What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
TEST v. UNITED STATES
No. 73-5993.
Argued December 11, 1974
Decided January 27, 1975
Walter L. Gerash argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Louis M. Fischer.
William L. Patton argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, and Deputy Solicitor General Wallace.
Sanford Jay Rosen filed a brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund as amicus curiae.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner was convicted under 21 U. S. C. § 841 (a) (1) for distribution of a hallucinogenic drug commonly known as LSD. Prior to trial he filed a motion to dismiss his indictment claiming that the master lists from which his grand jury had been, and petit jury would be, selected systematically excluded disproportionate numbers of people with Spanish surnames, students, and blacks. These exclusions, petitioner alleged, violated both his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and the provisions of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U. S. C. § 1861 et seq. Attached to this motion was an affidavit by petitioner's counsel stating facts that had been disclosed by testimony at a jury challenge in another case, and which petitioner claimed supported his challenge. Also accompanying the motion was another motion requesting permission to inspect and copy the jury lists “pertaining to the grand and petit juries in the instant indictment.” Petitioner asserted that inspection was necessary for discovering evidence to buttress his claims.
The District Court rejected the jury challenge and denied the motion to inspect the lists. Petitioner renewed his claims before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but that court affirmed his conviction without discussing these issues. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Jury Selection and Service Act required that petitioner be permitted to inspect the jury lists. 417 U. S. 967.
In its brief and oral argument before this Court, the United States has agreed that petitioner was erroneously denied access to the lists and urges us to remand the case. We also agree with petitioner. Section 1867 (f) of the Act, in relevant part, provides:
“The contents of records or papers used by the jury commission or clerk in connection with the jury selection process shall not be disclosed, except . . . as may be necessary in the preparation or presentation of a motion [challenging compliance with selection procedures] under . . . this section . . . . The parties in a case shall be allowed to inspect, reproduce, and copy such records or papers at all reasonable times during the preparation and pend-ency of such a motion. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision makes clear that a litigant has essentially an unqualified right to inspect jury lists. It grants access in order to aid parties in the “preparation” of motions challenging jury-selection procedures. Indeed, without inspection, a party almost invariably would be unable to determine whether he has a potentially meritorious jury challenge. Thus, an unqualified right to inspection is required not only by the plain text of the statute, but also by the statute’s overall purpose of insuring “grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community.” 28 U. S. C. § 1861.
Since petitioner was denied an opportunity to inspect the jury lists, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to remand to the District Court so that petitioner may attempt to support his challenge to the jury-selection procedures. We express no views on the merits of that challenge.
It is so ordered.
These lists were based on Colorado voter-registration records.
Petitioner further argues that the affidavit accompanying his motion to inspect established a prima facie ease of jury exclusion thereby entitling him to inspection under 28 U. S. C. § 1867 (d). Since we conclude that petitioner had an unqualified right to inspection under § 1867 (f) we do not decide whether his counsel’s affidavit was sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
The statute grants the rights to challenge selection procedures and inspect lists to the United States and the defendant in a criminal case, and to any party in a civil case.
The statute does limit inspection to “reasonable times.” No issue of timeliness has been raised in this Court.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3