What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BLUE VALLEY MACHINE & MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 20100.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Jan. 14, 1971.
Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. General Counsel, Leonard M. Wagman, Morton Namrow, Attys., N.L.R.B., for respondent.
Patrick E. Hartigan, Margolin & Kir-wan, Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and NEV-ILLE, District Judge.
VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judge.
Blue Valley Machine & Manufacturing Company has filed a petition to review the decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board finding it guilty of unfair labor practices hereinafter described. The Board has cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. Jurisdiction is established. The Board’s order is reported at 180 NLRB No. 55.
The Board, in agreement with the Examiner, found that the Company violated § 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 29 U.S.C. A. § 151 et seq., by withdrawing recognition and failing to bargain in good faith with the Union, which was the representative of a majority of the Company’s employees, and by granting a unilateral wage increase of fifteen cents an hour. The Board also found that the Company violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act by failing to make a valid offer of reinstatement to unfair labor practice striker Robert Hambel.
A careful examination of the record as a whole satisfies us that there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination that the Company violated § 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recognition and by failing to bargain in good faith with the Union, and by granting a unilateral wage increase. In reaching such determination we, like Board member Sagoria, place no reliance on the statement in footnote 21 of the Trial Examiner’s report to the effect that the Company’s withdrawal of its agreement on certain matters tentatively agreed upon in earlier negotiations constitutes evidence of bad faith. The Board’s order with respect to the violations just described will be enforced as well as the Board’s order that the Company bargain in good faith with the Union.
We find no substantial evidentiary support for the Board’s determination that the Company failed to make a valid offer of reinstatement to Hambel. We do not question the Board’s determination that Hambel was engaged in an unfair labor practice strike or that Hambel made an unconditional request for reinstatement. On the reinstatement issue, the Trial Examiner’s finding, which was upheld by the Board, reads:
“This officer [offer], made by the company officials, obviously with great reluctance and accompanied by comments and admonitions that tended to create an aura of restraint and coercion, carried an implied threat to the employee that, if he returned, his tenure might be very short-lived. The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that by this conduct the Respondent failed to make a valid offer of reinstatement to Hambel, and that in so doing it further violated Section 8(a) (1). Cf. Cello-Tape [Tak] Company, 143 NLRB 295, 303-304.”
Cello-Tak Company, cited by the Examiner, lends no support to his finding. The facts in Cello-Tak Company differ materially from those in our present case.
The only evidence offered on the reinstatement issue is that of Union organizer Stone and Company secretary Johnston. Stone accompanied Hambel to the Company offices on May 5, 1969, at which time a demand for reinstatement of Hambel was made. There is no substantial conflict in the testimony. Stone testified that he told the Company officers that the strike was over and that Hambel was making an unconditional request for reinstatement. On the relevant issue, Stone's testimony reads:
“Mr. Johnson spoke up and said Bob could go back to work. Mr. Hambel’s first name is Bob. He asked if he wanted to come back right away or after lunch, and it was approximately 11 o’clock at that time. Mr. Hambel said he preferred to come back after lunch. Mr. Johnston said, ‘If you come back to work we are going to be watching you.’ Mr. Johnston was gesturing with his finger toward Mr. Hambel. He said, ‘If you come back to work we are going to watch you and watch you close. There is not going to be any roaming around the shop and talking to Haley and the other guys, staying on the job, we are going to watch you and watch you close.’
“After an intermission Mr. Johnston repeated this again. Mr. Johnson said to me, T hope there is no hard feelings,’ he said, ‘there is none on my part.’ And I said, ‘There is no hard feelings on my part,’ but I pointed out to Mr. Johnson that District 71, the union, had unfair labor practice charges in process with the National Labor Relations Board. Mr. Johnson said, ‘Yes, I know, but I don’t think that will amount to anything.’ Mr. Johnson says, ‘Bob, I hope there is no hard feelings, I hope you hold no hard feelings, I don’t hold no hard feelings against you.’ and Mr. Hambel nodded his head; * *
Stone further testified that Hambel at a later date told him he did not go back to work because “he just couldn’t make himself go back to work there with the attitude Mr. Johnston had.”
Johnston’s testimony includes;
“Q. Can you explain what, if anything, was said to the people as they were gathered there, as far as how they should work in the shop? A. Yes, our superintendent was present in the office and he made his statement to our entire group of employees. This included several of the new hires and this type of statement went something like this, that previous to this time we have had a lot of trouble about people staying on the job, walking around the shop, bothering other people, talking to other people in excessive amounts, and we have been told by one of the new hires that they had been told they would have trouble if the old employees came back into the plant, so we wanted it understood, and our superintendent stated that they were all just alike in our employment excepting their seniority, and we did not wish these practices that had been going on over the last several months to continue.”
We find no evidentiary basis for the Board’s finding of an implied threat to Hambel that his tenure would be short-lived if he returned to work. We further find no unreasonable conditions were imposed in the reinstatement negotiations. There is no indication that Union membership or activity would be subject to scrutiny or discriminatory action. The testimony goes no further than to show that the Company expected all employees, including Hambel, to observe reasonable work rules prescribed by the Company.
The Board’s order will be enforced as to § 8(a) (5) and (1) violations consisting of withdrawing recognition, refusal to bargain in good faith, and the granting of the unilateral wage increase. The bargaining order will also be enforced. The Board’s order for reinstatement and back pay for Hambel is set aside and enforcement of such order is denied.
. District Lodge, 71, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1