What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James J. CANAVARI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. G. V. RICHARDSON, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 24314.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Dec. 19, 1969.
James J. Canavari, in pro. per.
Eugene Kramer, Herbert M. Schoenberg, Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Wm. Matthew Byrne, Jr., U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for ap-pellee.
Before BARNES, KOELSCH and KILKENNY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, a federal prisoner, takes this appeal from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. He urges that the time he spent “in custody” but on parole must count as time served on his three year sentence.
As explained by the trial judge who heard the petition:
“In essence, petitioner’s argument is that after revocation of parole and return to prison, he was entitled to have the time during which he was on parole credited against [his] sentence because while on parole he was in the constructive custody of the Attorney General.”
Such a legal' position is specifically contrary to congressional enactment. 18 U.S.C. § 4205:
“ * * * and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve.”
This court has rejected appellant’s contention in Chandler v. Johnson, 133 F.2d 139, 142 (9th Cir. 1943), and Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson, 216 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1954).
These cases not only reject appellant’s contention — they also uphold the constitutionality of the statutory release on parole procedure quoted above. It is only when congressional enactment transcends constitutional limitations, such as the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, enactment of ex post facto laws, and the like, that such statutes can be held unconstitutional.
We affirm what we said in Van Buskirk, supra:
“When appellant was conditionally released, he became subject to all the provisions of law relating to parole, one of which was that if he violated his parole he should again be taken into custody and the time spent on parole should not diminish the time he was originally sentenced to serve.” (p. 738)
Other courts, in an unbroken line of cases, have come to the same conclusion and have rejected appellant’s claim. We know of no cases to the contrary.
Appellant’s reliance on Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963), is misplaced. It held only that a prisoner on parole was in technical ‘custody’ for the purpose of filing a petition for ha-beas corpus. It did not consider appellant’s claim of unconstitutionality. As was said in O’Callahan v. Attorney General, 1 Cir., 351 F.2d 43 at 44 (1965):
“Petitioner accepted the parole ‘custody’ in the hope that it would discharge the balance of his prison sentence. Had he not violated the conditions it would have done so. The Constitution does not require that he have it both ways.”
Affirmed.
. First Circuit: O’Callahan v. Attorney General, 351 F.2d 43 at 44 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1017, 86 S.Ct. 632, 15 L.Ed.2d 531
Fourth Circuit: O’Neal v. Fleming, 201 F.2d 665 (1953)
Hall v. Welch, 185 F.2d 525 (1950)
Fifth Circuit: Clark v. Blackwell, 374 F.2d 952 (1967)
Van Horn v. Maguire, 328 F.2d 585 (1964)
Seventh Circuit: Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (1965)
Dolan v. Swope, 138 F.2d 301 (1943)
Eighth Circuit: Higgerson v. Attorney-General, 369 F.2d 398 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1026, 87 S.Ct. 1386, 18 L.Ed.2d 468
Vorhees v. Cox, 140 F.2d 132 (1944) Tenth Circuit: Postelwait v. Willingham, 365 F.2d 759 (1966)
Weathers v. Willingham, 356 F.2d 421 (1966)
Evans v. Hunter, 162 F.2d 800 (1947)
D.C. Circuit: Bates v. Rivers, 116 U.S. App.D.C. 306, 323 F.2d 311 (1963)

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1