What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WILLIS v. HUNTER.
No. 3562.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Nov. 17, 1947.
Arthur J. Mellott, Judge.
Richard Clarence Willis, pro se.
Eugene W. Davis, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan. (Randolph Carpenter, U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
On September 10, 1946, an indictment was returned in the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado charging that Willis, on July 6, 1946, “while in lawful custody by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, did attempt to escape from said custody.” On October 16, 1946, petitioner appeared in person and by his counsel, Charles J. Moynihan, Esq., and entered a plea of guilty to the charge in the indictment. On May 19, 1946, petitioner was arrested by an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on a charge of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 408, and was taken before a United States Commissioner at Montrose, Colorado. The Commissioner issued a mittimus • committing him to the Montrose County Jail. Petitioner was transferred to the County Jail of El Paso County, Colorado, at Colorado Springs, Colorado. While so confined, he attempted to escape.
On May 7, 1947, petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. As ground for discharge, he alleged that at the time he attempted to escape he had neither been bound over by a United States Commissioner nor indicted by a grand jury on a charge of felony and, therefore, was not being held on a charge of felony at the time he attempted to escape.
18 U.S.C.A. § 753h, in part, provides: ■“Any person * * * who is in custody by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or commissioner, or who is in custody ■of an officer of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, who escapes or attempts to escape from such custody * * * •shall be guilty of an offense. If the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest •on a charge of felony, * * * the offense of escaping or attempting to escape therefrom shall constitute a felony and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or by a fine of not more than $5,000, or both; * *
The evidence established that petitioner had been arrested and had been committed by the United States Commissioner on a charge of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 408. The offense defined in § 408, supra, is a felony. Moreover, the indictment charged that petitioner attempted to escape “while in lawful custody by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony,” and his plea of guilty admitted the facts charged in the indictment.
It follows that petitioner was not entitled to discharge on habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
Hereinafter referred to as petitioner.
Lindsay v. United States, 10 Cir., 134 F.2d 960, 962; Norris v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 114 F.2d 1007, 1009; Spencer v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 139 F.2d 828, 829.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0