What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William Allen HOUGH et al., Appellees, v. Dr. Robert SEAMAN et al., Appellants.
Nos. 73-1996, 73-1997.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 9, 1974.
Decided March 19, 1974.
Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., of N. C. (Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., of N. C., and Andrew A. Vanore,.Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellants in No. 73-1996.
David B. Sentelle, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Keith S. Snyder, U. S. Atty., on brief), for appellants in No. 73-1997.
George S. Daly, Jr., Charlotte, N. C., for appellees in Nos. 73-1996 and 73-1997.
Before CRAVEN, RUSSELL and FIELD, Circuit Judges.
DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:
This case represents a challenge by Air Force reservists to the anti-wig regulation of the Air Force, as applied to their use of hair wigs at their week-end drills “so long as the wigs, per se, conform to Air Force specifications.”
The regulation, attacked by the plaintiffs, provides:
“Wigs. Wigs or hair pieces will not be worn while on duty or in uniform except for cosmetic reasons to cover natural baldness or physical disfiguration. If under these conditions, a wig or hair piece is worn, it will conform to Air Force specifications.”
We recognize that the military has wide discretion in regulating the conduct of its personnel, including their personal appearance and grooming, and that, in enlisting in the military, whether on a full time or reserve basis, the soldier voluntarily assumes the obligation to conform to military regulations, even regulations which to some extent may by reason of military exigencies restrict what would, under other circumstances, be regarded as an illegal infringement of a recognized constitutional right. But, though military regulations may in some instances transgress what would normally be regarded as constitutional boundaries, they may not do so unreasonably, arbitrarily or irrationally and must find some basis, albeit a “minimal” one, in “military exigencies”. Applying this rule, courts have differed on whether reservists, during week-end drills, may be prohibited from the use of hair wigs to cover their extra-length hair in order to conform to the military appearance requirements. It is unnecessary, however, to resolve this issue, as we find the instant regulation, as drafted, invalidly discriminatory.
Many of the cases which have found valid a regulation prohibiting the use of hair wigs by military reservists during week-end drills have been influenced in their decision by the non-discriminatory character of the regulation in question. Thus, in Raderman v. Kaine, supra (411 F.2d at 1106), the Court, in sustaining a hair regulation, emphasized :
“ * * * There is no claim here that plaintiff was treated any differently than any other reservist; in fact, he was advised by a Major General of the Army that ‘Exceptions will not be made to this policy.’ ”
Again, in Agrati v. Laird (9th Cir. 1971) 440 F.2d 683, 684, which was an action by a military reservist seeking to escape the application of a hair-appearance regulation because of its effect on his civilian occupation, the Court pointed out:
“ * * * He [the plaintiff] does not contend that the regulation is invalid or that he is treated differently than others. He desires an exception made as to him.” (Italics added).
The regulation under attack, however, does not treat all reservists alike. It incorporates a definite exception in favor of the bald-headed. The defendants offer no rational or military basis for this exception. It was suggested on argument that the use of wigs by persons with extra-length hair often does not cover the hair sufficiently to conform to the military hair-appearance requirements. This argument loses its force in the face of the specific finding by the District Court, not assailed on appeal, that the wigs used by the plaintiffs. enabled them to “appearance-wise comply with military standards.” The regulation itself offers as the sole reason for the exception “cosmetic” considerations. We are unable to find “cosmetic” considerations which would allegedly justify a discriminatory constitutional deprivation as falling within any reasonable construction of military legitimacy, when applied to military reservists during their monthly week-end drills. We find convincing the conclusion reached by the Court in Good v. Mauriello (D.C.N.Y. 1973) 358 F.Supp. 1140, where, in speaking to this very wig regulation as applied to a reservist, it said at 1142:
“ * * * The government has failed to explain why the regulation must apply to some, but not to others. The regulations are in violation of the statutory authority given to the defendants.”
See, also, Etheridge v. Schlesinger (D.C.Va.1973) 362 F.Supp. 198, 204.
The result reached in the decision of the District Court is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
. Neither the plaintiffs nor the District Court questioned the validity of the regulation as it applied to the regular military personnel. Whether the regulation should be applied during summer, camp to reservists was likewise not in issue. Cf., Miller v. Ackerman (8th Cir. 1973) 488 F.2d 920, filed December 19, 1973. We are concerned in this case with the application of the regulation to reservists while attending week-end drills; any other issue must await explication in the context of a case in which such issue is expressly raised.
. Yahr v. Resor (4th Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 690, 691, cert. denied 401 U.S. 982, 91 S.Ct. 1192, 28 L.Ed.2d 334.
See, also, Dash v. Commanding General, Fort Jackson, South Carolina (D.C.S.C. 1969) 307 F.Supp. 849, 853, aff. 4 Cir., 429 F.2d 427, cert. denied 401 U.S. 981, 91 S.Ct. 1192, 28 L.Ed.2d 333 :
“ * * * ‘servicemen have all the protections of the Bill of Rights except such as are expressly or by necessary implication not applicable by reason of the peculiar circumstances of the military.’ ”
. Raderman v. Kaine (2d Cir. 1969) 411 F. 2d 1102, cert. dismissed 396 U.S. 976, 90 S.Ct. 467, 24 L.Ed.2d 447, is generally cited in support of the regulation.
The leading case to the contrary is Friedman v. Froehlke (1st Cir. 1972) 470 F.2d 1351.
. One court has recognized that, in the case of a military reservist with hair longer than permitted by regulation, the use of a hair wig to cover the extra-length hair and thereby to conform to the military hair regulations, is an entirely proper method of compliance, at least for a reservist. Thus, in Gianatasio v. Whyte (2d Cir. 1970) 426 F.2d 908, 911, cert. denied 400 U.S. 941, 91 S.Ct. 234, 27 L.Ed.2d 244, the Court, in upholding the Army hair regulation, said:
“ * * * We decline so to rule and note in the words of the court below 1 * * * that the plaintiff could have worn an appropriate wig, thereby complying with military requirements and satisfying the appearance needs of his job.’ ”
. To the contrary, see, Comunale v. Mier (D.C.Pa.1973) 355 F.Supp. 429, 432, and McWhirter v. Froehlke (D.C.S.C.1972) 351 F.Supp. 1098, 1101.
The first of these cases justifies its conclusion with this comment:
“ * * * Of course, the wearing of wigs by bald or disfigured men was permitted but I suppose the Air Force could consider that it could cope with a limited use of wigs which might improve the appearance of a squadron while ruling out the undiscriminate use of them.” (355 F.Supp. 432).
We do not find such reasoning persuasive.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99