What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CHANNELL v. SAMPSON.
No. 3466.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Dec. 29, 1939.
Hubert C. Thompson, of Boston, Mass. (John C. Twomey, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellant.
James T. Connolly, of Boston, Mass. (Walter R. Donovan, of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellee.
Before WILSON and MAGRUDER Circuit Judges, and PETERS, District Judge.
MAGRUDER, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit for personal injuries received in a collision between a car driven by defendant’s testator and a car in which the plaintiff was riding in the company of her husband, who was driving.
Plaintiff had a verdict and judgment below. The sole question raised on this appeal is whether the trial judge was in error in ruling that there was’ sufficient evidence for the jury upon the issue of negligence, the formal motions made by the defendant under Rule 50(b), Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, having been denied.
Passing upon the motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge had to exercise a judgment on the facts in determining whether there was substantial evidence from which it would not be unreasonable for the jury to infer negligence. Similarly, in reviewing the trial judge’s action on such a motion, the appellate court must exercise a judgment on the facts, but from a less advantageous viewpoint. In this case, for example, the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses was in elaboration of diagrams which he was drawing on a blackboard in the courtroom, and read in print the testimony is quite unintelligible. In many borderline cases, the appellate court might uphold a ruling either way, because it could not say, from a reading of the cold record, that the trial judge was clearly wrong in his judgment as to the sufficiency of the evidence. The present might indeed be such a case. However that may be, we do decide that the trial judge was not in error in ruling as he did that there was sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the jury.
Plaintiff’s car, a Buick, was proceeding northward on a main highway on Christmas afternoon. A misty rain or, sleet was falling, which made the way very slippery. A Ford car, driven by defendant’s testator, was approaching from the opposite direction. A third car, travelling ahead of the Ford, started to skid across the highway to the left. According to the plaintiff’s witnesses, the driver of the Buick had to swerve to the left to avoid being hit by this skidding car. This in turn caused the Buick to skid slowly, and swing across to the edge of the concréte on the other side, where it came to rest, facing south.
The plaintiff and her husband testified that, after the Buick stopped, an appreciable interval elapsed before the Ford car crashed into the right side of the Buick. Mr. Sampson testified that the Ford first struck the Buick “in the middle on the running board and the right spare tire, then the rear end bounced around and struck my car on the right rear side.” Photographs of the damaged cars were introduced as exhibits and seem to be consistent with Mr. Sampson’s testimony in this respect. Evidence for the defense tended to show that the Buick car, while still skidding, crashed into the Ford car which defendant’s testator had driven across a lawn on his right side in a frantic effort to avoid the collision. Plaintiff testified that when the Buick began to skid the Ford car was about 350 feet away. Even if this was a considerable overstatement of the distance, as the defendant insists must have been the case, the jury might still have concluded that a driver of ordinary care and skill could have so managed the Ford as to avoid hitting the errant Buick, considering the modest speed at which the Ford was proceeding (15 miles per hour) if the evidence for the defense is to be credited, and considering further that the driver of the Ford had warning of an impending mix-up when the car ahead of him started skidding across the road in the path of the northbound traffic. In the alternative, the jury might have inferred that the Ford was travelling considerably in excess of 15 miles per hour and perhaps too fast for icy pavements and misty rain, considering that it ran up to 60 or 65 feet across the neighboring lawn, incidentally knocking over a tree from 5 to 8 inches in diameter, and considering the very extensive damage to the two cars resulting from the collision.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed with interest and costs.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0