What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
DUNCAN v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
January 4, 1927.)
No. 4673.
Criminal law <§=»1036(8) — Question of sufficiency of proof, not raised below, Is not before appellate court.
Objections to sufficiency of proofs not raised in trial court, cannot be considered by appellate court. .
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee; Harry B. Anderson, Judge.
Criminal prosecution by the United States against Frank Duncan. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Wm. P. Smith, Thomas & Cummings and W. C. Cherry, all of Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff in error.
A. V. McLane, U. S. Atty., and W. H. Lindsey, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Nashville, Tenn.
Before DENISON and MOORMAN, Circuit Judges, and GORE, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Prosecution under the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, 38 St.at. 785, as amended February 24, 1919 (Compiled Statutes, § 6287g et seq.).
Whether the objection to evidence because of an insufficient search warrant was properly made and preserved for review, and whether a verdict of guilty would not have been inevitable even without the evidence seized on the warrant, are questions which need not be decided. The search warrant of September 22, which was the one used, was good. It is fairly to be inferred, though not .expressly recited, that the warrant was based on the affidavit of C. W. Fuller, who appeared before the officer issuing the warrant and stated, on oath of his own knowledge, facts which justified the issue. A copy of this affidavit was attached to the warrant. Whether there was a further affidavit by the narcotic agent is immaterial.
Duncan was charged in the first three counts with selling narcotics without having registered and paid a dealer’s tax (section 1, as amended February 24,1919), and in counts 4 and 5 with making sales to a person who had no order form (section 2). Counts 1, 2, and 3 were dismissed; he was convicted on 4 and 5. The point now made, that there was no proof that the purchaser had no order form, even if it is not covered by the established rule that the exceptions of this statute need not be negatived by the prosecution, was not made below, and cannot be considered now. The point actually made was that there was no proof that Duncan had not registered and paid; but this pertained to counts 1, 2, and 3.
The judgment is affirmed. Mandate forthwith.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0