What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James B. SPIKES, Appellant, v. MITTRY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 6703.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 27, 1961.
Leonard L. Pickering, Albuquerque, N. M., for appellant.
James T. Paulantis, Albuquerque, N. M. (Iden & Johnson, Albuquerque, N. M., were with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and PHILLIPS and HUXMAN, Circuit Judges.
HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.
This was an action by appellant, James B. Spikes, against appellee, Mittry Construction Company, to recover wages alleged to be due. The appeal is from a judgment of the District Court sustaining Mittry’s motion for summary judgment. The court’s judgment apparently was predicated on the ground that the action was barred by the Statutes of Limitation.
Mittry was engaged in the construction of a dam project under a contract with the U. S. Corps of Engineers in New Mexico. It had entered into a contract with the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 953, concerning the terms and conditions of employment of Mittry’s employees on all of its work in New Mexico. Mittry, by arrangement or practice, used the Union as a source of workmen falling within certain qualifications. On August 7, 1959, pursuant to a request by Mittry to the Union, Spikes was directed by the Union to report for work to be paid at the rate of $3.50 per hour. He reported and was put to work on August 10, 1959. After working briefly, his employment was terminated. At the time of his discharge, there apparently was due him the sum of $14, which was not paid.
He filed this complaint asking judgment for wages. The complaint was filed June 20, 1960. He asked judgment for $8,834, plus $28 for each twenty-four hours, or fraction thereof, after June 20, 1960, until payment was made, together with costs and attorneys’ fees. He sought this amount under Article VII, Section 1 of the contract between Mittry and the Union.
The basis of the court’s judgment is not set out in the record, but apparently the reason therefor was that the action was barred by the New Mexico Statutes of Limitation. Spikes’ position is that time for filing his action was governed by New Mexico Statute, 23-1-3, which provides for a period of six years for the bringing of an action founded upon contract. Mittry, on the other hand, contends that Section 59-3-4, New Mexico Statutes, 1953, which fixes a period of sixty days for the bringing of an action such as this, controls.
Spikes seeks to draw a distinction between the statutory cause of action created by Section 59-3-4, New Mexico Statutes, 1953, and what he refers to as his contractual cause of action under Article VII, Section 1 of the contract between Mittry and the Union. It is not necessary to decide whether the parties, by contract, could provide for a period of limitation for the bringing of an action such as this other than that provided by the law of the State, because Article VII, Section 1 of the contract is silent as to the time within which an action for recovery of such wages must be brought. In this posture of the case, the law of New Mexico controls the time within which this kind of an action must be brought, and the only question is, if this case were filed in the State Court, would it apply the six-year Statute of Limitation or the sixty-day Statute of Limitation of Section 59-3-4.
Statutes of Limitation are enacted by states as an expression of public policy to encourage promptness in bringing actions, and to do away with stale claims. While the courts of New Mexico apparently have not construed Section 59-3-4, Stat., 1953, we have no difficulty in concluding that by its passage, New Mexico declared it to be the public policy of the State that wages due employees severed from their employment should be promptly paid, and that sanctions should be imposed on employers failing to comply with its provisions. But we think it is also quite obvious that New Mexico intended that an employee seeking the benefits of the Act must act promptly and, therefore, fixed a limitation of sixty days for the institution of an action seeking the benefit of the sanctions imposed on a dilatory employer. That was just as much a part of the public policy of the State as was the provision for the prompt payment of wages.
It is immaterial whether we construe this as an action based upon the Statute or upon Article VII, Section 1, of the contract. In either event, it is an action to exact a penalty from an employer for failure to promptly pay wages, and the penalty provided for in the contract is the same as that provided for in the Statute.
We think the court correctly concluded that the sixty-day statute of limitation controlled such an action, and not being filed within that time, the court correctly sustained the motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
. Herein referred to as Spikes.
. Herein referred to as Mittry.
. Herein called the Union.
. Article YIX, Section 1.
“Workmen shall be paid weekly on the job. When workmen are laid off or discharged, they shall be paid all wages due them at time of layoff or discharge. If employee is discharged, not during office hours, he shall be paid the first morning following that the office is open. If workman so requests, check will be mailed to him.
“Employees quitting shall be paid all wages due them on or before the next weekly pay day. Failure of employer to meet these conditions shall result in additional pay being due workman based on eight (8) hours straight time for each 24 hours, or fraction thereof, during which payment is withheld.”
. Section 59-3-4, New Mexico Statutes, 1953.
Section 4. Discharged Employees.
“Whenever an employer discharges an employee, the unpaid wages or compensation of such employee, where such wages are a fixed and definite amount * * * the unpaid wages of such employee upon demand shall become due immediately, and the employer shall pay such wages to the employee within five days of such discharge.
“ * * * In case of failure to pay wages or compensation due and employee within the time hereinbefore fixed, the wages and compensation of such employee shall continue from the date of discharge until paid at the same rate the said employee received at the time of discharge, and may be recovered in a civil action brought by the employee. Any such action must be commenced within sixty (60) days from the date of discharge; * *
. Titus v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 5 Cir., 134 F.2d 223; 34 Am. Jur., 320.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1