What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Claude E. BRODY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Leonard B. BRODY, Jr., Appellant.
Nos. 73-1189, 73-1190.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 13, 1973.
Decided Oct. 11, 1973.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 27, 1973.
See also, D.C., 357 F.Supp. 910.
Gary Eldredge, and William C. Hopkins, II, Kansas City, Mo., for appellants.
Anthony P. Nugent, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before GIBSON and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Talbot Smith, Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
The defendants, Claude E. Brody and Leonard B. Brody, Jr., brothers, were charged in a two-count indictment with willfully possessing an unregistered shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d) and with transportation of two sawed-off shotguns in interstate commerce for the purpose of committing a bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b). The jury returned a guilty verdict on the “possession” count, [§ 5861(d)] and a not guilty verdict on the “transportation” count for both defendants. The District Court sentenced each defendant to ten years imprisonment on the first count.
On appeal, the defendants filed identical briefs, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, that an instruction given by the District Court in response to a question by the jury concerning the time of the offense was prejudicial, and that the District Court erred in denying a motion to suppress the sawed-off shotgun found in Claude Brody’s automobile.
The defendants’ three arguments merit brief discussion. First, the “sufficiency of the evidence” contention rests on a claim that two Government witnesses testified unreliably concerning defendants’ possession of the shotgun on dates other than July 7, 1972 (the day of defendants’ arrests). One of these two witnesses informed the police that the shotgun could be found in Claude Brody’s car. The defendants do not contend that the shotgun was not found in Claude Brody’s car. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the jury’s verdict, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support the convictions. United States v. Holt, 427 F.2d 1114, 1116 (8th Cir. 1970); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 108 (8th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1119, 89 S. Ct. 995, 22 L.Ed.2d 124 (1969).
The defendants also argue that the District Court gave an improper instruction to the jury. During the jury’s deliberations, the jury gave the bailiff an envelope containing the following question:
“Does Count One of the Indictment mean at the time of the arrest or possession of the gun at any previous time covered by the evidence at trial ?”
The District Court and all counsel agreed that the court should respond to the question with a written instruction, which was given as follows:
“Count One of the indictment in this case charges that the offense charged therein was committed ‘on or about the 7th day of July, 1972.’ The proof need not establish with certainty the exact date of the alleged offense. It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged.”
The defendants objected to this instruction, contending it purportedly interjected prejudicial new issues into the case, for it allowed the jury to convict based upon evidence of possession of the shotgun by defendants on days other than July 7, 1972, the day of defendants’ arrests. The Government responds that the grand jury indictment “charged not simply ‘on July 7’ but ‘on or about’ July 7,” and that such a charge encompasses possession on days other than the actual arrests. We agree with the Government’s position and further note that this instruction is commonly approved. Bradford v. United States, 413 F.2d 467, 470-471 (5th Cir. 1969); Yaw v. United States, 228 F.2d 382, 383 (9th Cir. 1955); Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 14.02 (2d ed. 1970).
Last, defendants contend that the District Court should have suppressed the evidence of the shotgun due to an illegal search and seizure of Claude Brody’s automobile. The defendants claim that the police officers did not have probable cause to arrest defendants or search the automobile. We have reviewed the record and think that there was adequate probable cause to support the warrantless search of the automobile. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-701, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
Judgment of convictions affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0