What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SUN-MAID RAISIN GROWERS OF CALIFORNIA, a Corporation, Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 16223.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Dec. 14, 1959.
Boyken, Mohler & Wood, Gordon Wood, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, George A. Sears, James Michael, Marshall P. Madison, San Francisco, Cal., for appel-lee.
Before BARNES and MERRILL, Circuit Judges, and ROSS, District Judge.
MERRILL, Circuit Judge.
Sun-Maid seeks relief from an injunction issued by the District Court on June 15, 1936, enjoining it from using the trademark “Sun-Maid” otherwise than upon packages containing raisins or raisin products. It has taken this appeal from an order of the District Court denying its motion to dissolve the injunction. The motion was opposed by appellee. Appellant contends that appellee has parted with all interest in the subject matter of the suit; that it had no standing to oppose the motion to dissolve; that under these circumstances denial of the motion was error.
On June 15, 1915, the predecessor of appellee instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the predecessor of appellant, complaining that the mark “Sun-Maid” was an infringement of its mark “Sun-Kist.” The action was settled by an agreement by which the predecessor of appellant covenanted to limit the use of the mark “Sun-Maid” to raisins and raisin products.
In 1929, appellee instituted an action in the District Court below, claiming that appellant had violated the agreement by which the former suit had been settled. This action culminated in the injunction now sought to be dissolved.
On September 20, 1950, appellee sold all of its right, title and interest in its trademark “Sun-Kist” to California Fruit Growers Exchange, now called Sunkist Growers, Inc.
Appellant contends that the purpose of the injunction was to protect the trademark “Sun-Kist”; that, since appellee has parted with that trademark, it has no right to continue to enforce the injunction; that to permit such enforcement would amount to an illegal restraint on trade. Its motion to the District Court was in the alternative: to dissolve the injunction or to join Sunkist Growers as a party.
The District Court ruled that no grounds for dissolution had been shown; that it would be inequitable, in the absence of valid grounds for dissolution, to relieve appellant from the restraint of the injunction; that it would not be fair to substitute a new party plaintiff and expose that new party to the possible necessity for re-litigation of a judgment which had stood as final for over twenty years.
We find no error or abuse of discretion in this ruling.
The assignment of the trademark did not in and of itself cause all rights under the contract and injunction to vanish magically as in a puff of smoke. Cf. Griffith v. Bronaugh, 1829, 1 Bland, Md., 547; Hawley v. Bennett, 1833, 4 Paige, N.Y., 163; Collier v. Newbern Bank, 1836, 21 N.C. 328. Unless some further ground for dissolution be shown to exist, those rights remain somewhere: either in appellee or in Sunkist Growers or in both. No matter where they may be, denial of the motion to dissolve the injunction upon this sole ground was proper.
As to the motion for joinder, we are again faced with the proposition that no ground for dissolution other than the mere fact of assignment has been asserted.
Substitution or joinder is not mandatory where a transfer of interest has occurred. Rule 25(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.; Virginia Land Co. v. Miami Shipbuilding Co., 5 Cir., 1953, 201 F.2d 506, 508; cf. Liberty Broadcasting System v. Albertson, D.C.W.D.N.Y.1953, 15 F.R.D. 121. Since appellant has failed to state facts showing any basis for a dissolution of the injunction as against Sunkist Growers, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the refusal of the District Court to grant substitution or joinder.
While it is required (Rule 17(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, this action has already proceeded to final judgment. Until valid grounds for dissolution are asserted, appellant’s attack upon the finality of the judgment must fail, no unresolved dispute can be said to exist, and the necessity for substitution or joinder has not been established.
Affirmed.
. Issued pursuant to opinion of this Court in California Packing Corporation v. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of California, 9 Cir., 81 F.2d 674.
. Permission to proceed in a matter affecting a final judgment having been granted by this Court in Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of California v. California Packing Corporation, 9 Cir., 244 F.2d 895.
. 165 F.Supp. 245, 255-256.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1