What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Richard Allen HILLEARY, Appellant, v. William O. WALLACE, Acting Warden of the West Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellee.
No. 75-1177.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 9, 1975.
Decided July 9, 1975.
H. Lane Kneedler, Charlottesville, Va. [court-appointed counsel] and (Charles L. Howard [third-year law student] on brief), for appellant.
Betty L. Caplan, Asst. Atty. Gen. of W. Va. (Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen. of W. Va., Richard E. Hardi-son, Deputy Atty. Gen. of W. Va., and Fredric J. George, Asst. Atty. Gen. of W. Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before RUSSELL, FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The State prisoner in this habeas proceeding contends that his constitutional rights were violated in the warrantless search of his automobile, and in the admission of identification testimony by one of the investigating officers in the course of his State trial, which resulted in his conviction for breaking and entering.
It is clear that the circumstances in the case were such as to justify a seizure of the petitioner’s automobile by the police authorities) and, having validly seized it, a search of it by them. The record establishes that between two and three o’clock in the morning the lone police officer on duty at the time in the village of Charles Town, West Virginia, observed on three occasions an automobile bearing a Virginia license cruising about the block on which the Supertane Sales Corporation store was located. His suspicions were aroused by the presence and the unusual movements of an out-of-state car at this early hour about the business section of the village. He endeavored to maintain some observation of its subsequent movements and activity. For a short time he lost sight of the car until he noticed it parked in a private parking lot, maintained by a local business for its use, and situated directly behind the Supertane Sales Corporation store, and in the block about which the car had been observed cruising earlier. No driver at the moment was in the car — or observable thereabouts. Upon examination of the car he found the radiator was warm and the key in the ignition switch. The presence of the key in the ignition switch suggested that the driver was nearby and might be expected to drive off in the immediate future. Shortly before this, the officer had routinely checked the Supertane Sales Corporation store and found it secure. Because of the unusual and suspicious movements of the car, and its sudden appearance behind the Supertane store, he decided to examine the store again. He discovered that it had been broken into during the period since his earlier examination. He immediately called the manager of the store and with him examined the interior of the store. A place in the display area of the store where normally television sets were exhibited was found bare. In the meantime, the officer called the owner-operator of the parking area and learned that the car had no legitimate right to be parked in the lot. With knowledge of all these facts the officer clearly had both exigent circumstances and probable cause to believe that the car was connected with the burglary of the store and that a search of it would yield evidence useful for prosecution of the crime of breaking and entering. The right of the officer in this context to seize the car without a warrant was manifestly justified. That the officer did not, however, search the car until a short time later after it had been removed to another location, as requested by the owner of the lot where the car was initially found parked, is unimportant. And, while it could not be used as a justification for the search, it is of interest that the search was fruitful and did reveal the presence in the trunk of the car of two television sets which by their tags showed they had been taken from the burglarized store. The claim of an invalid search is accordingly without merit.
The record also sustains the identification testimony given by one of the officers, as supported by an independent source, irrespective of any claim of taint raised by the petitioner. On at least three separate occasions the officer had observed the petitioner as he cruised in the seized car about the block in which the store burglarized was located. On the three occasions he had seen the petitioner in the automobile, the officer, though about one hundred feet from the petitioner, had the benefit of street lights, which enabled him to secure a good view of the petitioner, who had rather distinctive features and attire. We think that, considering the “totality of circumstances,” there was sufficient basis for a finding by the Trial Court of an independent source for the identification testimony challenged. Stanley v. Cox (4th Cir. 1973) 486 F.2d 48, 55.
The judgment of the District Court dismissing the habeas petition is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
. 28 U.S.C. 2254.
. If the driver was nearby, as the officer had every reason to assume, he must have observed the activities of the officer and would have had every “motivation to remove [the] evidence” of the crime which he knew was present in the trunk of his car. See Cardwell v. Lewis (1974) 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325.
. Boone v. Cox (4th Cir. 1970) 433 F.2d 343; United States v. Bozada (8th Cir. 1973) 473 F.2d 389, 391, cert. denied 411 U.S. 969, 93 S.Ct. 2161, 36 L.Ed.2d 691.
. The facts in this case are considerably stronger than those in Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, where the Court ruled that the facts “provided reason to believe that the car was used in the commission of the crime * * (417 U.S. at 592, 94 S.Ct. at 2470.)
. Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419.
. Chambers v. Maroney, supra (399 U.S. at 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975).

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1