What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Willa Dean WHETSTONE, Appellant, v. The ORION INSURANCE COMPANY, Limited, and Lloyd’s, London, Appellees.
No. 6827.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
March 20, 1962.
Gus Rinehart, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Richard E. Romang, Enid, Okl., on brief), for appellant.
Clayton B. Pierce, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellees.
Before Murrah, Chief Judge, and BRATTON and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
MURRAH, Chief Judge.
This appeal is from the dismissal of a garnishment proceeding brought to recover the unpaid balance of a judgment. Appellant had obtained the judgment against one John Bennett for damages resulting from an automobile accident. Bennett was employed as a land man by the McAlester Fuel Company and appellees are the insurers of McAlester under a general liability policy bearing an endorsement indemnifying such Company and its employees “when * * * liability is incurred by reason of, or in connection with, the assured’s operations.”
McAlester furnished Bennett an automobile to use in the performance of his company duties, and allowed its use on personal trips under an arrangement whereby Bennett reimbursed the Company at the rate of per mile. The record shows that Bennett left his place of employment in Midland, Texas and drove, with his family, to Roswell, New Mexico, where he transacted company business. He then drove, with his family, to Enid, Oklahoma to visit his wife’s relatives. On the return trip to Midland, the accident giving rise to the judgment occurred.
Appellant contends that Bennett was traveling “in connection with” the operations of McAlester at the time of the accident. Appellees contend that the terms “by reason of” and “in connection with,” as used in the contract, are synonomous and that a causal connection between the work or business of McAlester and the act of the employee which created his liability is necessary to bring that act within the coverage of the policy.
The first portion of the endorsement in question insured McAlester and its employees and agents “ * * * for any and all sums which (they) shall be legally liable to pay * * * by reason of the assured’s operations.” Clearly, this language required that the insurer respond only to liability incurred by its employees or agents in the course of their employment—i. e., while performing some function within the scope of their agency relationship. The remaining portion of the endorsement, however, restates the coverage when liability is incurred “by reason of * * * the assured’s operations” and alternatively provides that the same coverage shall obtain when liability results “in connection with” the assured’s operations.
The law will not presume that the parties used tautological words to express their contract. Rather, it will presume that every word has a distinct meaning and purpose within the context in which it is found. See Utex Exploration Co. v. Garwood (10 C.A.) 246 F.2d 547, 550; First National Insurance Co. of America v. Norton (10 C.A.) 238 F.2d 949; Basler v. Warren (10 C.A.) 159 F.2d 41, 43. The words “by reason of or in connection with” were obviously used as words of art to delineate coverage under the insurance contract. Clearly, these terms were not intended to be used synonomously. Rather, we think the term “in connection with” was intended to provide coverage in addition to that already stated in the contract. This additional coverage would seem to apply not only to acts within the doctrine of respondeat superior, but to acts which are in any way connected with the operations of the employer. It is not conditioned on the exercise of an agency relationship, nor does it require that the employee be acting within the scope of his employment. Had such been the intent, it would have been a simple matter to so state.
Here, the business purposes of Bennett’s trip undoubtedly ceased at Roswell. Even so, the record shows that it was within Bennett’s personal discretion to perform additional work for McAlester during the entire trip if he thought it advisable, and he was subject to call at any time. Indeed, he had left word where he might be reached during the trip. In addition, he carried a briefcase containing notes about company business and he was required to return the automobile to Midland, Texas. Each of these factors are tangibly associated and related to the “operations” of Mc-Alester and although merely incidental to Bennett’s return trip from Enid, they were sufficiently “connected” to McAlester’s operations to satisfy the plain terms of the endorsed coverage and to render Bennett an “assured” within the meaning of the policy.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0