What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
John P. BOURKE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 151, Docket 26449.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Jan. 11, 1961.
Decided Feb. 10, 1961.
Bernard Meyer son, Martin K. Kahn, Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellant.
Cornelius W. Wickersham, Jr., Brooklyn, N. Y„ Judith A. Gelb, Brooklyn, N. Y., Confidential Asst, to U. S. Atty., of counsel, for appellee.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and CLARK and HAND, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Judge Rayfiel has stated the facts very fully and we cannot see the necessity of a detailed repetition of them. He correctly says that the solution of this controversy can best be found by deciding where the collision took place between the motor car and the truck. He fixed it “at a point some 40 feet east thereof”: i. e. 40 feet “east of the west boundary of the northbound lane of Third Avenue.” If so, the truck had very nearly passed across the northbound lane whose width is 63 feet.
The plaintiff claims to have proved contributory negligence because the truck driver did not see the motor car coming up the north lane, which must have been in plain sight had he looked to the right after he passed the “stop signal,” and before he had himself entered the north lane. That is true, but it does not necessarily prove that the postal truck was at fault. The case falls within § 1142 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, McKinney’s Consol.Laws, c. 71 which sets the duty of a driver “approaching a stop sign,” as the driver of the postal truck had done. He is to “yield the right of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another highway or which is approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may proceed.” With this section we are to read § 1140(b): “When two vehicles enter an intersection from different highways at approximately the same time the driver * * * on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right.”
In the case at bar the only testimony was that the speed of the postal truck was not over five miles an hour while crossing the north lane of Third Avenue, and that the speed of the motor car was over twenty-five miles an hour. As we have said, the truck had crossed 40 of the 63 feet of the north lane. If so, it follows that when the two cars came within sight of each other the motor car was moving four or five times as fast as the truck and was not an “immediate ha2;ard.” The truck’s driver having stopped at the sign was entitled to “proceed.” Plainly § 1140(b) did not apply for the two cars could not have entered the “intersection from different highways at approximately the same time,” and the motor car should have yielded the right of way to the postal truck which had already “entered the intersection.” § 1140(a).
Judgment affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0