What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
PERSON v. UNITED STATES.
No. 11508.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 16, 1940.
Rehearing Denied June 11, 1940.
Action on a note by the United States against L. K. Person. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
L. K. Person, of Garland, Ark., pro se. Clinton R. Barry, U. S. Atty., of Fort Smith, Ark. (Duke Frederick, Asst. U. S. Atty., and John E. Harris, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Fort Smith, Ark., on the brief), for appellee.
Before STONE, GARDNER, and SAN-BORN, Circuit Judges.
STONE, Circuit Judge.
From a summary judgment for a balance due on a promissory note this appeal is brought.
Appellant presents here two matters: (1) the action is barred by limitations or laches; (2) summary judgment was improper because (a) there were controverted fact issues and (b) a supporting affidavit was insufficient.
I. Limitations.
The issue controlling as to limitations or laches (treated together by us) is whether the United States was, in the action to collect this note, proceeding in a sovereign capacity or not.
This loan was made under a “Joint Resolution for the relief' of farmers in the drought and/or storm stricken areas of the United States” (46 Stat. 1032). It is a matter of public knowledge and of judicial cognizance that during the year 1930 there had been large areas in the United States where crops had failed because of drought or had been destroyed by storms or hail. It was to meet these deplorable situations by enabling the stricken, farmers to put in crops in 1931 and to preserve their live stock, that this Joint Resolution was passed and became law on December 20, 1930. The Resolution appropriated $45,000,000 to be used in loans or advancements to such farmers or to purchase seeds, fertilizers and farm equipment which could be sold to such farmers. The expenditure of this money for these purposes was placed in charge of the Secretary of Agriculture. A lien upon the 1931 crops was declared sufficient security for such loans, advancements or sale moneys. False statements to procure such were declared criminal with prescribed penalties.
This loan was for $3,000 evidenced by a note executed March 25, 1931; due October 31, 1931; bearing 5% interest and secured by a mortgage on the crops grown during 1931 on described land.
This Resolution was not intended to put the United States into any “private” money business. It was solely an act of grace by the sovereign to meet a temporary emergency which had grasped certain citizens and left them temporarily in dire need of help. This it did from public funds. In no way is this situation altered by arrangements for repayment by the beneficiaries. The United States was acting purely in its capacity as a Sovereign. The note and mortgage here were appropriate means of exercising this sovereign power. Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 308 U.S. 21, 31, 32, 60 S.Ct. 15, 84 L.Ed. 11, 124 A.L.R. 1263.
It is firmly established that, as to enforcement of obligations arising out of exercise of sovereign power, no State statute of limitations nor any laches can be urged against the sovereign (cases cited in footnote 1).
Therefore, the statute of limitations of the State of Arkansas, relied upon by appellant, is of no avail.
2. Summary Judgment.
Appellant contends error in disposing of this case by summary judgment (Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 56, 28 U. S.C.A. following section 723c) for two reasons. The first of these is that, as he asserts, there were controverted issues of fact. He claims these issues were as to payment of the loan.
No such issues appear from the pleadings upon which the case was tried. The petition alleged the loan, certain payments thereon and sought judgment for the unpaid balance. The answer was a general denial and a plea of limitations. The answer admitted the note and mortgage. The only allegations in the answer referring to payments did not challenge the amounts but (for purposes of limitations) denied any payments had been made beyond a certain date.
Rule 86 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides, as to such rules, that “They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure applies.”
The petition and several motions in this case were filed and some of the motions ruled before the effective date of the Rules. The answer was filed and subsequent proceedings occurred after the effective date.
Rule 12(b) requires “Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, * * * shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto * * Rule 12(h) provides that “A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present * * * in his answer * Since the answer here raised no issue as to amounts paid on the note, such issue was not before the Court. While we think the Rule 12(b) and (h) applicable in the situation of this case as to the effective date of the Rules, yet the result would be the same if the Rules were not applied and the law of Arkansas followed.
The statutes of Arkansas provide that “Every material allegation of a complaint not specifically controverted by the answer * * * must, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true” (Pope’s Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, 1937, § 1455). Under Arkansas law, payment is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded or evidence is inadmissible as to payment (Interstate Jobbing Co. v. Velvin, 172 Ark. 212, 287 S.W. 1015, 1016) and the burden of proof is upon the party pleading payment. Thomas v. Tygart, 177 Ark. 1195, 6 S.W.2d 827, 828; Leach v. Maxwell, 171 Ark. 1188, 286 S.W. 1029, 1030.
In the state of these pleadings and in view either of Rule 12(b) and (h) or of the law in Arkansas, there was no issue here as to amount of payment. Since plaintiff was immune from limitations, any issue as to when payments were made was immaterial.
The second ground for attack upon the summary judgment procedure is that the court considered a supporting affidavit not made “on personal knowledge”, as required by Rule 56(e). The Rule contains such a requirement and this affidavit does not conform thereto, and, therefore, is of no avail.
However, the insufficiency of the affidavit does not require reversal. The affidavit had to do with payments on the note. It added nothing to the issues as made by the pleadings. There was no issue as to payment. The error as to the affidavit was clearly non-prejudicial.
The judgment must be and is affirmed.
While the character of governmental action must be determined upon the circumstances of each action, yet the following cases are illustrative of instances where the issue has been whether the government was acting in a sovereign or in a “private” or “business” capacity. Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 308 U.S. 21, 60 S.Ct. 15, 84 L.Ed. 11, 124 A.L.R. 1263; Standard Oil, Co. v. United States, 267 U.S. 76, 45 S.Ct. 211, 69 L.Ed. 519; E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Davis Director General, 264 U.S. 456, 44 S.Ct. 364, 68 L.Ed. 788; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 39 S.Ct. 407, 63 L.Ed. 889; United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 6 S.Ct. 1006, 30 L.Ed. 81; United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 25 L.Ed. 194; United States v. Miller, 8 Cir., 28 F.2d 846, 61 A.L.R. 405. As to status of the Farm Credit Administration, see United States v. Thomas, 5 Cir., 107 F.2d 765.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0