What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
STANDARD OIL CO. v. INDEPENDENT OIL MEN OF AMERICA.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted January 17, 1929.
Decided February 4, 1929.
Petition for Rehearing Denied. February 23, 1929.
No. 2118.
George A. Chritton, and Edward S. Rogers, both of Chicago, Ill., and Thomas L. Mead, Jr., of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Henry B. Floyd, of Chicago, Ill., and P. M. Floyd and Henry C. Robb, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and .ROBB and YAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.
This is a trade-mark opposition case, in which the appellant, Standard Oil Company, opposes the registration by appellee. Independent Oil Men of America, of a trade-mark for gasoline. The opposition was .sustained by the Examiner, who was on appeal reversed by the First Assistant Commissioner, and from the decision this appeal was taken.
The appellee’s mark consists of two concentric circles, in the space between which appear the words “Red Hat Gasoline.” Within the smaller circle is a representation of a fanciful hat, similar in appearance to that used by the mythical Unde Sam. The hat is red in color, with a blue band on it, with white stars. The opposer’s mark eonsi sis also of two concentric circles, and in the spate between the outer and the inner circles are the words “Red Grown Gasoline.” Within the inner circle is the representation o£ the crown of royalty, including the jewels incident to such a crown. -The jewels are indicated by lighter colors, and the main body of the crown is red. Tho common features of the two marks reside in the concentric circles, in whieh the printing occurs, and in which the words “red” and “gasoline” are common to both, the only distinction being in the words “hat” and “crown.” The principal distinction between the two marks is in the design placed within the inner circles. One shows a hat and the other a crown.
Tho opposition is based upon the likelihood of the two marks creating confusion in trade. There is no direct evidence of confusion, but this is not determinative of the issue of confusion under our decisions. The court will view the marks with reference to the goods to which they are applied, and from its own observation arrive at a conclusion as to the likelihood of confusion. Where, as in this instance, the goods on whieh the respective marks are used is the same, and though confusion between the representation of the hat and the representation of the crown might not be assumed, in the case of an experienced dealer or purchaser, we are of opinion that, considering the extensive use made of gasoline in modern trade and commerce, and the vast number of purchasers, consisting of all classes of individuals, the marks a.re deceptively similar, and the Examiner was right in so holding.
This is an other example of the many cases we have had before us where the likelihood of confusion could have been readily avoided, had applicant selected a mark not closely similar to its competitor. As said by Mr. Justice Robb, in Phœnix Paint & Varnish Co. v. John T. Lewis & Brothers Co., 32 App. D. C. 285, “The purpose of the act [15 USCA § 81 et seq.] being to prevent, and not to promote, fraud and mistake, wo would not feel inclined, even in a doubtful case, to grant registration to a claimant where it appeared, as here, that, when ho adopted the mark, he knew of its prior adoption and use by another firm in connection with goods of the same general character and properties. The opportunity for selection being as limitless as the human imagination, we have reason to question the motive prompting the adoption by one dealer of a mark previously applied by another dealer to like goods.”
The rule is the same where the mark, applied to the same goods, is confusingly similar. When one is attempting to imitate the mark of another, he would not commit the blunder of absolutely copying the mark. There are usually points of similarity and dissimilarity employed, in order that the difference may be interposed as an argument that the marks are not deceptively similar; but the issue for the court to determine is whether or not, when an incautious purchaser is confronted by only one of the marks, tho similarity will not be sueli as to cause deception.
We will not stop to indulge in any discussion of the point that color alone is not capable of appropriation as a trade-mark. While “red” is the predominating' color in connection with these marks, its use in connection with closely associated features of the marks tends strongly to induce confusion. In determining, however, whether or not the marks are so similar as to be likely to- lead to confusion in trade, all tho features mast be taken into- consideration, and, though one of them may be incapable of appropriation as a trade-mark, its use in connection with other features is not for that reason forbidden in establishing a. valid mark. The marks here, however, consist of features which, taken together, force the conclusion that they ore deceptively similar.
The decision of the Commissioner is reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1