What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Claude C. SCOTT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 19763.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 13, 1966.
Decided Oct. 26, 1966.
Mr. Charles R. Work (appointed by this court), with whom Mr. Paul K. Murphy, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Edward T. Miller, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and William H. Collins, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Danaher, Circuit Judge, and Bastían, Senior Circuit Judge, and Wright, Circuit Judge.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge.
Scott was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in violation of D.C. Code § 22-2204 (1961). The jury also found the appellant guilty of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). In the District Court concurrent sentences were imposed with respect to the conviction on each count.
The appellant and the Government stipulated at trial that a certain identified Dodge automobile was owned by a resident of Richmond, Virginia, whose daughter had authorized the car to be parked on a Richmond street in front of a funeral home; further it was stipulated that the car bore a certain serial number and Virginia registration tags. Neither the owner of the car nor his daughter knew the appellant and conced-edly neither had given him permission to use the car.
The car was stolen on May 28, 1964. On the afternoon of November 25, 1964, a Metropolitan Police officer stopped the car for a speeding violation. The car then bore 1964 North Carolina license tags. When called upon to produce evidence of registration, the appellant opened the glove compartment and produced the Virginia registration which had been issued to the owner. A check of the serial number identified the car as that described in the Virginia registration. A similar check with North Carolina authorities developed that the North Carolina tags had been issued for a 1963 Ford.
The appellant offered no explanation for his possession of the stolen vehicle. Rather, he claimed to have been suffering from a form of amnesia and that he had no recollection of events over the period from May, 1964 to the date of his arrest.
In rebuttal, a psychiatrist on the staff at St. Elizabeths testified that he found the appellant had not suffered from mental disease or mental defect. The arresting officer testified that Scott had talked coherently, had answered questions put to him and had seemed normal in all respects.
There would seem to be no possible basis upon which this appellant’s use and operation of the stolen car on the public streets of the District of Columbia could be anything but “unauthorized” as the term is used in the pertinent section of our Code. We find no error.
Appellant contends that his conviction on either count may not stand in that the lapse of time between the theft in Richmond and his being arrested while driving the car in the District of Columbia had been so great that the car could not in any legally satisfactory sense be described as “recently stolen.” We need not decide the point, in the absence at trial of a request for limiting instructions or of objections to the charge as given.
Affirmed.
. This section in pertinent part provides: “Any person who, without the consent of the owner, shall * * * use, operate * * * on a public * * * highway * * * an automobile or motor vehicle, and operate or drive or cause the same to be operated or driven for his own profit, use, or purpose shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both such fine and imprisonment.”
. Cf. Travers v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 335 F.2d 698 (1964); Bray v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 139, 140, 306 F.2d 743, 746, 747 (1962); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896); Gilbert v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 215 F.2d 334 (1954) ; Boehm v. United States, 271 F. 454 (2 Cir. 1921).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1