What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PENOSI v. UNITED STATES.
No. 13637.
United Stales Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 14, 1953.
Frank Desimone, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant.
Walter S. Binns, U. S. Atty., Ray H. Kinnison, George M. Treister, Manuel L. Real, Asst. U. S. Attys., I,os Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before MATHEWS, HEADY and ORB, Circuit Judges.
ORR, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was tried by the Court sitting without a jury and convicted op two counts of an indictment charging him and a co-defendant, Louis A. Salerno, with the crime of receiving, concealing and facilitating the transportation of narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 174, and conspiring to commit that offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. He was sentenced to imprisonment for three years on each of the two counts and a fine of $1,000 on the substantive count, the sentences of imprisonment to ran concurrently.
Appellant challenges the judgment primarily on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment. We summarize the pertinent portions of the evidence.
On November 1, 1951, Federal Narcotic Agent Charles Van Natter and a government informer met co-defendant Louis A. Salerno in a bar in Hollywood, California. During the course of their conversation reference was made to narcotics. At Salerno’s request, the three men met again on November 3, 1951, at the same bar and the sale of narcotics was discussed. Salerno told the government men that if they wished to buy 20 ounces of heroin he would send a telegram to New York and have the heroin delivered by plane to Hollywood at a price of $250.00 per ounce. Until the shipment arrived from New York Salerno said he would supply the agent with a smaller quantity of heroin.
At or near 12 M. of November 4th, Salerno sent the following telegram to appellant in New York signed with the fictitious name, “Louis Ricco”: “Finish Work Need 20 More Let Me Know When You’ll Be Here.”
On the afternoon of November 5th, the government men met Salerno at his motel room pursuant to an appointment made the previous evening. Salerno then and there sold agent Van Natter four ounces of heroin at an agreed price of $1,000, payment being made in marked government funds. During a conversation had at the time of this sale, Salerno stated that he expected delivery of the larger amount of narcotics from New York within the next two days. The parties made an appointment to meet again at 10:00 p. m. the same night, November 5th, to discuss the sale of the 20 ounces of heroin.
At 7:51 p. m. Los Angeles time, November 5th, appellant dispatched from New York the following telegram to Salerno addressed to “Louis Rico”: “Arriving 8:20 P.M. Tuesday American Airlines Flight 609.” Salerno admitted the receipt of appellant’s telegram.
The two government men and Salerno met at the bar at approximately 10:00 p. m., November 5th, pursuant to an agreement entered into earlier that day. Salerno then stated that he had wired one of his men in New York to bring the heroin and that he expected him to arrive late the following night, November 6th. Salerno arranged a meeting the following night at 10 :00 p. m. to effect the sale of the 20 ounces of heroin.
The flight referred to in appellant’s telegram to Salerno was scheduled to arrive in Los Angeles at 8:20 p. m., November 6th, but due to weather conditions appellant did not arrive until the early morning of November- 7th, at 12:38 a.m. The government agents went to the bar on the night of November 6th, as arranged, but Salerno did not appear. A few minutes after midnight they received a phone call from Salerno postponing the meeting until 10:00 a. m., November 7th.
Appellant arrived in Los Angeles the morning of November 7th and upon arrival was met at the airport by Salerno and taken to the latter’s hotel room. At 10:00 a. m. agent Van Natter met Salerno in a downtown restaurant and was told by Salerno that the heroin was in and that he was ready to make delivery. Van Natter agreed to buy the 20 ounces previously agreed upon plus an additional 14 ounce package for a price of $8500. Salerno said that he would-go to the hotel where “his partner” was waiting,. get the narcotics, and deliver them to the agent in about an hour.
Two officers followed Salerno to his hotel and arrested him when he came out of the hotel ten minutes later carrying two packages wrapped in flowered paper. One sealed package contained 20 ounces of heroin and the other package contained 14 ounces of heroin. The arresting officers accompanied Salerno to his hotel room where appellant was found in bed. Wrapping paper of the same type as that in which the packages of heroin were wrapped was found in the room. Salerno admitted that appellant was present in the room at the time he wrapped the packages of narcotics. Currency in the amount of $2,-800, including $960 of the marked government bills was discovered in a bureau drawer.
Viewing the evidence adduced in this case, as we are required to do, in the light most favorable to the Government, we find no difficulty in determining that there is substantial evidence to support the judgment. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680; Woodard Laboratories v. United States, 9 Cir., 1952, 198 F.2d 995.
Appellant strongly urges that -when the Government relies upon circumstantial evidence for a conviction, the evidence must not only be consistent with guilt but inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is the language sometimes used in instructions to juries which, in many cases, serves no other purpose than to confuse. But here, the experienced trial Judge was conversant with the rules of evidence and knew how to apply them. He had no difficulty in finding that the evidence in this case was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and neither do we. If the evidence is sufficient to convince beyond a reasonable doubt that the charge is true it is immaterial whether it be circumstantial or direct. Guilt can be satisfactorily established from “ a ‘development and a collocation of circumstances’.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680.
On cross examination a witness made a response which appellant’s counsel moved to strike. The Court denied the motion. Appellant urges this as error. Before a jury immaterial evidence may sometimes be harmful. Not so before a Court. It is apparent that the Court, in this instance, would attach no significance to answer given. The argument is completely devoid of merit.
Judgment affirmed.
. Co-defendant Salerno was found guilty on three counts. His appeal was dismissed on April 22, 1953.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1