What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO. OF NEW YORK v. HOYLE et al.
No. 3431.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
April 4, 1933.
Armistead W. Sapp, of Greensboro, N. C. (Oscar L. Sapp, of Greensboro, N. C., on the brief), for appellant.
R. M. Robinson, of Greensboro, N. C., for appellees.
Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT, and SOPER, Circuit Judges.
PARKER, Circuit Judge.
For a number of years prior to 1939, M. W. Gant, Sr., was clerk of the superior court of Guilford county, N. C. In that year, having been found short in his accounts, he was removed from office and shortly thereafter was adjudged bankrupt. This appeal is taken from a judgment in favor of his trustees in bankruptcy in an action to recover on the bond of $5,090 executed by his son M. W. Gant, Jr., who was deputy clerk under him from March 9,1929 to October 9,1930.
The pertinent portions of the bond sued on are as follows:
“The Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, hereinafter called the surety, does hereby agree to indemnify Mason William Gant, Sr., — Clerk Superior Court of Greensboro, North Carolina, hereinafter called the employer, against the loss, not exceeding five thousand ($5,009.00) dollars, of any money or other personal property (including moneys or other personal property for which the employer is responsible) through the embezzlement, larceny, forgery, theft, wrongful abstraction or any other act of fraud or dishonesty of Mason William Gant, Jr., hereinafter called the employee, directly or in connivance with others, while the employee is engaged in the service of the employer, while this bond is in force.
“The foregoing agreement is subject to the following conditions: * * *
“3. In the event of the death of the employee during the term of this bond, or of his suspension, dismissal, or retirement from the service of the employer during the said term, this bond shall thereupon terminate without any action on the part of the surety. The right to make a claim hereunder shall cease at the end of six months after the termination, expiration, or cancellation of this bond.
“4. Upon the discovery by the employer of any dishonest act on the part o’f the employee the employer shall, at the'earliest practicable moment, and at all events not later than five days after such discovery, give written notice thereof addressed to the surety at its home office. * ” •> *
“5. Upon the discovery by the employer of any dishonest act on the part of the employee this bond shall terminate, without any action on the part of the surety, as to any act committed thereafter by such employee.”
Plaintiffs relied upon evidence as to withdrawal of funds from the clerk’s office by M. W. Gant, Jr., between April 23, 1929, and September 12,1930. While the evidence was conflicting as to the nature of some of the withdrawals, there is no question but that M. W. Gant, Sr., was thoroughly acquainted with what was going on and that most, if not all, of the improper withdrawals 'were made under hjs direction. The auditor employed to check the records in the clerk’s office did not discover the irregularities in the willidrawals, however, until October, 1931; and no notice thereof was given the bonding company or claim made under the bond until October 23, 1931. At the conclusion of the evidence the defendant moved for judgment as of nonsuit under the North Carolina statute (see C. S. § 507); and wo think that the motion should have been allowed (1) because under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence M. W. Gant, Sr., is precluded from recovery under the bond and plaintiffs have no greater rights than he, and (2) because the evidence shows that no demand was made on the company within six months after the service of M.- W. Gant, Jr., had been terminated.
It needs neither argument nor citation of authority to sustain the proposition that M. W. Gant, Sr., would not be allowed to recover ou the bond. Not only did he not give the notice which the bond required, but he was a party to the acts complained of and is precluded from recovery by the salutary rule that the law will not allow one to profit by his own wrong. His trustees in bankruptcy, as such, have no greater rights. Zartman, Trustee, v. First National Bank, 216 U. S. 134, 30 S. Ct. 368, 54 L. Ed. 418; Remington on Bankruptcy, vol. 4, § 1409. And even if they be hold to be vested with the rights of the claimants of funds wrongfully abstracted from the clerk’s office, and entitled for this reason to enforeo for the benefit of such claimants obligations running in favor of M. W. Gant, Sr., individually, they would still have no greater rights than he; for they w'ould necessarily enforce such obligations on the theory of subrogation and would be concluded by whatever would conclude him. Only on the theory that the bond was given for the protection of the public and not of Gant, Sr., individually, could the trustees have rights under it greater than he; and recovery on this theory cannot bo sustained, for it is clear that the bond was given to protect him and not the public.
The clerk is required to give bond for the faithful discharge of his duties and to account fo-r all moneys which may come into his hands by virtue of his office. C. S. § 927. And suits upon such bond, as upon other official bonds, run in the name of the state. C. S. § 354. The clerk is allowed to appoint deputies (C. S. § 935), and is responsible for their acts. C. S. § 937. No statute requires any bond of a deputy elerk; but, as the clerk is liable for the defaults and misfeasance of his deputies, common prudence dictates that he require bonds of them for his own protection. Such a bond, not being required by law, is not an official bond in the strict sense of that term. See 46 C. J. 1063. When given, however, it is valid as a common-law bond, the elerk individually, and not the public, being the obligee in interest thereunder. The fact that it runs in the name of the clerk as clerk is immaterial. Loeser v. Alexander (C. C. A. 6th) 176 F. 265, 269.
The question as to the nature of such a bond was before tlio Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in the case last cited. The question was raised there as to the right of a county treasurer, to whom a bond had been given by a deputy, to prove a claim on the bond against the bankrupt estate of the deputy. The court, speaking through. Judge Knappen said:
“The first of these objections is that the bond in question is a public bond; that it runs to the county treasurer as such, and is for the benefit of the county; and that Alexander individually had thus no interest as obligee in the bond, and so could not recover upon it. In our judgment, Alexander is the party in interest as obligee in the bond. By section 1080 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, the county treasurer is required to give a bond approved by the county commissioners, payable to the state, and conditioned for ‘paying over, according to law, all moneys which come into his hands for state, county, township or other purposes.’ This bond is suable only in the name of the state. Hunter v. Commissioners, 10 Ohio St. 515. The Ohio statutes contain no express authority for appointing deputy collectors under that name; but, as was held by this court in Board of Commissioners v. Strawn, supra [157 F. 49, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100], the treasurer had the undoubted power to appoint Blyfch a deputy for the purposes of making the collections in question. By section 1089 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, express authority is given the county treasurer to appoint ‘one or more deputies,’ and it is expressly provided that the treasurer himself ‘shall, in all cases, be liable and accountable for tho proceedings and misconduct in office of his deputies.’ The position of Blytjt was, in a very proper sense, that of a deputy of the county treasurer, at least for the purposes of the collections in question. Section 1090 makes express provision for the receiving of and receipting for taxes by the deputy treasurer. The statute providing for the appointment by the treasurer of deputies makes no provision for the giving of a bond; and in State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St., at page 348, 47 N. E. 139, reference is made to the relation between a county treasurer and his deputies in this language:
“ ‘The law goes no further than to authorize the treasurer, at his pleasure, to appoint one or more deputies, who hold their appointment only during the pleasure of the principal, who is answerable for the proceedings and misconduct of .the deputy, and may, for his own protection, take a bond with sureties for the faithful performance of the services required of the deputy; but the latter takes no oath of office, nor gives bond to any public authority, and is in no sense a public officer, but a mere agent of the treasurer.’
“In our opinion, the view above expressed of the relations between the county treasurer and his deputy is the correct one; and, in our judgment, those considerations pertain equally to Blyth’s relation toward his principal. We have no hesitation in holding that the bond in question was a valid common-law bond; that it was not a public bond, but was given for the sole benefit of claimant, and that he is the real obligee in interest therein. The fact that it runs to claimant ‘as county treasurer’ is not inconsistent with such construction.”
It will be noted that the bond in suit runs, not to the state of North Carolina, but to M. W. Gant, Sr., clerk of the superior court. It does not guarantee the faithful performance of duty by the deputy or provide that he shall faithfully account for moneys intrusted to him, but agrees to indemnify Gant, Sr., the clerk, against loss resulting from embezzlement, larceny, forgery, theft, wrongful abstraction, or any other act of fraud or dishonesty on the part of the deputy. To justify recovery under its terms, it must be shown that Gant, Sr., has sustained loss from the acts insured against. Those entitled to funds intrusted to Gant, Sr., and embezzled by Gant, Jr., would have the right to proceed against Gant, Sr., and, as incidental to that right, to proceed in equity by way of subrogation to enforce the obligation indemnifying him from loss from such embezzlement, where it appeared that he was insolvent and collection could not be made from him. See Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 624, 10 S. Ct. 494, 33 L. Ed. 667. But in such proceeding they would necessarily proceed by way of subrogation and would have no greater rights than Gant, Sr., would have had.
And we think that upon the evidence the trustees should have been nonsuited on the further ground that the employment covered by the bond terminated on October 9, 1930, and that no claim was made upon the company within six months thereafter, as required by the third condition of liability quoted above. It is contended that the misfeasance of Gant, Jr. was not discovered by the auditor employed to check the clerk’s office until October, 1931; but as we have seen above, the misfeasance was known to Gant, Sr., and whatever would bar him would bar the plaintiffs here. And in addition to this, we do not think that ignorance of the default, even by those protected by the bond, makes any difference. The company had a right, in the absence of statute to the contrary, to prescribe any conditions to its liability that it saw 'fit to prescribe; and, in addition to requiring immediate notice of any dishonest act discovered, it provided that the right to make a claim under the policy should cease at the expiration of six months after the termination of the bond. This was equivalent to limiting the period within which discovery of default might be made, as such discovery must necessarily precede the making of a claim. American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 149, 18 S. Ct. 552, 42 L. Ed. 977. And it is well settled that provisions limiting the period within which discovery of default must be made as a condition of liability under the bond are valid and will be enforced. American Surety Co. v. Pauly, supra; Id., 170 U. S. 160, 18 S. Ct. 563, 42 L. Ed. 987; Thompson v. American Surety Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 42 F.(2d) 953; Proctor Coal Co. v. U. S. F. & G. Co. (C. C.) 124 F. 424. And this is true although discovery of the default was prevented by a falsification of employee’s books (Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Consolidated Nat. Bank [C. C. A. 3d] 71 F. 116), or by other means taken to conceal it. Larrabee Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 250 Pa. 135, 95 A. 416, L. R. A. 1916F, 709. And see 25 C. J. 1097 and note in 43 A. L. R. at pages 994, 995.
' A number of interesting questions are raised by the appeal which it is unnecessary to discuss. In the view which we take, the trustees in bankruptcy were not entitled to recover under tbe evidence on any possible theory of the ease, and the motion to nonsuit should have been allowed.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1