What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Fredrico LOWE, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS; William Banister; Lewis Anderson, Appellees. Fredrico LOWE, Appellant, v. Thomas M. BOOKER; Carl Gilmore; City of St. Louis, Appellees. Fredrico LOWE, Appellant, v. Michael McDARBY; St. Louis City Jail, Appellees. Fredrico LOWE, Appellant, v. Claude WOODSON and City of St. Louis, Appellees. Fredrico LOWE, Appellant, v. Venus MATHISON and City of St. Louis, Appellees.
No. 86-1939.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 19, 1987.
Decided April 13, 1988.
Rehearing Denied May 18, 1988.
James P. Lemmonds, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
David R. Bohm, St. Louis, Mo., for appel-lees.
Before HEANEY, ARNOLD and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
Fredrico Lowe appeals from the district court’s directed verdict in favor of the City of St. Louis. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal arises out of five separate actions Lowe brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,1983, and 1988, against the City of St. Louis and various correctional officers and supervisory personnel at the St. Louis City Jail. The five cases were consolidated for trial.
In his complaint, Lowe alleged that on August 15,1984, while he was an inmate at the St. Louis City Jail, Officer Michael McDarby entered Lowe’s cell, beat Lowe with his fists, and severely injured him. Lowe also claimed that he was subsequently denied medical treatment and attention for the injuries inflicted. In his initial pro se complaint, Lowe alleged that the City knew that McDarby had previously attacked other inmates, but had done nothing about it. The amended complaint prepared by counsel alleged that McDarby had not been effectively trained, that the City knew of his propensity to assault inmates, and that the City was deliberately indifferent to this fact. It also alleged that the City denied Lowe needed medical care.
This case was tried to a jury. After three days of testimony, the court granted the City’s motion for a directed verdict. It stated:
I don’t believe that under the circumstances the City of St. Louis is liable. There was a failure to show a pattern and practice of acquiescing and allowing beatings and allowing guards to remain on duty that were incompetent. There was a failure to show in the court’s opinion that these acts were part of a custom and practice in the City Jail. That does not mean that these individual incidents did not happen. The Court is going to leave that to the jury in this case.
The jury found for Lowe against McDarby and awarded Lowe damages of $500. Thereafter, the district court denied Lowe’s motion for a new trial. Lowe’s timely appeal followed.
On September 3, 1986, this Court appointed appellate counsel for Lowe and directed counsel to file a brief setting forth the issues, facts, and arguments on appeal. He did so. No responsive brief was filed by the City. Thereafter, this Court required preparation of the trial transcript. We have now reviewed that transcript and find no error in the district court’s action in granting a directed verdict.
II. DISCUSSION
No presumption of correctness attaches to the district court’s directed verdict in favor of the City. See Wilson v. City of North Little Rock, 801 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir.1986). This Court must independently review the evidence and will affirm only if the evidence is so one-sided that it permits no reasonable inferences to sustain Lowe’s position. See id.; see also Williams v. Mensey, 785 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1986).
Municipal liability attaches under section 1983 when an official responsible for establishing final policy deliberately chooses to follow an unconstitutional course of action or when a city employee implements an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom which causes injury to the plaintiff. See Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 504, 98 L.Ed.2d 502 (1987); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 794 F.2d 330, 338 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 688 (1987). One must first identify the policy and then determine whether the policy is unconstitutional. Dick v. Watonwan County, 738 F.2d 939, 943 (8th Cir.1984).
Lowe alleges that the evidence at trial showed that the City acted pursuant to its policy in failing to supervise and control McDarby and in retaining him in a position that allowed him to assault Lowe. This theory requires proof that the City knew that McDarby had engaged in prior offensive conduct and that its failure to remedy this problem amounted to tacit authorization of or deliberate indifference to McDarby’s unconstitutional behavior. See Wilson, 801 F.2d at 322; Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir.1985).
Although the jury’s verdict in Lowe’s case establishes that McDarby acted unconstitutionally in beating Lowe, this single act is an insufficient predicate for municipal liability. See Sanders v. St. Louis County, 724 F.2d 665, 667 (8th Cir.1983). The record additionally shows (1) that McDarby assaulted a prisoner in 1983; (2) that he had engaged in a knife fight with another correctional officer in 1983; (3) that on two occasions he had been rated as “inadequate” in his relations with others; and (4) that in annual evaluations he had been rated as “must improve” in his dealings with other correctional officers, prisoners, superiors, and the public.
The record further shows, however, that Claude Woodson, the Chief Correctional Officer, responded to McDarby’s prior misbehavior by implementing the City’s “progressive discipline policy.” McDarby was suspended for three days for the first incident and twenty-four days for the second incident. Woodson advised him that he would be terminated if further incidents of this nature occurred. When the incident which is the subject of this lawsuit occurred, Woodson told McDarby that he would recommend that McDarby be terminated. At that point, McDarby submitted his resignation.
While Woodson may or may not be a policymaker who could bind the City, see St. Louis v. Praprotnik, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), we find insufficient basis in the transcript for holding the progressive discipline policy implemented by Woodson unconstitutional. It rather appears to be a reasonable one under all of the circumstances. We thus affirm the decision of the district court.
. The jury found for several other individuals named as defendants in Lowe’s complaint.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1