What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PERRY v. UNITED STATES.
No. 10632.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Nov. 22, 1948.
Taylor & Taylor, of Memphis, Tenn., and E. T. Palmer, of Dyersburg, Tenn., for appellant.
Wm. McClanahan and John Brown, both of Memphis, Tenn., for appellee.
Before HICKS, Chief Judge, MARTIN and McALLISTER, Circuit Judges.
HICKS, Chief Judge.
■ This suit was brought on July 21, 1947, against United States of America, under Sec. 410(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 931(a).
The parties will be styled as plaintiff and defendant as they appeared in the court below. The plaintiff, Loretta Ann Perry, a minor under fifteen years of age, sued by her father as next friend. Omitting immaterial matters, the complaint alleged: that on the 19th day of April 1943, the plaintiff started across Highway No. 51 in the edge of Halls in Lauderdale County, Tenn., when a military policeman, belonging to the Armed Forces of the United States and riding a motorcycle in a dangerous and reckless manner, ran it against, and injured her; and that the motorcycle was a part of the equipment furnished by defendant and was being used by said military policeman while on duty.
The defendant moved to dismiss upon three grounds. The third ground was that the Act under which the complaint was brought applies only to causes of action arising since January 1, 1945. The court sustained the motion, hence this appeal.
We think that the court was right. The Federal Tort Claims Act was passed on August 2, 1946. U.S.C.A.Title 28, Ch. 20, § 921 et seq. Prior to its passage the district court had no jurisdiction over claims against the United States for torts. But Sec. 931 (a) provided, among other things, that the district court for the district wherein the plaintiff is resident, or wherein the act complained of occurred, “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim against the United States, for money only, accruing on a<nd after January 1, 1945, on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” (Italics ours.)
As we stated in Old Colony Insurance Co. v. United States, 6 Cir., 168 F.2d 931, 933, there is nothing ambiguous is Sec. 931(a). By its terms the court was given jurisdiction to hear and determine claims against the United States for personal injury accruing only after January 1, 1945, and the specific averment of the complaint is that plaintiff was injured on the 19th day of April 1943. In an effort to avoid this plain obstacle, plaintiff points out that under sub-section 20 of Sec. 41, Title 28 U.S.C.A. it is provided that, “the claims * * * .of persons under the age of twenty-one years, first accrued during minority, * * * shall not be barred if the suit be brought within three years after the disability has ceased * * *.” Her contention is, that because she was a minor under fifteen years of age at the time her suit was brought, the statute of limitations quoted continued the accrual of her cause of action until after January 1, 1945, and that her case was therefore timely brought. This contention is wholly fanciful and without basis either in law or fact.
On the motion to dismiss, it must be taken as true that her right of action, if any she had, was against the military policeman alone, for wrongfully striking her with the motorcycle on April 19, 1943. We must conclude that his wrongful act terminated on that occasion and that the United States of America had no connection with it either directly or indirectly. The complaint contains no allegation that any part of the policeman’s unlawful conduct continued into the future, or, to be more specific, to or beyond January 1, 1945, the date upon which the defendant might become liable. The above quoted statute of limitations avails the plaintiff nothing. Simply stated, it provides that a minor who has a claim first accrued during minority may bring suit upon it within three years after she has reached her majority. It does not serve, either by itself or in connection with the Federal Tort Claims Act, to give the district court jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim against defendant for a cause of action which, as against it, never existed.
Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that the Act which was passed on August 2, 1946, was made applicable to claims accruing on or after January 1, 1945, —or more than eighteen months prior to its passage. That date clearly fixes the limit of retroactivity.
Affirmed.
1948 Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346.
1948 Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680.
1948 Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1