What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence Gaylord OLSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 71-1617.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Sept. 13, 1971.
Gerard J. Glass, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
James L. Browning, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KOELSCH and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and POWELL, District Judge.
Honorable Charles L. Powell, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
CHOY, Circuit Judge:
Lawrence Olson appeals his conviction for refusal to submit to induction. We affirm.
On October 11, 1966, Olson enrolled in Shasta Junior College and subsequently received a II-S student deferment. In 1967, he transferred to Cabrillo Junior College, and the II-S was continued. At the completion of his second year in college, his first at Cabrillo, Olson had completed 58% units, which fell short of the 60 units required by Cabrillo for junior college graduation after two years.
In December, 1968, Olson’s Local Board found that he was not “satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction” within the meaning of 32 C.F.B. sec. 1625.25 and reclassified him I-A. One day after the expiration of the thirty-day appeal period, Olson asked for an appeal and a personal appearance before the Board. The Board granted the appeal, but refused a personal interview. The I-A was upheld on appeal, and Olson was ordered to report for induction. He failed to do so, and was reordered to report. He did so, but refused to take the symbolic step forward. Olson was then indicted and convicted.
The Local Board was correct in revoking Olson’s II-S and reclassifying him I-A. Olson enrolled in a two-year college in October, 1966, and in October, 1968, should have completed the full 60-credit program required to graduate. He did not. Olson had four years from 1966 to obtain his baccalaureate degree; the letter sent by Tahoe College in 1969, attesting that he was enrolled as a full-time third-year student at that institution and would graduate in 1971, confirmed that he could not do so.
The Selective Service System recognizes that the four-year requirement need not be rigidly applied when a student transfers from a junior or community college to a four-year school. Local Board Memorandum No. 43, issued by the Director of Selective Service, provides :
“When a registrant transfers from a junior college or community college to a degree granting institution, and loses credit through no fault of his own, he may have less than the percent of course completion required in Regulation) 1625.25(c). * * * The local board may, in its discretion, grant a II-S deferment for the first year after transfer. * * * ”
But this Memorandum does not help Olson. First, the II-S deferment is discretionary with the Local Board. It need not be given. Second, the Memorandum applies only when a registrant transfers from a junior to a four-year institution and loses credit in that transition. Olson lost his credits in his move from Shasta Junior College to Cabrillo Junior College, or during his enrollment at either school. Finally, Olson has not proved that he lost his credits through no fault of his own.
Whether a student is “satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction” is a question of fact. In resolving that question, the main source of information and evidence is generally the college administration. “When a college cannot certify that the registrant is expected to graduate on time, certainly a local board would have a basis in fact for terminating the [II-S] deferment.” Coleman v. Tolson, 435 F.2d 1062, 1064 (4th Cir., 1970). Olson could not graduate in time. The Local Board was correct in revoking his II-S. United States v. Brooks, 415 F.2d 502 (6th Cir., 1969).
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the Board’s refusal to reopen Olson’s classification when it received the Tahoe College letter was punitive in nature. Since Olson had not presented a prima facie case warranting reopening his classification, the Board’s refusal to do so was not illegal.
Finally, Olson cites United States v. Karlock, 427 F.2d 156 (9th Cir., 1970), and urges that once the Board had waived the thirty-day appeal requirement and allowed his appeal, it was also obligated to grant him a personal appearance. We find Karlock distinguishable. Karlock brought a new classification request to his board’s attention; and once it had agreed to entertain that new classification request, it had an obligation to afford the registrant an opportunity for both local and appeals board review. Here, Olson was continuously contesting the validity of the revocation of his II-S. To extend Karlock to such a situation is unwarranted. The Board’s decision here to bestow one benefit does not require it to bestow another.
Affirmed.
. (a) In Class II-S shall be placed any registrant who has requested such deferment and who is satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college, * !! * such deferment shall continue until such registrant * * * fails to pursue satisfactorily a full-time course of instruction. * * *
(b) A student shall be deemed to be “satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction” when, during his academic year, lie has earned, as a minimum, ei'edits toward his degree which, when added to any credits earned during prior academic years, represent a proportion of the total number required to earn his degree at least equal to the proportion which the number of academic years completed bears to the normal number of years established by the school to obtain such degree. For example, a student pursuing a four-year course should have earned 25% of the credits required for his baccalaureate degree at the end of his first academic year, 50% at the end of his second academic year, and 75% at the end of his third academic year.
. Nor dill the Tahoe College letter constitute a prima facie case warranting reopening Olson’s classification. 32 C.F.R. sec. 1625.4; Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L.Bd.2d 362 (1970). The letter confirmed the fact that Olson had not completed his second academic year according to the terms of the Regulations. Since Olson’s academic year terminated in October, 1968, United States v. Brandt, 435 F.2d 324 (9th Cir., 1970), a prima facie case would have to show that at that time Olson had completed 50% of the credits needed to graduate in 1970. The Tahoe College letter did not show that.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1