What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Darrell G. NIMNICHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DICK EVANS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 72-3125
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 19, 1973.
Darryl J. Tschirn, C. T. Williams, Jr., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
John O. Charrier, Jr., New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellees.
Before GEWIN, COLEMAN and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
This is a seaman’s action for damages for personal injuries sustained while working on a barge off the coast of Louisiana.
Darrell G. Nimnicht was employed by Dick Evans, Inc. on Lay Barge No. 23 owned by J. Ray McDermott and Company, Inc. On February 13, 1970, Nimnicht was assigned to remove a small hand-operated hydraulic pump from a gondola cart on a total saturation diving system aboard Barge No. 23. The diving system was owned by Evans. This gondola cart was used to move a diving bell into position so that the divers could be transferred from the system to the bell and vice-versa. While in the process of removing this pump, Nimnicht sustained an injury to his back.
Alleging the unseaworthiness of the barge and negligence of his employer, Nimnicht filed suit under the Jones Act and General Maritime Law against Evans, McDermott, and McDermott’s insurer, Travelers Insurance Company. The case was submitted to the jury on interrogatories.
On the special interrogatories submitted to it, the jury found that Nimnicht was a seaman but that his employer was not negligent and that the barge was not unseaworthy. Nevertheless, in response to another interrogatory pertaining to compensatory damages, the jury entered an award of $13,500. In addition, the jury made certain findings regarding maintenance and cure which are not on appeal here. The relevant interrogatories answered by the jury are as follows:
1. Was plaintiff, Darrell G. Nimnicht, injured aboard McDermott Barge #23 on February 13, 1970?
A. Yes.
2. Was plaintiff a seaman or a member of the crew of Mc-Dermott #23?
A. Yes.
3. Was the barge McDermott #23 unseaworthy ?
A. No.
5. Did Dick Evans own, operate, control or have an operational interest in the barge in question?
A. Yes.
6. Was the defendant, Dick Evans, Inc., through its employees, negligent ?
A. No.
9. Was the plaintiff, Darrell Nimnicht, negligent?
A. No.
11. Without any reduction for negligence on the part of the plaintiff, if any, what amount do you find will fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff for the damages he sustained ?
A. $13,500.
After receiving the verdict responding to the interrogatories, the trial court pointed out to the jury that finding no negligence or unseaworthiness on the part of appellees there was no party which could be held liable to pay the damage award. Then, the Court, acting on the authority of Rule 49(b) F.R.Civ.P., entered judgment for appellees. Appellant moved for a new trial on the ground that the inconsistent verdicts evinced confusion on the part of the jury. Motion denied. He appeals. We affirm.
There was no objection to the form of the interrogatories as propounded to the jury. It, therefore, is too late to complain on appeal, Wyoming Construction Company v. Western Casualty & Surety Company, 10 Cir., 1960, 275 F.2d 97, cert. denied 362 U.S. 976, 80 S.Ct. 1061, 4 L.Ed.2d 1011, Halprin v. Mora, 3 Cir., 1956, 231 F.2d 197.
This leaves only the question of whether the trial court proceeded correctly in entering judgment for the appellees, notwithstanding the response to Interrogatory 11. For the answer to this we look to Rule 49(b), F.R.Civ.P., which provides:
“The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58. When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in 'accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial.”
This case presents a situation in which the answers to the special interrogatories were consistent with each other but inconsistent with the findings as to the quantum of damages. Under Rule 49(b) the trial court had three alternatives: (1) to enter judgment in accordance with the special answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, (2) to return the jury for further deliberation, or (3) to order a new trial. The trial court chose the first alternative, holding, in effect, that the answers to the special interrogatories inexorably negated the award of damages.
We are of the opinion that those findings left the District Court with no room to adopt any other course. In the absence of unseaworthiness or negligence, damages could not be awarded. The jury should not have responded to Interrogatory No. 11. The fact that it mistakenly did so could not change the answers to the prerequisite questions, upon which any damages at all had to live or die.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1