What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
William G. HOLLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, M.D., Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 87-2522
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 7, 1987.
William G. Hollis, pro se.
Samuel Longoria, Frank A. Conforti, Asst. U.S. Attys., Houston, Tex., John M. Gough, Office of the General Counsel, Dallas, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, William G. Hollis, on December 15, 1983, applied for social security disability benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 423, alleging disability dating from March 1, 1983. Adverse decisions by the administrative law judge and the Appeals Council found him capable of sedentary work, and the decision of the Appeals Council became the final decision of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. Appellant brought suit for judicial review, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The magistrate and the district court found substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the Secretary. After a careful perusal of the record, we affirm.
Our review is based upon a substantial evidence standard. We are to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the entire record to support the decision of the Secretary. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1432, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Allen v. Schweiker, 642 F.2d 799, 800 (5th Cir.1981).
We summarize briefly the evidence contained in the record. Appellant from 1978 to 1982 had several surgical procedures related to serious problems with his back. These procedures were all completed before the time period which is advanced as the justification for the disability payments. During this earlier time he was awarded disability benefits beginning October 31, 1978, and continuing until 1983. There was no appeal when these benefits were terminated so they are not before the Court.
During the period covered by the current application and since the application, appellant’s complaint basically is disabling pain plus some obvious limitation of physical motion in his back. Before his hearing, he was examined several times by several doctors who could find no justification for an amount of pain which was totally disabling. After an earlier denial of benefits, the Secretary asked for the case to be remanded from the district court for an inquiry into the possibility of mental illness of the patient. The full procedures of the administrative law judge and the Appeals Council and the decision by the Secretary were then carried out again. There was a finding of no mental illness justifying disability. The finding as to physical disability was that while he was disqualified from his prior work as a cement finisher in the construction industry, he retained the capacity to engage in sedentary work.
Appellant himself testified that he could lift at least 5 pounds, sit for 60 minutes, and stand for 90 minutes at a time. In December 1983, Dr. Fleming, his treating physician, offered as his residual functional assessment the conclusion that appellant could lift or carry up to 10 pounds, stand or walk less than 6 hours a day, sit less than 6 hours a day, and had a somewhat limited ability to perform push/pull maneuvers. He further concluded that appellant would have the capacity for unlimited fingering and feeling and limited reaching and handling. We do not detail other medical opinion rendered at that time because under a substantial evidence standard if the Secretary wishes to credit the conclusions of Dr. Fleming his testimony alone is enough to show residual capacity for sedentary employment.
Simply to avoid a claim of omission of relevant considerations, we also refer to the fact that appellant is missing a finger on one hand. This has been a long standing matter, however, and was carefully evaluated in the tests with a determination that he had adequate manipulative skills to work with his hands.
It is agreed by the Secretary that appellant has not worked since March 1983, that he has a “severe” impairment, and that he cannot work in his prior position as a cement finisher. Under the regulations, once it was determined he was physically unable to engage in his prior work, the burden of proof shifted to the Secretary to prove that the claimant is able to engage in gainful employment and is not totally disabled. Ferguson v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.1981).
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Secretary has carried that burden. The only contrary evidence consists of two one-page form diagnoses by physicians which concluded that appellant is disabled. These were given in October 1986. The Secretary had the right to conclude that these brief statements, unsupported by clinical data, were not persuasive over the much more detailed diagnoses of Dr. Fleming who had been appellant’s treating physician and other doctors. The Secretary had the right to conclude that there was a lack of medical findings to support these opinions, Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 621 (5th Cir.1983). The Secretary obviously was entitled to weigh the conflicting evidence. Barajas v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir.1984). The statute itself provides that the Secretary need consider only those physician statements as to the disabling effect of pain “which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5).
The conclusion of the Secretary is strongly supported by the established regulations, 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(a). Table 1 covers residual functional capacity involving “maximum sustained work capability limited to sedentary work as a result of severe medically determined impairment.” Rule 201.18 provides that an individual in appellant’s age group who is of limited education but able to communicate in- English and whose previous work experience is unskilled but whose impairment falls within the “severe” category is not disabled. The critical point is that while appellant has a severe impairment, this impairment is not shown under the substantial evidence rule to make it impossible for him to engage in sedentary work. The vocational expert testified that jobs which appellant could hold include engraving machine operator, publication inspector, electrical equipment inspector, and linen goods classifier.
We find ample evidence in the record to support the Secretary’s conclusion that appellant is not disabled within the statutory definition of the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment_” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0