What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. Patrick F. IZZI, d/b/a Pat Izzi Trucking Co., Respondent.
No. 6459.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Submitted March 30, 1965.
Decided April 12, 1965.
Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Stephen B. Goldberg and Michael N. Sohn, Washington, D. C., Attys., N. L. R. B., on brief for petitioner.
Sidney A. Coven, Gordon & Leiter, Boston, Mass., and Richard C. Levin, Fall River, Mass., on brief for respondent.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, and MARIS and BURGER* Circuit Judges.
By designation.
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.
This is a petition for enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board. The Board moves for summary judgment on the ground that there is no question open. Respondent’s opposition is based upon the claim that his failure to file due and proper exceptions to the decision of the Examiner was due to ignorance and inexperience of counsel. The Board, following the receipt of late exceptions, and a lengthy explanation, has denied a motion for reconsideration and now presses for judgment.
A brief statement of the facts is in order. Respondent employer was found guilty of various unfair labor practices of a routine sort. Prior to the Examiner’s decision his counsel withdrew and respondent employed new counsel. With the Examiner’s report respondent was furnished a copy of the Board’s rules specifying how he was to prepare and to prosecute his exceptions. In response to request the Board granted a three-weeks extension of time. General, blanket exceptions were filed within the extension period. These manifestly did not comply with the rules. The exceptions were stricken; respondent was notified, and on its own motion the Board granted a further extension. A second set of exceptions was thereafter filed, but in no substantial way any better than the first. These were also stricken and the Board then reviewed the Examiner’s report, made its decision and prepared an order. At this stage new counsel was retained by respondent, who has since rigorously taken various steps in an attempt to retrieve the situation, including a proffer of exceptions in proper form. These the Board refused.
The Board’s denial of the motion for reconsideration stated it to be “as lacking in merit.” Since the motion argued both the reason for untimeliness and the validity of the proposed exceptions on the merits we asked for clarification of this phrase, and a brief. The Board now states its position to be that the respondent’s excuses lack merit.
Section 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), providing that no matter may be reviewed that was not presented to the Board by way of exceptions is strictly construed. National Labor Relations Board v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 1961, 368 U.S. 318, 82 S.Ct. 344, 7 L.Ed.2d 312. Without deciding how kindly the Board was obliged to treat the respondent, NLRB v. Central Mercedita, Inc., 1 Cir., 1959, 273 F.2d 370; NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp., 3 Cir., 1963, 320 F.2d 641, certainly it was not required to do more than it did. Kiekhaefer Corp. v. NLRB, 7 Cir., 1960, 273 F.2d 314, cert. den. 362 U.S. 950, 80 S.Ct. 861, 4 L.Ed.2d 868; NLRB v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 5 Cir., 1962, 310 F.2d 565. There would be no end of Board matters if such patent disregard of the rules must be forgiven as matter of law simply because the respondent had been so ill advised as to retain inexperienced counsel. We hesitate to think where such a principle would lead to. We can recognize no basis for making the finality of the decision dependent upon a substantive review of competence of counsel, the more particularly when one warning has already been given. Respondent’s protestations that this particular case should be revived in the interests of justice, with considerable, entirely uncalled-for, acerbity directed towards the Board, overlooks how justice in the large would suffer Were laxness of this sort excusable as matter of law.
Nor, we might observe, will justice for individual litigants having good excuses be further generally if the Board must anticipate that, as respondent seeks to do here, every grant of grace in a particular case will put it on the defensive whenever some new applicant for grace is disappointed.
A decree will be entered enforcing the order of the Board.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0