What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. LEGG et al.
No. 3565.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
April 3, 1934.
George I. Neal, U. S. Atty., of Huntington, W. Va. (Okey P. Keadle, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Huntington, W. Va., on the brief), for the United States.
Roderick G. Merrick, of Charleston, W. Va. (William G. Thompson and George Love, both of Fayetteville, W. Va., on the brief), for appellees.
Before PARKER and SOPER, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAM C. COLEMAN, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal in a war risk insurance ease, and the only question presented is the sufficiency of the evidence to establish total and permanent disability while the insurance was in force. The insured was discharged from the army March 3, 1919, and the premiums paid continued the insurance in force during that month. He had been gassed and shell-shocked while in military service and following his discharge he had epileptic seizures. Grand mal epilepsy gradually developed and beeame worse towards the end of his life. He died in August, 1929, not from epilepsy, however, but as a result of acute dysentery.
There is no sufficient evidence in the ease that the insured became totally and permanently disabled as a result of the epilepsy, or from other cause, while the insurance was in force. On the contrary, the facts established by undisputed testimony show that he was not totally and permanently disabled at that time. Shortly after his discharge from the army in 1919 he went to work for the Long Branch Coal Company, and in the August following he was married. In applying for compensation about that time he stated that he went to work for the coal company at wages of $75 per month; and the testimony is that he worked for that company from 1919 to 1925. The records of his earnings for the years 1919 to 1922 were not available; but the books of the company show that he was paid as wages in 1923, $615.09, in 1924, $621.60, and in 1925, $806.-68. In the light of this work record, a finding of total and permanent disability while the policy was in force cannot be sustained. U. S. v. Harrison (C. C. A. 4th) 49 F.(2d) 227; U. S. v. Diehl (C. C. A. 4th) 62 F.(2d) 343; U. S. v. McGill (C. C. A. 8th) 56 F.(2d) 522; Nicolay v. U. S. (C. C. A. 10th) 51 F.(2d) 170. The ease here is very similar to that before the Supreme Court in Lumbra v. United States, 290 U. S. 551, 54 S. Ct. 272, 78 L. Ed. 492, and, in view of the decision there, further discussion here is unnecessary.
The judgment appealed from will be reversed.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0