What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, Inc., Petitioner, v. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 13817.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 5, 1958.
Decided May 22, 1958.
Mr. Henry J. Friendly, New York City, with whom Mr. Robert C. Barnard, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for petitioner.
Mr. Morris Chertkov, Atty., Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Franklin M. Stone, Gen. Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board, John H. Wanner, Associate Gen. Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board, O. D. Ozment, Asst. General Counsel, Litigation and Research, Civil Aeronautics Board, and Daniel M. Friedman, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for respondent.
Before Edgerton, Chief Judge, and Bazelon and Burger, Circuit Judges.
EDGERTON, Chief Judge.
Northwest flies a short route between Seattle and Tokyo. Pan American, under its certificate from the Civil Aeronautics Board, flies a much longer route, via Hawaii, between San Francisco and Tokyo. The Board fixed the same “service” rate, computed on the basis of the shorter Northwest mileage, to be paid by the Postmaster General for carrying mail to and from Tokyo by either route. Pan American contends this equalized rate fails to meet the statutory “fair and reasonable” standard and the Fifth Amendment “just compensation” standard because, although the rate more than covers out-of-pocket costs, it does not cover fully allocated costs plus or including a return on allocated investment.
The burden of proof is on Pan American to show that the rate is “unfair and unreasonable as applied to it.” United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 665, 69 S.Ct. 787, 799, 93 L.Ed. 938. We think it has not shown this. The Board says Pan American is better off by reason of the “equalized” rate than it would be if rates were based on actual mileage, because the Postmaster General would then give Northwest nearly all Tokyo mail and this would take away a good deal of Pan American’s revenue. We think the Board was right in giving weight to this fact. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 98, 61 S.Ct. 884, 85 L.Ed. 1212. “It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.” Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602, 64 S.Ct. 281, 288, 88 L.Ed. 333.
A carrier may be required to charge for a particular service a rate that is not fully compensatory, in the sense that it does not cover fully allocated costs and return. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 146, 73 S.Ct. 592, 97 L.Ed. 912; Market Street Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of State of California, 324 U.S. 548, 65 S.Ct. 770, 89 L.Ed. 1171. Cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc., v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 243 F.2d 422. “So long as a railroad is not caused by such regulations to lose money on its over-all business, it is hard to think that it could successfully charge that its property was being taken for public use ‘without just compensation.’ ” Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, supra, 345 U.S. at page 148, 73 S.Ct. at page 593. Pan American does not contend it will lose money on its over-all Tokyo business, which includes carrying passengers and freight as well as mail.
But for one point, we would affirm the Board’s order. Pan American says the service rate should at least include an allowance for carrying mail between San Francisco and Seattle. We think this contention is valid as far as it is applicable; but it is applicable only to so much of Pan American’s Tokyo mail as comes from or goes to such points that if it were carried between Seattle and Tokyo it would have to be carried between Seattle and San Francisco. Wo think the Board should determine how much mail is in this category and revise its order accordingly.
Modified and affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1