What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Frances P. PONS, Appellant, v. LORILLARD, a Division of Loew’s Theatres, Inc., Appellee.
No. 76-1369.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 9, 1976.
Decided Feb. 2, 1977.
Norman B. Smith, Greensboro, N. C. (Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis & James, Greensboro, N. C., on brief), for appellant.
Thornton H. Brooks, Greensboro, N. C. (M. Daniel McGinn, Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, Greensboro, N. C., on brief), for appellee.
Before BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Alleging violation of her rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970), appellant Frances P. Pons sued her employer, Lorillard, a Division of Loew’s Theatres, Inc., for injunctive reinstatement, lost wages, liquidated and punitive damages, costs and attorney’s fees. Lorillard’s motion to strike Pons’ demand for a jury trial on the issue of lost wages was sustained by the District Court and an interlocutory appeal of the order was allowed. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); FRAP 5.
Our task is to determine whether the Seventh Amendment provision for trial by jury “[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars” applies to a claim under the Age Act for lost wages. Analysis of the problem begins with the language of the Congress. In relevant part, sections 7(b) and 7(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) state:
“(b) ... In any action brought to enforce this [Act] the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this [Act], including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
“(c) Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter: . . (Emphasis added).
Our holding is that the inclusion of the phrase “legal . . . relief” empowers a Federal court to grant complainants the Constitutional right to a jury.
I.
At the outset, we are urged to hold that Age Act complaints should follow the pattern of denial thus far adopted in enforcing the provisions against employment discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. We decline.
Design for decision on this issue is to be found in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), declaring the availability of a jury in a civil action under Title VIII, section 812(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3612(c), relating to fair housing. This section, as relevant, defines the powers of the court:.
“(c) The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff: . . . ”
In Curtis the Court contrasts Title VII— fair employment — and Title VIII — -fair housing — enforcement clauses, concluding that the decisions rejecting a jury trial in Title VII are not construing remedial provisions like those in VIII. 415 U.S. at 196, 94 S.Ct. 1005. To repeat, the Court quite cautiously disavows any interpretation of VII, saying only that its language is not the same as that of VIII. Its distinguishment of the phrasing warrants a lengthy quotation:
“In Title VII cases the courts of appeals have characterized backpay as an integral part of an equitable remedy, a form of restitution. But the statutory language on which this characterization is based—
‘[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,’
contrasts sharply with § 812’s simple authorization of an action for actual and punitive damages. In Title VII cases, also, the courts have relied on the fact that the decision whether to award back-pay is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. There is no comparable discretion here: if a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and actual damages, he is entitled to judgment for that amount.” (Citation omitted.)
Id. at 197, 94 S.Ct. at 1010.
Equivalent differentiation is apparent between the Title VII remedies and those of the Age Act. Comparing the two as they have just now been set forth, it is seen at once that the Age Act includes the terminology of a law action, traditionally calling for a jury verdict, rather than only a suit in equity to be decided and decreed by a chancellor. Thus it comprises the power to grant legal relief, that is relief at law— obviously a suit “at common law” embodied in the Seventh Amendment.
II.
The Age Act by its very terms excludes the non-jury concept and commands the impanelment of a jury, if requested, in claims for lost wages. Forthright to prove this view is the incorporation of related provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the enforcement section of the Age Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), as follows:
“The provisions of this [Act] shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections . . . 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) [supra] of this section. . Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title:
The Fair Labor Standards Act provision, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (except subsection (a)), supra, stipulates:
“(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 [minimum wages] or section 207 [maximum hours] of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”
Thus the Age Act clearly equates lost wages as “unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation” under the FLSA. It is settled that section 216(b) claims are legal in nature and uniformly accorded a jury trial. McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320 (6 Cir. 1971); Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F.Supp. at 664 and cases cited.
The ultimate analysis to determine whether a suit is one “at common law” within the Amendment seems to be the three-pronged classical test: (1) Is the issue legal rather than equitable under the custom of the courts of law; (2) Is the remedy legal; and (3) Is the issue triable to a jury given the jurors’ practical abilities and limitations? Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 fn. 10, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970); see 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 38.16[4] pp. 162.6-8. Where issues of law and equity are intertwined in one suit, those meeting the three-pronged test merit a trial by jury. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470-73, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962).
It has been helpfully observed that claims of employment discrimination, coupled with prayers for lost wages, are analogous to the common law action for breach of contract by wrongful discharge or an action in tort, With the Age Act creating the legal duty. Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 69 F.R.D. at 350-51. To interpret this cause of action as one “incidental” or “integral” to the equitable issue of reinstatement would be to violate the rule of Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 470, 82 S.Ct. 894, as just mentioned.
As to the second and third phases of the Ross test, we believe that a monetary award for back wages is a traditional legal remedy and that the computation of such an award would not be beyond the practical capabilities of a jury. Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 69 F.R.D. at 351. Consequently, all of the prerequisites to a trial by jury under the Age Act are satisfied.
Hence we hold the jury demand should not have been denied. That order is now vacated and the claim for back pay is remanded for trial by a jury.
Vacated and remanded.
. Plaintiff at the age of 48 years was discharged on January 31, 1975; she alleges it was pursuant to a policy of employing younger persons. Lorillard is a foreign corporation doing business in North Carolina.
. On October 18, 1976 Pons moved this court to allow amendment of her complaint to include a prayer for punitive damages.
. This appeal involves only the right to a jury trial on the claim of lost wages. The District Judge’s opinion notes that the plaintiff “conceded that the liquidated damages issue would not be triable to a jury”. Nor are costs, attorney’s fees nor, as explained infra, punitive damages before the court. Of course no injunctive relief is now considered.
. The question has been discussed and resolved in favor of trial by a jury: Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F.Supp. 660 (S.D.Ohio 1974); Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 69 F.R.D. 348 (W.D.Mo.1975), and Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F.Supp. 1403 (N.D.Ga.1976). A list of cases implicitly settling the point is to be found in Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., supra, at 1402.
. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 196-97 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 1005, citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5 Cir. 1969); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4 Cir.), cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 573, 30 L.Ed.2d 655 (1971); cf. McFerren v. County Board of Education, 455 F.2d 199, 202-04 (6 Cir. 1972); Harkiess v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 451, 27 L.Ed.2d 439 (1971); Smith v. Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n. 8 (4 Cir. 1966) (en banc); see generally Developments in the Law — Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1265-66 (1971). To this list of the Court may be added Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4 Cir. 1972).
. At once, we recognize that the Seventh Amendment extends its guarantee not only to common law forms of action recognized at its date of enactment — 1791 — but also to actions under modern statutes that create legal rights and remedies. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 194, 94 S.Ct. 1005; see F.R.Civ.P. 38(a).
. In this court plaintiff for the first time moved to amend her complaint to include a claim for punitive damages. This motion must be remanded for presentation to the trial court. F.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Likewise items of costs and attorney’s fees are matters for decision by that court.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0