What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LONG v. UNITED STATES.
No. 3529.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 3, 1947.
See, also, 160 F.2d 706.
Donald C. Allen, of Wichita, Kan., for appellant.
Haskell B. Pugh, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Anadarko, Okl. (Robert E. Shelton, U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Okl., and William A. Berry, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Stillwater, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was tried to the court without a jury and convicted of unlawfully transporting, and aiding in the transportation, of one Rama Lou House in interstate commerce for immoral purposes, and for conspiring to commit the same offense. We affirmed on the sufficiency of the evidence. Long v. United States, 10 Cir., 160 F.2d 706. This appeal is from an order denying a motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence since the trial, conviction and affirmance.
The motion alleges that in the trial of the case Rama Lou House testified in effect that appellant registered her at the Franklin Hotel in Medford, Oklahoma, as his sister; that in affirming the. judgment we commented upon this testimony as tending to substantiate the testimony of the girl to the effect that appellant and his co-defendant Gibson discussed the immoral purposes of the interstate journey before they crossed the state line, thus forming a factual basis upon which the trial court was warranted in finding that the appellant did assist in the interstate transportation of the girl (Rama Lou House), with guilty knowledge that his co-defendant would havfe, or attempt to have immoral relations with her. The motion further alleges that the hotel registration card, if produced in evidence on a trial of the case, would conclusively show that appellant did not register Rama Lou House as his sister or at all, and that when this bit of corroborative testimony is thus impeached there is no possible factual basis for the guilty verdict. It is alleged that this hotel registration card was in the possession of the Government at the time of the trial of the case and that it was concealed from the defendant who had no knowledge of its whereabouts.
Upon a hearing on the motion, it was shown that the hotel registration card for room 218 was not in the possession of any representative of the Government during the trial of the case, or at any other time. The evidence tended to show that Rama Lou House’s mother, Mary Lou Stephenson, obtained possession of the registration cards in question from the hotel on the night and at the time the appellant and his co-defendant were arrested in Medford, and that she delivered the registration card for room 202 directly to the United States Attorney, who introduced the same in evidence. The registration card for room 202 showed a registration for Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Gibson on the date in question, and the evidence established that appellant’s co-defendant Gibson and Rama Lou House occupied this room as Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Gibson. It was not shown that on a new trial of the case the registration card for room 218 would be available as evidence. In overruling the motion for a new trial, the trial court observed that even though the registration card were available as evidence, it would be insufficient to justify a new trial.
In affirming the judgment of conviction, we stated it to be a fact that the entire party occupied a room (218) at the hotel, until Gibson suggested that Rama Lou register in another room (202) as his wife; that “Long protested, but Gibson persisted, and at his direction the girl registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Gibson.” We do not understand that appellant Long registered Rama Lou in room 202 or that he actually registered her as his sister in room 218, which was occupied by the entire party. As we- understood and credited the testimony of Rama Lou House, when appellant registered the entire party in room 218 he represented that she was his sister. We should not expect the registration card for room 218, if produced in evidence, to show that appellant actually registered Rama Lou as his sister.
The established fact is that the entire party occupied room 218 until the defendant Gibson induced Rama Lou to register in room 202 as his wife. It was in that room that Gibson attempted to have immoral relations with her and in which he was found when arrested. We simply held that these and other related circumstances, when considered together, tended to corroborate the testimony of Rama Lou House to the effect that the two defendants discussed immoral purposes before crossing the state line and the necessity of marriage as a means of avoiding prosecution. We were of the opinion that the evidence warranted the trial court’s verdict, and we do not think that the production of the evidence offered in the motion for new trial would alter or change that result.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0