What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. UNITED HATTERS, CAP AND MILLINERY WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, Respondent.
No. 8173.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 10, 1960.
Decided Jan. 4, 1961.
On Petition for Modification of Order and Decree March 8, 1961.
Herman I. Branse, Atty., N. L. R. B.„ Washington, D. C. (Stuart Rothman,. Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Melvin J. Welles, Atty., N. L. R. B., Washington,. D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.
Jacob J. Edelman, Baltimore, Md.. (Bernard W. Rubenstein, Baltimore, Md.,. on the brief), for respondent.
Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge,. HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judge, andi BRYAN, District Judge.
ALBERT Y. BRYAN, District Judge.
Picketing of a neutral employer by the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union was declared to be an unfair and outlawed labor practice in the order the National Labor Relations Board now seeks to enforce. In response, United defends the picketing as a permissible appeal to the neutral’s customers not to buy products of Korber Hats, Inc., a struck manufacturer — not, as the Board has found, the illegal encouragement of the employees of the neutral or of the motor carriers serving .the neutral to act to the neutral’s hurt. Labor Management Relations Act 1947, as amended. We uphold the order.
The neutral was Theodore Epstein & Sons, a Baltimore, Maryland wholesaler engaged in the purchase and sale of hats and caps. Korber Hats, Inc. of Pall River, Massachusetts, was one of the hat makers from which Epstein bought. All during the time of the present controversy, Korber was in a labor dispute with the respondent United. In September 1958 respondent’s business manager informed Epstein by telephone of his dispute with Korber, telling Epstein that there would soon be trouble at the Korber plant. He advised Epstein that the purpose of the call was to warn Epstein to enter elsewhere the orders it usually placed each year with Korber, because shortly no hats would be coming from the Korber plant.
In reply Epstein told United that it had already procured and sold its hats for that year and would buy no more until the next spring. In October 1958 United commenced its strike of Korber. While the attendant picketing was in progress at the Korber plant, about December 3, 1958, United’s manager again telephoned Epstein, saying that Korber was making a large shipment of hats to Epstein, and asked whether Epstein would accept or refuse the consignment. The manager cautioned Epstein that the union would in the event of acceptance place a picket line in front of the building occupied by Epstein. On December 4, 1958 the hats from Korber were accepted at the Epstein Company premises.
The following day United established a picket line at the main entrance of the building tenanted by Epstein. The pickets carried placards containing this legend: “T. Epstein and Sons sells nonunion hats made by Korber Hat Company. Do not buy Korber Hats.” In the lower portion of the sign was the union’s name. Initially the picketing was continuous during the work hours of every working day, but became less regular towards the end of December, 1958, and ceased altogether on January 22, 1959. The only untoward incident was a physical encounter between Epstein’s employee and a picket, when the latter blocked the employee’s way as he carried some cartons into the building and was pushed aside by the employee.
That the buying by the public of Korber hats was not the primary target of the picket line at Epstein’s is at once apparent. To begin with, the prefatory telephone calls show that it was directed at Epstein, not to the public. Epstein on the signs was the accused. Further, of the approximately 900 retail outlets of Epstein, only 25 of them were within the State of Maryland, and of these but 13 were in Baltimore.
Epstein does not make any hats, but orders them from various manufacturers in an unfinished form, without linings or bands. When finished and assembled by Epstein, the hats bear no markings revealing the manufacturer, such as Korber or any other producer. The shipping boxes and cartons bear the label of Epstein, and Epstein only. Purchases from Epstein, even in the City of Baltimore, are scarcely ever picked up by the buyer at Epstein’s business location. In sum, the picketing at its front door would not be seen by the buyers.
The picketing at that point, however, would confront the employees of many employers, other than Korber. Epstein had only a single employee — the one in the encounter with the picket. But, obviously, the appeal was to the employees whose employers dealt with Epstein. These employees were engaged in intra- and interstate transportation. As is well known, this craft is appropriately unionized and is, quite properly, sensitive to a picket line. That was the strategy of picketing Epstein’s.
Physically, moreover, Epstein’s front door was a ready and advantageous place at which to focus the adversity of United towards Epstein. Epstein occupied the third, fourth and fifth floors of the building. Its rooms were reached by a single entry-way leading into a recessed vestibule from which a passenger and freight elevator provided convenient access. Incoming merchandise from manufactories, as well as outgoing orders, went to and from Epstein by trucks. Their cargo was discharged or loaded at the curb, being manhandled to and from the elevator. To be effective, the pickets needed to patrol only that small frontage. Receipts and deliveries of goods were made throughout each day, their frequency depending upon the season.
At the outset, United questions both the soundness and applicability of the Board’s first premise: that the posting of a picket line at the neutral Epstein’s premises alone established the inducement or encouragement forbidden by the statute. N. L. R. B. v. Dallas General Drivers, Etc., Local Union 745, 5 Cir., 1959, 264 F.2d 642, 648, certiorari denied 361 U.S. 814, 80 S.Ct. 54, 4 L.Ed.2d 61. We think the proposition sound in the setting here, for the picket line was utilized in its normal function of deterring employees from trampling it. Be that as it may, the fact of the picket line was so complemented by other facts as to give conclusive proof of its inducing and encouraging effect. The accompanying events are those already mentioned: the threatening calls of United’s manager to Epstein, the primary direction of the force of the picketing against Epstein, the improbability of its impact upon the public as buyers, and the availability and sensibility of the employees of other employers to the picketing.
That concert in the reaction of these employees would be a natural and reasonable result of the inducement and encouragement offered, is inescapable in view of the broad scope of their employers’ operations and the nature of the employees’ occupation. Refusal to handle Epstein’s “goods, articles, materials or commodities” is exactly what would be expected of the employees if they followed the proffered persuasion. That they did not accept is not proof of the absence of the invitation. National Labor Relations Board v. Associated Musicians, 2 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 900, 904, certiorari denied 351 U.S. 962, 76 S.Ct. 1025, 100 L.Ed. 1483. While that fact may sometimes be enough to confute the assertions of inducement or encouragement, surely it does not here have that strength. Clearly, too, an object, if not the sole object, of the entreaties was to have these employees, in turn, force their employers “to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of” Epstein. National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 1951, 341 U.S. 675, 689, 71 S.Ct. 943, 950, 95 L.Ed. 1284.
The record in its entirety convinces us that the Board’s determination rests upon substantial evidence. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e); Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1951, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456. On their own peculiar facts other cases, such as Douds v. Local 50 Etc., 224 F.2d 49 (2 Cir., 1955) and United Wholesale & Warehouse Emp., etc. v. N. L. R. B., 1960, 108 U.S.App.D.C, 341, 282 F.2d 824 cited by United, have come to a contrary conclusion. But we find nothing in them to overturn the answer we give upon the proof before us.
Nor can we adopt the suggested dismissal of the petition as now presenting only an academic question, inasmuch as the pickets have long since been withdrawn. The Board is entitled to judicial assurance that the respondent cannot with impunity resume its secondary sanctions upon Epstein.
Finally, the terms of the Board’s order are not objectionably broad, for its injunction not only of Epstein’s employees but also “of any employer other than Korber Hats, Inc.”. No exception was taken to the terminology of the order when the Trial Examiner’s recommended order was filed. Cf. Sec. 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (e). Nor was the point intimated here until oral argument. Moreover, the order In its present form is necessary so as to encompass the employees of all the trucking companies carrying goods to and from Epstein. It would hardly be practicable for the Board to specify them by name. True, where deemed advisable we may narrow an order of the Board in an enforcement proceeding, but here we enforce the order as written. International Brotherhood of E. W. v. N. L. R. B., 1951, 341 U.S. 694, 705-706, 71 S.Ct. 954, 95 L.Ed. 1299.
Order enforced.
On Petition for Modification of Order and Decree
Since the release of our opinion in this case, the respondent union has filed a petition for modification of our decree upholding the order of the National Labor Relations Board. We directed enforcement of the Board’s order as written, and we denied the union’s request to re-word the order. The point of the petition is that the order commanded the union to cease and desist from activities seeking “to enforce or require” not only Theo. Epstein and Sons but also “any other employer to cease using * * * or doing business with”, not only Korber Hats, Inc. but also “any other producer, processor or manufacturer.”
Obviously, in these respects the order literally does go beyond the complaint and its related grievances. Equally obviously the terminology in the order never intended or in truth expressed the expansiveness the respondent now apprehends in it. Whenever and wherever the order should hereafter be invoked, it would of course be read in its context, confining the phraseology to the union activities pertinent to the controversy in suit.
The Board cannot enumerate every item of behavior barred by its order; nor can this court. To make the attempt would so particularize the order as to invite repeated hearings by the Board and thus multiply the burdens of enforcement. We think the order is quite intelligible and altogether apt. However, to allay all imaginable concern of its breadth, we will add to the order words explicitly demonstrating that it does not exceed the controversy in suit.
As rewritten, the order of the Board as adopted by our decree will be amended in paragraph numbered 1 thereof to read as follows, the additions now being underscored :
“1. Cease and desist from engaging in, or inducing or encouraging employees of Theo. Epstein and Sons, or of any employer other than Korber Hats, Inc., by picketing or by any other conduct, to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Theo. Epstein and Sons or any other employer supplying Theo. Epstein and Sons with any material, labor or services in the latter’s purchase, processing or sale of the products of Korber Hats, Inc., to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to otherwise cease doing business with, Korber Hats, Inc., or any other producer, processor, or manufacturer supplying Theo. Epstein and Sons with material, labor or service in the latter’s purchase, processing or sale of the products of Korber Hats, Inc.”
Order and decree amended.
. Sec. 8(b) (4) (A), not including the amendment of September 14, 1959, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (4) (A) : “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
* # * * *
“(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring * * * any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; * * * ”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1