What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
A. B. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS, a municipal corporation; and Robert V. Smrha, as Chief Engineer of the Division of Water Resources of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture, Appellees.
No. 6258.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
May 23, 1960.
Kenneth G. Speir, Newton, Kan. (Vernon A. Stroberg, Herbert H. Size-more and Richard F. Hrdlicka, Newton, Kan., on the brief), for appellant.
Richard E. Pringle, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Kansas, and Warden L. Noe, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Kansas (John Anderson, Jr., Atty. Gen., State of Kansas, on the brief), for appellee R.
V. Smrha, Chief Engineer of Division of Water Resources, Kansas State Board of Agriculture.
Robert B. Morton, Wichita, Kan. (Fred W. Aley, Wichita, Kan., on the brief), for appellee City of Wichita, Kan.
Before PICKETT and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges, and SAVAGE, District Judge.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
This case is here for the second time. The first appeal involved action by the trial court in sustaining motions to dismiss the complaint. This court, on January 26, 1956, remanded the case with directions that “action upon such motions be held in suspense for a reasonable time to await determination in the state courts of important questions of state law involved herein.”
On October 1, 1959, the trial court again examined the matter and held that: (1) more than a reasonable time had elapsed since the filing of the mandate; (2) the issues involved an interpretation of Kansas law which should be made by Kansas courts; and, (3) the plaintiff [appellant] had instituted suit in a Kansas court of appropriate jurisdiction to establish his water use rights which are the principal issue in this controversy. The court then dismissed the action without prejudice.
Appellant-plaintiff Williams seeks a declaratory judgment that two water use permits issued by the Chief Engineer of the Division of Water Resources of the Kansas State Board of Agriculture to the City of Wichita are void and for an injunction restraining action under such permits. The gravamen of the complaint is that Williams owns land overlying certain water beds from which Wichita, under the permits in question, withdraws and will continue to withdraw water to an extent that the value of his land will be diminished. The basic issue is whether Williams has a property right in such water of which he has been deprived by the withdrawals under the permits.
There is no diversity of citizenship. Jurisdiction depends on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which requires a substantial federal question.
The complaint does not attack the constitutionality of the Kansas statute under which the permits were issued and does not allege that the issuance of the permits was in violation of that statute. The claim is that Williams has been unconstitutionally deprived of a property right. The determination of such claim involves the question as to whether, under Kansas law, a landowner has a property right in water which underlies the surface of his land.
Prior to the enactment of the Kansas Water Appropriation Act of 1945, Kansas recognized the doctrine of riparian rights. This was changed by the 1945 law. A state may modify or reject the riparian doctrine and adopt the appropriation system but in so doing it must recognize valid and existing vested rights. The Kansas statute, as amended, provides that permits are subject to valid existing vested rights which are protected either by actions for damages or for injunction.
We do not know, and are not advised, if in Kansas rights to underground waters are absolute on the theory that the owner of the land owns that below and above the surface, if they are correlative and subject to the rule of reasonable use, or if they are dependent upon appropriation and application to beneficial use. Such rights may or may not differ if they involve the waters of definite underground streams, percolating waters, or artesian waters. Rights to the use of underground waters depend upon state law and vary greatly. They should be determined by local law.
For the federal courts to step in and determine these important questions in advance of authoritative action by Kansas would be unwise because of the possibility of provoking unseemly conflict between the two sovereignties. The determination of the constitutional questions asserted here is not necessary unless Williams has a property right in the underground water. This should be determined by the state processes without any impairment by federal action. These reasons are sufficient under Martin, Successor to Lawler, etc. v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 224, 79 S.Ct. 1034, 3 L.Ed.2d 1186, and cases there cited, to support the lower court in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction in this declaratory judgment suit between citizens of the same state.
The trial court followed the mandate of this court and waited for over three and one-half years for the parties to have a determination of the basic issues in the state courts which were and still are open to them. Further patience is not required. The judgment of dismissal without prejudice is affirmed.
. Porter v. Bennison, 10 Cir., 180 F.2d 523, 525. See also Gully, State Tax Collector, etc., v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70, and Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Company, et al., 255 U.S. 180, 199, 41 S.Ct. 243, 65 L.Ed. 577. The reliance on the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, does not change this situation as that act applies only to cases within the jurisdiction of a federal court.
. The constitutionality of the statute was upheld by a federal three-judge district court in Baumann v. Smrha, D.C., 145 F.Supp. 617, affirmed 352 U.S. 803, 77 S.Ct. 96, 1 L.Ed.2d 73.
. Kan.G.S.1949, Ch. 82a, Art. 7.
. E.g. State ex rel. Peterson v. Kansas State Board of Agriculture, 158 Kan. 603, 149 P.2d 604, 608.
. See State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440.
. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Company, 174 U.S. 690, 702-704, 19 S.Ct. 770, 43 L.Ed. 1136; Baumann v. Smrha, supra, 145 F.Supp. at pages 624-625, and cases cited in footnotes 2 and 3.
. See Kan.G.S.1957 Supp., Ch. 82a, Art. 7. Pertinent provisions are §§ 82a-712 to 82a-716, as amended.
. Section 82a-716, as amended, reads in part: “If any appropriation, or the construction and operation of authorized diversion works results in an injury to any common-law claimant, such person shall be entitled to due compensation in a suitable action at law against the appropriator for damages proved for any property taken.”
. See Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, Misc. Pub. No. 418, United States Dept, of Agriculture, Chap. 4. A summary of state law governing ownership and use of underground waters appears at pp. 147-151. At p. 155, the statement is made that: “The principles governing ownership and use of percolating ground [underground] waters have been developed mainly by the courts.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0