What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, Petitioner, v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Respondent.
No. 76-1873.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Order Granting Motion Dec. 23, 1976.
Decided Feb. 22, 1977.
Peter R. Taft, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Earl Salo, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on the motion to dismiss filed by respondent.
Gerry Levenberg, Washington, D.C., and Veri R. Topham, Salt Lake City, Utah, were on the response in opposition filed by petitioner.
Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge.
Opinion filed by LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge.
Opinion filed by FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, joining with LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge.
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:
Utah Power & Light Company (UP&L) petitioned this Court for direct review of a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), subjecting three of UP&L’s steam electric generating plants under construction to new source review under agency regulations regarding “significant deterioration of air quality.” In its petition for review filed September 20, 1976, UP&L predicated this Court’s jurisdiction upon Section 307(b)(1) of the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
On November 2,1976, EPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in this Court. Specifically, EPA contended that UP&L was not challenging “the Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating” a state implementation plan, within the meaning of Section 307(b)(1). On December 23, 1976, after considering the motion and the response thereto, this Court entered an order granting EPA’s motion to dismiss.
I
On December 5, 1974, respondent EPA promulgated regulations designed to prevent “significant deterioration” of air quality. The regulations, effective January 6, 1975, were made applicable to any new stationary source “which has not commenced construction or modification prior to June 1, 1975 . . . .” The regulations were incorporated into all state implementation plans.
In a letter dated September 2, 1975, Region 8 of the EPA requested that UP&L supply certain information on its plans to construct new power plants. UP&L responded by letter dated September 12,1975, noting, inter alia, that it had begun construction on three new plants in Utah, aftér having obtained new source construction permits from the Utah Air Conservation Committee (“Committee”). In accordance with the then existing Utah Air Conservation regulations, these permits were based upon plans that included for each plant a flue gas desulfurization unit (“scrubber”), designed to remove 80 percent of the sulfur dioxide from the flue gases emitted by each plant. Construction on all three plants commenced prior to June 1, 1975, the cutoff date under the EPA significant deterioration regulations.
The Utah Air Conservation regulations were amended on July 9,1975. On September 15, 1975, three days after its letter to EPA, UP&L applied to the Utah Committee for a determination that under the amended state regulations, the scrubbers were no longer required. In early 1976, the Utah Committee approved the elimination of the scrubbers from the plans for UP&L's three Utah plants.
On February 4, 1976, UP&L filed a request for an EPA ruling that the significant deterioration regulations do not apply to the three Utah plants. On March 25, 1976, EPA’s Region 8 notified UP&L that the elimination of the scrubbers constituted a “modification” of the plants, occurring after June 1, 1975, and that such modification would bring the three plants within the ambit of the regulations. Region 8 instructed UP&L to submit an application for permission to modify, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(d) (2)-{3). UP&L requested reconsideration on May 7,1976. In a letter dated August 23, 1976, Region 8 reaffirmed its earlier opinion and notified UP&L that its decision was “a final determination in the case.” Thereupon UP&L filed with this Court a petition for review, which EPA seeks to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
II
This Court has previously noted that the jurisdictional provisions of the Clean Air Act “have been sources of periodic confusion” and that therefore “proper disposition of a motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction requires precise characterization of the action sought to be reviewed.” District of Columbia v. Train, supra note 8, 533 F.2d at 1252. Section 307(b)(1) grants exclusive jurisdiction to courts of appeals “to hear challenges to a limited class of actions taken by the Administrator.” In the present case, the Court must decide whether the challenged action — i.e., the EPA’s decision as to the applicability of the significant deterioration regulations — can fairly be characterized as “action in approving or promulgating any [state] implementation plan" under Section 307(b)(1). If so, the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to hear UP&L’s claim. If not, this Court is without jurisdiction and must grant the motion to dismiss.
Characterization of the challenged action depends in turn on the nature of petitioner’s challenge. Specifically, the court must determine whether the petitioner is attacking the validity of an agency regulation or, instead, is attacking a particular interpretation or application of that regulation. Both the language of Section 307(b)(1) and the policy considerations underlying that provision compel the conclusion that challenges to the validity of certain agency regulations are directly reviewable by courts of appeals, whereas challenges to interpretations of those regulations are not. As with most general rules, an exceptional case may defy easy classification. In our opinion, this is not such a case.
UP&L’s challenge cannot fairly be characterized as impugning the validity of 40 C.F.R. sections 52.21(d)(1) and 52.01(d), which, respectively, make the significant deterioration regulations applicable to stationary sources modified (as well as constructed) on or after June 1, 1975, and define “modification” to include “any physical change in or change in the method of operation of” the polluting source. First, UP&L’s petition for review does not, on its face, attack the validity of the significant deterioration regulations. Second, as EPA notes, this Court has already sustained the validity of those regulations. Finally, any further facial challenge would seem to be time-barred under Section 307(b)(1).
Consequently, unless UP&L seeks to chailenge the EPA’s interpretation of the new regulations, the statute provides that petitioner will not be entitled to judicial review in any federal court. And, as previously indicated, that kind of challenge is not cognizable under Section 307(b) (l). Although we need not reach the question in this case, we note that if federal review of the action challenged here is available at all, it should be sought in the district court.
. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.01(d),(f), 52.21.
. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l). That section provides, inter alia, that a petition for review of “the Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating” any state implementation plan “may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.” See note 10 infra.
. The states are charged with the duty to develop implementation plans designed to achieve the level of air quality prescribed by national “primary” and “secondary” air quality standards promulgated by the Administrator of EPA. Section 107, 42 U.S.C. § 1857C-2. Pursuant to Section 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5, each state must submit its implementation plan to the Administrator for his approval. A proposed implementation plan must satisfy the requirements set out in Section 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2).
. 39 Fed.Reg. 42510 (1974). Minor amendments to the regulations were published on January 16, 1975 (40 Fed.Reg. 2802), June 12, 1975 (40 Fed.Reg. 25004), and September 10, 1975 (40 Fed.Reg. 42011).
. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(d)(1), 52.01(d), (f). 40 CFR § 52.21(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Review of new sources . . . [T]he requirements of this paragraph [i.e., the significant deterioration regulations] apply to any new or modified stationary source of the type identified below which has not commenced construction or modification prior to June 1, 1975 . . ..
40 C.F.R. § 52.01(d) provides, in pertinent part:
The phrases “modification” or “modified source” mean any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the emission rate of any pollutant for which a national standard has been promulgated .
. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 52.2346 (amending Utah’s implementation plan to incorporate by reference the significant deterioration regulations).
. See note 5 supra.
. District of Columbia v. Train, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 115, 533 F.2d 1250, 1252, cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 2224, 48 L.Ed.2d 829 (1976). See also National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 111, 512 F.2d 1351, 1361 (1975), in which Judge Wright, dissenting in part, stated that “the courts play jurisdictional badminton with these provisions,” “batting” cases back and forth between the district court and the court of appeals.
. District of Columbia v. Train, supra note 8, 533 F.2d at 1254 (emphasis added).
. Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l), specifies a number of grounds for direct review in the court of appeals:
A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard under section 1857c-7 of this title, any standard of performance under section 1857c-6 of this title, any standard under section 1857Í-1 of this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 1857f — 1(b)(1) of this title), any determination under section 1857f-1(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition under section 1857f-6c of this title, or any standard under section 1857Í-9 of this title may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 1857c-5 of this title or section 1857c-6(d) of this title, or his action under section 1857c-10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title or under regulations thereunder, may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.
None of the other grounds is relevant to this case, and neither party has argued otherwise.
. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l); see District of Columbia v. Train, supra note 8, 533 F.2d at 1252, 1254.
. See id.
. This distinction is not new to the law. In determining the degree of deference owed an agency determination, courts have distinguished between claims that an agency’s action is ultra vires and claims that an agency’s interpretation of the act it administers is legally unsound. See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 272, 487 F.2d 1143, 1170-71 (1973), aff’d sub nom., Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 94 S.Ct. 2737, 41 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974).
. Only by straining the meaning of the words “approving” and “promulgating” could it be said that challenges to interpretations or applications of EPA regulations constitute attacks on “the Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating” any state implementation plan. Nothing in the legislative history of Section 307(b)(1) supports this strained reading of the statutory language. Indeed, a passage in the Report of the Senate Committee on Public works clearly reveals that applications of agency regulations are not embraced within Section 307(b)(1). In discussing Section 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) [see note 18 infra], which, in enforcement proceedings, precludes review of issues that could have been raised under Section 307(b)(1), the Senate Committee states: “Of course, the person regulated would not be precluded from seeking review at the time of enforcement insofar as the subject matter applies to him alone.” S.Rep.No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1970). If attacks on particular applications of regulations are not precluded by Section 307(b)(2), then presumably they are not reviewable under Section 307(b)(1).
. The petition for review seeks review of the EPA’s determination “that petitioner’s three steam electric generating units, all of which commenced construction prior to June 1, 1975, are nonetheless subject to the regulations promulgated by respondent entitled ‘Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration’, 40 CFR Sections 52.01(d), (f), and 52.21.”
. See Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 540 F.2d 1114 (1976), cert. granted sub. nom. Utah Power & Light Co. v. EPA,-U.S.-, 97 S.Ct. 1597, 51 L.Ed.2d 802. The Court sustained the “commenced” and “modified” provisions against a claim that the regulations should apply to stationary sources commencing construction or modified prior to June 1, 1975. Id. at 1123, 1133.
. Section 307(b)(1) provides that any petition for review filed in a court of appeals pursuant to the jurisdictional grounds enumerated in that section “shall be filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation, approval, or action, or after such date if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day.” The significant deterioration regulations were promulgated on December 5, 1974, and were incorporated into Utah’s implementation plan on June 12, 1975.
There is no contention here that although the regulation as issued apparently was accepted by petitioner as constitutional, the interpretation at hand is a “new” circumstance that, if accepted as a correct interpretation of the regulation, has the effect of rendering the regulation invalid.
. The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to hear challenges to “the Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan.” 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1); see District of Columbia v. Train, supra note 8, 533 F.2d at 1252, 1254; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (“Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under [Section 307(b)(1)] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement”).
. See note 14 and accompanying text, supra. Recent judicial opinions have tended to construe Section 307(b)(1) narrowly. See District of Columbia v. Train, supra note 8, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 115, 533 F.2d 1250 (challenge to consent agreement between EPA and GSA does not trigger Section 307(b)(1) jurisdiction); West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 522 F.2d 302, 309 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 3165, 49 L.Ed.2d 1183 (1976) (action for declaratory judgment that power company was not violating sulfur emission standards was a challenge to methods of compliance, not to plan itself, and thus did not constitute challenge to “Administrator’s action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan”); Utah International, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 478 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1973) (challenge to EPA order disapproving previously approved portions of state plan did not constitute challenge to approval or promulgation of implementation plan).
. Previous decisions of this court have upheld the jurisdiction of the district court under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. See, e.g., Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 507 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 & nn.4-5 (1974). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving the same jurisdictional issue. Mathews v. Sanders, 426 U.S. 905, 96 S.Ct. 2225, 48 L.Ed.2d 829 (1976). Whatever the outcome of that case, it appears that UP&L could bring suit in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), as amended by Act of October 21, 1976, Pub.L.No. 94-574, § 703, 90 Stat. 2721, which removed the amount in controversy requirement in civil actions against the United States or agencies thereof. Serious questions of due process would arise if neither of these provisions offered UP&L a jurisdictional predicate, in district court.
'Finally, we note that in its papers filed with this Court, UP&L stated that the ambiguities of the Clean Air Act created a dilemma: if petitioner had first filed a complaint with the district court, and if that court had then dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the 30-day statute of limitation in Section 307(b)(1) would have barred UP&L from seeking review in this Court. Recognizing that the statutory scheme encourages litigants to file petitioners for review in the courts of appeals whenever jurisdiction is in doubt, we urge Congress to adopt the recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States and amend Section 307 to provide for transfer between courts of appeals and district courts when a proceeding to review EPA action under the Clean Air Act is filed in the wrong forum. Administrative Conference of the United States, Resolution of December 10, 1976, Judicial Review Under the Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act, reprinted at 41 Fed.Reg, 56767 (Dec. 30, 1976). See Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 179 U.S.App. D.C. 311 at -, 551 F.2d 1270, at 1272-73 (1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1