What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James Howard BROYHILL, Appellant, v. Zeb A. MORRIS, Jr., Solicitor, 15th Solicitorial District of the State of North Carolina; and LeRoy Reavis, Sheriff of Iredell County, State of North Carolina, Appellees.
No. 12596.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 31, 1968.
Decided March 20, 1969.
McElwee & Hall, North Wilkesboro, N. C. (John E. Hall), and Moore & Rousseau, North Wilkesboro, N. C. (Larry S. Moore), North Wilkesboro, N. C., for appellant.
Raymer, Lewis & Eisele, Statesville, N. C. (Douglas G. Eisele). Battley & Frank, Statesville, N. C. (Jay F. Frank), Statesville, N. C., and Ralph Moody, Deputy Atty. Gen., State of North Carolina, Raleigh, N. C., for appellees.
Before BRYAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges, and McMillan, District Judge.
MeMILLAN, District Judge:
James Howard Broyhill was tried under a federal indictment for bank robbery with firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C., § 2113, and was acquitted by a jury. The defendants, prosecuting authorities of North Carolina, have now taken out an indictment and propose to try him under North Carolina General Statutes 14-87 for robbery with firearms based on the same evidence. Broyhill brought this suit seeking injunction against the pending state prosecution, alleging that this prosecution violates the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy which he contends is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judge Eugene Gordon in the Middle District of North Carolina dismissed the suit, expressing the opinion, “relying primarily upon the authority of Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, [79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684] (1959), that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The plaintiff appealed.
In considering the appeal, as this Court said in Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 587 (4th Cir., 1964), “we start, as we must, with Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283,” the anti-injunction statute. On the face of it that statute, saying that United States courts “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court * * prohibits the use of injunction as a remedy against state court proceedings. Since injunction is the only remedy sought, § 2283 might appear to end the inquiry. However, in addition to having certain express exceptions not controlling here, § 2283 has been made the subject of numerous other exceptions through the years; now and then it has been disregarded; and its current status is by no means clear. Although it is possible that § 2283 bars issuance of an injunction, we do not rest final decision on that basis. Under the decisions of the Supreme Court as we read them, it is appropriate as a necessary part of deciding whether § 2283 applies, to inquire into the nature and effects of the state action complained of. It makes a difference whether the right allegedly invaded has constitutional protection and whether other and adequate state remedies exist. We therefore examine the complaint under the commission laid down in Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. O’Neill, 266 U.S. 292, 298, 45 S.Ct. 49, 51, 69 L.Ed. 293 (1924), where it was said that § 2283:
“ * * * does not deprive a district court of the jurisdiction otherwise conferred by the federal statutes, but merely goes to the question of equity in the particular bill; making it the duty of the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to determine whether the specific case presented is one in which relief by injunction is prohibited by this section or may nevertheless be granted.” (Emphasis added.)
Because it likewise appears from the results of the decided cases that a court has to look to the results complained of before deciding whether to abstain from equitable relief, we also carry forward into our consideration of the merits any consideration of abstention on grounds of comity from interference in the state proceedings.
In order to reach the merits of the requested injunction we must therefore proceed upon the assumption that neither the apparent prohibition of § 2283 nor the indistinct shapes of the absention principles should bar a United States court from inquiry into the state action complained of. All three questions — § 2283, abstention, and the ultimate injunction decision — depend for their answer on the same set of facts.
On the merits, the complaint recites a single alleged wrong — double jeopardy. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959) held that a state could with constitutional propriety prosecute a man under state law although he had been acquitted of a federal offense arising out of the same acts. If it has continuing vitality, Bartkus is dis-positive. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving the question whether the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states. However, decision of that question by the Supreme Court may not determine what this court should do with plaintiff’s request for injunction. If Bartkus is not overruled, the invalidity of the plaintiff’s sole alleged basis for injunction may of course be confirmed. However, if Bartkus is overruled, we will still face the question, decided in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943), whether the federal court under the circumstances should enjoin an unconstitutional prosecution or leave the constitutional decision to the state courts.
Even if the district court possessed power to enjoin the pending state prosecution, notwithstanding 28 U.S.C., § 2283, this is not an appropriate case for injunctive relief. There is no allegation or showing here and no likelihood inherent in the circumstances that plaintiff’s state remedies, including a state court defense of double jeopardy, are inadequate.
This is a single, previously pending prosecution. It was preceded by no threats. No misuse of the statute is charged. It does not affect free speech; the charge is bank robbery. The statute is not attacked for unconstitutionality; it is specific, not vague; narrow, not broad. A single criminal prosecution will provide an adequate forum and adequate procedures for raising all constitutional issues. It is not alleged that North Carolina courts are a poor forum to litigate constitutional questions. No oppression, bad faith or harassment is alleged. Lack of genuine expectation by the state that there will be a conviction is not alleged; in fact, a genuine apprehension of probable conviction may be plaintiff’s primary problem. If North Carolina commits error, complete remedy by appeal or certiorari is available. In short, none of the considerations which moved courts to interfere with state action in cases like Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965) ; and Baines v. City of Danville, 321 F.2d 643 (4th Cir., 1963), are present here.
Aside from the bar of Bartkus, plaintiff simply has not shown threat or likelihood of irreparable harm, nor any other facts calling for a federal court to intervene by injunction in a routine application of a clear state criminal law.
Affirmed.
. G.S. 14-87: “Any person * * * who, * * * with the use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, * * * unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another or from any * * * banking institution * * ®, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than thirty years.”
The North Carolina statute is somewhat broader than the federal statute, but it is alleged and appears clear that North Carolina has indicted the appellant for doing the same acts that formed the basis of the federal prosecution. The fact that the North Carolina statute would, for example, cover the crime if the robbery had been from a visitor in the bank whereas the federal statute would appear to cover the crime only if the robbery was from the bank itself should make no difference here.
. See the comprehensive discussion and analysis of authorities in Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, at pages 587 through 595 (4th Cir., 1964), and the other and later forms of treatment accorded § 2283 in, for example, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484, 499, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965) and Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 742, 85 S.Ct. 1751, 14 L.Ed.2d 715 (1965), 390 U.S. 611, 613, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968).
. The effect of § 2283 is especially uncertain in cases where relief is sought, as here, under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A., § 1983. The most recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court leave open the question whether § 1983 represents an explicit statutory exception to § 2283. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965) and Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 742, 85 S.Ct. 1751, 14 L.Ed.2d 715 (1965), 390 U.S. 611, 613, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) ; but see Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir., 1964). In the view we take of the instant case, which is not predicated upon the bar of § 2283, we find it unnecessary to effect a reconciliation between § 2283 and § 1983.
. Benton v. Maryland, 393 U.S. 994, 89 S.Ct. 481, 21 L.Ed.2d 460 (cert. in forma pauperis granted June 17, 1968).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1