What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Sylvester WADDELL, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 74-2041.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 10, 1975.
John P. Searls, Larry Victorson, El Paso, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
William S. Sessions, U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Ronald F. Ederer, Asst. U. S. Atty., El Paso, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before THORNBERRY, GOLDBERG and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:
On March 22, 1974, defendant-appellant Waddell was convicted by a jury of possession of a quantity of cocaine with intent to distribute that narcotic in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Although defendant was originally sentenced to serve a ten-year prison term with five years special parole, the trial judge subsequently reduced his sentence to five years imprisonment and five years special parole. The circumstances of Wad-dell’s apprehension and trial are very similar to those of United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 5 Cir. 1975, 507 F.2d 1213 [Feb. 10, 1975, No. 74-1914], also decided today. Here, as in Gomez-Rojas, the district court erred in its treatment of a defendant’s entrapment defense. We reverse.
On July 3, 1973, George Smith, an alleged Government informer, arranged a meeting in El Paso, Texas, between defendant and federal undercover agent Staton. At that meeting, Waddell tentatively agreed to sell Staton an ounce of cocaine for $1,000 or $1,100. The three men met again on the following day, and Waddell sold Staton 14 grams of cocaine which he had obtained from one Marial, a Mexican national. For the next several months, Smith and Staton urged Wad-dell to make additional sales of contraband, but defendant refused to do so. He was finally arrested on November 13, 1973, the day after the arrests in Gomez-Rojas.
Defendant Waddell, like defendant Sutherlin in Gomez-Rojas, admits participating in the narcotics transaction for which he was charged. He contends, however, that he was entrapped into making the sale by Smith, whom he claims is a paid Government informer. Waddell does not contend, as Sutherlin did, that Smith supplied the cocaine, so that there is no question of the Government selling contraband to itself. See United States v. Bueno, 5 Cir. 1971, 447 F.2d 903. Waddell alleges instead that Smith, a long-time acquaintance, had pressured him for some months to sell various sorts of contraband, but that he, Waddell, had always refused. Finally, in June of 1973, Smith told defendant that he needed to obtain some cocaine in order to pay pressing gambling debts. Waddell argues that only then did he capitulate, contact his friend Marial, and make the sale to Smith and Staton. In a word, Waddell claims that he had no predisposition to commit the crime with which he is charged, but rather that Smith induced him to break the law.
I
Here, as in the case of Sutherlin in Gomez-Rojas, Smith was subpoenaed to testify as a witness for a defendant alleging entrapment. On March 20, 1974, the day before Waddell’s trial was to begin, Smith appeared before the trial judge, who had recently completed the Gomez-Rojas trial, and once again advised the court that, if called as a witness, he would refuse to testify for fear of self-incrimination. Once again, the district court immediately excused Smith, despite Waddell’s protest.
We have discussed the consequences of the district court’s decision to excuse Smith from giving testimony in Gomez-Rojas; the discussion there is controlling here. For reasons set out below, we have concluded that Waddell is entitled to a new trial. At a second trial, if Smith continues to refuse to testify, the trial court must make a searching inquiry into the validity and extent of Smith’s Fifth Amendment claims and then determine what use, if any, Wad-dell may make of Smith’s reluctance to testify at the new trial.
II
Waddell also complains that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the legal basis of his entrapment defense, in that the court failed to advise the jury that entrapment can be perpetrated by paid Government informers as well as by law enforcement officials. The trial judge charged the jury that:
In this case, the fact that someone may have informed the agent that this man [Waddell] was available to make a sale — the Government can accept that. The only thing the Government cannot do as far as entrapment is concerned is to originally put this in his mind. ,
. If somebody urges you to break the law and finally, to get them off your back you go ahead and break the law you would be legally responsible, but if the Government directs somebody to keep harassing him and harassing him, a man that had never engaged in this activity and didn’t have an inclination that way, then that would be an excuse, but the mere fact that an informer notifies the Government and the Government provides the opportunity, that is not entrapment, if the Government wasn’t the one that instigated the harassment, or if this man Smith harassed him and if the Government did not tell Smith to harass this man, then you wouldn’t . have entrapment either.
If you believe [that Smith acted as Waddell alleges he did], then you decide whether the Government was the one that instigated George Smith to harass him over a period of a year’s time or a little over a year’s time, [emphasis added],
Although we must evaluate a jury charge as a whole, without paying particular attention to an isolated statement which is not prejudicial in the context of the total charge, United States v. Cisneros, 5 Cir. 1974, 491 F.2d 1068, it is clear that insofar as this instruction charges that only law enforcement officials can entrap citizens, the instruction is erroneous. The law is that Smith, if he was a paid Government informer, could entrap Waddell, even though no Government officer knew of Smith’s actions, because the Government is deemed to have constructive knowledge of such chicanery; the defense of entrapment cannot be defeated because the trapping was perpetrated by a Government surrogate. Sherman v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848; United States v. Oquendo, 5 Cir. 1974, 490 F.2d 161; United States v. Bueno, supra; see United States v. Gomez-Rojas, supra. Since this error strikes at the heart of Waddell’s only defense, and since it was not cured elsewhere in the charge, defendant’s conviction must be reversed and his cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
. Our disposition of this case is such that we pretermit discussion of Waddell’s other claims of error.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0