What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Edwin HARE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 78-5559
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 7, 1979.
J. Louis Wilkinson, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellant.
J. R. Brooks, U. S. Atty., Michael V. Rasmussen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and VANCE, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
Hare was convicted on counts One through Four charging possession with intent to distribute various drugs, and Count Five, possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony.
The defense did not move before trial to suppress the drugs and the guns as required by F.R.Crim.P. 12(b) and first raised it by objection at trial. Under Rule 12(f) this waived the point, but even if the issue of warrantless search had been properly raised it was without merit. Officers were not required to secure a warrant to search an open, unfenced, unposted densely wooded area, near a highway and not part of the curtilage of any dwelling. E. g., U. S. v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 453-54 (C.A.5, 1978).
There was no error in refusing to divulge the identity of an informer. Hare contended that he was entitled to know the informer’s identity on the theory that he did not know the contents of the bag hidden in the woods and containing the drugs and the guns and was merely investigating the sack to see what it contained. The informer’s tip had represented that the informer was present when Hare and his brother placed the bag in the woods and had said or implied that persons other than the Hare brothers may have been present. The bag was partially covered by rocks and vegetation. The area was so densely wooded that it was difficult to reach the location of the sack, and Hare had to crawl to get to it. Hare placed his hand into the sack but when he was flushed had not removed anything; he removed his hand and officers took possession of the sack and closed it. Shortly thereafter Hare voluntarily told his father, in the presence of the officers, that he had been “caught in a trap.” Later, at police headquarters, the officers dumped out the sack. In the bottom, underneath the drugs, were two guns. Soon thereafter Hare was overheard making a telephone call in which he told the person at the other end of the line to call his [Hare’s] lawyer and “tell him they’ve got both guns.” Hare’s theory is that, if revealed, the informer might testify that Hare, though physically present when the sack was brought into the woods and put in its location, did not know what was in the sack. Under the balancing test of Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1956), this possibility (if it can be called possibility at all) is simply too attenuated to be considered a necessary part of Hare’s defense.
The contention of multiplicity in counts One through Four is raised for the first time on appeal. In any event, we do not reach it since the sentences on counts Two, Three and Four are concurrent with the sentence on count One.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 8