What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Francis Hunter PRESSLY, Appellant, v. Terrell Don HUTTO, Director; Thomas J. Towberman, Regional Administrator; N.D. Hall, Regional Ombudsman; W.J. Townley, Superintendent, Unit #23; Ms. Tucker, Nurse, Unit #23; Sgt. Smoot, Officer in Charge, Unit #23; Sgt. Ford, Officer in Charge, Unit #23; Sgt. R.R. Overby, Officer in Charge, Unit #23; Officer Griffith; Officer Poole; Officer Nichols; Officer Cole, Appellees.
No. 82-6181.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 3, 1987.
Decided April 28, 1987.
George Rutherglen, Supervising Atty., University of Virginia School of Law; Elizabeth Finn Johnson, Third-Year Student, University of Virginia School of Law, for appellant.
Nelson H.C. Fisher, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., of Va.; Mark R. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellees.
Before WINTER, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
JAMES DICKSON PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge:
Francis Pressly, a convicted Virginia inmate at the time this action was filed, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against employees of the Department of Corrections. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Although Pressly raised several claims, all of which were denied, he appeals only the denial of his claim against Sergeant R.R. Overby. The relevant forecast of evidence, as developed on the summary judgment record, was as follows.
At approximately 7:30 p.m. on June 22, 1981, a disturbance erupted in the South-side Dormitory of Halifax County Correctional Unit # 23 involving Pressly and three other inmates, Russell, Powell, and Tobias. Sergeant R.R. Overby, the officer in charge that evening, went to the dormitory and found Pressly and Powell engaged in an argument. Because Pressly had sustained an injury to his eye, he was taken to the emergency room of a local hospital where he was treated and released. Sgt. Overby testified that after Pressly returned from the hospital he questioned all four inmates about the incident and received four different accounts. Pressly maintained that Powell, Tobias, and Russell had assaulted him because Powell thought Pressly had made a disparaging remark about Powell. Russell claimed to know nothing about th.e incident. Powell stated that Pressly had swung at him and missed. According to Powell, when Powell then grabbed Pressly’s head, the two fell to a bed causing Pressly to hurt his eye. Tobias stated that Pressly and Powell were fighting but that Powell made no effort to defend himself. No corrections officers observed the incident.
Sgt. Overby asserted that he then asked each inmate whether he felt safe returning to the dormitory and that each indicated that he felt safe and did not want to be moved or placed in segregation. Pressly claimed to the contrary that he asked to be separated from Powell, Tobias, and Russell. In any event, all four were returned to the same dormitory.
At about 11:00 p.m. that same night, Sgt. Overby was told that an inmate had reported that there was going to be trouble in the southside dormitory. After making a personal check of the dormitory and finding everything quiet, Overby sent an extra officer to the dormitory in case trouble developed. This officer was removed at about 11:30 p.m.
Almost four hours later, at about 3:15 a.m., inmate Tobias assaulted Pressly while Pressly was asleep, striking him about the head with a large, metal padlock. Sgt. Overby was summoned to the dormitory. He confiscated the padlock from Tobias and obtained an admission from Tobias that he had struck Pressly with the lock. Pressly was again taken to the emergency room where he received sutures and treatment for a concussion.
After returning from the hospital, Pressly signed a statement that he would feel safe returning to the dormitory if “the perpetrators of the incident [were] moved to another dormitory.” Tobias was placed in pre-hearing detention and Pressly was returned to the dormitory. Pressly asserted that since the assault he has suffered headaches and a loss of hearing in his left ear.
The district court granted summary judgment as to this claim on two grounds. First, it erroneously believed that Pressly had signed a statement refusing segregation after the first incident. The record shows, however, that Pressly signed a statement only after the second incident and that this statement indicated his willingness to return to the dormitory only if “the perpetrators” were removed. The record reflects a flat conflict in the testimony of Pressly and Sgt. Overby as to whether Pressly stated that he felt safe returning to the dormitory after the first incident.
The second basis for the district court’s judgment was its assumption that Pressly’s complaint at best stated a claim for simple negligence, which the court ruled would not be sufficient to support finding a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983.
Whether treated as a claim of deprivation of liberty without due process under the fourteenth amendment, or as a claim of eighth amendment violation, Pressly’s claim was properly denied if the evidence raised only an issue of mere negligence, as the district court concluded. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (mere negligent failure to protect inmate does not “deprive” of liberty, hence violate fourteenth amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (“obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence ... characterize the conduct prohibited by [the eighth amendment]”).
As indicated, however, the district court proceeded on a basic misapprehension as to the critical evidence. The record discloses a flat conflict of testimony between Pressly and Sgt. Overby on the dispositive factual issue. If Pressly’s testimony were believed, Sgt. Overby could be found deliberately to have failed to protect him against a real and imminent risk of harm at the hands of fellow inmates, which risk was specifically known to Overby. If Sgt. Overby’s version is believed, any risk involved was either insignificant or unknown to him, or both, so that his failure to protect was at most mere negligence.
Constitutional claims of convicted prison inmates that they have suffered physical harm at the hands either of prison officials or of fellow-inmates against whom prison officials failed to provide protection, are most appropriately assessed under the eighth amendment where both that source and the fourteenth amendment are invoked. The two sources provide essentially congruent protection, but the eighth amendment source is the primary one in this context. Whitley, 106 S.Ct. at 1088.
The eighth amendment protects a convicted inmate from physical harm at the hands of fellow inmates resulting from the deliberate or callous indifference of prison officials to specific known risks of such harm, Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir.1979), just as it protects against harm resulting from deliberate indifference of prison officials to serious medical needs, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Cf. Whitley, 106 U.S. at 1084-85 (contrasting “deliberate indifference” standard with more stringent “wantonness” standard applicable where physical force directly applied by prison officials to maintain security or discipline).
Here, as indicated, there is a disputed issue of fact as to the exact circumstances under which Pressly suffered harm at the hands of fellow inmates. That issue is a “genuine” one as to a “material” fact. If Pressly’s version were accepted by a fact-finder, it could support a legal determination that his harm resulted from the “deliberate indifference” of the defendant Overby. Summary judgment was therefore not appropriate as to this claim, and the case must be remanded for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0