What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Jay BURNS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 15178.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 4, 1955.
John E. Simpson, Alex P. Gaines, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Meyer Rothwacks, Ellis N. Slack, Harry Baum, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., H. Brian Holland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel A. Taylor, Chief Counsel, John M. Morawski, Sp. Atty., Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and RIVES and TUTTLE, Circuit Judges.
TUTTLE, Circuit Judge.
In this review of a decision of the Tax Court, involving income tax liability of petitioner for the year 1947, the question is whether a loss resulting from the sale of an unimproved lot in 1947 admittedly purchased in 1926 for use in the bakery business of petitioner, was deductible as an ordinary loss under Sec. 23(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, or as a capital loss under Secs. 23(g) and 117(a) d).
The facts relating to the acquisition, purpose, holding and sale of the lots in question are not in dispute. Taxpayer bought these lots in Tampa, Florida, in 1926, intending to build a bakery plant on them to re-enter the bakery business in which he had been previously engaged.
He paid $25,000 for the lots in a new industrial section of Tampa, intending to exchange them for stock of a corporation to be organized for the purpose of erecting a baking plant and conducting a bakery business. A corporate charter was acquired, and plans and specifications for the plant were drawn. Before organization of the corporation was completed, however, another baking company, which owned and operated a chain of bakeries through the South, acquired a site in Tampa and began the erection of a plant. Taxpayer thereupon abandoned his project, and continued to own the lots.
The development of the new industrial area in Tampa ceased with the collapse of the Florida land boom and taxpayer listed the lots with real estate agents for sale at a price of $5,000. No offers of purchase were received from 1927 through 1946. During most of that period “For Sale” signs were maintained on the property. In 1947 taxpayer accepted a purchase offer from the owner of corresponding lots across the avenue from taxpayer’s property, realizing approximately $1200 net after expenses of the sale.
The Tax Court held, 21 T.C. 857, that the lots were acquired by taxpayer in a transaction entered into for profit, and that they were not held by him primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
In his income tax return for 1947, taxpayer reported his loss on the sale of the lots ($23,807.60) as a loss sustained on “Property Other Than Capital Assets”; accordingly he deducted it in full, and reported no taxable net income. The Commissioner determined that the loss resulted from the sale of capital assets, and consequently was a capital loss the deductibility of which was subject to the capital loss limitations. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s determination.
The petitioner here contends that the loss sustained by him in 1947 was a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit which, by virtue of Sec. 23(e) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, may be deducted in full from gross income.
The Government contends that petitioner has overlooked See. 23(g) which deprives the taxpayer of the benefits of 23(e) (2) if the loss is from a sale of a capital asset. The Government further says that petitioner admits that these lots were capital assets. If this were true, the Government's position would be so obviously correct as to require little comment.
To the contrary, petitioner says these lots were not capital assets, because the very definition of capital assets in Sec. 117(a) (1) excludes them. Petitioner says they are “real property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.” If they are, then, since the loss was admittedly incurred in a transaction entered into for profit, the taxpayer would prevail.
This question was not passed on by the Tax Court. It is not clear why this was so, except that the petitioner below, having stated the facts as to the acquisition ownership and sale of the lots did not spell out the theory on which he relied for relief. He did raise other issues as to other parcels of real estate which he claimed he sold as “property held * * * primarily for sale to customers.” Since the Tampa lots were also in the category of real estate, the Tax Court contented itself with finding that these particular lots were in no way connected with taxpayer’s Lake Wales real estate business) and concluded, therefore, that they were capital assets. The Tax Court did not discuss or pass upon, the contention of the taxpayer that they fall within the last exception in the definition of capital assets instead of the third exception set forth in Sec. 117(a) (1).
This contention of the taxpayer is not even discussed by the Government in its brief filed before us, and it is treated rather lightly by petitioner himself in his brief; that is to say petitioner’s brief does not expressly explain, as counsel did in oral argument, that the reason Sec. 23(e) (2) applies is that Sec. 23(g) does not apply because the assets are not capital assets.
We are satisfied that under the theory applied in eases decided by the Tax Court to the effect that real estate acquired for use in a trade or business may not necessarily lose that status if plans to use it are frustrated, the Tax Court should, in this case consider this issue before it is passed on by this Court. Wé do not hereby pass on the validity of the theory expounded in the cases cited, but refer to the Tax Court the question as to whether this is a proper case for its application, since it is a theory that has not, so far as has been called to our attention, been passed on by any Circuit Court.
Since the failure of the Tax Court to pass on this contention is not attributable to any failure by petitioner to present the facts raising this issue, then we hold that the decision should be reversed insofar as it determines that the sale of the Tampa lots was a sale of capital assets, so that the Tax Court may consider and pass upon petitioner’s contention that this was a sale of real property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.
Reversed and remanded for further proceeding by the Tax Court consistent with this opinion.
. Internal Revenue Code of 1939:
“ § 23. Deductions from gross income.
“In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
# * * * *
“(e) Losses by individuals. In the case of an individual, losses sustained during the taxable year are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise—
“(1) if incurred in trade or business; or
“(2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or business; * * *,
“(g) Capital losses.
“(1) Limitation. Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent provided in Section 117.” 26 U.S.C.A. § 23.
“§ 117. Capital gains and losses
“(a) [A.s amended by Section 151(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 798] Definitions. As used in this chapter — -
“(1) Capital Assets. The term ‘capital assets’ means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, or property, used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23(1), * * * or real property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer; * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.) 26 U.S. C.A. § 117.
. Carter-Colson Cigar Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 T.C. 219, Acquiescence, 1947 — 2 C.B. 1; Wright v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 T.C. 173, Acquiescence, 1947 — 2 C.B. 5; Cf. Beck v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 Cir., 179 F.2d 688 and Hopkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 15 T.C, 160, 167-171..

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0