What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
J. R. ADNEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MISSISSIPPI LIME COMPANY OF MISSOURI, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11860.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Feb. 8, 1957.
V. Lee McMahon, J. F. Schlafly, Jr., Karl K. Hoagland, Alton, 111., for appellant.
Ralph T. Smith, Alton, 111., for appel-lees.
Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, and SWAIM and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.
SWAIM, Circuit Judge.
This action was commenced in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, by 461 Illinois residents seeking to enjoin the alleged tortious operation of a stone quarry by defendant, and for such other relief as might be just and equitable. Upon the application of defendant the cause was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Southern Division. On June 20, 1955, defendant filed its answer denying all averments in the complaint except the averments of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction was dependent, and also filed a counterclaim wherein defendant sought to restrain the plaintiffs from prosecuting damage claims in other courts pending a determination of the issues presented by the complaint and answer. On August 25, 1955, the plaintiffs filed an answer denying in general all averments in the counterclaim. Thereafter, on June 11, 1956, the plaintiffs filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of their complaint pursuant to Rule 41(a) (2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. After hearing oral argument the District Judge granted the motion on June 29,1956, and ordered the action dismissed at plaintiffs’ costs. On July 10, 1956, defendant filed a motion to alter or amend the order of June 29, 1956, and for leave to file a cross-complaint seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the plaintiffs from prosecuting any suit against defendant except in the District Court and in the present cause. The motion was denied.
Defendant appeals from the order dismissing the action. The alleged errors relied on arise out of the dismissal without prejudice or without retaining defendant’s counterclaim for determination of the issues therein, and the failure to allow defendant to file its cross-complaint.
Defendant relies on Rule 41(a) (2) which prohibits the dismissal of an action at plaintiff’s instance where the defendant, prior to the service upon him of plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, has pleaded a counterclaim that cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. The plaintiffs argue that the counterclaim sought only pendente lite relief and was not a bar to dismissal of the action under Rule 41(a) (2); that the so-called counterclaim was incidental to defendant’s defense of the asserted claims and a favorable disposition of the counterclaim would not have entitled defendant to affirmative relief. However, defendant insists that its counterclaim, being in the nature of a “bill of peace,” seeks to avoid a multiplicity of legal actions by determining in one equity suit its liability to numerous plaintiffs whose claims arise out of a single occurrence and involve a common question of law, and that it could maintain an independent action to obtain such relief. See Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, 9 Cir., 206 F.2d 884. Although the plaintiffs challenge the sufficiency of the counterclaim, insisting that it does not state a claim for such relief, this court is of the opinion that it meets the requirements of Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A., and that the counterclaim sets forth a claim for relief cognizable in the District Court. See Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, 9 Cir., 206 F.2d 884, and cases cited therein. The question whether equity jurisdiction will be exercised, however, rests in the sound discretion of the District Judge, Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, supra, but we think the District Judge here failed to exercise that discretion. The order dismissing the action reads as follows:
“This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss their Complaint herein. To this motion objection is interposed by the defendant, because of it having answered and filed a Counterclaim. In the Counterclaim the only relief asked for by the defendant is that the Court require the plaintiffs and the several insurance carriers to withhold prosecution of their claims until the Court has determined the issues presented herein. The issues presented herein have never been determined by the Court, and I am told by the plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss that they do not wish to have them determined.
“I have examined the authorities referred to on the oral argument, but I find nothing that would warrant my denying plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their suit. I have this day entered the following order:
“ ‘Motion by Plaintiffs to Dismiss allowed. Suit dismissed at Plaintiffs’ costs.’
“Dated this 29th day of June, A. D. 1956.”
Since defendant is entitled to have the District Court exercise its judicial discretion in determining whether the court shall assume jurisdiction of the counterclaim, we must reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Further, it appears that the District Court, after dismissing the counterclaim as a matter of law, adopted plaintiffs’ erroneous view that this court’s decision in Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 7 Cir., 180 F.2d 379, is still good law in this circuit. It was there held that a plaintiff had an absolute right of dismissal under Rule 41(a) (2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., restricted only by the requirement that the dismissal be upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court might deem proper, and that the only discretion was as to the terms and conditions. This interpretation was subsequently rejected in Grivas v. Parmelee Transportation Co., 7 Cir., 207 F.2d 334, certiorari denied 347 U.S. 913, 74 S.Ct. 477, 98 L.Ed. 1069, where the court stated that the allowance of a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a) (2) is not a matter of right, but is discretionary with the District Court both as to whether a dismissal shall be allowed as well as to the terms and conditions to be imposed if allowed-
_ _ In our view of the case it is not necessary to consider whether the District Court properly denied defendant leave to file its cross-complaint.
The order of dismissal is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1