What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MORRIS v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
No. 7859.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued Nov. 3, 1941.
Decided Dec. 8, 1941.
Mr. Neil Burkinshaw, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Daniel B. Maher, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Vernon E. West, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Richmond B. Keech, Corp. Counsel, and John Nesbitt, Asst. Corp. Counsel, both of Washington, D. G, were on the brief, for appellee.
Mr. Milton D. Korman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Washington, D. G, also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and EDGERTON, Associate Justices.
EDGERTON, Associate Justice.
Appellant was convicted, in the Police Court, of injuring a person with a motor vehicle and failing to stop and give assistance, etc., and report to the police. He has not brought here the evidence on which he was convicted, or questioned its sufficiency.
The trial court excluded evidence of appellant’s “reputation for tenderness and mercy.” In criminal prosecutions the accused may, unless the proof makes it irrelevant, “call witnesses to show that his character was such as would make it unlikely that he would be guilty of the particular crime with which he is charged.” But “it is well settled that the reputation subject to proof is that respecting the trait of character involved in the offense charged.” Injuring a person with a motor vehicle commonly involves no lack of tenderness and mercy, but only a lack of skill or the like. Likewise, tenderness and mercy commonly have nothing to do with reporting to the police. If one believes that the person struck is uninjured or is well cared for, failure to stop involves no lack of tenderness and mercy, though it may involve lack of coolness, judgment, or courage, and of respect for law. If it was shown that appellant held either or both of those beliefs, his tenderness and mercy were as irrelevant to the issue of flight as to the other possible issues in the case. “The present record does not show what evidence was or was not introduced. * * * We must therefore presume that the necessary evidence was introduced” to make the court’s ruling proper. “Error is not to be presumed, but must be made affirmatively to appear by the party asserting it.”
The same principle applies to the next point. The court excluded evidence that appellant carried $100,000 of liability insurance. He offered this as showing “lack of motive * * * not to comply with the purposes of the statute * * With nothing in the record to show what testimony concerning flight there may or may not have been, we cannot say that the exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial.
Appellant asked for a subpoena duces tecum directed to Kenneth Yeatman, a member of the bar, requiring him to produce “the statements of R. Harris, E. Edson and N. Clark in the case of Bomley v. Morris.” The record does not clearly identify the case of Bomley v. Morris. Appellant’s counsel told the court that the statements were made by witnesses to the accident who had been subpoenaed by the prosecution in the present case. The record implies that Bomley was the person injured, and that the statements were obtained by Mr. Yeatman as counsel for Bomley. The court refused the subpoena on the ground that the statements were privileged.
Some cases hold that the issuance of subpoenas to compel the production of documents on behalf of an accused is within the reasonable discretion of the court. Some require, at least, a showing of relevancy and materiality to the defense before the court is bound to issue the subpoena. No such showing appears to have been made here. The record does not indicate that appellant told the court what the desired statements contained, or what he had reason to believe, or did believe, that they contained.
We need not pass upon the question whether there was technical error in refusing the subpoena. There is nothing in the record to show that, at the trial, a foundation was or could have been laid for admitting the statements in evidence, either to impeach their authors or for any other purpose. It does not appear that they admitted making the statements, or were asked whether they had made them, or that the statements were actually in existence either at the time of the trial or when the subpoena was sought. The record does not even show that the authors testified at the trial. Without a proper foundation the statements, if they had been brought to court in response to a subpoena, would not have been admitted in evidence. There is therefore no basis in the record for an inference that the error, if any, in refusing the subpoena, was prejudicial. Like a harmless error in exclusion of evidence, it does not call for reversal.
Affirmed.
D.C.Code (1929), Supp. V, Tit. 6, § 247.
We do not consider the extra-record evidence referred to in the briefs.
Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 363, 17 S.Ct. 72, 73, 41 L.Ed. 467. Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 56.
Keady v. United States, 10 Cir., 62 F.2d 689, 690.
Junghans v. Junghans et al., 72 App.D.C. 129, 130, 112 E.2d 212.
Wabash Railway Co. v. Bridal, 8 Cir., 94 F.2d 117, 121, certiorari denied 305 U.S. 602, 59 S.Ct. 63, 83 L.Ed. 382.
Cf. 28 U.S.C.A. § 391.
Walker v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 613, 78 S.W.2d 754, 757; Eaton v. State, 163 Miss. 130, 140 So. 729, 732. But cf. Glotzer v. City of New York, 173 Misc. 829, 19 N.Y.S.2d 174; In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, D.C.E.D.Tenn., 248 P. 137.
Arnstein v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 199, 296 P. 946.
Cothren v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 644, 141 S.W.2d 594.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1