What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Larry WAYNE, Appellant, v. Carl WHITE, Superintendent, and Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Appellees.
No. 83-2488.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted May 17, 1984.
Decided May 31, 1984.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., George Cox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellees.
Shepherd, Sandberg & Phoenix, P.C., Richard L. Prebil, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Before ROSS, BENNETT , and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.
The Hon. Marion Bennett, United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
This is a petition for habeas corpus brought by Larry Wayne, a state prisoner. The District Court dismissed the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. We affirm the dismissal, though on different grounds.
As to exhaustion, the question is whether there is any presently available remedy in the courts of Missouri. If there is such a remedy, it is a petition under Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 27.26, a state procedure analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We are persuaded that in fact the courts of Missouri would not entertain a Rule 27.26 petition in this case. The reason is that Wayne has previously filed a petition under this rule, without raising the grounds that he now claims render his conviction invalid. Under Rule 27.26(d), a successive petition will not be entertained unless the petitioner gives good cause why the grounds he now seeks to raise were not previously raised. No such cause has been suggested, and Wayne was represented by counsel at the time of his previous 27.26 petition. For a fuller statement of the background of this case, see our previous opinion, Wayne v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir.1981).
Since there is no presently available state remedy, failure to exhaust is not a bar to this proceeding. Deliberate bypass of state procedures, however, is a bar. The State has provided an adequate avenue for Wayne’s contentions, he has failed to use that avenue, and no reason is suggested as good cause for the failure. The federal courts may therefore not entertain this petition. The order of the District Court dismissing the petition will be affirmed. Since that order was based on the exhaustion doctrine, the dismissal was without prejudice. Logically, a dismissal based on deliberate bypass, which is the ground adopted by this Court, would be a dismissal with prejudice, but the respondent has not cross-appealed, and we may not, as an appellate court, grant an appellee more relief than he secured below. The effect of our affirmance, therefore, is to leave in place the District Court’s order dismissing Wayne’s petition without prejudice.
This disposition makes it unnecessary to discuss the State’s alternative argument that this second federal habeas petition should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. We are grateful to appointed counsel for his diligent services to appellant.
Affirmed.
. The Hon. William L. Hungate, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting a recommendation made by the Hon. William S. Bahn, United States Magistrate for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0