What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bobby R. CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17877.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
April 11, 1968.
H. Wayne Grant, Chattanooga, Tenn., for appellant; Williams, Grant & Clements, Chattanooga, Tenn., of counsel.
John H. Reddy, U. S. Atty., Chattanooga, Tenn., for appellee; Robert A. Scott, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chattanooga, Tenn., on brief.
Before O’SULLIVAN, PHILLIPS, and COMBS, Circuit Judges.
COMBS, Circuit Judge.
The defendant-appellant, Bobby R. Carpenter, worked for the operators of a numbers game in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He was placed under surveillance by federal officers, and on three occasions in April and two occasions in July, 1966, was observed as he travelled by automobile from Rossville, Georgia, to the headquarters of the numbers racket in Chattanooga. The Tennessee-Georgia state line separates the city of Chattanooga from the town of Rossville. Carpenter was indicted and convicted for violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which prohibits travel in interstate commerce with the intent to promote or engage in illegal gambling activities.
It is admitted that Carpenter crossed the state line as charged in the indictment, and it is not denied that he was engaged in the operation of a numbers racket or lottery prohibited by the laws of Tennessee. Carpenter offered proof, which was not denied, that his permanent residence was at his mother’s home in Chattanooga and that his trips to Georgia had no connection with his activities in the gambling operation. Carpenter and his wife were separated and under the order of custody he had the right to visit his minor son. His married sister lived in Rossville and at irregular intervals the child was brought to her home for short visits. On these occasions Carpenter stayed overnight there in order to be with his son. On the dates referred to in the indictment he was going from his sister’s home in Georgia to his place of employment in Chattanooga. It is contended by Carpenter that the trips from Georgia back to Tennessee did not violate the Travel Act. There being no dispute about the facts, the case turns on whether he was entitled to a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law.
Carpenter relies on the line of cases of which Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 64 S.Ct. 1037, 88 L.Ed. 1331 (1944), is typical. Mortensen and his wife operated a house of prostitution in Grand Island, Nebraska. They were making plans to visit Mrs. Mortensen’s parents in Salt Lake City, Utah. Two of the prostitutes requested that they be permitted to go along as a vacation to them. The Mortensens agreed and the two girls accompanied them to Salt Lake City and returned with them to Nebraska. No prostitution was practiced on the trip but it was intended that the girls would resume their profession upon their return to Nebraska. The Mortensens were indicted and convicted for violation of the Mann Act. In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court said:
“An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive for such interstate movement. And the transportation must be designed to bring about such result.”
To the same general effect is Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559, 54 S.Ct. 494, 78 L.Ed. 968 (1934), and United States v. Hawthorne, 356 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908, 86 S.Ct. 1344, 16 L.Ed.2d 360 (1966).
We do not consider those cases as controlling here. The reasoning in those cases is that the interstate travel was not directly connected with the illegal activity; or stated differently, the promotion of the illegal activity was not the dominant motive for the travel. In this case, Carpenter went directly from his sister’s home in Georgia, where he was temporarily residing, to the gambling house in Tennessee. The officers testified that occasionally he took a circuitous route, apparently in an effort to avoid surveillance. On one occasion, at a parking lot he picked up a woman who also worked in the gambling operation and took her to the gambling house.
So far as is shown by the record, Carpenter’s only purpose in going from his sister’s home in Georgia to his place of employment in Tennessee was to assist in the gambling operation. Certainly, the jury had the right to reach this conclusion. It may be conceded that, in going from Tennessee into Georgia to visit his son, his motives were commendable and that he violated no law; but he was not tried for going into Georgia. He was tried for making the trips from his sister’s home in Georgia to the gambling house in Tennessee. The statute prohibits interstate travel with intent to “promote, manage, establish, carry on” an unlawful activity, including illegal gambling. We are of the opinion that the facts of this case meet the requirements of the statute. Compare United States v. Compton, 355 F.2d 872 (1966), where this Court upheld a conviction in somewhat similar circumstances.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1