What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
Michael J. PATRONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HOWLAND LOCAL SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 71-1883.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Dec. 19, 1972.
Robert T. Baker, Columbus, Ohio, John C. Burkholder, Means, Bichimer & Burkholder Co., Columbus, Ohio, David C. Comstock, Pfau, Comstock & Springer, Youngstown, Ohio, Raymond E. Schryver, Jr., Asst. Pros. Atty., Warren, Ohio, on briefs, for appellants.
Alan Kretzer, Youngstown, Ohio, Eugene Green, Green, Schiavoni, Murphy & Haines, Youngstown, Ohio, on brief, for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, KENT, Circuit Judge, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.
Michael J. Patrone, a nontenured school teacher in the Howland, Ohio, district, was employed for eight successive years under a series of one year certificates to teach industrial arts. He is not eligible for tenure under Ohio law because he has never qualified for a regular industrial arts teaching certificate. When his contract was not renewed for the 1970-71 school year, he filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, complaining that the Board of Education had refused his demands for a statement of the reasons for nonrenewal of his contract and had denied him an opportunity to be heard. Patrone does not assert in his complaint that the action of the Board of Education was caused by the exercise by him of freedom of speech or any other constitutional right. He contends that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees him a statement of reasons and a hearing before the school board.
The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the teacher and ordered reinstatement with back pay. We reverse.
The order of the District Court was based upon failure of the Board of Education to state a reason for nonrenewal of the contract and to grant a hearing. The District Court said that the recent decision of this court in Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943, 92 S.Ct. 2847, 33 L.Ed.2d 767, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898, 93 S.Ct. 95, 34 L.Ed.2d 157, is not controlling “since plaintiff’s case rests on constitutional grounds.”
The decision of the District Court is based upon a misinterpretation of Orr v. Trinter. Reversal is required not only by the decision of this court in that case, but also by the decision of the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, and by the decisions of this court in Lukac v. Acocks, 6 Cir., 466 F.2d 577 (1972), Harp v. Clemens, 6 Cir., 464 F.2d 1028 (1972), and Crabtree v. Brennan, 6 Cir., 466 F.2d 480 (1972).
On appeal Patrone argues that he had an expectancy of continuing employment, relying on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570. That case involved a situation where “the policies and practices of the institution” rose to the level of implied tenure. Ohio has a tenure system to protect the rights of career teachers. There are two types of teaching contracts, limited and continuing service. § 3319.08 O.R.C. A teacher with temporary certificate, such as the one possessed by Patrone, may be employed only under a limited contract. § 3319.11 O.R.C.
A teacher with a limited contract is entitled to reemployment unless notified to the contrary. § 3319.11 O.R.C. It is not disputed under the record in this case that Patrone was notified in writing in accordance with the statute that the Board did not intend to renew his contract. Furthermore, the Board’s affidavits state that Patrone’s 1969 certificate was conditioned upon his completing two courses of additional training; that the files of the Division of Certification of the Ohio Department of Education do not show that Patrone has submitted evidence of his completion of the two required courses; and that a fully certified teacher became available and was employed to teach industrial arts in the position formerly held by Patrone. Pat-rone does not assert that he completed the required courses of additional training, but states by affidavit that he received a temporary certificate for 1970-71. We find nothing in the record in this case that could be construed to establish an expectancy of continued employment as contemplated by Perry v. Sindermann, supra.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
. No allegation, to this effect is contained in the complaint.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 35