What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES et al. v. SASKATCHEWAN MINERALS.
No. 525.
Decided November 14, 1966.
Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert W. Ginnane, Fritz R. Kahn and Betty Jo Christian for the United States et al. in No. 625.
Charles W. Burkett, W. Harney Wilson, Arthur A. Arsham and Willard P. Scott for appellants in No. 526.
Wayne W. Wright for appellee in both cases.
Together with No. 526, Great Northern Railway Co. et al. v. Saskatchewan Minerals, also on appeal from the same court.
Per Curiam.
These appeals are from an amended judgment of a three-judge district court, 253 F. Supp. 504, which set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dismissing appellee’s complaint, 325 I. C. C. 621, and remanded the case to the Commission “for further proceedings with instructions to grant relief” to the appellee “in accordance with the opinion heretofore entered by this court on December 8, 1965, and the Supplemental Memorandum Decision entered by this Court on March 3, 1966.” Accepting the District Court’s decision to set aside the Commission’s order on the merits, appellants challenge that portion of the judgment which instructs the Commission to grant relief to the appellee and precludes the Commission from reopening the proceedings for the receipt of additional evidence relevant to the question whether the rates challenged by the appellee are in fact unreasonably preferential in violation of § 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1). We agree with the appellants that, under the circumstances present here, this restriction is an improper limitation on the Commission’s duty to reconsider the entire case. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 379 U. S. 642. Accordingly, the. judgment of the District Court is vacated and the cases are remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter an order remanding the case to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with the District Court’s opinion of December 8, 1965.
It is so ordered.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1