What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ROSE v. TRUST CO. OF GEORGIA.
No. 7706.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 11, 1935.
J. Louis Monarch, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen., and M. Neil Andrews, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
W. A. Sutherland, Joseph B. Brennan, and Pope F. Brock, all of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.
Before BRYAN, FOSTER, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
In July, 1928, appellee was appointed executor of the estate of J. J. Goodrum, who had died June 4th, of that year, and received as part of the estate 1,488 shares of stock of the Coca-Cola International Corporation, which had been organized for the purpose of retaining control of the Coca-Cola Company in the hands of certain southern interests. The International Corporation obtained a majority of the stock of the Coca-Cola Company, which it held. It did 110 other business. Prior to' the death of Good-rum, it was decided to reduce its stock and permit the exchange of one share of its stock for two shares of the Coca-Cola Company stock, which it held. By a series of resolutions, the exchange privilege was made irrevocable. In July and August, 1930, appellee exchanged the 1,488 shares of International stock by transactions with four individuals, receiving in each instance two shares of stock of the Coca-Cola Company therefor. Thereafter, in 'the same year, 100 shares of the Coca-Cola Company stock -received in exchange were sold at an advance over the basis of exchange. Appellee made its income tax returns for 1930 on the theory that no gain resulted from the exchange of stock,-and the gain on the sale of the 100 shares was taxable as a capital net gain, at the flat rate of 12J4 per cent. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that taxable gain had resulted from the exchange and the gain from the sale was subject to surtaxes. On that basis,he determined a deficiency which, with interest, amounted to $18,870.83. This was paid to the then Collector of Internal Revenue, appellant herein, and this suit was brought to recover it back. The jury was waived and the case was submitted upon a stipulation as to the facts. Judgment was entered in favor of appellee.. This appeal followed. Error is assigned to the denial of a motion for judgment in favor of defendant and to the entering of judgment for plaintiff.
In the cases of Bancker v. Commissioner, 76 F.(2d) 1 and Prescott v. Commissioner, 76 F.(2d) 3, both decided March 12, 1935, we affirmed the rulings of the Commissioner as to other exchange transactions of the two stocks, similar to his determination in this case. We refer to the opinions in the two cases just cited for a more complete discussion of the history of the International Corporation.
Under the provisions of section 112, Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2112), which governs, any gain or loss resulting from an exchange of property must be recognized, unless the transaction comes under one of the five exceptions set up in subdivision b of the section. It is conceded that these exceptions do not apply in this case. It is further conceded that if the Bancker and Prescott Cases apply, the judgment should be reversed. However, appellee seeks to distinguish those cases on the ground that in the Bancker Case the taxpayer had no right' to demand an exchange of stock and in the Prescott Case the right of conversion was not granted to the taxpayer until after she acquired the International stock. In support of an affirmance of the judgment, it is argued that the convertible bond rule, recognized by the Treasury Department in Article 1563 of Regulations 45 and a number of Treasury-decisions, should be applied by analogy.
The convertible bond rule is this: Where a corporation issues bonds, which in themselves contain a provision that the bond may be converted. into stock of the same corporation, and an exchange is made, taxable gain or loss does not result until the stock is sold. In the Bancker and Prescott Cases, supra, we pointed out that the Coca-Cola International Corporation and the Coca-Cola Company were separate and distinct entities. A situation analogous to one coming under the convertible bond rule did not arise. It is not shown in this case when Goodrum acquired his stock, and, of course, the executor would be in no better position than the decedent, but in any event we consider it immaterial when the right to the exchange accrued. There is no practical difference between the questions decided in the Bancker and Prescott Cases and those involved in this case. It follows that the judgment appealed from must be reversed.
Reversed and remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1