What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "manufacturing". Your task is to determine what subcategory of business best describes this litigant.

Opinion:
WOLF-TEC, INC., Appellee, v. MILLER’S SAUSAGE COMPANY, INC., Appellant.
No. 89-2796.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 6, 1990.
Decided March 28, 1990.
Roger M. Hibbits, Clayton, Mo., for appellant.
Howard A. Shalowitz, Clayton, Mo., for appellee.
Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Miller’s Sausage Company, Inc. appeals from the district court’s denial of its motion to quash enforcement of a default judgment obtained by Wolf-Tec, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. We reverse.
Wolf-Tec, a New York corporation, filed a diversity suit in the New York district court seeking payment of a Miller’s debt for food processing equipment. Miller’s did not answer or otherwise appear, and the court entered a default judgment. The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri then entered an enforcement order. Miller's sought to quash the order, claiming the default judgment was unenforceable because the New York district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Miller’s, a Missouri corporation.
The long arm statutes of the state where the federal district court sits determine whether the court has jurisdiction in diversity cases. Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 225 (8th Cir.1987). New York’s long arm jurisdiction does not extend to a party like Miller’s whose only contact with the state is ordering goods by mail or telephone. See Spectra Prods., Inc. v. Indian River Citrus Specialties, Inc., 144 A.D.2d 832, 534 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571-72 (1988). Because Wolf-Tec does not claim Miller’s New York contacts were more substantial than ordering equipment from Wolf-Tec, it failed to meet its burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., 846 F.2d 40, 42 (8th Cir.1988). Further, in choosing not to appear, Miller’s did not waive its right to object to the district court’s jurisdiction. See Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 3 n. 3 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1808, 108 L.Ed.2d 939 (1990). The district court had no jurisdiction over Miller’s, and thus the judgment of the district court is unenforceable. See id.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment granting the motion to quash.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)", specifically "manufacturing". What subcategory of business best describes this litigant?

Choices:
auto
chemical
drug
food processing
oil refining
textile
electronic
alcohol or tobacco
other
unclear

Answer: 3