What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Benny PEOPLES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 7488.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 13, 1964.
Malcolm E. MacDougall, Denver, Colo., for the appellant.
Jack R. Parr, Asst. U. S. Atty. (B. Andrew Potter, U. S. Atty., with him on brief), for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and HILL and SETH, Circuit Judges.
MURRAH, Chief Judge.
Peoples was convicted and sentenced pursuant to jury trial on a one-count indictment charging him with unlawfully entering a bank with intent to commit a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). On trial of the case he was represented by retained counsel. He was granted leave to appeal from that judgment in forma pauperis and competent counsel was appointed to represent him. After hearing oral argument on the merits and upon careful consideration of the briefs and record submitted, this Court in a per curiam opinion dismissed the appeal as untimely for failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 37(a) (2), F.R.Crim.P. See: Peoples v. United States (10 CA), 324 F.2d 689, citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259. Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment of dismissal and remanded the case “for consideration in the light of Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 84 S.Ct. 1689, 12 L.Ed. 760, decided this date.” Peoples v. United States, 378 U.S. 586, 84 S.Ct. 1929, 12 L.Ed.2d 1040. We think this case clearly distinguishable-, from the facts in Fallen.
In the Fallen case, letters written by the convicted defendant and addressed' to the Clerk of the Court “asking for a. new trial and for an appeal” were received by the Clerk four days after the-expiration of the time for filing notice-of appeal prescribed by Rule 37(a) (2).. The letters were dated within the ten-day pex-iod and if promptly mailed would have been, in the course of normal events,, received by the Clerk within the prescribed period. On the basis of the record, there was no reason to doubt that the date on the letters was accurate and that they were deposited with the prison authorities for mailing. In these circumstances, “petitioner had done all that: could reasonably be expected to get the letter to its destination within the required 10 days.” He was held, therefore, not to be chargeable with the-delay. In short, the timely deposit with, the prison authorities constituted a timely filing within the spirit and purpose of Rule 37(a) (2). Try as we may, we cannot bring our case within the precepts, of the Fallen decision.
Although the convicted defendant in our case stated at sentencing and' in the presence of his retained attorney that he would “like to appeal in forma, pauperis,” nothing was done to effect the-appeal for more than two months after-imposition of sentence. If the defendant had not been represented by counsel,, it would have been the duty of the trial Court to fully advise him of his right-to appeal and upon his request, direct the-Clerk “to prepare and file forthwith a. notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant.” Rule 37(a) (2). But, the defendant was represented by retained counsel and according to the record in the case,, depended upon this attorney “to perfect-this appeal in my behalf.” There is-nothing in the record to indicate, or from which it can be inferred, that the-trial Court, the Clerk or anyone else considered the defendant’s statement as “an oral notice of appeal given in open court.” The Court was justified in the assumption that timely notice of appeal would be filed by counsel. And, its subsequent treatment of the defendant’s statement as an oral notice of appeal cannot be legally justified unless it can be said that representation by retained counsel was so inadequate as to cast upon the Court the burden to protect the convicted defendant’s right of appeal. See: Footnote 4, Fallen v. United States, supra.
In these circumstances, it is appropriate to relate that in response to a complaint lodged with the Oklahoma Bar Association, the attorney of record stated that he had informed his client that “in my opinion, his case was without merit and that an appeal would be fruitless and in my opinion, would avail him nothing. I further informed Peoples, that in my opinion, he would have a better chance of being granted a parole, due to his age and his physical health.” The attorney further stated that the reason he felt an appeal would be ineffectual was: “That the government’s evidence showed conclusively that Peoples’ fingerprints were lifted from the door of the bank vault; that his white Cadillac was the get-away-car used by the parties who ran from the bank; coupled with the testimony of two accomplices who testified under oath at the Preliminary Hearing of Peoples’ case, that they, along with Benny Peoples, planned the bank burglary and attempted to carry it out. One of these said accomplices changed his testimony at the trial to a jury in the Trial Court and was filed on for purjery (sic.) for so doing; the other reiterated his testimony given at the preliminary hearing and testified that the three of them attempted to burglarize the bank together.” Upon consideration of the attorney’s response, the Executive Council of the Oklahoma Bar Association “found no basis for disciplinary action” and the matter was closed.
Certainly, it was proper in the circumstances of this case for counsel to advise his client as he said he did. It did not become the duty of the trial Court under Rule 37(a) (2) to assume that the defendant was not competently represented, even to the point of deciding: whether an appeal should or would betaken, and thus treat his oral statement, as a notice of appeal. Given its most-liberal construction in the light of its-purposes, we do not believe the Rule can be stretched to cover our situation. We, therefore, reaffirm our judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Dismissed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0