What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Fernando Luis RODRIGUEZ-SANDOVAL, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 72-1003.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued Feb. 5, 1973.
Decided March 23, 1973.
Gerardo Ortiz Del Rivero, San Juan, P. R., by appointment of the Court, for appellant.
Jorge Rios Torres, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Julio Morales Sanchez, U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, MeENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
. “Indeed the better practice would be to instruct the jurors that they may draw the inference unless the evidence in the case provides a satisfactory explanation for the rproved fact], omitting any explicit reference to the statute itself in the charge.” United States v. Gainey, supra at 71 n. 7, 85 S.Ct. at 759.
McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
Fernando Luis Rodriguez Sandoval was tried and convicted for the purchase, sale, concealment and transportation of heroin in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 4704 (a), 4705(a), 21 U.S.C. § 174, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of fifteen years imprisonment. He appeals from this conviction as well as from the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduction of sentence. We affirm.
Sandoval’s primary contention on appeal relates to the prosecution’s alleged misuse of the evidentiary presumptions written into 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174. The latter section authorizes conviction upon evidence that the defendant had possession of a narcotic drug “unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.” Similarly, § 4704(a) provides that “the absence of appropriate taxpaid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subsection by the person in whose possession the same may be found.” In making his opening statement, the United States Attorney informed the jury that the government would rely on these presumptions, which he said would “authorize conviction unless the possession [of heroin] is explained to you by the defendant to your satisfaction.” In addition to these comments, the prosecutor made several similar references to the presumptions, both in his opening statement and in his summation. Appellant contends that these statements necessarily and impermissibly drew the jury’s attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, and that his conviction must therefore be reversed under our decision in United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971). This argument is without merit. When read in context, it is clear that the prosecutor’s remarks were intended only to explain to the jury what the government’s evidence would be and the theory under which it would press for conviction. Such an explanation could hardly have been made without some reference to the presumptions on which the government intended to rely. While the avoidance of any language having even a slight tendency to highlight the defendant’s failure to testify or produce evidence would have been preferable, cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 71 n. 7, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965), we do not believe that the prosecutor’s statements caused appellant to suffer any substantial prejudice. The district court took great pains to instruct the jury that the defendant did not have to testify or call witnesses and that the “explanation” of his possession of narcotics could come from any of the facts and circumstances revealed by the evidence. In view of these instructions, the prosecutor’s accurate explanation of the statutory presumptions involved in this case does not warrant reversal.
Appellant also objects to the court’s instructions to the jury on the ground that they made explicit reference to the statutory presumptions in issue, contrary to the “better practice” suggested by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gainey, supra, at 71, n. 7, 85 S.Ct. 754. While the “better practice” was admittedly not followed, Gainey does not require reversal if the “overall reference [of the charge] was carefully directed to the evidence as a whole, with neither allusion nor innuendo based on defendant’s decision not to take the stand.”. Id. at 71, 85 S.Ct. at 759. As noted above, the court carefully instructed the jury that the statutory presumptions did not have to be rebutted by the defendant’s own testimony or evidence in his behalf, but could be overcome by any evidence in the case. These instructions amply met the standard set forth in Gainey, supra. See United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957, 87 S.Ct. 391, 17 L.Ed.2d 303 (1966).
The only other matter which warrants our consideration is the question of whether the court contravened the holdings of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) and Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967) in sentencing appellant to a term of fifteen years imprisonment when he had received only a ten year sentence following his first conviction of the charges involved in this case. In Maraño, supra, we set forth the general principle that a defendant may not be given a more severe sentence upon retrial than he received following his original conviction. We recognized, however, that a trial judge may properly consider the defendant’s conduct subsequent to the reversal of his first conviction in deciding what sentence to impose after retrial. In the present case, the relevant facts are as follows. Following appellant’s conviction below, a sentencing hearing was held on November 26, 1971, at which time the United States Attorney informed the court that Sandoval had been twice arrested in New York for narcotics violations while on bail pending retrial. The court specifically stated, however, that it would not consider this information in imposing sentence, adding somewhat cryptically that “what I have before me is enough.” The court then proceeded to sentence appellant to six concurrent terms of fifteen years imprisonment. After the appeal in this case had been filed, defendant made a motion in the district court for a reduction of sentence. In response, the trial judge issued a certificate to this court requesting that the case be remanded for resentencing, on the grounds that the sentence of November 26 might have been illegal under North Carolina v. Pearce, supra and Marano v. United States, supra. We remanded the ease for the limited purpose of considering the motion to reduce sentence, without prejudice to the government’s arguing that the court could consider subsequent conduct as defined in Maraño although it had declined to consider it at the time of the original re-sentencing. At a subsequent hearing, the district court clearly indicated that it was now considering a portion of the pre-sentence report which related subsequent circumstances concerning Sandoval’s New York drug arrests and two forfeitures of bail for his failure to appear as ordered, and proceeded to deny the motion on the basis of appellant’s conduct while free on bail pending retrial.
Appellant appears to argue that the court’s initial failure to consider his subsequent conduct irretrievably tainted any increase in his sentence. We do not agree. The record clearly indicates that on remand the court reconsidered the November 26 sentence in light of Maraño and Pearce, read the presentence report it relied on, gave appellant an opportunity to respond, and affirmatively stated its reliance on subsequent conduct in reaffirming the increased sentence. Although this decision was made on a motion to reduce, the nature of the district court’s certificate and our remand make it perfectly clear that the decision was equivalent to a full reconsideration and resentencing. Since the court applied the proper standard on remand, we will not disturb on appeal its decision as to appellant’s sentence.
Affirmed.
. Repealed, Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-513, title III, § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292, effective date of repeal being May 1, 1971, Pub.L. 91-513, § 1105(a). The subsection provided in relevant part:
“It shall bo unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic drugs except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; . . . . ”
. Repealed, Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-513, title III, § 1101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292, effective date of repeal being May 1, 1971, Pub.L. 91-513, § 1105 (a). The subsection provided in relevant part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away narcotic drugs except in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be issued in blank for that purpose by the Secretary or his delegate.”
. Repealed, Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-513, title III, § 1101(a)(2), (4), 84 Stat. 1291, effective date of repeal being May 1, 1971, Pub.L. 91-513, § 1105 (a). The section provided as follows:
“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the United States, shall be imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty years and, in addition, may be fined not more than 820,000.”
. Even if we were to accept appellant’s analogy between the circumstances of this case and Flannery, that decision would not be relevant in the present context. Flannery is applicable only to cases going to trial after November 12, 1971; trial in the instant case began on September 20, 1971.
. Appellant’s original conviction was reversed by this court in Rodriguez-Sandoval v. United States, 409 F.2d 529 (1st Cir. 1969).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1