What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
INDUSTRIAL CLEARINGHOUSE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BROWNING MANUFACTURING DIVISION OF EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-1928
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 21, 1992.
Kevin P. Sullivan, Fulbright & Jaworski, Dallas, Tex., W. Wendall Hall, Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio, Tex., for Browning Mfg.
Mark J. Zimmermann, Thomas C. Clark, John W. Hicks, Jr., Tori S. Levine, Baker, Glast & Middleton, Dallas, Tex., for Indus. Clearinghouse, Inc.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, REAVLEY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:
Browning Manufacturing (Browning) appeals from a district court’s interlocutory order allowing Industrial Clearinghouse, Inc. (Industrial) to discover communications between Browning and Browning’s former counsel in this suit between Browning and Industrial. We reverse the district court’s order because there is no evidence to support the district court’s finding that Browning, by suing its former counsel, publicized confidential communications that it made to its former counsel.
I. BACKGROUND
Industrial and Browning have long disputed the ownership of certain inventory in the district court proceeding (the Industrial dispute) from which Browning now makes this interlocutory appeal. Midway through the Industrial dispute, Browning became dissatisfied with its counsel, Canterbury, Stuber, Elder, & Gooch (Canterbury), and retained a different law firm to manage that dispute.
Browning also filed a separate action against Canterbury for legal malpractice (the Canterbury suit), alleging, inter alia, that Canterbury failed to verify the accuracy of facts contained in affidavits that Canterbury prepared for Browning’s employees to sign. Browning also alleged that Canterbury did not adequately prepare Browning’s employee, Richard Schaa, for his deposition in the Industrial dispute because Canterbury failed to review with Schaa his prior testimony in a bankruptcy proceeding. Browning alleged that Canterbury’s failure resulted in damaging inconsistencies between Schaa’s deposition and bankruptcy-court testimony.
After Browning filed the Canterbury suit, but before anything else happened in that action, Industrial served Canterbury with a notice of deposition and subpoena duces tecum by which Industrial requested information concerning Canterbury’s representation of Browning. At the deposition, Canterbury’s representative, Charles Stu-ber, refused to produce documents and answer many of Industrial’s questions because of Browning’s attorney-client privilege.
Industrial filed a motion to compel Canterbury’s testimony. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate, who ruled that Browning, by suing Canterbury, waived its attorney-client privilege as to matters “fairly raised” in Browning’s complaint in the Canterbury suit. Record on Appeal at 260. While accepting Industrial’s waiver-by-publication argument, the magistrate refused to hold that Industrial presented sufficient evidence that the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege entitles Industrial to secure otherwise-protected information from Canterbury.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the transcript of the hearing before the magistrate, the district court found that “Browning has so compromised the confidentiality requirement of the attorney-client privilege that it has, by its actions, waived the privilege with regard to matters complained of in its state court petition that also bear upon Industrial’s claims in this case.” District Court Opinion at 15. The district court also agreed with the magistrate’s ruling as to the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege; the court held that “Industrial has made no showing that Browning used its relationship with Canterbury/Stuber to promote intended criminal activity.” District Court Opinion at 12-13 n. 16. So the district court affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s order compelling Canterbury to produce documents and provide deposition testimony concerning matters which were fairly raised by Browning’s complaint against Canterbury. Browning appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Industrial claims that Browning admitted that it waived its attorney-client privilege as to the issues raised in the Canterbury suit by suing Canterbury, so the only issue now presented is whether the district court correctly held that Browning’s waiver extends beyond Canterbury to third parties like Industrial. But at the hearing wherein the magistrate considered Industrial’s motion to compel, Browning’s counsel argued that “there’s been no waiver.” Record on Appeal at 238. Industrial’s only evidence that Browning admitted to waiving its attorney-client privilege is the parties’ agreed statement of the issue presented to both the magistrate and the district court: District Court Opinion at 11 (emphasis added). Browning waived nothing by agreeing to this issue statement. The phrase “which are waived” required the district court, as it did, to find that a waiver occurred before addressing the waiver’s scope. So Browning legitimately appeals from the district court’s finding that Browning waived its attorney-client privilege by suing Canterbury.
The issue presented to the court is the extent of the waiver of the privilege for those communications which are waived by reason of their inclusion in the malpractice petition, i.e., whether they are waived only as to Canterbury/Stuber’s defense of the malpractice suit, or whether they are waived completely and as to any third party.
The attorney-client privilege exists to encourage clients to be candid with their attorneys. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944, 104 S.Ct. 1927, 80 L.Ed.2d 473 (1984). The privilege protects only confidential communications of the client to the attorney. Id. at 538 nn. 8, 9. “ ‘[Disclosure of any significant portion of a confidential communication waives the privilege as to the whole.’ ” Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 n. 18 (5th Cir.1981)). The confidentiality of a client’s communications may be compromised either through the publication of evidence of the communications themselves or through the publication of evidence of attorney statements or documents that disclose the client’s confidential communications. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 979 (D.C.Cir.1989). The attorney-client privilege protects only evidence of client communications; it “does not protect against discovery of underlying facts from their source merely because those facts have been communicated to an attorney.” El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 538-39 n. 10.
The only evidence of waiver presented by Industrial and considered by the magistrate and the district court is Browning’s complaint, titled “Original Petition,” filed against Canterbury in Texas state court. Industrial, the magistrate, and the district court fail to specify one single communication of Browning’s that is revealed by the Original Petition, let alone any confidential communication. The Original Petition simply accuses Canterbury of various negligent actions in handling the Industrial dispute on Browning’s behalf. While the Original Petition reveals some things that Canterbury told Browning, it reveals no communication from Browning either directly or by reference to Canterbury’s statements. We thus find no record support for the district court’s finding that Browning waived its attorney-client privilege by suing Canterbury.
We are also concerned that the magistrate and the district court so easily dismissed as dicta Judge Rubin’s statement that “[t]he mere institution of suit against a lawyer ... is not a waiver of the privilege for all subsequent proceedings, however related or unrelated.” United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986). Ballard teaches, quite correctly, that the mere institution of suit against an attorney is insufficient to waive the attorney-client privilege as to third parties in a separate action that concerns the same subject matter as the attorney malpractice action. Id. at 291-92; accord Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1985) (“A party does not automatically waive [the attorney-client privilege] simply by bringing suit.”). The institution of suit against an attorney does not waive the privilege even as to matters that are raised in both the malpractice suit and the third party suit. Ballard, 779 F.2d at 291-92. The revelation of confidential communications, not the institution of suit, determines whether a party waives the attorney-client privilege. Thus, if a complaint against an attorney, or the attorney’s response or testimony in the malpractice case, reveals confidential client communications, the client waives the privilege as to the subject matter of the disclosed communications. See, e.g., Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir.1967) (privilege waived where client “demanded and obtained” factual inquiry into claim that appointed attorney failed to render effective assistance). No such revelation has compromised Browning’s attorney-client privilege.
Finally, Industrial argues that the communications are not protected due to the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, and that the district court erred in holding that Industrial is not entitled to Canterbury’s testimony and documents under the crime/fraud exception. To invoke the crime/fraud exception, a party must establish a prima facie case that a crime has been committed. Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 789-90 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 2064, 104 L.Ed.2d 629 (1989). The district court found that Industrial failed to show that any misrepresentations made by Browning were intentional. Industrial presents nothing to show that the district court abused its discretion in making its finding as to Browning’s intent. See id. at 789 (standard of review is abuse of discretion). A party must present evidence of an intent to deceive to establish a prima facie case of fraud or perjury. Therefore, the district court properly rejected Industrial’s claim to Canterbury’s information based on the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1