What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Wayne L. LaMADE, Appellant, v. Alfred WILSON, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff. PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL, a corporation v. McDONALD'S CORPORATION and McDonald’s of Forest Heights, Maryland, Inc., Third-Party Defendants.
No. 73-1979.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 6, 1975.
Decided May 19, 1975.
Barry J. Nace, Washington, D. C., with whom Earl H. Davis, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant. William Reback, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellant.
Howard C. Donahue, for appellee Wilson.
James A. Welch, Washington, D. C., for appellee Providence Hospital.
Before WRIGHT and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Judge, United States Court of Claims.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 293(a).
PER CURIAM:
In October, 1969, appellant, Wayne L. LaMade, while in the employ of McDonald’s, sustained a severe injury when his left eye was struck with the paper work hat of another employee. He consulted appellee Dr. Wilson, who prescribed several medicines, including a “pain killer” known as Ophthaine. Treatment by Dr. Wilson continued until December, 1969, at which time both appellant and Dr. Wilson considered the wound healed, appellant’s sole complaint being of “some slight pain,” with the eye “sensitive to light.” On January 1, 1970, plaintiff filed a workmen’s compensation claim in the state of Maryland.
In March, 1970, appellant began to experience difficulty with the eye, including discomfort, light sensitivity and “crusting.” After emergency hospital treatment he visited Dr. Wilson on March 9, 1970. Dr. Wilson conducted an examination, and determined there was an ulceration of the cornea. He prescribed medication directed towards a diagnosed bacterial infection and again prescribed Ophthaine to minimize the pain. After eight office visits, between the 9th and 21st of March, appellant was admitted to appellee Providence Hospital under Dr. Wilson’s care. Dr. Wilson again prescribed Ophthaine, among other medications. At Dr. Wilson’s instructions, the nurses left a bottle of Ophthaine at appellant’s bedside. Appellant was able to lift his eye patch and insert the drops whenever he felt intense pain. Appellant stayed at Providence Hospital from March 21 to March 30, when Dr. Wilson made arrangements to have him transferred to the Washington Hospital Center for further consultation and treatment. He stayed there from March 30 to April 16, 1970, during which time he was under the care of Dr. Jerome Goldman.
In this civil action, appellant claimed that Dr. Wilson was negligent in prescribing and permitting the frequent use of Ophthaine in view of the indication in the Physician’s Desk Reference that prolonged use of the medication “may possibly delay wound healing” and that “[sjoftening and erosion of the corneal epithelium have been reported” in connection with the use of the drug. Appellant also claimed negligence on the part of the Providence Hospital on the theory that its nurses had a duty to question the physician concerning his instruction that medication of this nature be left at the appellant’s bedside. The jury returned a verdict in favor of both appellees.
Appellant raises a number of issues on appeal from that verdict, but our disposition of the case is governed by the improper way in which the issue of the previously filed workmen’s compensation claim was injected into the proceedings below. Counsel for Dr. Wilson stated in his opening remarks that a workmen’s compensation claim was filed on appellant’s behalf in Maryland in 1970. Appellant’s trial counsel immediately objected: “I do not think the workmen’s compensation should be in here.” The judge overruled the objection. Defense counsel continued, stating that there had been two hearings in Maryland on July 10 and July 21, 1970; that at that time appellant introduced testimony through Dr. Goldman that the condition of appellant’s eye as of July 1970 was related directly to the accident in which he was struck by the hat; that an award was made by the State of Maryland on the basis of that testimony; and that shortly after the Maryland hearing appellant “turned around . . . and filed a lawsuit” based on Dr. Wilson’s alleged negligence in March 1970, thus “completely changpng] the whole atmosphere of the case.” (J.A. 25-6). At closing argument Dr. Wilson’s counsel, over objection by appellant’s counsel, was, permitted to argue to the jury that:
This case was tried in July of 1970. It was given a full hearing in July of 1970 and Mr. LaMade got what he asked for there, that he be entitled to these benefits because this injury that he has is related to the McDonald’s accident and not to any Ophthaine.
We have tried the identical case in front of you ladies and gentlemen. (J.A. 378)
In addition to the opening and closing statements, the defense counsel also referred to the workmen’s compensation hearing in his cross-examination of appellant and of Dr. Goldman. He elicited that Dr. Goldman had testified at the hearing. The cross-examination purported to elicit how Dr. Goldman had previously testified. The record before us is muddy. Taking it in the sense most favorable to the defendant, Dr. Goldman appears to have related that at the prior hearing he testified that appellant, as of July, 1970, “had this syndrome known as recurrent epithelial erosion which involves the left cornea,” and that, since appellant had sustained an injury from the hat in October and had also experienced delayed healing as attested to by Dr. Wilson, he felt “there was nothing that I could reasonably be certain what transpired in March was probably related to his previous injury [sic].” (J.A. 185-86)
In our view, there was prejudicial error due to the way in which defense counsel, with the judge’s approval, called attention to the workmen’s compensation claim, hearing, and award. This case is governed by the line of cases holding that the admission of evidence concerning an injured party’s receipt of collateral social insurance benefits constitutes reversible error, because it involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact and the possibility of its misuse by the jury outweighs its probative value.
Defense counsel was free to seek to impeach Dr. Goldman by reference to his prior inconsistent testimony. Such impeachment is entirely proper and may be put before the jury, with opportunity given to the witness to reconcile what seem to be diverging statements. But this kind of impeachment must be carried out in such a way as to limit the reference to the prior proceeding to bring out what is material (the inconsistent testimony) without eliciting what is prejudicial (that a workmen’s compensation claim had been filed and that an award had been made). In the case before us, neither defense counsel nor the trial judge manifested the requisite prudence or sensitivity. Rather, it was hawked to the jury that moneys had already been received by appellant for what was described as being the same claim.
The case is flawed by the substantial possibility that the jury was influenced by prejudicial evidence. The case will be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
So ordered.
. See Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., Inc., 375 U.S. 34, 84 S.Ct. 1, 11 L.Ed.2d 4 (1963); Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255, 84 S.Ct. 316, 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1963); Caughman v. Washington Terminal Co., 120 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 345 F.2d 434 (1965).
For the general principle that evidence may not be admitted where prejudicial impact outweighs probative value, see, e. g., Rule 403, Federal Rules of Evidence (P.L. 93-595, approved January 2, 1975); United States v. Bussey, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 271, 432 F.2d 1330, 1333 (1970); Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 155-57, 348 F.2d 763, 767-69 (1965).
. Counsel for both appellees seek affirmance on the basis of lack of adequate evidence of negligence or proximate cause. The record reflects a determination by the trial judge that the evidence on these matters was sufficient to go to the jury. We need not consider how the matter would stand if the judge had vacated a verdict for plaintiff on the ground that the evidence was insufficient, on either negligence or proximate cause, to sustain a verdict. The flaw that Wilson’s counsel injected precluded an effort even to solicit such a ruling by the trial judge. We do not think it an appropriate use of appellate judicial energies to canvass the record on points like these in the first instance. Counsel for appellee Providence Hospital did not initiate the error, but it could have profited from the prejudice, so its judgment must also be reversed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 0