What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Weldon Kelley LORRAINE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Appellees.
No. 71-1069.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 18, 1971.
Weldon Kelley Lorraine, pro se.
C. Nelson Day, U. S. Atty. and Glenn J. Mecham, Asst. U. S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah.
Before PICKETT, BREITENSTEIN and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Lorraine was sentenced to a term of imprisonment on June 9, 1970, after his conviction by a jury of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113. We were without jurisdiction to entertain his direct appeal because of an untimely notice of appeal. United States v. Lorraine, No. 666-70, unpublished (10th Cir. March 30, 1971). An opinion affirming on direct appeal the conviction of two co-defendants is being filed with this opinion. See United States of America v. Lujan, 444 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1971).
By motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Lorraine alleged that he had been denied adequate assistance of counsel at trial, and challenged the court’s instructions to the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence. Relief was denied without a hearing. The court held that the bare conclusionary statements without factual allegations cannot avail against the court’s observation at the trial of the representation of the defendant by his counsel. Under the circumstances of this case, we agree.
Lorraine’s attack on his trial representation is directed to counsel’s failure to file certain motions, that he committed tactical errors, that he lost interest in the case for personal and financial reasons, and that he failed to interview witnesses with evidence favorable to Lorraine without specifying the content of the alleged favorable evidence.
As noted by the district court, these claims are conclusionary statements with no supporting factual allegations and therefore insufficient. See Atkins v. Kansas, 386 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1967) and Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1965).
We recently held that the competency and qualification of a lawyer before the court are a matter of which the trial court had judicial knowledge and of which it could take judicial notice. Mitchell v. United States, 432 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1970).
The burden on an appellant to establish a claim of ineffective assistance is heavy, and neither hindsight nor success is the measure. Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352 (10th Cir. 1970). It does not mean victorious or flawless counsel. Brady v. United States, 433 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1970). The representation must have been such as to make the trial a mockery, sham, or farce, Basker v. Crouse, 426 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1970), or resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights. Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1967); Criser v. United States, 319 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1963). The instant allegations do not meet these tests.
Lorraine challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The question is not whether the evidence was sufficient, in a collateral attack, but whether the verdict of guilty was so devoid of evidentiary support as to raise a due process issue. Johnson v. Turner, 429 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1970); Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970); Martinez v. Patterson, 371 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1966); Hall v. Crouse, 339 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 941, 85 S.Ct. 1777, 14 L.Ed.2d 704 (1965). We have the trial transcript before us and are satisfied that there is ample evidentiary support.
Finally, collateral relief is not available to set aside a conviction on the basis of erroneous jury instructions unless the error had such an effect on the trial as to render it so fundamentally unfair that it constitutes a denial of a fair trial in a constitutional sense. Linebarger v. Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 938, 89 S.Ct. 1218, 22 L.Ed.2d 470 (1969). See also Ortiz v. Baker, 411 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 279, 24 L.Ed.2d 234 (1969); Martinez v. Patterson, supra; Poulson v. Turner, 359 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 905, 87 S.Ct. 219, 17 L.Ed.2d 136 (1966); Hilliard v. United States, 345 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1965); Carrillo v. United States, 332 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1964).
This case was assigned to the summary calendar upon docketing in this court and Lorraine was informed that he could submit papers addressing the underlying merits, which he has not done. Nonetheless, we have carefully and thoroughly reviewed the files and records in this cause and are convinced that the judgment of the district court was correct
Accordingly, we affirm.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0