What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Dr. David C. FARSHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Irving G. KAGAN, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 76-2896.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 7, 1978.
David C. Farshy, pro se.
John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., William D. Mallard, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., Carl H. Harper, Reg. Atty., Thomas A. Rice, Asst. Regional Atty., Dept. of HEW, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, TUTTLE and THORNBERRY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dr. David Farshy sought to enjoin his employers at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta from terminating his employment pending resolution of his Title VII, discrimination-in-employment suit. The District Court denied his motion in a carefully deliberated Order and Dr. Farshy appeals. Cognizant of our somewhat limited role in reviewing denials of temporary injunctive relief, we affirm.
Dr. Farshy brought this Title VII suit alleging that his supervisors had retaliated against him for filing complaints with the Civil Service Commission, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 20006-3. While this suit was pending before the District Court, Dr. Far-shy was given notice of his discharge from the CDC. Dr. Farshy then moved for a preliminary injunction until his Title VII suit was determined.
In ruling on Dr. Farshy’s motion, the District Court referred to the four prerequisites that have been established for the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction:
(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.
See Morgan v. Fletcher, 5 Cir., 1975, 518 F.2d 236, 239; Canal Authority v. Callaway, 5 Cir., 1974, 489 F.2d 567, 572. The Court carefully analyzed the second factor- — the question of irreparable harm — and expressed strong doubt whether Dr. Farshy had presented sufficient evidence to satisfy that prerequisite. But the ground upon which the District Court finally and explicitly denied the injunction was the first factor — likelihood of success on the merits: “Plaintiff has not introduced one shred of evidence that any of defendants’ actions resulted from a discriminatory animus on their part; and the evidence of possibly retaliatory treatment is slight at best * * * tt
The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests in the discretion of the District Court, and appellate review is limited to determining whether the District Court abused its discretion as bounded by the four prerequisites set forth above. E. g., Canal Authority v. Callaway, supra, 489 F.2d at 572.
In denying Dr. Farshy’s motion in this case, the District Court clearly acted within its discretion. Should it eventually be determined that Dr. Farshy was indeed discharged in violation of Title VII, he would be entitled to a complete restoration of pay under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, and any harm could be remedied. See generally Sampson v. Murray, 1974, 415 U.S. 61, 94 S.Ct. 397, 39 L.Ed.2d 166. More significant, however, is the fact that on the record as it now exists, Dr. Farshy has not carried his burden of persuading us that the District Judge was in error in concluding that he is not likely to prevail on the merits. On these probabilities, we echo the conclusions of the District Court: the evidence thus far presented “reveals that the plaintiff, an otherwise competent scientist, is basically unable to achieve results in the CDC work environment. * * * [T]he evidence does not reveal that the discharge decision or other activity by defendants * * * resulted from any discriminatory or retaliatory animus on their part.”
AFFIRMED.
. In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees * * * because [they have] opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [they have] made a charge * * * under this subchapter.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 5