What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF KEENE STATE COLLEGE et al. v. SWEENEY
No. 77-1792.
Decided November 13, 1978
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. In Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567 (1978), we stated that “[t]o dispel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas, the employer need only 'articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’ ” Id., at 578, quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802 (1973). We stated in McDonnell Douglas that the plaintiff “must ... be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated reason for [the plaintiff’s] rejection was in fact pretext.” Id., at 804. The Court of Appeals in the present case, however, referring to McDonnell Douglas, stated that “in requiring the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court placed the burden squarely on the party with the greater access to such evidence.” 569 F. 2d 169, 177 (CA1 1978) (emphasis added).
While words such as “articulate,” “show,” and “prove,” may-have more or less similar meanings depending upon the context in which they are used, we think that there is a significant distinction between merely “articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” and “prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive.” By reaffirming and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, supra, we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet the employee's prima facie case of discrimination. Because the Court of Appeals appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco warrants, its judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in the light of Furnco, supra, at 578.
It is so ordered.
While the Court of Appeals did make the statement that the dissent quotes, post, at 27, it also made the statement quoted in the text above. These statements simply contradict one another. The statement quoted in the text above would make entirely superfluous the third step in the Furnco-McDonnell Douglas analysis, since it would place on the employer at the second stage the burden of showing that the reason for rejection was not a pretext, rather than requiring contrary proof from the employee as a part of the third step. We think our remand is warranted both because we are unable to determine which of the two conflicting standards the Court of Appeals applied in reviewing the decision of the District Court in this case, and because of the implication in its opinion that there is no difference between the two standards. We, of course, intimate no view as to the correct result if the proper test is applied in this case.
We quite agree with the dissent that under Furnco and McDonnell Douglas the employer’s burden is satisfied if he simply “explains what he has done” or “produe[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.” Post, at 28,29. But petitioners clearly did produce evidence to support their legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for refusing to promote respondent during the years in question. See 569 F. 2d, at 172-173, 178; App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2 to B-24. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals held that petitioners had not met their burden because the proffered legitimate explanation did not “rebut” or “disprove” respondent’s prima facie case or “prove absence of nondiscriminatory motive.” 569 F. 2d, at 177 — 179 ; see App. to Pet. for Cert. B-25. This holding by the Court of Appeals is further support for our belief that the court appears to have imposed a heavier burden on the employer than Furnco, and the dissent here, require.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1