What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Randolph W. COPELAND, Petitioner, v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent.
No. 20130.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 29, 1964.
Thomas N. Crawford, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for petitioner.
Myles F. Gibbons, Gen. Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board, Chicago, 111., David B. Schreiber, Associate General; Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board, Edward E. Reilly, David M. Goldman, Railroad Retirement Board, Chicago, 111., of counsel, for respondent.
Before CAMERON and WISDOM,. Circuit Judges, and DeVANE, District. Judge.
CAMERON, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves the question of whether there was substantial evidence to support the Railroad Retirement Board’s finding that the petitioner’s physical or mental condition was not such that he was unable to engage in any regular employment.
Petitioner, a forty-six year old railroad laborer, applied for an annuity under § 2(a) (5) of the Railroad Retirement Act, on the ground that his “permanent physical or mental condition” was such that he was “unable to engage in any regular employment.” He worked for the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company as a “bridge builder,” from October 6, 1941 to September 19, 1958, having been disqualified for service by a medical officer of the Railroad. Petitioner has a fifth grade education, and has a history of only menial arduous work. Since petitioner is less than sixty years of age and is credited with less than twenty years of service as an employee under the Railroad Retirement Act, it is impossible for him to be eligible for any type of annuity other than the one under § 2(a) (5) of the Act.
Application for an annuity was filed on November 14, 1958. A succession of doctors employed by both the Board and the petitioner found that he was highly nervous, underweight, arthritic, deaf in left ear, and had several other physical disabilities. Psychiatric tests revealed a congenital low intelligence, but no markedly identifiable mental disorders other than extreme apathy. Several doctors expressed an opinion that the petitioner was unfit to continue performing heavy manual labor.
The test here is whether the claimant is capable of engaging in “any” gainful employment. Subsequent to the filing of the application petitioner was accorded a general physical examination by a designated Board examiner, Dr. M. P. Hughes. Dr. Hughes reported his diagnosis as “arthritis right elbow, shoulder and spine,” and a loss of hearing in the left ear; on this medical evidence he concluded that petitioner was not then able to work at his last occupation or some other type of work, and that it was questionable whether his condition could be expected to improve, or that he would be able in the future to do any type of work.
The Director of Retirement Claims arranged for petitioner to undergo an orth-opaedic examination at the V. A. Hospital in Birmingham on December 23, 1958, where it was concluded that petitioner was not permanently disabled from work in all regular employment. The report of the examination by Dr. Cas Reagan stated that the petitioner was a “small, slender fellow, who weighed 122 pounds;” that petitioner stated his weight had been between 136 and 140 pounds a year earlier; that petitioner had many complaints, especially with respect to the right shoulder, right elbow and lower back; and that “ * * * there is no acute joint tenderness today. However, he is unable to elevate his right arm above the level of his right shoulder, due to arthritis, which he claims in his right shoulder. There is no periarticular tenderness but definite limitation of motion. The lumbo-sacral region, bending forward he can reach about 6" below the knees and there is a slight amount of muscle-rigidity in the lower lumbar region. The lateral movements are limited and so are the backward movements. He cannot flex his right elbow due to pain. He complains considerably of the right knee and says one week ago it was swollen but apparently today there is no swelling but there is limitation of movement and pain on extension and flexion of the right knee * * The X-rays taken at the V. A. Hospital of the right elbow, right shoulder and spine revealed general normality in the bones, joints and interspaces with changes only minimal where they occurred.
Petitioner’s family physician, Dr. C. D. Killian, stated: “This man will not be able to return to his employment nor will he be able to do any type of manual labor again and, as I understand it, this is his only qualification. In my professional judgment I would classify him as being totally and permanently disabled.”
Dr. A. I. Chenoweth stated, “Mr. Copeland is totally and permanently disqualified- for any gainful employment by reason of arthritis and anxiety tension state with an inadequate personality and an inactive duodenal ulcer.”
Nearly a year after petitioner’s application had been filed he underwent a neuropsychiatric examination which showed a mental age of eight years with final diagnosis of (1) mental deficiency and (2) chronic anxiety reaction. On January 12, 1960, Dr. John N. Chit-wood of Birmingham, Alabama examined petitioner and concluded, “In my opinion this man is permanently and totally disabled to perform any type of work.” Dr. Glenn Barnes was of the opinion that “Mr. Copeland does have osteoarthritis but not of sufficient degree to totally incapacitate him. A psychiatric evaluation is, however, suggested, as I feel that he probably has a personality defect.” A general and neuropsychiatric examination was conducted by Dr. Henry Spira on November 24, 1959. Dr. Spira reported, “There is no objective evidence of swelling, edema, deformity, ankylosis, or any muscular atrophy * * *. There is no objective evidence of any arthritic change or any muscular weakness or atrophy. Subjectively, however, the patient complains of severe pain on flexion of the trunk and he is hardly able to make a fist or stand on his heels or his toes. There is a marked difference’ between subjective complaints and objective findings. * * * The only abnormality found with respect to the nervous system was complete deafness of the left ear. * * * ” Dr. Spira further stated “Perhaps the most outstanding factor in the patient’s general attitude was the fact that he exaggerated his symptoms.”
After a psychiatric evaluation on July 18, 1961, Dr. James Sussex summarized that “this man is considered to show impairment of intellectual functions and of general adjustment to a degree inconsistent with any mental, emotional or other psychiatric disorder, disease or defect which can be demonstrated in this single examination.”
Petitioner, citing decisions under the Social Security Act, and contending that the standards which the courts have applied in interpreting the disability provisions under that Act apply also in the interpretation of the disability provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act, argues that there was not substantial evidence to support the Railroad Retirement Board’s finding that petitioner’s physical and mental condition was not such that he was unable to engage in any regular employment. It is claimed on behalf of the Board that the tests provided by the two Acts are not identical. § 11 of the Railroad Retirement Act, under which this action was brought, incorporates by reference the judicial review provisions of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 355(f), which provides that: “The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive.”
The standards prescribed in the Social Security Act are of like import: “The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, * *
A painstaking examination of the evidence, some of which has been discussed supra, leads us to the conclusion that the finding of the Board was not supported by substantial evidence. The decision of the Railroad Retirement Board is, therefore, reversed and the case remanded for such proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[Judge DeVANE participated in the hearing and decision of this case, but died before the foregoing opinion was written.]
. 45 U.S.C.A. § 228b (a) (5).
. E.g., Butler v. Fleming, 5 Cir., 1961, 288 F.2d 591; Ferran v. Flemming, 5 Cir., 1961, 293 F.2d 568; and cf. the opinion of Judge Rives, sitting as District Judge of the Middle District of Alabama, in Aaron v. Fleming, 1958, 168 F.Supp. 291.
. 45 U.S.C. § 228 (k).
. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0