What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
FURMAN v. GEORGIA
No. 69-5003.
Argued January 17, 1972
Decided June 29, 1972
Anthony G. Amsterdam argued the cause for petitioner in No. 69-5003. With him on the brief were B. Clarence Mayfield, Michael Meltsner, Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Jack Himmelstein, and Elizabeth B. DuBois. Mr. Greenberg argued the cause for petitioner in No. 69-5030. With him on the brief were Messrs. Meltsner, Amsterdam, Nabrit, Himmelstein, and Mrs. DuBois. Melvyn Carson Bruder argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 69-5031.
Dorothy T. Beasley, Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent in Nos. 69-5003 and 69-5030. With her on the briefs were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Courtney Wilder Stanton, Assistant Attorney General, and Andrew J. Ryan, Jr. Charles Alan Wright argued the cause for respondent in No. 69i-5031. With him on the brief were Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Alfred Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Robert C. Flowers and Glenn R. Brown, Assistant Attorneys General.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, and David 0. Givens, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Indiana as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 69-5003. Paul Raymond Stone filed a brief for the West Virginia Council of Churches et al. as amici curiae urging reversal in Nos. 69-5003 and 69-5030. John E. Havelock, Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Alaska as amicus curiae in Nos. 69-5003 and 69-5030. Briefs of amici curiae in all three cases were filed by Gerald H. Gottlieb, Melvin L. Wulf, and Sanford Jay Rosen for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Leo Pfeffer for the Synagogue Council of America et ah; by Chauncey Eskridge, Mario G. Obledo, Leroy D. Clark, Nathaniel R. Jones, and Vernon Jordan for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et ah; by Michael V. DiSalle for Edmund G. Brown et al.; and by Hilbert P. Zarky and Marc I. Hayutin for James V. Bennett et al.
Together with No. 69-5030, Jackson v. Georgia, on certiorari to the same court, and No. 69-5031, Branch v. Texas, on certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Pee Curiam.
Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. §26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 253, 167 S. E. 2d 628 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69-5030 was convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 790, 171 S. E. 2d 501 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant to Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961). 447 S. W. 2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Certiorari was granted limited to the following question: “Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?” 403 U. S. 952 (1971). The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.
So ordered.
Me. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall have filed separate opinions in support of the judgments. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black-mun, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist have filed separate dissenting opinions.
Maine has totally abolished the death penalty, and severely limited its imposition. Based on ALI, supra, n. Rhode 98, at Island has 25.
Miehigan, Minnesota, and wisconsln have completely abolished capital punishment. North Dakota has severely restricted its use.
Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota were not admitted to the national death registration area until 1923, 1924, and 1930 respectively.
South Dakota introduced the death penalty in 1939.
Based on ALT, supra, n. 98, at 28. See also id,., at 32-34.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0