What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Roman TORINO, Appellant, v. TEXACO, INC.
No. 16244.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued March 22, 1967.
Decided May 16, 1967.
Avram G. Adler, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
E. Alfred Smith, Philadelphia, Pa., (Timothy J. Mahoney, and Krusen, Evans & Byrne, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before STALEY, Chief Judge, and KALODNER and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
STALEY, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a dismissal for want of prosecution of a seaman’s civil action. The dismissal was prompted by the failure of the plaintiff-appellant, Roman Torino, to appear at his trial. Despite the fact that Torino’s counsel was prepared to try the case, the district court on its own motion dismissed the case. The precise question before us is whether an action may be dismissed for want of prosecution where counsel is ready to proceed in the absence of his client. We hold that, under the particular circumstances present here, a dismissal was proper.
Plaintiff was allegedly injured in November of 1961 while employed as a cook aboard the “S.S. Texaco Virginia” when he tripped over a sill separating a passageway from a storeroom. Civil and Admiralty actions were filed in March, 1962, but the latter was dismissed without prejudice in June of that year. We are concerned only with the civil action. Admiralty Rule 38, 28 U.S.C.A., has no application.
Because of plaintiff’s frequent and long absences from Philadelphia and his failure to consult with his attorney, the discovery phase of this litigation was unduly prolonged. The defendant moved for a dismissal of the action in December of 1964 because of plaintiff’s failure to answer interrogatories and to appear for an oral examination. A hearing was held in the late summer of 1965. The district court thereupon entered an order denying the motion with leave to renew it in the event that plaintiff failed to file a written statement that he wished to proceed and that he would be present for pre-trial and trial.
The plaintiff never complied with that portion of the order relating to his being present for pre-trial and trial. Subsequently, the case twice came into the “ready pool” on the trial list. On both occasions plaintiff’s counsel requested continuances. The first was granted, but only on the condition that the case would be restored to the highest possible position on the trial list within a month (it was expected that plaintiff would have returned to Philadelphia by that time). Plaintiff failed to appear; and when the case was again called, the motion for a continuance was denied. Thereupon, plaintiff’s counsel proceeded to trial in the absence of his client. A jury was impaneled and sworn. Coúnsel sought to introduce plaintiff’s answers to defendant’s interrogatories and statements from the defendant’s pre-trial memorandum to prove liability. The court requested the defense to move for a dismissal but the defense failed to do so (apparently because the dismissal might not have gone to the merits). The defense then moved for a directed verdict, and it was denied. The district court, on its own motion, withdrew a juror and dismissed the case but granted the plaintiff leave to file within thirty days a motion to set aside the judgment. The plaintiff did file such a motion, but it was denied.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action because the plaintiff had a right to present his case in any manner which he desired; and if he failed to make out a prima facie case, it was then for the district court to non-suit him upon a defense motion to that effect. We agree that there is no requirement, absent a subpoena or court order or some unusual circumstance, for a plaintiff to appear and testify. See Dinsel v. Pennsylvania R R., 144 F. Supp. 883, 884 (W.D.Pa., 1956). We also agree that within reasonable limitations the plaintiff could present his case as he wished.
The pivotal fact in the disposition of this case is that plaintiff failed to comply with the district court’s order requiring him to state that he would be present for both the pre-trial and trial. He not only failed to state that he would appear; he failed to appear. The district court, in a memorandum denying the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the dismissal, specifically noted the failure to comply with the above-mentioned order as well as numerous other incidents reflecting plaintiff’s. disinterest in the litigation.
The district court relied upon Link v. Wabash R. R., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962), in dismissing, and we think its reliance was properly placed. In Link, the Supreme Court stated that the “inherent power” of a court to sua sponte dismiss a case for want of prosecution had not been disturbed by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 41(b), and held that the dismissal did not constitute an abuse of discretion especially when all the circumstances of the case were considered. Here, as. in Link, there were numerous instances of delays; and the district court stated that it relied upon all of them in dismissing. Considering the totality of circumstances as they existed before the district court, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
The only distinguishing factor between this case and Link is that the plaintiff here is a seaman and, as a ward of the court, is entitled to beneficent treatment. Like the district court, we are fully cognizant of this. There are, however, two cases, consolidated on appeal, and disposed of by this court in Lynn v. American Barge Line Co., 226 F.2d 934 (C.A.3, 1955), which provide ample authority for upholding a dismissal of this type. Both admiralty actions were dismissed by the district court. The first appeal arose out of circumstances similar to those which are present here. Libellant failed to appear at the trial and could not be located so that he could be served. His proctor sought to offer his deposition to prove liability; the respondent then called the libellant for cross examination. When he did not respond to the call, the court dismissed the case. The second appeal was from a dismissal arising out of libellant’s failure to answer interrogatories. We affirmed both appeals per curiam.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
. In denying the motion, the court stated:
“I am not persuaded by the reasons advanced by plaintiff that his failure to appear was due either to excusable neglect or to circumstances beyond his control. Instead, I am convinced that the failure to appear reflected plaintiff’s indifference to the prosecution of his relatively minor claim based on a questionable theory of liability.
*****
“ * * * I can only conclude that, in this case, plaintiff made a deliberate choice to subordinate the trial of his cause in favor of signing on for another voyage of approximately one month’s duration.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0