What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Sheryl EZELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, in his capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 87-3128.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 7, 1988.
Decided May 9, 1988.
James M. Cagle, Charleston, W.Va., for plaintiff-appellant.
James S. Feight, Jr., Asst. Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Dept, of Health & Human Services (Beverly Dennis, III, Chief Counsel, Region III, James C. Newman, Supervisory Asst., Regional Counsel, Philadelphia, Pa., Michael W. Carey, U.S. Atty., Gary E. Pullin, Asst. U.S. Atty., Charleston, W.Va., on brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before SPROUSE and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and BRITT, Chief District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Sheryl Ezell appeals the district court dismissal of her complaint challenging the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services prohibiting her from representing claimants seeking benefits pursuant to the Social Security Act and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. We affirm.
Section 206(a) of the Social Security Act provides that non-attorneys may represent claimants if “they are of good charater [sic] and in good repute.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 406(a) (West 1983). Ezell, a non-attorney representative of claimants, was notified in August 1984 that the Secretary was initiating proceedings to suspend or disqualify her from further representation of claimants. The Secretary’s actions were based upon Ezell’s September 1983 felony conviction of two counts of filing false claims for job-related expenses. United States v. Ezell, No. 83-107-A (E.D.Va. September 8, 1983).
Following a hearing an administrative law judge suspended Ezell from representing claimants for a period of five years. The Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council affirmed that decision, but found disqualification rather than suspension to be warranted. Ezell then filed suit in district court challenging the constitutionality of section 206(a) and the statutory authority for her disqualification. She contended that in addition to the lack of authority for the disqualification, the standard of good character and reputation required of non-attorney representatives denied her equal protection and due process. She based her equal protection argument on the claim that the good character requirement unconstitutionally distinguishes between attorneys and non-attorneys. Due process was allegedly denied because the requirement was ambiguous and vague. Ezell also alleged that the Secretary’s actions were arbitrary and exceeded statutory authority because the actions for which she was disqualified did not involve representation of a claimant.
The district court dismissed Ezell’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), finding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 669 F.Supp. 141. The court held that judicial review of the Secretary’s decision was precluded by section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, which provides:
The findings and decision of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under Section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this sub-chapter.
42 U.S.C.A. § 405(h) (West 1983). The district court rejected Ezell’s argument that section 205(h) does not foreclose judicial review of the action due to the presence of her constitutional questions, stating that Ezell’s “constitutional claims [were] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with her challenge to the Secretary’s decision to suspend her.”
Ezell contends that section 205(h) does not apply because it only pertains to claimants seeking recovery of benefits under the Social Security Act and not to disqualifications of representatives. We need not address this argument because we find subject matter jurisdiction lacking due to Ezell’s failure to raise a colorable statutory or constitutional claim.
As the district court noted, the regulations implementing section 206(a) do not provide for judicial review of the disqualification decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1745-404.1799 (1987). And, judicial review of a decision of the Secretary is foreclosed unless it is an “initial determination.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (1987). One administrative action which is not an “initial determination” subject to judicial review is “[d]is-qualifying or suspending a person from acting as [a] representative in a proceeding before [the Social Security Administration].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.903(g) (1987).
These regulations do not absolutely foreclose judicial review because federal courts are always free to examine whether the Secretary has acted arbitrarily or exceeded his authority. Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153, 102 S.Ct. 1023, 71 L.Ed.2d 309 (1982). However, before subject matter jurisdiction arises for review of the propriety of the Secretary’s actions, there must be more than a bare allegation of unconstitutional action. Thomason v. Schweiker, 692 F.2d 333, 336 (4th Cir.1982). The court in Thomason determined that the district court had properly dismissed an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where there was no “colorable” claim on constitutional, statutory or regulatory grounds. Id. This result is consistent with the Supreme Court’s declaration that a “substantial” constitutional claim is required for invocation of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1379, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).
Ezell’s contentions fail to meet these requirements. She entered a guilty plea for two counts of filing false claims for expenses following her dismissal from employment with the federal government. The action of the Secretary disqualifying Ezell for lack of good character was clearly warranted in light of this felony conviction and Ezell failed to assert a colorable statutory challenge to this decision. Further, her claims of violations of constitutional protections are clearly unsubstantiated.
AFFIRMED.
. This requirement also applies to representatives of claimants under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. 30 U.S.C.A. § 923(b) (West 1986).
. The applicable regulations under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.688-410.699 (1987).
. The corresponding provision for the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act is 20 C.F.R. § 410.615(f) (1987).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1