What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William Arthur McKinley JONES, Jr., Appellant, v. J. S. PETROVSKY, Warden, F. C. I., Sandstone, Minnesota, Appellee.
No. 80-1330.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 15, 1980.
Decided Oct. 21, 1980.
William Arthur McKinley Jones, Jr., pro se.
Thomas K. Berg, U. S. Atty., James A. Morrow, Asst. U. S. Atty., D. of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., Elizabeth L. De La Vega, Legal Intern, for appellee.
Before ROSS, HENLEY and McMILLI-AN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
William Arthur McKinley Jones, Jr., appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated below.
Jones is an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota, where he is serving a nine year sentence and a four year sentence, consecutively, pursuant to two convictions by the State of Delaware. He is a state prisoner but is incarcerated at Sandstone pursuant to an agreement between the federal government and the State of Delaware.
Jones pled guilty to two state charges pursuant to two separate plea agreements with the State of Delaware. In his petition, which names the Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution at Sandstone, Minnesota, as respondent, Jones attacks the convictions and the consecutive sentences, alleging specifically that the Delaware court ignored the terms of the plea agreements at sentencing.
This is Jones’ third petition under § 2254. Jones first appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court of Delaware. That court affirmed both convictions. He then filed a § 2254 motion in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware naming the head of the Delaware prison system as respondent. Jones based that application on three grounds:
1) that he was sentenced to a greater number of years than provided for in the plea agreement;
2) the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to allow Jones to revoke his guilty plea;
3) denial of effective assistance of counsel.
The Delaware district judge dismissed Jones’ first claim, finding that it was not supported by the transcript of the sentencing proceedings and that no guarantees were made as to sentences. He dismissed the second claim on the ground that there existed no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted, and the third for a failure to exhaust state remedies.
Jones returned to Delaware Superior Court to seek post-conviction relief. According to the information contained in his present § 2254 application he relied on the same allegations as he did in his first § 2254 petition. That petition was denied in August 1978.
He filed a second § 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, again naming the Delaware warden as respondent, and alleging a violation of the plea agreements. In a memorandum order dated August 21, 1979, the district judge dismissed Jones’ petition for lack of jurisdiction over the respondent. Jones did not appeal.
In the § 2254 petition in this case he alleges that his due process rights were violated because the sentencing court “ignored” the aforementioned plea agreements. The district court judge dismissed Jones’ petition on the merits.
Jones’ petition fails to state a cause of action under § 2254. The point of his allegations is that the sentencing judge did not abide by the terms of the plea agreement. However, his reliance on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), is misplaced. In Santobello the Supreme Court held that where a promise or agreement is made by a prosecutor to a defendant as an inducement to plead guilty, that promise must be fulfilled. Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499. That obligation is binding only on the prosecutor. Nothing in Santo-bello requires that a court adhere to the terms of a plea agreement. Even had Jones succeeded in stating a cause of action cognizable under § 2254 we would be compelled to affirm the district court’s dismissal on the ground that this is a successive petition. Rule 9(b) of the rules governing § 2254 states:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits * * *.
Jones bases this petition on one of the grounds included and adjudicated in the original § 2254 petition. Though couched in different language, in each petition the idea is the same; that his sentences must comply with the terms of the plea agreements. It is clear that the original determination by the Delaware district court was on the merits and that the judge there had ample opportunity to review transcripts of the state court proceedings. See Hill v. Wyrick, 570 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1978); Irwin v. Wolff, 529 F.2d 1119, 1122 n.10 (8th Cir. 1976); Winford v. Swenson, 517 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1023, 96 S.Ct. 464, 46 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
. On completion of the state sentences Jones will serve a five year sentence pursuant to a conviction in United States District Court for the District of Delaware for interstate transportation of stolen checks.
. Jones’ argument focuses upon two agreements between himself and Delaware officials. The first, dated June 30, 1976, provided that the state would recommend a total sentence of no more than ten years and that any sentence be made concurrent with any other sentences to be imposed. The agreement of November 8, 1976, provided that Jones would be permitted to serve his sentence outside of the State of Delaware and that the state would not recommend that any sentence be made concurrent.
. In his present § 2254 application Jones cited a failure to exhaust state remedies as the reason for his failure to appeal even though that was a basis for dismissal only as to the third claim.
. Jones’ current § 2254 application gives no reason for dismissal by the Superior Court of Delaware.
. The United States Magistrate recommended in a report dated January 4, 1980, that the government’s motion to transfer the petition to the District of Delaware pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 be granted. However, Jones objected to the transfer and the government moved to vacate the request for transfer and requested a determination on the merits. The district court granted the motion and vacated the magistrate’s report and recommendation.
. Judge McMillian is of the opinion that when a prosecutor has agreed to make a recommendation and the court does not intend to follow the prosecutor’s recommendation, fairness dictates that the defendant be given an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267-69, 92 S.Ct. 495, 501-02, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (Marshall, J„ concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0