What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FOOK v. UNITED STATES.
No. 9528.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.
Argued Oct. 14, 1947.
Decided Nov. 19, 1947.
Writ of Certiorari Denied Feb. 16,1948.
See 68 S.Ct. 608.
Mr. Woodrow E. Faulkner, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. John D. Lane, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. George Morris Fay, United States Attorney, and Edward Molenof, Assistant United States Attorney, both of Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Sidney S. Sachs, Assistant United States Attorney, of Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, Associate Justice, MARIS, Circuit Judge, and PRETTY-MAN, Associate Justice.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Lee Fook has been convicted of deliberate and premeditated murder and sentenced to death. His guilt is clear. The crime was committed in broad daylight on a busy public street. Testimony of several disinterested witnesses showed that appellant, carrying a knife, pursued the deceased, Harry Lee, several hundred feet; that Harry Lee fell; and that appellant kicked and stabbed him many times as he lay on the ground. The pursuit and stabbing occupied four or five minutes. Death was caused by several punctures of the liver. While appellant was standing beside the body he was asked why he did it and replied that the man was a son of a bitch. Harry Lee was unarmed during the pursuit and stabbing, but a knife was found resting loosely in the left hand of his apparently lifeless body and there was testimony that appellant put it there. Some days before the stabbing appellant had said to Harry Lee “I am going to get you next time.” After the stabbing appellant had a slight cut or scratch on his hand.
Testifying through an interpreter, appellant said he went to Harry Lee’s laundry to see him about an immigration paper for appellant’s son; that Harry Lee had sold this son a “citizenship paper” but refused to help appellant get the son, who was in a New York hospital, back to China; that appellant said to Harry Lee “I am going to report to the immigration authorities”; that Harry Lee’s “face changed color, and then he snatched a knife and came after me * * * and I grabbed for him, and I got cut right here (indicating on hand) * * *. And when he cut me, I don’t know how I do it, I try defend myself, and after I couldn’t do it, I ran outside, and the deceased was chasing me. * * * When he came at me with his knife, I defended myself and try to hold him off with this hand, and that is when I got cut, and maybe when I did this, knocked the knife into him, and I got scared and ran out.” Two of Harry Lee’s employees testified in rebuttal that they were familiar with his place and his equipment but had never seen the paring knife with which he was killed. Whatever may have happened before the men went from the laundry into the street, no reasonable jury could fail to believe the disinterested witnesses who saw appellant pursue his victim through the street and stab him repeatedly.
We find no error. Appellant complains of the court’s comment, “I think it is a plain inference that he must have been mad at him. * * * He must have been angry, if he threatened to denounce him to the immigration authorities. * * * ” But the court added: “As you know, I have a right to comment on the facts. My inference is not binding on the jurors. * * * They can draw their own inference.” Moreover, the theory that appellant might have acted in the heat of passion was favorable to him. It had been urged by the defense, and was afterwards adopted by the court, as the basis for a manslaughter charge. Although there was blood on the victim’s shirt while he was running away from appellant, the court did not err in refusing to give a charge based on the theory that “the fatal blow,” i. e. the only fatal blow, was struck in the laundry. For no one could reasonably infer from the evidence that death was caused by the one accidental cut which appellant says he “maybe” inflicted there and not by any of the numerous intentional cuts which ha certainly inflicted in the street several minutes later.
There was neither error nor prejudice in the court’s refusal to grant a continuance for the purpose of enabling counsel to go to New York to get evidence regarding the cause of appellant’s hostility to the deceased. That sort of evidence was insignificant and probably inadmissible. Moreover an adjournment which took place for other reasons gave counsel, as he conceded at the trial, ample opportunity to get this evidence if he cared to do so.
There was no error in disposing of unrelated criminal business, in the absence of the jury, during a recess in the trial. There was no error in charging the jury that if they believed appellant put the knife in Harry Lee’s hand they might, if they thought fit, regard that attempt to manufacture evidence as showing consciousness of guilt. We find no basis for appellant’s contention that the charge to the jury was “one-sided.” We think the charge was clear, well expressed, and eminently fair to the appellant. Justice Holtzoff conducted the entire trial with the fullest regard for appellant’s rights. An example of this was his readiness to have appellant’s sanity tested when the issue was raised for the first time in mid-trial. He did not abuse his discretion in declining to grant a new trial when he learned that a juror had overheard but had not been influenced by a remark of the interpreter, during a recess, to the effect that appellant was lying.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0