What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Horace TEASLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17133.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
April 3, 1969.
William M. Evans, Indianapolis, Ind., Horace Teasley, in pro. per., for appellant.
Alfred W. Moellering, U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., for appellee.
Before FAIRCHILD and KERNER, Circuit Judges, and HOLDER, District Judge.
Judge Holder is sitting by designation from the Southern District of Indiana.
KERNER, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Teasley appeals from his conviction (without jury) of violating the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312, by knowingly transporting a stolen vehicle from Chicago, Illinois to Gary, Indiana. We affirm.
At the time of his arrest, after being fully warned of his constitutional rights, Teasley gave a statement to F.B.I. Agent Standifer. In the statement, Teasley admitted transporting the car across the state line but alleged that he bought it in Chicago for $200 cash and did not receive a bill of sale or title for it. The statement also contained various allegations relating to where and when defendant was working. The government presented the uncontradicted testimony of the alleged employers which refuted the allegations relating to employment.
Defendant contends that since his exculpatory statement was introduced by the Government, it must be taken as true in the absence of proof of its falsity beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject this contention. The readily verifiable facts in the statement were shown to be false by uncontradicted testimony. Accordingly, there is no reason to accord the statement any probative value, much less a presumption which was rejected by the only circuit which ever found it to exist. Puryear v. United States, 378 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) and cases cited therein at 30 n. 2. See also, 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 909 at 581-585. We believe the court below was correct in considering this statement to be so incredible and patently false that it could infer a consciousness of guilt from it once the uncontradicted testimony was admitted. United States v. Fabric Garment Co., 262 F.2d 631, 639 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 989, 79 S.Ct. 1117, 3 L.Ed.2d 978 (1959).
Defendant also contends that the corpus delicti was not proved as there was no showing by the Government that he knew that the car was stolen. It is well established, in this Circuit as in all the others, that the possession of a recently stolen vehicle gives rise to an inference of knowledge of its theft in the absence of a satisfactory explanation to the contrary. United States v. Angel, 201 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1953), and Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1309, 1360 et seq., § 41(a) et seq. The Indiana cases cited to us are inapplicable to this federal prosecution.
We are grateful to William M. Evans of the Indiana Bar who represented the defendant before us as court-appointed counsel.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1