What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. FIRST NAT. BANK & TRUST CO. OF MINNEAPOLIS et al.
No. 12392.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Feb. 23, 1943.
Paul S. McMiahon, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen. (Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key and Edward First, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., and Victor E. Anderson, U. S. Atty., and Linus J. Hammond, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of St. Paul, Minn., on the brief), for appellant.
John W. Windhorst, of Minneapolis, Minn. (Leland W. Scott and Fletcher, Dorsey, Barker, Colman & Barber, all of Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief), for appellees.
Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
THOMAS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment against the United States in favor of plaintiffs, appellees, in a suit to recover $1,481.-30 with interest and costs allegedly illegally assessed as estate taxes and paid under protest by the executors of the estate of Eilef Smedal, deceased.
The facts are not in dispute. The decedent died testate domiciled in Wisconsin on January 30, 1938. At the time of his death he was insured under nine life insurance policies of the total value of approximately $35,000. The issue is whether four of these policies were properly included in the decedent’s gross estate. The four policies involved in the controversy were issued by the following companies and were of the following matured values at the time of decedent’s death:
Name of Company. No. of Policy. Amount of Proceeds.
Aetna Life Insurance Company 317927 $10,000.00
Aetna Life Insurance Company 557980 10,058.78
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 4248454-A 5,090,27
New York Life Ins. Company 8794489 5,682.32
$30,831.37
In June and July, 1937, the decedent changed the name of the beneficiary in each of the four policies, naming the “First National Bank & Trust Company, Minneapolis, Minnesota, as Trustee, under the last Will and Testament of the insured”, or, as stated in two of the policies, “under Trust Agreement Dated May 27th, 1937.”
The decedent had previously executed his will on May 27, 1937. He made no specific reference in his will to the proceeds of the four insurance policies, but bequeathed $40,000 and the residue of his estate, after deducting certain specific bequests, to the First National Bank and Trust Company of Minneapolis, Minnesota, in trust for the benefit of his wife and daughter.
Upon the death of the decedent his will was probated at La Crosse, Wisconsin, and the First National Bank and Trust Company qualified as one of the executors. The proceeds of the Aetna policies were made payable to the First National Bank and Trust Company of Minneapolis, as trustee, and the checks therefor were endorsed by the bank as executor. Checks for the proceeds of the Metropolitan and New York policies were payable in the same manner but these companies refused to accept the endorsement of the bank as executor of the decedent. The bank therefore qualified in a Minneapolis, Minnesota, court as trustee under the decedent’s will, endorsed the policies as such, and the companies paid on that endorsement. The proceeds of the two Aetna policies were included in the inventory, and also in the final account of the executors. The proceeds of the New York and Metropolitan policies were not at first included in the inventory of the estate nor in the final account of the executors as originally filed in the County Court of La Crosse, Wisconsin. However, that court directed the executors so to include these proceeds; and they then filed a supplemental final account which included the proceeds of the New York and Metropolitan policies.
None of the proceeds of the four policies was used to pay debts or costs of the estate, and all of the residue, including the claimed right to a refund of the estate taxes, was transferred to and received by the trustees named in the will in compliance with the decree of distribution of the probate court of Wisconsin.
The question presented for determination is whether the proceeds of life insurance policies payable to the trustees of a testamentary trust created for the benefit of the insured’s wife and daughter come within the $40,000 exemption granted by § 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, § 302(g).
The statute reads:
“Sec. 302. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated—
******
“(g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon Tiis own life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life. * * * ”
The narrow question for solution is whether the proceeds of the four policies are “receivable by the executor” of decedent’s estate or by “other beneficiaries” within the meaning of § 302(g), supra.
The trial court found for the plaintiffs, holding that the proceeds of the life insurance policies were not receivable by the executors of the insured’s estate but by “other beneficiaries”, namely, the insured’s wife and daughter. The court observed in its opinion that under -the Wisconsin statutes insurance proceeds are exempt from claims of the insured’s creditors or representatives (Wisconsin Statutes 1937, §§ 246.09, 272.18), and that the ultimate fact is clear that the insured intended that his wife and daughter should be the beneficiaries, and not the executor.
The government contends that (1) the decision is inconsistent with the legislative intent, (2) is based upon an unsatisfactory explanation of the Congressional reason for the $40,000 exemption, and (3) the proceeds of the insurance policies were payable to the beneficiaries by virtue of a testamentary disposition, and not by virtue of an inter vivos trust.
We need not review the legislative history of § 302(g) of the Act for the purpose of determining the Congressional intent. That has been done by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, at page 540, 61 S.Ct. 646, at page 649, 85 L.Ed. 996, where it is said: “Implicit in this provision [§ 302(g)] is acknowledgment of the fact that usually insurance payable to specific beneficiaries is designed to shift to a group of individuals the risk of premature death of the one upon whom the beneficiaries are dependent for support. Indeed, the pith of the exemption is particular protection of contracts and their proceeds intended to guard against just such a risk.” Citing authorities. That such was the intent and design of the insured in this case is as manifest as it would be had he named his wife and daughter beneficiaries in the policies instead of naming a testamentary trustee to receive the proceeds of the insurance for their benefit.
Trust estates including the proceeds of life insurance policies and created by contract or will for the benefit of widows and children are not unusual. The effect of such an arrangement under § 302 (g) is covered by regulation. In Article 27 of Treasury Regulations 80 (1937 edition) it is provided that “The word, ‘beneficiaries’, as used in reference to the $40,-000 exemption, means persons entitled to the actual enjoyment of the insurance money.”
The government does not contend that the wife and daughter are not entitled, under the means employed by the insured, to the actual enjoyment of the insurance money. This being true, it follows that by application of the statute, as construed by the Supreme Court, and of the applicable regulation, the wife and daughter, and not the executor, are the beneficiaries within the meaning of § 302(g).
Here, by virtue of the statutes of Wisconsin and of the decree of the Wisconsin court in whose jurisdiction the will was probated and under whose authority the estate was administered, the proceeds of the insurance were turned over to the trustee named in the policies for the benefit of the widow and daughter of the insured as provided in the will. In our opinion no reasonable construction of § 302(g) would warrant a holding that these proceeds were “receivable by the executor.”
Any further discussion of the case would extend this opinion unnecessarily. Our conclusion is supported by able opinions of the 1st, 5th and 6th Circuit Courts of Appeals in cases arising under the same statute and in which the facts are similar. See Proutt’s Estate v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 125 F.2d 591; Webster v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 120 F.2d 514; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 1 Cir., 100 F.2d 266; Commissioner v. Jones, 6 Cir., 62 F. 2d 496. See, also, Lucky v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 1268.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0