What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James Donald YARBROUGH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 7103.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 29, 1962.
Robert S. Slosky, Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Michael C. Villano, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo. (Lawrence M. Henry, U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before PICKETT, BREITENSTEIN and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, Yarbrough, was convicted on an indictment which charged that, having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, he transported in interstate commerce firearms and ammunition in violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 902(e), and he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years. At the close of the prosecution’s case Yarbrough moved for a judgment of acquittal upon the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove the essential elements of the crime except by the uncorroborated confession of the accused. The question presented is whether there was sufficient corroboration of Yar-brough’s post-arrest confession and admissions to sustain the conviction. We hold that the corroborating evidence was insufficient.
Yarbrough, who had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, was arrested by a highway patrolman in northwestern Colorado while driving an automobile with Oregon license plates. Found in his possession were a .32 caliber pistol, a .38 caliber pistol, and a quantity of ammunition. After his arrest Yarbrough confessed to a Colorado highway patrolman and to an F. B.I. agent that he had driven the automobile from Utah into Colorado, and had transported the guns and ammunition from Utah to Colorado. He stated to the F.B.I. agent that he had won the .38 caliber pistol on a punchboard at a motel in Utah, but was not certain of the place. He said that he had acquired a postcard while at the motel on which there was a picture of the establishment, and that this postcard was still in the automobile. The agent found an unused postcard in the glove compartment of the car which appeared to be an advertisement of a motel at Fruitland, Utah. This is the extent of the corroborating evidence as to the interstate transportation of the firearms and ammunition.
The law is well settled that a criminal conviction cannot be sustained when the offense is proven solely by the uncorroborated extra-judicial confession or admissions of the accused. It is necessary that such extra-judicial statements establishing essential elements of the crime charged be corroborated by evidence independent of the confession or admissions. The prosecution, in addition to the confession or admissions, must produce substantial independent evidence of the essential elements of the crime charged which will tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statements made by the accused. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 75 S.Ct. 158, 99 L.Ed. 101; Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192; Kelly v. United States, 10 Cir., 246 F.2d 864; Braswell v. United States, 10 Cir., 224 F.2d 706, cert. denied 350 U.S. 845, 76 S.Ct. 86, 100 L.Ed. 752.
The essential elements of the offense charged in this case are the interstate transportation of firearms or ammunition by one previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a period of more than one year. The corroborating evidence relied upon by the trial court to satisfy the corroborating evidence test was the the possession of the automobile bearing Oregon license plates and the postcard which apparently advertised a motel in Utah. It is conceded that possession of an automobile with a foreign state license plate, standing alone, is insufficient corroborative evidence of interstate transportation. Kelly v. United States, supra. Clearly the picture and printing on the postcard, when considered independently of Yarbrough’s confession and admissions, proves nothing. Aside from his statements there is no evidence that the automobile, the guns and ammunition, or Yarbrough himself, were ever in any state other than Colorado.
The judgment is reversed and the •case remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.
. 15 U.S.C.A. § 902(e) provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person who is under indictment or who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or who is a fugitive from justice to ship, transport, or cause to be shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce any firearm, or ammunition.” (Footnote omitted)
. In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S.Ct. 158, 164, 99 L.Ed. 101, the Supreme Court, after discussing the divergent views of the quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the corroboration rule, said:
“Whether the differences in quantum and type of independent proof are in principle or of expression is difficult to ■determine. Each case has its own facts admitted and its own corroborative evidence, which leads to patent individualization of the opinions. However, we think the better rule to be that the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish tlie corpus delicti. It is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, the independent evidence serves a dual function. It tends to make the admission reliable, thus corroborating it while also establishing independently the other necessary elements of the offense. Smith v. United States, post, p. 147 [348 U.S. 147, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192], It is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth. Those facts plus the other evidence besides the admission must, of course, be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0