What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Louis SMITH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 18151.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 16, 1963.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro and Frank L. Mallare, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Warren C. Colver, U. S. Atty., and James R. Clouse, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Anchorage, Alaska, for appellee.
Before BARNES, HAMLIN and JERTBERG, Circuit Judges.
HAMLIN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by Louis Smith, appellant herein, from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska denying appellant’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for an order setting aside his sentence. The facts in the main are undisputed, but are somewhat complicated.
On November 10, 1960, appellant was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, the indictment containing two counts. The first count charged appellant and two others with the crime of conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 174 by arranging for appellant to procure narcotics in the Orient and to mail or import such narcotic drugs into the United States. The second count charged that on or about October 10, 1960, appellant imported into the United States heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174.
From about September 14, 1960, until November 24 or 25, 1960, appellant was in Korea. On approximately the latter date, he bought an airplane ticket to go from Korea to Tokyo, Japan. When his plane stopped in Tokyo, appellant was refused admittance into Japan (for some reason unexplained in the record). The Japanese authorities told him that he had to stay out of the country one year and for that reason would have to leave on the same plane that he had arrived upon. That plane was going to Alaska, and he was permitted to stay on the plane for a free ride from Tokyo to Alaska.
When he arrived in Alaska on November 25,1960, the authorities there arrested him upon the warrant that had been issued for his arrest by reason of the indictment in Hawaii. After his arrest for this charge, he was searched and found to have approximately eleven grains of heroin on his person, which he stated were for his own use. Shortly thereafter, he was indicted in Alaska upon the charge of importing narcotics into Alaska.
We think that it would serve no purpose to set out in detail the proceedings in the District Court of Alaska from the time of appellant’s arrival in Alaska on November 25, 1960, to March 31, 1961. It will suffice to say that during that time appellant first entered guilty pleas to counts 1 and 2 of the Hawaii indictment, then withdrew his guilty plea to count 2 of that indictment and pleaded not guilty to count 2. Still later, he withdrew this latter not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to count 2. Also, he first pleaded guilty to the Alaska charge, then changed his mind and pleaded not guilty to that charge, and later again changed his mind and pleaded guilty.
At no time during the proceedings in the Alaska district court was the appellant represented by an attorney. While at some times he was asked if he thought he needed an attorney and replied “No”, at other times he was told that if he was going to plead guilty, an attorney’s advice would not help him.
On March 1, 1961, he changed his plea to guilty on the Alaska charge and received a sentence of five years imprisonment. After he had received this sentence, he was told that if he pleaded guilty to the Hawaii charge, he would get the same sentence on that charge as he had received on the Alaska charge, and that such sentence would run concurrently with the sentence on the Alaska indictment. Thereafter, on March 31, 1961, he changed his plea upon the Ha-wan indictment from not guilty to guilty on each count.
In accordance with the representations that had been made to appellant the court thereupon sentenced him to five years on each count of the Hawaii indictment to run concurrently with each other and with the Alaska indictment sentence. However, about one and a half hours later, he was brought back into court and told that a grievous error had been discovered in respect to the minimum sentence upon the Hawaii charge. Appellant was informed that the minimum sentence was ten years instead of five years, and that therefore the five year sentence on the Hawaii charge must be withdrawn. This was done and appellant was then sentenced to ten years on each count, to run concurrently with each other and with the Alaska sentence.
We do not reach the question whether under the circumstances of this case a minimum sentence of ten years was mandatory. It is apparent that the pleas of guilty of appellant to the Hawaii indictment were received with the understanding that appellant would receive no greater sentence than he had already received upon the Alaska charge. Later, when the district judge had a different view of what the mandatory minimum sentence was, the second sentence was pronounced without giving the appellant an opportunity to withdraw his previous plea of guilty. Under these circumstances we feel that the plea of guilty by the appellant to the Hawaii charges and the sentence imposed thereon should be set aside.
The appellant may desire to plead not guilty to the Hawaii charge, and in that event further proceedings would be transferred to the Hawaii district court.
The case is remanded to the District Court of Alaska with instructions to set aside appellant’s pleas of guilty to the Hawaii charges, to set aside the sentence imposed thereon, and to take such further proceedings as may be necessary.
. The court’s conclusion that a minimum sentence of ten years was mandatory was based upon its interpretation of the following provision of 21 U.S.C. § 174:
“For a second or subsequent offense (as determined under section 7237(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), the offender shall be imprisoned not less than ten or more than forty years * *
Section 7237 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 reads in pertinent part as follows:
“(c) Conviction of second or subsequent offense.—
“(1) Prior offenses counted. — For purposes of * * * subsections (c) and (h) of section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended (21 U.S.C., sec. 174), * * * an offender shall be considered a second or subsequent offender, as the case may be, if he previously has been convicted of any offense the penalty for which was provided in subsection * * * (c), (h), or (i) of section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C., sec. 174); * *
However, on facts similar to those of the instant case, the First Circuit concluded that the “subsequent offense” provisions would not be applicable. (Gonzales v. United States, 224 F.2d 431 (1st Cir., 1955)).
. Cf. Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir., 1963).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1