What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
MAHER, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF CONNECTICUT v. DOE et al.
No. 76-878.
Decided June 20, 1977
Per Curiam.
The motion of appellees for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Appellees are mothers of illegitimate children who receive welfare benefits from the State of Connecticut under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program administered for the Federal Government by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). They are prosecuting this litigation to challenge the constitutionality of § 52-440b, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1977), which would require them, under pain of contempt, to divulge to appellant the names of the fathers of their children.
In 1975, after a three-judge District Court upheld the constitutionality of § 52-440b, we vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of an intervening amendment to § 402 (a) of the Social Security Act, and, if a relevant state proceeding was pending, in light of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and Huffman. v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975). Roe v. Norton, 422 U. S. 391.
On remand the District Court held that the Younger/ Huffman doctrine did not prohibit the issuance of an injunction in this case. 414 F. Supp. 1368 (Conn. 1976). The court also held that § 52-440b remained valid provided the Connecticut welfare authorities first determine, in accordance with § 402 (a) of the federal statute, that the appellees did not have “good cause” for refusing to cooperate, under standards which take into account the “best interests of the child.” 414 F. Supp., at 1381.
Noting that the Secretary of HEW has not yet promulgated regulations defining “good cause” and “best interests of the child,” appellant reads the District Court’s opinion as enjoining any state proceedings under § 52-440b until such guidance is forthcoming. But the court’s opinion contains the following passage in a footnote:
“HEW has taken the position that the entire amendment [to § 402 (a)] will not become effective until the new regulations have been approved. We do not believe that this is the proper construction of the act.
“. . . [T]he wiser course is to require the Commissioner, if he is unable to determine without the aid of specific regulations that his proposed enforcement action is not against the best interests of the child, to postpone any enforcement until the new regulations have been issued and approved.” 414 F. Supp., at 1381 n. 20.
Though it is somewhat ambiguous, the quoted portion can be read to require appellant to make his own determination of “good cause” and “best interests of the child” if he is able to do so without the aid of the HEW regulations. If this is the correct reading, appellant’s apprehension that he is presently barred from proceeding in accordance with § 52-440b would be erroneous.
The day after the District Court issued its opinion on remand a new Connecticut statute became effective, 1976 Conn. Pub. Act No. 76-334, amending Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17~82b. In pertinent part that statute provides:
“All information required to be provided to the commissioner as a condition of such eligibility [for welfare assistance] under federal law shall be so provided by the supervising relative, provided, no person shall be determined to be ineligible if the supervising relative has good cause for the refusal to provide information concerning the absent parent or if the provision of such information would be against the best interests of the dependent child or children, or any of them. The commissioner of social services shall adopt by regulation . . . standards as to good cause and best interests of the child. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the commissioner as to the determination of good cause or the best interests of such child or children may request a fair hearing in accordance with the provisions of sections 17-2a and 17-2b ”
While it is obvious that this pronouncement is intended to have some effect in the general area of this litigation, its impact on § 52-440b is not clear.
Therefore, we must once again vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand this case. That court must now consider its interpretation of § 52-440b in light of the amendment to § 17-82b, and clarify whether appellant is free to make his own “good cause” and “best interests of the child” determinations in the absence of effective HEW regulations.
It is so ordered.
Pub. L. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2359, amending 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (26) (1970 ed., Supp. V). The District Court also considered a second, subsequent, change in § 402 (a), Pub. L. 94-88, 89 Stat. 436.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1