What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LA FEVER, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALL-STAR INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. LA FEVER, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 76-2310.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 28, 1978.
Maurice Rosen, No. Miami Beach, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.
George J. Baya, Miami, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Before TUTTLE, COLEMAN , and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Judge Coleman did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d), the case is decided by a quorum of the court.
CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge:
La Fever, Inc., appeals from an order denying its motion for a new trial based on the recanting affidavit of a witness. At an evidentiary hearing before the district judge who also presided over the original jury trial, the witness reaffirmed his trial testimony. The district court found that the witness had undoubtedly committed perjury. However, the court also found that the witness was wholly unworthy of belief as to any testimony or affidavit given, and therefore it could not determine which of the witness’ versions of the facts was perjurious.
La Fever challenges the legal standard applied by the district court in making these findings. It urges that when a material witness recants, a trial court has no further discretion and a new trial must be granted, citing Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527, 48 S.Ct. 20, 72 L.Ed. 408 (1927), which states that in a criminal action the court has a duty to grant a new trial where a government witness admits on oath that he gave perjured or mistaken testimony as to a material issue. The problem for appellant’s argument here is similar to that faced by the appellant Martin in his appeal. The assertion of perjury was not proven. Martin was refused new trial relief because that court was unable to find, just as the trial judge was here, that the recanting affidavit was true.
Decisions subsequent to Martin have spoken to the legal standard for determining whether perjury has been committed. Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928), citing Martin, set out this three-part approach to new trial requests: [A] new trial should be granted when,
(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false.
(b) That without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion.
(c) That the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial, (emphasis in original)
Our circuit referred to Larrison as setting “well defined standards” in Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1956). Does then the Larrison requirement that the court be “reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false” require us in this civil case to apply some standard of review which differs from the clearly erroneous testing we would normally give to fact findings of the trial court? No is the answer, for two reasons.
First, this circuit has never applied any part of the Larrison standards to review of a new trial ruling in a civil case. English v. Mattson, 214 F.2d 406, (5th Cir. 1954), reviewed the denial of a new trial in a double recantation setting almost identical to that present in the case at bar. There we stated:
It has been uniformly held that according to Rule 59 of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., a motion for new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be disturbed except for a clear abuse of that discretion. Such a motion grounded upon newly discovered evidence will not be granted unless (1) the facts discovered are of such a nature that they would probably change the outcome; (2) the facts alleged are actually newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier by proper diligence; and (3) the facts are not merely cumulative or impeaching.
214 F.2d at 409.
In Fulenwider v. Wheeler, 262 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1959), a civil case involving a motion for a new trial based on the affidavit of a recanting witness, we stated:
it is in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion for the trial judge and not the appellate judges to say whether the case is one for-setting aside the verdict, and the district judge should not set aside a verdict on such a motion unless it appears to him that the tendered evidence is of such a nature that if offered on a new trial, it would probably change the outcome.
Second, any distinction in the standards is immaterial to resolution of the instant appeal. This is clearly established in United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 562 (1946). There the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit for overturning a trial judge’s finding that perjury did not exist in denying a new trial in a criminal case. The Court explicitly pretermitted a determination of whether the Larrison standard or the civil case new trial standard should have been the guide. More importantly, Johnson was emphatic in stating that an appellate court could not intervene to reverse a trial court’s findings of fact unless it should “clearly appear that the findings are not supported by any evidence.” 327 U.S. at 112, 66 S.Ct. at 466. See also United States v. Mackin, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 65, 561 F.2d 958 (1977).
The record establishes that the trial court’s findings here are not clearly erroneous. Perjury was not proven. The judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
. English, in turn, relies on Glade v. Allied Electric Products, Inc., 135 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1943), a case decided by the Seventh Circuit subsequent to Larrison, which upholds the denial of a bill of review in a civil action without citing its criminal case precedent in Larrison.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99