What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Dorothy REED, Appellant, v. RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Appellees.
No. 22463.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
July 26, 1966.
Sherman F. Raphael, New Orleans, La., for appellant.
Peter H. Beer, New Orleans, La., for appellees.
Before RIVES and THORNBERRY, Circuit Judges, and GARZA, District Judge.
RIVES, Circuit Judge:
Dorothy Reed was employed as a domestic servant in the home of Ivan M. Foley in New Orleans. Foley had installed a gas hot water heater manufactured and distributed by Rheem Manufacturing Company (hereafter Rheem). When Dorothy Reed attempted to light the hot water heater an explosion occurred and a back lash of flame severely and permanently injured her vision, face and arms. So Dorothy Reed alleged in her complaint against Rheem and its liability insurer. She predicated her complaint upon negligence and implied warranty, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and prayed for the recovery of damages in the amount of $30,000.00.
Rheem and its insurer moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Dorothy Reed had previously released any and all claims which she may have had as a result of the accident, and attached to their motion a copy of the release. The consideration for the release was $1,250.00 paid by Foley and his insurer and acknowledged by Dorothy Reed to be “in full settlement of any and all damages to the undersigned * * * arising from or out of any and all matters aforementioned.” The release also recited that Foley and his insurer in paying said sum of money did not admit any liability.
Treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, the district court, without disclosing its reasons, granted that motion.
On appeal, Dorothy Reed’s counsel takes the same position which he had asserted in brief before the district court, viz:
“It is the position of the plaintiff that on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits submitted there is not a scintilla of evidence that Ivan M. Foley and/or General Accident F & L Assurance Corporation, Ltd., and the defendants at the bar are joint tort-feasors, and accordingly the Court can not say, as a matter of law, that there is no material question of fact to be presented to the jury, as required under the strict dictates of Rule 56, F.R.C.P.”
We sustain that position and reverse.
Article 2203 of the Louisiana Civil Code reads as follows:
“Art. 2203. The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one of the codebtors in solido, discharges all the others, unless the creditor has expressly reserved his right against the latter.
“In the latter case, he can not claim the debt without making a deduction of the part of him to whom he has made the remission.”
Applying the underlying principle of that article that there is but one debt and hence there can be but one satisfaction of it, the Louisiana courts have consistently held that a release of one joint tort-feasor with no express reservation of rights discharges all joint tortfeasors.
In Louisiana, however, it is also settled that the release of one of several alleged joint tort-feasors who is not in fact at fault does not release the others, because there can be no joint liability between them.
Apparently the burden of proof in a trial on the merits rests upon an alleged tort-feasor who claims the benefit of a release granted to another to establish that the other “was negligent and thus that he was a joint tort-feasor.” In any event, “the burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact rests on the party moving for summary judgment, whether he or his opponent would at trial have the burden of proof on the issue concerned.” 6 Moore F.P. 2d Ed., p. 2342. Before rendering summary judgment, the Court must be satisfied not only that there is no issue as to any material fact but also that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
According to Dorothy Reed’s affidavit filed in opposition to the motion, the $1,250.00 consideration she received for the release was in no way adequate compensation for the injuries she received. Her counsel argued to the district court in brief that the inadequacy of that consideration should be compared with the allegation in the pleadings, to be taken as true for purposes of the motion, that as a result of her injuries she is entitled to recover $30,000.00 from Rheem and its insurer. As has been stated, the release itself contained an express denial of any admission of liability on the part of Foley and his insurer. All of these circumstances are consistent with Dorothy Reed’s position that there is no conclusive proof, indeed no proof whatever, that Foley is a joint tort-feasor with Rheem.
Clearly, the burden rested on Rheem and its insurer, as the parties moving for summary judgment, to prove that there is no genuine issue of fact but that Foley was at fault in injuring Dorothy Reed. Otherwise, there can be no joint liability between Foley and Rheem. Rheem and its insurer having failed to meet that burden, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
. As permitted by Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.
. Reid v. Lowden, 1939, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286; Guarisco v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co., 1945, 209 La. 435, 24 So.2d 678; Evans v. Walker, 1959, La.App., 111 So.2d 885; Reiley v. Atlas Construction Company, 1962, La.App., 146 So.2d 211; Harvey v. Travelers Insurance Co., 1964, La.App., 163 So.2d 915.
. Guarisco v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co., supra n. 2, at 24 So.2d 680; see also Evans v. Walker, supra n. 2, 111 So. 2d at 890; Harvey v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra n. 2, 146 So.2d at 922. See also Annotation 73 A.L.R.2d 417, 418.
. Harvey v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra n. 2, 146 So.2d at 922; see also Evans v. Walker, supra n. 2, 111 So.2d at 890.
. See also Surkin v. Charteris, 5 Cir. 1952, 197 F.2d 77, 79.
. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Palmer v. Chamberlin, 5 Cir. 1951, 191 F.2d 532, 540, 27 A.L.R.2d 416.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0