What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
RONEY v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 3492.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Oct. 3, 1933.
Wilton H. Wallace, of Washington, D. C. (E. F. Colladay, Joseph C. MeGarraghy, and Colladay, MeGarraghy, Colladay & Wallace, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
William Cutlér Thompson, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen. (Sewall Key and J. P. Jackson, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and E. Barrett Prettyman, Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and J. A. Lyons, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT, and SOPER, Circuit Judges.
NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition to review a decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals involving income tax of the petitioner for the year 1928 in the amount of $35,373.07. The opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals is reported in 26 B. T. A. 1213. The facts were stipulated and are as follows:
In 1919 the petitioner and one Morris Sehapiro, who were engaged in the wholesale scrap iron and metal business, purchased from the Gwynnbrook Distillery, a corporation, the land, building, and equipment of said distillery located at Gwynnbrook, Md., with the intention of dismantling the distillery and selling the salvage material. They had purchased other distilleries in Kentucky, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and disposed of them in that manner. After commencing dismantling operations, the owners decided that it would be profitable to manufacture whisky for medical purposes.
Late in the year 1920 a permit to manufacture medicinal whisky at Gwynnbrook Distillery was secured from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and shortly before its expiration this permit was renewed for another year. Between November, 1920, and January, 1922, the partnership Gwynnbrook Company, whose members were the petitioner and his partner Schapiro, manufactured whisky under these permits. To carry on this business, they hired a man who had been superintendent of the former corporation. The whisky manufactured was at first placed in a government concentration warehouse and warehouse receipts were given for it. In 1925, when the government ordered the removal of the whisky from the concentration warehouse, it was placed in the warehouse of the Baltimore Distillery Company. The original warehouse certificates were surrendered, and new certificates were issued to the owners of the whisky.
In 1925 the Gwynnbrook Company entered into an agreement to sell all the whisky represented by the certificates. Under this agreement, whisky was to be delivered and paid for at intervals during the years 1927 to 1932. In accordance with this arrangement, the whisky represented hv certificates 1 to 9', inclusive, was sold in 1927. In 1928 the balance of the whisky represented by certificates 10 to 60 was transferred to and paid for by the purchasers. It was stipulated that the partnership, Gwynnbrook Company, realized a net profit of $630,027.20 in 1928, when tbe whisky covered by tbe certificates was sold, and that one-half of the net profit is, taxable to this petitioner. The petitioner reported his profit as capital net gain.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that the profit realized on the sale of the whisky in the year 1928 was taxable as ordinary income and this holding was affirmed by the Board. The petitioner contends that the profit realized was taxable as “capital gain” under section 101 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2101), which defines a capital asset as: “ * * * Property held by the taxpayer for more than two years (whether or not connected with his trade or business), hut does not include stoek in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property beld by tbe taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of bis trade or business. * * * ”
The sole question involved is whether tbe whisky manufactured by tbe petitioner and bis partner during tbe years 1920', 1921, and 1022 was stock in trade properly to be included in an inventory and property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of bis trade or business, or was property beld for more than two years as an investment. It is also contended on behalf of tbe petitioner that be and bis partner were principally engaged in the junk business and were not actually engaged in tbe manufacture of whisky.
That tbe petitioner did not purchase tbe distillery with tbe primary intention of operating it seems clear, but that the intention with which the purchase was made was changed is equally clear, and the partnership undoubtedly went into the business of manu-. factuxing whisky. A permit was secured from the government for the* manufacture of whisky as distillers, and the distillery was operated through two distillery seasons, 1920-2.1 and 1921-22. The fact may not he disputed that a person may be engaged in more than one trade or business (Mente v. Eisner [C. C. A.] 2:66 E. 161, 11 A. L. R. 496), and the fact that' petitioner and his partner were in the junk business does not at all negative the fact that they were also in the distillery business, a business for which they bad to procure a permit from tbe government. As was said by the Board of Tax Appeals in its opinion: “Tbe production involved the use of a fully equipped whiskey-distilling plant and the employment of men. The petitioners carried on their distilling operations under the firm name of the Gwynnbrook Company and' gave their product the name of ‘Gwynnbrook Pure Rye Whiskey.’ The whiskey was stored' prior to sale, and was sold, under the firm' name. While the whiskey was in storage it was- held primarily for sale, the time t®. depend' uponi market conditions. The time' must have' appeared to he ripe in 1925, for the whole lot was then sold by the partnership; for future-deliveries. The manufacture, storage, and sale of the whiskey was all in accordance’with, the plan adopted before distilling.-operations were commenced.”
It may be mentioned, incidentally, that' the-aging of whisky might be properly regarded as a part of the process of its manufacture..
The whisky in question was the st'oek in' trade of the partnership operating, as theGwynnbrook Company, and was property proper to be included in tbe inventory-'of. the-partnership-.
We think the ease is controlled by a decision of' the Supreme Court in Renziehausem v. Lucas,. 280: U. S. 387, 50 S. Ct. 156, 74 L. Ed. 501.
The activities of the partnership with; regard to the whisky business between the years 1922 and 1925 were continuously carried on, even though slight, and consisted in paying-warehouse' charges and transporting the whisky from- one-warehouse to .another in the-year 1924 and again in the year 1925, but very slight activity constitutes “doing business”"' when the end is profit. Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust (C. C. A.) 39 F.(2d) 43; Harmar Coal Co. v. Heiner (C. C. A.) 34 F.(2d) 725; Sloan v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 63 F. (2d) 666.
We are of the opinion that the decision of the Board was correct, and the order is accordingly affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1