What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DOMENA v. UNITED STATES.
No. 4032.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
May 25, 1945.
Armando A. Miranda, of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for appellant.
Wilbur C. Pickett, Acting Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, Department of Justice, of Washington, D. C., Philip F. Herrick, U. S. Atty., and Pascual Amado Rivera, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of San Juan, Puerto Rico, Francis M. Shea, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Fendall Marbury, Atty., Department of Justice, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MAGRUDER, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico dismissing a complaint in an action filed on January 3, 1941, to recover on a policy of war risk insurance issued during the first World War.
Omitting recitation of procedural matters which in the view we take are inconsequential, the case may be stated thus: The plaintiff-appellant is the widow, and “judicial administrator” of the estate, of one Felix Manzano Reyes who was inducted into the United States Army on August 14, 1918, and discharged therefrom for physical disability on September 24, 1918, and who, while in the army, applied for and was granted War Risk Term Insurance in the amount of $10,000. Premiums for this policy were deducted from the insured’s pay while he was in the service. No premiums were paid thereon after his discharge. In her complaint the plaintiff alleges that the insured while in the United States Army and while his insurance policy was in force, “became so disabled that he was unable thereafter to follow continuously any substantially gainful occupation” and that he “continued so disabled till his death,” which occurred in Puerto Rico on December 3, 1937. The plaintiff alleges that she made claim on the policy, presumably sometime after her husband’s, the insured’s, decease, but she does not give the date, and that her claim was denied by the Veterans’ Administration on February 29, 1940.
One of the defenses interposed by the government was that the plaintiff’s action was not timely brought under 38 U.S.C.A. § 445, § 19 of the World War Veterans’ Act, 1924, as amended, and the court below, believing this defense to be good, ordered the plaintiff’s action dismissed for want of jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that, this conclusion is correct.
The plaintiff contends that the insured’s total and permanent disability, which she says occurred while he was in the service and his insurance was in effect and continued uninterruptedly until his death, operated to suspend premium payments, and thus that the policy sued upon was in force when the insured died in 1937 and her suit for death benefits is timely. This contention was refuted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Towery, 306 U.S. 324, 59 S.Ct. 522, 83 L.Ed. 678. In that case on facts comparable to those before us here the court construed war risk term insurance policies as giving not two rights but only one, a right to benefit payments, and held that but one critical contingency conditioned that right, namely, the occurrence either of total and permanent disability or of death while the policy was in force, and that whichever event first occurred started the running of the period of limitation provided in the statute quoted in the footnote above. Thus on the plaintiff’s allegations the critical contingency which conditioned the right to benefit payments which she derived from the insured occurred in September 1918 and the right of action on the policy has long been barred. In accord see Roskos v. United States, 3 Cir., 130 F.2d 751, 752, 753, and cases cited.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
So far as material this Section reads: “No suit on yearly renewable term insurance shall be allowed under this section unless the same shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made or within one year after July 3, 1930, whichever is the later date * * * Provided, That for the purposes of this sectiem it shall be deemed that the right accrued on. the happening of the contingency on which the claim is founded: Provided further, That this limitation is suspended for the period elapsing between the filing in the Veterans’ Administration of the claim sued upon and the denial of said claim by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1