What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Jesse Willard PERKINS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 27593.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 12, 1969.
Jack E. Yelverton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen. of Louisiana, Bernard N. Marcantel, Dist. Atty., Baton Rouge, La., Alfred R. Ryder, Asst. Dist. Atty., for respondent-appellant.
Richard D. Chappuis, Jr., Lafayette, La., for petitioner-appellee.
Before GOLDBERG, DYER and CARSWELL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The State of Louisiana appeals from an order entered by the District Court after an evidentiary hearing granting Perkins a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Perkins had been convicted of burglary in the state court. He was subsequently charged under the Louisiana habitual offender statute (La.R.S. 15:529.-1), found guilty, and sentenced accordingly. After exhausting state remedies he sought relief by writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, asserting that a pry-bar used in evidence against him in his burglary conviction was the product of an illegal search and seizure of his automobile.
The morning following a burglary of the Elkhorn Lounge, two uniformed deputies, one of whom was Perkins’ cousin, came to the home where Perkins was staying to question him in connection with the burglary. The officers were not armed- with either an arrest or search warrant and they testified at the hearing in the District Court that while Perkins was a suspect at the time, there was not yet probable cause which would have sustained an arrest or search warrant. Following a half-hour interrogation of petitioner by the two deputies, Perkins was asked permission to search his car. According to the testimony of the officers, petitioner gavé his consent to the search. However, it is uncontroverted that the officers did not inform Perkins that his consent was necessary for a search of the car or that they would not make a search if he declined permission. Perkins testified that he did not think there was much he could do about the search. Under these circumstances the District Court found that Perkins’ acquiescence in the search of his ear did not amount to a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the Constitution.
Consent may constitute a waiver of fourth amendment rights, Zap v. United States, 1946, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S. Ct. 1277, 90 L.Ed. 1477), but, to be valid, a waiver must be an intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege, Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461. A waiver cannot be valid unless the person knows that his permission may be freely and effectively withheld. See Pekar v. United States, 5 Cir.1963, 315 F.2d 319.
The question whether there has been a consent to a search and seizure is one of fact. Landsdown v. United States, 5 Cir.1965, 348 F.2d 405. The “clearly erroneous” rule is applicable to findings of fact in habeas corpus proceedings, Fed.R.Civ.P., rules 52(a) and 81(a) (2); Tyler v. Beto, 5 Cir.1968, 391 F.2d 993, cert. denied 393 U.S. 1030, 89 S.Ct. 642, 21 L.Ed.2d 574; and we cannot say that the finding of the District Court that there was not an intelligent and voluntary consent to the search of the automobile is clearly erroneous. A simple admonition by the officers that the search could not and would not be conducted without Perkins’ consent would have sufficed.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
. At the evidentiary hearing in the District Court there was a conflict in the testimony on this point. The officers testified that permission was requested and given; petitioner testified that permission was not asked and was never given. In the view of the case taken by the District Court and by us, it does not matter if permission was in fact sought and given.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0