What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
JAMES STEWART &. CO., Inc., v. NATIONAL SHAWMUT BANK OF BOSTON.
No. 2861.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
March 14, 1934.
H. R. Bygrave, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.
Thomas Hunt, of Boston, Mass. (Gaston, Snow, Saltonstall & Hunt, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellee.
Before WILSON and MORTON, Circuit Judges, and PETERS, District Judge.
MORTON, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the District Court sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff’s declaration. The action was at common law, and the declaration alleged, in substance, that the defendant was a compensated trustee of the Washington Central Trust, a voluntary association having transferable shares; that as such trustee it contrasted with the plaintiff for the latter to erect a building on land owned by the trust; that under this contract the liability of the defendant was expressly limited to the , amount of the trust property in its hands; that after having made the contract with the plaintiff the defendant as trustee so carelessly, negligently, and improperly managed the trust property that said property was lost; whereby, when the defendant had completed its contract, as it did according to the terms thereof, there was nothing in the trustee’s hands with which to pay it. The District Judge was of opinion, very properly, we think, that, in view of the probable length and expense of trial on the merits, substantial doubt as to liability ought to be resolved against the plaintiff on the demurrer. The trust agreement under which the defendant acted is not set out; but the defendant asserts, and the statement is not denied, that under it the trustee’s only expressed obligation was to the shareholders in the trust. We accept this as true.
This action being at law, the question beforg us is whether the defendant, by making the contract with the plaintiff, came under a legal duty to the plaintiff to use reasonable care and diligence in safeguarding the trust property, from which, and from which alone, the plaintiff was to be paid. We entertain no doubt that it did. There are ma’ny instances in the law in which a person, by making a contract with another person, creates a legal duty of care towards a third person. The point is discussed with acuteness and learning, and the authorities are referred to by Judge Cardozo in Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, 23 A. L. R. 1425. It is unnecessary to restate the discussion. In that ease the defendants were employed by the sellers of merchandise to weigh the goods sold. They knew that their weights would be accepted by the buyers. The weighing was carelessly done to the damage of the buyers; and they were allowed to recover their loss from the defendants. The present ease is much less extreme. Here, the bank was in direct relations with the plaintiff. It made a contract with the plaintiff calling for large expenditures by the latter, which were to be repaid only from the trust property in the hands of the bank. If the trust fund had consisted of tangible property, like jewels, in the possession of the defendant, against the value of which the contract was made, nobody would doubt that the making of the contract put upon the defendant the duty of exercising due care and diligence on the plaintiff’s behalf to keep them safely; nor that the plaintiff would have a right of action for breach of that duty. The principle is the same whatever form the trust property takes. “It is a well-recognized rule in the law of negligence that, when one knows or has reason to anticipate that the person, property, or rights of another are so situated as to him that they may be injured through his active intervention, it becomes his duty so to govern his action as not negligently to injure the person, property, or rights of that other.” Bingham, J., Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Aec. & Plate Glass Ins. Go. (C. C. A.) 240 F. 573, at page 579. Even a volunteer may, by undertaking an act which did ' not legally concern him, assume duties for breach of which he will bo liable. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Aec. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., supra; Glanzor v. Shepard, supra; Douglas v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 81 N. II. 371, 127 A. 708, 711, 37 A. L. R. 1477. The conservator of a fund against which obligations have been issued certainly owes a duty to care for it properly, not only to persons by whom the fund was established and the obligations issued, but also to the persons by whom the obligations are held, especially when those obligations run in the name of the conservator, though limited to the property in its hands.
We have no occasion to consider whether it was an implied term of the contract, made between the defendant and the plaintiff, that the former would take reasonable care of the trust fund in its possession from which payments under the contract were to be made, nor whether the arrangement between the parties gave the plaintiff an equitable interest in the fund, nor whether the trustee was in fact negligent in its conduct of the trust. We hold only that the declaration states a good cause of action at law against the defendant.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, with costs, and the ease is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1