What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Maitland E. BROWN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 23858.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 21, 1967.
Jack Bryant, Abilene, Tex., for appellant.
William O. Callaway, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Fort Worth, Tex., Melvin M. Diggs, U. S. Atty., for appellee.
Before GEWIN, THORNBERRY and DYER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying petitioner relief on his § 2255 motion seeking to vacate and correct sentences imposed upon him in the United States District Court on June 12, 1959. This is the seventh post-conviction motion filed by petitioner. All previous motions were unsuccessful, the fourth being ruled upon by this Court. Brown v. United States, 5th Cir. 1963, 318 F.2d 404.
The only issue presented by this appeal is whether the district court erred in holding that the pronouncement of sentence in open court by the original trial court was sufficient to effectuate the court’s intent to make the sentences run consecutively rather than concurrently. At the original trial, petitioner pled guilty to three separate charges: (1) A two-count indictment charging forgery of postal money orders in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500; (b) a one-count indictment charging bail jumping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146; and (c) an information charging the interstate transportation of an altered American Express money order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. At the time of sentencing, the following colloquy took place:
THE COURT: Well, I am going to have to impose a sentence here to prevent you from forging, altering checks; so in Cause No. 2012, which is the case for two counts of falsely and fraudulently counterfeiting postal money orders, I sentence you to the custody of the Attorney General for five years, on both counts generally. In Cause No. 2009, bail jumping, I sentence you to the custody of the Attorney General for one year, and in Cause No. 2010, charging the violation of transportation in interstate commerce of an altered American Express Company Money Order, I sentence you to the custody of the Attorney General for six years.
MR. BINION [the prosecuting attorney] : Your Honor, may I inquire about the sentences as to—
THE COURT: He is sentenced independently, separately, and to be served consecutively.
Petitioner has had the benefit of able and experienced court-appointed counsel, and his case has been advanced with unusual diligence and vigor. Despite the commendable efforts of counsel, however, we feel that disposition of the appeal in a manner contrary to petitioner’s position is clearly dictated by this Court’s opinion in Henley v. Heritage, 5th Cir. 1964, 337 F.2d 847. Dealing there with a factual situation substantially identical to thát at bar, this Court concluded:
* * * that the clear meaning of the [court’s oral pronouncement of sentence] * * * is that the sequence of sentences is to follow the order in which the sentences were announced, and that consequently, the prisoner is entitled to no relief.
337 F.2d at 848. Clearly this language, and the entire reasoning of the Henley case, applies equally well in the instant controversy. The sentencing pronouneement clearly reveals the trial court’s intent that the three sentences were to run consecutively in the order announced; and, in light of the holding in Henley, it was legally sufficient to implement that intent. The judgment of the district court denying petitioner’s motion is therefore affirmed.
. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 1