What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ZICOS v. DICKMANN et al.
No. 11084.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Aug. 18, 1938.
Louis Hudson and Maurice J. Gordon, both of St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Oliver Senti, of St. Louis, Mo. (E. H. Wayman, of St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GARDNER, SANBORN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit in equity brought by the appellant to enjoin law enforcement officers of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, from seizing or confiscating mint vending machines belonging to him. From a decree dismissing the bill of complaint and the suit for want of equity, this appeal is taken.
The bill of complaint alleges that the petitioner (appellant) is a resident and citizen of Illinois, and' that defendants (appellees) are “the duly appointed, qualified and acting members of the Board of Commissioners of the Police Department of the City of St. Louis, Missouri,” “the duly appointed, qualified and acting Chief of Police of the City of St. Louis, Missouri,” “the duly elected, qualified and acting Circuit Attorney of the City of St. Louis, Missouri,” and “the duly elected, qualified and acting Sheriff of the City of St, Louis. Missouri”; that petitioner is in the business of selling mints by means of vending machines and has been engaged in that business in St. Louis, Missouri; that his business consists of placing mint vending machines in restaurants and other places of business; that he is the owner of about fifty of such machines in locations in St. Louis, which machines are worth $100 each, that he has in St. Louis 100 cases of mints of the value of $1,000, and that his total investment in machines' and equipment in that City is about $6,000 or more; that in November, 1937, the Board of Commissioners of the Police Department, acting through its police officers, “without cause or justification and without warrant issued by a competent or judicial authority, unlawfully seized and confiscated” one of petitioner’s machines, arresting the proprietor of the place where it was installed, and that the defendants ordered the proprietors of two other places in which petitioner’s machines had bepn installed, to remove them under threat of arrest; that petitioner is informed and believes that the Police Board of the City of St. Louis ordered the seizure and removal of all of the petitioner’s machines and the arrest of the proprietors of the places where they were located; that after the seizure by police officers of “the mint vending machines aforesaid” petitioner withdrew the machines theretofore installed and has not since attempted to install any machines or to have any machines operated in St. Louis, “in orders to forestall the unlawful and unwarranted seizure and confiscation thereof by defendants.”
The bill of complaint describes the nature and use of the vending machines and the contracts under which they are installed, all" of which the petitioner claims clearly indicate that they are not gambling devices and are not capable of being used for the purpose of gambling; and the petitioner alleges that there is no law of Missouri or of the United States, enacted to prevent gambling, which applies to the operation of the petitioner’s machines, but that, unless the defendants are restrained from so doing they will destroy any machines of petitioner which may be found in places of business, and arrest the proprietors of. such places and compel petitioner to withdraw his machines from use forever, and will prevent him from earning the profits which would otherwise accrue to him through the leasing of the machines and the selling of mints thereby.
The bill contains this allegation: “Petitioner states that by reason of the seizure, confiscation, and destruction of th$ mint vending machines, now being held by defendant Police Board, aforesaid, and the continued seizure, confiscation and destruction of further machines as threatened by the defendants, and by reason of the loss-of the profits which lawfully accrued to him through the operation and leasing of the said mint vending machines, petitioner is unlawfully deprived of his property without due process of law, in violation of Section 30, Article II, of the Constitution of Missouri [Mo.St.Ann.Const. art. 2, § 30] and of Article V, of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States [U. S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5]; that by reason of the seizure of said machines, petitioner and his property and effects are being subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of Section [Article] II, of the Constitution of Missouri [Mo.St.Ann. Const, art. 2, § 11], and of Amendment IV, (four) of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States [U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 4] ; that by reason of the seizure and confiscation and destruction of said machines, petitioner is deprived of the right to follow a lawful business and earn a livelihood, in violation of Section IV, of Article II, of the Constitution of Missouri [Mo.St.Ann.Const. art. 2, § 4]; guaranteeing all persons a natural right to the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry.”
The first question to be determined is whether the court below acquired jurisdiction of this case.
It is to be noted that the bill of complaint contains no allegation as to the value of the right of the petitioner to .conduct his business in the City of St. Louis, and states no facts from which the value of that right can be determined. Petitioner alleges merely that he had an investment of some $6,000 in his business in that City, and that, after the seizure of one of his machines and after threats had been made to confiscate two others, he withdrew his investment and ceased operations in St. Louis. That the value of his right to continue in business in St. Louis is worth more than $3,000 does not appear from the facts stated. Since his mint vending machines (with the exception of one which was seized) have been withdrawn, it appears that they are no longer in jeopardy and their value would certainly not measure the sum or value of the matter in controversy.
In a suit of this nature, the jurisdiction of the District Court attaches only “where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000, and (a) arises under th? Constitution or laws of the United States, or 'treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or (b) is between citizens of different States, or (c) is between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.” Jud.Code, § 24(1), 28 U.S.C. § 41(1), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1).
The Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 37, 36 Stat. 1098, 28 U.S.C. § 80,28 U.S.C.A. § 80, makes it the duty of the District Court to enforce these jurisdictional limitations (McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 298 U.S. 178, 182, 56 S.Ct. 780, 782, 80 L.Ed. 1135; American United Life Ins. Co. v. Franklin, 8 Cir., 97 F.2d 76), and it is incumbent upon one who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor to allege in his pleading the facts essential to give jurisdiction, and throughout the litigation to carry the burden of showing that he is properly in court. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, supra, page 189, 56 S.Ct. page 785.
It is the value of the right which the petitioner seeks to protect against interference which measures the amount in controversy in such a suit as this. Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 205 U.S. 322, 336, 27 S.Ct. 529, 51 L.Ed. 821; Bitterman v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 207 U.S. 205, 225, 28 S.Ct. 91, 52 L.Ed. 171, 12 Ann. Cas. 693; Berryman v. Whitman College, 222 U.S. 334, 345, 346, 32 S.Ct. 147, 56 L.Ed. 225; Glenwood Light Co. v. Mutual Light Co., 239 U.S. 121, 125, 126, 36 S.Ct. 30, 60 L.Ed. 174; McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, supra, page 181, 56 S.Ct. page 781.
Suits between citizens of different states and suits arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States cannot be brought in the federal courts unless the value of the matter in controversy is more than $3,000. Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 176 U.S. 68, 72, 73, 20 S.Ct. 272, 44 L.Ed. 374; Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269, 270, 54 S.Ct. 700, 703, 78 L.Ed. 1248.
While it is unnecessary to consider other questions, we take the liberty of directing attention to the failure of appellant to allege .in his bill that the defendants are citizens of Missouri, and to the rule that jurisdictional facts may not be inferred argumentatively from the allegations of a pleading. Brown v. Keene, 8 Pet. 112, 115, 8 L.Ed. 885; Continental Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.S. 237, 240, 7 S.Ct. 193, 30 L.Ed. 380; Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 702, 11 S.Ct. 449, 34 L.Ed. 1078; Timmons v. Elyton Land Co., 139 U.S. 378, 11 S.Ct. 585, 35 L.Ed. 195; Roberts v. Lewis, 144 U.S. 653, 656, 12 S.Ct. 781, 36 L.Ed. 579; Stuart v. Easton, 156 U.S. 46, 15 S.Ct. 268, 39 L.Ed. 341; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 279, 280, 16 S.Ct 1051, 41 L.Ed. 157.
The suit should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and not for want of equity.
The case 'is remanded, with directions to set aside the decree appealed from, and .to enter a decree of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1