What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Stanley NORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 85-1772.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
May 30, 1986.
Sumner J. Hatch, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant-appellant.
Brent D. Ward, U.S. Atty., and Samuel Alba, Asst. U.S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant, Michael Stanley Norris, appeals his criminal conviction as an accessory after the fact to a robbery of a Brinks armored car. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 1951.
In July 1984 Richard Scutari and others robbed the Brinks car in California. In December 1984 Norris was seen traveling by car with Scutari in Utah. In January 1985 Norris was traced to and arrested in Alabama.
The Brinks robbery, which was the federal crime underlying Norris’ charge as an accessory, was listed as obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce by threats of violence, as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The government presented extensive evidence at trial to show a close connection between Scutari and Norris. Norris was convicted by a jury and sentenced to a prison term.
On appeal Norris claims that (1) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the government need not show Norris knew Scutari’s name was Scutari, although it must show that the man who had been with Norris in Utah was the Scutari who had committed the robbery; (2) the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to show Norris knew Scutari had committed the holdup; and (3) 18 U.S.C. § 1951 had not been violated. We affirm.
Norris’ counsel did not object to the contested jury instruction at trial. This precludes our consideration of it on appeal unless the instruction constituted “plain error.” See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, 52(b); United States v. Kilbum, 596 F.2d 928, 935 (10th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966, 99 S.Ct. 1517, 59 L.Ed.2d 782 (1979). There was no denial of a fundamental right here; the instruction was not hopelessly confusing, as alleged. Rather, it was correct under 18 U.S.C. § 3.
Norris bases his insufficiency of the evidence claim on the lack of direct evidence that he knew an offense had been committed. But the knowledge required by 18 U.S.C. § 3 may be shown wholly by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1051 (9th Cir. 1983). The circumstantial evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, fully supports the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., R. 111, 75-82, 87-91, 104-07; R. IV, 199-202, 220-22, 272-83, 307-54.
Norris’ final argument is that the robbery did not interfere with interstate commerce, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3). We note initially that § 1951, the “Hobbs Act,” was enacted primarily to deal with labor racketeering and extortion. See United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 401-10, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 1010-15, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973); United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 418-21, 76 S.Ct. 522, 524-27, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956). But the Supreme Court dispelled any doubt over the Act’s application to crimes of the sort involved here in United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 98 S.Ct. 1112, 55 L.Ed.2d 349 (1978). In Culbert a unanimous Court held that racketeering was not an essential requirement of the crime; it held that a single attempt to extort money from a banker fell within the statute’s prohibition. Id. at 374-80, 98 S.Ct. at 1114-17.
Section 1951 literally prohibits any act that “affects commerce ... by robbery____” With little discussion, courts
have allowed § 1951 to be used against ordinary robberies. See e.g., United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 341, 347-48 (6th Cir.1984) (general store); United States v. Caldarazzo, 444 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (7th Cir.1971) (jewelry salesman), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 328, 30 L.Ed.2d 276 (1971). A de minimis effect on commerce has been held to be enough to violate § 1951. United States v. Conn, 769 F.2d 420, 424 (7th Cir.1985) (state court clerk accepting bribes). A mere “depletion of assets” of a firm engaged in interstate commerce will meet the requirement. United States v. Jackson, 748 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir.1984) (bank officer’s extortion).
We therefore must conclude that this Brinks robbery violated 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Norris assisted a person who had committed “an offense against the United States,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3.
AFFIRMED.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0