What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
Jewell Jess STONE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Harold V. CARDWELL, former Warden, Arizona State Prison, and Robert Raines, present Warden, Arizona State Prison, Respondents-Appellants.
C. A. No. 79-2561.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
May 30, 1980.
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., William J. Schafer, III, (argued), Galen H. Wilkes, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for respondents-appellants.
Paul J. Prato, Phoenix, Ariz., for petitioner-appellee.
Before MERRILL and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and REED, District Judge.
The Honorable Edward C. Reed, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
By order dated February 14, 1980, this Court remanded this case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, with instructions to set forth the findings made by said District Court when it earlier (January 11,1979) had ordered the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa, to permit petitioner Jewell Jess Stone to withdraw his guilty plea. Further, we asked the District Court to point out the portions of the State court records upon which its findings are based.
The District Court has complied with our order. After reviewing the State court records, United States District Judge Walter E. Craig found: (1) At the time petitioner Stone entered into an oral plea bargain agreement he believed that his confinement in prison would be for a term of three to five years, if probation was not granted; (2) petitioner Stone believed no aggravation hearing would be held; (3) he did not waive his presence at the aggravation hearing; and (4) the petitioner’s plea of guilty was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
The portions of the State court records specified to us by Judge Craig contain testimony of the petitioner, his attorney and the petitioner’s two brothers that support each of the findings. Those findings, including the one that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made, are not clearly erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) covers the situation where a state prisoner applies to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Insofar as is pertinent to this case, it provides that after a state court has held a full and fair hearing on a factual issue, the federal courts are bound by the written determination of that issue by the state court unless it appears from the record of the state court proceedings that the factual determination of the state court is not fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8); Teubert v. Gagnon, 478 F.Supp. 474 (1979); see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Hill v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1972).
The United States District Court must make its determination as to the sufficiency of the state findings (respecting the merits of the petitioner’s claim) from its independent review of the record made in the state courts, or else grant a hearing and make its own findings on the merits. Griff v. Rhay, 455 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972); Turner v. Chavez, 586 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1978). In the instant case the material facts were adequately developed during three days of hearing before the Arizona Superior Court. The reviewing United States District Judge had the full transcript of that hearing, as well as complete transcripts of the State court proceedings on the criminal complaint, the preliminary hearing, the change of plea, the aggravation hearing and the sentencing. Further, the presentence investigation report was available to Judge Craig during his review of the record of the State proceedings. Thus, there was no need for an additional hearing to be held by him. See Anderson v. Pope, 356 F.Supp. 321 (N.D.Cal.1973).
The finding of the United States District Judge as to the voluntariness of the guilty plea cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Knowles v. Gladden, 378 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1967); Albrecht v. Nelson, 462 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1972); Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1970).
In this case, as aforestated, the finding is that the petitioner’s plea of guilty was not made knowingly and voluntarily. The plea, as a result, is ineffective. Teubert v. Gagnon, supra.
Therefore, the order dated January 11, 1979, whereby the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ordered the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa to permit petitioner Jewell Jess Stone to withdraw his guilty plea entered October 19, 1971, is affirmed.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 3