What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
RYAN v. UNITED STATES.
No. 12.
Argued October 14, 1964.
Decided November 23, 1964.
William R. Bagby argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jones, Joseph M. Howard and Norman Sepenuk.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In August 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Whelan issued a summons to taxpayer Ryan ordering him to pro-ducé his books for the years 1942 through 1953 inclusive. Ryan appeared but refused to produce the records, claiming that because tax liability for those years was long since barred except for fraud, the agent had no right to examine the records unless he could show grounds for suspecting fraud.
The Government then instituted an enforcement proceeding in a federal district court pursuant to § 7402 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The complaint alleged that on the basis of estimated net worth calculations the agent' strongly suspected fraud, and that examination of the records for the years in question was relevant and material in determining its existence. The taxpayer answered, putting the question of probable cause in issue, and, in addition, stating that he had not received the letter required by § 7605 (b) informing him that the Secretary or his delegate had determined the examination to be necessary.
At the hearing the District Judge clearly indicated his opinion that the Government need not show probable cause for suspecting fraud, and ordered Ryan to produce those records which he had available. Although the hearing confirmed Ryan’s assertion that no “necessity letter” had been sent to him, the judge made no mention of this, probably because counsel did not press the point.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 320 F. 2d 500, on the theory that no full-scale showing of probable cause need be made. Except for the records relating to the year 1945, which appeared to have been once previously examined, the court ruled that no necessity letter was required by § 7605 (b) because the Government had made no previous examination of those years.!
We granted certiorari, 376 U. S.. 904, on the only issue raised by petitioner, whether the Government must show probable cause for its examination of the records. On that issue we sustain the judgment of the Court oT Appeals for the reasons given in United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Golderg concur in the result, because they believe that through the testimony of Internal Revenue Agent Whelan a sufficient showing was made that the Government was not proceeding capriciously in this case.
Me. Justice Douglas dissents for the reasons given in his separate opinion in United States v. Powell, ante, p. 59.
I. R. C., § 6501. See United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48, at p. 49, note 2.
See id., at p. 52, note 10.
See id., at p. 52.
The propriety of the court’s interpretation of the necessity letter requirement of § 7605 (b) is, therefore, not before us. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U. S. 40, 48.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1