What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. SHORE et al.
No. 1304.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 26, 1935.
Thompson, Mitchell, Thompson & Young and John M. Holmes, all of St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Chas. G. Yankey, Harvey C. Osborne, John G. Scars, Jr., and Verne M. Laing, all of Wichita, Kan., and E. J. Taggart and John Bradley, both of Wellington, Kan., for appellees.
Before LEWIS, PHILLIPS, and BRATTON, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
This action was instituted to recover damages for failure to drill offset oil wells on leased premises. Defendant sought no affirmative relief by way of counterclaim or otherwise. The case was tried and judgment rendered for plaintiffs. On appeal this court reversed the judgment, hold-, iug that there was no implied obligation to drill such wells. The case was remanded, with direction to proceed in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion. 72 F.(2d) 193. The mandate issued in strict conformity to the opinion and the trial court entered an order vacating the judgment and directing that all further proceedings be had pursuant to the opinion. Plaintiffs thereafter moved to dismiss their petition without prejudice to the right to bring another suit at law or in equity concerning the same matters. The motion was sustained; the action was dismissed without prejudice over the objection of defendant; and this appeal is from that order.
It is contended that the nonsuit is so broad that it permits the parties to litigate in another action matters which were decided on the former appeal and therefore violates the judgment and mandate of this court. The right of dismissal in an action at law is a question of procedure, and, pursuant to the provisions of the Conformity Act, must be determined by the law of the state. 28 U.S.C.A. § 724; Barrett v. Virginian Ry. Co., 250 U.S. 473, 39 S.Ct. 540, 63 L.Ed. 1092; Snider v. Sand Springs Ry. Co. (C.C.A.) 62 F.(2d) 635; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning (C.C.A.) 177 F. 893; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Stack (C.C.A.) 60 F.(2d) 830; Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co. v. Daniels (C.C.A.) 63 F.(2d) 322. We therefore turn to the law of Kansas.
The pertinent part of section 60 — 3105, R.S. 1923, provides:
“An action may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action:
“First. By the plaintiff, before the final submission of the case to the jury, or to the court where the trial is by the court.”
The statute was considered in the case of Schrag v. Blaze Fork Drainage Dist., 123 Kan. 739, 256 P. 979. Plaintiff there sought a mandatory injunction to compel the removal of a dam placed in his drainage ditch and a restraining writ to prevent the collection of special assessments. upon his land for the purpose of maintaining the drainage system. Plaintiff prevailed, and defendant appealed. The court reversed the decree and remanded the cause, with direction to. proceed in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion. After the mandate issued in accordance with the opinion, plaintiff sought and obtained á dismissal of the action without prejudice. In sustaining that disposition of the case, the court quoted with approval language to the effect that the matter of a voluntary dismissal rests largely in the discretion of the trial court; that a plaintiff will be permitted to dismiss his action if it does not prejudice the rights of the defendant, but that such dismissal will be denied if it deprives the defendant of a just defense or some other substantial right. Making application of that doctrine, it was held that no abuse of discretion was shown. Defendant seeks to distinguish, that case from this one, in that there several questions were not decided on the first appeal and hence remained for subsequent determination. That is merely a difference of fact which does not render the governing principle of law inapplicable here.
Ordinarily, after a judgment has been reversed on appeal and the cause remanded, the case stands for trial de novo on the issues properly joined. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879, Ann.Cas. 1914D, 1029. With respect to the right of plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit, it stands in the same relative position which it occupied before the trial in the first instance. Cybur Lumber Co. v. Erkhart (C.C.A.) 247 F. 284; Currie v. Southern Pac. Co., 23 Or. 400, 31 P. 963; Hayden v. Maine Cent. Ry. Co., 118 Me. 442, 108 A. 681; Siddens v. Thomas, 237 Ky. 362, 35 S.W.(2d) 537.
The dismissal did not deprive defendant of any defense or other substantial right. The fact that plaintiffs may institute another suit and subject defendant to the annoyance of double litigation is not enough within itself to take away the right of dismissal. Accordingly, we fail to perceive an abuse of discretion in the action of the court permitting plaintiffs to discontinue without prejudice.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1