What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
BONETTI v. ROGERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
No. 94.
Argued April 7, 1958.
Decided June 2, 1958.
Joseph Forer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was David Rein.
Roger Fisher argued the cause for respondents. With him on a brief was Solicitor General Rankin. Beatrice Rosenberg was also on a brief for respondents.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a deportation ease. It presents a narrow and vexing problem of statutory construction. The principal question here is which, if less than all, of several entries into this country by the alien petitioner was "the time of entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. 64 Stat. 1008.
The facts are clear and undisputed. Petitioner, an alien who was born in France of Italian parentage, was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on November 1, 1923, at the age of 15. He became a member of the Communist Party of the United States at Los Angeles in 1932 and remained a member to the end of 1936, when he voluntarily ceased paying dues and left the Party. He never rejoined it. On June 28, 1937, he departed the United States — abandoning all rights of residence here — and went to Spain to fight with the Spanish Republican Army. He fought in that army for one year, was wounded in action and suffered the loss of his left foot. On September 19, 1938, he came to the United States as a new or “quota immigrant,” and applied for admission for permanent residence. He was detained at Ellis Island. A hearing was held by a Board of Special Inquiry on the issue of his admissibility. At that hearing he freely admitted that he had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States at Los Angeles, California, from 1932 to 1936, and had voluntarily left the United States on June 28, 1937, to go to Spain and fight in the Spanish Republican Army. The Board ordered him excluded, but its order was reversed on an administrative appeal, and on October 8, 1938, he was admitted to the United States “for permanent residence as a quota immigrant.” He has since continuously resided in the United States (California), except for a one-day visit to Tijuana, Mexico, in September 1939. “[A]t the time of entering the United States” on October 8, 1938, he was not, and has not since been, a member of the Communist Party.
In October 1951, proceedings were instituted to deport him under §§ 1 and 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, as an “alien who had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States after entry into the United States.” After a hearing, disclosing the facts above recited, the hearing officer ordered him deported, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
Petitioner then brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against respondent, praying that the order of deportation be set aside. Respondent moved for summary judgment. The district judge sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint. On appeal the Court of Appeals, finding that after petitioner’s first admission for permanent residence on November 1, 1923, he admittedly had been a member of the Communist Party of the United States from 1932 through 1936, affirmed the judgment. 99 U. S. App. D. C. 386, 240 F. 2d 624. We granted certiorari. 355 U. S. 901.
The parties agree that petitioner’s past Communist Party membership did not make him excludable “at the time of entering the United States” on October 8, 1938, nor when, after his one-day visit to Mexico, he re-entered in September 1939.
Section 1 of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, deals with the subject of exclusion of aliens from admission and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“[Sec. 1] That any alien who is a member of any one of the following classes shall be excluded from admission into the United States:
“(1) . . . ;
“(2) Aliens who, at any time, shall be or shall have been, members of any of the following classes:
“(C) Aliens who are members of . . . the Communist Party of the United States ....
“(H) . . . (Emphasis added.)
Section 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, deals with the subject of deportation and, in pertinent part, provides:
“Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter ... a member of any one of the classes of aliens enumerated in section 1 (2) of this Act, shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. The provisions of this section shall be applicable to the classes of aliens mentioned in this Act, irrespective of the time of their entry into the United States.” (Emphasis added.)
The sense of the two amended sections, as applied to this case, is this: Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter, a member of the Communist Party of the United States shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported in the manner provided in the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917.
Petitioner contends that it was his entry of October 8, 1938, made after the administrative adjudication of that date that he was admissible “as a quota immigrant for permanent residence” — not his entry of November 1, 1923 — that constitutes “the time of entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a); and inasmuch as he was not then, and has not since been, a member of the Communist Party he is not deportable under that section. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that § 4 (a) applies to any “entry into the United States” by petitioner, including that of November 1, 1923, and that inasmuch as he was a member of the Communist Party of the United States from 1932 to 1936 before departing from, and abandoning all rights to reside in, the United States on June 28, 1937, he is deportable under that section as an alien who has been, after entering the United States, a member of the Communist Party.
To decide the question presented it is necessary to examine and construe the statutes involved. It seems plain that the reference in § 4 (a) to the “classes of aliens enumerated in § 1 (2)” incorporates only the classes enumerated in subsections (A) through (H), and that the only one of those classes which is applicable here is class “(C),” namely, “Aliens who are members of . . . the Communist Party of the United States.” (Emphasis added.) There being no question about the fact that petitioner was not a member of the Communist Party at the time of entering the United States on October 8,1938, or at any time thereafter, the question is whether that entry — as affected, if at all, by his re-entry as a returning resident alien after his one-day trip to Mexico in September 1939 — or the one of November 1, 1923, constituted “the time of [his] entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a), as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950. If it was the latter he is deport-able, but if the former he is not.
It is obvious that Congress in enacting these statutes did not contemplate the novel factual situation that confronts us, and that these statutes are, to say the least, ambiguous upon the question we must now decide. Our study of the problem, in the light of the facts of this case, has brought us to these conclusions: The first phrase of § 4 (a) — “Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States” — necessarily refers to “the time” of petitioner’s adjudicated lawful admission, as affected, if at all, by his re-entry as a returning resident alien after his one-day trip to Mexico in September 1939, under which he claims the right to remain-. The next phrase — “or has been at any time thereafter” — necessarily refers to all times subsequent to such lawful admission. Thus the two phrases, when read together, refer to the particular time the alien was lawfully permitted to make the entry under which he claims the status and right of lawful presence that is sought to be annulled by his deportation, and to any time subsequent thereto. Inasmuch as petitioner claims no right of lawful presence under his entry of November 1, 1923, and respondent does not by the deportation order here seek to annul any right of presence acquired under that entry, we must hold that petitioner’s entry of October 8, 1938 — as affected, if at all, by his returning from Mexico in September 1939 — constituted “the time of entering the United States,” within the meaning of § 4 (a). Since petitioner was not a member of the Communist Party “at the time of entering the United States” on October 8, 1938, and has not been a member “at any time thereafter,” including, of course, the time of his returning entry from Mexico in September 1939, he is not deportable under § 4 (a), as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
In a different context this Court has said that the word entry “includes any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one.” United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422, 425. While that holding is quite correct, it is not here apposite or controlling, for the question here is not whether petitioner’s coming to the United States in 1923 constituted an entry. Admittedly it did. Rather, our question is whether it was that entry, or the adjudicated lawful entry of October 8, 1938, as affected, if at all, by petitioner’s re-entry as a returning resident alien in September 1939, which constituted the time of petitioner’s entry upon which his present status depends. In the novel circumstances here we think it evident that it could not be his entry of November 1, 1923, since petitioner had abandoned all rights of residence under that entry. Volpe did not involve any question of abandonment.
Of course, if petitioner had become a member of the Communist Party after the entry of October 8, 1938, or the re-entry of September 1939, he would have been deportable under § 4 (a). Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522. But it is admitted that he was not a member of that party at those times or “at any time thereafter.” Likewise, if he had applied for entry after June 27, 1952, he would be excludable under § 212 (a) (28) (C) (iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a)(28)(C)(iv).
The Government argues that the construction which we adopt would enable a resident alien, who after lawfully entering the United States for permanent residence became a member of the Communist Party, to avoid deportation for that cause simply by quitting the party and thereafter stepping across the border and returning. While a resident alien who leaves the country for any period, however brief, does make a new entry on his return, he is then subject nevertheless to all current exclusionary laws, one of which, at present, excludes from admission any alien who has ever been a member of the Communist Party. Section 212 (a) (28) (C) (iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, supra. If he enters when excludable, he is deportable, even though he would not have been subject to deportation if he had not left the country. Hence, our construction of the statutes here involved does not enable an alien resident to evade the deportation laws by leaving the country and returning after a brief period, for if at the time of his return he is within an excluded class he would be excludable, or, if he nevertheless enters, he would be deport-able. It is admitted that when petitioner returned from Mexico after his one-day trip in September 1939 he was not excludable under then current exclusionary laws. That entry, being lawful, can only support our conclusion in this case.
Though §§ 1 and 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of 1918, as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950, are quite ambiguous in their application to the question here presented, we believe that our interpretation of them is the only fair and reasonable construction that their cloudy provisions will permit under the rare and novel facts of this case. “When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not out of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts . . . against the imposition of a harsher punishment.” Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83. And we cannot “assume that Congress meant to trench on [an alien’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10. Cf. Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637, 642-643; Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 391.
As applied to the circumstances of this case, we hold that the phrase in § 4 (a), “Any alien who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter,” refers to the time the alien was lawfully permitted to make the entry and re-entry under which he acquired the status and right of lawful presence that is sought to be annulled by his deportation. Petitioner’s entry of October 8, 1938, as affected, if at all, by his subsequent entry in September 1939 as a returning resident alien, constituted “the time of entering the United States” within the meaning of § 4 (a). Inasmuch as petitioner was not on October 8, 1938, or at any time thereafter— including September 1939 — a member of the Communist Party, he is not deportable under §§ 1 and 4 (a) of the Anarchist Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by § 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the judgment must be reversed for that reason.
Reversed.
40 Stat. 1012, as amended, 41 Stat. 1008, 54 Stat. 673, 8 U. S. C. § 137.
He stated that he did so because he felt that Franco was a tool of Mussolini and Hitler, and if the Kome-Berlin Axis was not stopped “they would go on from country to country until the World War would start.”
The statutory provision for exclusion from admission solely by reason of membership in the Communist Party was first enacted in the Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 1006), and therefore, petitioner was not excludable from admission, on the ground of past membership in the Communist Party, at the time he entered the United States on October 8, 1938, or at the time he re-entered, after a one-day visit to Tijuana, Mexico, in September 1939.
See note 1.
64 Stat. 1008.
Although both §§ 1 and 4(a) were repealed by §403 (a) (16) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1962 (66 Stat. 163, 279), those sections nevertheless apply to this case under the saving clause (§405 (a)) of the 1952 Act, since the order of deportation involved here was issued prior to the effective date of the 1952 Act.
Cf. Berrebi v. Crossman, 208 F. 2d 498, and Klig v. Brownell (dissenting opinion), 100 U. S. App. D. C. 294, 299-300, 244 F. 2d 742, 747-748 (certiorari granted, 355 U. S. 809; judgment of the Court of Appeals vacated and case remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the cause as moot, sub nom. Klig v. Rogers, 355 U. S. 605).
Cf. Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398; United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129.
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206; United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422; United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78; Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1