.”
The Regulation challenged here is the product of a long history of regulation of the transportation of explosives and inflammables.. Congress recognized the need for protecting the public against the hazards involved in transporting explosives as early as 1866. The inadequacy of the legislation then enacted led to the .passage, in 1908, of the Transportation of Explosives Act, which was later extended to cover inflammables. In accordance with that Act, the Commission in the same year issued regulations applicable to railroads. In 1934 the Commission exercised its authority under the Act to promulgate regulations governing motor trucks, including the Regulation here in question. In 1940 this Regulation was amended to substantially its present terminology. That terminology was adopted only after more than three years of study and a number of drafts. The trucking industry participated extensively in this process, making suggestions relating to drafts submitted to carriers and their organizations, and taking part in several hearings. The Regulation’s history indicates the careful consideration which was given to the difficulties involved in framing a regulation which would deal practically with this aspect of the problem presented by the necessary transportation of dangerous explosives on the highways.
The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense does miich to destroy any force in the argument that application of the Regulation, would be so unfair- that it must be held invalid. That is evident from a consideration of the effect of the requirement in this case. To sustain a conviction, the Government not only must prove that petitioner could have taken another route which was both commercially practicable and appreciably safer (in its avoidance of crowded thoroughfares, etc.) than the one it did follow. It must also be shown that petitioner knew that there was such a practicable, safer route and yet deliberately took the more dangerous route through the tunnel, or that petitioner willfully neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to .inquire into the availability of such an alternative route.
In an effort to give point to its argument, petitioner asserts that there was no practicable route its trucks might have followed which did not pass through places they were required to avoid. If it is true that in the congestion surrounding the lower Hudson there was no practicable way of crossing the River which would have avoided such points of danger to a substantially greater extent than the route taken, then petitioner has not violated the Regulation. But that is plainly a matter for proof at the trial. We are not so conversant with all the routes in that area that we may, with no. facts in the record before us, assume the allegations of the indictment to be false. We will not thus distort the judicial notice concept to strike down a regulation adopted only after much consultation with those affected and penalizing only those who knowingly violate its prohibition.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the cause to the District Court with directions to reinstate counts 1, 3, and 5 of the indictment.
Affirmed.
18 U.S.C. § 835:
'“The Interstate Commerce Commission shall formulate regulations for the safe transportation within the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States of explosives and other dangerous articles, including flammable liquids, flammable' solids, oxidizing materials, corrosive liquids, compressed gases, and poisonous substances, which shall be binding upon all common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce which transport' explosives or other dangerous articles by land, and upon all shippers making shipments of explosives or other dangerous articles via any common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by land or water.
“Such regulations Shall be in accord with the best-known practicable .means for securing safety in transit, covering the packing, marking, •loading, handling while in transit, and the precautions necessary to determine whether the material when offered is in proper condition to transport.”.
49 CFR § 197.1 (b).
“Whoever knowingly violates any such regulation shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and, if the death or bodily injury of any person results from such violation, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 18 U. S. C. § 835 (sixth paragraph).
R. 2.
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 502-503 (1925); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 393 (1932). The provision which was there challenged and upheld was concerned basically with a requirement as to distance, a requirement applying within necessary limits of practicability, just as the Regulation here challenged is concerned basically with avoidance of designated points of. danger, within like limits of practicability.
14 Stat. 81.
35 Stat. 554, as amended, 35 Stat. 1134.
41 Stat. 1444.
49 CFR, 1938, § 85.34 (b); see Regulations for Transportation of Explosives, 2111. C. C. 351, 354 (1935).
49 CFR, 1940 Supp., § 197-7.3082: “Drivers of motor vehicles transporting inflammable liquids shall-avoid, so far as practicable, driving into or through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts and dangerous crossings. So far as practicable, this shall be accomplished by prearrangement of routes.” The section was amended to its present form in 1942. 7 Fed. Reg. 2869.
Compare United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7 (1947); Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 434 (1915); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. (Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 221 U. S. 612, 620 (1911).
Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 101-103 (1945); United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 524 (1942); Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19, 27-28 (1941); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348 (1918).
The officers, agents, and employees of every motor carrier concerned with the transportation Of explosives and other dangerous articles are required to “become conversant” with this and other regulations applying to such transportation. 49 CFR § 197.02.
This case is here to review the granting of a motion to dismiss the indictment. It should not be necessary to mention the familiar rule that, at this stage of the case, the allegations of the, indictment must be taken as true.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 4
3