What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Miguel CORONADO, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 76-1840.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Submitted March 4, 1976.
Decided March 23, 1977.
See also 6 Cir., 540 F.2d 216.
Miguel Coronado, Jr., pro se.
E. Edward Johnson, U. S. Atty., Mary K. Briscoe, Asst. U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., for respondent-appellee.
Before SETH, McWILLIAMS and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Miguel Coronado, Jr. seeks review of the denial by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant was mandatorily released as if on parole from a federal penitentiary in 1973 from the remainder of a ten-year term begun in 1969. In 1974 he was convicted of several drunk driving violations by the State of Texas; he was incarcerated in a state facility for approximately a year. In October of 1974 the Parole Board (now the Parole Commission) lodged a detainer with Texas authorities; appellant requested an immediate parole revocation hearing. The Parole Board reviewed the matter and determined to let the warrant stand as a detainer. In October of 1975 appellant was paroled to federal authorities. He claims he requested a local revocation hearing in order that his attorney could be present, but that he was instead summarily dispatched to Leavenworth, Kansas where his final revocation hearing was held within two months as approved by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. He claims he requested counsel at the time of his final revocation hearing but that this request was denied. Parole was revoked and Coronado instituted this action claiming the Parole Board violated his constitutional rights in that:
1. The Board failed to provide him with a prompt revocation hearing following his incarceration on state charges despite his request for speedy disposition;
2. The Board failed to hold his final hearing in Texas (where he had retained counsel, witnesses, etc.) despite his request for a local hearing; and
3. The Board denied his request for counsel made at the time of his parole revocation hearing at Leavenworth, Kansas.
The Supreme Court in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236, determined that the requirement for a prompt revocation hearing begins to run when the Board executes the parole violator’s warrant and takes the parolee into custody. Moody also approved, in effect, this court’s ruling in Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir.1974) that the Board need not execute the warrant pending an alleged violator’s service of an intervening sentence. See also Eblen v. U. S. Board of Parole, Unpublished 75-1311 (10th Cir., filed February 2, 1977). The Parole Commission’s new guidelines provide that once a review or “dispositional interview” of a parolee’s record has been conducted, the option of simply letting the detainer stand may be properly exercised. See 18 U.S.C. § 4201 et seq; 28 C.F.R. § 2.1 et seq. Here appellant sought an immediate hearing; the Board considered but declined the request. Appellant was not entitled to more.
Next Coronado claims that he was entitled as a matter of right to a local final hearing as opposed to one conducted far from the scene of the alleged violation. The right to a local parole violator’s hearing as established by Morrissey has never been extended to violators convicted of crimes committed under supervision. Moody, supra, 429 U.S. 86, n.7, 97 S.Ct. 274. Since the fact of conviction is easily established and suffices in lieu of the initial (probable cause) hearing, all that is left for a violator convicted of an intervening crime is the right to present to the Board evidence of mitigating circumstances. Martinez v. Patterson, 429 F.2d 844 (10th Cir.1970); see also Preston v. Piggman, 496 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.1974); Caton v. Smith, 486 F.2d 733 (7th Cir.1973). The record in this case reveals that Coronado was given this opportunity and that he was provided with the reasons his parole was revoked.
Finally appellant claims that at the time of his hearing at Leavenworth he requested counsel, which request was denied by the Board. Although there is no documentary evidence to support this claim, neither is there any to refute it. A parole violator whose violation consists of a crime committed while under parole supervision is not entitled to counsel as a matter of right. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656; Julian v. Harris, 482 F.2d 405 (10th Cir.1973); Cotner v. United States, 409 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.1969). See also Ganz v. Bensinger, 480 F.2d 88 (7th Cir.1973); accord, Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82 (2nd Cir.1976). The purpose of providing counsel at all is .to assist the Board in understanding complex or difficult facts or to help a violator who is not capable of speaking effectively for himself. Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. 790-791, 93 S.Ct. 1756.
Under the Parole Commission’s regulations in effect at the time of his parole hearing, Coronado was entitled to present voluntary witnesses and documentary evidence, 28 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1975). He was entitled to (and apparently did) speak in his own behalf offering mitigating .circumstances for the Board’s consideration. Martinez, supra.
The Board’s present rules provide that a parole violator is to be advised of his right to apply to a United States District Court for appointment of counsel. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.47(a), 2.48(b) (1976). Under Gagnon, supra, and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, it appears that appellant may be entitled to reasons for the denial of counsel. However, inasmuch as he did not request such reasons from the Parole Board, the district court was correct in dismissing the action.
When this case was docketed in this court, the parties were notified that the appeal would be decided on the original record without oral argument. The parties were invited to submit memoranda in support of their respective positions. Only appellant has done so. We have thoroughly reviewed the files and records in this case and are convinced that the opinion of the district court should be affirmed.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0