What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Garland FIELDS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 10684.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Dec. 5, 1966.
Decided Jan. 5, 1967.
Alexander L. Wilson, Arlington, Va. (Court-appointed counsel) for appellant.
Stefan C. Long, Asst. U. S. Atty. (C. V. Spratley, Jr., U. S. Atty., on the brief) for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BOREMAN and WINTER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Convicted, in a trial without a jury, of the offenses of selling narcotics not in pursuance of a written order on a form issued in blank for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury and selling narcotics not in the original stamped package, in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4705(a) and 4704(a), and sentenced to consecutive terms of eight and two years, respectively, appellant appeals. He alleges as fatal to his conviction denial of a speedy trial, failure to sever, failure to grant a mistrial when a codefendant allegedly essential to appellant’s defense refused to testify, and improper conduct on the part of the trial judge in examining witnesses and erroneously summarizing previous testimony of other witnesses. We find no merit in any contention, and we affirm.
The alleged denial of a speedy trial is predicated on the following facts: The offenses allegedly occurred May 19-20, 1965. A complaint was filed with the United States Commissioner on September 21, 1965 and appellant was arrested that day. At a hearing on September 30, 1965, probable cause was found and appellant was admitted to bail. Because a co-defendant was at large and the grand jury was not in session, an indictment was not returned until December 8, 1965. On December 16, 1965 and January 10, 1966, appellant appeared for arraignment without counsel. Counsel was then appointed by the Court and appellant pleaded not guilty on January 12,1966, waived a jury trial and the date of April 11, 1966 was fixed for trial. The trial was held as scheduled.
True, eleven months elapsed between the date of the alleged offenses and the actual trial, of which eight months was between arrest and trial, but the record fails to disclose a single instance in which appellant was prejudiced by any delay. At all times he was unrestrained, and his freedom to develop witnesses, testimony and matters of defense unhampered. The record reflects no request on his part that he be tried at any earlier date. We find no circumstances amounting to an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957); United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601 (4 Cir. 1962).
The alleged improper failure to grant a severance is grounded upon the fact that a codefendant, Corbin, elected to testify in his defense, while appellant did not. Prior to Corbin’s testimony, the government’s case consisted of the testimony of a narcotics agent who purportedly met appellant and his codefendants twice during the days in question and, for $300.00, purchased from them certain narcotics not in or from original stamped packages and not in pursuance of a written order on the form provided by the Secretary of the Treasury, and that of another agent, who testified only that the first agent and the several defendants were seen together at the times and at the places described by the first. Cor-bin’s testimony corroborated the association of the agent and the defendants at the times and places previously testified to, but constituted a denial that Corbin was aware of the nature of the transaction or that the materials delivered to the agent, for which he paid $300.00, were various narcotics. Appellant's counsel at no time, before, during or after Corbin’s testimony, requested a severance for his client.
In a proper case the failure of appellant’s counsel to request a severance would not foreclose our noticing and correcting plain error in the record. Rule 52(b) Fed.Rules Crim.P. But appellant’s claim that he was entitled to a severance on the record in this case is a bald assertion that codefendants may not be tried jointly when one or more of them elects to testify in his own behalf. Cor-bin made no attempt to incriminate appellant, other than to confirm his presence when the alleged illegal action was formulated and carried out. Under these circumstances, we perceive no such rule as that for which appellant contends. We disagree with appellant’s argument that he could not have been convicted on the testimony of the agent alone, because we are not aware of any rule which requires corroboration of the agent’s testimony. Indeed, the district court’s findings of fact with respect to appellant’s guilt indicate that the court relied on the testimony of the agent, uncorroborated by that of Corbin; the district court, in finding Corbin also guilty, rejected the exculpatory aspects of his testimony.
There is no merit in the contention that appellant should have been granted a mistrial when the codefendant, Breed-en, who changed his plea to one count of the indictment from not guilty to guilty four days before the trial, refused to testify. Breeden did in fact testify in regard to an aspect of appellant’s defense, albeit, unfavorably. Breeden was called as a witness by counsel for Corbin for the limited purpose of identifying and explaining a letter, which he admitted he wrote, purportedly exculpating appellant and Coibin. Prior to his being called, and düring the course of his limited examination, counsel for Corbin twice asked that Breeden be made a witness for the court, and counsel for appellant raised no objection if, indeed, some of his remarks might not be construed as joining in the request. During his limited examination, Breeden testified that he was unable to say that a statement in his letter that Corbin and appellant had nothing to do with the “actual sale” referred to the sale for which appellant was prosecuted. Later, when made a witness for the court, and asked to describe in his own words what took place on May 19-20, Breeden, although instructed by the court and his counsel to answer, refused to testify further. Again, before, during and after Breeden’s testimony, appellant’s counsel did not request a mistrial.
Although we can notice plain error, we find none in the failure to grant a mistrial. That a witness testifies unfavorably, or even that his testimony is different from that which is anticipated, does not indicate the necessity for such relief in the circumstances reflected by this record.
There was no improper conduct on the part of the trial judge in examining witnesses, and there were no errors of any consequence in his summarization of previous testimony of other witnesses. In regard to this contention, we have reviewed the record thoroughly.-- To the extent that the trial judge erroneously summarized previous testimony of other witnesses, he was, in most part, corrected by counsel, the witnesses themselves, or by his asking further questions. Nothing in the district judge’s finding of facts in which he found appellant guilty discloses any misunderstanding of any essential fact. His exercise of his right to interrogate witnesses, in this non-jury case, was nothing more than an effort on his part to clarify his own understanding of the case and to elicit potentially material facts not inquired into by any of counsel. His calling Breeden as a court witness was in response to the twice repeated request of counsel for one of the codefendants, and in the face of the announced refusal of the prosecution to call him and the announced reluctance of counsel for any defendant to call him. The trial judge’s admonitions to Breeden that he must testify and that he must tell the truth, under penalty of perjury if he did otherwise, appear to be no more than a conscientious effort to carry into effect the advice given by the court, and concurred in by Breeden’s counsel, that Breeden could not claim self-incrimination in the area inquired into. In short, the conduct of the trial judge did not exceed the proper bounds of his function, as set forth by us in United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21 (4 Cir. 1966), and Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4 Cir. 1941), cert. den. 314 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 412, 86 L.Ed. 555 (1941).
The judgment of the lower court is
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0