What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William Jerald MYERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17254.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
April 18, 1967.
Leslie W. Morris, II, Lexington, Ky., for appellant.
James F. Cook, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky. (George I. Cline, U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., on the brief), for appel-lee.
Before O’SULLIVAN, PHILLIPS and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is from an order after a hearing overruling appellant’s motion to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
Appellant was charged with transporting a stolen automobile to Kentucky in violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1964). Appellant, after consulting with appointed counsel, pled guilty. The District Judge who took the plea then announced that appellant “should be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for discipline and training under the Youth Corrections Act,” 18 U.S. C. §§ 5005-5024 (1964).
Appellant was sent to a Youth Correction Center at Chillicothe, Ohio, where he remained for two years before being granted a conditional release.
On violation of the terms of that release, appellant was returned to Chilli-cothe. He thereupon filed the instant motion to vacate sentence. His petition recited that he had been informed by the Court that the maximum he could receive if he pleaded guilty was five years and that the Court did not explain the terms of the Youth Corrections. Act to him.
His petition cited and relied on Pil-kington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (C.A. 4, 1963).
The District Judge who denied his motion to vacate sentence did so after full evidentiary hearing. He said in part:
“This ease is not the Pilkington case. The Pilkington case is where the judge-made a positive statement which mislead the defendant. This is not the-Williams case. In the Williams case he had no attorney to advise him. In the Pilkington case, the judge made a positive statement to him * *
* * * * * *-
“There is no reason as I can find that this defendant has been in any way misled or has not been fully advised of his rights before he entered his plea. * * *”
The record clearly shows that the sentencing judge did not tell appellant that his plea could only result in a maximum of five year. Cf. Pilkington v. United States, supra. It also clearly shows that he did tell appellant that he was being-sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act. He did not, however, specifically inform him of the total length of incarceration which was possible under the-Youth Corrections Act.
In this appeal the only question of' substance is whether or not the District. Judge in sentencing defendant on a plea, of guilty deprived him of some legal or constitutional right by failing to advise him prior to committing him under the-Youth Corrections Act that this could result in a total of six years of incarceration.
No appeal was taken from the sentence, nor was any effort made to set it aside until after Myers had been released conditionally at the end of about two years, and had violated the terms of the parole and been reincarcerated.
The District Judge, after full hearing, found no legal or constitutional deprivation and held that the appellant was not misled by ignorance of the facts into a plea of guilty which was involuntary.
We cannot hold this finding to be clearly erroneous.
Contrary to the facts in the Pilking-ton case, heavily relied on in this appeal, there is no factual misrepresentation made to appellant by the sentencing judge. Further, here, as contrasted with Pilkington, there has been a full evi-dentiary hearing on appellant’s motion under Section 2255.
Contrary to the facts in the Williams case (Williams v. United States, 231 F.Supp. 382 (E.D.Ky.1964)) appellant’s plea herein was entered after advice of competent counsel.
While not controlling on voluntariness of the plea, we also note that appellant .admits full knowledge of the nature of the Youth Corrections Act (and its potentialities for a maximum of six years’ imprisonment) shortly after his arrival .at the Youth Correction Center at Chil-licothe. No motion for relief was filed then or for a matter of several years thereafter, until appellant had been released on parole under the terms of the Youth Corrections Act.
While we agree with Judge Sobeloff in Pilkington v. United States, .supra, that it is highly advisable for a District Judge in sentencing under the Youth Corrections Act to make an explanation of its purpose and terms, we do not believe that failure to do so (in facts such as these) represented a violation of appellant’s legal or constitutional rights.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1