What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N. A., et al. v. FINANCE ADMINISTRATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK et al.
No. 77-1659.
Decided March 5, 1979
Per Curiam.
Petitioners are national banks that lease office space in New York City, where they maintain their principal places of business. After the city assessed them for its commercial rent and occupancy tax for the period June 1, 1970, through May 31, 1972, they brought the present action, arguing that their status as national banks rendered them immune from the tax. Petitioners relied on our cases that have held that national banks may not be taxed except as permitted by Congress. First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax Comm’n, 392 U. S. 339 (1968); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436-437 (1819). The New York state courts upheld the assessments, finding the necessary congressional authorization in Pub. L. 91-156, 83 Stat. 434, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 548 (1970 ed.).
Pub. L. 91-156, as amended by Pub. L. 92-213, § 4 (a), 85 Stat. 775, provided that as of January 1, 1973, national banks were to be treated as state banks for the purposes of state tax laws. The Act also contained temporary provisions that enabled States to tax national banks on a more limited basis from its date of enactment, December 24, 1969, until January 1, 1973. Banks like petitioners, with their principal offices in the taxing State, could be subjected to any nondiscriminatory tax generally applicable to state banks. A saving clause, however, prevented the imposition prior to January 1, 1973, of any tax in effect prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 91-156, unless such imposition was authorized by subsequent “affirmative action” of the state legislature. The saving-clause prohibition did not apply to “any tax on tangible personal property.”
The New York Court of Appeals held that the disputed tax could be imposed on petitioners prior to January 1, 1973, because the affirmative-action requirement of the saving clause had been satisfied by an amendment of the commercial rent tax passed subsequent to Pub. L. 91-156 which increased the rate of the tax. 43 N. Y. 2d 425, 372 N. E. 2d 789. We disagree. Based on our study of the legislative history of Pub. L. 91-156, we are quite sure that the affirmative-action provision was designed to require the States, when imposing new taxes on national banks prior to January 1, 1973, to consider the impact of such taxes on the existing balance of taxation between national and state banks. On its face, a mere increase in the tax rate under an existing tax law does not indicate that such attention has been given; and nothing in the available legislative history of the rate amendment suggests that Pub. L. 91-156 was given the slightest attention.
The New York Court of Appeals also concluded that, under New York law, the commercial rent and occupancy tax was a tax on tangible personal property and hence not subject to the prohibitions of the saving clause. Whether the tax at issue is a tax on tangible personal property within the meaning of Pub. L. 91-156 is a question of federal law; and for the purposes of that statute, it appears to us that Congress did not consider real estate occupancy taxes to be taxes on tangible personal property. This is sufficiently clear from the provisions of the Act dealing with the interim taxation of banks having their principal offices outside the taxing State. Those provisions, in numbered paragraphs, list five kinds of taxes that were permissible. Paragraph (2) specified “[tjaxes on real property or on the occupancy of real property located within such jurisdiction” (emphasis added), while paragraph (4) referred to “[tjaxes on tangible personal property.” It follows that the saving clause forbade collecting from banks like petitioners pre-existing real estate and occupancy taxes without affirmative legislative action, although it did not bar taxes on tangible personal property.
We accordingly conclude that the New York Court of Appeals was in error. The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgments of the New York Court of Appeals are reversed.
It is so ordered.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3