What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Theodore TREVINO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF ARIZONA and Harold Cardwell, Superintendent, Arizona State Prison, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 75-1304.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Dec. 4, 1975.
Bruce F. Rinaldi (argued), of Verity, Smith, Lacy, Allen & Kearns, P. C., Tucson, Ariz., for petitioner-appellant.
Frank T. Galati, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Phoenix, Ariz., for respondentsappellees.
Honorable Charles H. Carr, Senior United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
OPINION
Before WALLACE and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and CARR, Senior District Judge.
CARR, Senior District Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Petitioner is serving a life sentence in the Arizona State Prison for first degree murder. He claims his sentence is invalid because of ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was involuntary.
His attorneys informed him that upon his guilty plea to first degree murder, he would be eligible for parole within seven years. This was erroneous since under Arizona law a prisoner serving a life term would not be eligible for parole unless his sentence was commuted.
The district court conducted a full evidentiary hearing and decided that the plea was motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty, and that it resulted from a negotiated plea.
At the time of the plea, the death penalty was still in effect in Arizona. The district judge found that, “ * * * the issue of parole eligibility was not a significant consideration in petitioner entering a plea of guilty to first degree murder.” The district judge also stated in his opinion, “Given the brutal and premeditated circumstance, giving rise to the decedents [sic] murder, the overwhelming indication from the evidence before this court is that the main consideration in this case was avoiding the imposition of the death penalty.”
Obviously, the district judge found that the plea was voluntary, and it must be concluded from a study of the record in this case that the finding was not clearly erroneous.
It is therefore unnecessary to consider petitioner’s contention that Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964), should be applied retroactively. To do so would lead to a consideration of the applicability of Rule 11, F.R.Crim.P., to state proceedings which, in the end, would not benefit petitioner since an extension of Munich to state proceedings would lead to the result that Munich would not be applied retroactively. Fong v. United States, 411 F.2d 1181 (9th Cir. 1969).
Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel falls far short of meeting the test that the trial must be reduced to a farce, sham or mockery of justice by incompetent counsel.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1