What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Maurice Mickey MANDEL, Appellant, v. David M. HERITAGE, Warden, United States Penitentiary, McNeil Island, Washington, Appellee.
No. 16376.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 5, 1959.
Maurice Mickey Mandel, in pro. per.
Charles P. Moriarty, U. S. Atty., David J. Dorsey, Asst. U. S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., Charles W. Billinghurst, Tacoma, Wash., for appellee.
Before POPE, CHAMBERS and HAMLEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Mandel has had trouble with “forged securities” in interstate commerce— some operation involving “bad checks.” 18 U.S.C. § 415. The record here begins in August, 1948, in the Northern District of Oklahoma. In a total of seven similar counts found in four indictments or in-formations he was sentenced on August 17,1948, to serve ten years on each count, all sentences to run concurrently. A week later, on August 24, on another similar count in another information or indictment he was sentenced to serve five years, the time to be concurrent with that of the sentences of August 17. He was received at Leavenworth penitentiary on August 26, 1948, where apparently the time of his sentence was established as having started to run as of the date of the first sentence: August 17, 1948. On September 8, 1954, he was released conditionally from the Federal Prison Camp at Tucson, Arizona, a notation being made on his record that there remained' 1438 days to be served.
On October 26, 1954, a member of the U. S. Board of Parole issued a warrant for Mandel’s arrest upon the ground that the latter had violated the conditions of his release. On January 5, 1955, pursuant to the warrant he was arrested in Omaha, Neb., and on January 14, 1955, he was returned to Leavenworth penitentiary. There he was given credit for having begun to serve time as of January 5, 1955. Apparently while incarcerated he is a good prisoner, and he was released on June 16, 1957, on a reconditional release, a notation then being made on the record that there were 544 days remaining to be served.
Out once again, Mandel was soon in trouble, and on February 7, 1958, a member of the U. S. Board of Parole issued a warrant for rearrest for violation of the terms of the reconditional release. Pursuant to the warrant, arrest was made at Oakland, Calif., on November 5, 1958, and he was returned this time to the federal penitentiary at McNeil Island, State of Washington. There his time was noted as having started to run again as of November 5, 1958.
It would appear that actual time served is as follows:
Aug. 17, 1948, to Sept. 8, 1954.
6 years and 22 days
Jan. 5, 1955, to June 16, 1957.
2 years, five months, 11 days
Nov. 5, 1958, to date.
Approximately 6 months.
November 4, 1959, has been set by the prison authorities as the prisoner’s prospective release date.
Upon a petition for habeas corpus, the district court on January 9, 1959, denied issuance of the writ, after having required the respondent warden to show cause in writing.
While the petition is lengthy, somehow Mandel seems to believe that he has not lost his credit for “good time” served during his first two periods of incarceration or that the prison authorities credited on his “time schedules” an excessive amount of “good time” and somehow this is to his advantage now.
We have considered carefully Sections 4161, 4168, 4164, 4165, 4205, and 4207 of Title 18 U.S.Code, which appear to have application here.
We are certain that the prisoner on rearrest is not entitled to take advantage of an erroneous calculation of time made previously (if such it is) and that on rearrest his “good time” theretofore earned or credited was properly and legally forfeited. This leads to the conclusion that the prisoner is now only entitled to such “good time” as he may earn on the period of time remaining unserved (without allowance for “good time” previously credited) at the time of his last rearrest. Yates v. Looney, 10 Cir., 250 F.2d 956; Morneau v. U. S. Board of Parole, 8 Cir., 231 F.2d 829.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Now 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1