What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".

Opinion:
ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. CAROLINA, C. & O. RY. v. SAME.
Nos. 3895, 3896.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 6, 1936.
PARKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
Nathan L. Miller, of New York City (Carl H. Davis, of Wilmington, N. C, Edward C. Bailly, of New York City, and Robert R. Faulkner, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioners.
Morton K. Rothschild, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen. (Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT, and SOPER, Circuit Judges.
Certiorari denied 56 S. Ct. 676, 80 L. Ed.
SOPER, Circuit Judge.
Two questions are presented by the petition for review in these cases: (1) Whether either the lessor or the lessee is entitled to a deduction for depreciation under section 23 (k) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 791, 799, when one railroad company leases equipment from another for 999 years and agrees to maintain, repair, and renew the property during the term of the lease; and (2) whether a railroad company which acquires the common stock of another in exchange for a stated consideration, including a guaranty to pay dividends on the other’s preferred stock, and makes payments under its guaranty, is entitled to deduct the amounts paid as ordinary and necessary expenses or losses under section 23 (a) and (f) of the Revenue Act of 1928. Income taxes for the years 1928, 1929, and 1930 are involved.
Under a lease of October 16, 1924, the Carolina, Clinchfield & Ohio Railway, hereinafter called the Carolina Company, and its subsidiaries, leased all their properties to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, hereinafter called the Coast Line, and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, jointly, for a period of 999 years. The Coast Line owns 51 per cent, of the stock of the Louisville & Nashville. The lease provided for the payment by the lessees of money rental in stated amounts, certain corporate expenses of the lessors, interest on outstanding obligations of the lessors, and all taxes upon the lessors or the leased property, including federal income taxes. Ill addition thereto, the lessees agreed at their own expense to maintain, repair, renew, and replace the leased property so that the same should at all times be in substantial repair, working order, and condition, but with the right in their discretion to replace with other property of equal value; to make such additions and betterments as in their judgment should be advisable at their own expense and accept the bonds or other obligations of the lessors therefor; during the term of the lease, to assume all liability of the lessors in respect to maturing obligations as set out in the lease, with the right only to receive new bonds of the lessors payable in effect at the end of the lease and without interest; during the term of the lease to abide by, keep, and perform all agreements and covenants binding on the lessors under any of their mortgages, deeds of trust, and equipment trust agreements; and to return the leased property at the end of the term or upon earlier termination of the lease in good order and condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
Since the effective date of the lease, the accounts of all the railroad companies involved have been kept in accordance with the uniform system of accounts prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the authority vested in it by the Interstate Commerce Act. In accordance with this system, no charge has been made on the books of the lessors on account of depreciation computed on the leased equipment, but depreciation has been computed thereon and currently accrued on the books of the lessees.
The taxpayers concede that their tax liability is not controlled by the system of accounts established in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission; but the Coast Line, one of the taxpayers, seeks to deduct from its gross income an allowance for depreciation with respect to the property in which it had no capital investment, but which it held under the lease for 999 years. The Carolina Company, the other taxpayer, seeks in the alternative to deduct from its gross income an allowance for said depreciation on the same property which during the term of the lease, the Coast Line was obliged to retain, repair, and renew. In our opinion neither position is tenable. It has been uniformly held that where property is leased for a long term of years and the lessee covenants to maintain, repair, and renew the property, the lessee' is not entitled to an allowance for depreciation because it has invested no capital in the property. See Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 49 S.Ct. 337, 73 L.Ed. 720; Belt Ry. Co. v. Lucas, Commissioner, 59 App.D.C. 137, 36 F.(2d) 541, certiorari denied, 281 U.S. 742, 50 S.Ct. 348, 74 L.Ed. 1155; Tunnel R. R. Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 61 F.(2d) 166, certiorari denied, 288 U.S. 604, 53 S.Ct. 396, 77 L.Ed. 979. In respect to the lessor under such a lease, the decisions are also unanimous to the effect that it is not entitled to an allowance for depreciation because it has sustained no loss, in view of the fact that the lessee has assumed an obligation to maintain, repair, and renew. Commissioner v. Terre Haute Elec. Co. (C.C.A.) 67 F.(2d) 697; Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 77 F.(2d) 897, certiorari denied October 14, 1935, 56 S.Ct. 117, 80 L.Ed. —.
It is suggested by the taxpayers that in none of the cases in which these questions have been considered did the court have before it at the same time both the lessor and lessee railroad, and therefore did not meet the alternative propositions that the allowance for depreciation with respect to the property should be made either to one or the other. The contention that the allowance must be made to one or the other of the parties to such a lease was, however, considered and rejected in New York Central Railroad Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 79 F.(2d) 247, 250, certiorari denied (56 S.Ct. 370, 80 L.Ed. —) December 23, 1935, in the following language: “The petitioner argues that either the lessor or the lessee of property should have a right to deduct a reasonable amount for exhaustion and depreciation, that under the facts at bar the lessor sustains no loss of capital, since he will receive equivalent property upon the termination of the lease, and that therefore the loss falls upon the lessee who has the burden of restoring the property’s value. The Commissioner relies upon Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 49 S.Ct. 337, 73 L.Ed. 720, as did the Board, as establishing that the claimed deductions should not be allowed. There the taxpayer was engaged in the business of taking 99-year leases, renewable forever, and subletting. He claimed a deduction for depreciation of the buildings, which, it was assumed for purposes of the decision, he undertook to keep up to their present condition. In disallowing the deduction, Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that the lessee had not yet made any capital investment, and concluded that ‘it is not enough that he has made a contract that very possibly may not be carried out to replace that capital at some future time.’ 279 U.S. 333, at page 336, 49 S.Ct. 337, 338, 73 L.Ed. 720. Despite possible verbal differences in the leases, we think Weiss v. Wiener is controlling and requires affirmance of the Board on this issue. In the case at bar the lessee made no capital investment in the leased property.”
The facts with regard to the second question raised by the Coast Line relate to an agreement of February 23, 1926, between the Coast Line and a committee representing the bondholders of the Atlantic, Birmingham & Coast Railroad Company which was placed in receivership in 1915, and .operated by the receiver up to and including the year 1926. During the taxable years involved, all of its stock was owned by the Coast Tine and its income tax returns were included in the consolidated returns filed by the latter. The agreement of February 23, 1926, provided that a new company should be organized to acquire the property of the company in receivership which should have a capitalization of $5,200,000 par value preferred stock entitled to 5 per cent, cumulative dividends, payable semiannually, and 150,000 shares of no par value common stock; that the preferred stock should have no power to vote except in case of a continuing default in the payment of two semiannual dividends, in which event the preferred stock should have exclusive voting power so long as the default continued; that the dividends of the preferred stock should be guaranteed by the Coast Line; that the Coast Line should provide cash for certain specified requirements in the total amount of approximately $3,600,000 and that the Coast Line should be entitled to receive the entire issue of common stock in exchange for the cash so provided. The agreement was performed and the stock of the company distributed as therein provided. During each of the years 1928, 1929, and 1930, the Coast Line, in compliance with its guaranty, paid the dividends on the preferred stock, including the sum of $257,059 to owners thereof other than the Coast Line itself. In its returns for these years, it claimed .the said sum as a deduction, but it was disallowed by the Commissioner.
The taxpayer contends that the obvious purpose of this agreement was to place it in a position to maintain and exercise continuous control of the properties of the A. B. & C. Railroad Company and to operate these properties as a part of its railroad system. It is pointed out that the taxpayer acquired nothing new or in addition to what it already had by the payments, and that each payment preserved for the six months’ period the existing right to exclusive voting control over the affairs of the A. B. & C. Railroad and the management of its property. It is therefore contended that the payments were a regularly recurring expense necessary to preserve control over the physical operations of a part of the taxpayer’s railroad system, and should be regarded either as an ordinary and necessary expense of the business or as a loss sustained in the course'of its operation.
The argument is not without persuasive force, but we are of opinion that the payments made by the Coast Line under its guaranty were part of the consideration paid by it for the common stock and were therefore capital expenditures rather than losses or ordinary and necessary business expenditures. In Newark Milk & Cream Co. v. Commissioner (C.C.A.) 34 F.(2d) 854, a dispute between two sets of stockholders of a corporation was settled by an agreement whereby one set acquired the stock formerly held by the other; and as part of the agreement, the corporation guaranteed a return of 8 per cent, upon the consideration so paid for its stock for a period of ten years. It was held that the amounts paid under this guaranty by the corporation were not deductible from income as an ordinary and necessary business expense, but constituted part of the price paid by the stockholders who acquired the business in order to get control of the company.
The Coast Line contends that if a similar view is adopted in the present case, it will be impossible to determine the basic cost of the stock now or at any particular time in the future, and since the Coast Line would not be relieved from the obligation of its guaranty by a sale, the transaction could never be closed for tax purposes. This consideration, however, would not necessarily determine the character of the expenditures made under the guaranty, nor would any practical difficulty arise in the determination of the gain or loss by the taxpayer fpr purposes of taxation in case of a sale. If such a sale should take place, the cost of the stock would then be determined by reference to the cash outlay made under the agreement in 1926, including therein such amounts as would have been paid in the performance of the guaranty, and the profit or loss could be calculated accordingly. If additional payments under the guaranty should subsequently be required, they would be deductible as losses for the year in which they should occur.
The decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals are affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?

Choices:
local
neither local nor national
national or multi-national
not ascertained

Answer: 3