What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re LEGG. LEGG v. ST. JOHN.
No. 6906.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 15, 1935.
Henry Roberts, of Bristol, Va. (Roberts & Roberts, on the brief), for appellant.
Clayton Scyphers, of Bristol, Va., and Robert Burrow, of Bristol, Tenn., for ap-pellee.
Before HICKS, SIMONS, and ALLEN, Circuit Judges.
ALLEN, Circuit Judge.
The District Court affirmed an order of the referee in bankruptcy directing a life insurance company to pay disability benefits accruing to the' bankrupt after adjudication in bankruptcy, to the trustee as assets of the bankrupt’s estate. The bankrupt’s life insurance policy and its cash surrender value, together with $40 of the monthly disability benefits, were held exempt. The sole question is whether the remainder of the monthly total and permanent disability payments, amounting to $134.52 per month, are exempt under sections 8456 and 8458 of the Tennessee Code of 1932, or under title 11, u: S. C. § 110 (a) (5), 11 USCA § 110 (a) (5).
Even were we to assume that section 8456 applies notwithstanding the phrase “in case of his < death,” the question presented under sections 8456 and 8458 is the same. The disability payments are exempt only if they are made under a policy of life insurance or annuity. It is appellant’s principal contention that they are made under a life insurance policy. The bankrupt was insured under such a policy. The disability contract, both- by its terms and physically, is “attached to and made part of” the life insurance policy. Considered separately, the disability contract in no sense provides for life insurance. It is effective. before death, upon a contingency, and is payable directly to the insured. However, appellant contends that as the contract is attached to and made part of the life insurance policy, it falls within the statutory exemption.
The disability contract contains the following provision: “This Supplementary Contract shall be deemed to be a part of the above numbered Policy and the provisions of said Policy concerning declarations and representations by the insured, restrictions, payment of premiums, change of beneficiary, and assignment, are hereby referred to and by such reference made a part hereof. No other provisions of said Policy shall be held or deemed to be a part hereof He * Hi ”
Certain exceptions follow, which have no application here.
The disability contract, then, provides that the two contracts should be read together as to certain features, and should be separate as to other features. The payment of disability benefits does not fall within those provisions in which the two contracts are one. The premiums for the two forms of protection are entirely separate. In short, the disability contract is not a life insurance contract, nor is it by its own terms, except in limited particulars, a part thereof. Neither is it an annuity contract. An annuity contract provides for payments to the insured or a named person or persons of a sum or sums 'periodically during life, or for a certain period. While this supplementary contract resembles an annuity in the fact that periodical payments to the insured are now being made thereunder, it does not fall within the definition of an annuity contract, and also it is not issued “upon the life” of the insured (section 8458). Hence the Tennessee statutes have no application.
Neither does the contract fall within section 70a (5) of the Bankruptcy Act (section 110 (a) (5), 11 USCA). That provision covers any insurance contract which has either an express cash surrender value or a cash surrender value under the concession or practice of the insurer. Hiscock, Trustee, v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202, 27 S. Ct. 488, 51 L. Ed. 771. This disability contract has no cash surrender value. Also nothing in the record indicates a practice of the insurer giving it cash surrender value, nor any offer from the company to pay any amount upon the surrender of this disability contract.
We grant that Tennessee exemption statutes are to be construed liberally. Terry v. McDaniel, 103 Tenn. 415, 53 S. W. 732, 46 L. R. A. 559; Dawson, Trustee, v. National Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300 S. W. 567. However, no construction is called for where the contract is clearly not within the terms of the statute.
Appellant urges thaj, since the disability contract provides for waiver of premiums and also for the payment of disability benefits, the'effect of the holding of the District Court is inconsistent in that it preserves for the insured his right to a waiver of premiums during disability while applying the disability benefits to the payment of his debts. This contention ignores the fact that each of these provisions is now being performed. The payment of premiums is waived, and the disability benefits are being paid.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Section 8456: “Any life insurance effected by a husband on his own life shall, in case of his death, inure to the benefit! of his widow and children; and the money thence arising shall be divided between them, according to the statutes of distribution, without being in any manner subject to the debts of the husband.”
Section 8458: “The net amount payable under any policy of life insurance or under1 any annuity contract upon the life of any .person made for the benefit of, or assigned to, the wife and/or children, or dependent relatives of such person, shall be exempt from all claims of the creditors of such person arising out of or based upon any obligation created after the effective date of this Code, whether or not the right to change the named beneficiary is reserved by or permitted to such person.”
Section 110 (a) (5), title 11, U. S. C., 11 USCA § 110 (a) (5): “ * * * When any 'bankrupt shah have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated to the trustee' by the company issuing the same, pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the ' bankruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets « * * >>

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1