What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Harry HOWARD, Appellant, v. A. Robert TARR, Appellee.
No. 16019.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Dec. 3, 1958.
Rehearing Denied Dee. 30, 1958.
Harry Howard, appellant, pro se.
Robert M. Duboc, Kansas City, Mo. (Roy P. Swanson, Blackmar, Swanson, Midgley, Jones & Eager, Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before JOHNSEN, VAN OOSTERHOUT and MATTHES, Circuit Judges.
MATTHES, Circuit Judge.
This proceeding, an action for deficiency judgment after foreclosure of mortgage on a promissory note executed by appellant, is a diversity case in which we have jurisdiction because of the amount involved.
Upon application of appellee, who was plaintiff below, the trial court entered summary judgment against appellant for $27,062.09 with interest from November 21, 1955, at the rate of 5'% per annum. The correctness of the court’s action is challenged in this appeal. Under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., a summary judgment may be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Kennedy v. Bennett, 8 Cir., 261 F.2d 20, and cases there cited.
The following undisputed facts appear from the pleadings, affidavits, the pretrial order, deposition, and pertinent parts of exhibits. Appellee-plaintiff and appellant-defendant entered into a written contract on April 23, 1953, prepared by defendant, who is- a lawyer, under which plaintiff, as seller, agreed to sell and convey by warranty deed to defendant, as buyer, certain real estate in San-dusky County, Ohio, for the agreed price of $79,000. The contract provided that $5,000 of the purchase price was to.be deposited with a title company on the day of its execution and $2,500 at the time the deed was executed and delivered to buyer, and the contract obligated the buyer to execute and deliver to the seller his promissory note for the balance of the purchase price of $71,500, payable within two years from date thereof, together with a first mortgage on the real estate, in conformity with the laws of the state of Ohio. Under the contract, defendant’s denomination and status as “Buyer” was qualified by the phrase “or his (defendant’s) nominee, being any person he may substitute for himself, to whom the title to the property hereinafter described may be transferred, and who may execute the note and mortgage as a part of the consideration herein expressed.” However, it appears that defendant did not exercise the power to nominate another and chose instead to take title to the property in his own name as Buyer, thereby becoming bound to execute the note and mortgage therefor.
In conformity with the contract, the sale of the real estate was consummated at Fremont, Ohio, on July 14, 1953, when plaintiff executed and delivered • to defendant an Ohio Warranty Deed conveying fee simple title to the premises. At the same time, plaintiff received from one C. W. White a cashiers’ check in the amount of $7,500; defendant executed the promissory note for the balance of the purchase price, together with an Ohio mortgage, and delivered both instruments to plaintiff. On the next day, July 15, 1953, defendant executed a warranty deed in blank and delivered same to C. W. White, whereby the same real estate was conveyed subject to encumbrances thereon.
After default was made in payment of the note, the real estate was sold under foreclosure proceedings on September 20, 1955, for the sum of $52,081.33; on November 21, 1955, personal property was sold under a chattel mortgage for $388.86. Credit was given for the sum of the amounts so received, leaving a balance due of $27,062.09.
The main thrust of defendant’s contention, as we understand it, is that inasmuch as he did not personally gain from the transaction, and received nothing from plaintiff in exchange for the note, there was no consideration for the instrument and the action must fail for that reason. It cannot be gainsaid that defendant is correct in asserting that, insofar as this record is concerned, he did not benefit or, in fact, receive anything of value from the transaction. But that factor alone is not dispositive of the question of whether there was sufficient legal consideration to support the validity of the instant promissory note. To begin with, under the Negotiable Instruments Law, “(e) very negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.” Section 24, Beutel’s Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law, Seventh Ed.; Page’s Ohio Revised Code, Annotated (1953 Ed.) § 1301.26. See also, Dalrymple v. Wyker, 60 Ohio St. 108, 53 N.E. 713. Section 1301.27 of the Ohio Revised Code, supra, provides further that “(v)alue is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.” The Ohio courts recognize the rule which seems to have universality, to the effect that a valuable consideration may consist of a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. In City Trust & Savings Bank v. Schwartz, 68 Ohio App. 80, 39 N.E.2d 548, 554, the court elaborated on the rule in this language:
“In 9 Ohio Jurisprudence, 297, Section 65, it is stated that a valuable consideration may consist either in a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. Many cases are cited in support of the statement. It is further set forth in the section that the definition has been more elaborately stated as follows: ‘A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the other party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.’ ”
See and compare Hueter v. Binduchow-ski, 94 Ohio App. 481, 116 N.E.2d 598, 600; Merchants’ Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Ryan, 67 Ohio St. 448, 66 N.E. 526; Judy v. Louderman, 48 Ohio St. 562, 29 N.E. 181. It stands undisputed that plaintiff parted with title to the land that was conveyed to defendant. This was a sufficient consideration for the note even though defendant was not the actual purchaser of the property and did not personally gain from the transaction. Further, and apart from any question of legal consideration, it is our view that the effect in law of the transaction between plaintiff, defendant, and White, bearing upon the relationship of the parties to each other was to make defendant an accommodation party for White. In Negotiable Instruments Law, an accommodation party is defined as “ * * one who has signed the instrument as maker, * * * without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.” § 29 of Beutel’s Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law, Seventh Ed.; Page’s Ohio Revised Code, supra, § 1301.31. Plaintiff, on the other hand, although having knowledge of the relationship between defendant and White, was nevertheless a holder for value of the note, and as to plaintiff, the defendant became, and is, liable. § 29 Beutel’s N.I.L., supra; Page’s Ohio Revised Code, supra, § 1301.-31. See also City Trust & Savings Bank v. Schwartz, supra, 68 Ohio App. 80, 39 N.E.2d 548, 555; Roof v. National Surety Corp., 92 Ohio App., 295, 110 N.E.2d 159, 161; 11 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 739 b; 8 Am.Jur. Bills and Notes, §§ 456 and 457.
While defendant’s unfortunate plight is sufficient to provoke sympathy, it can hardly be contended that it constitutes a legal defense to the action. And since it is obvious that the pleadings, admissions, and evidence before the court reveal no genuine issue as to any material , fact, the court properly entered summary judgment.
Affirmed.
. The note was in the principal amount of $71,500, and was payable to plaintiff on or before July 14, 1955, and provided for interest at the rate of 5% from date thereof.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0