What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WOODWARD IRON CO. v. MINYARD.
No. 12425.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 12, 1948.
B. J. Dryer, of Birmingham, Ala., for appellant.
D. G. Ewing, of Birmingham, Ala., and-W. E. Brobston, of Bessemer, Ala., for appellee.
Before McCORD, and LEE, Circuit-Judges, and1 MIZE, District Judge.
McCORD, Circuit Judge.
A. F. Minyard sued Woodward Iron Company, a corporation, claiming damages because of an alleged failure to furnish him,, while employed .by defendant, with a safe place in which to work; it was charged, that as a proximate consequence plaintiff developed a dust disease of the lungs known as silicosis. By amendment at the trial, the complaint consisted of only one-count, which claimed damages for aggravation or acceleration of the disease during, the period from December 10, 1945, to September 13, 1946.
The defendant, in answer offered in defense of the action (1) the general issue; (2) contributory negligence; (3) assumption of risk; (4) statute of limitations of one year; and (5) that plaintiff’s injury was an occupational disease for which no recovery could he allowed.
By consent of the parties, the case was tried before the court without a jury.
The evidence discloses that plaintiff, a man approximately fifty-three years of age, began working for the defendant in the year 1923, and had served defendant continuously until he was forced to leave because of poor health on September 13, 1946. Defendant has been engaged in the operation of ore mines and related activities for more than twenty-six years. While in the service of defendant, plaintiff worked at practically all types of. mining jobs. Throughout the years of his employment, in the discharge of his various mining duties, plaintiff was forced to breathe much dust. In the year 1943, he commenced to suffer from dyspnea as he went about his work. At first he ignored this symptom, and held to his work at the mine. However, as time passed his suffering increased and he developed a cough which caused him to expel from his lungs red ore dust, and later much purulent material. The dyspnea and cough became progressively worse, and finally so severe that he was forced to report to defendant’s physician for examination and treatment. Upon examination, plaintiff was referred by defendant’s doctor to two other doctors, specialists in radiology, to have his chest X-rayed. Their examination disclosed that plaintiff then had silicosis, nodular type, a dust diseasé of the lungs. Plaintiff was afterwards advised by defendant’s doctor to remain in the open air for a period of approximately six weeks, and that after that period he might be able to re-enter the mines and work with safety to his health. Defendant .thereupon removed plaintiff from the mines and placed him on light work around the furnaces above ground. After three months of this type work, during which time his suffering had somewhat abated and his health had improved, plaintiff was notified by defendant that he might remain in his new place, but that his salary would be reduced accordingly. When informed of this, plaintiff threatened to leave the service of defendant, but was told that his services were needed in another mine. The evidence further shows that plaintiff thereafter remained in the employ of defendant working in its Pyne Mine, as he was told to do, and that he there necessarily exposed himself to a dust hazard equally as bad, if not worse, than the one he had previously been forced to leave. His new mining duties in the Pyne Mine involved mining for red iron ore, containing a large percentage of silica. Because of blasting and drilling activities in the mine, large amounts of silica dust were precipitated into the atmosphere where plaintiff and other miners worked. As a result, during the last ten months of his employment with defendant in the Pyne Mine, plaintiff’s dyspnea increased, his cough became.much worse, and his health failed. His condition interfered to a marked degree with his rest at night. He lost his appetite, and frequently became nauseated, at work during the day. His weight decreased from one hundred and thirty-five pounds to one hundred and twenty-two pounds. His cough and dyspnea eventually became so incapacitating that he was forced to leave his job on September 13, 1946, after he had held on as long as his progressive malady would permit.
It was shown that blasts were set off in the Pyne Mine at the end of each working shift which forced clouds of silica dust into the recesses of the mine where plaintiff and others worked; that the ventilation in the mine was wholly inadequate to remove the dust following the explosions; that the only means provided by defendant for allaying the dust was a water hose with inadequate pressure and no nozzle provided,, so that the miners were required to compress the water at the end of the hose with their hands in order to obtain any spray. Plaintiff was not provided with a respirator, and was not informed that defendant would provide respirators for its miners at their request. It was further shown that certain methods and processes for reducing and controlling the effect of the harmful concentrations of silica dust in its mines were available to defendant at all times from November 24, 1945, to September 13, 1946; that such measures, though entailing additional expense, were practical and effective, and included the employment of wetting agents, the use of a water curtain, misting processes, more adequate ventilation, periodic medical examinations of miners exposed, and an increase in the interval between working shifts after the explosions were set off. Defendant reserved to its policy making board, and did not delegate to agents, the decision as to the means and methods to be employed in maintaining safety and health precautions within its mines, and it was shown that no ■ effective dust control measures were ever instituted by that body.
The trial court found that the Pyne Mine where plaintiff last worked for defendant contained harmful silica dust of pathogenic quantity and size; that plaintiff was exposed to this silica dust and inhaled it without adequate protection therefrom; that his silicotic condition was aggravated thereby, and that approximately one-third of his present sixty per-cent permanent disability is the result of his inhaling silica dust during the period for which recovery is sought. In a well considered opinion, the court thereupon gave judgment for the plaintiff and assessed his damages at $10,000.
We are of opinion the evidence fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that defendant, by failing to adopt effective methods designed to eliminate the harmful concentrations of silica dust in its mines, thereby breached its duty to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work. Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co., 234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530; Hardy v. City of Dothan, 234 Ala. 664, 665, 176 So. 449.
Plaintiff, by merely performing the duties assigned him by defendant, was not guilty of contributory negligence, nor did he assume the risk of a constant dust hazard resulting from the negligence of defendant during the term of his employment. Under the Alabama decisions, a servant does not assume the risk of his master’s own negligence. Alabama Great So. R. Co. v. Brooks, 135 Ala. 401, 33 So. 181; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Handley, 174 Ala. 593, 56 So. 539; Citizens Light, Heat & Power Co., v. Lee, 182 Ala. 561, 62 So. 199. Moreover, silicosis is not an occupational disease, because it does not result from the ordinary and generally known risks inherent and incident to employment in the mining industry. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183 So. 677; Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co., 234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530.
We further find no merit in appellant’s contention that this action is barred by the Alabama one year statute of limitations. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183 So. 677; Howell v. City of Dothan, 234 Ala. 158, 174 So. 624; Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Donaldson, 231 Ala. 242, 164 So. 97; Cf. Michalek v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 2 Cir., 76 F.2d 115.
There appearing no reversible error in the record, the judgment is accordingly
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0