What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Samuel BRADY, Appellant.
No. 364, Docket 33830.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Dec. 11, 1969.
Decided Jan. 20, 1970.
Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty. for Southern Dist. of New York, for appellee (Thomas J. Fitzpatrick and Lars I. Kul-leseid, Asst. U. S. Attys., on the brief).
Thomas D. Edwards, New York City, for appellant.
Before MOORE and KAUFMAN, Circuit Judges, and RYAN, District Judge.
Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
RYAN, District Judge:
Appellant and his co-defendant, Thomas Sanders, who did not appeal, were convicted on two counts charging embezzlement of packages by Postal Service employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1709. The evidence at the trial below may be fairly summarized as follows:
Appellant, Sanders and an unidentified companion were observed on August 18, 1968, a Sunday afternoon, in front of a schoolyard on East 148 Street, in the County of the Bronx, New York City, about an hour after appellant and Sanders left work for the Postal Service. They were in possession of four sizable packages which they took out of a taxicab onto the sidewalk by the schoolyard. These observations were made by two New York City policemen who also saw that the packages appeared to be original cartons, one bearing the name “Philco” printed on it.
The patrolmen approached the men and asked for their names, addresses and the origin of the packages. Brady and Sanders said they were delivering the packages to a candy store nearby owned by a “Mr. Rodriguez” at the request of an unknown man in Manhattan. The patrolmen asked to accompany the men to the candy store; this was assented to, with the three men carrying the packages. During the walk, the third man fled and escaped. At the candy store, “Mr. Rodriguez” was unknown.
Brady and Sanders were taken to the police precinct and later turned over to a Postal Inspector, since the packages bore stamps and Post Office markings. Although several times during the course of the afternoon various law enforcement officials gave the defendants their Miranda warnings and attempted to ask them a few questions, each attempt at interrogation terminated immediately after the defendants indicated a desire to remain silent. Both were released and permitted to go home, to return on the following morning. That day, when interviewed by an Assistant United States Attorney, each admitted stealing the packages from the Post Office, intending to sell them.
Appellant raises no question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish his guilt. Rather, he urges that the seizure of the stolen packages constituted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the appellant’s statements, both to the police officers and to the Assistant United States Attorney, were inadmissible. These contentions are rejected and the conviction is affirmed.
We find the action of the police officers in their initial approach to Brady to be entirely reasonable and proper under the circumstances. When these officers observed Brady and his companions alight from a taxicab at a deserted schoolyard on a Sunday afternoon in possession of four cartons, at least one of which was marked with a well-known brand name, they were certainly entitled to make a casual inquiry. The subsequent flight of the third man, coupled with the non-existent “Mr. Rodriguez,” made further inquiry not only proper but virtually mandatory. The facts of this case are almost parallel to those which we reviewed in affirming the conviction in United States v. Thomas, 396 F.2d 310 (2 Cir. 1968). We there sustained conduct by officers very similar to that of the policemen here, stating:
“Not only were appellants not in custody, but there were few restraints of any kind on them at that time (when they were questioned as to the origin of the packages). * * * Appellants were approached on a public street, not questioned in the station house * * *, and they never suggested that they wanted to leave. * * * Under these circumstances, the few questions asked appellants on the street to determine whether any crime had been committed were more in the nature of ‘on the scene’ questioning as part of the fact-finding process than custodial interrogation.”
The inquiries by the policemen which led to the discovery that the packages were stolen were entirely proper, and well within the bounds that permit a seizure clearly lawful under the Constitution.
Appellant also raises a novel interpretation of the Miranda rule established by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The evidence reveals no less than five warnings to Brady of his Constitutional rights.Appellant argues that his confession was inadmissible on the ground that, once he had declined to speak, he could not be questioned again, even if such further questioning occurred after a significant interval of time and was preceded by new Miranda warnings.
We rejected such an argument in United States v. Thomas, supra. Recognizing the fact that Thomas is a controlling precedent, appellant asks us to reconsider Thomas. We find no basis for such a review. In view of the release of Brady overnight by the Postal Inspector, the repetition of the Miranda warnings on subsequent occasions does not appear to have been designed to subvert the Miranda rule. We find no violation of the Supreme Court mandates in the procedure here; rather, appellant was afforded his full measure of justice.
Conviction affirmed.
. These occurred (1) when Officer Dean asked appellant to sit in his patrol car, (2) at the station house after one of the packages was noticed bearing a Yassar College address, (3) by the Postal Inspector at the station house, (4) by the Postal Inspector at his office, and (5) by the Assistant United States Attorney just before Brady made his incriminating admissions.
. Brady also contends that his initial exculpatory statements relating to Mr. Rodriguez and the candy store were improperly admitted because he made these statements before he was informed of his Miranda rights. However, Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations, and at the time Brady told his exculpatory tale about the candy store, not the slightest restraint had been placed on his liberty. We are, therefore, of the view that this claim is without merit.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1