What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
W. Van Meter ALFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY Company, Defendant-Appellant (two cases). W. Van Meter ALFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 75-1019, 75-1020.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued June 3, 1975.
Decided Oct. 6, 1975.
William H. McCann, Brown, Sledd & McCann, Lexington, Ky., for Continental Cas. Co.
R. J. Turley, Turley, Savage & Moore, Lexington, Ky., for W. Van Meter Alford.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and WEICK and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.
In May 1972, William Van Meter Alford underwent surgery for the removal of a small tumor in the lacrimal gland near his left eye. The operation was performed skillfully by a competent surgeon, and there is no allegation of medical negligence. Two days later the bandages were removed, and it was discovered that Mr. Alford had lost sight in his left eye. The surgeon was surprised at this unfortunate and unusual development, and none of the physicians involved in the case was able to explain definitely the cause of Mr. Alford’s partial blindness. The medical testimony indicated that the loss of vision probably resulted from a temporary occlusion or spasm of the central retinal artery, but the cause of the occlusion is unknown. The physicians saw no causal relationship between the presence of the tumor and the occlusion, but they guessed that Mr. Alford would not have lost vision in his left eye if the operation had not been performed.
At the time of the surgery, Mr. Alford was insured under an accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty Company. The policy provided that the insured would receive $37,500 for the loss of sight in one eye resulting from “bodily injury caused by an accident.” Mr. Alford filed a timely claim under the policy, stating that his loss was the result of an accidental injury during surgery. After processing and investigating the claim, Continental concluded that Mr. Alford’s loss of vision was not the result of an accident within the meaning of the policy. Accordingly, Continental refused payment of the claim.
Subsequent negotiations were fruitless, and Mr. Alford eventually filed suit against Continental in Fayette Circuit Court, Fayette County, Kentucky, seeking recovery of the $37,500 allegedly due under the insurance contract. In addition, the complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages on the ground that Continental’s refusal to pay Mr. Alford’s claim was oppressive and in bad faith and therefore tortious. Continental removed the action to the District Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and the case came on for trial before the late District Judge Mac Swinford. At the close of the evidence, both parties moved for a directed verdict. Judge Swinford dismissed the tort claim and submitted the contract claim to the jury, which found in favor of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court entered judgment against Continental in the amount of' $37,500, plus interest and posts. Both parties have appealed to this court.
In Continental’s appeal, it argues that as a matter of Kentucky law plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to create a jury question on the issue of whether Mr. Alford’s loss of sight was accidental within the meaning of the insurance policy. The court’s denial of Continental’s motion for a directed verdict and its instructions to the jury on the meaning of the word “accident” were based largely on Donohue v. Washington National Insurance Co., 259 Ky. 611, 82 S.W.2d 780 (1935). In this case, the insured was stricken with a sharp pain in his hip while lifting a large can of oil. The pain caused him to fall on the afflicted hip, and the injury resulted in a substantial period of disability. The attending physician apparently was unable to identify with certainty the cause of the initial pain. The court held that the trial judge should have submitted to the jury the question of whether the insured’s injury was accidental. In the course of its opinion, the court discussed generally the law applicable to accident insurance policies:
An accident in its commonly accepted meaning and as used in insurance contracts is “an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation. An undesigned, sudden and unexpected event, * * * happening by chance or unexpectedly, taking place not according to the usual course of things.” “An event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected; chance, casualty or contingency.” Pack v. Prudential Casualty Co., 170 Ky. 47, 185 S.W. 496, 498, L.R.A.1916E, 952; Huffman v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 79, 234 S.W. 962, 964.
The words “accident,” “accidental” and “accidental means,” as used in insurance policies, have never acquired a technical meaning in law, and must be interpreted according to the usage of the average man and as they would be read and understood by him in the light of the prevailing rule that uncertainties and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured. Id. at 613, 619, 82 S.W.2d at 781, 784.
If this is an accurate statement of Kentucky law, Judge Swinford was surely correct in overruling Continental’s motion for a directed verdict and in submitting the contract claim to the jury. There was ample evidence to the effect that Mr. Alford’s loss of vision was an entirely unforeseen and unexpected result arising from an unknown ultimate cause. Under the Donohue definition, the evidence plainly warranted a finding by the jury that Mr. Alford’s loss was accidental.
Continental, however, argues that Donohue is factually distinguishable and that this case should be controlled by Salinger v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 178 Ky. 369, 198 S.W. 1163 (1917), which stated that “an injury is not produced by accidental means within the terms of an accident insurance policy where it is the direct though unexpected result of an ordinary act in which the insured intentionally engages.” Id. at 371, 198 S.W. at 1164. Continental believes that under Salinger plaintiff suffered no accident, since his blindness resulted from the surgery, which he underwent intentionally.
Although the issue is not free from doubt, we hold that the District Court properly applied the Donohue definition in the case at bar. It appears that the effect of the language from Salinger quoted above was called into question by the court’s later opinion in Donohue, in which the court concluded that:
[Salinger is not] rested on the theory that the insured was voluntarily and intentionally doing the thing claimed to have caused the injury, although that principle was referred to in [the opinion]. The opinion in [Salinger] was based on the theory that the injury resulted from disease 259 Ky. at 615, 82 S.W.2d at 782.
In the case at bar, of course, the evidence indicated that Mr. Alford’s loss of vision did not result from the disease in his lacrimal gland.
Furthermore, a number of subsequent cases have relied upon Donohue in defining the word “accident.” The Travelers v. Humming Bird Coal Co., 371 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky.1963); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Witt, 260 S.W.2d 641, 642-43 (Ky.1953); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Fagan, 292 Ky. 533, 536-37, 166 S.W.2d 1007, 1009 (1942). In these cases, the court essentially looked to the factors identified by Donohue in determining whether the injury involved was accidental. We eonclude that Donohue states general principles of Kentucky insurance law properly applicable to this case. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in denying Continental’s motion for a directed verdict on the contract claim.
In his appeal, Mr. Alford contends that the District Court should have submitted to the jury his tort claim for compensatory and punitive damages based on Continental’s refusal to make payment under the policy. Initially, we note our uncertainty that Kentucky recognizes a cause of action in tort for refusal to pay an insurance claim. See McNutt v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 369 F.Supp. 381, 385-86 (W.D.Ky.1973), aff’d 494 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1974); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Fyffe, 471 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1971); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d 685 (Ky.1966).
As we view the matter, however, this question of Kentucky law need not be resolved. Mr. Alford does not argue that he is entitled to recover in tort in the absence of bad faith or unreasonable conduct on the part of the insurer, and in this respect the proof was entirely inadequate. The record in this case demonstrates that Continental obtained several medical reports from the doctors who treated Mr. Alford. This information was examined by Continental’s claims adjusters and reviewed by the company’s medical staff. Mr. Alford’s claim was considered thoroughly by Continental employees in consultation with each other. In addition, it was by no means obvious that Mr. Alford’s loss of sight was accidental within the meaning of the insurance policy. There is simply no evidence that Continental’s refusal to make payment was motivated by other than a good-faith belief that Mr. Alford’s loss was not covered under the policy. Since there was no evidence of bad faith or unreasonable conduct, the District Court properly directed a verdict in favor of Continental on the tort issue,
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. No costs are taxed; each party will bear its own costs on appeal,

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0