What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DECOSS v. TURNER & BLANCHARD, Inc.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
November 15, 1926.)
No. 66.
1. Trial <§=>382 — -Trial judge, as trier of facts, must make firm decision on issues of fact, and cannot escape responsibility by statement that his mind is confused.
Trial judge, as trier of facts, must render firm decision on issues of fact raised by conflicting testimony, and cannot escape responsibility by mere statement that his mind is confused or unsettled.
2. Witnesses <@=>340(2) — Moral qualities must be considered in determining credibility of witnesses, and one witness having proper attributes outweighs any number not possessing such attributes.
Moral qualities must be considered in determining credibility of witnesses, and one witness having proper attributes of ability and credibility outweighs any number of witnesses not possessing such attributes.
3. Admiralty <®= i 17.
Appeal in admiralty is trial de novo, and appellate court may examine facts.
4. Master and servant'<@=>279(4).
Evidence held to show that injury sustained by stevedore while unloading ship was caused by negligence of fellow servant, precluding recovery.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.
Libel filed by Peter Deeoss against Turner & Blanchard, Inc., to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while in its service. Decree for respondent; libelant appeals.
Affirmed.
Milton A. Fischer, of New York City, for appellant.
E. C. Sherwood, of New York City (William L. O’Brion, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before HOUGH, MANTON, and MACK, Circuit Judges.
MANTON, Circuit Judge.
The appellant was employed by the appellee on a steamship at Pier 6, f'oot of Forty-Second street, Brooklyn. He was a member of a gang of stevedores who were unloading boxes and barrels through one of the hatchways to the dock. A net sling was used in lifting the barrels, and it was the duty of the appellant, with others, to take the barrels from their place of stowage in the hold of the vessel and prepare them for hoisting. .The claim upon which negligence is predicated is that pieces of wood —parts of broken boxes — had accumulated together with pieces of dunnage, and were on the floor of the hold in the clear space; that while tipping a barrel, which was being prepared for hoisting, the edge of the barrel struck a piece of wood, which flew up, striking him in the eye., and causing the loss of an eye. The barrels in question weighed about 700 pounds and were 3 feet high. Three men were engaged in moving each barrel. The appellant was using a hook, endeavr ofing to tip the barrel, when he says this accident occurred. In support of this claim, he called four men of his gang. The appellee produced one disinterested witness, who testified that one of the men engaged in moving the barrel was using a hand hook, and that it slipped, striking the appellant in the eye, causing the injury. The District Judge rendered an opinion, stating:
. “The trial resolved itself into a question of veracity. "* * “ There is no middle ground. Either one side or the other was telling the truth. In other words, the testimony is evenly balanced as to this determining point. * * * Either the watchman was telling the truth, or these companions of libelant’s were. The watchman’s story was neither improbable nor unlikely, nor can I see that anything in the way of motive existed. Nor was the story of the stevedores necessarily improbable or unlikely, although, if the watchman’s story is true, considerable motive may have existed in the mind of at least the companion of libelant, who unfortunately then had caused the injury.
“However, bearing in mind the burden resting on libelant, to prove by a fair preponderance of evidence, how the accident happened, the cause, as well as the effect, I am unable on this record to determine the cause. One story is as likely as the other. One witness’ statement is absolutely contradictory of the other. There is nothing in the record by which I can measure the respective credibility of the witnesses. I am therefore unable to determine by a fair preponderance of evidence what caused the accident.”
Thereupon, he said, “It is necessary for me to dismiss the complaint.”
The learned District Judge was called upon to decide where the truth was in this controversy. He had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing them testify and through the process of cross-examination learning their interest and thus he had full opportunity of reaching a determination on the issue of fact presented. Such is the daily task of a trial judge where issues of fact axe presented. It will not do to escape the responsibility by a mere statement that the mind of the trier of facts is confused or unsettled as to the controversy. Either the libelant made out his claim or failed to do so, and a firm decision on this issue of facts should have been rendered. It was not a difficult task.
Within a courtroom, as without, many elements enter into the test of credibility of a witness. They have often been repeated in the cases. No measure need ordinarily be made because of quantity. It is the moral qualities which constitute credibility. One witness, having the proper attributes of ability and credibility, who exemplifies such as he testifies, outweighs any indefinite number of witnesses, who do not possess the same attributes, or might possess other attributes. When evidence is weighed to determine what is the fact proven thereby, the qualities going to make up the integrity of the witness are never bolstered up by numbers. The number of witnesses are ordinarily not to be counted by a jury or trial judge, in order to determine upon which side there is a preponderance. The evidence given by them is to be weighed by the familiar tests by which men determine the truthfulness of statements of other men in everyday life.
This being an appeal in admiralty, and therefore a trial de novo, we may and do examine the facts. Mr. Brasier, called by the appellee, was employed by the steamship line. He was a disinterested witness, and his testimony, when read, is most convincing. He showed no bias or motive to deceive. It was his duty to watch the men and guard against theft. His testimony is clear that the appellant’s injury was caused by a hook slipping and striking him in the eye. Without bias or motive, with a frankness to be commended, there was nothing to indicate why he should wrong an unfortunate workman who has sustained such an injury. On the other hand, the testimony given by the appellant’s fellow workmen contains many doubts and inconsistencies. It should not be accepted as establishing the claim that a piece of wood caused the injury.
The decree is affirmed, with costs.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1