What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Martin J. McDONOUGH, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. HARDWARE DEALERS MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee.
No. 71-1142.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Sept. 30, 1971.
Philip D. Epstein, Boston, Mass., with whom Epstein, Goldstein & Feldman, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellant.
John E. Lecomte, Boston, Mass., for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff McDonough is the owner of a building insured under a standard Massachusetts fire policy issued by the defendant. A fire occurred nearby which required some 700,000 gallons of water to extinguish. Some of this water flowed onto plaintiff’s land, damaging the building. Defendant conceded, correctly, see Jiannetti v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 1931, 277 Mass. 434, 438, 178 N.E. 640, that it was liable for this damage. Much of the water, however, went underground where, allegedly, after a number of months, it weakened the foundations, causing the building to settle and crack. The defendant denied liability for this additional loss. Plaintiff invoked arbitration of damage under the standard clause which, for nearly 100 years has been required to be a part of Massachusetts fire policies. Mass.G.L. c. 175 § 99. The referees admitted all of plaintiff’s evidence and found for him in the amount claimed. Defendant refused to pay. In the present action removed to the district court because of diversity of citizenship, plaintiff sought to recover on the award. The district court held that two provisions in the policy were, respectively, totally and partially fatal to his claim. We start with the former.
Section C4 of Article V of the policy provided in part,
“V. EXCLUSIONS
This policy does not insure against: ******
C. Loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by any of the following: ******
4. water below the surface of the ground including that which exerts pressure on or flows, seeps or leaks through sidewalks, driveways, foundations, walls, basement or other floors, or through doors, windows or any other openings in such sidewalks, driveways, foundations, walls or floors; unless loss by fire or explosion, as insured against hereunder, ensues, and then this Company shall then be liable only for such ensuing loss.”
The court found that this subparagraph, if read “literally,” was “unambiguous” in the company’s favor. It went on to say that this construction “is quite as reasonable as the restricted construction urged by plaintiff,” and held for the defendant. This was the wrong approach. If there is a reasonable construction of the policy other than the literal one which is more favorable to the insured, under familiar principles he is entitled to it. See Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 1 Cir., 1971, 439 F.2d 1035, 1039; Insurance Co. of North America v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 1 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 675, 682.
We believe the exclusion effected by subparagraph C4 is reasonably open to a more restricted construction than that contended for by the company. Contrary to the court’s narrow focusing upon this subparagraph, it should have considered Article V as a whole. Most of Article V in referring to water designates water which could not conceivably have resulted from fire. That being the general tenor of the other subparagraphs, it is natural to read this inference into subparagraphs C4, having in mind that water resulting from a fire is normally within the policy. Such a reading could have been easily avoided, if a different concept was intended, by adding thereto the simple words, “whether resulting from fire or not.” Under these circumstances, the policy appears to us to be ambiguous. See Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Cir., 1947, 160 F.2d 599, 601 (L. Hand, J.). It is not enough to say, as did the district court, that the reading contended for by the company makes for ease and simplicity of application. The company draws the policy, and must plainly provide, particularly with regard to exclusions, Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 1965, 348 Mass. 427, 431, 204 N.E.2d 273, what it wants.
It follows that plaintiff was properly permitted to prove that the underground water damage came from water discharged by the fire trucks. We need not determine whether on the evidence, he sufficiently did so, however, because we agree with the district court that part of the claim he was permitted to establish was not recoverable by reason of another provision in the policy. We find no ambiguity in Article II (“Property Not Covered”) § D. Inasmuch as the referees admitted evidence as to matters within, and therefore excluded by, this clause, and made no separation in their findings, their award cannot stand. The case must be resubmitted. See 14 Couch, Insurance, § 50,290 (2d ed.).
With respect to the amount stipulated by the parties for damages admitted by the defendant, we note and endorse the parties’ stipulation that interest shall run from April 8, 1967. The same date should apply as to any additionally established award.
A final matter. Having written the policy without protest to the Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner for his act in approving the form requiring it to contain an arbitration clause, and having proceeded to arbitration without complaint, defendant now wishes us to hold the clause unconstitutional. We cannot comprehend such a belated claim. We may add that even had it been raised seasonably, and in the proper forum, defendant would appear to have a very heavy burden.
The judgment of the district court is vacated and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order consistent herewith.
. The other Article V exclusions relating to water exclude “flood, surface water, waves, tidal water or tidal wave, overflow of streams or other bodies of water, or spray from any of the foregoing, all whether driven by wind or not,” and “water which backs up through sewers or drains.”
. “D. The cost of excavations; foundations of building (s) which are below the under surface of the lowest basement floor, or where there is no basement, which are below the surface of the ground; foundations of machinery or boilers and engines which are below the surface of the ground ; underground flues, pipes, wiring and drains; sidewalks or driveways; piling for building(s) or wharf property below the low water mark.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1