What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FIRST UNION TRUST & SAVINGS BANK v. UNITED STATES.
No. 4843.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
April 4, 1933.
Edward N. D’Ancona, A. J. Pflaum, Edward C. Kohlsaat, and Cohort EtsIIokin, all of Chicago, Ill., and Harold R. Small and Edward H. Miller, both of St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Dwight H. Green, U. S. Atty., and Thomas Dodd Healy, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Chicago, Ill.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.
ALSCHULER, Circuit Judge.
The appeal is from a judgment for $902.-55, with interest, awarded the government against appellant. Jury was waived, and the facts appear by stipulation.
One Tobin held United States Liberty bonds aggregating $2,500 registered in his name. He left these bonds for safe-keeping with the Northwestern Bank of Missouri. The cashier of that bank forged Tobin’s name to an assignment upon the bonds, and thereupon the bank sold the bonds to the Federal Commerce Trust Company of St. Louis, receiving unto itself and using in its business the proceeds of the sale. The two bonds here in -issue, one for $1,000 and one for $500, were sold by Federal Commerce Trust Company to- appellant. Appellant thereupon presented the bonds to the government for exchange for coupon bonds, which were then issued to appellant, and the registered bonds were canceled. All this occurred in 1925, neither the Federal Commerce Trust Company, the government nor appellant having notice of the forgery.
In May, 1926, the Northwestern Bank, be ing insolvent, went into liquidation under the banking laws of Missouri. Thereafter the government, learning of the forgery, prosecuted the forger to conviction, and Tobin, first learning of the forgery after insolvency, 'on October 15, 1906, exhibited his demand against the insolvent estate of the bank as a preferred claim. While the claim was pending, the government issued to Tobin its registered bonds of same face value as those which had been forged, and Tobin gave to the government an assignment of his claim against the estate of the insolvent bank. The government, as assignee, prosecuted the claim to allowance, and received thereon as a preferred claim applicable to these two bonds the sum of $597.45, which was applied as a credit upon the government’s claim against appellant, and thereupon the suit against appellant was begun. The assets of the insolvent bank were insufficient to pay in full the preferred claims, and nothing was realized on the general claims.
In the stipulation it was stated:
“That the defense is: That- Tobin and plaintiff as his assignee in the Missouri insolvency proceedings made claim to the money paid by Federal Commerce Trust Company to the Northwestern Bank of Missouri, and had this claim for such money sustained as a preference claim and thereby unquestionably ratified the payment in exchange for the bonds.
“That after having ratified such transfer it cannot now recall such ratification in order to secure further moneys from defendant.”
The single issue here is as to the effect of the filing, by Tobin, of the claim for a preference in the assets of the insolvent bank, and the acceptance of assignment by the government and its prosecution of the claim.
Appellant contends that the effect was a ratification by Tobin, and by the government, of the sale and transfer of the bonds by the Northwestern Bank, and that, having so ratified the sale, the government was not entitled to proceed against appellant to recover the balance not covered by the realization upon the claim filed against the insolvent bank.
We do not think that such doctrine has place under the indicated circumstances Apart from any question arising upon the presentation of the claim against the insolvent bank, the government would have been entitled to recover against appellant, since appellant presented to the government for exchange bonds to which, because of the forgery, appellant had no title.
When the loss accrued to the government by exchanging the forged bonds and also paying the registered holder of those bonds, it was the duty of the government to take such steps as it reasonably might to minimize the loss, so that others upon whom liability therefor might ultimately rest would be exonerated to the extent that the government’s loss was lessened. • \
If, upon ascertainment of the forgery, a general claim against the estate of the insolvent bank had been filed, nothing would have been realized to apply on this loss, and in all likelihood the defense to this suit would then have been the failure of Tobin and the government to file the claim as one preferred.
The government chose to prosecute the claim in the manner 'which might reasonably be expected to be of some avail, as in fact it proved to be. We do not believe that, having chosen to prosecute the claim in the only way that could yield, and did yield, a substantial amount, the government should now be penalized for having by its well-directed exertions exonerated appellant to the extent of what the claim realized — something over one-third of the face of the bonds in question.
We are satisfied that the judgment of the District Court is right, and it is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1