What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SPOETZL v. UNITED STATES.
No. 6500.
Circuit Coürt of Appeals, Fifth. Circuit.
Jan. 28, 1933.
William H. Scott and John A. Vivier, both of Houston, Tex., for appellant.
H. M. Holden, U. S. Atty., of Houston, Tex.
Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, charged jointly with Joe Koneaba with unlawful possession and unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor, to wit, beer, was convicted on both counts. Spoetzl alone appeals. He urges here that the evidence made no case against him; that the refusal of his motion for an instructed verdict was error.
Though the evidence was circumstantial, it made a case for the jury which amply supports the verdict. The incriminating facts, established by the uneontradieted testimony, are: Spoetzl operates in Shiner, Tex., under license, a brewery where near beer is made. Koneaba has been an employee of his at the brewery for some six years, and has hauled beer by truck to Houston and other points. Spoetzl’s and another brewery, located at San Antonio, were the only licensed breweries in Texas at the time of the arrest. To make near beer, beer is first made, then put through a process of reboiling to take the alcohol out of it. The beer in question was brewery beer; that is, beer which had been made at a brewery. At 1:30 o’clock on the morning of April 27th, Koneaba was arrested in Houston, Tex., while driving Spoetzl’s truck heavily loaded with beer, with a canvas over the load. To inquiries as to his destination and business, ho answered that he was to deliver the load to an unknown man at a certain corner which he named. To this comer he and the officers went, but, though they waited there for nearly an hour, no man appeared. Taken to jail, he was held there until Spoetzl, notified by telephone of his arrest, came to Houston, arranged bond for him, secured a lawyer to defend him, ana put him back to work. Except for the flat denial of Koneaba, and his attempted explanation of his presence in Houston with the load, and the equally flat denial of Spoetzl that he knew of or had anything to do with the haul, no explanation was rnado.
At the trial Koncaba’s explanation of the matter was that he had worked six years for Spoetzl in and around the brewery, and had hauled near beer under permit to Houston and other points; that he had Spoetzl’s general consent to use his truck; that on Sunday afternoon an unknown and unidentified man told him that he had broken down with his truck on the way to Houston, and offered him a few dollars to take the load there; that, making small earnings, and needing money, he agreed to take it; that in Spoetzl’s truck he went with the stranger at about 4 o’clock in the afternoon to where the truck was broken down, a short distance out of Shiner; that he loaded the truck up, went back to his own house, changed his clothes, and started about 7 o’clock for Houston, the man employing him telling him that he would go on ahead and meet the load there; that Spoetzl knew nothing of, and had nothing to do with, the transaction.
The officers testified that the statement he made to them was in substance that he left Spoetzl’s brewery on Sunday with a truckload of beer to deliver it at the corner of San Jacinto and Elgin streets; that he had orders not to collect anything for it; that, when he went to get the truck, he found it loaded at the house of Spoetzl just across the street from the brewery. As to this purported conversation, Koneaba testified he might have made that statement; that he just said what the officers wanted him to say; that they had asked him where ho started from, and he told them Spoetzl’s yard, because that was where he filled up with gas.
Spoetzl testified very briefly. He admitted that the truck was his and that Koneaba was his employee. He said ho knew nothing about the truckload of beer, that he was not. in Shiner on that Sunday, having left for his farm at Orange Grove about 1 or 2 o’clock in the morning, from which he returned at about 11 that night; that he did not own the beer or make the beer in question, or know anything about it; that all that he made in his brewery was near beer; that he had been in this country seventeen years, and never had been eonvieted. The justice of the peace from his neighborhood testified to the good reputation of both defendants.
In a full charge, to which no exception was taken, the court correctly submitted the issues to the jury. Appellant urges that if the evidence that he owned a brewery, that the beer was made at a brewery, that it was found on his truck in the possession of his driver, who was undertaking to deliver it, that, when notified of the driver’s arrest, he did not accuse or upbraid him, but secured his release from jail, took charge of his defense, and put him back to work, and the testimony of the officers as to Koneaba’s statement to them that he had started from Spoetzl’s brewery with the load with instructions to deliver it to an unknown person, would have made a ease, in the absence of explanation, it fails to do so because Roncaba and Spoetzl both positively denied his connection with the transaction.
We cannot agree with this view. Certainly, if defendants had attempted no explanation, the case would have amply supported a verdict of guilty. Willmering v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 61 F.(2d) 1009; Nounes v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 4 F.(2d) 833. When the defendants took the stand to explain, it was for the jury to say whether on the whole case they had a reasonable doubt of the guilt of defendants. They may well have found the strange and improbable tale told by Roncaba more inculpating than exculpating, and Spoetzl’s flat denial of connection with the matter wholly unconvincing.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0