What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Frances P. NORMAN and Frances P. Norman d/b/a The Norman Company, a partnership consisting of Frances P. Norman and Norman Norman, Appellees, v. Leonard LAWRENCE, Appellant.
No. 66, Docket 26043.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued Nov. 1, 1960.
Decided Dec. 21, 1960.
Swan, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Mock & Blum, Blum, Moscovitz, Friedman & Blum, Alex Friedman, New York City, for defendant-appellant.
Kenyon & Kenyon, Ralph L. Chappell, Richard A. Huettner, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before HAND, SWAN and MEDINA, Circuit Judges.
HAND, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of Judge Bruchhausen (180 F.Supp. 186), holding valid and infringed Claim 1 of Patent No. 2,763,999, issued to one of the plaintiffs, Frances P. Norman, for “earring pads.” The disclosure was for two kinds of “pads” — the “clip-on” and the “screw-on — but we need concern ourselves only with the “clip-on” type. It was designed to provide a “clip” that would grasp an earring to the lobe of the ear and hold it firmly in place to resist entanglements in the hair, but without too much pressure on the lobe for the comfort of the wearer. There had been numerous earring “clips” before, at times using round sections of a soft rubber cylinder, and holding their position by adhesives on one or both of the two arms of a spring pressed clamp. We accept, because they are not shown to be “clearly erroneous” Judge Bruchhausen’s findings of fact as follows. “The articles on the market prior to the introduction of plaintiffs’ article were so-called stick-on pads, supposed to remain glued onto the rear of the earring clamp upon application of finger pressure. However, these pads would continually loosen and become caught in a user’s hair. Also, on the market was a tubular rubber cot or sleeve for twisting on to the rear of the earring. The cot or sleeve was found unsatisfactory because the rubber cots or sleeves were difficult to twist on to the earring clamp and, since the clamps were not strong, would frequently break. The plaintiff, Frances P. Norman, then experimented and eventually developed her article, a flat flexible thin rubber pocket created by the dipping of two flat thin rubber pieces into a latex solution, holding the pocket intact and rendering it extremely flexible. It also developed that a sponge rubber pad could be retained on the fiat side of the rubber pocket, which would not slip off or loosen from the pocket.”
The pads themselves were very old, but were not satisfactory for the reasons just given. The other element of the combination, the rubber “pocket” just mentioned, known as the Dorsey “boot,” had appeared thirty years before the application for the patent; it was made up of sections of a rubber tubing to be slipped over one of the clamps, quite unlike the patented circular discs of rubber about the size of the clamp on which they were to be used. Two of these were stuck together at their circumferences except for an opening between them long enough to admit the inner clamp by stretching. The plaintiffs sold their “pockets” with a pad already glued on; in the accused clip the pads and “pockets” were sold separately with instruction that a pad should be glued to the inner “pocket.” The invention therefore consisted of combining a kind of “pocket” that could be easily slipped on and off the clamp, with the old pad into a single member that would hold the earring in place upon the lobe of the wearer’s ear.
In spite of the fact that this combination was of the simplest sort, made of two elements that had for many years been used in the industry, no one had thought of combining them. Hence it is argued, as it always is when an invention consists of a combination of old elements, that there can be no “invention” in mere “aggregation.” In the case at bar the judge has found that “the commercial success was phenomenal, and again there is no reason to hold that this finding was “clearly erroneous.” The appeal therefore presents the question that so often arises as to patents: what shall be the test or standard of invention? We have just discussed this once again in the case of Reiner v. I. Leon & Co., 285 F.2d 501, handed down at the same time as this, and could only repeat what we there said. It is true that courts have again and again evinced repugnance to recognizing as patentable a trivial readjustment of existing elements into a new combination, apparently insisting that monopolies should be limited to new assemblages of old elements that are important and imposing. That disposition will no doubt continue; it is hard to attach value to a trifling modification of a gadget that has arisen on the surface of a stream of novelties because it has found immediate favor. We can only reply that, while the standard remains what it is, we can see no escape from measuring invention in cases-where all the elements of the new combination had been long available, (1) by whether the need had long existed and been desired, and (2) whether, when it. was eventually contrived, it was widely exploited as a substitute for what had. gone before.
Judgment affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0