What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GRAY MOTOR CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
January 3, 1927.)
No. 4816.
I. Internal revenue <@=>25 — Collateral attack on income tax assessment in action on bond for payment held not permissible.
Collateral attack on assessment of income tax may not be bad in action on bond for payment of amount finally adjudicated by Commissioner " of Internal - Revende, on claim for abatement, to be due; but, desiring to dispute the assessment, the tax should be paid and steps taken to recover it back.
2. Internal revenue <§=>23 — Action on bond for payment of income tax heid maintainable within five years after filing of return (Revenue Act -1924, §§ 277, 1009 [Comp. St. §§ 6336i/6zz(4), 6371%k]).
Action on bond given on claim for abatement for payment of amount of income tax that may finally be adjudicated by Commissioner of Internal Revenue to be due can be maintained within the five years after return was filed, limited by Revenue Act 1924, §| 277, 1009 (Comp. St. §§ 6336%zz[4], 6371%k) for action where no bond is ■ given.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas; William H. Atwell, Judge.
- Action-by the United States against the Gray Motor Company and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.
Affirmed.
W. J. Rutledge, Jr., of Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs in error.
Henry Zweifel, U. S. Atty., and N. A. Dodge, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Port Worth, Tex. (Alexander W. Gregg, Gen. Counsel Bureau of Internal Revenue, and C. C. McCormick, Atty. Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and POSTER, Circuit Judges.
POSTER, Circuit Judge.
This ease comes' up on an agreed' statement of facts. Those material to a decision are as follows:
The Gray Motor Company, a Texas corporation, hereafter referred to as the company, was in the automobile business in Dallas. Its.fiscal year ended February 29th. On May 29, 1920, it filed its income and property tax return, showing that it was indebted' to the United States in the sum of $2,256.57; At the same time a payment of $564.15 was made, leaving a balance due of $1,692.42. On November 20, 1920, a claim for abatement of the balance of the tak was filed, and in connection therewith the ' company executed a bond in the sum of $2,100, to Scott Reed, collector of internal revenue, to secure the payment of $1,692.42, shown to be due under the return. On this bond W. 0. Connor and P. P. Florence, the other-plaintiffs in error, were sureties.- Briefly stated, the condition of this bond was that the company should" promptly pay the amount finally adjudicated by the Commissioner of - Internal Revenue to - be due th'e United States by the company for the year 1919 as taxes, penalties, and interests. Thereafter the return was audited, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that an overassessment of $365.16 had been made. A certificate to that effect was issued and the amount credited upon the account of the company, reducing the outstanding taxes against it to $1,327.27, and the claim for abatement whs denied and rejected. This amount was not paid, and on May 29, 1925, suit was brought on the bond. The company and the sureties filed answers, in which in substance they denied there was anything due, pleaded the statute of limitations of five years, and set up that Tom Gray, the manager of the company, had been guilty of fraudulent acts by which the company had lost money, so that in fact no profit was earned during its fiscal year 1919.
The District Court sustained demurrers to that part of the answer setting up the statute of limitations and fraudulent acts of the manager of the company. The jury was waived, and judgment' v?as entered in favor of the United States against the company and the sureties in the sum of $1,327.27, with interest at the rate of 1 per cent, per month from November Í4, 1922, and costs. Error is assigned to the sustaining of the demurrers, to the exclusion of evidence to sustain the allegations of the answer demurred to, and to the entering of the final judgment.
Extended discussion and citation of authority are .unnecessary to sustain the ruling of the District Court. The suit was on a bond, the condition of which had been clearly breached. By giving bond the company postponed payment of the amount admitted to be due by the return and secured immunity from distraint of its assets. To contest the amount of tax found to be due by the Commissioner in this proceeding would be to permit a collateral attack upon the assessment, something not countenanced by the law. If the company desired to dispute the assessment, the way was open by paying the tax and taking the proper steps to recover it back.
In any aspect of the case the plea of limitation is without merit. Had no bond been given, and the suit had been merely to collect the tax, it would have been timely, as it was brought within five years after the return was filed. Sections 277, 1009, Revenue Act of 1924 (Comp. St. §■§ 6336Vgzz(4), 63715/Gk). No other statute of limitation is relied on.
No error appearing in the record, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99