What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Albert THOMPSON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. KAWASAKI KISEN, K.K., et al. Appellees. BAY STATE STEVEDORING COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant, Appellant, v. Albert THOMPSON et al. Appellees.
Nos. 6447, 6457.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
July 7, 1965.
Nathan Greenberg, Boston, Mass., for Albert Thompson.
Blair L. Perry, Boston, Mass., with whom Hale & Dorr, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for Bay State Stevedoring Co.
Hiller B. Zobel, Boston, Mass., with whom Robert J. Hallisey, Thomas H. Walsh, and Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for Kawasaki Kisen, K.K.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, BREITENSTEIN Circuit Judge, and GIGNOUX, District Judge.
By designation.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
The sole issue in this negligence action is whether at the jury trial the court properly received evidence of payments to the plaintiff (appellant Thompson) from an unnamed source during a period for which he claimed disability.
Plaintiff, an injured longshoreman, sought recovery from a shipowner (ap-pellee Kawasaki Kisen, K.K.) which in turn sought indemnity from the steve-doring company (Bay State), the plaintiff’s employer. The case was begun in a Massachusetts state court and removed to federal court by the shipowner on the ground of diversity. The shipowner filed a third-party complaint against the stevedoring company. The jury found for the shipowner on the claim of unseaworthiness and for the longshoreman on the claim of negligence. The third-party complaint issues were heard by the court without a jury and the stevedoring company was ordered to indemnify the shipowner. The verdict of $7,827 was for less than the payments made to the longshoreman by his employer’s compensation carrier and the court upheld the carrier’s lien.
The longshoreman is dissatisfied with the recovery and his appeal (No. 6447) is based on the alleged erroneous admission of the noted evidence. The stevedor-ing company’s appeal (No. 6457) is directed to the preservation of its third-party defendant’s rights with respect to the scope of any new trial which may be ordered.
The accident occurred when the longshoreman was working in the hold of the ship unloading cargo. He stumbled on a piece of dunnage while carrying a carton of nails. He claimed an injury to his back, was hospitalized, and asserts inability to work. On cross-examination of the plaintiff, counsel for the shipowner asked the following question:
“Q. During this period you were receiving from a source which for the moment I won’t reveal $70 a week, weren’t you ?”
An objection, which we deem appropriate to raise the issue here presented, was overruled. The answer disclosed that plaintiff had received $70 a week for an undefined period and later $52 a week, but at the time was receiving nothing.
Counsel for the longshoreman argues that the trial court erred in requiring an answer to the question on receipt of benefits during the disability period. He relies on Tipton v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., Inc., 375 U.S. 34, 84 S.Ct. 1, 11 L.Ed.2d 4, rehearing denied 375 U.S. 936, 84 S.Ct. 328, 11 L.Ed.2d 268, and Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 84 S.Ct. 316, 11 L.Ed.2d 307. Tipton is not pertinent. There the Supreme Court held that evidence of the receipt of compensation under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was not admissible on the issue of whether the plaintiff was an offshore drilling employee rather than a seaman because that status was to be determined on the basis of the facts of the case — not on the basis of a prior contention of the plaintiff.
Eichel was an action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Supreme Court held that evidence of the plaintiff’s receipt of a disability pension under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 was properly excluded. The Court commented that “it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes if the receipt of disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act * * * were considered as evidence of malingering by an employee asserting a claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.”
The instant case is not based on any federal statute but rather on ordinary negligence. No authority of which we are aware holds that the rules of evidence applicable to ordinary negligence cases do not apply when the plaintiff is a longshoreman and the defendant is a shipowner. Rule 43(a), F.R.Civ.P., provides that evidence shall be admitted if it is admissible under the rules of evidence applied in either the federal courts or the courts of the state in which the federal court is held and that the rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs. The case at bar was begun in Massachusetts and removed to federal court because of diversity. Under Massachusetts law evidence of receipt of collateral income is admissible “to affect the weight of plaintiff’s previous testimony that he was disabled from working on account of the accident.” The trial court properly permitted the question to be answered.
In No. 6447 the judgment is affirmed. This action makes unnecessary the consideration of No. 6457 and that appeal is dismissed.
. Although the source of the payments was not identified, the plaintiff and his counsel, both before and after the question in issue, improperly (cf. Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 255, 84 S.Ct. 316, 11 L.Ed.2d 307) brought to the attention of the jury the presence of insurance in connection with the care and treatment which the plaintiff had received.
. 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
. 45 U.S.C.A. § 228b(a)4.
. See J. H. Horne & Sons Co. v. Bath Fibre Co., 1 Cir., 272 F.2d 8, 10.
. See 5 Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 43.04, at 1326-1328 (2d ed.).
. McElwain v. Capotosto, 332 Mass. 1, 122 N.E.2d 901, 902.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0