What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. The LITTLE ROCK DOWNTOWNER, INC., Respondent (two cases).
Nos. 17581, 17615.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
March 5, 1965.
Peter M. Giesey, Atty., N. L. R. B. made argument for petitioner and filed brief with Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel and Lee M. Modjeska, Atty., N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C.
William E. Fortas and Earl W. De-Hart, of Fowler, Fortas & DeHart, Newell N. Fowler, Memphis, Tenn., made ai'gument for respondent and filed brief.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT and MEHAFFY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIES, District Judge.
RONALD N. DAVIES, District Judge.
These two cases are before us upon petitions of the National Labor Relations Board agreeable to Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) to enforce consolidated orders directed to The Little Rock Down-towner, Inc., issued against that Respondent, July 29, 1963, and January 28, 1964, respectively.
We have jurisdiction of these causes under Section 10(e) of the Act.
For purposes of clarity and reference, No. 17,581 will be denominated “the first case,” and No. 17,615 “the second case.”
In the consideration of these petitions we turn for guidance at the outset to the much discussed and often quoted Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456.
There the Supreme Court said: “Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” 340 U.S., p. 491, 71 S.Ct. p. 466.
The Court said further in that same ease:
“The Taft-Hartley Act provides that ‘The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive.’ 61 Stat. 148, 29 U.S. C. (Supp. Ill) § 160(e). Surely an examiner’s report is as much a part of the record as the complaint or the testimony.” 340 U.S., p. 493; 71 S.Ct., p. 467; 95 L.Ed. p. 456.
Mindful of the rationale of Universal Camera and of particular questions determined in Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board et al., 85 S.Ct. 398 (December 14, 1964), we address ourselves to the petitions before us.
We are unaware of any problems here presented which would justify outlining at great length a run of the mine case such as this. In the first ease the Board found that Respondent had interfered with its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act by interrogating and threatening them and that it discriminated against employees, Eddie Robinson, Irma Baruday and Jessie Moseley. In the second case the Board found that Respondent refused to bargain in good faith collectively with the employees’ union by granting wage increases and changing working conditions of certain employees, by refusing to meet requests of the union for bargaining sessions, and finally by Respondent’s refusing to meet at all with union representatives. In addition the Board found that Respondent violated the Act by declining to rehire an employee for union activities and by refusing to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers when requested to do so.
We have thoroughly examined the Joint Records of two volumes, Respondent’s Supplement to Joint Record, and the briefs of both parties.
A careful reading of the record reveals that there is no substantial evidentiary basis for the Board’s findings in the cases of Eddie Robinson and Irma Baruday. Robinson was insubordinate and his discharge was justified. Baruday was and had been an unsatisfactory employee whose work and habits, were demonstrably below Respondent’s standards and there was ample justification for termination of her employment. With respect to Jessie Moseley, we conclude that the record substantiates the Board’s findings.
In N. L. R. B. v. South Rambler Company, 324 F.2d 447, 449, (8 Cir., 1963), this Court said:
“[5-8] Certainly, an employer may hire and discharge at will, so long as his action is not based on opposition to union activities. Farmers Co-Operative Co. v. N. L. R. B., supra, [8 Cir.], 208 F.2d 296, at 303-304; N. L. R. B. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1 Cir., 317 F.2d 912, 914 (1963); N. L. R. B. v. Local 294, International Bros. of Teamsters, Etc., 2 Cir., 317 F.2d 746, 749 (1963). Furthermore, an employer’s general hostility to unions, without more, does not supply an unlawful motive as to a specific discharge. N. L. R. B. v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 5 Cir., 293 F.2d 300, 304 (1961), rehearing denied 296 F. 2d 896 (1961); Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc., v. N. L. R. B., 9 Cir., 284 F.2d 542, 545-546 (1960); N. L. R. B. v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 5 Cir., 284 F.2d 397, 402 (1960). An inference that a discharge of an employee was motivated by his union activity must be based upon evidence, direct or circumstantial, not upon mere suspicion, Osceola Co. Co-Op. Cream. Ass’n v. N. L. R. B., supra, [8 Cir.], 251 F.2d [62] at 69; N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 8 Cir., 157 F.2d 486, 491 (1946); Schwob Manufacturing Company v. N. L. R. B., 5 Cir., 297 F.2d 864, 867 (1962); N. L. R. B. v. Western Bank & Office Supply Company, supra, 283 F.2d [603] at 606, and the burden of proving an improper motive for discharge is upon the Board. N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, 157 F.2d at 491; N. L. R. B. v. Moore Dry Kiln Company, 5 Cir., 320 F.2d 30, 32-33 (1963); Lawson Milk Company v. N. L. R. B., supra, [6 Cir.], 317 F.2d [756] at 760; Portable Electric Tools, Inc., v. N. L. R. B., 7 Cir., 309 F.2d 423, 426-427 (1962); Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc., v. N. L. R. B., supra, 284 F.2d at 545-546.”
We conclude that the orders of the National Labor Relations Board must be enforced except as to the employees, Eddie Robinson and Irma Baruday.
The order, as here modified, is en-foi'ced.
. Board’s opinion reported in 143 N.L.R.B. 897.
. Board’s opinion reported in 145 N.L.R.B. No. 132.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1