What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BENTON STATE BANK, Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 71-1146.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Dec. 9, 1971.
Fred E. Briner, Benton, Ark., Robert D. Cabe, Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Edward L. Wright, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
E. DeMatt Henderson, Catlett & Henderson, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, MEHAFFY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This diversity appeal involves a suit brought on a bankers’ blanket bond issued by the defendant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, to plaintiff, Benton State Bank. The district court granted Hartford’s motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the coverage under Hartford’s bond was limited to an aggregate sum of $25,000.-00. We affirm.
Briefly the facts are that Benton State Bank was the victim of a fraudulent scheme whereby a real estate developer had obtained loans from the bank by the use of promissory notes and real estate mortgages bearing the names of fictitious persons or persons who had no connection with or knowledge of the transactions. The bank brought this action seeking recovery of $600,000.00, the face amount of the bond, and alleging losses in excess of that amount. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment.
The district court found that the only coverage under the bond as applied to this case was Clause E which provided protection with respect to losses sustained by the bank on account of reliance on forged documents, which would include notes, mortgages, or deeds of trust. It found that a rider denominated Partial Fraudulent Signature Coverage Rider, Form F-2890, did not apply. It found that Clause E was modified by a rider Form F-2849, which in pertinent part is as follows:
“In consideration of the premium charged for the attached bond as limited by this rider, it is agreed that:
“2. The total liability of the Underwriter under Insuring Clause (E) of the attached bond, with respect to any loss or losses sustained at any time but discovered after the date and hour this rider becomes effective, is limited to the sum of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND and NO/lOO - - - DOLLARS ($25,000.00).
“3. The liability of the Underwriter as limited in each of the paragraphs numbered 1 and 2 of this rider shall be a part of and not in addition to the amount of the attached bond; subject, nevertheless, to the Non-Reduction of Liability Section of the attached bond.”
The Non-Reduction of Liability Section referred to in the rider is Section 6 of the bond and is as follows:
“Section 6. Payment of loss under this bond shall not reduce the liability of the Underwriter under this bond for other losses whenever sustained; PROVIDED, however, that the total liability of the Underwriter under this bond on account of (c) any loss or losses other than those specified in (a) and (b) preceding, caused by acts or omissions of any person (whether one of the Employees or not) or acts or omissions in which such person is concerned or implicated, . . is limited to the sum above stated in the opening paragraph of this bond irrespective of the total amount of such loss or losses.”
The position of the defendant Hartford in this court and in the court below is that when rider Form F-2849 and Section 6 of the bond are construed together the limit of defendant’s liability under Clause E is $25,000.00 for loss occasioned by any one forgery and $25,000.00 for plural losses resulting from a number of separate forgeries perpetrated by the same person. Plaintiff bank contends here as it did below that with respect to plural losses occasioned by a series of forgeries committed by one person defendant’s limit of liability for each loss is limited to $25,000.00 but that it is also liable for the aggregate of losses up to the face amount of the bond or $600,000.00.
At the outset we agree with the district court that the only coverage provided is under Clause E of the bond as modified by rider F-2849 and that the rider denominated Partial Fraudulent Signature Coverage Rider, Form F-2890, does not apply since it deals with induced signatures, a factor not involved in this case. The .appellant bank does not appear to contend otherwise in this court.
We can find no controlling Arkansas law on the proper construction to be given the language of the bond. “This being so, it devolved upon the District Court in the case at bar, sitting in that State, to - determine what would probably be the decision of the highest court of the State in a similar factual situation. * * * In such a situation this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the District Court, unless it is clearly demonstrated that it misapplied the local law of Arkansas.” State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 346 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1965).
In reviewing cases of this nature this court has also stated:
“ ‘Finally, and in any event, we revert to principles well established by decision of this court: that our task is not to formulate the legal mind of the State but merely to ascertain and apply it: that the standard for review here on a doubtful question of state law is only whether the trial court has reached a permissible conclusion: that the appellants’ burden of showing misconception or misapplication of local law by the trial court is a heavy one; and that where we feel that the trial court has reached a permissible conclusion we do not interfere with it. * * * ’ ” State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 324 F.2d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1963).
With these rules in mind, we turn to the district court’s holding. It held that the rider Form F-2849 provided a total bond limit on Clause D and E losses. It held that under the Non-Reduction of Liability clause, Section 6 of the bond, there was no reinstatement of this total limit. We find support for this position in Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Arkansas Loan & Thrift Corp., 297 F.Supp. 73 (W.D.Ark.1969), aff’d, 427 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1970), and Roodhouse Nat’l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 426 F.2d 1347 (7th Cir. 1970). The Arkansas Loan & Thrift case, although not dealing directly with the matter, held that similar bond language did not operate to reinstate the face amount of the bond. The court in Roodhouse agreed with the Arkansas Loan & Thrift case, and as we interpret Roodhouse held that a similar rider provided a total limit on a similar Clause E coverage of a similar bond.
We cannot say that the district court’s holding was an impermissible one or that it clearly misapplied the local law of Arkansas. We recognize the rules of Arkansas law on ambiguous insurance contracts but we are not required to use a forced construction of the terms of the contract when no ambiguity exists. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Pennington, supra.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0