What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HOGAN v. ZERBST, Warden.
No. 8947.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 9, 1939.
Harold C. Hogan, in pro. per.
Lawrence S. Camp, U. S. Atty., and Harvey H. Tisinger and J. Ellis Mundy, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.
Before FOSTER, HUTCHESON, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the prisoner to the custody of the warden of the Atlanta penitentiary. The material facts shown by the. record are these:
Appellant began serving a sentence of four years in a Federal jail on November 7, 1931. He was released on parole December 5, 1933. While on parole he was arrested in the state of Arkansas and charged with aiding four other men in a robbery. His participation in the robbery consisted in conveying the robbers away from the scene of the crime, after it had been committed, for which he received $200. On July 23, 1935, while the state charge was pending, a parole warrant was issued for his arrest and placed with the state sheriff as a detainer. The criminal proceedings in the state court dragged along but were finally terminated in favor of appellant by the entering of a nolle prosequi of the indictment. In th.e meantime he had been reporting regularly to the Federal probation officer and continued to do so after the termination of the state charge. Part of this time he was in jail under the state charge and part of the time he was enlarged on bail. After the termination of the state case the parole warrant was executed, appellant was rearrested on August 12, 1937, and is held to serve out the balance of his Federal sentence.
While awaiting trial under the state charge appellant was either actually or constructively in custody of the state court which had authority to detain him. The facts show reasonable ground for revoking his parole although he was not convicted under the state charge. The Parole Board had jurisdiction over appellant when the parole warrant was issued. Had he then absconded delay in his ultimate arrest would not have prevented revocation of his parole nor the service of the unexpired portion of his sentence. Though appellant was not serving a sentence, the pending criminal proceedings in the state court had the effect of preventing the exercise of jurisdiction by the Parole Board. We find no legal grounds for interfering with the discretion of the Parole Board in this case. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247; Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 58 S.Ct. 872, 82 L.Ed. 1399, 116 A.L.R. 808.
The record presents no reversible error.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1