What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
K. B. KIMBALL, Appellant, v. JONES-MAHONEY CORPORATION.
No. 16717.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 30, 1968.
Decided May 1, 1968.
Vincent A. Gamal, Christiansted, St. Croix, V. I., for appellant.
Warren H. Young, Young & Isherwood, Christiansted, St. Croix, V. I., for appellee.
Before KALODNER, STALEY and SEITZ, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SEITZ, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his declaratory judgment action on the merits.
By a contract dated September 9, 1964, the plaintiff agreed to buy and the defendant agreed to sell certain land owned by it and located on the Island of St. Croix. The purchase price was $33,495.-00. The agreement recited that $3,349.50 had been paid to the seller as an earnest money deposit. That money was placed in an escrow account with the Virgin Islands Title and Trust Company (“Trust Company”). The “closing” was to take place on or before 30 days from September 9, 1964. At closing the seller was required to deliver a “full Warranty Deed warranting the property to be free and clear of all liens and encumbrances [with immaterial exceptions].”
The agreement then contains the following pertinent paragraph:
“Title Examination and Default by Seller.
Buyer shall be allowed thirty (30) days from the date hereof [September 9, 1964] within which to obtain title insurance or to have title to the property examined by an attorney, if he so desires. If the title shall be shown to be defective * * * then Seller shall have ninety (90) days within which to correct such defect in title. If title is not good and merchantable at the time for closing, or not made good and merchantable within the time allowed herein to cure any defect in title, then this agreement shall be voidable at the election of the Buyer and all payments made shall be returned to the Buyer and the Seller shall pay to the Buyer all direct costs and expenses incurred.”
At some time prior to the closing date, plaintiff became aware of the fact that the property was subject to a tax lien which amounted to almost twice the purchase price. Consequently, performance of the contract was not tendered by the October 9, 1964, closing date. In November 1964, plaintiff wrote the defendant asking for a report as to removal of the lien, and said he was ready to close the transaction when a satisfactory arrangement was made. Defendant replied that if anything could be worked out it would be in touch. In June of 1965 defendant asked plaintiff if he was still interested in buying the property if the lien could be removed. Plaintiff replied that he was ready to close the transaction and indicated that his earnest money was still on deposit with the Trust Company. In January of 1966 plaintiff again made inquiry. Defendant responded that its efforts to remove the lien had been unsuccessful and indicated that it intended to keep trying.
By letter dated February 15, 1966, defendant’s attorney advised plaintiff, with a copy to defendant, as follows:
“In reviewing the file, it is apparent to us that the seller will not be in a position to clear the property of the Government tax lien within the for-seeable future. Under the circumstances, we feel that it would be better to conclude and resolve the contract of September 9, 1964. According to Paragraph 5 of that contract, you have the election to void the contract in the event that title is not cleared within the 90 additional days allowed to seller, or you have the alternative to purchase the property subject to whatever defect there may be.
“Will you please advise us of your election in this matter. If you wish to void the contract, we will have the Virgin Islands Title and Trust Company refund the down deposit of $3,-349.50. We will also have the seller corporation reimburse you whatever reasonable expenses you have incurred in this matter. If you wish to go through with the sale, we will prepare the deed and arrange for a closing. if 7f
Following a conversation between them on the previous day, the defendant’s attorney wrote a letter to plaintiff’s attorney dated February 18, 1966. This letter advised that the defendant was directing the Trust Company to refund plaintiff’s deposit, it being impossible for defendant to convey merchantable title. Thereafter plaintiff received a check dated February 21, 1966, from the Trust Company in the amount of his deposit. The check was unconditionally endorsed and cashed by plaintiff on February 25, 1966.
This action was filed on March 23, 1966. Plaintiff prayed (1) that he be declared to have the sole and exclusive right to specific performance of the contract at his election at such time as title to the property is good and merchantable, or (2) alternatively, that he be granted damages for breach of contract.
The district court found, after a hearing, that plaintiff in effect had elected to void the contract. It therefore denied both prayers of the complaint. Essentially plaintiff’s appeal challenges the correctness of the ruling that he elected to void the contract.
It is clear that the contract itself visualized the possibility that the seller might be unable to convey merchantable title. In that situation the purchaser was given what is denominated as an “election.” Whatever its full import, it is clear that one election available to the purchaser was the right to void the agreement and, of vital significance, to recover all payments made. The crucial issue then is whether, as the district court found, the purchaser so elected.
By the letters of February 15, and February 18, 1966, the defendant was putting plaintiff to what it considered to be an election. We need not pause to consider whether the terms of the election stated in the letters accurately reflected the agreement. We do say that the election to void the contract contemplated the return of the deposit to plaintiff. With knowledge thereof, plaintiff accepted and cashed the check after consultation with his counsel. This was an act which, as to the seller here, was only reasonably compatible with an intention to elect to void the contract. The fact that plaintiff’s attorney may have advised plaintiff that he could cash the check without any implication as to “consent” cannot prevail against an inconsistent objective manifestation of his intention.
We conclude that in this setting the cashing of the check representing the return of the deposit supports the ruling below that plaintiff elected to void the contract. The district court therefore properly dismissed the complaint on the merits.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0