What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Martha M. DIEU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ralph P. NORTON, Wendell W. Wright, Robert F. Cotton, Marie M. Tellschow, Gerald Block and S. S. Kresge Co., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17198.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
May 28, 1969.
Martha M. Dieu, in pro. per.
John P. O’Rourke, Danville, 111., for defendants-appellees Hon. Robert F. Cotton, Marie M. Tellschow and Gerald Block.
Ralph P. Norton, pro se.
Wendell W. Wright, William A. Young, Wright & Young, Danville, 111., for defendants-appellees Wendell W. Wright and S. S. Kresge Co.
Before CASTLE, Chief Judge, HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge and CAMPBELL, District Judge.
HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order and judgment dismissing an' amended complaint. It was entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, Honorable William G. Juergens, Chief Judge presiding. The following statement is required to place this litigation in proper perspective.
Martha M. Dieu, of Danville, Illinois, brought an action for damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered in a fall in the K-Mart store in Danville on July 25, 1964. Named as defendant therein was S. S. Kresge Co., doing business as K-Mart. The action was filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Vermillion County, Illinois.
In the state court proceeding plaintiff was represented by her privately employed attorney Ralph P. Norton. Defendant Kresge was represented by its attorney Wendell W. Wright. The case was tried to a jury. Honorable Robert F. Cotton, circuit judge, presided. Marie M. Tellschow, official court reporter, acted in her official capacity, and Gerald Block, clerk of the circuit court acted in his official capacity, during such proceedings.
At the close of plaintiff’s case, defendant filed its motion for a directed verdict and asked that the jury be instructed to return a verdict for defendant. The trial court denied such motion. The trial was resumed and defendant put in its case.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, defendant again moved for a directed verdict in its favor. The motion was granted, the jury was so instructed in writing and returned its verdict favorable to defendant. Judgment for defendant was entered thereon. A post-trial motion was filed on behalf of plaintiff and after argument was denied. No appeal was taken. Plaintiff, acting pro se, unsuccessfully sought to obtain, on her own terms, a transcript of the state court proceedings from the court reporter and circuit court clerk.
Thereafter, Martha M. Dieu brought the instant action in the federal district court for what may be denominated as an alleged violation of her civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981-1988, although not mentioned as such in her complaint. She filed this action pro se and continues to act as her own attorney.
Named as defendants herein are the following persons who acted in their respective capacities in the state court proceeding, viz: Ralph P. Norton, plaintiff’s attorney; Wendell W. Wright, attorney for defendant Kresge; Robert F. Cotton, circuit judge; Marie M. Tells-chow, court reporter; and Gerald R. Block, court clerk. By an amended complaint, S. S. Kresge Co., defendant in the state court action, was named as an additional defendant.
As best we can understand, the theory of plaintiff’s pro se complaint is that her alleged present injury arises from the action of the state circuit judge in directing a verdict for- defendant at the conclusion of all the evidence.. She charges her attorney with engaging in some sort of a conspiracy by participating in a conference in the judge’s chambers on the motion for a directed verdict, and by refusing to appeal the case, even though she agreed to pay for ah appeal. She charges Kresge’s attorney with obstructing justice in moving for and securing a directed verdict. She charges the circuit judge with misconduct in sustaining the motion for a directed verdict, denying a “rehearing” and presumably of conspiring with lawyers in his chambers. She charges the court reporter with depriving her of a transcript of the trial and the clerk with denying her a transcript of the record. She insists that the Kresge Co. is responsible for her injuries and demands that we award her a judgment for $50,-000.
The district court sustained the several motions of defendants to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff appealed from this dismissal.
There is no showing or claim of diversity of citizenship. It would appear all parties are citizens of Illinois. Absent diversity, the district court properly tested the complaint for a showing of federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, supra. It found none and neither do we.
Defendants Norton and Wright were lawyers who participated in the trial of private state court litigation. We have repeatedly held that lawyers so engaged were not acting under color of state law within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act. Meier v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 7 Cir., 356 F.2d 504 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 875, 87 S.Ct. 151, 17 L.Ed.2d 102, and cases there cited.
Defendants Circuit Judge Cotton, court reporter Tellsehow and circuit court clerk Block were all acting in the discharge of their official responsibilities. As such they were protected by the traditional doctrine of judicial immunity, and this rule of law was not abolished by § 1983, supra. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Bauers v. Heisel, 3 Cir., 361 F.2d 581, 586-588 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 457; Byrne v. Kysar, 7 Cir., 347 F.2d 734, 736 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913, 86 S.Ct. 902, 15 L.Ed.2d 668; Rhodes v. Meyer, 8 Cir., 334 F.2d 709, 718 (1964); Peek-ham v. Scanlon, 7 Cir., 241 F.2d 761, 763 (1957).
Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff is attempting to allege an actionable conspiracy within the reach of § 1983, supra, the complaint must fall. At best, the complaint does nothing more “than merely state vague and conclusionary allegations respecting the existence of a conspiracy” without showing any “overt acts which defendants engaged in which were reasonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy.” Powell v. Workmen’s Compensation Bd. of State of New York, 2 Cir., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (1964). See Davis v. Foreman, 7 Cir., 251 F.2d 421, 422 (1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 974, 78 S.Ct. 1137, 2 L. Ed.2d 1148.
Finally, it becomes apparent that the district court had no jurisdiction to render a money judgment against S. S. Kresge Co., an added defendant in the amended complaint below. Further, we have no jurisdiction to award plaintiff a judgment of $50,000 against Kresge on this appeal, as she would have us do.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the district court properly dismissed the amended complaint and the judgment order appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. For a comprehensive compilation of judicial immunity holdings, see 361 F.2d at 586-587.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1