What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Roy I. MARTIN and Elizabeth E. Martin, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 13759.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued March 5, 1962.
Decided June 28, 1962.
Thomas S. Weary, Philadelphia, Pa. (Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for petitioners.
Giora Ben-Horin, Washington, D. C. (Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Harry Baum, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Before STALEY, HASTIE and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
• STALEY, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves the taxability of money paid by a corporation to the widow of one of its officers. At his death, Arthur Purdy was president of A. R. Purdy Co., Inc. (“corporation”). Pursuant to a resolution passed by its board of directors, the corporation paid decedent’s widow, petitioner, $32,727.24 in 1955 and $27,272.76 in 1956. Petitioner failed to report these payments as income on her tax returns, causing the Commissioner to assess a deficiency against her on the basis that they were subject to treatment as ordinary income. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, concluding that petitioner failed to establish that the payments constituted a gift.
On this appeal, petitioner contends that the Tax Court misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960), as announcing a new rule for determining when payments by a corporation to a widow constitute a gift, and that under the holdings in pre-Duberstein Tax Court decisions, the payments here clearly constituted a gift. The Commissioner’s position, also based on Duberstein, is broken down into two parts. First, the controlling question is why the transfer was made, and that if made from “detached and disinterested generosity, * * * out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulse,” it is a gift, while if the payment is for past services, it receives income treatment. Next, the Tax Court’s resolution of that question is a factual one that must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.
This court recently had occasion in Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (C.A.3, 1962), to review the decision in Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra, and United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 80 S.Ct. 1204, 4 L.Ed.2d 1233 (1960). We said that, under those decisions, determination of whether a transfer constitutes a gift is a factual one that rests in the first instance with the trier of fact. That determination is to be made in light of all the relevant facts and circumstances and must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.
We cannot say, from our review of the record, that the Tax Court’s finding is clearly erroneous or charge it with relying on facts not relevant to the inquiry.
The corporation was closely held. Immediately prior to Arthur Purdy’s death, its outstanding stock was held as follows:
Stockholder Common Preferred Stock Stock
Trust under Will of Ethel B. Purdy (deceased’s mother) 588 588
Deceased 2,282% 2,282%
Elizabeth Purdy Shaw (deceased’s sister) 1,825% 1,825%
Ralph W. Shaw, Jr. (deceased’s brother-in-law) 304 3Ó4
Under Ethel B. Purdy’s trust, upon deceased’s death the trust was to terminate, whereupon one-half of the corpus was to pass to deceased’s sister, and one-half was to be placed in trust for deceased’s children, the trustee being Ralph W. Shaw, Jr., deceased’s brother-in-law. The deceased placed his shares of stock in the corporation into two trusts, the trustees of which were the petitioner and a corporate trustee.
Within seven days after death ensued, decedent was succeeded as president by Ralph W. Shaw, Jr., his brother-in-law, and petitioner was elected to the board. Shortly thereafter, the board unanimously passed a resolution which in pertinent part read:
“Whereas, Arthur R. Purdy, President of this Company, died on November 3, 1954 and
“Whereas, he had been associated with the Company for more than 18 years and had rendered loyal and faithful service to the Company, and
“Whereas, the Directors believe that recognition of such service should be made and that his salary should be paid for a reasonable period of time to his widow * *
The Minutes of the meeting stated:
« * * * jn vieW of Mr. Purdy’s long and loyal service to the Com- ■ pany, the officers thought that his salary should be continued to be paid to his widow * * * for a reasonable period of time after his death in recognition of such service.”
The resolution went on to provide that deceased’s salary should be continued for a twenty-four month period and paid to petitioner in equal monthly installments. Two board members who supported the resolution testified before the Tax Court. One testified that the payments were “based upon the past services of Mr. Purdy.” The other one, an assistant vice-president of a bank, said that he was a board member in order to help protect the bank’s interests, and testified that he had met the petitioner only once and that he voted for. the payments because “the services that the late Mr. Purdy had rendered to the company justified the payment on its part.” He also testified that when considering the resolution, he possessed little knowledge about petitioner’s financial position, although he was aware that the corporation had not been paying dividends. The corporation’s year-end surplus for 1955 was $801,845.52, and $828,450.82 for 1956.
The monthly payments, equal to the amount paid decedent as a monthly salary at the time of his death, were made on regular employees’ payroll checks. They were deducted as business expenses by the corporation. The 1955 payments were included in the corporation's workmen’s compensation policies, and subjected to withholding tax by the corporation which was reflected on a Withholding 'Tax Statement, commonly known as a “W-2”, issued by it at the end of the year. The corporation did not withhold tax for 1956 after petitioner executed a hold harmless agreement on its behalf.
The clear force of these facts is that the payments were made by the corporation as additional compensation for the deceased’s services. Petitioner cites many cases to us, but a situation of this kind involving, as it does, the resolution of a purely factual question makes precedent of little value.
The decision of the Tax Court will be affirmed.
. The petitioner, Elizabeth E. Martin, was married to Roy I. Martin in 1955. The husband is a petitioner on this appeal because joint income tax returns were filed for the years in question. All future references will be to the wife-petitioner only.
. 36 T.C. 556 (1961).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2