What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William Addison WALKER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 25317.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 23, 1970.
John R. Foster, Del Rio, Tex., for appellant.
Ernest Morgan, Seagal V. Wheatley, U. S. Attys., Reese L. Harrison, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, for appellee.
Before BELL AND SIMPSON, Circuit Judges, and ROBERTS, District Judge.
SIMPSON, Circuit Judge:'
Walker was convicted below, after a jury trial, under a two-count indictment. The first count charged Walker with receiving, concealing and facilitating transportation and concealment of marijuana in violation of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 176a. The second count was brought under Title 26 U.S.C., Section 4755(a) (1). It charged that Walker imported marijuana without having registered or paid the tax required by Title 26, U.S.C., Sections 4751-4753, inclusive. The appellant was given a five-year sentence as to the first count and a three-year confinement sentence as to the second count, the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
Walker and three other persons, not involved in this appeal, entered the United States from Mexico in an automobile. At the Border Customs Station at the International Bridge in Eagle Pass, Texas, Walker was asked his citizenship and if he had anything to declare at Customs. The appellant stated that he had nothing to declare. A subsequent customs inspection revealed twelve plastic bags of marijuana weighing a total of ten pounds, eleven ounces.
Appellant took the stand and was quite candid about his marijuana activities. He admitted purchasing the marijuana in Mexico and importing it into the United States. Walker’s testimony on direct examination consisted of a fourteen page monologue extolling the virtues of marijuana and denouncing the federal laws against its importation. He testified that his intent in crossing the bridge with the marijuana was to test such laws.
On appeal, Walker raises the following issues: lack of effective counsel, insufficiency of the evidence, and the alleged unconstitutionality of Title 26, U.S.C., Sec. 4755(a) (1) and Title 21 U.S.C., Sec. 176a.
The main thrust of the appellant’s attack on his trial counsel's effectiveness is directed at counsel’s failure to object during the United States Attorney’s reference in closing argument to “detrimental narcotics” and “hippie people”. Often, the decision as to whether or not to object to particular statements made in closing argument is a matter of tactics. Since an objection may tend to emphasize a particular remark to an otherwise oblivious jury, the effect of objection may be more prejudicial than the original remarks of opposing counsel. Williams v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1965, 354 F.2d 698, 705, 706. We find that lack of effective counsel is not shown.
The appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of concealment or a finding that any marijuana was imported into the United States. As to the concealment contention, the evidence is abundant. A customs inspector testified that Walker, when asked if he had anything to declare, answered “Nothing”. Walker’s own testimony revealed that the marijuana was wrapped in his clothing and packed in a suitcase.
The importation question is likewise without merit. Appellant suggests that he was wrongfully convicted because the customs inspection prevented completion of the importation. A similar theory was rejected in Walden v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 698.
The appellant contends that the jury was erroneously instructed that it was entitled to presume importation from the fact Walker had possession of the marijuana. The trial judge paraphrased Title 21 U.S.C., See. 176a, which states in pertinent part:
“Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection, the defendant is shown to have or to have had the marijuana in his possession, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains his possession to the satisfaction of the jury.”
The appellant correctly contends that the above provision is unconstitutional in marijuana cases. Leary v. United States, supra, footnote 1. While such an instruction may be technical error in light of Leary, we find that in the instant case it was harmless. Harrington v. California, 1969, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284; Chapman v. California, 1967, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. Where the evidence clearly demonstrates that the defendant transported marijuana from Mexico to the United States and no reliance was placed upon the presumption, there is no prejudice. Waldon v. United States, supra. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of conviction rendered under Title 21, U.S.C., Sec. 176a.
Since concurrent sentences were imposed, this Court in its discretion declines to pass on the validity of the judgment of conviction under Title 26 U.S.C., Section 4755(a) (1). Benton v. Maryland, 1969, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
. No retroactivity issue is present because appellant’s direct appeal was pending pri- or to the disposition of Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57. See United States v. Scardino, 5 Cir. 1969, 414 F.2d 925.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0