What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TELEPHONE CO. v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 8390.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued March 4, 1943.
Decided June 16, 1943.
Messrs. R. A. Van Orsdel and J. R. Coleman, Jr., both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
Messrs. Lloyd B. Harrison, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C., and Glenn Simmon, Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C., both of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Richmond B. Keech, Corporation Counsel, D. C., and Vernon E. West, Principal Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C., both of Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for respondent.
Before PARKER, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation, and VINSON and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.
EDGERTON, Associate Justice.
One question here is whether petitioner is entitled to deduct from its gross receipts, in order to determine its “gross earnings” in 1939 and 1940 for purposes of taxation, the amount which it paid for telephone directories. This included the cost of paper, printing, binding, and transportation. Petitioner does not ask to deduct the cost of selling directory advertising or of compiling and distributing the directories. It did not print the directories but bought them as finished products. Its gross receipts from directory advertising and sales were some $400,000 per year, and the costs which it seeks to deduct in computing its gross earnings were over $200,000 per year.
We think petitioner is entitled to this deduction. In District of Columbia v. Georgetown Gas Light Co., followed in District of Columbia v. Washington Gas Light Co., both of which cases were decided under this same statute, this court held that a public service company which furnishes a “tangible commodity * * * as an incident to the rendition of the services” may deduct from its gross receipts, in order to determine its gross earnings, the amount which it pays for the materials which go into the commodity. We see no reason for distinguishing the present case, in which it happens that the taxpayer buys the entire commodity which it furnishes instead of buying the materials in a more or less raw state and making the commodity. It does not follow, as respondent suggests, that petitioner might deduct the cost of its telephone instruments. Directories regularly lose their value, and are replaced, in a very few months. In substance, if not in the strictest sense, they are promptly consumed by the particular subscribers to whom they are furnished. For present purposes, therefore, they are rather like gas than like telephone instruments.
The gross earnings tax has now been replaced, under an Act of July 26, 1939, by a tax upon “gross receipts, from the sale of public utility commodities and services within the District of Columbia.” Petitioner has no plant or facilities and performs no services outside the District. The second question here for review is whether the tax for 1941 applies to petitioner’s receipts from “the sale of * * * services within the District” in the handling of inter-state calls, which services are necessarily performed in conjunction with services which connecting companies perform outside the District. This question must be answered in favor of respondent. Since all petitioner’s services are performed within the District, its receipts from all its services are subject to the tax. In Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, on which petitioner relies, the statute spoke of “business done,” not of “the sale of * * * services.” Moreover, since it was a state statute, the Court necessarily construed it in the light of constitutional considerations which have no application here.
The Board of Tax Appeals for the District decided both questions in favor of respondent. The Board’s action is therefore reversed as to the first question and affirmed as to the second question.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
VINSON, Associate Justice, took part in the consideration of this case and agreed in the result, but resigned before the opinion was written.
District of Columbia tax law of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 619, D.C.Code 1929, T. 20, § 760.
45 App.D.C. 63, 72.
45 App.D.C. 78, certiorari denied 241 U.S. 676, 36 S.Ct. 725, 60 L.Ed. 1232.
53 Stat. 1107, D.C.Code 1940, § 47— 1701.
142 U.S. 339, 12 S.Ct. 250, 35 L.Ed. 1035.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1