What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Muriel KANGLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 85-3856.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Jan. 8, 1986.
Decided Feb. 10, 1986.
Designated for Publication April 29, 1986.
Manza, Moceri, Gustafson & Messina, P.S., John S. Glassman, Michael S. Manza, Tacoma, Wash., for plaintiff-appellee.
Gene S. Anderson, U.S. Atty., Marie G. Creson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tacoma, Wash., for defendant-appellant.
Before WRIGHT, CANBY and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
WIGGINS, Circuit Judge.
The United States (government) appeals from the district court’s award of $145,-855.60 to Muriel Kangley (Kangley) in her Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) action. The government assigns error to a number of the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because we find one of the government’s claims dispositive of this appeal, we do not address its other claims.
I. FACTS
On January 6, 1982, Kangley went to Madigan Army Medical Center (MAMC) near Tacoma, Washington, to talk to someone in the office of the Staff Judge Advocate about a patient in the hospital. She entered a hall known as Ramp 1 and walked down the hall to the JAG office. As a result of her meeting in the JAG office, Kangley was upset. She departed the JAG office and walked back down Ramp 1. As she was doing so, she slipped and fell, severely injuring herself.
A door that leads outside is located along the side of Ramp 1 between the two ends of the ramp. A mat is permanently affixed to the floor just inside that door. Kangley walked across this mat on her way down the hall. As she stepped off the mat, her foot slipped out from under her and she fell.
Two officers assigned to the hospital testified that they found Kangley lying on her back with her head and shoulders on the mat and her feet extending off the mat. They both testified that they did not see any water, ice, or snow on the floor near Kangley and that her pants did not appear to be wet. Kangley testified that her pants became wet after she fell and that both the floor and the mat felt cold and wet.
II. DISCUSSION
Under the FTCA, tort actions against the United States are governed by the “law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). This accident occurred near Tacoma, Washington. We therefore apply Washington state law to this case.
The general rule in Washington for injuries caused by a transitory unsafe condition on property is that the owner or occupier of a building is liable for the injuries if it or its employees caused the unsafe condition or if it has actual or constructive knowledge that an unsafe condition exists. Pi-mentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wash.2d 39, 44, 666 P.2d 888, 893 (1983); Hemmen v. Clark’s Restaurant, 72 Wash.2d 690, 692, 434 P.2d 729, 732 . (1967). Constructive knowledge exists if the unsafe condition has been present long enough that a person exercising ordinary care would have discovered it. Pimentel, 100 Wash.2d at 44, 666 P.2d at 893; Hemmen, 72 Wash.2d at 692, 434 P.2d at 732. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition.
Further, Washington cases make it clear that the mere presence of water on a floor where the plaintiff slipped is not enough to prove negligence on the part of the owner or occupier of the building. See, e.g., Brant v. Market Basket Stores, 72 Wash.2d 446, 433 P.2d 863 (1967); Merrick v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 67 Wash.2d 426, 407 P.2d 960 (1965). To prove negligence, the plaintiff must prove that water makes the floor dangerously slippery and that the owner knew or should have known both that water would make the floor slippery and that there was water on the floor at the time the plaintiff slipped. See Brant, 72 Wash.2d at 451-52, 433 P.2d at 866-67.
The district court found that the government knew or should have known that the floor where Kangley slipped was unreasonably dangerous at the time she fell. The government claims that there is no evidence in the record to support this finding.
The court’s finding on this issue raises two questions for our review: (1) Whether the government actually knew that a dangerous condition existed or (2) whether the government had constructive knowledge of the existence of a dangerous condition. We review both of these questions for clear error. The first is a question of fact. The second is a question of application of law to facts in which issues of fact predominate: did the condition exist long enough that it should have been discovered? See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).
There is some evidence in the record to indicate that the government might have been aware that, the floor where Kangley slipped would be dangerous if it got wet. However, our search of the record has not revealed any evidence that would support a finding that the government knew or should have known that the floor was wet, and Kangley has not directed us to any such evidence either in her brief or at oral argument. The only evidence we have been shown in support of this finding is that there was a rug affixed to the floor inside the door where Kangley fell and that there was snow and ice on the ground outside.
The existence of a rug inside a door alone is not enough to establish that an owner or occupier knows the floor might be dangerous. See Kalinowski v. YWCA, 17 Wash.2d 380, 394-95, 135 P.2d 852, 859 (1943). The same is true of the fact that it is wet outside. If we were to hold that a person who slips inside a door where a mat has been placed on a day when it is wet outside may recover for injuries sustained without showing anything more, we would place an intolerable burden on businesses in areas like Tacoma where it is often wet outside. We are convinced that this is not the law in the state of Washington.
We hold that Kangley did not sustain her burden of proving that the government knew or should have known that a dangerous condition existed at the place and time she slipped and that the district court’s finding that she had sustained that burden is clearly erroneous. The district court’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED with directions that Kangley’s action be dismissed.
. At oral argument, Kangley argued that the government caused the floor to be dangerous by improperly using a slip resistant wax. Kangley did not raise this issue in the district court or in her briefs in this court. We therefore do not consider this issue on appeal. See International Union of Bricklayers v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.1985).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1