What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FAKES v. GIRAND.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
December 21, 1927.
No. 5182.
Bankruptcy (§=>314(6) — Trustee cannot be required to pay taxes assessed against property set aside to bankrupt as exempt (Bankr. Act I8S8, § 64, as amended by Act May 27, 1926 [II USCA § 104]).
Under Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 64, as amended by Act May 27, 1926 (11 USCA § 104), trustee in bankruptcy cannot be required to pay taxes against property set aside to bankrupt as exempt, since it forms no part of bankrupt estate, and such equity as there may be in property over and above valid liens belongs to bankrupt.
Petition to Superintend and Revise from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas; James C. Wilson, Judge.
In the matter of the bankruptcy of Albert Perry Fakes. Order of the referee directing W. D. Girand, trustee, to pay certain taxes was reversed by the District Court, and the bankrupt petitions to superintend and revise.
Affirmed.
E. L. Harwell and R. W. Haynie, both of Abilene, Tex. (Wagstaff, Harwell & Wag-staff, of Abilene, Tex., on the brief), for pe- ' titionér.
W. D. Girand, of Abilene, Tex., trustee, pro se.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and FOSTER, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
This case is brought up in the form of a petition to superintend and revise in matter of law, but will be treated as an appeal under section 24b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Act of May 27, 1926 (11 USCA § 47 [b ]). Petitioner was adjudicated bankrupt December 13, 1926, and surrendered two certain pieces of real estate, one of which he claimed as a business homestead and the other as a residence homestead, under the laws of Texas.
The city of Abilene filed a claim for taxes assessed against the said property, amounting to $127.50, and asked that it be paid by priority. The referee found that the property claimed as a business homestead was of the reasonable value of $25,000, and was incumbered with valid liens in the sum of $20,000, leaving an equity of about $5,000, and that the residence homestead was of the reasonable value of $7,000, and ordered the trustee to pay the taxes, on the theory, apparently, that they should be paid because of the equity of the bankrupt in the property. On appeal to the District Court the order of the referee was reversed, and the ease is here for a review of the order of the District Court.
■ Under the law as it was prior to the amendment of section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 by the Act of May 27, 1926 (11 USCA § 104), which amendment was in effect when petitioner was adjudicated bankrupt, there were decisions both ways as to the duty of the trustee to pay the taxes on exempt property and other property not administered in the bankruptcy proceedings. These cases, which it is unnecessary to quote, are no longer applicable, as the amendment of 1926 has made a change in the law, which must be given effect. Section 64 now reads as follows:
“(a) The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, state, county, district; or municipality, in the order of priority as set forth in paragraph (b) hereof: Provided, that no order shall be made for the payment of a tax assessed against real estate of a bankrupt in excess of the value of the interest of the bankrupt estate therein as determined by the court.”
Under the law as amended by the addition of the proviso above quoted, it is clear that the trustee cannot bo required to pay taxes assessed against property set aside to the bankrupt as exempt. It forms no part of the bankrupt estate administered by the trustee, and such equity as there may be in the property over and above valid liens belongs to the bankrupt. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U. S. 294, 23 S. Ct. 751, 47 L. Ed. 1061.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0