What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LARABEE FLOUR MILLS CORPORATION v. CITY FLOUR & GRAIN CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
October 20, 1925.)
No. 2228.
I. Trial @=>177 — Determination of facts submitted to court by request of both parties for directed verdict.
By request of both parties for directed verdict, determination of the facts is submitted to the court.
2. Appeal and error @=>997(3) — Finding on request by both parties for directed verdict is final.
Court’s determination of facts, submitted to it by request of both parties for directed verdict, is final.
3. Sales @=>150(1) — Buyer relieved from liability by seller’s canceiiation of contract before time for performance.
Seller having breached its contract by canceling it in advance of time for performance, forfeits its right of recovery thereunder, and relieves buyer from liability.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of South Carolina, at Greenville; Henry II. Watkins, Judge.
Action by the Larabee Flour Mills Corporation against the City Flour & Grain Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
R. B. Paslay, of Spartanburg, S. C. (Evans & Galbraith, of Spartanburg, S. C., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
Jesse W. Boyd, of Spartanburg, S. C. (L. K. Brice and Brown & Boyd, all of Spartanburg, S. C., on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before WOODS, WADDILL, and ROSE, Circuit Judges.
WADDILL, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff in error instituted this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina, to recover damages for the alleged breach of a contract entered into with the defendant in error on the 9th of August, 1920, whereby plaintiff in error contracted to sell, and the defendant to purchase, 1,000 barrels of flour at $12.60 per barrel. This contract was made in behalf of the plaintiff in error by J. J. Wilkes, and on behalf of the defendant in error by W. B. Harrison, and set forth particularly the terms and conditions of the payments thereunder, to be made by draft drawn on a bank at Spartanburg, S. C., the homo place of the defendant corporation, time of shipment 60 days; and further provided that the contract was to be subject 'to confirmation by the seller at Atlanta, Ga., and that the terms and conditions were to bo binding on both parties to the contract, and could not be modified except by their written consent, and no verbal conditions, warrants, or modifications should be valid. The contract also provided for extensions of the times of delivery, and the method of procedure in case of default on the part of the parties in carrying- out the same. Simultaneously with entering into the contract, Wilkes, acting in behalf of his company, made the following provision for extension:
“City Flour & Grain Co., Spartanburg, S. C. — Gentlemen: With the attached contract for 1,000 barrels Larabee’s flour for shipment in 60 days, it is hereby agreed between buyer and seller that the Larabee Flour Mills Corp. will not force shipment on the buyer City Flour & Grain Co., or make any carrying ehai’ge on this contract, before March 1st, 1921. All other parts of this contract shall be binding on both buyer and seller. [Signed in ink] J. J. Wilkes. This 8/9/20 [written in pencil]. The above will apply on contract extended 11/4/20. J. J. Wilkes. 11/4/20.”
On the 9th of August, 1920, plaintiff in error wired defendant in error from Atlanta, Ga., “Confirm you thousand barrels Dixie Dream twelve sixty subject freight changes,” and on August 10th, 1920, a letter of confirmation was also written, as follows:
“Wo confirm sale made yon August 9, 1920, by J. J. Wilkes, as follows: 1,000 bbls. Dixie Dream Flour 98 lb. Cot. basis at $12.60 per bbl. f. o. b. mill — freight allowed Spartanburg. Terms: Arrival draft bank Bank of Spartanburg. Time of shipment 60 days. Subject adjustment of freight rates. For local office. [Signed] Larabee Flour Mills Corporation, by C. T. Bramblett, Branch Manager.”
On the 13th of August, defendant in error wrote plaintiff in error as follows: “Dear Sirs: Attention Mr. Bramblett. In your letter confirming flour sale made to us by your Mr. Wilkes, you failed to confirm the conditions on which this sale was made. Please confirm this by return ‘mail. We are not uneasy but what this part of the contract will be all right, as it is, but Mr. Wilkes explained that it would have to be confirmed by you. Thanking you for your prompt attention, we are,
“Yours very truly,
“[Signed] City Flour & Grain Co.”
On the 17th, of August, plaintiff in error wroto defendant in error, in reply, thanking them for the contract, and saying, among other things:
“Replying to your letter of August 13th in regard to flour sold you by our Mr. J. J. Wilkes some few days since. You may rest assured that your contract will be looked after in the manner which Mr. Wilkes described to yon. * * * ”
The memorandum of the extension made in pencil, signed on the 4th of November. 1920, seems to have'been the result of an extension'of the contract made on that, day at plaintiff in error’s request, ■ and caused doubtless in part by the desire not to put upon the face of the original paper the matter of - the extension to March 1, 1921, on account of some regulation prescribed by the Southeastern Millers’ Exchange, of which plaintiff' in error was, and defendant in error was not, a member, and the controversy came about chiefly because of the refusal of the plaintiff in error to accede to the extension of the time of delivery under the contract-to March 1, 1921, and of their demand for deliveries ait what they claim to be the expiration of the time thereof, on the 4th .of November, 1920, as of which date they canceled the contract, and subsequently instituted suit to recover the difference between the market price of the flour on that day, and the price named in the contract, to wit, $2.40 per barrel, which, together' with the entry charge of 50 cents per barrel, made a total of $2,900.
Was this extension of the time of delivery of the flour to the 1st of March, 1921, valid and binding between the parties?
Upon this question, issue was joined, a jury impaneled, and the ease fully heard, with the. result that at the conclusion of all the testimony both sides moved the court for an instructed verdict; and the learned Judge of the District Court, upon full eon-. sideration of the evidence, reached the conclusion that the extension of deliveries to the 1st of March, 1921, was a part and parcel of the contract entered into with plaintiff in error’s approval, and that, having breached their contract,by canceling the same on the 4th of November’previous, they were'not entitled to recover, and directed a verdict for the defendant in error, and dismissed the suit, with costs to the defendant. ' It is as to the correctness of this decision in the respect mentioned that we have to pass.
Where, as here, both parties- asked for a directed verdict, they thereby submitted to the court the ascertainment and final determination of the facts of the ease; and its conclusion in that respect is final and binding upon the parties to the controyersy, and which this court should accept and enforce in the proper disposition of the case. Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154, 15 S. Ct. 566, 39 L. Ed. 654; Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R., 210 U. S. 1, 28 S. Ct. 607, 52 L. Ed. 931, 15 Ann. Cas. 70; Sena v. American Turquoise Co., 220 U. S. 497, 31 S. Ct. 488, 55 L. Ed. 559; Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Patterson (4 C. C. A.) 195 F. 382, 115 C. C. A. 284; New York v. Third Nat. Bank (2 Cir.) 221 F. 175, 137 C. C. A. 75; Williams v. Vreeland (3 Cir.) 244 F. 346, 352, 156 C. C. A. 632; Lockhart v. Tri-State Loan & Trust Co. (C. C. A. 5 Cir.) 268 F. 523, 525; Richman, etc., v. Mulcahy (C. C. A. 3 Cir.) 269 E. 786, 788; Martin v. Richmond F. & P. R. Co. (4 C. C. A.) 3 F.(2d) 26, 28.
Plaintiff in error, having breached its contract by canceling the same in advance of the time of its performance, thereby forfeited its right of recovery thereunder, and relieved the defendant in error from liability. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 953, and eases cited; The Eliza Lines, 199 U. S. 119, 128, 26 S. Ct. 8, 50 L. Ed. 115, 4 Ann. Cas. 406; Central Trust Co. v. Chicago, 240 U. S. 581, 36 S. Ct. 412, 60 L. Ed. 811, L. R. A. 1917B, 580.
The decision of the District Court should be affirmed, with costs.
Affirmed.
The late Judge WOODS concurred' in the affirmance of the judgment below, but died before he passed upon the above opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1