What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Otho J. BLOCKSON, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Arnold R. JAGO, Superintendent, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 78-3126.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 4, 1978.
Decided Nov. 7, 1978.
Otho J. Blockson, Jr., pro se.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Ohio, Richard David Drake, Columbus, Ohio, for respondent.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, MERRITT, Circuit Judge, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Otho J. Blockson, Jr., appeals from the denial of his application for a writ of habe-as corpus. He was convicted at a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Ashtabula County, Ohio, of rape in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02 and aggravated burglary in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.11.
The Ohio Court of Appeals of Ashtabula County affirmed the conviction. In one of the four assignments of error in his appeal to that court, Blockson contended that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence and in admitting in-custodial statements made by him prior to his being provided with Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed an appeal raising the same issues, holding that no substantial constitutional question was presented. Chief District Judge David S. Porter denied the application for a writ of habeas corpus by an order entered December 20, 1977. This appeal followed.
At approximately 11:30 a. m. on June 25, 1975, a 79 year old woman was awakened, by a male intruder, while taking a nap in a living room chair at her home in Ashtabula, Ohio. The intruder held a knife with a six inch serrated blade near her face and ordered her to go upstairs to a bedroom, disrobe and lie in bed with her eyes shut. As soon as she complied with his orders, the intruder inserted his penis into her vagina, gave her several thrusts, but quickly stopped and left. A neighbor woman saw a man run past her back door at approximately noon and heard the man crash into a deep ravine near her home.
A policeman had been dispatched to the vicinity of the assault to investigate an automobile bearing no license plates. A teenage boy told the policeman that a man was hanging to a tree in the ravine. With the help of other police officers and the use of a rope, Blockson was rescued from the ravine, handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser.
Immediately after being placed in the cruiser, and without any questioning of Blockson by the police, except for his name and address, Blockson “blurted out” that he was sorry for what he had done to the old lady, that he had been in her house and that he was ashamed of what he had done. The officers testified that Blockson’s statements were made voluntarily, immediately after he entered the cruiser, and were not made in response to any interrogation. Blockson then directed the officers to the residence where his victim lived. While on the way to the police station, and again without any interrogation, Blockson “blurted out” that he was sorry about the old lady, that he had done it before, and that he could not help himself.
Prior to the trial, Blockson moved to suppress his statements on the ground that no Miranda warnings were given. After an evidentiary hearing, the State trial judge overruled the motion to suppress.
The record fully supports the holding of the district court and the Court of Appeals of Ohio that the statements of Blockson were not in response to any interrogation, but were made freely from an apparent concern for the life of his victim. The Ohio Court of Appeals observed that “[h]e apparently was concerned that due to her age, coupled with fear and anxiety, she might have died and he did not wish to face a homicide charge.”
The opinion in Miranda expressly states: “Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See also United States v. DeBose, 410 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920, 91 S.Ct. 906, 27 L.Ed.2d 823 (1971).
We conclude that no federal constitutional rights of appellant were violated by the order of the State trial court denying the motion to suppress or by the admission of the foregoing volunteered self-incriminating statements into evidence.
Blockson further challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. This issue is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action unless the conviction is totally devoid of evidentiary support as to a crucial element of the offense. Brooks v. Rose, 520 F.2d 775 (6th Cir, 1975).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. It was later established that the automobile belonged to Blockson.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0