What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ARBOGAST v. GOTTFRIED.
No. 6064.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 14, 1932.
Frick & D’Arcy, of Tiffin, Ohio, for appellant.
Niles & Peters and Paul A. Flynn, all of Tiffin, Ohio, for appellee.
Before MOORMAN, HICKS, and HICKENLOOPER, Circuit Judges.
MOORMAN, Circuit Judge.
The bankrupt was a married man living with his wife, and at the time of his bankruptcy owned live stock, farming implements, and machinery .upon which there were a valid first mortgage for $657.73, and a second mortgage to his mother, admittedly preferential, for $1,110. He had no other property of consequence. The property in question was sold at public auction for $1,536.83. The bankrupt’s mother released her mortgage by withdrawing it from the files of the office of the county recorder, and later filed proof of an unsecured claim. The bankrupt asked to be allowed $500 in lieu of a homestead exemption out of the proceeds of the sale of the property in excess of the valid mortgage. The referee and District Court allowed the exemption, and the trustee appeals.
The only question presented is: May a bankrupt claim a homestead exemption in property which was transferred as a preference but which has been returned to his trustee? Section 24, title 11, USCA, provides that the Bankruptcy Act shall not affect the allowance to the bankrupt of the exemptions prescribed by the state laws. Section 11738 of the General Code of Ohio provides for an exemption of $500 in lieu of a homestead. In determining the rights of bankrupts to exemptions, courts of bankruptcy will follow the construction placed upon local statutes by the highest court of the state. In re Tollett, 106 F. 866, 54 L. R. A. 222 (6 C. C. A.); In re National Grocer Co., 181 F. 33, 35, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 982 (6 C. C. A.); In re Baker, 182 F. 392, 393 (6 C. C. A.).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has decided that a homestead exemption may be allowed from property fraudulently conveyed, and recovered by creditors. Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 298, 84 Am. Dec. 378; Tracy v. Cover, 28 Ohio St. 61; Bills v. Bills, 41 Ohio St. 206; Roig v. Schults, 42 Ohio St. 165. The first two of the above-cited cases state that such exemptions are based upon the policy of the homestead act to protect the family of the debtor, irrespective of his censurable acts. To the same effect are In re Hewitt, 244 F. 245, 247 (1917 D. C. N. D. Ohio), per Judge Westenhaver, and In re Cabot, 295 F. 765 (1921 D. C. S. D. Ohio), per Judge Peek. Appellant concedes the controlling effect of these eases as to property fraudulently conveyed, but insists that there is a distinction to be made between the right to claim exemption from property thus conveyed and recovered back and from property that has been preferentially conveyed. The Supreme Court of Ohio has never been called upon to consider the rights of a homestead claimant to property preferentially conveyed; but see In re Assignment of White, Ohio (Goebels) Prob. Rep. 153. The only ease cited in support of appellant’s contention is In re Neal, 14 A. B. R. 550 (Ohio Referee). This decision is not supported by the Ohio decisions in fraudulent conveyance cases which proceed upon the theory that, if the creditors are seeking to subject the property to a debt on the ground that it is the property of the debtor, they may not contest the right of the debtor to claim exemptions on the same ground. Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio St. 298-300, 84 Am. Dee. 378; Tracy v. Cover, 28 Ohio St. 61, 65. Collier on Bankruptcy (1927), page 198, finds no good reason for the Neal decision, stating: “The effect of the surrender or recovery of preferences received by creditors is to restore the property of the bankrupt to his estate as if such preference had not been given. When a preferential transfer is set aside it has the same effect as the setting aside of a fraudulent transfer. The property then becomes restored to the bankrupt’s estate and is subject to his exemptions.” In construing and applying. the exemption statutes of Ohio, the Supreme Court of that state, as pointed out in Re Hewitt, supra, “has extended their protection, whenever the law or the facts brought a case within the policy and reason thereof.” The giving of a preference is no more reprehensible than the making of a fraudulent conveyance. In either ease the effect of the recovery of the property, as said by Collier, supra, is to restore it to the bankrupt’s estate. It being the policy of the Ohio exemption laws to protect the family of the debtor, we can see no reason why property which has been preferentially conveyed but voluntarily restored to the trustee, as in this case, is not subject to homestead exemptions.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1