What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
Wayne WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. and T. A. Brouillette and Son, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 71-1835.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Nov. 28, 1972.
Decided May 24, 1973.
William D. Hanagan, Mt. Vernon, 111., for plaintiff-appellant.
John E. Jacobsen, Mt. Vernon, 111., Vincent J. Hatch, Belleville, 111., for defendants-appellees.
Before DUFFY, Senior Circuit Judge, STEVENS, Circuit Judge, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.
Senior District Judge William J. Campbell of the Northern District of Illinois is sitting by designation.
WILLIAM J. CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.
In this diversity action in which Illinois law controls, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the district court which dismissed his products liability complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In his amended complaint, the plaintiff named as defendants General Motors Corp. and T. A. Brouillette and Son, Inc., respectively the manufacturer and the seller of plaintiff’s truck, and alleged that he was operating the truck when, due to a defect in the transmission system, the truck went into two gears at once, stopped on a public highway and could not be moved. The amended complaint further alleged that the plaintiff then activated the emergency flasher lights on the vehicle, got out of the truck in order to make emergency repairs on the transmission system so that the vehicle might be moved off the road, and while so engaged was struck and injured by a vehicle coming from the opposite direction.
The defendant General Motors Corp. moved to dismiss the amended complaint, and the district court held as a matter of law that the defendants’ conduct was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The district judge stated:
“The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show that the product was defective and that the defect caused the truck to stop on the highway. The complaint does not show where with regard to the travel portion of the highway the truck came to rest. It does allege, however, that plaintiff was standing at the left front side of the truck. It does not allege whether the plaintiff was standing in the line of the oncoming traffic or whether the oncoming car crossed over into plaintiff’s lane and struck plaintiff. In either case it can hardly be said that the defective condition of the truck was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. The allegations of the complaint show that his injuries were caused by his own conduct in improperly placing himself in the lane of oncoming traffic or the wrongful conduct of the oncoming vehicle by its being in the improper lane. Neither of these conditions can be attributable to the defect in the product.”
Under Illinois law, before an intervening force will relieve a defendant from liability for his wrongful conduct, the intervening force must itself be outside the range of reasonable anticipation as a consequence of the defendants’ wrongful conduct. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill.2d 74, 80-83, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954). Where the question of whether the intervening force or event was a reasonable foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ conduct is one over which reasonable men might differ, the issue of proximate causation should never be determined as a matter of law. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill.2d 74, 84, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954). In that circumstance, the issue of proximate cause is for the jury to decide under appropriate instructions. We note, too, that the Illinois approach comports with the view of the Restatement. Restatement of Torts, 2d edition, §§ 440-447 (1965).
Examining the allegations in the plaintiff’s amended complaint, we are unable to conclude as a matter of law that the defendants’ conduct was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Whether the plaintiff’s conduct in attempting to make emergency repairs on the disabled vehicle and his being struck by another oncoming vehicle while so engaged interrupted the chain of causation set in motion by the defendants’ wrongful conduct is a question over which, we think, reasonable minds might reach differing conclusions. When a vehicle suddenly comes to a halt on a public highway, we do not believe that an attempt to make emergency repairs on the vehicle or the vehicle’s being struck by another vehicle are outside the range of reasonable anticipation. In any event, since there is room for an honest difference of opinion, the issue of proximate causation presents a question of fact for the jury to resolve.
For the reasons stated, the order of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0