What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BUNGE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The LONDON AND OVERSEAS INSURANCE CO. et al., Defendants-Appellees. The LONDON AND OVERSEAS INSURANCE CO. et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Brooks BANKER, as Treasurer of American Express Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
No. 354, Docket 32015.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued March 19, 1968.
Decided May 6, 1968.
See also D.C., 267 F.Supp. 406.
Philip C. Scott, New York City (Marc J. Luxemburg, Robert J. Paulus, and Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, New York City, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
William Warner, New York City (William Garth Symmers, Frederick Fish, and Symmers, Fish & Warner, New York City, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Peter H. Kaminer, New York City (Edwin J. Wesely, George I. Gordon, and Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New York City, on the brief), for Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Before FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit Judges, and CLARIE, District Judge.
Of the District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
HAYS, Circuit Judge:
Bunge Corporation was one of the holders of warehouse receipts on vegetable oil stored in the tanks of a warehousing subsidiary of the American Express Company. In late 1963 it was discovered that a massive fraud had been perpetrated by one Tino De An-gelis, president of a vegetable oil concern, and that there was little or no oil in the tanks. Bunge brought suit on a contract of insurance against the issuing underwriters (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Lloyd’s”) to recover its losses. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Lloyd’s denied liability under the contract but served a third-party complaint on the American Express Company. Thereafter, Bunge entered into a settlement with American Express and gave it a general release.
American Express then moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint. The court below granted the motion on the ground that the release given American Express by Bunge was binding on Lloyd’s. However, in response to an oral motion by counsel for Lloyd’s, the court also granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint in the main action, the action of Bunge against Lloyd’s. The court ruled that Bunge’s release of American Express had the effect of relieving Lloyd’s of any obligation to Bunge under the insurance contract. We affirm as to dismissal of the third-party complaint, but reverse as to dismissal of Bunge’s action against Lloyd’s.
I.
An insurer who has not paid its insured’s claim has no right in claims which the insured has against third parties. See, e. g., Meredith v. The Ionian Trader, 279 F.2d 471, 474 (2d Cir., 1960); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 409, 412, 208 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979-980, 171 N.E.2d 321, (1960); American Surety Co. v. Palmer, 240 N.Y. 63, 67, 147 N.E. 359 (1925).
Since Bunge has executed a release, its rights against American Express are extinguished; thus, even if Lloyd’s were now to pay Bunge in full, it would succeed to no rights against American Express.
It follows that the third-party complaint was properly dismissed.
Lloyds’ contention that our decision in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Lines Co., 258 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 587, 3 L.Ed.2d 574 (1959), requires a contrary result is without merit. The court there found that the purposes of Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and inconsistent adjudications — would be furthered by interpreting the Rule to permit an insurance company which had not made payment to implead a third party. The court did not purport to change the law of subrogation as to the rights of nonpaying insurers against such third parties.
II.
It is well settled that, at least after a denial of liability by an insurer, the insured may enter into a settlement with a third party without prejudicing its rights against the insurer. See, e. g., Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Polchlopek, 18 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 275 N.Y.S.2d 515, 520, 222 N.E.2d 383 (1966); Cardinal v. State, 304 N.Y. 400, 410-411, 107 N.E.2d 569 (1952), cert. denied as not timely applied for, 345 U.S. 918, 73 S.Ct. 729, 97 L.Ed. 1351 (1953); In re People ex rel. Emmet (Empire State Surety Co.), 214 N.Y. 553, 563-564, 108 N.E. 825 (1915).
To require that the insured first fully litigate its dispute with the insurer before pursuing the third party would be manifestly unfair. The possibility of prompt reimbursement would be lost. Moreover, because of the financial condition of the third party or the size of other claims pending against it, it might be essential that redress against the third party be promptly pursued lest nothing remain to satisfy insured’s claim. On the other hand, the self-interest on the insured affords considerable protection to the insurer under the present rule. Recognizing the possibility that his suit against the insurance company may fail, the insured will attempt to recoup as much of his losses as possible from the third party. If the insurer is ultimately held liable, the amount so recovered will inure to its benefit.
Of course, it remains open to Lloyd’s to challenge the settlement on the ground that it was entered into in bad faith; certainly an insured cannot claim as losses such amounts as it could have recouped in a good faith settlement.
The judgment is reversed as to dismissal of Bunge’s complaint against Lloyd’s and affirmed as to dismissal of the third-party complaint.
. Popularly known as the “salad oil swindle.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1