What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Alvin Francis RAMEY and Owen Leroy Linder, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 15565.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 17, 1956.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 1956.
See 230 F.2d 171.
Roy A. Scott, Corpus Christi, Tex., for appellants.
Harman Parrott, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Russell B. Wine, U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for ap-pellee.
Before HOLMES, RIVES, and CAMERON, Circuit Judges.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
The appellants were convicted upon count one of a three-count indictment, and sentenced by the court below to serve prison terms and to pay fines respectively. A judgment of acquittal as to each of them was entered as to counts two and three, on which the court had peremptorily instructed the jury to find them not guilty. This appeal is from the sentences imposed upon the appellants, after each of them had been found guilty by the verdict of a jury.
Count one charged that in April, 1954, in Bexar County, in the San Antonio division of the Western District of Texas, the appellants conspired and agreed to transport in foreign commerce from Mexico to the United States five thousand dollars ($5000), which had been taken by fraud from the owner thereof, pursuant to said conspiracy. To effect the object thereof, eleven overt acts were alleged with particularity. The appellants offered no evidence in their defense, but relied upon the asserted insufficiency of the evidence on behalf of the government. The substantial evidence against them, which was uneon-troverted and which the jury evidently found to be true, is, in part, as follows:
The appellant Linder, representing himself as John Henry Henderson, employee of a wealthy oil man from Houston, visited an apartment house owned by the victim (Mrs. Burres) in San Antonio on April 18, 1954, to inquire about buying one of the apartments for his employer. While the proposed deal was pending, he persuaded her to visit several places with him, and to let him examine her books and papers, which revealed that she had $5000 in a savings account with a San Antonio building and loan association. He took the victim on one occasion to Laredo in his two-toned Pontiac with Texas license plates, which car was rented by him from the witness Gregory. Oklahoma license plates were on this same car when Linder was later arrested. Linder introduced the victim to Alvin Ramey, co-appellant, who was posing as a Mr. Mantel, employee of the New York “Bankers Club,” an alleged wire gambling syndicate. After glowing accounts of how much money could be won by placing horse-racing bets with Mantel’s very exclusive organization, they persuaded the victim to withdraw her $5*300 of savings from said association and accompany them across the river from Laredo into Mexico, where they rented a hotel room and exhibited to her what purported to be bundles of money which they claimed to have won gambling. In that room in Mexico, the victim was induced by appellants to give Linder her $5000 in bills of large denominations, American money, which they promised to return to her as soon as the race was over, which they never did because they claimed the money was bet on the wrong horse. The whole scheme was a fraud. Linder, almost immediately after getting the money, allegedly took a plane to Wyoming and Mantel stayed behind to comfort the victim and, by assurances that her money would be repaid, keep her from telling the police immediately.
It is unnecessary to relate all the details of direct and circumstantial evidence that were in the record. In our opinion, there was substantial evidence to convince the jury of appellants’ guilt under count one, not only beyond every reasonable doubt, but to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of their innocence or of the innocence of either one of them. We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0