What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CARROLL ELECTRIC CO. v. FREED-EISE-MANN RADIO CORPORATION.
No. 5140.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted May 7, 1931.
Decided June 1, 1931.
Chas. A. Douglas and Edmund D. Campbell, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Max L. Rosenstein, of Newark, N. J., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
An appeal from an order quashing service of summons upon a foreign corporation.
The Carroll Electric Company, a District of1 Columbia corporation, plaintiff below, sued the Freed-Eisemann Company, a New York corporation, for damages because of the alleged breach of a contract existing between'them relating to certain dealings in radio equipment.
A writ of summons was issued for the defendant, which was returned by the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia with the following indorsement, to wit, “served copies of the declaration, affidavit, and this summons, on the Defendant Corporation within named by serving Fred McCarthy, Salesman, in charge personally, July 18, 1929.”
Thereupon, by special appearance) the defendant moved to quash this service, alleging in substance that it was a foreign corporation and was not doing or transacting business in the District of Columbia at the date of the alleged service, and did not have or maintain an office or an agent therein, and that McCarthy upon whom service was made was not a “salesman in charge,” nor doing or transacting business for defendant in the District, except for assistance rendered'in soliciting orders for merchandise.
This motion was heard upon affidavits and was sustained. The service was quashed, and the present appeal was taken.
This-subject is governed by section 373, c. 15, tit. 24, of the Code of the District of Columbia 1929, .reading as follows:
“Service on foreign corporations. — In actions against foreign corporations doing business in the District all process may be served on the agent of such corporation or person conducting its business, or, in case he is absent and can not be found, by leaving a copy at the principal place of business in the District, or, if there be no such place of business, by leaving the same at the place of business or residence of such agent in said District, and such service shall be effectual to bring the corporation before the court.
“When a foreign corporation shall transact business in the District without having any place of business or resident agent therein, service upon any officer or agent or employee of such corporation in the District shall be effectual as to suits growing out of contracts entered into or to be performed, in whole or in part, in the District of Columbia or growing out of any tort committed in the said District.” ’
The relations between the two corporations were created by a written contract called a “Distributor’s Franchise” entered into by them in New York City on May 1, 19291, wherein the Freed-Eisemann Radio Corporation is designated as the “Manufacturer” and the Carroll Electric Company as the “Distributor.” The following stipulations, among others, appear in the contract.
“1. The Manufacturer agrees to and does hereby grant to the Distributor a Freed-Eise-mann Distributor- Franchise for the term and subject to the conditions of this Agreement, in the following described territory; District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland, Part of West Virginia, Part of Delaware.
“2. The Distributor agrees to earry at all times a representative stock of the products of the Manufacturer, and to exert every reasonable effort to sell the products of the Manufacturer at wholesale within said territory, and to secure an adequate number of dealers to sell said products at retail within said territory.
“3. The Distributor agrees to purchase the products of the Manufacturer in accordance with the Manufacturer’s formal acknowledgment of orders at a discount of 50% and 10% from list price, F. O. B. factory at Clifton, New Jersey, payment less 2% to be made on or before the 10th of the following month.
“4. The Distributor agrees to have every new dealer to whom the Distributor sells the Manufacturer’s products, approved by the Manufacturer, and to have said dealer execute in triplicate the Manufacturer’s “Authorized Dealer Contract”, a specimen of which is annexed hereto, and to forward the same in triplicate to the Manufacturer. If approved and executed by the Manufacturer, one copy of said contract shall be kept by it, one copy shall be returned to the Distributor and one copy shall be sent by the Manufacturer to the dealer.”
“10. The Distributor agrees to act as a wholesale Distributor of the Manufacturer within the territory specified in paragraph ‘1’ hereof, and to maintain at the Distributor’s expense an office and show-room within the territory hereby assigned, with an efficient service department and sales force adequately equipped to service and sell at wholesale the Manufacturer’s products.
“11. The Distributor agrees not to sell, advertise, offer or display for sale any radio sets, speakers, parts or tubes other than those furnished by the Manufacturer during the term of this Agreement.”
It appears that the contract between the two corporations was terminated prior to the beginning of this ease, but that a contract identical in form with this was then in exist-tenee between the manufacturer and the Oriole Phonograph Company, a corporation of the District of Columbia, and consequently the termination of the former contract is not important in this particular.
The terms of the contract between thq parties have the effect of creating a limited agency in the distributor, under which- the latter discharged various obligations for the manufacturer in disposing of its products within the specified area. The distributor was not an independent merchant dealing with the manufacturer upon its own initiative, but conducted its business in the District of Columbia in conformity with the stipulations contained in the contract. The activities thus provided for constituted the transaction of business by both parties not only in New York City, where the contract was made, but also in the District of Columbia, within which it was in part carried out. The ease thus falls within the provisions of the second paragraph of section 373 supra, and the service of summons on McCarthy, who was an employee of the manufacturer, was valid under that paragraph. Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Miller, 38 App. D. C. 237; Hoffman v. Washington-Virginia Railway Co., 44 App. D. C. 418; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359, 47 S. Ct. 400, 71 L. Ed. 684; Wilson v. Hudson Motor Car Co. (D. C.) 28 F.(2d) 347; La Porte Heinekamp Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (D. C.) 24 F.(2d) 861.
The order of the lower court quashing the service of summons is reversed, with costs, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1