What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
William Jerald MYERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17254.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
April 18, 1967.
Leslie W. Morris, II, Lexington, Ky., for appellant.
James F. Cook, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky. (George I. Cline, U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., on the brief), for appel-lee.
Before O’SULLIVAN, PHILLIPS and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is from an order after a hearing overruling appellant’s motion to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
Appellant was charged with transporting a stolen automobile to Kentucky in violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). Appellant, after consulting with appointed counsel, pled guilty. The District Judge who took the plea then announced that appellant “should be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for discipline and training under the Youth Corrections Act,” 18 U.S. C. §§ 5005-5024 (1964).
Appellant was sent to a Youth Correction Center at Chillicothe, Ohio, where he remained for two years before being granted a conditional release.
On violation of the terms of that release, appellant was returned to Chilli-cothe. He thereupon filed the instant motion to vacate sentence. His petition recited that he had been informed by the Court that the maximum he could receive if he pleaded guilty was five years and that the Court did not explain the terms of the Youth Corrections. Act to him.
His petition cited and relied on Pil-kington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (C.A. 4, 1963).
The District Judge who denied his motion to vacate sentence did so after full evidentiary hearing. He said in part:
“This ease is not the Pilkington case. The Pilkington case is where the judge-made a positive statement which mislead the defendant. This is not the-Williams case. In the Williams case he had no attorney to advise him. In the Pilkington case, the judge made a positive statement to him * *
* * * * * *-
“There is no reason as I can find that this defendant has been in any way misled or has not been fully advised of his rights before he entered his plea. * * *”
The record clearly shows that the sentencing judge did not tell appellant that his plea could only result in a maximum of five year. Cf. Pilkington v. United States, supra. It also clearly shows that he did tell appellant that he was being-sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act. He did not, however, specifically inform him of the total length of incarceration which was possible under the-Youth Corrections Act.
In this appeal the only question of' substance is whether or not the District. Judge in sentencing defendant on a plea, of guilty deprived him of some legal or constitutional right by failing to advise him prior to committing him under the-Youth Corrections Act that this could result in a total of six years of incarceration.
No appeal was taken from the sentence, nor was any effort made to set it aside until after Myers had been released conditionally at the end of about two years, and had violated the terms of the parole and been reincarcerated.
The District Judge, after full hearing, found no legal or constitutional deprivation and held that the appellant was not misled by ignorance of the facts into a plea of guilty which was involuntary.
We cannot hold this finding to be clearly erroneous.
Contrary to the facts in the Pilking-ton case, heavily relied on in this appeal, there is no factual misrepresentation made to appellant by the sentencing judge. Further, here, as contrasted with Pilkington, there has been a full evi-dentiary hearing on appellant’s motion under Section 2255.
Contrary to the facts in the Williams case (Williams v. United States, 231 F.Supp. 382 (E.D.Ky.1964)) appellant’s plea herein was entered after advice of competent counsel.
While not controlling on voluntariness of the plea, we also note that appellant .admits full knowledge of the nature of the Youth Corrections Act (and its potentialities for a maximum of six years’ imprisonment) shortly after his arrival .at the Youth Correction Center at Chil-licothe. No motion for relief was filed then or for a matter of several years thereafter, until appellant had been released on parole under the terms of the Youth Corrections Act.
While we agree with Judge Sobeloff in Pilkington v. United States, .supra, that it is highly advisable for a District Judge in sentencing under the Youth Corrections Act to make an explanation of its purpose and terms, we do not believe that failure to do so (in facts such as these) represented a violation of appellant’s legal or constitutional rights.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0