What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Receiver of Inland Empire Insurance Company, Appellant, v. LEWIS, ROCA, SCOVILLE & BEAUCHAMP a partnership, Appellee.
No. 6278.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit,
May 12, 1960.
Rehearing Denied June 8, 1960.
David K. Watkiss, Salt Lake City, Utah (Calvin L. Rampton, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for appellant.
John P. Frank, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee.
Before PICKETT and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges, and SAVAGE, District Judge.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
For a third time we have before us the controversy between the law partnership of Lewis, Roca, Scoville & Beau-champ and the receiver of Inland Empire Insurance Company. The issue raised now is the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Utah to hear a counterclaim based on tort and asserted by the receiver against the partnership. As the partnership and its members are nonresidents, jurisdiction is predicated upon the rule announced in Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 240-243, 56 S.Ct. 204, 80 L.Ed. 192, permitting a counterclaim by a receiver against a claimant. The trial court held that it had no jurisdiction and this appeal followed.
The application of the Alexander v. Hillman rule to the case at bar is vigorously contested on the ground that a tort claim by a receiver against a claimant may not be determined summarily in the receivership proceedings but must be decided in a plenary suit. We deem it unnecessary to consider this point as the peculiar facts of this case convince us that the lower court was without jurisdiction to determine the counterclaim.
The partnership had an Arizona judgment against Inland. To enforce payment of that judgment it attached securities of Inland in the state of Kentucky. Thereafter, the court below appointed a receiver for Inland and the receiver, without notice to the partnership, took possession of the attached securities and removed them to Utah. The partnership then filed a general claim in the receivership proceedings on the basis of the Arizona judgment and asserted that it was entitled to have the claim paid out of the securities. The lower court approved the claim as a general claim but denied payment out of the securities as a preferred claim. We reversed, holding that the attachment was good and that as it preceded the receivership the partnership was entitled to payment out of the attached securities.
. , ,, . ... _ .. .. After remand the receiver filed a petition for judgment” based on an alleged tort liability of the partnership to Inland. This petition was in effect a counterclaim or set-off and is referred to herein as a counterclaim. The lower court denied an application by the partnership for the immediate payment of its claim out of the attached property and held that the right to payment must await determination of the counterclaim. We granted mandamus, ordered immediate payment, and declined to consider any issues relating to the counterclaim. Thereafter, the lower court ordered payment and, on the motion of the partnership, dismissed the counterclaim because of lack of jurisdiction
It would be inequitable to apply the Alexander v. Hillman rule to the case at bar. The assertion here of personal jurisdiction can arise only from voluntary submission to the jurisdiction. Whatever submission there was to the Utah jurisdiction arose because of the action of the receiver in removing the Kentucky securities to Utah in disregard of the attachment. The result of this action was to compel the partnership to proceed in Utah if it wished to pursue its rights against the attached property. While the partnership was not required to assert its rights, a party should not be deterred from the fearless assertion of its rights to property by the necessity of proceeding in a jurisdiction into which the property has been brought in disregard of legal rights. Granting that the receiver acted in good faith in removing the securities, its act was wrongful and the resulting enticement of the partnership into Utah did not establish jurisdiction of the lower court over the tort c\a{m '
. . , Moreover, the issue as to the right of the Partnership to payment out of the Cached securities had been fully and finally determined before the filing of the counterclaim. While the partnership bled a «eneral claim’ had 0Ii}l one claim and that was based 011 tbe Anzona indgment. Our holding that such claim was to be Paid out of the Cached property terminated the matter and ended whatever submission the partnership had made to the Jurisdiction. The equitable considerations upon which the Alexander v‘ Hillman rule is based do not exist m thls fase yberel? ,th? r?fiyer mdfed the filing of the claim by its wrongful removal of the securities and then withheld its counterclaim until the right of the partnership to payment out of the attached property had been upheld in the appellate court,
Affirmed.
. Of. Inter-State National Bank of Kansas City v. Luther, 10 Cir., 221 F.2d 382, 388 et seq.
. Lewis, Roca, Scoville & Beauchamp v. Inland Empire Insurance Company, 10 Cir., 259 F.2d 318.
. Lewis, Roca, Scoville & Beauchamp v. Christenson, 10 Cir., 263 F.2d 536.
. Cf. Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 130, 37 S.Ct. 44, 61 L.Ed. 192. See also Wyman v. Newhouse, 2 Cir., 93 F.2d 313, 315, 115 A.L.R. 460. Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144, 25 S.Ct. 614, 49 L.Ed. 988, is distinguishable as in that case there was no enticement arising from a wrong- ^ act'
. Gt New York Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 522, 36 S.Ct. 613, 60 L.Ed. 1140; Conway v. Union Bank of Switzerland, 2 Cir., 204 F.2d 603, 609.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1