What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Lena F. PACE, an Individual, Appellant, v. The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF OSA-WATOMIE, KANSAS, a Corporation, and Betty Jane Hartley, as Administra-trix of the Estate of Vesta Crayton, Deceased, Appellees.
No. 9860.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 27, 1968.
See also, D.C., 277 F.Supp. 19.
Albert O. Kiesow, Kansas City, Kan., for appellant.
Willard L. Phillips, Kansas City, Kan., (P. B. MeAnany, Thos. M. Van Cleave, Jr., James J. Lysaught, John J. Jureyk, Jr., Bill E. Fabian and Robert E. Fabian, Kansas City, Kan., on brief) for ap-pellee First National Bank of Osawa-tomie, Kansas.
Willis H. McQueary, Osawatomie, Kan., for appellee Betty Jane Hartley.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and BREITENSTEIN and HILL, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant-plaintiff Lena F. Pace claims two Kansas bank accounts on the ground that she is a surviving joint tenant. The trial court held that she was not and dismissed the action. Jurisdiction is based on diversity.
Plaintiff Lena Pace and decedent Vesta Crayton were friends of long standing. Vesta, who lived in Kansas, was in poor health. She owned property in California which was sold through the efforts of Lena acting under a power of attorney. A check for the cash proceeds of the sale, $27,021, was sent to Vesta. At the request of Vesta, Lena opened two accounts in a Kansas bank, a cheeking account for $5,000 and a savings account for the balance. Lena told the bank president that she wanted the accounts set up so that she could write checks to pay Vesta’s hospital or doctor bills. The banker produced a “Depositor’s Contract and Signature Card.” Lena signed it, later secured Vesta’s signature, and returned the card to the bank. There was no communication between Vesta and the bank other than that through Lena.
About two weeks later Vesta discussed her impending hospitalization with Lena, handed Lena the bank book and deposit slip reflecting the two accounts and said: “Lena, these are yours. * * In case I don’t go through with the surgery all right, everything don’t work out all right, it is yours to do as you please with.” Lena testified that her understanding was that the money was given to her on the contingency of death and that if Vesta recovered, the money was still hers (Vesta’s). Vesta died five days later. Before her death there were no additional deposits to, or withdrawals from, the accounts. Lena tried to draw on the cheeking account to pay the funeral expenses and payment was refused. Later Lena tried to withdraw all of each account and was refused the right to do so.
The signature card in pertinent part read:
“Dated 5-2-64. The Bank is authorized to recognize any of the signatures subscribed below in payment of funds or the transaction of any business for this account.
Here insert in Writing Whether Account is Individual; Joint; Partnership; or Corporation--”
The blank was never filled in. The banker testified that he did not know what kind of an account was desired.
The applicable Kansas statute says that a joint tenancy is not created unless the language used in the grant “makes it clear that a joint tenancy was intended to be created.” The pertinent Kansas law is summarized in Edwards v. Led-ford, 201 Kan. 518, 441 P.2d 834. With reference to bank accounts, the court said, Id. at 840, that “the terms of the contract of deposit must clearly indicate that a joint tenancy was intended.”
If the contract claimed to create the joint tenancy, here the signature card, is ambiguous, parol evidence may be received. Because of failure of a designation on the signature card of the type of account intended, the trial court received and considered parol evidence. The court found that even if the testimony of the plaintiff Lena is given the inferences most favorable to her, it “does not disclose an intention or direction from the decedent as the owner of the accounts or the potential grantor to set up joint tenancy accounts, or for that matter, any type of account, in which it was intended that the plaintiff have a property right.” We agree. Vesta made no grant of any kind. Her only dealings with the bank were through her agent Lena. Nothing shows the clear intent which the Kansas statute and decisions require. Indeed, the intent of the decedent was never made known. The plaintiff testified that at the time she opened the accounts she claimed no interest in or right to the money. The fact that there was no grant of any kind negatives the claim of both joint tenancy and tenancy in common.
The acts and words of the decedent on the night before she went to the hospital made no valid disposition of the property as a gift inter vivos. The gift was not absolute and unconditional because the plaintiff testified that the money would be Vesta’s if she lived.
Affirmed.
. Kan.Stat.Ann. § 58-501 provides that:
“Real or personal property granted or devised to two or more persons including a grant or devise to a husband and wife shall create in them a tenancy in common with respect to such property unless the language used in such grant or devise makes it clear that a joint tenancy was intended to be created: * * * »
. See Simonich v. Wilt, 197 Kan. 417, 417 P.2d 139, 145. Cf. Smith v. Blu-baugh, 199 Kan. 89, 427 P.2d 443, 448.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1