What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Frank TAVANO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 91-4078.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
March 29, 1993.
Gary R. Allen, Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Scott P. Towers, Brian C. Griffin, Charles E. Brookhart, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee.
Before KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
In Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1967), our predecessor circuit wrote in dictum that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the Internal Revenue Service need not be signed in order to be valid. Id. at 865 n. 4 (citing Commissioner v. Oswego Falls Corp., 71 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir.1934), and 9 Jacob Mertens, Jr., Federal Income Taxation § 49.186 (1965)). We now expressly so hold. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the tax court holding appellant Tavano liable for tax deficiencies and additions.
I.
On April 5, 1988, Tavano received from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a statutory notice of deficiency notifying him of taxes and additions to taxes owed for tax years 1985 and 1986. The notice did not contain the signature, stamp, or seal of the Commissioner or of a representative of the Commissioner. Tavano properly filed a petition in the tax court seeking redetermination of his tax liability. The tax court upheld the Commissioner’s determinations.
II.
The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Commissioner to notify a taxpayer by certified or registered mail of a deficiency in income tax owed. 26 U.S.C. § 6212(a) (1988). The mailing of a valid notice of deficiency is generally a prerequisite to formal assessment and collection of the deficiency by the IRS. Id. § 6213(a); see, e.g., H & H Beverage Distributors v. Dep’t of Revenue, 850 F.2d 165, 168 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 994, 109 S.Ct. 560, 102 L.Ed.2d 586 (1988); United States v. Zolla, 724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830, 105 S.Ct. 116, 83 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Meyer v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 555, 560 (1991). Tavano challenges the validity of the notice he received on the ground that it was unsigned.
The Code does not expressly require a notice of deficiency to be signed. Urban v. Commissioner, 964 F.2d 888, 889 (9th Cir.1992); Oswego Falls Corp., 71 F.2d at 677, cited in Brafman, 384 F.2d at 865 n. 4. Indeed, it prescribes no form at all for deficiency notices. Benzvi v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S.Ct. 273, 93 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986). The Internal Revenue Manual does specify the manner in which delegates of the Commissioner who are authorized to issue notices of deficiency should sign notices. I.R.M. § 4(13)14.3(2); Urban, 964 F.2d at 889 n. 2. It does not, however, purport to condition the validity of a deficiency notice on a proper signature. See Urban, 964 F.2d at 890; see also United States v. Horne, 714 F.2d 206, 207 (1st Cir.1983) (holding that the manual’s provisions are not mandatory); United States v. Will, 671 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); Smith v. United States, 478 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir.1973) (same as to the manual’s predecessor).
Judge Learned Hand explained that “the notice [of deficiency] is only to advise the person who is to pay the deficiency that the commissioner means to assess him; anything that does this unequivocally is good enough.” Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir.1937), quoted in Benzvi, 787 F.2d at 1542. The notice Tavano received adequately advised him that the Commissioner intended to assess him, notwithstanding that the notice was unsigned. Thus, the tax court properly proceeded to evaluate the correctness of the Commissioner’s determinations.
The judgment of the tax court is AFFIRMED.
. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as circuit precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.
. In addition to the fact that his notice of deficiency was unsigned, Tavano argues six other grounds for reversal, all of which are meritless. Tavano claims that the tax court erred by: (1) denying his motion for a protective order; (2) not finding the deficiency notice arbitrary, excessive, or without factual foundation; (3) denying his motions to strike the testimony of certain witnesses and for rehearing; (4) admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution; (5) disallowing certain deductions and interfering with his rights under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution; and (6) upholding the Commissioner’s additions to tax for negligent disregard of the tax laws and substantial understatement of income tax.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0