What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Hugh BRYSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. Misc. 464.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 20, 1955.
See also D.C., 16 F.R.D. 477.
Gladstein, Andersen, Leonard & Sibbett, Richard Gladstein, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Lloyd H. Burke, U. S. Atty., Richard H. Foster, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before DENMAN, Chief Judge, and BONE and ORR, Circuit Judges.
DENMAN, Chief Judge.
Bryson, appellant, moves for a reduction of bail pending appeal from the amount of $50,000 allowed by United States District Judge Mathes acting under Rule 46(a) (2) and (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.
The question before us is whether Judge Mathes abused his discretion in fixing the bail at this high amount. In determining that question we are controlled, as was Judge Mathes, by the provisions of Rule 46, the pertinent portions of which are:
“(a) (2) Upon Review. Bail may be allowed pending appeal or certiorari only if it appears that the case involves a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court. Bail may be allowed by the trial judge or by the appellate court or by any judge thereof or by the circuit justice. ******
“(c) Amount. If the defendant is admitted to bail, the amount thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or justice will insure the presence of the defendant, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.”
(A) The appeal presents a substantial question.
The Chief Judge is of the view that the indictment charged in count one that Bryson violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in filing on April 26, 1951 an affidavit required by Section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(h), stating he then and there was not a member of the Communist party, whereas he was in fact a member of the Communist party. On this charge of membership in some unnamed one of the Communist parties he was acquitted.
Count two charged violation of the above acts by filing an affidavit on April 26, 1951 that he was not an “affiliate of the Communist party,” whereas he then was an “affiliate of the Communist party.” On this last charge he was convicted. It is obvious that the appeal may present several substantial questions. One is to the validity of the indictment with reference to the phrase “the Communist party” without the statement of which one of the various Communist parties, such as the Communist parties in the several states and the Communist party of the United Státes, was intended. Does such a phrase sufficiently inform one when making the affidavit of the character of the offense and thus comply with the requirement of precision required in drafting a criminal statute?
A Communist party well may seek to establish Marxian -socialism, without seeking to overthrow the Government by force, as did the Russian Mensheviks, the second largest party in Russia at the time of the revolution. See American Bar Association circulated Statement on Communism, pages 10 and 18.
Since there may be various Communist parties some of whom do not seek the overthrow of Government by force, must not 9(h) be construed to require that the affidavit deny membership or affiliation in a Communist party “and that he does not believe in or teach . . . the overthrow of the United States Government by any illegal or unconstitutional methods”, the latter phrase identifying the kind of affiliation in the party which he occupied ? Does he violate the Act if his affidavit is not false both as to affiliation and belief ?
We are all agreed on the question as to what the words “affiliated with” mean. The definitions of Webster’s dictionary of these words are “Intransitive: 1. To connect or associate: — followed by with, as, they affiliate with no party. 2. To be friendly, to fraternize. U. S.”
If “affiliate with” means “connect with” what are the kinds of connections intended by the statute, which a person must have in mind when he makes his affidavit? Did Congress mean that the affiant, when he made his affidavit, was to consider that he was falsely swearing to lack of affiliation, if he was merely friendly to the Communist party?
Further, assuming that the phrase “affiliated with” makes the statute one that is enforceable, there arises the question of the instructions given by the court as to the nature of affiliation, which we understood at the hearing on the motion was agreed to present a substantial question.
The judge himself certifies that there is a substantial question and our required determination agrees with his.
B. The requirement of a bond for $50,000 would keep the appellant in jail for many months, perhaps for more than a year.
The uncontradicted evidence before us is to the effect that Bryson has not the means to raise and cannot raise through his friends a bond for $50,-000. Though these facts were before Judge Mathes he nevertheless required that amount and this despite the provision of Rule 46 that he should consider “the financial ability of the defendant to give bail.”
This means that unless the bail be reduced Bryson will be confined in jail for the period of his appeal in this court and for the period in which certiorari is sought and granted or denied and if granted until the Supreme Court decision. Since this is a case of first instance and also involves a number of substantial questions, it is quite likely that certiorari may be granted. If it be granted and any of the substantial questions are resolved in favor of Bryson, he will have taken out of his life by imprisonment a period of something like a year at least. In the case of Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 73 S.Ct. 1055, 97 L.Ed. 1557, in which bail was granted, the notice of appeal was filed in this court on July 6,1950. The case was decided here against Bridges. Certiorari was granted and the final judgment of reversal by the Supreme Court was made in June 1953. 345 U.S. 979, 73 S.Ct. 1130, 97 L.Ed. 1393. It is thus apparent that, as in that case, a similar period could expire for Bryson and nearly three years could be taken out of his life, that is, nearly three-fifths of his sentence.
As will later appear, such a result would be in complete disregard of the principle established by the Supreme Court in the case of Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, at page 285, 15 S.Ct. 450, 453, 39 L.Ed. 424:
“The statutes of the United States have been framed upon the theory that a person accused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment, but may be admitted to bail, not only after arrest and before trial, but after conviction, and pending a writ of error.”
C. Bryson’s likelihood of flight to escape prosecution is hut that of the normal case and the hail should he fixed at the usual norm in appeal cases.
The record shows that the United States Attorney prosecuting Bryson stated at the time of the fixing of bail during appeal by Judge Mathes that no question of Bryson’s likely flight was involved. The attorney then was asking for bail of not less than $30,000. This statement of the prosecutor of absence of Bryson’s likelihood to flee is supported by all the facts before Judge Mathes.
It appears that Bryson has no prior record of convictions of any offenses, felony or misdemeanor. For many years of his life he was an American merchant seaman, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard; at no time was he ever charged or convicted of any violation of the rules or regulations of the United States Coast Guard. In all respects whatsoever, save and except for the conviction hereinabove mentioned, Bryson’s record of conduct has been and is without blemish.
It further appears that Bryson has a home in San Francisco where he is living with his wife and four children, their ages ranging from six to one. The question of his flight to Mexico was raised and his testimony is that he has today no connections with anyone in Mexico and that he had visited Mexico but once in 1951 to see relatives of a former wife. He further testified that he had never been in Canada and has no connections there.
Coupled with this there are of record in the files of this action statements of a large number of responsible citizens of California to the effect that Bryson was a reliable and dependable person, such elements in his character being required to be considered by the last phrase of 46 (c), “the character of the defendant.”
That such a man with such chances of a reversal would flee from his home and wife and children, or flee with them, and for the rest of his life be a fugitive from justice, seems less likely than the usual case with the ordinary appellant in a criminal appeal.
The bail is ordered reduced to $20,-000.00.
. Since we are considering allowing release on bail we must determine the existence of a substantial question.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1