What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Bruce PARKHURST, Dennis Madigan, James K. Pruett, M.C. Sturgis, Jose Ward, Joe Roth, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, v. ARMSTRONG STEEL ERECTORS, INC., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 87-6383. 87-6470.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted June 27, 1989.
Decided April 25, 1990.
Peter W. Cavette, Patrick M. Hevesy, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants-cross-appellees.
Robert E. Willard, Newport Beach, Cal., for defendant-appellee-cross-appellant.
Before NELSON and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges, and BROWNING, District Judge.
The Honorable William D. Browning, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants, trustees of six trust funds who manage multi-employer benefit plans, appeal the district court’s denial of statutory and contractual liquidated damages and the denial of interest on liquidated damages. Armstrong Steel Erectors cross-appeals challenging the award of attorneys’ fees.
1. Award of Liquidated Damages
We review district court interpretations of federal law de novo. United States v. Mortenson, 860 F.2d 948, 949 (9th Cir.1988). We apply the same standard where the district court interprets a contract without using extrinsic evidence. L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc., 880 F.2d 219 (9th Cir.1989).
The Trust Funds assert that the district court should have awarded liquidated damages based either on ERISA or by the terms of the trust agreements. We have held that unpaid contributions must exist at the time of suit for statutory liquidated damages to be awarded. Idaho Plumbers and Pipefitters Health and Welfare Fund v. United Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 875 F.2d 212, 215-16 (9th Cir.1989). Because there were no unpaid contributions outstanding at the time the Trust Funds brought suit, no statutory liquidated damages are due.
The Trust Funds contend that our holding on this point in Idaho Plumbers was dictum as the entitlement to statutory damages was not an issue in that case. Nevertheless, the Idaho Plumbers position is well considered and we choose to follow it. Although the plaintiffs in Idaho Plumbers did not seek statutory liquidated damages, they did argue that the statutory provision supported their entitlement to contractual damages. Id. at 215. After reviewing the statutory language and the case law of other circuits, the Idaho Plumbers court determined that there is a statutory entitlement to liquidated damages only when there are unpaid contributions at the time of suit.
The Trust Funds alternatively contend that the trial court should have awarded liquidated damages as provided for by the terms of the trust agreements themselves, independent of ERISA’s enforcement provisions. The trial judge concluded that it would not “effectuate[ ] the policies behind ERISA and LMRA [Labor Management Relations Act] to give effect to the punitive liquidated damages provisions of the trust agreements.” Memorandum of Decision at 4, Parkhurst v. Armstrong Steel Erectors, CV 86-5590 WDK (C.D.Cal. August 25, 1987). The trial court arrived at this conclusion after weighing federal law’s approval of such damages when the contributions have not been made at the time suit is filed against the federal common law’s and California’s disfavor for liquidated damages provisions under certain circumstances. See Memorandum Decision at 3-4 (citing Bennett v. Machined Metals Co., Inc., 591 F.Supp. 600 (E.D.Pa.1984)).
Idaho Plumbers also addressed the imposition of liquidated damages pursuant to contractual agreement. Idaho Plumbers affirmed the trial court’s determination that the liquidated damages provision at issue was void as a penalty. That agreement provided for liquidated damages of 20%, or $9,245.23 in that instance, for a contribution that was paid four days late. Idaho Plumbers, 875 F.2d at 214. Here the Trust Funds’ agreements also provided for liquidated damages in the amount of 20% of the delinquent contribution. Armstrong was assessed $29,199.49 for a series of delinquencies averaging less than 20 days in length. The trial court did not specifically find the trusts’ liquidated damages provisions void as a penalty, rather he declined to award damages because he found that so doing would not effectuate the policies behind ERISA and LMRA. However, the District Judge’s quotation of Bennett suggests that he was concerned that the 20% penalty provision did not constitute a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm caused. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 20% provision in the Trust Funds’ agreements was any more a reasonable forecast of damages than the 20% provision in Idaho Plumbers. Therefore, we hold that as in Idaho Plumbers, the 20% provision is void as a penalty.
As to the Trust Funds’ single assessment at the previous rate of 10%, appellees’ counsel conceded at oral argument that the Idaho Plumbers penalty analysis would recognize no difference between a 10% or 20% rate. Without some indication that the liquidated damages provision is a good faith attempt to set an amount reflective of anticipated damages, we will find the provision void as a penalty. Idaho Plumbers, 875 F.2d at 217 (citing United Order of American Bricklayers and Stone Masons v. Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc., 519 F.2d 331, 332 (7th Cir.1975)).
2. Interest on Liquidated Damages
Our affirmance of the district court’s denial of liquidated damages resolves the Trust Funds’ claim for interest on the liquidated damages.
3. Attorneys’ Fees
Armstrong cross-appeals on the issue of whether the trial court should have awarded attorneys’ fees to the Trust Funds. The trial court’s Memorandum Decision awarded $4,441.25 in fees on the basis that “[hjaving brought suit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1145 and having prevailed on the issue of interest, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit under 1132(g)(2)(D).” Memorandum of Decision at 4, Parkhurst v. Armstrong Steel Erectors, CV 86-5590 WDK (C.D.Cal. August 25, 1987).
Armstrong contends that the Trust Funds did not really prevail on the interest claim because, as the memorandum decision notes, “Armstrong has not contested its obligation to pay interest under the trust agreements, and even concedes that it has not paid those sums, in part because it never received an invoice for them.” Id.
Nevertheless, the trial court found “that Parkhurst properly brought this action to recover interest owing on the delinquent contributions and is entitled to recover $671.74 on that basis.” Id.
Armstrong’s Answer sets forth an affirmative defense that “[a]ll sums due from defendant to plaintiffs as contributions under the agreements between the parties were paid in full by defendant before the filing of this action, as plaintiffs well know, and all sums sought by plaintiffs in this action from defendant are for so-called liquidated damages only.” The Trust Funds’ complaint did include a demand for interest, both on the contributions for the time they were delinquent and for interest on the liquidated damages.
Section 1132(g)(2)(D) states that “In any action ... to enforce section 1145[ ] of this title in which a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by the defendant....” 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(g)(2)(D) (West 1985). In the case at bar, apparently Armstrong had conceded the interest issue but the District Judge found that it had not paid the amount prior to the filing of the judgment or the suit.
We review a district court’s award of mandatory attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 1132(g)(2)(D) according to the deferential, clearly erroneous standard. Lads Trucking Co. v. Board of Trustees, 777 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir.1985). The trial court’s finding that the Trust Funds prevailed on the issue of interest is not clearly erroneous and is supported by the record.
Each side will bear its own costs and fees for this appeal.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99