What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ADAMS v. WALICEK. In re WALICEK.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
November 20, 1925.
Rehearing Denied December 14, 1925.)
No. 4552.
1. Homestead <§=>29 — Husband may select homestead contrary to yvife.’s wishes, subject to limitation stated.
Under Const. Tex.-art. 16, § 50, and Rev. St. Tex. 1911, arts. 3794, 3795, in absence of fraud on wife, husband has right to select-homestead contrary to wishes of wife; only limitation being that he cannot exclude dwelling in which he lives and appurtenances thereto, property indispensable to home, a part of which is actually used for homestead purposes.
2. Homestead <§=>29 — Farm on which wife and her children by former marriage lived held not indispensable part of husband’s homestead.
Where husband with established homestead, to believe discord between families by first and second marriages, established home on a nearby farm for his second wife and her children by her first husband, and himself continued to live on former homestead with child of his first marriage, held, farm on which his wife lived was not indispensable to his home, or so much a ■ part of it that he could not, under Const. Tex. art. 16, §-50, and Rev. St. Tex. 1911, arts. 3794, 3795, exclude-it in making a homestead selection.
Petition to Superintend and Revise from .the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas; Joseph C. Puteheson, Judge.
In the matter of the bankruptcy of F. J. Walicek. On petition - of W. F. Adams, Jr., trustee, to superintend and revise action of lower court in sustaining bankrupt’s claim to designated homestead.
Petition denied.
For opinion below, see 4 F.(2d) 265. .
H. W. Wallace, of Cuero, Tex., for petitioner.
Geo. J. Schleicher and A. C. Hartman, both of Cuero, Tex. (Crain & Hartman, of Cuero, Tex., on the brief); for respondent.
Before WALKER and BRYAN, Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition to superintend and -revise the action of the lower court in' sustaining a bankrupt’s claim of a designated 200 acres of land out of a larger tract as a rural homestead under the Constitution and laws of Texas. The tract so claimed as exempt included the dwelling and the appurtenances thereto actually and continuously used for homestead purposes by the bankrupt and some of his family since prior to the death of his first wife in 1908; the bankrupt’s absences therefrom having been temporary and without any intention to abandon that place as a homestead, he and his minor son by his first marriage having lived in that dwelling up to the date of the bankruptcy adjudication. The claim asserted is challenged on the ground that the bankrupt did not have the right to omit from his homestead a 90-acre tract which was occupied by his second wife, who, with her children by a former husband, for several years after her marriage to the bankrupt, lived with him in the above-mentioned dwelling. The pertinent facts with reference to that 90-aere tract are shown by the following statements contained in the opinion rendered by the District Judge:
“In August, 1917, bankrupt, F. J. Wa-Heek, purchased a 90-aere farm about 3 miles distant from, the 200 acres claimed as exempt, and Mrs. Walicek, with three of her children, moved upon the 90-aere farm; the bankrupt helping her to make the move. It was the intention, at the time Mrs. Walicek moved upon the 90-aere farm, for her to make her home there with her children. There was never any separation between F. J. Walicek and his wife; they were on friendly terms, and lived together as man and wife. She made her principal home on the 90-aere farm, and he visited her there, advised with her about the cultivation of the farm, furnished her teams when she needed them, and did some work in the field. These relations existed between the bankrupt and his wife at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy; Mrs Walicek at that time making her home on the 90-acre farm, and Mr. Walicek staying most of the time on the 200-acre farm. Mrs. Walicek would come over to the 200-acre farm and cook bread enough for several days’ supply, and at other times Mr. Walicek would go to the 90-acre farm, where his wife made her home, and would eat his meals there. There were no children bom to Mr. Walicek by his second wife. * .* * In November, 1917, the bankrupt deeded the 90-acre farm to his wife, and the deed from the bankrupt to his wife was filed for record January 16, 1918, and recorded January 18, 1918, in volume 80, on pages 467, 468, of the Deed Records of De Witt county, Tex. Mrs. Walicek was living on the 90-acre farm at the time the farm was deeded to her, having moved there in August, 1917, and continues to make the 90-acre farm her home to this day.”
In the absence of fraud upon the wife, the husband has the right to select the homestead, and his selection may be contrary to the wishes of his wife; the only limitation upon his right in this regard being that he cannot exclude the dwelling in which he lives and appurtenances thereto, property indispensable to the home, a part of wha,t is actually used for homestead purposes. Constitution of Texas, art. 16, § 50; Revised Civil Statute of Texas 1911, arts. 3794, 3795; Hanes v. Hanes (Tex. Com. App.) 239 S. W. 190; Watkins Land Co. v. Temple (Tex. Civ. App.) 135 S. W. 1063; Hughes v. Hughes (Tex. Civ. App.) 170 S. W. 847.
The just stated proposition is not controverted, and it is not claimed that the characteristics of homestead which long prior to the bankruptcy had attached to the larger tract, which included the 200 acres claimed, had been lost by abandonment by a discontinuance of the use of the premises for home purposes, coupled with an intent on the bankrupt’s part not to use them again as a home. In re Johnson (C. C. A.) 294 F, 258. The contention in behalf of the petitioner is to the effect that the use made of the above-mentioned 90-aere tract made it property indispensable to the home, or a part thereof, or appurtenant thereto, within the moaning of the above-cited decisions. We do not think that that contention is sustainable. The law does not protect two homesteads for the same family, one for the husband and one for the wife. Holliman v. Smith, 39 Tex. 357; Slavin v. Wheeler, 61 Tex. 654. If the one selected by the husband includes the dwelling in which he and some of his family live, and all property appurtenant thereto and actually used for homestead purposes, it need not include also other property used by the wife as a place of residence, hut which the husband never consented to include in the homestead selected by him, or to be substituted therefor in whole or in part.
The petition is denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0