What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Deborah A. NORTHCROSS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS et al., Defendants-Appellees, CITY OF MEMPHIS and Wyeth Chandler, Mayor of Memphis, et al., Third-Party and Added Defendants, Exxon Corporation et al., Added Defendants.
No. 73-1666.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Dec. 4, 1973.
Norman J. Chachkin, New York City, and William E. Caldwell, Memphis, Tenn., for Deborah A. Northcross; Louis R. Lucas, Elijah Noel, Jr., Ratner, Sugar-mon & Lucas, Memphis, Tenn., Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, New York City, on briefs.
Ernest G. Kelly, Jr., Evans, Petree, Cobb & Edwards, Memphis, Tenn., for Bd. of Ed. of the Memphis City Schools.
Frierson M. Graves, Jr., City Atty., Memphis, Tenn., for City of Memphis and others.
Before WEICK, CELEBREZZE and PECK, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
This case was consolidated for hearing with Cases Nos. 73-1667 and 73-1954, 489 F.2d 15 (and also with Cases Nos. 73-1953 and 73-1955, 489 F. 2d 18), and for further explanation of the factual background involved see the per curiam opinion filed therein this date and the earlier appeals arising out of the same general situation cited therein. At issue in the present appeal is the validity of a resolution adopted by the Memphis City Council directing the mayor and comptroller to withhold $250,000 from funds previously approved for use by the Memphis Board of Education. Said sum approximated the cost of the busing of school children ordered by the District Court, and in oral argument in this Court the City’s attorney frankly conceded that the City’s action was a protest against such Court ordered busing. The District Judge found that the City took such action in an effort to prevent busing as a means of desegregation and issued an order restraining such unlawful defiance of the Court’s orders. This appeal followed, and we affirm, holding that the action of the District Court was required to accomplish a constitutionally mandated result.
Appellees seek costs and attorneys’ fees in this case and in the dispute involving the School Board’s gasoline supply. In support of this request appellees cite Rule 38, Fed.R.App.P., which empowers an appellate court to “award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee” when the appeal is determined to be frivolous. Alternatively, appellees suggest the application of 20 U.S.C. § 1617, which entitles the prevailing party to attorneys’ fees in a suit against “a local educational agency, a State (or any agency thereof) for failure to comply with any provision of [Chapter 36 of the General Educational Provisions Act of 1972] . or for discrimination on the basis of race . . . [in] elementary or secondary education . . . .” Finally, appellees cite Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973), to buttress their claim. In that case the Supreme Court held that attorneys’ fees should normally be awarded in discrimination cases, and that it required a special circumstance of unfairness to defeat this rule.
We find that the appeals in these eases are essentially frivolous in nature, constituting an attempt by appellant to interfere with the desegregation plans ordered by the District Court. Although appellant is technically neither a “State” nor “an agency thereof,” the spirit of 20 U.S.C. § 1617 and North-cross, supra, justify the award of costs and attorneys’ fees to appellees in this case. In addition, we are empowered to make this award under Rule 38, Fed.R. App.P.
Costs including an attorney’s fee of $500 is hereby assessed against the City of Memphis.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0