What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
George SAUNDERS, Lacy L. Wilkinson and Grant Kindwall, Appellants, v. The GREAT WESTERN SUGAR COMPANY, Great Western United Corporation, and the Colorado Milling & Elevator Company, Appellees.
No. 10107.
United States Court oí Appeals Tenth Circuit.
May 24, 1968.
Michael C. Farrar, Atty., Department of Justice (Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Lawrence M. Henry, U. S. Atty., Thomas C. Seawell, Asst. U.S. Atty., and Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty., Department of Justice, on the brief), for appellants.
Thomas S. Nichols, Denver, Colo. (Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colo., Predovich & Ward, Pueblo, Colo., and M. B. Holt, Jr., Denver, Colo., and White & Case, New York City, of counsel, on the brief), for appellees.
Hugh A. Burns, Denver, Colo., for National Sugar Mfg. Co.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
The appellants, local officials of the Small Business Administration (SBA), appeal from a May 15, 1968, order of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado which was entered under Rule 37, F.R.Civ.P., and which compels them to respond to subpoenas duces tecum issued by that court. We granted a temporary stay so that a full hearing could be had. The order is appealable under our decision in Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 10 Cir., 340 F.2d 993, cert. denied 380 U.S. 964, 85 S.Ct. 1110, 14 L.Ed.2d 155.
SBA is an agency of the United States Government. Its officials say that under agency regulations they may not disclose information or produce documents without authorization from the Assistant Administrator for Administration of the agency and that such authorization has been withheld. The statute establishing SBA empowers the Administrator to “make such rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the authority vested in him.” 15 U.S.C. § 634(b) (6). Pursuant thereto regulations were promulgated to govern “Disclosure of Information.” See 13 C. F.R. §§ 102.1-102.7. Section 102.7 provides in part that when a subpoena is issued against an SBA officer or employee, he shall advise the Assistant Administrator and that if such officer does not authorize disclosure, “the employee shall respectfully decline to disclose the information or produce the files, documents and records demanded or requested, basing such refusal on this part.” Here the disclosure was not authorized.
The SBA officials rely on Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 20 S.Ct. 701, 44 L.Ed. 846, and United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 469, 71 S.Ct. 416, 95 L.Ed. 417. In Boske the Court upheld regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury relating to the disclosure of information and in Touhy it gave effect to comparable regulations of the Attorney General.
The appellees seeking the disclosure rely on our decision in Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local Union No. 537, 10 Cir., 334 F.2d 381. Sperandeo is distinguishable from the case at bar because there the governmental agency brought suit seeking judicial action and then refused to disclose. Here the SBA and its officials are not parties to the antitrust suit in the district court in which the disclosure is sought.
The requirement on litigants to proceed only in the District of Columbia to obtain relief from agency action denying disclosure is a hardship. We see no reason why the claim of governmental privilege may not be determined as satisfactorily -in a federal court removed from the District of Columbia as in a court that is there located. Be that as it may, the congressional action in granting jurisdiction over federal officials in the district courts in civil actions, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e), has not been extended to situations such as we have before us. We are bound by Touhy and Boske.
The defendants in the antitrust litigation assert that the requested information is relevant and important to them. The plaintiff in that litigation concedes relevancy but says that the information will be cumulative. In the circumstances the defendants are entitled to disclosure unless governmental privilege forbids. Some remedy must be afforded. We interrogated at length the attorney for the government whether the proper SBA official, if subpoenaed in the District of Columbia, would defend on any ground other than privilege and received the positive assurance that he would not. This answer satisfies the question raised by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Touhy. See 340 U.S. 470, 472, 71 S.Ct. 416. We assume that the proper SBA official in the District of Columbia can be reached by legal process and that the claim of privilege can be promptly determined there.
In our opinion no further argument is required on the issues presented. The May 15, 1968, order of the district court, entered on the docket of that court on May 17, 1968, is set aside and held for naught. The stay heretofore granted is vacated.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 3