What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Howard Ira WASSERSTEIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Melvin LAIRD, Secretary of Defense, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
No. 646, Docket 72-1152.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued March 2, 1972.
Decided March 31, 1972.
Barry Satlow, New York City, for petitioner-appellant.
Steven J. Glassman, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U. S. Atty. for the S. D. N. Y., with him on the brief), for respondents-appellees.
Before MURRAH, KAUFMAN and OAKES, Circuit Judges.
Senior Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Several months after enlisting in the United States Army Reserve, appellant Wasserstein applied for discharge as a conscientious objector pursuant to Department of Defense Directive 1300.6 and Army Regulation 135-25. After investigation and interviews, as provided by AR 135-25, Wasserstein’s entire file was forwarded to the Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Reserve Components Personnel Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, who convened a Conscientious Objector Review Board to make a final determination of Wasserstein’s application. The Review Board denied the application, essentially on the grounds that Wasserstein had not presented sufficient evidence to establish his objections as being sincerely held and basically religious in nature.
Wasserstein thereafter submitted a second application which included additional information and letters tending to contradict some of the reasons given by the Review Board for its denial of his first application. Although this second application was also forwarded to Fort Benjamin Harrison, it was returned with a statement that “the additional documentation submitted is not sufficient to warrant rehearing” by the Review Board; thus, no action was taken upon it in accordance with AR 135-25 § 12.
Upon being ordered to report for six months active duty subsequent to the return of his second application, Wasser-stein petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, on the ground that he was being unlawfully detained by the Army, or alternatively for a writ of mandamus, pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1361, commanding the respondents to comply with AR 135-25, and process his second application. The District Court denied habeas corpus relief, finding that there was a rational basis for the Review Board’s refusal to accept the validity of Wasserstein’s claim. Wasserstein immediately filed notice of appeal claiming that there was no objective evidence which would serve to support the Review Board’s rejection of his application. He also contends that his case should be remanded in light of our recent decision in Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935 (1971), inasmuch as the Review Board has never considered his application in accordance with the procedures set forth in AR 15-6, and made applicable to Conscientious Objector Review Board proceedings by AR 135-25 § 7(h).
In this posture of the case we do not reach the merits, for we are of the view that the interests of justice would best be served by affording the District Court the opportunity to reconsider Wasserstein’s petition in light of Friedberg v. Resor, supra. See Feliciano v. Laird, 426 F.2d 424, 427 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Mankiewicz v. Ray, 399 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1968).
We reverse and remand with directions to determine whether and to what extent the Conscientious Objector Review Board complied with the regulations set forth in AR 15-6 in its processing of Wasserstein’s application. The stay of Wasserstein’s order to report for active duty is to be continued until the course of action set forth above is completed.
. AR, 15-6 is a general regulation designed to afford military due process in investigations affecting the rights or status of individual members of the armed forces.
To that end it provides the right to a bearing (AR 15-6 § 1(6) (a) (1)), to notice of that hearing (AR 15-6 § 1(6) (a) (1) (a)), to challenge members of the board for cause (AR 15-6 § 1(5)), to inspect all records and documents referred with the case and not subject to security requirements (AR 15-6 § 1(6) (a) (5)), to have counsel present at the hearing (AR 15-6 § 1(8)), to rebut any adverse allegations presented (AR 15-6 § 11(11)) and (AR 15-6 § 11(14)), and to submit a written brief covering the whole or any portion of the case under investigation (AR 15-6 § 11(17)).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1