What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COTHREN v. EVANS et al.
No. 13794.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Feb. 17, 1949.
G. P. Houston, of Heber Springs, Ark., and Gerland P. Patten, of Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
M. F. Highsmith and W. D. Murphy, Jr., both of Batesville, Ark., for appellees Miriam' Evans, administratrix of Wilfred J. Evans, deceased, and J. N. Mason.
Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge.
The sole question for decision is whether this case was properly removed to the Federal Court. The appeal is from a judgment entered upon the verdicts of a jury in an action involving claims for personal injuries and an alleged wrongful death.
On June 27, 1947, an automobile owned by Wilfred J. Evans, a citizen of Indiana, and driven by J. N. Mason, a citizen of Illinois, collided with a motor truck belonging to W. M. Hunt, the driver of which was Willard O. Cothren. Both Hunt and Cothren were citizens of Arkansas. The collision occurred in Randolph County, Arkansas. As a result of the accident, Evans' died, Mason and Cothren were injured, and the motor vehicles were damaged.
Counsel for Hunt and Cothren, on September 11, 1947, procured the appointment by the Referee in Probate for Randolph County, Arkansas, of Carl Brown, Sheriff of the County, as Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, deceased. No property of Evans ever came into the hands of Brown. On September 20, 1947, Miriam Evans, the widow of Wilfred J. Evans, was appointed Administratrix of his estate by the Probate Court of Knox County, Indiana, the place of his' and her domicile.
Cothren and Hunt, on October 10, 1947, as plaintiffs, brought this action in a State court of Arkansas against Miriam Evans, as administratrix of the estate of her husband, J. N. Mason, and Carl Brown, Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, deceased. Process was duly served upon all the defendants. The claim of Cothren was that the collision and his injuries were due to the negligence of Mason and Evans, and he asked for a judgment of $22,500. The claim of Hunt was that his truck was damaged to the extent of $2,500 by the negligence of Mason and Evans, and he prayed for judgment in that amount. The case was removed by the nonresident defendants to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The answer of Brown, as Public Administrator of the estate of Evans, was prepared by counsel for the plaintiffs and consisted of a general denial. Miriam Evans, as Administratrix, and J. N. Mason filed an answer denying that the collision was due to the negligence of Wilfred J. Evans and Mason, and asserting, by way of cross-claims, that the death of Evans and the injuries of Mason, due to the collision, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiffs. Mason asked for a judgment of $20,-000 against the plaintiffs, and M-iriam Evans, as Administratrix, asked for a judgment of $30,000 against them as damages for the alleged wrongful death of her husband.
The plaintiffs moved the District Court to remand the case on the ground that Carl Brown, as Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, was a citizen of Arkansas and a necessary party defendant, and that the case had therefore been improperly removed from the State court. The District Court remanded to the State court the claim of Hunt for $2,500 damages to his truck, but denied the plaintiffs’ motion otherwise. The case was tried to a jury upon the claim of Cothren and the separate cross-claims of the defendants Miriam Evans, as Administratrix, and J. N. Mason. The jury returned a verdict against Cothren on his claim, and verdict's against the defendants upon their respective cross-claims against Cothren. Judgment was entered on the verdicts.
Cothren has appealed from the judgment, asserting that the District Court erred in denying his motion to remand the case to the State court. He contends that Brown, the Sheriff of Randolph County, Arkansas, who was appointed Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans at the instance of Cothren’s counsel, was an indispensable party defendant and that the case was therefore not removable.
It is obvious that Brown, as Public Administrator of the Estate of Wilfred J. Evans, had “no real substantial legal interest in the controversy.” Ex parte State of Nebraska, 209 U.S. 436, 445, 28 S.Ct. 581, 584, 52 L.Ed. 876. He was in no way connected with the controversy between Cothren and Mason and had no actual interest in the controversy between Cothren and Miriam Evans as the domiciliary representative of the estate of her husband. The controversies were in reality between citizens of different states, and the removal of the case could not be prevented by making Brown a party defendant. See 'and compare, Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185, 186, 27 S.Ct. 184, 51 L.Ed. 430, 9 Ann.Cas. 757; Ex parte State of Nebraska, supra, 209 U. S. 436, 445, 28 S.Ct. 581, 52 L.Ed. 876; Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers’ Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 189, 190, 44 S.Ct. 266, 68 L.Ed. 628, 31 A.L.R. 867.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1