What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Earthia B. WILEY, Appellant.
No. 72-1516.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 14, 1973.
Decided April 20, 1973.
Stewart R. Perry, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.
Joseph T. Walbran, Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee.
Before MATTHES, Chief Judge, and ROSS and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
ROSS, Circuit Judge.
Earthia B. Wiley was originally indicted for knowingly receiving and possessing a firearm, after having been convicted of a felony, under 18 App. U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1). No allegation was made that the firearm was “in or affecting commerce.” He appealed his conviction to this Court, and we affirmed, holding that no nexus with interstate commerce need be shown in cases charging receiving and possessing. United States v. Wiley, 438 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated, 404 U.S. 1009, 92 S.Ct. 686, 30 L.Ed.2d 657 (1972). The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court, and after its decision in the case of United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972), the Wiley case was vacated because of the Government’s failure to plead and prove a nexus with interstate commerce. This Court then remanded with directions to dismiss. The United States later reindict-ed Wiley for the same offense, alleging that Wiley received “a firearm, in and affecting commerce . . . . ” Wiley was again tried and convicted after which he perfected this appeal.
On this appeal Wiley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he received a gun which at one time had been transported in interstate commerce or that he, at the time of such receipt, was a convicted felon. He does claim that the reindictment violates the double jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment; that the mandate of this Court in the first ease required dismissal with prejudice; that the statute under which he was charged is unconstitutional in that it fails to require knowledge or intent; that the evidence was insufficient in that there was no showing that Wiley knew or should have known that the gun had theretofore traveled in interstate commerce; that the trial court erred in admitting the gun into evidence; and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it was not necessary to show knowledge by Wiley that the firearm was in commerce. We have carefully considered each of the alleged errors and for the reasons hereinafter set forth reject them and affirm the judgment of conviction.
Double Jeopardy
Wiley claims that since he was once tried and convicted on an identical charge, and since he appealed without asking for a new trial and the conviction was reversed on the basis of insuffieent evidence, that double jeopardy attaches. The Government claims that because the prior conviction rested upon an invalid indictment that failed to allege an essential element of the crime and since Wiley appealed and was successful on that issue, the retrial upon a correct indictment did not constitute double jeopardy, citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). We agree with the Government’s position and hold that double jeopardy did not attach to the trial on a new indictment.
In Tateo the Supreme Court restated the law on this subject as follows:
“The Fifth Amendment provides that no ‘person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . ’ The principle that this provision does not preclude the Government’s retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction is a well-established part of our constitutional jurisprudence. In this respect we differ from the practice obtaining in England. The rule in this country was explicitly stated in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-672, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300, a case in which defendants were reindicted after this Court had found the original indictment to be defective. It has been followed in a variety of circumstances ; see, e. g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103 (after conviction reversed because of confession of error); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct. 317, 94 L.Ed. 335 (after conviction reversed because of insufficient evidence); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 80 S.Ct. 481, 4 L.Ed.2d 412 (after original conviction reversed for error in instructions to the jux-y).
“If a case is reversed because of coerced confession improperly admitted, a deficiency in the indictment, or an improper instruction, it is presumed that the accused did not have his case fairly put to the jury. . . . ” Id. at 465-467, 84 S.Ct. at 1589.
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896), cited by the Supreme Court in Tateo, is just as explicit in its holding:
“ [I]t is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same offence of which he had been convicted.”
Clearly the reindictment and retrial were not barred by the fifth amendment in this case.
Wiley’s argument that the remand from this Court required a dismissal of the indictment with prejudice is likewise without merit. In the absence of instructions to dismiss with prejudice, the Government was free to decide whether to x-eindict or not. No such instructions were included in the remand, directly or by inference.
Knowledge or Intent
Wiley claims that the statute under which he was charged “is unconstitutional in that it fails to require knowledge or intent.” Presumably the claim is that knowledge of the prior interstate transportation of the gun and intent to violate the statute are essential to the constitutionality of the statute. In United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607-610, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971), the Supreme Court held that there was no requirement of specific intent or knowledge in cases charging the defendant with receiving or possessing a firearm not registered to him. See also Bryant v. United States, 462 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1972). Recently, the Ninth Circuit has applied this rationale to the section of the statute under which Wiley was indicted. In United States v. Crow, 439 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 1009, 92 S.Ct. 687, 30 L.Ed.2d 657 (1972), Judge Duniway concluded that possession of a firearm by one convicted of a felony does not require knowledge or intent except as the word “possession” imparts a knowing possession. In other words, the defendant must be shown to knowingly possess a gun, but it need not be shown that he knew the gun had traveled in interstate commerce or that he intended to violate the statute. We agree with this interpretation and holding.
The fourth and sixth assignments of error relate to the knowledge and intent issue and are disposed of by our determination that knowledge and intent were not essential elements of the statute or of the proof, except to show knowing possession of the gun.
The fifth assignment of error relating to admission of the gun into evidence is clearly without merit and need not be discussed, especially in view of our recent decision in United States v. Man-cino, 474 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir., 1973).
The judgment of conviction is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1