What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Eclophia SMITH, Jr., Appellee, v. James MARCANTONIO, Bill Armontrout, Donald Cline, Orolee Brady, Dick Moore, Dr. Richard K. Bowers, Appellants.
No. 89-2476.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted April 9, 1990.
Decided Aug. 6, 1990.
Bruce Farmer, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellants.
Andrew C. Webb, Sedalia, Mo., for appel-lee.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge and FAGG, Circuit Judge.
FAGG, Circuit Judge.
Eclophia Smith, Jr. brought this civil rights action to recover damages for injuries he sustained as an inmate at the Missouri State Penitentiary. James Marcanto-nio, manager of the prison honor dormitory, Orolee Brady, correctional officer assigned to the honor dormitory, and Dr. Richard K. Bowers, chief medical officer of the prison hospital, appeal from a district court order denying their motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. We reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment.
Unknown prison inmates poured a scalding liquid on Smith as he slept in the honor dormitory, causing severe burns. Smith was transported to the University of Missouri Hospital for treatment, including skin grafts on the burned areas. After this treatment, Smith returned to the prison hospital with directions for medication, daily dressing changes for his burns, and weekly checkups at the University Hospital. For about three weeks, Smith alternated between the prison hospital and a dormitory for inmates awaiting their prison assignments, where he received outpatient treatment. When Smith complained about his outpatient care, he was readmitted to the prison hospital. Afterwards, Smith returned to the honor dormitory. Smith also received follow-up examinations at the University Hospital. Smith’s wounds have healed to complete recovery.
Smith claims Marcantonio and Brady failed to take adequate precautions to protect him from harm by other inmates. Although Dr. Bowers never treated him, Smith claims Dr. Bowers acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, because Smith did not receive the exact treatment the University Hospital prescribed and Dr. Bowers prematurely discharged him from the prison hospital while his burns were still healing.
Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless: their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right; they knew or should have known the right was clearly established; and they knew or should have known their conduct violated the right. Tyler v. Barton, 901 F.2d 689, 690-91 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam). Smith’s right to be protected from harm by fellow inmates and his right to adequate medical care are beyond dispute. In this case, however, the summary judgment record fails to support Smith’s claims that Marcantonio, Brady, and Dr. Bowers violated those rights. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
Our inquiry into Smith’s claims against Marcantonio and Brady begins and ends with his deposition testimony:
Q. To this day [do] you [ ] know [which] inmates [scalded you]?
Smith: No.
Q. [D]id you have any animosity towards any other inmate within the Missouri State Penitentiary?
Smith: No.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe [ ] anybody might want to scald you?
Smith: No.
Q. Did you give any of the [prison officials] any reason to believe that somebody might scald you?
Smith: No, because I [didn’t] know. It’s [] something that just happened.
Q. [Y]ou told Mr. Marcantonio that you feared for your life?
Smith: After the incident, yes.
Q. How about prior to the incident?
Smith: No, because I didn’t know ... this was gonna happen.
Q. But you never complained to Mr. Marcantonio prior to this incident that security was inadequate?
Smith: No.
Q. Did [you feel] at any time prior to this incident [] that your life was in danger?
Smith: No.
Q. [Y]ou didn’t feel there were any inmates in [the honor dormitory] that were a threat to you?
Smith: I didn’t fear that at all, no.
Q. Did you think that Officer Brady could have done anything to prevent this?
Smith: No, I don’t believe he could.
Q. How about Mr. Marcantonio, could he have done anything to prevent this from happening?
Smith: No, I don’t think so. He wasn’t there at the time ... that it happened, no.
Smith’s factually impoverished claim that Marcantonio and Brady were aware of the risk of injury to Smith is frivolous. The summary judgment evidence shows Mar-cantonio and Brady were unaware of any immediate threat of harm to Smith. Smith himself had no inkling he was in any danger of harm before he was injured, and he never complained of specific fears for his safety. Smith sustained his injuries in the first violent episode in the honor dormitory, and the identity and origin of his attackers remain a mystery. Nor does the evidence support Smith’s assertion that Brady permitted inmates to enter Smith’s sleeping quarters to harm him. Indeed, in his deposition Smith testified neither Marcantonio nor Brady could have prevented the attack. Because Smith has not made a showing sufficient to establish Marcantonio and Brady failed to protect him from known dangers of attacks by fellow inmates, Miller v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 841, 105 S.Ct. 145, 83 L.Ed.2d 84 (1984), or that a pervasive risk of harm prevailed within the honor dormitory, Porra v. White, 762 F.2d 635, 637 (8th Cir.1985), Marcantonio and Brady are entitled to a summary judgment grant of qualified immunity.
Smith’s claim that Dr. Bowers was deliberately indifferent to Smith’s serious medical needs is equally deficient. In a nutshell, Smith merely disagrees with his medical treatment. Smith thought he ought to remain in the prison hospital instead of convalescing in nonmedical housing with outpatient care. He demanded more pain-killing medication than the prison’s medical personnel were willing to dispense. He was dissatisfied with the frequency of his bandage changes. He blamed Dr. Bowers for a one-week delay in his first checkup at the University Hospital. Because Smith’s complaints represent nothing more than mere disagreement with the course of his medical treatment, he has failed to state an eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference. Lair v. Oglesby, 859 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam). Further, Dr. Bowers cannot be held liable for Smith’s claims of inadequate treatment by other medical personnel because respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir.1990). Dr. Bowers is entitled to a summary judgment grant of qualified immunity.
Summary judgment is designed to remove factually unsubstantial cases like Smith’s from crowded district court dockets. See City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988). We thus reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remand for the entry of judgment dismissing Smith’s claims against Marcantonio, Brady, and Dr. Bowers.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1