What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clarence JALAS and Chicago Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Union Local No. 110, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17052.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
April 10, 1969.
Thomas A. Foran, U. S. Atty., Jack B. Schmetterer, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, 111., for plaintiff-appellant; John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, 111., of counsel.
Edward J. Calihan, Jr., George F. Callaghan, Chicago, 111., for defendantappellees.
Before SWYGERT, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, District Judge.
. Judge Gordon is sitting by designation from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
SWYGERT, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the Government’s cause of action on the ground that it had no standing to bring an injunctive suit to prevent violation of section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 504(a). The defendant, Clarence Jalas, is and has been business manager of the Chicago Moving Picture Machine Operators’ Union Local No. 110 for thirty years. On January 5, 1968, Jalas pleaded guilty to a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (l), namely, that he knowingly accepted valuable common stock from an employer while serving as business manager of the local, which stock was delivered to him with the intent to influence his actions, decisions, and duties. Jalas was fined $500 for this misdemeanor offense. Subsequent to the conviction, Jalas’ name was placed in nomination for reelection as the local’s business manager and on February 1, 1968 he was reelected in an uncontested election. The action which is the subject of this appeal was brought on February 29 after Jalas’ conviction on January 5 and the February 1 election. The Government sought by its complaint to enjoin Jalas from running for and serving in the office of business manager on the basis of its averment that Jalas’ prior section 186(b) (1) conviction was a crime cognizable under section 504 (a)’s disqualification provisions. Since we are of the view that the Government has no standing to bring this action, it is unnecessary to decide whether the district court erred in concluding that Jalas’ violation of section 186(b) (1) constituted a conviction for bribery within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) and that consequently Jalas’ service as business manager is in violation of the latter section.
The Government urges that if it is denied the power to bring injunctive suits to prevent violations of the Land-rum-Griffin Act, the important national policy of keeping unions free from dishonest officials will be thwarted. Relying on the delay which invariably occurs before criminal prosecution under section 504 can be completed, the Government asserts that because its remedy at law is ineffective, equitable injunctive relief is essential to assure ethical standards are followed by union officials. Although we agree that enforcement delays and difficulties may exist under the present statutory scheme, this is a question which Congress with its special competence can best resolve. Assuming arguendo that Jalas’ taking office is a crime under section 504(a), nevertheless, none of the jurisdictional theories advanced by the Government allows us to grant the relief sought. Underlying our examination of the injunctive-relief issue is the doctrine that courts have no power to enjoin the commission of a crime. See 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice |J 38.24 [3], at 192 (2d ed. 1968). Historically this doctrine has been subject to exception in only three general situations: national emergencies, widespread public nuisances, and where a specific statutory grant of power exists. All the cases cited by the Government fall into one or another of these categories. For example In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895), United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947), and United States v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 96 F.Supp. 428 (N.D.Ill.1951), dealt with court-issued injunctions where acute national emergency situations which were unique necessitated such relief. The case of Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 64 S.Ct. 587, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944), which the Government relies upon, concerned the use of an injunction which was expressly granted by statute. The Government does not cite any cases falling under the public nuisance rubric, but examples are set forth by the Supreme Court in the Debs case. It is our view that the facts of the instant case do not fall into any of the categories of exceptions to the general rule prohibiting issuance of an injunction against the commission of a crime.
It is revealing that the Government fails to rely on any specific jurisdictional provision of the federal labor laws other than section 504(a) which is patently a criminal statute contemplating proceeding by indictment or information. In fact throughout the Landrum-Griffin Act the only authority which is vested in the United States Attorney is enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Act. The statutory scheme bolsters our conclusion that the sole remedy for the complained-of-wrong is criminal prosecution.
The final argument advanced by the Government in support of its position on the standing question is that two other federal courts have found that they have jurisdiction to entertain actions for injunctive and declaratory relief under section 504. The Government relies specifically on Serio v. Liss, 189 F.Supp. 358 (D.N.J.1960), aff’d, 300 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1961), and Berman v. Local 107, 237 F.Supp. 767 (E.D.Pa.1964). In Berman a union official sought injunctive relief to force the union to place his name on the ballot for a forthcoming union election. By way of defense, the defendant union claimed that the plaintiff, Berman, had violated section 504(a). The Berman case is of no help to the Government. It does not hold that the Government may institute an injunctive action. Further, it did not involve, as here, a situation where, absent injunctive relief, the defendant allegedly would have committed a crime. Serio was a case involving a suit by a union officer seeking to enjoin the union president from removing the plaintiff from office. Although it is true that the Government was allowed to intervene on behalf of the defendant, in that case also the Government was not seeking to enjoin a union official from committing a crime.
Because the case law and statutory language do not compel a contrary conclusion, we hold that the Government has no standing to bring this injunctive action. There is no national emergency which warrants departing from the general rule prohibiting injunctions against the commission of criminal acts. If we were to hold otherwise and enjoin Jalas from holding office, we would necessarily be deciding in the context of a civil action an important criminal law question under section 504(a).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. Section 504(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) No person who * * * has been convicted of * * * bribery * * * shall serve—
(1) as an officer, director * * * business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee [other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties] of any labor organization
during or for five years after * * * such conviction * * *. No labor organization or officer thereof shall knowingly permit any person to assume or hold any office or paid position in violation of this subsection.
. Section 186 provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer * * * to pay, lend, or deliver * * * any money or other thing of value—
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to any of his actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as such officer or employee of such labor organization.
(b) (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or accept * * * any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0