What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LLOYD-SMITH v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 12.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 6, 1941.
Wright, Gordon, Zachry & Parlin, of New York City - (Charles C. Parlin and James A. Fowler, Jr., both of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner.
Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Norman D. Keller and Maurice J. Ma-honey, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before L. HAND, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.
In 1932 the above taxpayer, Marjorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, transferred to Jorwil Corporation certain assets belonging to her which had a cost basis of $2,636,778.-49, and a fair market value at the time of tránsfer of $477,606.19. In exchange Jorwil Corporation issued to her its capital stock of the par value of $15,000 and its unsecured two year 6% promissory note for $303,000. In 1933 the note was split into two notes, one for $70,000 and the other for $233,000. In the same year the $70,-000 note was sold for $70,000 in cash. Both the Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals held that the cost basis to be used for computing income taxes on the sale of the note was $70,000 and that on that basis the sale resulted in no loss which could be deducted for tax purposes. The taxpayer, however, says that the note represented a part of a total consideration of stock and notes received in exchange for assets valued at $477,606.19, but which had a cost basis of $2,636,778.49. She accordingly argues that the note should be given a proportionate cost basis of $386,458 and that its sale at $70,000 involved a loss of $316,458. The disallowance by the Board of this alleged loss resulted in an order determining a deficiency of $21,299.17. We think the order was right and should be affirmed.
The question before us on this appeal is what was the proper basis' for tax purposes to be applied on the sale of the $70,000 two year unsecured note of Jorwil Corporation which was disposed of for its face value in the year 1933.
The consequences of such a transfer of property as the taxpayer made to Jorwil are set forth in Section 112 (b) (5) and (e) and Section 113 (a) (6) of the 1932 Revenue Act, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, pages 511, 513, 515:
Sec. 112 (b) (5):
“* * * No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation, and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are in control of the corporation; * * * ”
“(e) Loss from Exchanges Not Solely in Kind. If an exchange would be within the provisions of subsection (b) (1) to (5), inclusive, of this section if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such paragraph to be received without the recognition of gain or loss, but also of other property or money, then no loss from the exchange shall be recognized.”
Sec. 113 (a) (6): “Tax-free exchanges generally. If the property was acquired upon an exchange described in section 112 (b) to (e), inclusive, the basis shall be the same as in the case of the property exchanged, decreased in the amount of any money received by the taxpayer and increased in- the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss to the taxpayer that was recognized upon such exchange under the law applicable to the year in which the exchange was made. If the property so acquired consisted in part of the type of property permitted by section 112 (b) to be received without the recognition of gain or loss, and in part of other property, the basis provided in this paragraph shall be allocated between the properties (other than money) received, and for the purpose of the allocation there shall be assigned to such other property an amount equivalent to its fair market value at the date of the exchange. * * * ”
According to the above provisions no gain or loss shall be recognized where property is transferred in exchange for stock or securities of a corporation controlled by the transferor; and where as in 112 (e), the property received in exchange includes money or “other property” as well as the stock and securities referred to in 112 (b) (5), “no loss from the exchange shall be recognized”. Section 112 (e) also provides that no loss shall be recognized where similar exchanges accompany socalled reorganizations. Now, if the $70,000 note received in partial exchange for the assets transferred,came within the meaning of the word “securities” as used in 112 (b) (5), the taxpayer was entitled to claim a loss based on that proportion of the cost of the assets transferred which the note bore to the total value of the assets received. If, on the other hand, the note came within the description of “other property” then under Section 113 (a) (6) no 'loss from the exchange involved in the case at bar would be recognized because, under subdivision (a) (6), the basis for the note sold by the taxpayer was its value when received. That value was $70,000 and the selling price was $70,000. Therefore, both under 113 (a) (6) and 112 (e) no loss is to be recognized.
In reorganizations which are dealt with in Section 112 (b) (3) and (4) it has been held that there must be a continuity of interest, resembling that found in consolidations or mergers, in order that gain or loss shall not be recognized. Accordingly unsecured short time obligations have been regarded as not coming within the meaning of “securities” since they do not furnish any such continuity of interest as is required to satisfy that term. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 60 S.Ct. 313, 84 L.Ed. 355; Helvering v. Tyng and Helvering v. Buchsbaum, 308 U.S. 527, 60 S.Ct. 378, 84 L.Ed. 445; Pinellas Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 53 S.Ct. 257, 77 L.Ed. 428; Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 60 F.2d 937, certiorari denied 288 U.S. 599, 53 S.Ct. 316, 77 L.Ed. 975; L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 390.
We see no justification for supposing that the word “securities” had different meanings when used in the reorganization subdivisions and in those relating to transfers. Continuity of interest if required to satisfy the term as used in subdivisions 112 (b) (3) and (4) ought to be required for 112 (b) (5).
The opinion in LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 60 S.Ct. 313, 84 L.Ed. 355, makes it plain that a continuity of stock interest is necessary to prevent the recognition of gain or loss in a reorganization or non-taxable transfer, but it did not attempt to say that all debts accompanying shares of stock are “securities”, or to include evidences of debt within the term which the courts had not been accustomed to classify as “securities” under 112 (b) (3), (4) or (5). It only said that “where the consideration'is represented by a substantial proportion of stock, and the balance in bonds, the total consideration received is exempt from tax under Sec. 112 (b) (4) and 112 (g), 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, pages 377, 379”. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. at page 420, 60 S.Ct. at page 316, 84 L.Ed. 355.
We do not think it meant to say that what the court in Pinellas Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470, 53 S.Ct. 257, 260, 77 L.Ed. 428, called “short-term purchase-money notes” are to be regarded as “securities”. These notes represented no such continuity of interest as the courts have generally found necessary to satisfy that term and they differed little from cash or credit received in'the course of a sale.
The decision in Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387, 56 S.Ct. 275, 80 L.Ed. 289, is cited by the taxpayer in support of her contention. There bonds. secured by a mortgage, which ran for a considerably longer average period than the notes we are dealing with were held to be “securities”. But we adhere in general to the view we expressed as to the meaning of “securities” when we discussed Helvering v. Watts, supra, in L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d at page 392. The short term unsecured note of the case at bar which ran for but two years is still farther from the mortgage bonds involved in Helvering v. Watts, supra, than were the bonds in L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra. We think the sale of the note resulted in no taxable deduction.
Order affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1