What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SHEPHERD v. HUNTER, Warden.
No. 3531.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Oct 3, 1947.
No appearance for appellant.
Eugene W. Davis, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan. (Randolph Carpenter, U. S. Atty., of Topeka, Kan., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
MURRAH, Circuit Judge.
In April 1945, petitioner was taken from the Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, where he was serving a three-year sentence imposed in the United States District Court of New Hampshire, to answer to an indictment returned in the United States District Court of Nebraska, charging violations of 18 U.S.C.A. § 76, (falsely pretending to be a United States Officer) and 10 U.S.C.A. § 1393 (unlawful wearing of United States Naval Uniform). Appearing before the Nebraska court in person and represented by appointed counsel, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to both counts in the indictment and was sentenced for a period of 18 months on count one and 6 months on count two, to run concurrently, or a total sentence of 18 months, to commence on the termination of the three year New Hampshire sentence, which he was then serving.
By this habeas corpus proceedings petitioner seeks his release on the grounds: (1) He was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, in that the attorney appointed by the court was incompetent and “unfaithful to his cause”; (2) that the Nebraska judgment deprives him of the statutory computation of good time, to which he is entitled under the New Hampshire judgment, and is therefore void; and (3) “perjury in the indictment” and “suppressed evidence.”
Petitioner’s allegation that he was not effectively represented by counsel appears to be based upon his own view that the attorney was incompetent, and on the further ground that the attorney advised him to enter a plea of guilty to the indictment. He offered no testimony other than his own to support this allegation. By affidavit, his counsel testified that when he was appointed by the court to represent petitioner, he obtained a copy of the indictment, examined the same; ascertained the circumstances of his arrest, and studied the evidence upon which the Government would seek his conviction. That he thereafter had a conference with petitioner and went over the case with him, explained the charges made and the nature of the crime. He stated that he explained the difference between a plea of guilty and one of not guilty, advising him that upon a plea of guilty he would be admitting the charges in the indictment, and that if he pleaded not guilty he would be entitled to a jury trial. That he told petitioner if he decided to enter a plea of not guilty he would use his best efforts to secure an acquittal without the necessity of his paying any attorney’s fee, but further advised him that if he were guilty of the charges, it was his advice that he enter such a plea.
“Certainly one charged with crime is not deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel merely because the counsel assigned to him by the court, after an investigation of the facts, advised or even urged him to plead guilty to the charge.” Crum v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 151 F.2d 359, 360. The court’s finding that petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is amply supported by the evidence.
It is not plain from the record when, according to the Warden’s computations, petitioner commenced service of the second sentence, or when under his computations he will be eligible for release. The trial court found, however, that giving petitioner credit for all statutory good time earned and allowed, he became eligible for conditional release under the New Hampshire judgment on February 7, 1947, at which time the 18 months sentence imposed in the Nebraska court commenced by operation of law. The court further found that giving petitioner credit for all statutory good time, he would be entitled to conditional release under the Nebraska judgment on May 19, 1948, and that the full term would expire April 17, 1949.
It is thus plain that under the trial court’s computation the Nebraska judgment does not deprive petitioner of credit for any statutory good time. Furthermore, petitioner is not presently entitled to release from the judgment under his own computation, and he does not so contend. Not being presently entitled to release, habeas corpus is not available to determine prospectively when he will be entitled to release under the applicable statutes. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238; McMahan v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 150 F.2d 498, certiorari denied McMahan v. Johnston, 326 U.S. 783, 66 S.Ct. 332, 90 L.Ed. 475; Macomber v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 115 F.2d 114; Kelly v. Aderhold, 10 Cir., 112 F.2d 118;, Hunt v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 111 F.2d 42.
Petitioner’s contentions as to “perjury in the indictment” and “suppressed evidence,” were presented to the Nebraska sentencing court in a motion to vacate the judgment. The motion was overruled and is now pending on appeal to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. These contentions do not go to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, are not proper subjects of habeas corpus proceedings, and cannot, therefore, be relitigated here.
Petitioner complains of mistreatment by prison authorities. But, it is not within the province of the courts to superintend the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there. Platek v. Aderhold, 5 Cir., 73 F.2d 173; Sarshik v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 142 F.2d 676.
The judgment denying the writ is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1