What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In the Matter of BRENDAN REILLY ASSOCIATES, INC., Bankrupt. Quintino TESCIUBA, Creditor-Appellant, v. CAMBRIDGE FACTORS, Creditor-Appellee.
No. 148, Docket 32587.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 17, 1968.
Decided Dec. 26, 1968.
Anthony B. Cataldo, New York City, for creditor-appellant.
Howard C. Amron (Bendes, Stark & Amron, New York City), for creditorappellee.
Before WATERMAN and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and BONSAL, District Judge.
Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
MOORE, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from one phase of extended bankruptcy proceedings involving Quintino Tesciuba, doing business as Mutual Trade Enterprises Company; Cambridge Factors (Cambridge), a financing agent; and Brendan Reilly Associates, Inc., a bankrupt manufacturer of furniture. See In re Brendan Reilly Associates, Inc., 372 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1967). Tesciuba, appellant herein, supplied marble on consignment to the bankrupt, which used the marble for table tops. Cambridge, which made secured advances to the bankrupt, paid for the marble as it was used. The value of the marble on the bankrupt’s premises on the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, March 6, 1964, was found by the Hon. Edward J. Ryan, Referee in Bankruptcy, to be $14,480.12. On April 2, 1964, after discovering that the bankrupt was still using the marble on the premises but that no corresponding payments were being remitted by Cambridge, Tesciuba petitioned the Referee for payment of the value of the marble used up to that date ($1,721.00), the return of all unused marble, and an accounting of all other marble used after that date. On April 9, 1964, the Referee issued an order granting Tesciuba’s requests. Following some preliminary proceedings, Cambridge tendered a cheek in the amount of $1,721.00 to Tesciuba. The check was refused because it bore the printed legend “This check is accepted IN FULL PAYMENT OF THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT.” On June 29, 1964, Judge Tyler of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held Cambridge in contempt for failure to pay the amount of $1,721.00 and levied a fine of $1,000.00 upon Cambridge. On July 20, following a motion for reargument, the same check, with the objectionable printed legend crossed out, was re-tendered to and accepted by Tesciuba. Judge Tyler specifically expunged the June 29, 1964 order holding Cambridge in contempt, reduced the fine to $250, and ordered that the concluded contempt proceedings were to be “without prejudice to the balance of the proceedings hereunder to take place before the Hon. Edward J. Ryan.”
After the passage of more than three years, during which time both parties, according to the record, must share some responsibility for causing delay, the district court, Wyatt, Judge, ordered the Referee to proceed with the accounting as required by the order of April 9, 1964. On November 3, 1967, the Referee found that Cambridge owed Tesciuba $7,-121.86, a figure representing the above-mentioned total value of the marble ($14,480.12) minus the value of márble returned to Tesciuba ($5,637.14) and the check accepted by Tesciuba ($1,721.-00). This amount was awarded without interest and each party was directed to bear its own costs. Both parties moved in the district court to review the Referee’s decision. The court denied both motions from which order Tesciuba alone appeals.
Tesciuba first asks reversal on the ground that Cambridge, in collusion with the bankrupt, committed the tort of conversion and, in fact, owes Tesciuba not $7,121.86 but $16,000. In support of this theory, Tesciuba cites New York case law. But, as pointed out by the Referee and the district court below, this theory is an afterthought, introduced by Tesciuba only during the latter part of the 1967 accounting proceedings. It was not given consideration during any of the 1964 proceedings, during which Tesciuba had sought only the return of the marble or compensation of the invoice value thereof ($14,480.12). The record is barren of any evidence of conversion. Furthermore, to grant Tesciuba’s request would be to allow a total recovery of more than $23,000. Tesciuba cannot recover a windfall of $8,000 by tardily espousing an unsupported conversion theory.
Neither can Tesciuba recover interest customarily applied to conversion awards since we find no conversion here.
Tesciuba is also misguided in asserting that he is entitled to costs and attorney’s fees incurred during these proceedings, on a theory of contempt enforcement. Judge Tyler’s order of July 20, 1964 specifically purged Cambridge of its earlier contempt and, upon levying the moderate fine of $250, ordered that the contempt proceedings should not prejudice the remaining litigation. Neither are we persuaded that the Referee erred in concluding that each party herein should bear its own costs. § 2a(18) of the Bankruptcy Act permits the Referee, on his own discretion, to assess costs in part to each of the parties. 1 Collier on Bankrupcy, Par. 2.71 (1968). We have examined the record and find no abuse of discretion therein.
The order of the district court is affirmed.
. We note, in passing, that a computation here yields a result of $7,121.98, $0.21 more than the awarded figure.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1