What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. LUTTON.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit
December 7, 1928.
No. 5043.
Norman A. Emery, of Youngstown, Ohio (Harrington, De Ford, Huxley & Smith, of Youngstown, Ohio, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
John Ruffalo, of Youngstown, Ohio (Ruf-falo & Wall, of Youngstown, Ohio, on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before DENISON, MACK, and MOOR-MAN, Circuit Judges.
DENISON, Circuit Judge.
Lutton was brakeman on a freight which entered the Youngstown yards, moving east upon the south or main passenger track. His train, after stopping in the yard, was ordered to cross over to the next track south, called the east-bound freight. This cross-over or ladder track, running southeasterly, was substantially a continuation of a yard lead track, which came up from that direction and led into the east-bound freight at a point immediately east of its junction with the crossover. The switch stands, operating the respective points, were six feet apart. Lutton went down toward the west switch stand to throw that switch. He saw a light engine and tender without cars coming toward him on the yard lead track, and signaled them to stop. They did so, but not until the forward point of the engine was upon, or so close to, the south-bound rail of the east-bound freight that the latter track was not clear.
At this time Lutton was throwing this westerly switch, so that his train could come down the cross-over onto thp east-bound freight. He says that, after observing that the track was thus fouled, and that the eastbound switch had not been thrown to permit the light engine to come forward, he assumed that it would baek away, because, according to the custom of the yard, his train had the right of way; his switch having been thrown. He started baek up the cross-over track toward his train, signaling his engineer to come ahead, and after walking some 10 feet the light engine without warning came up behind him and inflicted the injury for which he brought this suit. The defendant’s testimony is that the crew of the light engine told Lutton that they would first come forward and then go baek down the east-bound freight out of the way, and that in the execution of this plan they had moved a few feet, when Lutton suddenly stepped on the track ahead of them, and they could not avoid the injury. The case was submitted to the jury upon definitions of due care and ordinary care, as being due from each party to the other, and upon instructions as to contributory negligence and the last clear chance. The plaintiff had a verdict.
As we read the record, there was one simple issue of fact in the case, and no other open controversy, either of law or of fact. The case would have been appropriate for the submission of this clear and sharp issue, complicated by no other question as to liability. It is beyond question that this was a yard movement; that Lutton was a brakeman, moving about among the tracks along which engines and trains were in motion, or about to be; that he knew the light engine was about to move, and was physically equally able to go backward, away from him, or forward, toward him. Under these conditions, and excepting for the matter to be mentioned, the train crew had a right to assume that Lutton would look out for himself, and they were under no obligation to watch out for his safety, or to warn him, unless they saw him in danger. Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 418, 12 S. Ct. 835, 36 L. Ed. 758; Boldt v. Penn. R. R., 245 U. S. 441, 445, 446, 38 S. Ct. 139, 62 L. Ed. 385; Ches. & O. v. Nixon, 271 U. S. 218, 220, 46 S. Ct. 495, 70 L. Ed; 914.
It is not claimed that they did see him until too late for them to stop. Hence there could be no basis for any finding of negligence by defendant, save for the effect of the mutual agreement, or understanding, if there was one, that the light engine would go backward, and not forward. If there was such an understanding, rightly to be inferred from the facts and the custom, then Lutton was under no obligation to pay any attention to the light engine, and its crew were bound to assume that he might be (as he was) going baek to his engine in the natural way,, and were plainly negligent in running him down, without paying any attention to where he might be. Unless the engine crew knew, or should have known, that Lutton might have and rely upon such understanding, they were not at fault. The case was clearly not appropriate for an instructed verdict.
In this situation, neither party requested the submission of this simple issue. It may be inferred that each party hesitated to risk the case on that sharp test; at any rate, each seemed to be content with, if not to prefer, having the eourt give to the jury general definitions and principles, thus perhaps hoping to get a favorable verdict, without troublesome reasons as to exactly how or why. Defendant took two exceptions to the charge as given. One was to the instructions upon the ground of the last clear chance. We agree with defendant’s counsel that this rule can have no application to the facts of this case, because it applies only in succession to defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s contributory negligence; while here, if there was no initial negligence by defendant, that is the end of the case, and, if such negligence is to be inferred from the facts, the same facts free the plaintiff from the charge of contributory negligence. However, the defendant’s exceptions to the charge on this ground are so far confined to details in whieh it is doubtful whether defendant is right, and it is so uncertain just how far this rule was intended to be given to the jury as an independent ground of recovery that we cannot reverse for that reason.
The other exception is to the refusal of the request: “I think we are fairly entitled here to a charge that, under the circumstances mentioned by your honor, there was no duty upon the railroad company in this situation to either blow the whistle or ring the bell. It was purely a yard movement, and it was the duty of every yard employee to protect himself in situations of that kind.”
If this request could rightly be construed as asking an instruction that there was no duty to give a warning signal, unless the duty had been created by the understanding that the light engine would go backward, the request should have been given. We do not see that it can be so narrowly interpreted. The “circumstances mentioned” by the court had included the plaintiff’s contention that there was such an agreement and the defendant’s contention to the contrary. The request assumed that the circumstances were as claimed by defendant, and, in that broad form, there was no error in the failure to give it.
The judgment must be affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1