What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ROBINSON v. UNITED STATES.
(Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted February 8, 1927.
Decided March 7, 1927.)
No. 4525.
Criminal law <S=»1169(5) — In robbery prosecution, admitting evidence that defendant and another were engaged in keeping house of prostitution held error,, not cured by instruction.
In prosecution for robbery committed in house of prostitution, it was error for court to permit witness to testify that for six months she had been luring men to defendant’s house and dividing money received with defendant, nor was such error cured by court’s instruction that testimony was to be considered only as explaining the presence of the witness in defendant’s house at the time involved.
Appeal from the Supreme Court of District of Columbia.
Sylvia Robinson and another were convicted of robbery, and the defendant named alone appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
J. A. O’Shea and J. H. Burnett, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Peyton Gordon and W. H. Collins, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
The appellant, together with one Ruth Mills, was tried, convicted, and sentenced upon a charge of robbing one L.eo Lagaña of his poeketbook, containing $290, at a certain time and place in the District of Columbia. The appellant alone has appealed.
The testimony tended to prove that Lagana was lured by Ruth Mills to the house of appellant for the purpose of prostitution; that appellant was present in the house at the time, and let them in at the door; that Lagaña and the woman Mills went into a bedroom and were upon the bed together, when he felt the woman take his poeketbook from his pocket; that he then jumped up, shouting, "I have been robbed,” and found his empty pocketbook lying upon the bed; that at the time he entered the house with the woman his pocketbook contained $290 in bills, on one of which he had previously written the figures “300”; that a search was immediately made by Lagaña and a policeman for the money, and it was found under a couch upon which appellant had seated herself as soon as the search began.
At the trial the government called one Ailene Davis as a witness. She testified that she was present when Lagaña and Ruth Mills came into the house; that she saw appellant take off her shoes and tiptoe from the kitchen back to the door of the room into which they had gone; that when appellant returned to the kitchen she had some paper money with her; that witness then left the house by appellant’s orders. In the course of her examination in chief the witness was permitted to say, over the objection and exception of the defendant, that for a period of six months preceding this event she used to go to the defendant’s house for the purpose of luring men there, and had at divers times brought men there, and that she always divided the money received by her with the appellant, Robinson.
The court in its general charge to the jury instructed them that “the testimony of the witness Ailene Davis concerning the relations and financial transactions with Sylvia Robinson was not to be considered by the jury,- in so far as being evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged in the indictment, or any other crime, but was merely admitted for the single purpose of explaining the presence of the witness Davis in the house of the defendant Sylvia Robinson at the time of the commission of the alleged offense charged in the indictment.”
We think it was error for the trial court to permit the witness Davis to tell the jury that the defendant, with the assistance of witness, had been engaged in keeping a house of prostitution during the six months preceding the time of the alleged robbery. That fact simply reflected upon the defendant’s character, which had not been put in issue. It did not tend to' prove the crime charged,.nor to connect the defendant with it if committed; nor did it have any possible connection with the charge of robbery, which was then on trial. Billings v. U. S., 42 App. D. C. 413; Ambrose v. U. S., 45 App. D. C. 112; Ellis v. District, of Columbia, 45 App. D. C. 384; Boyd v. U. S., 142 U. S. 450, 12 S. Ct. 292, 35 L. Ed. 1077; Bishop’s New Cr. Proc. (2d Ed.) § 1120.
Nor do we think that this error was effectually remedied by the trial court’s instruction to the jury to consider this testimony only “for the single purpose of explaining the presence of the witness Davis in the house of the defendant Sylvia Robinson at the time of the commission of the alleged offense charged in the indictment.” Such an explanation was neither necessary nor relevant, and, moreover, the fact of her presence there was not denied. It may be noted that the court did not withdraw the irrelevant testimony from the jury, but simply instructed them concerning its application in the case. It had, however, no lawful application to the issue raised by the charge of robbery.
Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the lower court, and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent hérewith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0