What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals. The issue is: "Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile, (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?" Answer the question based on the directionality of the appeals court decision. If the court discussed the issue in its opinion and answered the related question in the affirmative, answer "Yes". If the issue was discussed and the opinion answered the question negatively, answer "No". If the opinion considered the question but gave a mixed answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part, answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion does not discuss the issue, or notes that a particular issue was raised by one of the litigants but the court dismissed the issue as frivolous or trivial or not worthy of discussion for some other reason, answer "Issue not discussed". If the opinion considered the question but gave a "mixed" answer, supporting the respondent in part and supporting the appellant in part (or if two issues treated separately by the court both fell within the area covered by one question and the court answered one question affirmatively and one negatively), answer "Mixed answer". If the opinion either did not consider or discuss the issue at all or if the opinion indicates that this issue was not worthy of consideration by the court of appeals even though it was discussed by the lower court or was raised in one of the briefs, answer "Issue not discussed". If the court answered the question in the affirmative, but the error articulated by the court was judged to be harmless, answer "Yes, but error was harmless".

Opinion:
Henry J. ERNST, Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, and Roy N. Mikel, Appellees.
No. 15431.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
April 29, 1957.
Maurice T. Johnson, Fairbanks, Alaska, for appellant.
George M. Yeager, U. S. Atty., Eugene v. Miller, Fairbanks, Alaska, Perry W. Morton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
Before HEALY, LEMMON, and FEE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This action was brought by appellant against the Secretary of the Interior, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, and one Roy N. Mikel, seeking review of a decision of the Solicitor can-celling a homestead entry which had been allowed to appellant in 1951. The complaint alleged that the decision permitted the re-entry by Mikel, who was the contestant.
Service of process on the Secretary and the Solicitor was attempted by mailing copies of the complaint to them and to the Attorney General of the United States in Washington, D. C., and by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the United States Attorney at Fairbanks, Alaska. The latter moved the court that an order be entered quashing the return of service and dismissing the complaint as against the Secretary and Solicitor on the ground that they are residents of the District of Columbia and actions can be brought against them only in that place. The motion was granted and an order to quash and dismiss was entered accordingly. The plaintiff appealed, stating as the point on which he intended to rely that the court erred in granting the motion.
Appellees Secretary and Solicitor, by their attorneys, have appeared specially and moved this court to affirm the judgment below and to remand the cause for further proceedings, serving appellant with a copy of the moving papers. Appellant has appeared and filed with us a memorandum opposing the motion.
The order to quash and dismiss the case as against the Secretary and the Solicitor was clearly correct inasmuch as the court lacked jurisdiction of those officers. Their official residence is in Washington, D. C. The governing statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b) provides that “a civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.” There is no statutory authority for instituting suit against these officials elsewhere than in their place of residence. An affirmance of the order below will operate to avoid fruitless delays and costs and will in no wise prejudice appellant’s right to bring an action in the proper jurisdiction. Appellate courts have, and frequently exercise, authority to dispose summarily of matters which are patently without merit. See, for example, the action of this court in United States v. Berger, 150 F.2d 56, which reversed on motion a judgment of dismissal granted by the district court. Accordingly the order below dismissing the action as against the Secretary and the Solicitor is affirmed.
As earlier stated, the motion asks also that the cause be remanded for further proceedings, presumably as against .the defendant Mikel. Mikel had answered appellant’s complaint, denying all allegations thereof save that a decision in his favor had been rendered in the contest proceeding. Mikel was and is mere nominal party in any event. However the case, if any, as against Mikel is remanded for the further consideration of the district court.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part.

Question: Did the court rule that some evidence, other than a confession made by the defendant or illegal search and seizure, was inadmissibile (or did ruling on appropriateness of evidentary hearing benefit the defendant)?

Choices:
No
Yes
Yes, but error was harmless
Mixed answer
Issue not discussed

Answer: 4