What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
IMPERIAL TYPE METAL CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 7006.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Aug. 10, 1939.
Eugene C. Fish and Leon Meltzer, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioner.
James W. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key, J. Louis Monarch, John A. Gage, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before BIGGS, MARIS, and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
This petition by the Imperial Type Metal Company to review a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals determining its income tax liability for the years 1933 and 1934, raises three issues. They will be separately considered.
1. Bad Debt Reserve Deduction.
In its income tax return for the year 1933 the petitioner claimed a bad debt deduction in the amount of $11,100, this amount having been added to its reserve for bad debts in that year. The petitioner’s accounts receivable at the beginning of 1933 were $100,010.62 and at the end of the year $142,786.65. The reserve at the beginning of the year was $7,863.52 and at the end of the year $15,244.33. The amount credited to the reserve was not fixed by taking an established percentage of accounts receivable. On the contrary the president and treasurer of the petitioner examined each account and determined upon an addition to the reserve which they, from their personal knowledge of prevailing business and economic conditions and of the debtor’s financial status, considered necessary to cover possible losses.
In 1933 business conditions in the entire industry served by the petitioner were bad. Standard McCarthy, Inc., a customer, which owed the petitioner $16,000 was in very severe financial straits and did in fact become a bankrupt in 1934. The petitioner recovered less than $500 from it. For these reasons the petitioner’s officers increased its bad debt reserve. The Commissioner disallowed the addition to the reserve to the extent of $3,554.61. The Board of Tax Appeals found as a fact that a reasonable addition to the petitioner’s reserve for bad debts for the year 1933 was not in excess of the amount determined and allowed by the Commissioner and sustained his determination.
The petitioner relies upon section 23(j) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 169, 180, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(k), for the right to make a deduction from gross income of a reserve for bad debts. That section provides :
“Sec. 23. Deductions from gross income
“In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: ******
“(j) Bad Debts. Debts ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year (or, in the discretion of the Commissioner, a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts) * *
It will be seen that the statute requires that the additions credited by a taxpayer to a reserve for bad debts must be reasonable in order to be deductible from gross income. Whether the $11,100 addition to the reserve for 1933 was reasonable is a question of fact. The Commissioner in the exercise of his discretion found that it was excessive. His determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 54 S.Ct. 8, 78 L.Ed. 212. The Board was not persuaded by the testimony presented by the petitioner that the Commissioner erred and found as a fact that the amount as reduced by the Commissioner was reasonable. The finding by the Board if supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 55 S.Ct. 732, 79 L.Ed. 1343; Elmhurst Cemetery Co. v. Com’r, 300 U.S. 37, 57 S.Ct. 324, 81 L.Ed. 491; Helvering v. Nat. Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 58 S.Ct. 932, 82 L.Ed. 1346.
A search of the record of this case for evidence justifying the amount added to the 1933 reserve by the petitioner discloses only generalizations as to the prevailing economic conditions and'the opinions of the petitioner’s officers. -Except for the Standard McCarthy account there is no identification of the accounts for which the reserve was set up and even as to that account the possibility that it had already been reflected in the reserve is not precluded. The petitioner did not meet the burden which rested upon it to prove its right to the full amount of the claimed deduction and the action of the Commissioner in disallowing a part of it was properly sustained.
II. Royalty Bonus Expense.
The petitioner deducted $16,496.84 on its 1933 income tax return and $28,233.07 on its 1934 return for what it described as royalty bonus expense. Its obligation to make these payments arose under an agreement of April 3, 1913, which transferred to the petitioner corporation all the assets of a metal business previously carried on by four partners. By that agreement the petitioner agreed to pay each of three of these partners or their assignees 5% of the profits of the business during his lifetime and a like amount to his estate for a period of five years after his death. The petitioner treated the payments thus made as a necessary expense incurred during the taxable years in carrying on its business. The deduction was disallowed by the Commissioner on the ground that the payments were either distributions' of profits or payments for capital assets and, therefore, not deductible. The Board concluded from the facts that the payments were made by the petitioner corporation for assets acquired by it from the partners and accordingly affirmed the action of the Commissioner in disallowing the deductions.
By the terms of the 1913 agreement the former partners sold, assigned, transferred and set over to the corporation all their right, title and interest in and to “a certain metal business * * * including tools and equipment, furnaces, moulds, laboratory and supplies, lease on property, office fixtures, accounts receivable, cash on hand, stock on hand and in the process of manufacture, business assets and existing insurance policies.” The business was chiefly based upon secret chemical processes which had been developed by the three partners to whom the payments were made, for the accurate analysis of type metals. There was, however, no specific reference to these secret processes in the agreement, although they were undoubtedly acquired by the corporation.
If, as the record indicates, the secret processes are part of the business assets of the partnership which were transferred to the corporation by the agreement, the payments to the three partners and their assignees out of the corporate income could not be royalties for their use, as the petitioner contends, since the agreement was an assignment not a license, and no interest in the secret processes was reserved or retained by the partners. Nowhere in the written instrument is there any mention of an' agreement for royalty payments for the use of the secret processes. On the contrary the language of the agreement leads inevitably to the conclusion that the respective 5% income payments were a part of the price which the petitioner agreed to pay for title to the capital assets, including the secret processes, with which it was to start business. As such they are capital expenditures and are not deductible as current business expenses.
Petitioner relies upon the case of George La Monte & Son v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 32 F.2d 220, in which the facts were somewhat similar. The deductibility of payments made for the purchase of capital assets was not considered in that case, however. Consequently it cannot be deemed authority in support of the petitioner’s position here. Our conclusion is that the Board properly held the so-called royalty bonus-expense not deductible.
III. Additional Royalty and Employee Bonus.
The petitioner deducted in its 1933 income tax return $1,175.06 and in its 1934 return $582.67 as additional deduction for royalty and employee bonus. In prior years, it had determined the amount of bonus upon a basis of net profit calculated by the use of a depreciation rate which revenue agents concluded was too high. When the lower depreciation rate was used the net profit was increased and the bonus of necessity was greater. This is the petitioner’s explanation of the need for the addition to the bonus charge.
In view of our conclusion that the royalty bonus payments were payments for capital assets and not deductible we will consider here only the claim for an addition to the employee bonus. The petitioner, although it has set up these charges in its tax returns, has not set them up as accruals for 1933 and 1934 on its hooks, nor had it paid any of these amounts at the time of the hearing before the Board. The taxpayer uses the accrual method of accounting. It must, therefore, take the deduction in the year in which incurred. The liability for the employee’s bonus was not incurred unless and until the petitioner’s hoard of directors ordered distribution and specifically designated the employees who were to receive the payments. This action had not been taken in 1933 or 1934.
The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1