What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nina Bowen HORNE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 85-8833.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 23, 1986.
Lester B. Johnson, III, Savannah, Ga., for defendant-appellant.
Michael J. Goldman, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal by Nina Bowen Horne from a district court order granting summary judgment to plaintiff/appellee State Automobile Insurance Company (hereafter, “State Auto”) in its action for declaratory judgment to determine whether it was required to extend to Home full optional ($50,000) Personal Injury Protection (“PIP”) coverage on her automobile liability insurance policy. We affirm the ruling of the district court that the company was not required to extend appellant Home the additional protection.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 12, 1980, John Chokos of Pederson-Chokos and Company, an independent insurance agency, which solicits insurance applications for numerous insurance companies, met with appellant Home and her mother to renew various insurance policies taken out by the Homes, collect the required premiums, and acquire their signatures on the various policy applications. Chokos had apparently been performing this service for the Hornes for a number of years past. Included in the policies discussed was an application for standard automobile liability insurance with appellee State Auto. The application has two separate sections. The first contains the basic liability application with a signature space at the end. The second, labeled “Offer to Purchase Optional Coverages” contains within an application for additional, optional, personal injury protection (“PIP”) above and beyond the $5,000 coverage included in the basic standard, liability policy. This section of the application has the heading: “Personal Injury Protection ($5,000 coverage included in your basic premium charges).” To receive the additional coverage, there are spaces indicating the amount of extra-insurance sought from $10,000 to $50,000. Additionally, there is a separate clause and blank space following stating: “I reject all PIP options below.” At the end of the one page second section is a separate signature space for the insured to sign. According to appellant, Chokos, in whom she had “complete confidence” did not explain the contents of this policy, nor did she question him about it. However, at his request, she simply signed both sections of the automobile liability insurance application. She contends that she additionally told Chokos that she wanted the maximum PIP protection. The application that was eventually received and accepted by State Auto, although requesting several other forms of optional insurance, indicated on the form by various checkmarks, expressly waived the optional PIP protection by a checkmark next to the “I reject all PIP options below” statement on the form. Horne claims that Chokos made the check-marks in the blanks on the form after she had signed it. Appellee disputes appellant’s view of the events leading to the filing of the application, stating that Cho-kos “made the appropriate checkmarks as per Ms. Home’s instructions, providing minimum $5,000 personal injury protection, dated the application, and presented Ms. Horne with the form for her review and signature.” Once signed, he forwarded the application to State Auto for its consideration.
State Auto issued the policy in question in early October, 1980, by delivering it to Chokos who in turn forwarded the document to appellant. Home, however, never requested any change in the policy and on January 13, 1981 she was involved in an automobile accident, following which she claimed and received $5,000 in PIP benefits. On March 9,1984 she made a demand for $50,000 in optional PIP benefits and tendered the additional premium to State Auto. The insurance company refused to provide the extra benefits and subsequently commenced a declaratory judgment action in U.S. District Court to determine whether it was required to extend the full optional ($50,000) coverage to Home. The court below entered summary judgment in favor of State Auto, declaring that the optional benefit selector form used by State Auto and signed by Horne was in substantial compliance with Georgia statute O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5(b) as interpreted by St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nixon, 252 Ga. 469, 314 S.E.2d 215 (1984) and its progeny. Thus the court found that as a matter of law, appellant made a knowing and intentional waiver of her right to optional PIP benefits when she signed the form. Additionally, it found that State Auto had no obligation to make any more payments to Horne because as a matter of law, Chokos was her agent and, as such, even if he did make the checkmarks on the form after she had signed it, she was bound by that action. Following entry of final judgment in the action, this appeal ensued.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the district court erred when it granted appellee’s State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment when it concluded appellee’s application was in substantial compliance with O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5(b).
2. Whether the district court erred when it granted appellee’s State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment when it concluded that Pederson-Chokos was not appellee’s agent.
DISCUSSION
Appellant Horne has raised two issues on appeal. She first argues that the district court erred in finding that the automobile liability insurance application form used by State Auto here was proper under Georgia law. We cannot agree with appellant. Under the Georgia Code’s automobile liability insurance provision in effect at the time the policy at issue in this case was promulgated, it was stated that:
(a) Each insurer shall also make available on an optional basis the following coverage: (1) an aggregate limit of benefits payable without regard to fault up to $50,000 per person, which may be rejected or reduced to not less than an aggregate limit of benefits payable without regard to fault of $5,000 per person by written consent of the policy holder ...
(b) Each application for a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance sold in this state must contain separate spaces for the insured to indicate his acceptance or rejection of each of the optional coverages listed in subsection (a) of this code section and no such policy shall be issued in this state unless the spaces are completed and signed by the prospective insured.
O.C.G.A. § 33-34-5(a), (b). To determine whether an application complied with these requirements, the Georgia Supreme Court in St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Nixon, 252 Ga. 469, 314 S.E.2d 215 (1984), developed what has been labeled the “substantial compliance test.” In the opinion, the court approved an insurance application form with one signature space for the portion of the application containing basic information and a second signature space pertaining to the insurer’s “Offer to Purchase Additional Coverage Application.” The court stated that:
Here, as in Nalley (Nalley v. Select Insurance Co., 251 Ga. 722 [313 S.E.2d 465] (1983)), although the optional-coverage application has only one signature, it is clear from the form of the application that the intent of the insured was to reject optional PIP benefits and vehicle-damage protection. Therefore, we hold that, ‘the form is in substantial compliance with the statutory requirement, O.C.G.A. § l-3-l(c) (Code Ann. § 102-102), and satisfies the intent of the General Assembly to ensure “ ‘that insurers offer optional coverages to applicants for no-fault insurance and that an applicant’s waiver of his privilege to obtain coverages be made knowingly and in writing.’ ” Flewellen, supra, 250 Ga. [709] at 714 [300 S.E.2d 673 (1983)].’ Nalley v. Select Ins. Co., 251 Ga., supra, p. 724 [313 S.E.2d 465].
St. Paul v. Nixon, 252 Ga. at 470, 314 S.E.2d 215. An application form thus is in compliance with the statute’s requirements if it reasonably evidences the insured’s awareness of and rejection of his right to optional no-fault coverages. In the present case, the form used by State Auto clearly meets the standard set by the state statute. The form discussing optional coverages, similar to that approved in Nixon, is on a separate page, displays the optional coverages required to be offered, provides separate clauses and spaces for rejection of each of the options, and has a signature line at its bottom, which is in addition to the signature space for the general portion of the insurance application. The form reasonably presents the optional coverages and places a reasonable person in the position of an insured with a clear awareness of the coverages and thus is in “substantial compliance” with the statute. The district court was correct in upholding the propriety of this form.
Appellant also challenges the district court’s determination that Pederson-Chokos did not act as State Auto’s agent in the transaction in question. We agree with the court’s decision on this matter. The Georgia Court of Appeals has ruled that in questions of agency involving insurance brokers, such as Pederson-Chokos, insurance companies, and insureds, “while insurance agents or brokers may be considered as ‘dual' agents, or agents for both the insurer and the insured, normally such insurance representatives are independent insurance brokers and are the insured’s agents, not those of the insurer.” National Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Wells, 166 Ga.App. 281, 282, 304 S.E.2d 458 (1983) (citations omitted.) In this case, it is quite clear that Chokos cannot be considered to have acted as an agent for State Auto. His company, Pederson-Chokos, is an independent insurance agency which takes applications from its customers and places automobile liability insurance with a number of different companies, State Auto only one of several. The agency was under no obligation to submit applications to State Auto nor did State Auto have any ownership interest in it. Pederson-Chokos merely prepared applications requesting insurance and forwarded them to appellee. State Auto completely retained the power to accept or reject the applications. Additionally, there were no signs posted on the building housing Pederson-Chokos’ offices, indicating a relationship between State Auto and the agency. The district court was correct in determining on summary judgment that Pederson-Chokos did not function in this case as an agent for appel-lee State Auto.
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0