What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re MAIER BREWING CO., Inc. SIMONS v. WELLS.
No. 6980.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
June 5, 1933.
Rex B. Goodeell and Frank L. Simons, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
Thomas C. Ridgway and Lawrence M. Cahill, both of Los Angeles, Cal., for appel-lee.
Before WILBUR, SAWTELLE, and MACK, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denied September 6, 1933.
MACK, Circuit Judge.
The facts are stipulated as follows. More than four months before the petition in bankruptcy was filed, appellant commenced an action against alleged bankrupt in the state court for recovery of certain attorney’s fees, and caused an attachment, which is now a valid lien, to be duly levied on a twenty-year leasehold estate in real property. Within the four months’ period appellant recovered judgment in the action and bad execution levied on the leasehold.
Thereafter, but before the date set for the sheriff’s sale, the petition in bankruptcy was filed, alleged bankrupt denied insolvency, and no adjudication has as yet been bad. Appellee, after qualifying as receiver, obtained from alleged bankrupt possession of the premises covered by the lease. Pursuant to an order directed to and served on appellant and the sheriff, to show cause why the sale should not be enjoined, a bearing was bad in the bankruptcy eourt over appellant’s objection to the summary jurisdiction. On the stipulated facts supplemented by testimony that the leasehold was worth far more than the judgment, the sheriff’s sale was enjoined and the receiver was directed to sell the leasehold premises with reasonable expedition and in any event within six months. The appeal is from this order.
In Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 53 S. Ct. 605, 77 L. Ed. - (U. S. Supreme Court, May 8, 1933), the paramount summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was held properly invoked, but under circumstances entirely different from those in the instant ease. There it was not to stay the enforcement of a valid lien, but to prevent the state eourt in a receivership proceeding begun within four months of bankruptcy from charging property in its control but belonging to the trustee in bankruptcy, with allowances for its receiver. In re Morse, 210 F. 900 (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1914), cf. In re Hudson River Nav. Corp., 57 F.(2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2, 1932), a sheriff’s sale was enjoined temporarily until a trustee could be appointed, so as to enable him to bid and thus more effectively protect the interest of the estate, as against the eoneededly valid lien claimant. It is unnecessary to express any opinion on the soundness of this decision; the instant case, in any event, is entirely different, in that here the injunction was permanent and its sole purpose was to change the control of the property from the state eourt to the bankruptcy court, by substituting the receiver for the sheriff as the proper party to sell the property.
If a state eourt, by proceedings to foreclose or otherwise enforce a valid lien, instituted even within four months preceding the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, has acquired control of the property, the bankruptcy eourt, whatever its jurisdictional power may be, will not enjoin the continuance of such proceedings. Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165, 172, 175, 23 S. Ct. 67, 47 L. Ed. 122 (1902); Straton v. New (1931) 283 U. S. 318, 331, and cases collected in note 6, page 326, 51 S. Ct. 465, 75 L. Ed. 1060; In re Greenlie-Halliday Co., 57 F.(2d) 173, 174 (C. C. A. 2, 1932); Bryan v. Speakman, 53 F.(2d) 463 (C. C. A. 5, 1931); In re Gillette Realty Co., 15 F.(2d) 193 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926). In bankruptcy, as in equity, “one court will not snatch a res from another’s month.” In re Greenlie-Halliday Co., supra.
Appellee urges, however, that where, as here, the bankruptcy court, through its receiver, is properly in actual possession of the res, that court may administer the property and stay further proceedings in another court to enforce even a concededly valid lien. This court has held in a ease of attachment of realty, in which, unlike personalty, levy is perfected by notice and recording without actual seizure and possession (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 542; Clark v. Sawyer, 48 Cal. 133, 138), that exclusive jurisdiction of the res is not thereby acquired (Pacific Coast Pipe Co. v. Conrad City Water Co., 245 F. 846 [C. C. A. 1917]). See, too, In re Hall & Stillson Co., 73 F. 527 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1896). But as stated in Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 on page 317, 19 L. Ed. 931 (1870) : While the general rule in regard to jurisdiction in rem requires the actual seizure and possession of the res by the officer of the court, such jurisdiction may be acquired by acts which are of equivalent import, and which stand for and represent the dominion of the court over the thing, and in effect subject it to the control of the court. Among this latter class is the levy of a writ of attachment or seizure of real estate, which being incapable of removal, and lying within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, is cor all practical purposes brought under the jurisdiction of the court by the officer’s levy of the writ and return of that fact to the court.”
Our opinion last year in Ke-Sun Oil Co. v. Hamilton (C. C. A.) 61 F.(2d) 215, seriously questioned the soundness of the Pacific Coast Pipe decision. See, too, Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. El. R. Co., 177 U. S. 51, 20 S. Ct. 564, 44 L. Ed. 667 (1900); In re Greenlie-Halliday Co., 57 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Bryan v. Speakman, 53 F.(2d) 463 (C. C. A. 5, 1931); Griffin v. Lenhart, 266 F. 671 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920); Beardslee v. Ingraham, 183 N. Y. 411, 76 N. E. 476, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073 (1906); McGrew v. Maxwell, 80 W. Va. 718, 94 S. E. 395 (1917); also eases cited in Ke-Sun Oil Case, supra, at page 217 of 61 F. (2d).
On further consideration of these cases, we are of the opinion that, in so far as it conflicts with the views herein expressed, the Pacific Coast Pipe Case must be overruled.
The order of the District Judge enjoining the sheriff’s sale and directing a- receiver’s sale must therefore be reversed.
Of course the rule is inapplicable where foreclosure or enforcement of a lion is begun in another court after bankruptcy petition is filed. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, 51 S. Ct. 270, 75 L. Ed. 645 (1931).
In equity, the principle is fortified by Judicial Code, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162, U. S. C., title 28, § 379 (28 USCA § 379). See Ke-Sun Oil Co. v. Hamilton (C. C. A. 9, 1932) 61 F.(2d) 215, especially cases cited at page 217.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1