What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Anthony IBANEZ, Nelson Vargas, Felix Mejia-Castillo, Jose Matista, and Angela Matista, Defendants, Felix Mejia-Castillo, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 260, Docket 90-1246.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Nov. 7, 1990.
Decided Jan. 15, 1991.
Gerald J. McMahon, New York City, for defendant-appellant.
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City (Otto G. Obermaier, U.S. Atty., S.D.N.Y., Helen Gredd, Asst. U.S. Atty., New York City, of counsel), for ap-pellee.
Before LUMBARD, KEARSE and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.
McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-appellant Felix Mejia-Castillo appeals, following a jury trial, from a criminal sentence imposed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (David N. Edelstein, Judge). Mejia-Castillo makes two arguments: (1) that the district court wrongly denied him a two-point reduction for his acceptance of responsibility under the federal Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) that the district court miscalculated his Criminal History Category under the Guidelines. The district court rejected both objections. Because we agree with the district court, we affirm the sentence.
BACKGROUND
Defendant-appellant Felix Mejia-Castillo was arrested in May 1988, together with three others, and charged with conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute, and possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 812, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). One codefendant pled guilty before trial and the other two fled one day before the jury rendered a verdict.
At one point, the government dismissed the substantive possession counts and proceeded to trial on the conspiracy charges. On December 20, 1989 the jury returned a verdict against all defendants. Mejia-Castillo was remanded immediately.
In preparing the presentence investigation report (the “PSI”), the probation officer calculated a base offense level of 34, which did not include a two-point credit for acceptance of responsibility. The Probation Department also assigned a Criminal History Category of II because, according to its records, Mejia-Castillo committed his federal offense while on probation from a prior New York State conviction. The final guideline calculation, therefore, yielded a range of 168 to 210 months.
Prior to sentencing, Mejia-Castillo filed written objections to the PSI, largely challenging factual inaccuracies. Appellant did, however, file one objection aimed directly at the guideline calculation, namely, that he should have been placed in Criminal History Category I and subjected to the resulting lesser range. At sentencing, Mejia-Castillo raised the additional objection that the Probation Department erroneously denied him a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
After hearing argument, the district court denied the objections and sentenced appellant in the middle of the range, imposing a 189-month term of imprisonment. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Acceptance of Responsibility
Appellant maintains that, unlike his code-fendants, he did not jump bail (despite his alien status) or commit or assist in committing outright perjury during the course of trial. Such meritorious conduct, in the eyes of the appellant, demonstrates responsible behavior and deserves a reduction in the guideline calculation. The district court nonetheless declined any reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant may earn a two-point reduction if he “clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Because “[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” the trial court’s decision appropriately receives great deference on appellate review. Id. at Application Note 5; see United States v. Ramirez, 910 F.2d 1069, 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 531, 112 L.Ed.2d 542 (1990); United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 828 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Rios, 893 F.2d 479, 481 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Moskowitz, 883 F.2d 1142, 1155 (2d Cir.1989) (district court’s denial of acceptance reduction upheld, noting sentencing court’s “understandable skepticism” of defendant’s sincerity in his narrowly tailored acceptance); see also United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir.1990) (per curiam) (“Other cases from our circuit that have affirmed the denial of the acceptance of responsibility credit_ rested on deference to the sentencing judge’s credibility determination that the defendant had not accepted responsibility for the crimes of which he had been convicted.") (emphasis in original).
Turning to the record in this case, the district court committed no error in not awarding a two-point credit for acceptance of responsibility. Evaluating appellant’s purported acceptance, the court noted that “it still means that there is no assumption of responsibility.” The record is devoid of any affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for the crimes committed, as contemplated by the Guidelines. Oliveras, 905 F.2d at 632. Abstaining from the commission of a crime or from impropriety is certainly not evidence of acceptance of responsibility.
Indeed, it came out during sentencing that Mejia-Castillo, when interviewed by the probation officer after trial, refused even to discuss the case, insisting that he had nothing to do with the crime. While exercising the constitutional right to trial does not, of course, preclude receiving an acceptance reduction, Tillem, 906 F.2d at 828, this court has upheld a district court’s denial of the reduction even where a defendant makes a plea on the eve of trial but later shows a lack of contrition. Rios, 893 F.2d at 480-81.
II. Criminal History
A separate numerical calculation, wholly distinct from the offense level calculation, determines criminal history category. If a defendant has only one prior conviction, for which he received a sentence of probation, then he receives one point toward his criminal history and falls within Category I. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(c). If, however, the defendant commits another offense while still on probation from the prior conviction, an additional two points are added (for a total of three points), placing that defendant in Criminal History Category II for purposes of computing the Sentencing Guideline range for the second offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d); United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Dyke, 901 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990); United States v. Rich, 900 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 408 n. 3 (2d Cir.1989).
Appellant’s adjusted guideline range was properly calculated at 34. For defendants who fall within Criminal History Category I, the applicable range would be 151 to 188 months; for those falling within Criminal History Category II, the applicable range is 168 to 210 months. Before sentencing, Mejia-Castillo’s counsel objected in writing to the PSI’s finding that appellant committed the offense while on probation, stating “[djefendant advises ... that he was informed prior to his arrest on this case that his probation was terminated early.”
In a signed addendum to the PSI, the probation officer addressed the objection, responding:
This officer spoke directly with the defendant’s State Probation Officer, Sandra Brown, on two separate occasions. Mejia-Castillo was not terminated early from supervision as he states he was. This fact is also reflected on his NYSID sheet which gives his expiration date as the maximum, November 6, 1989.
When asked at sentencing whether he had anything to add, Mejia-Castillo himself stated: “Yes, I wasn’t on parole when they said I was on parole.” Apparently, Mejia-Castillo’s counsel had no lingering concern about the issue (in light of the Probation Department’s addendum) because when the prosecutor mentioned the violation of state probation, there was no argument from the defense. Indeed, at one point defense counsel implicitly conceded the point in arguing that the proper offense calculation was a level 32 (assuming an acceptance of responsibility reduction) with a resulting range of 135 to 168 months. That range corresponds to an adjusted offense level of 32 with a Criminal History Category of II.
Under the Guidelines, “[w]hen any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). The information then presented to the court need only have “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy” without regard to admissibility under the rules of evidence. Id.; see also Commentary to § 6A1.3; United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980).
Defendants are entitled to due process up to and through the imposition of sentence. United States v. Pugliese, 805 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1986) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067, 109 S.Ct. 1344, 103 L.Ed.2d 813 (1989). Disputed sentencing factors, however, need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence to satisfy due process. United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 127, 112 L.Ed.2d 95 (1990); United States v. Rivalta, 892 F.2d 223, 230 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1833, 108 L.Ed.2d 961 (1990); see McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2418-20, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (preponderance standard held to satisfy due process in state sentencing proceeding).
On appeal, the reviewing court must “accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 196, 112 L.Ed.2d 158 (1990); United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir.1990); see also United States v. Lanese, 890 F.2d 1284, 1291 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2207, 109 L.Ed.2d 533 (1990). We will not overturn the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts absent an abuse of discretion. Santiago, 906 F.2d at 871; Parker, 903 F.2d at 103; Shoulberg, 895 F.2d at 884. On this record we find no clear error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Mejia-Castillo was on probation at the time he committed his crime.
Recently, this court unequivocally confirmed that, although “the Guidelines reduce a sentencing court’s discretion in setting the sentence, this decreased discretion does not limit the procedure a district court may choose to follow in determining the facts affecting sentence.” United States v. Prescott, 920 F.2d 139, 143-44 (2d Cir.1990) (emphasis in original). The procedure followed in resolving disputed factors at sentencing rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 144; see United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d at 574 (sentencing court’s discretion largely unlimited either as to kind or source of information it may consider). Accordingly, the sentencing court is under no duty to conduct a “full-blown” evidentiary hearing every time a defendant contests a fact in a presentence report. Prescott, 920 F.2d at 144. Indeed, “[t]his is not the sort of situation where all a defendant need do is knock on the hearing room door, and it will automatically open to him.” United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1102 (2d Cir.1990). The commentaries to section 6A1.3 state that, in many circumstances, the written statements of counsel or affidavits of witnesses are themselves sufficient to resolve the dispute.
In sentencing Mejia-Castillo, the district court relied upon the signed PSI addendum documenting firsthand discussions with the state probation officer and review of the state rap sheet. Both confirmed that Mejia-Castillo was indeed on probation at the time of his offense. In addition, the district court was entitled to consider the failure of Mejia-Castillo or his counsel to support the bald, unsubstantiated statement that defendant was not on probation at the time of his offense, despite their clear opportunity to do so. United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177,182 (2d Cir.1990) (Consideration of relevant evidence is “not thought to offend due process, provided a defendant was given an opportunity to contest the accuracy of that information.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Romano, 825 F.2d 725, 728-30 (2d Cir.1987).
On a review of the record, it cannot be said that the district court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion, or that the procedure followed resulted in a deprivation of due process.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby affirmed.
. We note in passing that if the district court had sentenced appellant somewhere within the twenty-month overlap, his dispute regarding any alleged criminal history miscalculation would not have been appealable because appellant would be unable to demonstrate any prejudice. Thus, if the sentence had been 188 months, instead of 189 months, no appeal would lie. United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925, 934-35 (2d Cir.1988); see United States v. Rich, 900 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 688-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 199, 107 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0