What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GRAFFI v. UNITED STATES.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
December 1, 1927.
No. 3945.
1. Counterfeiting <©==16 — Allegation that defendant knowingly transferred counterfeited obligation sufficiently charges knowledge of its character (Cr. Code, § 154 [18 USCA § 26£]).
Allegation of indictment, under Criminal Code, § 154 (18 USCA § 268), that defendant knowingly transferred a counterfeited obligation, held sufficiently to charge that he knew the character of the obligation when he transferred it.
2. Counterfeiting <©=I6 — Indictment charging transfer of counterfeited obligation with intent to defraud United States held sufficient (Cr. Code, § 154 [18 USCA § 268]).
Indictment, under Criminal Code, § 154 (18 USCA § 268), for transferring counterfeited obligation, alleging that defendant knowingly transferred counterfeited obligation with intent to defraud the United States, held sufficient, in that a charge of transfer with such intent included charge that defendant know it was counterfeited.
3. Counterfeiting <©=16 — Defect in form of indictment for transferring counterfeited obligation held not ground for holding indictment insufficient (18 USCA § 556).
' Defect or imperfection in matter of form only of indictment for knowingly transferring a counterfeited obligation of the United States with intent to defraud the United States held not ground for holding indictment insufficient, in,view of Rev. St. § 1025 (18 USCA § 556).
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.
Sam Craffi was convicted of transferring a counterfeited $20 gold certificate of the' United States, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Leslie P. Whelan, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error.
Jacob I. Crossman, of Chicago, Ill., for the United States.
Before ALSCHULER, PAGE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff in error pleaded guilty and was sentenced to imprisonment upon an indictment charging that he “did unlawfully, willfully, knowingly and feloniously, and with intent to defraud the United States, transfer and deliver to one J ohn Oglesby, a certain counterfeited obligation of the United States, to wit, a twenty dollar gold certificate of the United States, which said certificate was on the face thereof of the tenor following, to wit: (Here follows a copy of the certificate) with the intent that the said twenty dollar certificate be passed, published or used as true and genuine by the said J ohn Oglesby, contrary,” etc.
The indictment was drawn under section 154 of the Criminal Code, the applicable part of which reads:
“Whoever shall * * * transfer, * * * or deliver any * * * counterfeited * * * obligation * * * of the United States, * * * with the intent that the same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine, shall he fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 18 USCA § 268.
if is conceded that by pleading guilty plaintiff in error waived all objections which run to the mere form in which the various elements of the crime are stated, or to the fact that the indictment is inartistically drawn, but it is contended that he did not thereby waive the objection that some substantial element of the crime is omitted.
He complains that the indictment is bad because a scienter is not alleged; that is, he insists that there is no averment that he knew the certificate was counterfeited when he transferred and delivered it to Oglesby. In Dunbar v. United States, 156 U. S. 185, 15 S. Ct. 325, 39 L. Ed. 390, the indictment charged that the defendant “did willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly, and with intent to defraud the revenues of the United States, smuggle and clandestinely introduce into the United States” opium upon which the duty had not been paid; and one of the objections to it was that a scienter was not alleged — that it was not averred that he knew it was opium upon which the duty had not been paid. It was held that the objection was not well taken.
The court further said that the language of the indictment excluded the idea of any unintentional and ignorant bringing in of opium upon which the duty had not been paid, and that it could only be satisfied by proof that such bringing in was done intentionally, knowingly, and with intent to defraud the revenues of the United States.
In Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 16 S. Ct. 434, 480, 40 L. Ed. 606, and in Price v. United States, 165 U. S. 311, 17 S. Ct. 366, 41 L. Ed. 727, the Supreme Court held that a charge that defendant “unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly” deposited in the mail obscene matter, was a sufficient averment that he knew the character of the matter which he mailed. In Konda v. United States (C. C. A.) 166 F. 91, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304, this court had before it the charge that defendant unlawfully and knowingly deposited in the mail§ nonmailable matter. The statute declared:
“Any person who shall knowingly deposit * * * nonmailable matter * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
After quoting the statute the court said:
“That is, in the statute the adverb ‘knowingly’ not merely modifies the verb, but characterizes the whole act that is stated by the predicate and the subject. Now, if the courts and the citizens of the country are bound to know, on reading the statute, that a depositing of nonmailable matter is a* misdemeanor only when the depositor has knowledge of the character of the matter, we believe that the same language in an indictment is sufficient to notify a defendant that the government is charging and has undertaken to prove that he knew the character of the matter when he mailed it.”
So here a charge that plaintiff in error knowingly transferred a counterfeited obligation sufficiently charges that he knew the character of the obligation when he transferred it.
The indictment in the ease at bar. not only alleges that plaintiff in error knowingly transferred the counterfeited obligation, but also that he did it “with intent to defraud the United States” — that is, with intent that a spurious obligation should pass into and impair and debase the circulating medium and eventually be redeemed by the United States as genuine. A charge that he transferred a eouhterfeited obligation with such intent includes the charge that he knew that it was counterfeited. The intent to defraud the United States could not exist without knowledge of the character of the instrument by which the fraud was to be accomplished. If this view be correct, the most that can be said is that the indictment is defective, in that one element of the offense is stated loosely and without technical accuracy. It is a “defect or imperfection in matter of form only,” and is not ground for holding the indictment insufficient. See section 1025, R. S. (18 USCA § 556).
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0