What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Owen NORMAN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18779.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
July 15, 1969.
J. B. Tietz, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant; Ralph K. Helge, Pasadena, Cal., J. B. Tietz, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.
Carlton H. Petway, Nashville, Tenn., for appellee; Gilbert S. Merritt, Jr., U. S. Atty., Alfred H. Knitht, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., on brief.
Before O’SULLIVAN, PECK and COMBS, Circuit Judges.
O’SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Owen Norman, Jr., appeals from conviction for refusing induction into the armed forces of the United States in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 et seq. He was tried without a jury, before District Judge William E. Miller in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, and was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision as a youth offender under 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b) and 5017(c). He refused induction, claiming that he was wrongfully denied conscientious objector status.
On March 1, 1963, Norman registered with his Local Selective Service Board No. 62 in Jasper, Tennessee. In answers to his registration questionnaire he did not claim to be a conscientious objector. On October 17, 1963, he was given a I-A classification, (available for military service). He thereupon requested Selective Service Form 150 and completed it to assert a claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. Such exemption was denied him, but on November 18, 1963 his local board did give him a I-A-0 classification which qualified him for noncombatant military service. Thereupon, Norman initiated and for nearly three years pursued various proceedings within the Selective Service System, seeking exemption as a conscientious objector (1-0 classification), or to be accorded an occupational deferment (II-A classification). These unsuccessful attempts ended on September 26, 1966 when he refused to step forward to submit himself for induction.
During the course of these administrative proceedings, Norman made personal appearances as well as written presentations to support his contentions. An account of these proceedings is set out in the opinion of the District Court reported as United States v. Norman, 301 F.Supp. 53 (M.D.Tenn.1968.)
Norman, on this appeal, raises the following four issues: I. Did the Selective Service System have a basis in fact for denying Norman’s claim of a conscientious objector classification? II. Did the Selective Service System deny Norman due process? III. Did the trial court commit error in its admission of evidence? IV. Did the trial court err in denying Norman’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal based upon a claimed failure of the government to meet its burden of proof ?
Except for the matters we discuss herein, we are satisfied that the opinion of District Judge Miller provides an adequate exposition of the questions presented and correctly resolves them.
We affirm.
Because they are not covered in the District Court opinion, we discuss appellant’s claim that his Selective Service System file, identified and received in evidence as plaintiff’s Exhibit One, should not have been received in evidence and that the government failed to prove that Norman was called for induction in the proper order.
1) Admission of Selective Service file.
Norman’s counsel initially objected to the sufficiency of the identification of Norman’s Selective Service System file, but the matter was concluded by counsel’s withdrawal of his objection, as follows :
“I’ll withdraw that objection. It is a point I feel has merit, but in order to get to the further merits, I’ll withdraw it.”
Aside from such withdrawal, we consider that the file was properly authenticated and was admissible as competent evidence. See LaPorte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 1835, 20 L.Ed.2d 856 (1968); Haven v. United States, 403 F.2d 384, 385 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1114, 89 S.Ct. 926, 22 L.Ed.2d 120 (1969).
2) Order of call.
The majority of cases which have considered this question involved orders to report for civilian work by registrants classified as conscientious objectors. 32 C.F.R. § 1660.20 provides that:
“Such order shall not be issued prior to the time that the registrant would have been ordered to report for induction if he had not been classified in Class 1-0 unless he has volunteered for such work.”
We consider, however, that 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 requires that those classified in I-A be called for induction in proper order.
We do not think that the alleged failure of the government to prove with particularity that Norman was called to appear for induction in proper order vis-a-vis other registrants presents a question properly saved for review by us. No such alleged deficiency was asserted at the close of the government’s case. Defendant’s counsel made an opening statement of his defense without mention of it. Neither was the point raised when the proofs were closed. When both sides had rested, appellant’s counsel filed a written Motion for Judgment of Acquittal which contained no reference to the order of call. The first mention of the point appeared during counsel’s argument on his motion for acquittal when he said that a recent case in a California District Court held that a motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted “when the government failed to show that the defendant was called up in proper order.” We assume that the District Judge included this point among “the remaining contentions of defendant” which he disposed of by saying “they are without merit.” We agree with this disposition, but are constrained to discuss the point to the following extent.
The case having been tried and both sides having rested without mention of the order of call, we believe that, solely upon the basis of the presumption of the regularity of the Selective Service System’s proceedings, the point cannot now be relied upon. In Lewis v. United States, 279 U.S. 63, 49 S.Ct. 257, 73 L.
Ed. 615 (1929), the Supreme Court said:
“It is the settled general rule that all necessary prerequisites to the validity of official action are presumed to have been complied with, and that where the contrary is asserted, it must be affirmatively shown. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657, 660, 17 S.Ct. 212, 41 L.Ed. 588; United States v. Royer, 268 U.S. 394, 398, 45 S.Ct. 519, 69 L.Ed. 1011; and cases cited.” 279 U.S. at 73, 49 S.Ct. at 260.
Such rule was applied to the regularity of draft board proceedings in Ayers v. United States, 240 F.2d 802, 809 (9th Cir.1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1016, 77 S.Ct. 563, 1 L.Ed.2d 548 (1957), and Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1959). Dealing specifically with a claim that the prosecution had not, as part of its case, established that an accused had been called in proper order, we recently held that such a question could not be raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Boroski, 412 F.2d 668 (6th Cir.1969).
We need not discuss what would have been the government’s burden had the defendant raised the question before the proofs had been concluded, but we cite with approval the following language from Yates v. United States, 404 F.2d 462 (1st Cir.1968), rehearing denied, 407 F.2d 50 (1969) :
“[T]here exists the possibility that capricious or arbitrary action was taken by a local board; a defendant has little opportunity to obtain proof of discrimination; and there is no chance or procedure to review this issue before the agency. There ought, therefore, to be a means of exerting constant pressure on the local boards to adhere faithfully to the order of call regulation.
“There is no difficulty in the perhaps rare case where a defendant can produce evidence of a person who should have been called before him was not. In such a case, the government cannot disprove a leak in a bucket simply by showing most of it was tight. But where the defendant lacks any such proof, his only recourse is to examine the clerk of the local board. This may not conclusively establish the absence of any violation of the regulation but, since the clerk must testify in any case to the validity of the order to report, there is little extra burden on the government to have him prepared to testify on order of call.
“If, however, the order of call point is not raised before trial and there is no examination or cross-examination of the clerk on this point, and defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal, should the motion be granted? We think not. In this circumstance, where what is involved, while an element of the offense, has not been deemed important enough in the particular case to make any effort to elicit facts, we see no unfairness in allowing the government to go to the jury on the issue, relying on the presumption of regularity.” 404 F.2d at 466.
Judgment affirmed.
. United States v. Rhodes, N.D.Calif., No. 41,112, January 26, 1967, unpublished.
. See also, United States v. Sandbank, 403 F.2d 38, 40 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 1301, 22 L.Ed.2d 562 (1969); Greer v. United States, 378 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 1967); Lowe v. United States, 389 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1968); Pigue v. United States, 389 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1968).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0