What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Paul CHAPLIN, Appellant.
No. 695, Docket 33182.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued April 16, 1970.
Decided May 21, 1970.
Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U. S. Atty., for the Southern District of New York; Peter L. Truebner and Jack Kaplan, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel, for appellee.
Samuel W. Gilman, New York City, for appellant.
Before WATERMAN and FRIENDLY, Circuit Judges, and ZAMPANO, District Judge.
Of the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Following a non-jury trial before Judge Marvin E. Frankel in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, appellant Paul Chaplin was convicted of the unlawful receipt and concealment of approximately 100 grams of heroin. 21 U.S.C. §§ 173, 174. We affirm the judgment.
Appellant first contends there was no probable cause for his arrest. At appellant’s pretrial suppression hearing, agent O’Brien testified that surveillance prior to the arrest had revealed a pattern of clandestine meetings between appellant and two other narcotic suspects. On one occasion, Chaplin was seen to pass a large sum of money to the suspected narcotics traffickers; shortly thereafter the agent observed Chaplin emerge from the suspects’ car supporting something under his jacket. On another occasion, Chaplin was a party to an incriminating conversation which was overheard by a federal agent. The vehicles used by the appellant in his dealings with these suspects were registered to known narcotic offenders. Finally, after observing the appellant’s involvement in another similar transaction on October 9, 1967, the agents moved in and arrested Chaplin in his automobile. A search of the vehicle uncovered the heroin.
The appellant argues that had the search not disclosed the contraband, there would not have been sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. While this may be true, the requirements of probable cause are not grounded on so rigid a test, but on the “practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Much less evidence is necessary to constitute probable cause for arrest than is required to establish guilt. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-312, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). We believe that under the circumstances here the officers reasonably determined that a violation of the narcotics laws had occurred, cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); probable cause, therefore, existed for Chaplin’s arrest.
The appellant next asserts that, even assuming the arrest was valid, the officers were required first to obtain a warrant before they conducted a search of the vehicle. The claim is without merit. Since the search and seizure occurred in 1967, we need not consider whether the principles established in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) apply. See United States v. Bennett, 415 F.2d 1113 (2 Cir. 1969). Pre-Chimel law clearly authorized the search of the appellant’s automobile at the time and place of the arrest. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); United States v. Mazzochi, 424 F.2d 49 (2 Cir. 1970); United States v. Gorman, 355 F.2d 151, 154-155 (2 Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1024, 86 S.Ct. 1962, 16 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1966).
Appellant’s final complaint is that Judge Croake’s pretrial denial of his motion to suppress “without prejudice” entitled him to another plenary hearing before the trial judge. Upon counsel’s renewal of the motion at trial, Judge Frankel permitted the appellant to present only the testimony of a witness who was unavailable at the time of the original hearing. This testimony was completely consistent with Judge Croake’s pretrial disposition of the issues ; the trial judge was not required to pursue the matter further. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e); United States v. Culotta, 413 F.2d 1343, 1345 (2 Cir. 1969).
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0