What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BOESENBERG v. CHICAGO TITLE & TRUST CO. KROESCHELL et al. v. CHICAGO TITLE & TRUST CO.
No. 7836, 7844.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
May 6, 1942.
Rehearing Denied June 12, 1942.
Wm. B. Goodstein and Leo S. Samuels, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellant Boesen-berg.
J. Kentner Elliott, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant Kroeschell.
Geo. L. Pilkington and Edmund J. Reynolds, both of Chicago, Ill. (Saltiel & Pilkington and Edward P. Saltiel, all of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellee.
Before SPARKS and MINTON, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.
LINDLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a dismissal of his complaint, the District Court having found that jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship did not exist for the reason that plaintiff’s interest involved less than $3,-000.
Plaintiff sued as representative of a class, great in number, all beneficiaries of a trust estate, averring that the trustees had been guilty of malfeasance, had wrongfully converted trust funds to their own use and fraudulently paid excessive compensations to certain individuals. Plaintiff sought restraint of the' trustees from further wrongful action, lodgment of the trust estate in a receiver to be appointed by the court, determination of the amount due the estate and its restorement to the fund. The sums said to have been wrongfully diverted were more than $30,000 and the entire estate consisted of property worth some $70,000. Plaintiff’s proportionate interest therein is less than $3,000.
The District Court evidently believed this to be a suit to recover the several individual amounts due plaintiff and others of the same class of which the court had no jurisdiction because of lack of the essential element of jurisdiction depending upon diversity of citizenship, in that the sum due plaintiff is less than the requisite amount.
We think this was error. True, several claims of many against one may not be aggregated to create a sum conferring jurisdiction. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 43 S.Ct. 454, 67 L.Ed. 763; Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 43 S.Ct. 480, 67 L.Ed. 871; Illinois Bankers’ Life Ass’n v. Farris, 7 Cir., 21 F.2d 1014; Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc. 306 U.S. 583, 59 S.Ct. 744, 83 L.Ed. 1001; Robbins v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 7 Cir., 4 F.2d 249. But such is not the case before us. Rather it is within the rule announced by this court in Johnson v. Ingersoll et al., 63 F.2d 86, 87. There a stockholder brought suit to protect a corporate right and the resultant common interests of all stockholders therein, the corporation having refused to take action. “In such case, it is not necessary for the shareholder to show that his private interest or damage, actual or threatened, amounts to the sum which is required to give the federal courts jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is tested by the value of the object sought to be gained by the suit. Fidler v. Roberts [7 Cir.], 41 F.2d 305, 306; Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 32 S.Ct. 9, 56 L.Ed. 81; Swan Island Club, Inc. v. Ansell [4 Cir.], 51 F.2d 337; Haynes v. Fraternal Aid Union, D.C., 34 F.2d 305, 307. See, also, Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn [8 Cir.], 299 F. 424, 428; Larabee v. Dolley, C.C., 175 F. 365, 378; Greenwood v. Union Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, 16, 26 L.Ed. 961; Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 26 L.Ed. 827; Harvey v. American Coal Co. [7 Cir.], 50 F.2d 832; Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464, 479, 11 S.Ct. 419, 34 L.Ed. 1044; Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379, 382, 21 S.Ct. 402, 45 L.Ed. 583; Cyc. of Federal Procedure, §§ 61, 62.”
This rule applies equally as strongly where the plaintiff is a beneficiary of a trust. Handley v. Stutz, 137 U.S. 366, 11 S.Ct. 117, 34 L.Ed. 706. Such was the situation in Marion Mortgage Co. v. Edmunds, 5 Cir., 64 F.2d 248, 252. There plaintiff sought to recover for trust estates funds alleged to have been wrongfully diverted. The court held it immaterial whether the interest of plaintiff was worth more than $3,000 saying: “But these interests do not fix the amount in controversy, for this bill is not a suit to recover on the bonds and certificates. There is no prayer for such a judgment, but only for a recovery by each trust of what has been taken from it, to be returned to the several trustees who are parties. It is like a stockholders’ bill to enforce a corporate right which the corporate officers refuse to assert. The amount in controversy is the corporate right and not the stockholder’s interest in the corporation, which latter is necessary only to justify his suing in the corporation’s behalf.”
Inasmuch therefore as plaintiff sought to have the court take jurisdiction of a trust fund aggregating more than $70,000 in value; to have restored to that fund sums aggregating some $30,000 alleged to have been wrongfully diverted and to have the estate administered in court, it is apparent that the subject of controversy was not the recovery of plaintiff’s interest in the trust fund but the protection, preservation and administration of a trust estate worth far more than $3,000, under the well known powers of a court of equity. Such is a true class suit, which may be maintained by “one or more” of the class, Rule 23, Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c; United States v. “Old Settlers”, 148 U.S. 427, 13 S.Ct. 650, 37 L.Ed. 509; Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 7 Cir., 125 F.2d 84. Consequently “the issue of diversity of citizenship of the parties must be determined by the citizen status of the parties before the court.” Irwin v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 7 Cir., 19 F.2d 300, 303.
It is said, however, that, in view of the fact that within two days after the suit was begun, other beneficiaries, residents of Illinois, intervened and adopted the pleadings of plaintiff, the latter should be classed as original plaintiffs and the jurisdiction of the court defeated because of their citizenship. Whether the court had jurisdiction is to be determined from plaintiff’s complaint, which, we have seen, was sufficient. The fact that thereafter other beneficiaries were introduced into the controversy “did not oust the jurisdiction of the court, already lawfully acquired, as between the original parties.” Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 5 S.Ct. 1163, 1164, 29 L.Ed. 329; Johnson v. Riverland Levee District, 8 Cir., 117 F.2d 711, 134 A.L.R. 326; Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 43 S.Ct. 51, 67 L.Ed. 124; Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, at page 365, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673. The jurisdiction of the court “is determined as of the date when suit was begun.” Irwin v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 7 Cir., 19 F.2d 300; Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 43 S.Ct. 51, 67 L.Ed. 124.
The judgment is reversed with directions to proceed in accord with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99