What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Walter M. WEIL and Adele D. Weil, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 12456.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 7, 1956.
M. E. Newcomer, Cleveland, Ohio (McAfee, Grossman, Tapian, Hanning, Newcomer & Hazlett, Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for petitioners.
Carolyn Just, Washington, D. C. (H. Brian Holland, Ellis N. Slack, L. W. Post, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Before SIMONS, Chief Judge, and McALLISTER and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
SIMONS, Chief Judge.
Review of the Tax Court decision in the above entitled cause presents a disputed interpretation of the alternative tax section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 in effect for the year 1948 and its impact upon the tax liability of taxpayers having substantial long-term capital gains. The facts are not in dispute and computations based on the conflicting interpretations are concededly correct.
Prior to the Revenue Act of 1921, capital gains were taxed in full in the year realized. Because taxpayers were reluctant to sell or exchange property which would result in large capital gains taxed in a single year at high progressive rates, the 1921 Act, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 233, adopted an alternative tax treatment of capital gains, in order “to permit such transactions to go forward without fear of a prohibitive tax.” The Act provided that the alternative tax shall be imposed at the election of the taxpayer and shall be determined by a partial tax, at regular progressive rates, imposed upon ordinary net income plus a percentage of capital net gain. Experience led to changes in this concept in 1924, 1926, 1928, 1932, and 1934, until the formula evolved in the 1938 Act, which was in effect in 1948 and governs the present taxpayers in respect to their capital gains. This is embodied in § 117 (c) (1) of the 1938 Act and was substantially carried over into § 117(b) and § 117(c) (2) of the 1939 Code, 26 U.S. C.A. § 117(b), (c) (2). The purpose of § 117 of the 1938 Act was to place an upper limit on the amount of tax levied upon capital gain. The details of earlier provisions and their legislative history is recited in the clear and carefully reasoned opinion of the Tax Court in 23 T.C. 424, November 30, 1954, and will not be here restated.
Section 117 (c) (2) provides:
“If for any taxable year the net long-term capital gain of any taxpayer (other than a corporation) exceeds the net short-term capital loss, there shall be levied, collected and paid, in lieu of the tax imposed by sections 11 and 12, a tax determined as follows, if and only if such tax is less than the tax imposed by such sections:
“A partial tax shall first be computed upon the net income reduced by the amount of such excess, at the rates and in the manner as if this subsection had not been enacted, and the total tax shall be the partial tax plus 50 per centum of such excess.”
What the Commissioner determined, the Tax Court approved, and we have to consider, is the impact of this section upon the tax liability of the petitioners in 1948. In that year, the petitioners’ ordinary income was $50,753.61, their reportable long-term capital gain was $1,470,328.84, and their taxable gain was 50% of that amount, namely, $735,164.-42. During the year, however, the taxpayers claimed deductions of $114,269.63 for charitable contributions and taxes allowable under § 23 of the 1939 Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23, then in effect. The Commissioner applied to these figures the provisions of § 117(c) (2). He first computed a partial tax upon the net income, reduced by the taxable capital gain, at the rates and in the manner provided in §§ 11 and 12 of the 1939 Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 11, 12. He found the result, of course, to be zero. He then added 50% of the net long-term capital gain and found the tax to be $367,582.21. The taxpayers contended in the Tax Court that the Commissioner’s determination of the alternative tax resulted in a disallowance of otherwise authorized deductions, since their net income was less than net taxable capital gain. They urged instead that the 50% rate should be applied to such gain only to the extent that such gain does not exceed net income upon which the tax liability is determined under the regular as distinguished from the alternative method of computation and that their alternative tax should be 50% of this figure, or $335,224.20. They say that the Commissioner’s ruling deprived them of their deductions in the computation of the partial tax and that their unused deduction must be deducted from the taxable capital gain in computing the capital gain portion of the alternative tax. The Tax Court held, however, that the taxable capital gain is not to be reduced by such unused deductions, in computing the alternative tax. It pointed out that if the petitioners’ tax were determined pursuant to the ordinary method, full allowance would be given to them of the deductions allowable under the Code, but their tax would then be computed at the progressively increasing surtax rates of the Code, whereas, the alternative tax can only be imposed upon a fixed rate and then only if it is less than the tax would have been under §§11 and 12. It also showed that the alternative tax is less under both petitioners’ and respondent’s computations and, accordingly, must be imposed under either view. The 1938 Act provides that the taxable portion of capital gain must either be added to the taxpayers’ other gross income and taxed in the regular manner at progressive rates or taxed separately at a flat rate, according to which method produces the lesser tax.
Except for the need of stating the problem, and some general considerations, we might well decide this case by summary judgment based upon the excellent opinion of the Tax Court. There is, however, a seeming inequity in a result which appears to deprive the taxpayers of the full measure of their deductions allowable under § 23 of the Code. The alternative computation provision is, of course, a relief measure and should, therefore, be liberally construed. This, the Tax Court conceded. The purpose of the alternative computation was to tax, at a flat maximum rate, only 50% of net taxable gains. This would be automatically achieved if all income taxes were based upon a fixed percentage of net income without the progressive accelerations in percentages. However, the application of such progressive rates would, in the case of taxpayers having large capital gains, result in their paying a much higher tax than one computed upon 50% of such gains. Seeking over the years for a formula to prevent this result, the Congress, after many changes, evolved the procedures dictated by § 117(c). Perhaps, it is not precise but it reasonably achieves the congressional purpose. In cases where ordinary income is greater than net capital gains, no problem arises and, so, the Tax Court viewed the present problem as one of first impression. The test of its unfairness, however, is the end result and not the means by which it is reached for it must be remembered that, if no relief for the taxpayer is accomplished by the alternative computation, all net income must be taxed at the progressive rates. The ease of the present taxpayers presents a clear example of the extent of the relief accorded them. Had there been no alternative tax, the petitioners would, under §§11 and 12, have faced a tax liability of over $500,-000.00, roughly estimated. Instead of that, their taxes are computed at $367,-582.21. The section involved is clear and unambiguous. It calls for no interpretation and no unfairness therein invites search for a formula other than the one provided.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0