What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Samuel Jennings JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Fred T. WILKINSON, Warden, United States Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, Appellee.
No. 18246.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
June 20, 1960.
Rehearing Denied July 29, 1960.
Samuel J. Johnson, in pro. per. William C. O’Kelley, E. Ralph Ivey, Asst. U. S. Attys., Charles D. Read, Jr., U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.
Before RIVES, Chief Judge, and CAMERON and BROWN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, by a writ of habeas corpus, seeks release from the federal penitentiary in Atlanta on the ground that he has served his sentence in full. He was convicted for interstate transportation of stolen vehicles and sentenced on February 5, 1951, to six years and six days in prison. With 852 days remaining on this sentence, he was paroled. While on parole, he committed a second federal offense for which he was arrested in January 1955, convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned in a federal penitentiary in Virginia. Also, because of this offense and other conduct, the Parole Board issued a warrant for his arrest as a parole violator in January 1955 (which petitioner asserts was then served). On June 4, 1957, after serving his sentence for the second crime, he was served with the parole violator’s warrant (the Government says the one originally issued in January 1955) confining him for the 852 days remaining on the original sentence. Petitioner contends that the time served for the second offense should be credited on his first offense as it was federal custody subsequent to revocation of his parole. On the pleadings and affidavits and a full response showing the record of his confinement, releases, etc., but without a hearing, the District Judge denied the writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
The confinement in the federal prison in Virginia was pursuant to the conviction and sentence for the federal crime committed while on parole from the original sentence. Petitioner is not entitled to credit on the original sentence for the time spent serving the sentence for the subsequent crime committed while he was on parole from the original sentence. Zerbst v. Kidwell, 1938, 304 U.S. 359, 58 S.Ct. 872, 82 L.Ed. 1399. The District Court found that the parole violator’s warrant was not served until June 14, 1957 at the end of the second sentence. Even assuming that a warrant for the arrest of petitioner was served by a deputy Marshal in January 1955 as petitioner •claims, he was not at that time returned to the custody of the Attorney General under that warrant. He remained under the same confinement until he was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the second offense and commenced service of that sentence in April 1955. The service of the warrant, if made then as claimed, would not have transmuted that custody into custody under the parole violator warrant. That would have been accomplished only by the Marshal’s carrying out the command of the warrant. Jenkins v. Madigan, 7 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 904. This was not done until two years later in June 1957. Until then the unexpired term on the original sentence had not begun to run. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4205.
As all the facts either appeared on the face of the record or the one “disputed” fact was immaterial, the District Court could properly dispose of the petition without holding a hearing. Rea v. McDonald, 5 Cir., 1946, 153 F.2d 190.
Affirmed.
. Petitioner would have been out of prison a long time ago but for a sequel to the events recited above. He was paroled a second time and again broke his parole for which he was returned to serve the remaining time (then 727 days) on his original conviction.
. The parole violator’s warrant, directed to any federal officer authorized to serve criminal process, provides:
“NOW, THEREFORE, this is to command you to execute this warrant by taking the said Samuel J. Johnson [petitioner], wherever found in the United States, and Mm safely return to the institution designated according to law.”
. 18 U.S.O.A. § 4205:
“Retaking parole violator under warrant; time to serve undiminished
“A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated his parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole or a member thereof and within the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced. The unexpired term of imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to run from the date he is returned to the custody of the Attorney General under said warrant, and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0