What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES.
No. 2912.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Nov. 10, 1934.
Arthur Harrington, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.
Arthur J. B. Cartier, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass. (Francis J. W. Ford, IJ. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for the United States.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
On the 6th day of September, 19‘33, Frank Melville Reynolds, setting himself up as a resident of Hull, Mass., filed with the clerk of the District Court for Massachusetts a petition for naturalization in the usual form, in which he stated that ho was born in Charles-town, Boston, Mass., on May 26, 1885; that his last foreign residence was near Six Milo Lake, Canada; that he emigrated to the United States from Montreal, Quebec, Canada, through St. Albans, Vt., on August 27, 1914; that “it is my intention to become a citizen of the United States and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to George V * * * of whom at this time I am a subject.”
This petition was filed without the usually required preliminary declaration of intention under the provisions of the Naturalization Act of May 9, 1918-, as amended (8 USCA § 377), which allowed such filing when the petitioner had “resided uninterruptedly within the United States during the period of five years next preceding July 1, 1929,” having during that time, in good faith, because of misinformation, regarded himself a citizen and exercised the rights and performed the duties of such citizen. In the affidavit required by the Department of Labor in such eases he gave the time and place of his birth as sot out in the petition; that he believed that he was and continued to be a citizen of ihe United States “in view of my birth in this country”; that he continued to so believe until May, 1933, when the Registrars of Voters at Hull, Mass., removed his name from the list of eligible voters in Hull on the ground that ho had “become a citizen of Canada, as a result of an application for Canadian citizenship claimed to have been made by me at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, Canada, on or about October 20, 1913”; that he had exercised the following rights and duties of a citizen of the United States: “I was appointed Postmaster at the Nantasket Beach Post Office, Hull, Massachusetts, in February 1916, after having taken a Civil Service examination at Boston, Mass., in 1915. * * * I have served as Postmaster at the Nantasket Beach Post Offihe, Hull, Mass., from February 1916 until the present date.”
When the petition came on for hearing in the District Court, counsel for the petitioner, in the petitioner’s presence, requested the court to deny the petition upon the ground that the petitioner is now a citizen. Among the papers submitted at that time was a photostatie copy of a written oath of allegiance to Great Britain purporting to be, though not conceded by petitioner to be, signed by him. At a later hearing counsel for the petitioner requested the court to rule in substance that the petitioner is entitled to have his status determined by filing a petition for citizenship and having the petition denied at his request on the ground that he is already an American citizen. This request was denied and the petitioner excepted.
The court, in making a final disposition of the case, said:
“I am not prepared to say that a person has the right to file a naturalization petition, reciting that he is an alien, with the intent later to take the position that he is a citizen, and then have his petition denied upon such ground as he requests. It is urged that, unless this can be done there is no way in which a person may have his citizenship established, and that accordingly I ought to find the facts and pass upon a petition, the granting of which the petitioner at no time intended to urge. I find nothing in the Acts of Congress or in Judge Morton’s decision [In re Mary Bates Fitzroy (D. C.) 4 F.(2d) 541] (which as before stated involved an application for leave to file a petition) which requires or warrants such a course. Nor do I feel that it is for the District Court to extend the Fitzroy Case, in view of Judge Morton’s opinion, to eases not presenting the special and unusual circumstances there considered.
“Without passing upon the question whether the petitioner signed an oath of allegiance to Great Britain purporting to bear his signature, or the effect thereof, and without passing upon the matter of the petitioner’s citizenship) the petition is denied on the broad ground that neither at the time it was filed nor at any other time has the petitioner really wanted to have it allowed.”
As said by the Circuit Court for Massachusetts as far back as 1884, “the jurisdiction of the district court, in matters of naturalization, does not depend upon facts stated, but is derived from the statutes of the'United States. Whether the court will grant naturalization papers in a given case depends upon, the facts; but it has jurisdiction over the matter even if the facts be insufficient for a favorable result to the application.” United States v. Walsh, 22 F. 644, 649.
The jurisdiction given the several courts to naturalize aliens involves the filing of a petition as an alien, and it is the duty of the court on the filing of such a petition to determine on all the evidence the facts on which the petition should be either allowed or denied, and to enter judgment accordingly. The applicant in this ease did not withdraw his petition or ask to have it dismissed or disposed of other than on its merits, and we think that'the judgment of the District Court denying it without passing upon the merits was erroneous. By his petition the applicant sought to establish his status [In re Grant (D. C.) 289 F. 814; Petition of Zogbaum (D. C.) 32 F. (2d) 911; In re Fitzroy (D. C.) 4 F. (2d) 541. See, also, In re Guliano (D. C.) 156 F. 426], whether he was a citizen or an alien and that the petition be dismissed or allowed as the fact was found to be. His request that on the evidence the court find he was a citizen and deny the petition was not improper and should not have been so regarded, for the requested finding and ruling would establish his status to be that of a citizen. As the chief issue raised by the petition was his status — a citizen or alien — the determination of the fact one way or the other should be stated in the judgment denying or granting the petition. Had it been determined that the applicant was an alien we cannot conceive that he would have desired any disposition of the petition other than to have it allowed.
The Fitzroy Case, supra, as reported in 4 F.(2d) 541, states that the petition of Mary Bates Fitzroy was “for admission to citizenship.” The original records in' the case show that it was a petition “for leave to file a petition for admission to citizenship,” and the practice of allowing such a petition to be brought was supported on the opinion of Judge Hough in Re Guliano (D. C.) 156 F. 420, 421. The suggestion in the Fitzroy Case that the practice of allowing such a petition to be brought “should be confined to special and unusual eases,” had nothing to do with a straight petition for naturalization; and in the Guliano Case, where the petition was one for leave to file a petition for naturalization, it was held that there was nothing in the naturalization statute “forbidding a preliminary inquiry in cases where it is doubtful whether the applicant can truthfully verify a petition [for naturalization] giving' him any hope of a successful issue,” and that in such a case he should “be permitted to make a .preliminary showing in this regard without the payment of the fees [considerable in amount] attaching to the filing of an application” for naturalization.
The decree of the District Court is vacated, and the ease is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0