What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Roy Lee SMARTT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lynn BOMAR, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 15832.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Jan. 26, 1965.
Robert L. Seaver, Cincinnati, Ohio (court appointed), Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio, on the brief), for appellant.
Henry C. Fouteh, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn. (George F. MeCanless, Atty. Gen., State of Tennessee, Nashville, Tenn., of counsel), for appellee.
Before MILLER, O’SULLIVAN and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner-appellant, Roy Lee Smartt, is a prisoner of the State of Tennessee. He is confined under a fifteen year sentence which followed his conviction by a jury of robbery with a deadly weapon. In his trial in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, he was represented by privately employed counsel. Smartt is also serving a five year concurrent sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to a separate offense of robbery with a deadly weapon. He appeals from dismissal of his habeas corpus petition to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Counsel was appointed to assist him in such habeas corpus proceeding and two hearings were had thereon, at each of which petitioner was present in person and by counsel.
The District Court memorandum filed January 30, 1964, directing the dismissal of Smartt’s petition adequately sets forth his claims and correctly disposes of them. We add our comment on one point. Smartt asserts that his constitutional rights were infringed by the state trial judge’s failure to appoint counsel to process an appeal on his behalf. He relies on Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); and Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). His situation does not fit the rule of those cases.
After Smartt’s conviction, his counsel moved for a new trial, which was denied. Smartt’s opportunity to appeal was then protected by his counsel’s praying for and being granted an appeal on Smartt’s behalf. Tenn. Code Anno. § 27-111 allowed Smartt 30 days to file a bill of exceptions to implement an appeal, or within said 30 days to obtain an extension of time for such filing. Smartt’s counsel had been retained only for the trial, and recommended to him that an attorney be employed to prepare and file a bill of exceptions, and to prosecute the appeal. No attorney was employed and the time for filing a bill of exceptions went by. In the other cause then pending against Smartt — the cause in which he ultimately received a five year sentence upon his plea of guilty — his retained counsel was given leave to withdraw as such upon representation that Smartt had not paid attorney fees owed and was uncooperative, and he was thereafter represented by the Public Defender.
In the case which had been tried to a jury, the technical record — the record without a bill of exceptions — was forwarded to the Supreme Court of Tennessee and Smartt’s conviction was there affirmed. A bill of exceptions would have been necessary to expose error of the sort claimed in Smartt’s conviction. He contends that the Tennessee trial judge should have appointed counsel to perfect and carry on his appeal. No request therefor was made by Smartt. Neither was the trial court informed of Smartt’s indigency, if such was the fact. Smartt, although given the opportunity to testify at the hearing in the District Court, gave no evidence that the trial or appellate courts were in any way apprised of his indigency. He contends, however, that the state trial judge should have assumed such from his dispute over fees with his own retained counsel and should have appointed counsel for him sua sponte. We find no merit in this contention. See State ex rel. Dych v. Bomar, 213 Tenn. 699, 378 S.W.2d 772 (1964); Horton v. Bomar, 335 F.2d 583 (CA 6, 1964) ; McCoy v. Bomar, 333 F.2d 959 (CA 6, 1964); cf. Polk v. Bomar, 336 F.2d 330 (CA 6, 1964). The principle stated in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), that counsel must be provided where constitutionally required regardless of whether the defendant so requests, does not apply where the defendant has been represented throughout the trial by retained counsel and there is no indication that he is unable, rather than unwilling, to pay counsel fees.
We express appreciation for the capable services rendered by Robert L. Seaver, of the Cincinnati Bar, appointed by us to present Smartt’s appeal to, this Court.
Judgment affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1