What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
J. Morton ROSENBLUM, Trustee, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Appellees.
No. 5899.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
April 4, 1962.
Frederic T. Greenhalge, Pittsfield, N. H., with whom Booth, Wadleigh, Langdell, Starr & Peters, Manchester, N. H., was on brief, for appellant.
John J. Gobel, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Joseph Kovner, Attorneys, Department of Justice, and William H. Craig, U. S. Atty., were on brief, for United States of America, appellee.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
WOODBURY, Chief Judge.
A trustee in bankruptcy has taken this appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denying his petition for leave to intervene in an action brought by the United States under § 6332(b) of Title 26 U.S.C. to impose personal liability upon four debtors of the bankrupt for their failure to honor federal tax levies duly served upon them prior to bankruptcy.
At the outset we are confronted with the question of our appellate jurisdiction, for not every order denying leave .to intervene is appealable. Mr. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 331 U.S. 519, 524, 525, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947), spelled out the applicable rule of appealability in detail. Summarizing his discussion he wrote:
"Our jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order denying intervention thus depends upon the nature of the applicant’s right to intervene. If the right is absolute, the order is appealable and we may judge it on its merits. But if the matter is one within the discretion of the trial court and if there is no abuse of discretion, the order is not appealable and we lack power to review it. In other words, our jurisdiction is identified by the necessary incidents of the right to intervene in each particular instance. We must therefore determine the question of our jurisdiction in this case by examining the character of the Brotherhood’s right to intervene in the proceeding brought under § 16(12) of the Interstate Commerce Act.”
This rule was followed in Sutphen Estates, Inc., v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 20, 72 S.Ct. 14, 96 L.Ed. 19 (1951). But see Cameron v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993, 997 (C.A. 1, 1946).
To determine our jurisdiction over this appeal we therefore turn to consideration of the “nature” or “character” of the trustee’s right to intervene to see whether he has an absolute right or is only privileged to intervene in the discretion of the court below.
The trustee does not invoke the provisions of subsection (b) of Rule 24, Fed.R. Civ.P., 28 U.S.C., dealing with permissive intervention his only claim is of an absolute right to intervene under subsection (a) (3) of the above Rule quoted in the margin. Conceding, as he must, that the statutory lien of the United States for taxes can be asserted against intangible personal property such as debts, see United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 121 (C.A. 4, 1955), and cases cited, he rests his assertion of an absolute right to intervene on the proposition that the Notices of Levy (Form 668-A) served by the United States on the four debtors of the bankrupt pursuant to § 6331 of Title 26 U.S.C., did not reduce the government’s claims against them to “possession” within the meaning of § 67, sub. c of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 107, sub. c quoted in material part in the margin below. Wherefore, the trustee says, the bankrupt’s claims against the four debtors came into his possession as an officer of the bankruptcy court and that if the United States should prevail in its action and recover the claims he will be adversely affected in his official capacity because it will be impossible for him to distribute the proceeds of the claims in accordance with statutory priorities.
The decisive issue is a narrow one. It is whether the government, by simply serving the notices of levy authorized by § 6331 of Title 26 U.S.C. upon debtors of a bankrupt, reduces its claims against the debtors to “possession” thereby preventing the trustee in bankruptcy from subordinating the government’s claims against the debtors to the payment of the expenses of administering the bankrupt's estate and claims against the bankrupt for wages.
The trustee, in support of his contention that mere notice of levy is not enough but that in addition thereto a “warrant of distraint” must also be served upon a debtor in order to reduce the government’s claim against the debt- or to “possession,” relies primarily upon two cases decided under § 3692 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C. § 3692, United States v. O’Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (C.A. 6, 1947), and Givan v. Cripe, 187 F.2d 225 (C.A.7, 1951). These cases, however, do not stand unquestioned. The late Chief Judge Parker, writing for his court in United States v. Eiland, supra at 121, disagreed with the O’Dell and Givan cases relied upon, by the trustee and in a carefully reasoned opinion held that it was not necessary to serve a “warrant of distraint” upon a debtor in order to reduce the government’s claim to “possession;” that under the 1939 Code notice of levy alone was enough to accomplish that end. Moreover, all of these cases were decided under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and split upon the meaning to be given to a specific reference to a “warrant” in its § 3692 which we quote in material part in the margin, whereas in the comparable provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, with which we are here concerned, there is no reference whatever to a “warrant.” Indeed, § 6331 ■(b) of the current code specifically provides under the subtitle “Seizure and sale ■of property” that: “The term ‘levy’ as ■used in this title includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means.”
It seems clear to us that in the 1954 Code Congress resolved the problem under the 1939 Code which split the courts in the cases relied upon by the trustee ■and the court in the Eiland case. In .short we agree with the rationale of Judge Foley in the recent case of United States v. Manufacturers National Bank, 198 F.Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y.1961), the only case in point under the 1954 Code that we have found, and with his conclusion that the omission of any mention in § ■6331 of the present code, or in the regulations, of any form of warrant establishes that the effectiveness of federal tax liens does not depend upon service of a warrant of distraint, Our conclusion therefore is that the “nature” or “character” of the trustee’s claim is such that he does not have an absolute right to intervene.
On the authority of Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, cited at the beginning of this opinion:
An order will be entered dismissing the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
. Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: “ * * * (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof.”
. “Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title, and except where the estate of the bankrupt is solvent: * * * statutory liens, including liens for taxes or debts owing to the United States * * *, on personal property not accompanied by possession of such property, * * * shall be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of section 104 of this title * * *.”
. “In case of neglect or refusal under section 3690, the collector may levy, or by warrant may authorize a deputy collector to levy upon all property and rights to property, * * (Italics added.)

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0