What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private organization or association", specifically "business, trade, professional, or union (BTPU)". Your task is to determine what subcategory of private association best describes this litigant.

Opinion:
TERMINAL R. ASS’N OF ST. LOUIS v. MOORE, Judge.
No. 12974.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Oct. 19, 1944.
Arnot L. Sheppard, Louis A. McKeown, and Joseph A. McClain, Jr., all of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner.
■ William H. DeParcq and Robt. J. McDonald, both of Minneapolis, Minn., Harvey B. Cox, of Washington, D. C., and C. A. Randolph, of Kansas City, Mo., for respondent.
Before STONE, Circuit Judge, and REEVES, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
A personal injury action by A. T. Schorb against Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis is pending in the Eastern District of Missouri. Therein, plaintiff moved for “Discovery and Production of Document and for Permission to Copy Same,” describing the desired matter as “any statement or statements given by plaintiff to any claim agent or other employee of defendant, whether it shall be a statement signed by plaintiff or a statement taken stenographic-ally in question and answer form and not signed by plaintiff, or both.” The motion was sustained in an order requiring production of and permission to make copies of “Any statement or statements concerning an accident which occurred in the yard of Defendant at East St. Louis, Illinois, at about the hour of 10:28 A.M. on September 11th, 1943, wherein Plaintiff was injured, given by Plaintiff to any Claim Agent or other employee of Defendant, whether it be a statement signed by Plaintiff or a statement taken stenographically in question and answer form and not signed by Plaintiff, or both; and also any written document of any kind in Defendant’s possession which purports to be Plaintiff’s statement or account of the occurrence of the aforesaid accident, or any statement made by Plaintiff of any of the facts pertaining to the cause or occurrence of said accident or the injuries sustained as a result of said accident, whether said statement or statements be signed or unsigned by Plaintiff and in whatsoever form be made”.
Thereupon, the Terminal filed in this Court a petition for the writ of prohibition challenging the above order. Since the trial day of the personal injury action is set for less than a week away, the parties have agreed to proceed informally in order not to postpone the trial and the Court has, under the circumstances, accommodated itself to the situation. The parties submit the matter on the petition for the writ and its attached exhibits which are the motion, a supporting affidavit and the order thereon. Counsel have ably presented their views orally and by memoranda of authorities handed to the Court.
Obviously, the motion and order thereon are controlled by Rule 34(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, which empowers the trial court to “order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or control.”
The issues before us have to do with the jurisdiction of this Court to accord the remedy of prohibition in this situation; and, if such jurisdiction exists, the propriety of its exercise here. Speaking generally, these issues depend upon principles of importance in practice and procedure. They merit a full consideration of the powers of this Court in this respect and of the scope of Rule 34. However, the pressure of the imminence of the trial of the personal injury action precludes any such full consideration and we confine our determination as narrowly as possible to dispose of the case before us.
We refrain expressly from determining the jurisdiction of this Court to control, by prohibition, the action of a trial court taken under Rule 34, although that jurisdiction is by no means free from doubt, yet we assume its existence purely for the purposes of early disposition of this case because we are clearly of the opinion that the writ should not, for other reasons, issue.
The motion and order are narrowly confined to statements made by the plaintiff in the injury suit, concerning the accident or his injuries, to any employee of the defendant therein. Clearly such statements are not privileged. Whether such statements “constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action” depends upon the character of the statements and the use sought to be made of them at the trial of the injury action. The most which can be properly said against the order — and we do not intimate such — is that it is of doubtful propriety; or, expressing the thought otherwise, that the jurisdiction to enter it is doubtful. Even where there is clear jurisdiction in the appellate court to issue the writ of prohibition, it will not issue if “the jurisdiction of the lower court is doubtful.” Ex parte Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 255 U.S. 273, 275, 279, 41 S.Ct. 288, 289, 65 L.Ed. 631; Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 534, 41 S.Ct. 85, 65 L.Ed. 383; Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616, 619, 41 S.Ct. 609, 65 L.Ed. 1122; Ex parte United States, 263 U.S. 389, 393, 44 S.Ct. 130, 68 L.Ed. 351.
The writ is denied and the petition therefor dismissed.
Keaton v. Kennamer, 10 Cir., 42 F.2d 814, 815, 816.
Where there is doubt as to the propriety of issuing the writ, “it is admissible, and is common practice, to pass the question of power and to deny the writ because without warrant in other respects”. Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438, 448, 49 S.Ct. 411, 412, 73 L.Ed. 789.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private organization or association", specifically "business, trade, professional, or union (BTPU)". What subcategory of private association best describes this litigant?

Choices:
Business or trade association
utilities co-ops
Professional association - other than law or medicine
Legal professional association
Medical professional association
AFL-CIO union (private)
Other private union
Private Union - unable to determine whether in AFL-CIO
Public employee union- in AFL-CIO (include groups called professional organizations if their role includes bargaining over wages and work conditions)
Public Employee Union - not in AFL-CIO
Public Employee Union - unable to determine if in AFL-CIO
Union pension fund; other union funds (e.g., vacation funds)
Other
Unclear

Answer: 0