What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Petition of Joe CAHILL, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Cal. No. 1106, Docket 71-1855.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Sept. 3, 1971.
Decided Sept. 3, 1971.
Frank Durkan, New York, City, for petitioner-appellant.
Stanley H. Wallenstein, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, for respondent-appellee.
Before KAUFMAN, HAYS, and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joe Cahill, a British citizen holding a valid Irish passport and a visa permitting entry into the United States, boarded an airplane in Dublin, Ireland, on September 1, 1971, bound for the United States. Upon his arrival at New York’s Kennedy Airport, immigration officers informed him that his visa had been revoked by the Secretary of State and detained him pending a determination of his alien status. Although an exclusion hearing before a Special Inquiry Officer was scheduled for 9:00 A.M., September 2, counsel for Cahill requested and was granted an adjournment until September 7.
Counsel for Cahill has requested that Cahill be released on bail or paroled. The Attorney General through the District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York, has denied this application.
Alleging that the denial of bail or parole by the Attorney General was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the first and fifth amendments to the Constitution, Cahill petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus directing Sol Marks, District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to show cause “why the petitioner should not be restored to his liberty and granted bail or parole pending determination of his status. * * * ” After a hearing in open court, Judge Wyatt denied the petition without prejudice.
Immigration officers have the right to detain for further inquiry any alien “who may not appear to the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The Attorney General, however, “may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States * * 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Petitioner’s allegation that the denial of bail or parole under the authority of this section was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the first and fifth amendments is without merit.
It is established constitutional doctrine that an alien denied entry does not enjoy the panoply of rights granted by the Constitution. “Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry into the United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien. * * Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-544, 70 S.Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950). See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210-215, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953). This firmly embedded line of decisions bars our review of the Attorney General’s discretion as long as he has exercised discretion under §§ 1182(d) (5) and (6) to deny parole. Chin Ming Mow v. Dulles, 117 F.Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y.1953).
The petitioner argues that he will contend at his hearing that he does not fall into the category of an “alien denied entry.” On the papers before us we cannot determine the merits of this contention. But cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, supra, 345 U.S. at 215, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956. At this posture of the proceedings before the Immigration and Naturalization Service we believe we are without authority to grant parole or bail.
The appeal from Judge Wyatt’s order is dismissed and parole or bail is accordingly denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0