What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
WILLIS v. HUNTER.
No. 3562.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Nov. 17, 1947.
Arthur J. Mellott, Judge.
Richard Clarence Willis, pro se.
Eugene W. Davis, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan. (Randolph Carpenter, U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
On September 10, 1946, an indictment was returned in the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado charging that Willis, on July 6, 1946, “while in lawful custody by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, did attempt to escape from said custody.” On October 16, 1946, petitioner appeared in person and by his counsel, Charles J. Moynihan, Esq., and entered a plea of guilty to the charge in the indictment. On May 19, 1946, petitioner was arrested by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on a charge of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 408, and was taken before a United States Commissioner at Montrose, Colorado. The Commissioner issued a mittimus • committing him to the Montrose County Jail. Petitioner was transferred to the County Jail of El Paso County, Colorado, at Colorado Springs, Colorado. While so confined, he attempted to escape.
On May 7, 1947, petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. As ground for discharge, he alleged that at the time he attempted to escape he had neither been bound over by a United States Commissioner nor indicted by a grand jury on a charge of felony and, therefore, was not being held on a charge of felony at the time he attempted to escape.
18 U.S.C.A. § 753h, in part, provides: ■“Any person * * * who is in custody by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or commissioner, or who is in custody ■of an officer of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, who escapes or attempts to escape from such custody * * * •shall be guilty of an offense. If the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest •on a charge of felony, * * * the offense of escaping or attempting to escape therefrom shall constitute a felony and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or both; * *
The evidence established that petitioner had been arrested and had been committed by the United States Commissioner on a charge of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 408. The offense defined in § 408, supra, is a felony. Moreover, the indictment charged that petitioner attempted to escape “while in lawful custody by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony,” and his plea of guilty admitted the facts charged in the indictment.
It follows that petitioner was not entitled to discharge on habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
Hereinafter referred to as petitioner.
Lindsay v. United States, 10 Cir., 134 F.2d 960, 962; Norris v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 114 F.2d 1007, 1009; Spencer v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 139 F.2d 828, 829.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1