What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
In re William J. HINES and Patricia Hines, Debtors. Appeal of COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE.
No. 83-1167.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) Oct. 25, 1983.
Decided Dec. 14, 1983.
Jason W. Manne, Asst. Counsel, Dept, of Public Welfare, Harrisburg, Pa., for appellant.
Mitchell W. Miller, Jack K. Miller, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.
Before GIBBONS, GARTH and HIGGIN-BOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, appeals from an order of the district court, affirming an order of the bankruptcy court which confirmed a plan of William J. Hines and Patricia Hines pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1982), for payment to their creditors. The plan provides for payments of $175 a month for thirty-six months. The Commonwealth objected that it was not filed in good faith within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982) because, while it provides for payment in full to a secured creditor, it provides for only nominal payments to unsecured creditors.
The Commonwealth concedes that every court of appeals which has considered the question has ruled that Chapter 13 plans providing for nominal repayments to unsecured creditors do not, for that reason, violate the good faith standard of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982). We conclude that those decisions are entirely consistent with the statute.
What the Commonwealth does urge is that the order confirming the plan should be reversed because the debtor failed to carry the burden of proof of establishing good faith. That contention has dual aspects. First, the Commonwealth contends that in every instance the statute imposes on the proponent of a Chapter 13 plan the burden of showing good faith affirmatively. Second, it contends that if the burden of showing the absence of good faith is normally on the creditor objecting to confirmation, that burden should shift to the debtor in every case where the plan provides for only nominal repayments to unsecured creditors.
At the hearing on confirmation the debt- or introduced in evidence the report of the standing Chapter 13 trustee finding that the debtor’s proposed plan met the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322 and 1325 (1982). Moreover, the standing trustee appeared at the confirmation hearing and recommended confirmation. If the statute imposes any affirmative burden of showing good faith upon the debtor, it was satisfied by the report of the standing trustee. The Commonwealth objected to confirmation, but represented that it had no evidence to offer. It made no argument that the debtors had underestimated income. It did argue that they had overestimated the amount that would be needed for family recreation for their family of five. The bankruptcy judge considered and rejected that objection. The Commonwealth does not now urge that in so ruling the bankruptcy judge abused his discretion.
What is left, therefore, is the Commonwealth’s contention that some affirmative burden, beyond the showing made in the report of the standing trustee, was required because the plan provided for only nominal payments to unsecured creditors. The adoption of such a rule would be inconsistent with the authorities cited in the margin, which we approve.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed.
. In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885, 887-89 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam); In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir.1982); Deans v. O’Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 969-72 (4th Cir.1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 198-200 (D.C.Cir.1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386, 1388-91 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 431-32 (7th Cir.1982).
. We have by an order filed simultaneously herewith denied Hines’ motion to dismiss the Commonwealth’s appeal as moot.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 38