What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Russell A. PATTERSON, Appellant, v. A. L. LOCKHART, Superintendent, Cummins Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.
No. 74-1670.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 12, 1975.
Decided April 3, 1975.
H. Clay Moore, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Jack T. Lassiter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, CLARK, Associate Justice, Retired, and LAY, Circuit Judge.
Associate Justice Tom C. Clark, United States Supreme Court, Retired, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus sought by an Arkansas state prisoner. The petitioner Russell A. Patterson was convicted in an Arkansas state court of possession of stolen property and his conviction was upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Patterson v. State, 253 Ark. 393, 486 S.W.2d 19 (1972). He based his claim for habeas relief on alleged constitutional deficiencies in the proceedings against him: (1) that the search of his farm house which produced the stolen property entered in evidence against him was illegal since the affidavit upon which the search warrant was granted failed to establish probable cause; (2) that discussions concerning items not offered or received in evidence occurred between law officers and jurors outside the courtroom during the course of his trial; and (3) that the sentence imposed upon him amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court denied relief on the first and third grounds and found that petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies as to the second. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
During oral argument before this court the State of Arkansas confessed error, conceding the invalidity of the affidavit which supported the search warrant. We agree that it was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause for the search warrant. The Attorney General now points out, however, that at the time the warrant was issued, Arkansas law permitted the state to reinforce such an affidavit when attacked in a habeas proceeding by demonstrating that oral testimony establishing probable cause was also presented to the magistrate. The state now seeks permission to take additional testimony to show probable cause. The rule in Arkansas has been changed by statute and such reinforcement is no longer possible. See Ark. Stats.Ann. § 43-205 (1971); Cockrell v. State, 505 S.W.2d 204 (Ark.1974). Whether this statute bars reinforcement of a warrant for a search conducted pri- or to its enactment is essentially a question of state law which should be decided by an Arkansas court. Cf. United States v. Berkus, 428 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1970).
Upon the confession of error, the district court’s denial of the petition is therefore vacated and the cause is remanded to the district court. The district court shall request the State of Arkansas to immediately schedule a plenary hearing in the state court upon all questions pertaining to the validity of the search warrant, as well as to the other constitutional issues alleged in the petition. The district court shall retain jurisdiction until the state has complied with this order. In the event of compliance the habeas petition should be dismissed without prejudice to the state court proceeding; in the event of noncompliance the petition should be granted and a writ of habeas corpus issued.
Judgment vacated and the cause remanded.
. Petitioner was found guilty of three counts of receiving stolen property and was sentenced to 21 years on each count, with the sentences to run consecutively. At oral argument a separate issue emerged concerning the punishment imposed. There was apparently no proof by the state as to when the stolen property was received by the defendant. Thus, there is some question whether he could properly be charged and sentenced on three separate counts. Since the case is to be remanded to the state court, however, this issue can be explored anew in that forum and it is unnecessary for us to reach it at this time.
. It is difficult to understand why the state has failed to confess error until this late date. The search warrant was defended in the state courts as well as in the federal district court. The state even defended the legality of the search in briefs filed in this court. Three affidavits were presented in support of the warrant. They were all conclusory and clearly insufficient. The most complete of the three stated only:
The undersigned being duly sworn deposes and says: That he has reason to believe that on the premises known as J. D. Flake Farm located on Route 2, Morrilton, described as Section 21, Township 7 North, Range 15 West in the County of Conway, State of Arkansas, there is now being concealed certain property, namely new Atlas Tires, boxes of Atlas dry charge batteries, boxes of Esso oil, and also certain credit cards of Kurt P. Herz and Frieda Schurger, and other personal property of the said Kurt P. Herz and Frieda Schurger which are items observed by Carl Stobaugh and Dick Daniels, June 1, 1971, which were on the above described premises, and other personal property reported stolen in other states, which was not necessarily visible, but information leads to the conclusion that said items are on the premises.
And that the facts tending to establish the foregoing grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows: that the above items have been reported stolen by other owners, and there is reason to believe that such items are upon said property.
. Since the state has confessed error as to the validity of the search, we need not pass on the other issues raised. We encourage petitioner’s counsel, however, to amend his petition in the state court to indicate all the claims now raised and which possibly could be raised, thus avoiding any questions which might later arise as to exhaustion of state remedies.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0