What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CAPITAL COMPRESSED STEEL CO. v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC R. CO. CAPITAL COMPRESSED STEEL CO. v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO.
Nos. 4058-4059.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
July 29, 1950.
Herman Merson and Duke Duvall, Oklahoma 'City, Okl. (Dudley, Duvall & Dudley, Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellant.
Harvey L. Harmon and J. I. Gibson, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Satterfield, Franklin & Harmon and Savage, Gibson, Benefield & Hart, all of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellees.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and MURRAH and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
' PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.
This appeal involves the construction of an application of Freight Tariff 414-A, commonly known as the Kipp Tariff, set forth in subjoined note l. The tariff covers “iron or steel articles, in their original form or partly dismantled, * * * having no recognized commercial use or value except for the recovery of the ferrous-metal content thereof.”
On December 6, 1946, the War Assets Administration at New Orleans, Louisiana, issued a special offering of certain surplus government property. The Capital Compressed Steel Company tendered a bid for certain heavy wire cable items in the special offering. The bid was on a basis of $22.20 per ton, which was the current price for scrap iron. The bid was accepted on January 16, 1947, upon a scrap basis. On January 15, 1947, the Steel Company wrote the War Assets Administration, instructing it to bill the material as steel scrap .and to ship it in open-top gondola cars. It did not specifically request the War Assets Administration to affix to the bill of lading the certificate required by paragraph (b) of the Kipp Tariff. The wire cable had no recognized commercial use or value, except for the recovery of the ferrous-metal content thereof. The War Assets Administration described the material in the bill of lading as reels of steel wire rope. The wire cable was shipped in 14 cars. The delivering carrier of four cars was the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, and the delivering carrier of the remaining 10 cars was the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company.3
Upon arrival of the shipments, the Steel Company changed the freight bills so they reflected a scrap rate; made the following certificate on the bill of lading,
“March 18, 1947.
“Affidavit
“The undersigned hereby certifies that the material shipped in car NP 27790 and covered by your freight bill No. 8205 was purchased as scrap and will be prepared and sold as scrap for remelting purposes only”; and paid freight on the basis of the Kipp Tariff rate.
The carriers classified the shipment under Item 6920 of the SWL Tariff No. 173-U, which includes wire rope, and fixed the rate at 86 cents per 100 pounds. The Steel Company refused to pay on the basis of the higher tariff and the carriers brought this action to recover the balance of the freight alleged to be due.
The wire cable was large size marine cable, some of it two inches in diameter. It was in good condition. Most of it was new and was protected by a coating of galvanized material and grease. There was a little corrosion on a portion of it. There was no market for this type of marine cable for its intended use.
The representatives of the War Assets Administration did not bill the cable as scrap iron and did not attach the certificate provided for in subparagraph (b) of the Kipp Tariff, because they were uncertain that the Kipp Tariff was applicable thereto.
From a judgment in favor of the carriers, the Steel Company has appealed.
The wire cable would have been entitled to move under the Kipp Tariff if the requirements of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) thereof had been complied with. There was no compliance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) and the certificate attached to the bill of lading by the Steel Company did not certify that the wire cable had “no recognized commercial use or value except for the recovery of the ferrous-metal content thereof,” except as that fact may be implied from the statement in the certificate that the wire cable “was purchased as scrap and will be prepared and sold as scrap for remelting purposes only.”
We are of the opinion that there was not a substantial compliance with the requirements of the Kipp Tariff.
The question presented then, is whether or not a commodity, which was, in fact, iron or steel goods in their original form, but having no recognized commercial use or value, except for recovery of the ferrous-metal content thereof was entitled to move under the Kipp Tariff, notwithstanding a non-compliance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) and a failure to comply fully with subparagraph (c). In other words, if the commodity fell within the purview of the Kipp Tariff, was non-compliance with subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) immaterial?
In Burrus Mill & Elevator Co. of Oklahoma v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 10 Cir., 131 F.2d 532, 534, we said: “The construction of tariffs does not substantially differ in character from that of any other document drawn in controversy. Great Northern Railway Co. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S.Ct. 477, 66 L.Ed. 943; W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 299 U.S. 393, 57 S.Ct. 265, 81 L.Ed. 301. And one cardinal rule of construction is that all pertinent parts and provisions shall be taken into consideration and each given effect if that can reasonably be done.”
Of course, the requirements of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) were to prevent commodities moving under the Kipp Tariff, which did not come within the purview thereof, but we cannot regard the requirements of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) as immaterial, merely because the commodities could have been truthfully described in the bill of lading as scrap iron or steel, and the certificates prescribed by subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) could have been truthfully made.
The further alternative contention of the Steel Company that the wire cable was entitled to move under SWL Tariff No. 173-U, Item 6920, may be briefly disposed of. The wire cable was not scrap in the ordinary acceptation of that term, and the trial court so found. Note 2 of that Tariff reads:
“Ratings on Scrap Iron or Scrap Steel apply only on pieces (separate or combined) of iron or steel having value for remelting or precipitation purposes only.”
The wire rope was in its original form- and was not in pieces, that is, it was not in fragments, or parts separated from the.whole.
The judgment is affirmed.
Freight Tariff No. 414-A Application Iron or Steel Scrap
Carload rates, ratings and minimum weights applicable on iron or steel scrap will also apply on carload shipments of pieces of iron or steel (not scrap or fragments) and iron or steel articles, in their original form or partly dismantled, with or without other metals incidentally combined therewith, having no recognized commercial use or value except for the recovery of the ferrous-metal content thereof, provided
(a) Each such shipment is described in the bill of lading as follows:
“Scrap iron or steel, viz. - (Here insert general description of lading.)”
(b) The shipper certifies on the bill of lading:
“The material comprised in this shipment has been bought as iron or steel scrap and has no recognized commercial use or value except for the recovery of the ferrous-metal content thereof -- (Shipper) By -."
(c) The consignee executes and furnishes to the delivering carrier a certificate in the following form:
“The undersigned consignee hereby certifies that the property described in the following freight bill: -Railroad Freight Bill No. — Date--Oar No. and Initial — Commodity - Origin •- Destination —,— Consignor -Consignee —;- Has been bought by him (or us) as Iron or Steel Scrap: that it has no recognized commercial use or value except for the recovery of the ferrous-metal content thereof; and that it will be used or resold only for that purpose.
- (Consignee) Dated — By -”
. Hereinafter referred to as the Steel Company.
. Hereinafter referred to as the carriers.
. See Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States ex rel. Sonken-Galamba Corporation, 8 Cir., 98 F.2d 457, 458; Sonken-Galamba Corporation v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 10 Cir., 145 F.2d 808, 809.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1