What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Wendell O. CHRISTIAN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF MAINE et al., Respondents.
Misc. No. 278.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Dec. 6, 1968.
Wendell O. Christian, pro se.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
We have before us a petition for a certificate of probable cause to appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding, the district court having refused to grant either the writ or the certificate. Petitioner has complied with our Rule 8 by filing a memorandum giving detailed reasons why he believes there are substantial grounds for an appeal. We accordingly consider them.
The following facts appear. Petitioner was indicted and brought to trial before the Maine Superior Court, charged with a felony. Prior to trial his counsel had access to a list of the jury venire, their addresses and their occupations. A panel of twelve was duly selected and petitioner acknowledged his satisfaction therewith. On the second trial day, after the case had gone to the jury, and while it was deliberating, it came to the attention of petitioner’s counsel that in another case then pending before a different judge of the Superior Court a defendant had filed a pretrial motion attacking the makeup of the venire, and asking that it be dismissed in its entirety. The reason advanced by this other defendant was apparently that the addresses and occupations of the jurors drawn to the venire showed them not to be fully representative so as to constitute “a fair and just distribution according to population,” as was required by 14 Maine Rev.Stat.Ann. 1255 (1965). Petitioner, whose jury had been drawn from the same venire, then filed a similar motion, but the Superior Court denied it on the ground that it was filed too late, without reaching the merits. Petitioner was convicted, and upon his appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court attacking the venire the conviction was affirmed. The Court declined to determine whether petitioner had made his claim too late, but, instead, held that he had failed to establish it.
The habeas corpus petition is commendably specific. After stating that petitioner had exhausted his state remedies, and the manner in which he had done so, petitioner alleged that he was imprisoned in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury ve-nire “and the jury which rendered a verdict of guilty in petitioner’s case was illegally drawn by the Jury Commissioners of the County of Cumberland and State of Maine because the said jury was not a fair and just distribution according to the population of the County of Cumberland and State of Maine.” For this assertion petitioner gave detailed if somewhat repetitive reasons, namely, that only one juror appeared from the second largest city in the county and state; that the smaller towns were overrepresented; that of 31 jurors on the venire 9 were retired, 8 were executives, 4 were housewives, none were semiskilled workers, and “the working class was not sufficiently represented.”
By agreement the district court considered the case on the pleadings and the state record. In refusing the writ it stated that petitioner had received a full and fair hearing in the state court proceeding and that the state court had correctly applied the relevant federal constitutional standards.
We, too, will not consider the question of waiver, but will deal with the merits. On analysis, all that petitioner shows or offers to show is that the venire, and ultimate panel, were not in fact representative of a cross-section of the community. There is no constitutional requirement that they should be. The issue is not whether the particular panel proved to be unrepresentative in fact, but is whether it was drawn from an artificially limited base, or in a discriminatory manner. As the Court said in Fay v. New York, 1947, 332 U.S. 261, at 284, 67 S.Ct. 1613, at 1626, 91 L.Ed. 2043.
“It is fundamental in questioning the composition of a jury that a mere showing that a class was not represented in a particular jury is not enough; there must be a clear showing that its absence was caused by discrimination * *
Accord, Swain v. Alabama, 1965, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759. See also, Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 1946, 328 U.S. 217, 220, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181. This case is at the opposite end of the spectrum from cases such as Whitus v. Georgia, 1967, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599. Petitioner’s demonstration that his panel may have been unrepresentative does not of itself show a constitutional fault, and is not, as a single example, probative of any underlying constitutional error. Frazier v. United States, 1948, 335 U.S. 497, 69 S.Ct. 201, 93 L.Ed. 187. Petitioner indicated nothing further. He has no basis for an appeal.
The certificate is denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1