What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Benjamin T. LANGENDORF et al., Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
No. 18031.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 22, 1963.
Ramsey Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger P. Marquis and Raymond N. Zagone, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., and Melvin C. Blum, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
Robert T. Whitman, Downey, Cal., for appellees.
Before CHAMBERS and HAMLIN, Circuit Judges, and PENCE, District Judge.
HAMLIN, Circuit Judge.
In May, 1960, the United States of America, appellant herein, filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of California, an action against Benjamin T. Langendorf and Lucille Langendorf, husband and wife (hereinafter appellees). In the first count of an amended complaint thereafter filed the appellant alleged that it was the owner and entitled to the possession and the rents and profits of certain property situated in the county of San Bernardino, California; that the appellees were in possession of said property wrongfully; that demand had been made by the United States for possession; and that the appellees had refused to surrender possession knowing that the property was owned by appellant. In the second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action appellant alleged, in addition to the allegations contained in the first count, that appellant was entitled to damages for the use of said property by the appellees since 1945, that it was entitled to a further sum of over $8,000 for moneys paid by appellant to appellees by reason of the false representation of appellees that they were the owners of said property, and that demands had been made upon appellees by appellant for said rental damage and for the return of said moneys paid to appellees by reason of their false statements.
An answer was filed by appellees admitting their possession and use of the land since 1944, but denying the allegations of appellant as to title and further alleging the defense of laches and the defense that appellant was estopped from removing appellees from the use, occupancy, and possession of the property. In a counterclaim filed with the answer, the appellees contended they had made certain improvements on the property and asked that they be permitted to retain the use of the property or in the alternative be awarded damages by reason of their removal from the possession thereof.
Thereafter, appellant moved to strike certain allegations in appellees’ answer, purporting to raise the defenses of adverse possession, estoppel and/or laches, and moved that the counterclaim be dismissed. On the same day appellant moved for a partial summary judgment that it was, under the first count of the amended complaint, the legal owner of the real property and entitled to recover its possession, and that appellees had no right, title or interest therein.
On March 6, 1961, the court granted appellant’s motion striking the defenses and dismissing the counterclaim. It did not, however, rule on the appellant’s motion for summary judgment.
Over a period of many months thereafter memoranda were submitted to the district court upon the merits of the motion for summary judgment; apparently negotiations also were had between appellees and appellant looking toward a settlement of the litigation and the issuance of a permit to appellees to occupy the lands under certain conditions. These negotiations did not result in any agreement between the parties.
On January 19, 1962, appellant moved for a ruling upon the motion for a partial summary judgment and for an order setting the case for trial upon the damage issues. The district court on February 14, 1962, granted summary judgment that appellant was the owner of the property, and that the appellees had no right, title or interest therein. It further ordered the appellees to leave the property and to cease and desist from operating or using the property within sixty days from the date of entry of said judgment. The court’s order included the following:
“7. That this action is hereby dismissed as to all remaining claims of the plaintiff, but this dismissal shall not operate as an adjudication upon the merits.”
On April 13, 1962, appellant filed notice of appeal to this court “from, and only from, those portions of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and summary judgment, entered herein on February 14, 1962, wherein and whereby the trial court dismissed the remaining claims of the plaintiff, to-wit, its second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action.” It filed its brief with this court on November 2, 1962. No brief was filed within the time allowed by law by appellees; nor to this date has one been filed.
Appellant contends on appeal that the district court erred in denying a trial to determine the amount of damages, if any, due to appellant and in dismissing “all remaining claims of the plaintiff (appellant).” We agree.
A similar question was before the Supreme Court in Utah Power & Light Company v. United States. There an action was brought by the United States claiming that certain lands owned by the United States were being used by the defendants as sites for electric power plants. The United States sought to enjoin such use and to secure compensation for such occupancy or use in the past. The lower court ruled in favor of the government on the issue of the ownership of the lands and the right to their use, but refused the government’s prayer for pecuniary relief. The Supreme Court stated:
“As the defendants have been occupying and using reserve lands of the United States without its permission and contrary to its laws, we think it is entitled to have appropriate compensation therefor included in the decree. * * *
“It follows that the decrees are right and must be affirmed, save as they deny the Government’s right to compensation for the occupancy and use in the past, and in that respect they must be reversed.”
Here the district court determined that appellant owned the lands in question and that appellees had no right, title or interest in the lands. Appellant therefore had the right to have determined the issues raised concerning damages which it alleged resulted from appellees’ unauthorized use of those lands. The district court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and we can see no reason why it should not have determined these issues on the merits.
Judgment of dismissal of the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action alleged by appellant is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for trial on the issues contained therein.
. In discovery proceedings instituted by the United States the Langendorfs answered certain interrogatories and made certain admissions.
. On April 13, 1962, appellees filed notice of appeal to this court from the summary judgment made by the district court on February 14, 1962. On April 18, 1962, the appellant moved the district court for an order to show cause why a writ of assistance should not be issued authorizing the United States Marshal to place appellant in possession of the premises in question. After a hearing, the district court on June 28, 1962, upon the application of the appellees granted them leave to appeal in forma pauperis and made a further order staying the execution of the judgment of February 14, 1962, pending appeal upon condition “that the defendants, and each of them, file a supersedeas undertaking wherein they, and each of them, undertake to deposit into the registry of the court all rents, issues and profits or income of any type, nature or character whatsoever as it accrues to them during the pendency of their appeal; * *
On July 12, 1962, appellees filed the undertaking as directed by the district court. The record shows that subsequent to July 12, 1962, appellees took no further steps to perfect their appeal. No opening brief was filed by them as required by the rules of this court. By letter dated July 25, 1963, counsel for appellees was notified that pursuant to paragraph 7, rule 18 of the Rules of Practice of this court, the failure of the appellees to file a brief on appeal would be called to the attention of this court at 2 p. m. on August 7, 1963. On August 9, 1963, no brief of the appellees yet being on file, this court made an order dismissing their appeal.
. Because of the failure of appellees to file their brief, upon notice to the parties this court placed the matter on the calendar for March 7, 1963. At that time counsel for appellees (at his request) was given until March 22, 1963, to file his brief. Thereafter on successive requests by counsel for appellees, time to file appellees’ brief was extended to April 1, 1963, April 8, 1963, April 15, 1963, and April 30, 1963.
. 243 U.S. 389, 37 S.Ct. 389, 61 L.Ed. 791 (1917).
. See United States v. Bernard, 202 F. 728 (9th Cir., 1913).
. See United States v. Hosteen Tse-Kesi, 191 F.2d 518 (10th Cir., 1951).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1