What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
LUMBERMEN’S MUTUAL CASUALTY CO. v. ELBERT.
No. 11.
Argued October 14, 1954.
Decided December 6, 1954.
Charles L. Mayer argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Joseph H. Jackson.
John M. Madison and Whitfield Jack argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the Louisiana direct action statute. This Court has today had occasion to test that statute against certain claims of unconstitutionality, Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., post, p. 66. Questions are raised here involving the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases arising under the statute.
Respondent, a citizen of Louisiana, was injured in an automobile accident at Shreveport, Louisiana, allegedly because of the negligence of Mrs. S. W. Bowen, also a Louisiana citizen. Petitioner, an Illinois corporation, had issued a public liability policy to Mr. Bowen insuring him and members of his household against claims arising from their negligent operation of the family car. The policy was applied for, issued, and delivered within the State of Louisiana. Petitioner was certificated to do business in Louisiana and had, as a legal prerequisite thereto, consented in writing to be sued directly for damages sustained in Louisiana accidents involving its policyholders.
The pertinent portion of the direct action statute provides:
“The injured person or his or her heirs, at their option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy in the parish where the accident or injury occurred or in the parish where the insured has his domicile, and said action may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and the insurer, jointly and in solido.” La. Rev. Stat., Tit. 22, § 655. (Italics added.)
Pursuant to this provision, respondent brought this action against petitioner in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, alleging diversity of citizenship and damages in excess of $3,000. Mrs. Bowen, the alleged tortfeasor, was not made a codefendant. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction; the district judge granted the motion. 107 F. Supp. 299, 108 F. Supp. 157. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for trial, 201 F. 2d 500, one judge dissenting from the denial of a petition for rehearing. 202 F. 2d 744. From that decision, this Court granted certiorari. 347 U. S. 965. Thus, the sole question to be decided is whether the United States District Court in Louisiana has jurisdiction over this suit for damages brought under the direct action statute against the wrongdoer’s insurer alone, where diversity of citizenship exists between the complainant and the defendant insurer but not between the complainant and the wrongdoer.
Section 1332 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (a), reads as follows:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between:
“(1) Citizens of different States . . . .”
It is petitioner’s contention that the “matter in controversy” here is the underlying tort liability of the alleged wrongdoer. If this were true, of course, no diversity of citizenship would exist between respondent and Mrs. Bowen, as the real party-defendant in interest. But the Louisiana courts have differentiated between actions brought by an injured party against the insurer alone and those brought against either the tortfeasor alone or together with the insurer. In the former action, the insurer is foreclosed from asserting defenses such as coverture, normally available to the tortfeasor. Edwards v. Royalty Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191. Similarly, the insurer is severely restricted in advancing technical defenses based upon the terms of the policy, such as a failure of notice, when the injured party brings a direct action. Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 19, 29 So. 2d 177. While either type of action encompasses proof of the tortfeasor’s negligence, in the separate suit against the insurer a plaintiff must also establish liability under the policy. The Louisiana courts have characterized the statute as creating a separate and distinct cause of action against the insurer which an injured party may elect in lieu of his action against the tortfeasor. West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122; Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., supra.
Petitioner is therefore not merely a nominal defendant but is the real party in interest here. This conclusion to disregard the tortfeasor’s citizenship in the instant case for purposes of federal jurisdiction is fortified by cases honoring the states’ characterization of a guardian or other fiduciary as determinative of the real party in interest in federal litigation. New Orleans v. Gaines’s Administrator, 138 U. S. 595; Mexican Central R. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U. S. 429. There is even greater justification for disregarding the tortfeasor’s citizenship here than for disregarding the citizenship of a beneficiary since the insurer — -unlike a fiduciary — has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation.
Petitioner next asserts that the tortfeasor is an indispensable party to this litigation, and that failure to join her as a defendant deprives the federal court of jurisdiction: Clearly under the Louisiana statute and practice the argument has no merit. And the circumstances which have led the federal courts to findings of indispensability are not present here. In Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 139, indispensable parties were defined as “Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.” The tortfeasor in a Louisiana direct action against the insurer is not such a person. The state has created an optional right to proceed directly against the insurer; by bringing the action against petitioner, respondent has apparently abandoned her action against the tortfeasor. See Miller v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 199 La. 515, 526, 6 So. 2d 646, 649. Thus a complete disposition of the entire claim may be made in this one action, without injustice to any of the participants.
Finally, petitioner contends that the federal courts should decline, as a matter of discretion, to exercise their jurisdiction over suits against an insurer alone. This argument is based upon the differing standards of review on appeal of a jury verdict in the Louisiana and federal courts. Petitioner relies upon Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, as authority for the suggested discretionary refusal to exercise jurisdiction. But in Burjord, jurisdiction was declined to avoid a potential interference with a state’s administrative policy-making process, a consideration not present here. Moreover, traditional equitable authority, not available here, was relied upon to justify the holding.
The language of the congressional grant of jurisdiction to the lower courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (a), is clear, and this case seems to us to fall squarely within the provision. In Louisiana the practice of bringing direct actions in the federal courts has long been recognized. See, e. g., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, 167 F. 2d 767 (C. A. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 822; Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Green, 181 F. 2d 1 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Belanger v. Great American Ind. Co., 188 F. 2d 196 (C. A. 5th Cir.). Neither federal nor Louisiana law suggests any reason to disturb this practice. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
Ajjirmed.
See also McDowell v. National Surety Corp., 68 So. 2d 189, appeal dismissed, 347 U. S. 995.
Two proposals for compulsory joinder of insured and insurer as party-defendants have failed of passage in the Louisiana Legislature within recent years. See La. Senate Bill 73, 1952 Session; La. House Bill 600, 1954 Session.
See also 3 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948), ¶ 19.07 et seq.; Note, Indispensable Parties in the Federal Courts, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1050 (1952).
No case has been cited, although there has been nearly a quarter-century of experience under the direct action statute, where an injured party has attempted to bring suit against the tortfeasor following an unsuccessful suit against the insurer in either state or federal courts.
Appellate review in the federal courts is, of course, limited ultimately by the Seventh Amendment. Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 3 Pet. 433. In Louisiana, appellate review in civil cases extends to both matters of law and fact. See La. Const., Art. 7, §§ 10, 29.
See also Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293; Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341, cited in the dissenting opinion below. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 234, 236, 237.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 5
3