What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Francis V. GEDDES, Jr., Petitioner, v. BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Intervenor.
No. 83-1452.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued 10 Nov. 1983.
Decided 22 May 1984.
Bernard J. DiMur0, Alexandria, Va., with whom John D. Grad, Alexandria, Va., was on the brief for petitioner. Janis L. McDonald, Alexandria, Va., also entered an appearance for petitioner,
John F. Ward, Gaithersburg, Md., for intervenor, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
Before WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.
Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
WILKEY, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Francis V. Geddes seeks review of a determination of the Benefits Review Board, U.S. Department of Labor, which denied his claim for back pay and benefits under section 49 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”). That section prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because the employee has claimed compensation under the Act. The Benefits Review Board (the “Board”) denied Geddes’ section 49 claim on the ground that petitioner did not prove that his filing of a claim for compensation motivated the employer’s allegedly discriminatory action. We find that the Benefits Review Board failed to apply the correct standard of proof and improperly allocated the burden of proof between Geddes and his employer. We, therefore, vacate the order on review and remand the case to the Board.
I. Background
Petitioner Geddes was employed as a bus driver by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) for seven years prior to his injury. In March of 1975, a public hearing was held concerning proposed rate increases for WMATA buses. Geddes testified in opposition to the proposed rate increases as a private citizen at the public hearing, noting instances of wasteful mismanagement at WMATA. Within two days of Geddes’ appearance at the hearing, WMATA fired him from his job. After much publicity and press coverage of the firing, Geddes was reinstated the following week.
Once reinstated, however, Geddes was subjected to intense harassment by WMA-TA officials. He was put under unusually strict surveillance on the job; he received citations for fabricated violations; and his supervisors spread lies about him. The repeated harassment by supervisors had an upsetting effect on Geddes, who became physically ill on 11 April 1978 when he was told to report after work to answer for yet another violation. Geddes was unable to complete his scheduled bus run and was placed on sick leave. He came under the care of a psychiatrist. On 8 May 1978 Geddes filed a claim for compensation for total temporary disability under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. After recovering from his illness, in October 1978 Geddes began making inquiries about returning to work. WMATA, however, put Geddes on “inactive status” and failed to respond to his inquiries. Geddes has not worked at WMATA since the day he became ill.
Geddes’ claims under the Act sought both compensation for total temporary disability as well as back pay due to WMA-TA’s allegedly unlawful refusal to permit him to return to work. A hearing on both claims was held before an Administrative Law Judge in April 1979. In his subsequent decision and order, the AU determined that WMATA supervisors’ harassment of Geddes during the course of his employment caused Geddes’ psychological/physical illness. The AU held that Geddes was entitled to compensation for temporary total disability from 11 April 1978 until 11 August 1978. In addition, the AU found that WMATA unlawfully discriminated against Geddes by refusing to allow him to return to work after his recovery. This, the AU held, violated section 49 of the Act, which prohibits an employer from discriminating in any manner against an employee because the employee has claimed compensation under the Act. Accordingly, the AU ordered WMATA to reimburse Geddes for lost wages for the period during which Geddes had recovered but had not been reinstated.
WMATA petitioned the AU for reconsideration of the section 49 discrimination issue only; it did not challenge the AU’s finding that the supervisors’ harassment of Geddes at work made him ill. The petition for reconsideration was granted and a supplemental hearing was held. In his decision upon reconsideration, the AU found that WMATA became aware of Geddes’ interest in returning to work in October 1978. He further found that WMATA treated Geddes as an “outcast,” hoping to prevent him from returning to work. He explicitly found that WMATA had animus toward Geddes and did not want Geddes back on the job. The AU, however, reversed his previous position on causation in regard to the discrimination claim and held that Geddes had failed to prove that his filing of a claim for compensation under the Act contributed to the animus and hostility WMATA directed at him. The AU, therefore, denied Geddes’ claim for back pay under section 49.
Geddes appealed that finding to the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor. The sole issue on appeal was whether the AU properly denied Geddes’ discrimination claim under section 49. The Board affirmed the AU’s decision and this petition for review ensued.
II. Analysis
review of the decision of the- Benefits Review Board is limited to a review for errors of law and for findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. We find that the Board erred by failing to apply the proper standard of proof and by improperly allocating the evidentiary burden between Geddes and WMATA.
A. Elements of a Discrimination Claim Under Section h9
Geddes seeks back pay on the ground that WMATA discriminated against him in violation of section 49 of the Act. That section provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer or his duly authorized agent to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee as to his employment because such employee has claimed or attempted to claim compensation from such employer____
The elements of a meritorious complaint under section 49 are twofold. First, the employer must commit a discriminatory act. Second, the discriminatory act must be motivated by animus against the employee because of the employee’s pursuit of his rights under the Act. This second requirement of a section 49 claim is satisfied even if the employer’s action is only partially motivated by an employee’s exercise of his rights under the Act; an employer who discriminates against an employee both because the employee filed a compensation claim and because of other, independent reasons nonetheless violates section 49.
Turning to the first element of the section 49 offense claimed here, the AU heard testimony about WMATA’s discriminatory treatment of Geddes, which was alleged to be WMATA’s refusal to allow Geddes to return to work from the time of his recovery until June 1980. Geddes testified that he made numerous attempts to return to work beginning in the fall of 1978 and that WMATA ignored and frustrated his efforts to be reinstated. The AU found that, at minimum, WMATA was aware of Geddes’ inquiries about returning to work and attempted to dissuade him from doing so. The AU apparently found it unnecessary, however, to make an explicit determination of whether the actions of WMATA were discriminatory because of his finding with respect to the second element of a section 49 claim — WMATA’s motivation for its actions.
In addressing the issue of WMATA’s motivation for its actions, the AU found that WMATA had animus against Geddes, which finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. There was testimony that WMATA supervisors passed Geddes’ claim form around the office while laughing at his claim and ridiculing his illness. There was also testimony that a member of WMATA’s claims office said that Geddes would be prevented from returning to work until the dispute over his claim for compensation had been fully resolved.
The AU not only concluded that WMA-TA believed that Geddes was not a “team player” and that it had animus against him but he also concluded that this animus prompted WMATA’s unwillingness to allow Geddes to resume his job. According to the AU, WMATA treated Geddes as an “outcast,” intending to induce him never to return to work. This treatment was caused by WMATA’s animus against Geddes.
Although Geddes successfully proved that WMATA’s animus motivated its attempts to prevent Geddes from returning to work, the AU denied petitioner’s claim under section 49 because Geddes failed to prove that the animus against him was at least partially motivated by his filing of a claim for compensation. The AU noted that WMATA’s harassment of Geddes began when Geddes testified at the public hearing in 1975. He concluded that “general animus” continued to motivate WMA-TA’s actions even after Geddes filed his claim for compenation under the Act. The AU denied Geddes’ claim, therefore, because Geddes failed to prove that his filing of a compensation claim was a separate, contributing factor in WMATA’s refusal to let him return to work, when this refusal was viewed in the context of WMATA’s repeated harassment of and discrimination against Geddes over the course of three years.
B. Allocating the Burden of Proof
In finding that WMATA’s motivation for its actions against Geddes was unrelated to Geddes’ exercise of his rights under the Act, the AU placed too heavy a burden on Geddes to prove that the filing of his compensation claim contributed to the animus against him. Claimants seeking relief under the Act have long enjoyed the benefit of a light standard of proof in making their claims. The settled law articulated by the Supreme Court is that although a claimant seeking relief bears the burden of persuasion, the Act must be liberally construed in light of its beneficient and humanitarian purposes. Accordingly, claimants who seek compensation under the Act do not bear as heavy a standard of proof as the one borne by plaintiffs in civil actions. A claimant is not required to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence; instead, a lesser standard suffices. This lesser standard of proof requires that inferences be made and doubtful questions of fact be resolved in favor of the employee seeking benefits under the Act.
This liberal standard of proof applies to claims alleging unlawful discrimination under section 49 of the Act. In Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Robertson, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the settled rule that all „ ,, . , , , ... „ provisions of the Act must be liberally con- , • v , , i. ... strued in light of the humanitarian purposes of the Act. And in Gondolfi v. Mid-Gulf Stevedores, Inc., the Benefits Review Board held that it was error to conclude that a claimant alleging discrimination under section 49 was required to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, a claimant under section 49 bears the same light burden of proof that an injured claimant bears when he seeks compensation under the Act.
This light standard of proof should be applied to Geddes’ claim that WMATA violated section 49 by preventing him from returning to work during the period of October 1978 to June 1980. The petitioner need not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s animus was due to the filing of a claim. Instead, doubtful questions of fact must be resolved and inferences must be made in favor of the petitioner. On remand, the Benefits Review Board should apply this light standard of proof to its evaluation of the evidence'
addition, the Benefits Review _ . . . , . , „ Board improperly allocated the burden of proof in this case. The AU not only required Geddes to prove that WMATA committed a discriminatory act motivated by animus, but he required Geddes to separate WMATA’s long-standing animus due to Geddes’ testimony at a public hearing in 1975 from animus based on Geddes’ attempts to receive compensation for his work-related illness. The proper rule, however, is that once Geddes proves that WMATA committed a discriminatory act caused by animus, the evidentiary burden of proof should shift to WMATA to prove that its animus was not even partially motivated by Geddes’ exercise of his rights under the Act.
Such an allocation of the burden of proof . ,. . . , „„ , f is essential m order to effectuate the bene- .... „ , ^ flCient P™?oses of the Act Puttm^ the responsibility on the petitioner to separate WMATAs motivation for harassment before the Petitioner filed his compensation claim from the reasons for harassment after the filing of the claim places a herculean ^ur<^en on a claimant seeking relief under section 49. The mandate that the Act t»e liberally interpreted in order to avoid harsh results counsels a shifting of the evidentiary burden of proof under the facts of this case. We note that courts have properly shifted the burden of proof in other contexts under the Act in order to effectuate its humanitarian purposes. For example, in New Orleans (Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit required the employer to bear the burden of proving the availability of jobs for which the injured claimant was qualified, instead of requiring the claimant to prove, as part of his case in chief, that he was incapable of obtaining light work, The court held that such an anocation of the burden of proof was required by the settled rule that the Act must be liberally , , . „ . . . , ,, construed m favor of claimants.
Furthermore, shifting the evidentiary burden of proof in the instant case is consistent with the principles underlying evidentiary shifts in other areas of law. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in tort law, for example, a rebuttable inference or presumption of negligence arises when the plaintiff proves facts from which it would be reasonable to conclude that the defendants were at fault, and when an explanation of the event is more accessible to the defendants than to the plaintiff. Likewise, in the field of employment discrimination, the burden of proof shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case. In both of these areas of law, the evidentiary burden of proof properly switches from the plain- , 4 , , tiff to the defendant for two reasons. „ , . . ,, , ,, , First, it is reasonable to presume that the ’ , . . „ , ,, . acts complained of, if not otherwise explained, are likely to have been caused by improper conduct on the part of the defend- , „ , , ant. Second, the defendant typically has , ,, ,, greater access to the evidence on the par-f. . . ,, , ,, ticular issue than does the plaintiff.
Both of those reasons for shifting the evidentiary burden of proof are present in the instant case. When, as in this case, an employee who sought compensation under the Act introduces sufficient evidence to prove that his employer subsequently both committed a discriminatory act and was motivated to do so by animus, it is reasonable to presume that, unless otherwise explained, the employer’s act was at least ,. ’ . partially motivated by the employee s claim J J . . tor compensation. This presumption is , , . , , , particularly appropriate when, as here, the employer’s animus against its employee was the cause of the employee’s original illness and his claim for compensation. Under such circumstances, it is likely that the employee’s filing of a compensation claim will contribute to the employer’s animus against the employee. In addition, in cases such as the instant one it is likely that the employer will have greater access than the employee will have to evidence that can prove the motivation for its actions. Thus when a claimant under section 49 proves that the employer committed a discriminatory act motivated by animus, and particularly when, as here, the employer’s hostility towards the employee was the cause of the original injury and compensation claim, it should be presumed that the filing of the compensation claim contributed to the employer’s motivation for the discriminatory act. This presumption is, of course, rebut-table,
jjj Conclusion
„ We vacate the decision on review and „„„„ , . ,, „ j... 0 . remand the case to the Benefits Review t> j ¿ ., .. „ ,, ., Board for consideration of the evidence m H of the staridarcl and burden of f_ The liberal standard of proof avail. ,, , ,. , , , ,, , able to claimants under the Act should be r , , ,,. .... , , . „ , , applied to this petitioners claim for back , , „ ,, Pay and benefits under section 49 of the .„ .... ,. „. Act. Furthermore, if petitioner satisfies this evidentiary burden by proving a discriminatory act caused by animus, a rebut-table presumption will arise that the animus was motivated at least in part by the petitioner’s filing of his claim for compen-sati0n. The burden of proof then shifts to WMATA to prove that its animus was not motivated, even in part, by Geddes’ exercising 0f his rights under the Act.
. . Accordingly, the order on review is va- . , , ,, . cated and the case is remanded for further ^ proceedings consistent with this opinion,
So ordered.
. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1976); id. § 948a.
. Decision and Order, No. 81-277, 28 February 1983, Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 17.
. See Decision and Order of the Administrative Law Judge, 28 November 1979, J.A. at 3-4.
. Id. at 5-6.
. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1976) is extended to employers in the District of Columbia by D.C.Code Ann. § 36-501 (1968).
. J.A. at 5, 12-13 & n. 1. Petitioner now seeks back pay for the period from October 1978 to 27 June 1980, the date on which WMATA stated that Geddes could return to work.
. J.A. at 3-9.
. Decision and Order upon Reconsideration, 2 December 1980, J.A. at 12, 15.
. Id. at 15.
. See Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 74 S.Ct. 88, 98 L.Ed. 5 (1953); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Robertson, 625 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.1980).
. 33 U.S.C. § 948a (1976).
. See Gondolfi v. Mid-Gulf Stevedores, 11 BRBS 295 (1979).
. See id.
. J.A. at 208.
. J.A. at 9.
. J.A. at 15.
. Id.
. See Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333, 74 S.Ct. 88, 91, 98 L.Ed. 5 (1953); Alley v. Julius Garfin-kle & Co., 1 BRBS 66 (1974).
. See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 406 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921, 89 S.Ct. 1773, 23 L.Ed.2d 238 (1969); Gondolfi v. Mid-Gulf Stevedores, 7 BRBS 1001, 1004 (1978).
. 625 F.2d 873, 878 & n. 9 (9th Cir.1980); see also Reed v. S.S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 1353, 10 L.Ed.2d 448 (1963).
. 7 BRBS 1001, 1004 (1978).
. 661 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir.1981)
. Id.
. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 211-26 (4th ed. 1971).
. See, e.g., Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
. See generally J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2485-2489 (J. Chadbourn ed., 1981).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 5