What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL NO. 18, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The DAYTON POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 73-1905.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 15, 1974.
Decided July 18, 1974.
Jeffrey A. Belkin, Belkin & Belkin, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. R. Newlin, Dayton, Ohio, on brief, for defendant-appellee.
Before PECK and ENGEL, Circuit Judges, and CONTIE , District Judge.
Honorable Leroy J. Contie, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant union instituted this action against the Dayton Power & Light Company (hereinafter “Dayton”), seeking to compel Dayton to submit a grievance to binding arbitration. The grievance involved appellant’s allegation that Dayton had violated the terms of a “Memorandum of Understanding” between Dayton and local construction unions. This matter is before us on appeal from the district court’s denial of appellant’s motion for summary judgment and subsequent entry of an order of dismissal under Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.
Dayton is one of three public utilities which own the J. M. Stuart Electric Generating Station on the Ohio River. Pursuant to agreements among the owners, Dayton has acted for the other two companies in connection with the construction of Stuart Station. The owners further delegated their authority by appointing the Maxon Construction Company as their agent and construction manager on the project. Maxon, in its capacity as agent, executed a “Memorandum of Understanding” with the South Central Ohio Building and Construction Trades Council, of which appellant union is a constituent member. The agreement, which covers all construction work at the project site, provides that in return for certain pay rate concessions the building trade unions will not strike. Dispute settlement is governed by the final clause of the agreement which in pertinent part.reads as follows: “It is agreed that any grievance between local union(s) and contractor(s) shall be settled in accordance with the grievance machinery provided in the craft agreement (s) or, if none is so provided, by arbitration.” It was Dayton’s refusal to process a grievance filed thereunder that led to the filing of this action. On appeal, appellant urges this Court to reverse the decision of the district court and to order that appellant’s grievance be submitted immediately to binding arbitration. For the reasons appearing hereinafter, we decline to so hold.
The sole issue here presented is whether or not the Memorandum obligated Dayton to arbitrate any dispute with the South Central Ohio Building and Construction Trades Council or any of its members. Of course, “[n]o obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation of law. The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration only if he has contracted to do so.” Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 94 S.Ct. 629, 635, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974). The question of whether a party has contracted to arbitrate is a matter for the courts to decide on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962). In the instant case, although clearly a party to the Memorandum, Dayton was a party to it as an owner, not as a contractor. Dayton employed no craft union members at Stuart Station or otherwise and it had no labor-management contract with the appellant. As the district court pointed out, the dispute involved herein is “between Dayton and a labor union — between the owner and the union, as distinguished between [sic] the contractor and a union.” The arbitration clause does not constitute an agreement between the owner and the building trade unions working at Stuart Station to arbitrate disputes arising between these parties.
It thus appearing that the unambiguous language of the “Memorandum of Understanding” militates against the position asserted by appellant, we hold that the district court’s order dismissing the complaint was correctly entered, and the judgment in favor of Dayton is, therefore, affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0