What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CALIFORNIA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cecil D. ANDRUS, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 81-1249.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 13, 1981.
Decided Jan. 8, 1982.
Jerry Jackson, Atty., Appellate Section, Land and Natural Resources Div., U. S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Carol E. Dinkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dirk D. Snel and Margaret M. McMahon, Attys., U. S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., with him on the briefs), for defendants-appellants.
Robert P. Mallory, of Lawler, Felix & Hall, Los Angeles, Cal. (R. F. Outcault, Jr. and Steven J. Miller, of Lawler, Felix & Hall, Los Angeles, Cal., and Mitchell Melich, of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief), for plaintiffappellee.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, McWIL-LIAMS, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, District Judge.
Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
SETH, Chief Judge.
The plaintiff had been assigned a coal lease issued to a predecessor in January 1935. The Bureau of Land Management sought to adjust the lease terms on a date about two and one-half years after its anniversary date. The anniversary dates for these purposes are the end of each twenty-year period following the date of the lease. The lease expressly gives the Department the right to adjust the terms, conditions, and royalties “at the end” of each twenty-year period. The plaintiff is mining coal on the lease.
The Interior Board of Land Appeals upheld the adjustment made by the Bureau of Land Management and the plaintiff filed this action in the trial court for review of the administrative action. The trial court on cross motions for summary judgment held that the adjustment came too late and was beyond the statutory authority of the Department. The Government has appealed.
Under the lease terms the plaintiff’s lease was subject to readjustment on January 4, 1975, but it received no notice that readjustment would be made and no adjustment was then made. As mentioned, the Department did not give notice nor seek to readjust the lease terms until August of 1977.
This case was consolidated with and presents the identical questions considered by this court in Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of Interior, 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir.). It concerns the same statute, regulations, and administrative action there taken. The lease terms are the same and the leases were issued pursuant to the same statutory authority. The Rosebud opinion determines this appeal and it need not be repeated here.
We must conclude that the Department acted beyond its statutory authority in attempting to readjust plaintiff’s lease some two and one-half years after the anniversary date, and also in seeking to apply a retroactive regulation to accomplish such readjustment.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1