What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".

Opinion:
VERMONT STRUCTURAL SLATE COMPANY, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TATKO BROTHERS SLATE COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 313, Docket 23886.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued April 3, 1956.
Decided May 8, 1956.
John C. Blair, Stamford, Conn., Clarence S. Lyon, Stamford, Conn., of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.
W. Brown Morton, Jr., New York City, Maxwell E. Sparrow, New York City, James F. Sennett, Granville, N. Y., of counsel, for defendant-appellant.
Before FRANK, MEDINA and WATERMAN, Circuit Judges.
FRANK, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment declaring defendant’s patent invalid. The judge entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. The facts are amply stated in the opinion of Judge Foley, reported in D.C., 134 F.Supp. 4. We agree with his conclusion.
Summary judgment represents a most useful legal invention to save time and expense, by the avoidance of a trial, when there exist no material fact-issues. It may well be that, in a patent case, a judge should exercise unusual caution in granting a summary judgment. But there are patent cases where it would be an absurd waste of time and effort to deny such a judgment. This is such a case.
In many a patent suit, there arise issues of fact as to which the testimony of expert witnesses may be important. Then the credibility of those witnesses is crucial, and it would be erroneous, by a summary judgment, to deprive either party of a “live trial” at which the trial court could observe the witnesses’ demeanor in evaluating their testimony. There was no such issue here. The pri- or art and the patent claims are, without expert aid, easily understandable by anyone of the most modest intelligence. Nor did it require expert testimony to make it plain that the differences between the prior art and- the patent claims were obvious to persons having ordinary skill in the trade at the time the alleged invention was made.
There was but one material issue of fact here, which defendant in the district court described as the “state of affairs existing in the industry at the time the (alleged) invention and the extent to which it has been adopted with resulting economies.” On that issue, the trial judge fully accepted the statements in the affidavits filed by defendant as demonstrating (to quote the judge) “that this new arrangement of boards and stringers brought an advancement in utility, safety and economy in the industry.” On that basis, he found as a fact: “It allows a more secure handling of the slate and stone when it is being lifted and transported. It may be that less labor is needed in such efforts and the vertical filing permits stocking of the slabs as to color on the pallets which is desirable to purchasers. All these endorsements are set forth in the answering affidavits * * * and I accept them fully as to the usefulness of the Tatko pallet * * * This attribute of utility is further advanced by the adoption of a most similar pallet by plaintiff * * * ” It follows that the credibility of witnesses on this issue of fact was not involved. The judge therefore correctly rejected the contention made by defendant in the court below that, on this issue, the judge “should await the presentation of testimony.” If the question of patentable invention were a “close one,” the facts here thus taken as true might tip “the scales of judgment” in defendant’s favor; but where “invention is plainly lacking,” such a fact “cannot fill the void.” Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 567, 69 S.Ct. 269, 272, 93 L.Ed. 235. We agree with the judge that here the question of invention was not at all close. The patent disclosed no more ingenuity than that of a man skilled in the art.
Plaintiff argues that the recent amendment to the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 103, lowered the standard of invention, citing Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 2 Cir., 224 F.2d 530, 535-536. Even so, the plaintiff’s patent, we think, is clearly sub-standard.
Affirmed.
. See, e. g., Park-In-Theatres v. Perkins, 9 Cir., 190 F.2d 137, 142 ; 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953) Section 56.17(44).
. Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Bostwick Laboratories, 2 Cir., 181 F.2d 315.
. The writer of this opinion has serious doubts about the correctness of that ruling. See the following to the effect that the amendment merely codified the existing decisions: Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 3 Cir., 203 F.2d 846; General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 6 Cir., 203 F.2d 912; Interstate Rubber Products Corp. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 4 Cir., 214 F.2d 546; Wasserman v. Burgess & Blacher Co., 1 Cir., 217 F.2d 402.
. See Gentzel v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 2 Cir., 1956, 230 F.2d 341.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?

Choices:
local
neither local nor national
national or multi-national
not ascertained

Answer: 3