What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. KELLY et al.
No. 209.
Argued November 30, 1951.
Decided January 2, 1952.
Saul R. Gamer argued the cause for thé United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, Paul A.' Sweeney and Herman Marcuse.
Henry J. Fox argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court of Claims awarded judgment to respondent, a per diem employee of the Government Printing Office, for premium pay and gratuity pay for work performed by him on certain holidays during World War II. 119 Ct. Cl. 197, 96 F. Supp. 611. Thus, respondent was held entitled to the aggregate of:
1. His regular compensation for the days worked;
2. Fifty per cent of his regular compensation as premium pay;
3. A full day’s compensation as gratuity pay.
The.Government sought review of that part of the judgment which awarded gratuity pay to respondent and others like him, and we granted certiorari, 342 U. S. 808.
Respondent’s compensation was fixed by a wage agreement which provides in pertinent part:
“Holiday Rate. Employees required to work on a legal holiday or a special holiday declared by Executive Order shall be paid at the day rate plus 50 per cent for all the time actually employed in addition to their gratuity pay for the holiday as provided by ' law . . . .”
By a 1938 Resolution, the applicable law during the period in question, Congress provided that whenever per diem employees were “relieved or prevented from working solely because of the occurrence of” holidays declared by statute or executive order, “they shall receive the same pay for such days as for other days on which an ordinary day’s work is performed.” The question thus presented is whether the Resolution somehow precludes the awarding of the gratuity pay which the agreement seems to grant.
The 1938 Resolution amended the Act of 1895 which had been consistently administered ag providing for gratuity pay in addition to regular compensation'if.tibe employee worked on a holiday. The Government contends that Congress intended to repeal the earlier statute in this respect, and that the Resolution provided gratuity pay only for holidays on which an employee is “relieved' or prevented from working.”
We think this argument misses the point. The 1938 Resolution established the holidays for which gratuity pay v/as to be allowed. It was silent on the subject of gratuity pay for holidays on which work was performed, and we may even assume that it did not provide gratuity pay for those days. But the wage agreement is not silent on the subject. It provides that when an employee works on a holiday he is to receive regular compensation, premium pay, and gratuity pay “for the holiday a# provided by law.” The holidays “as provided by law” are the days provided for in the 1938 Resolution. Nothing in the Resolution prohibits such a wage agreement, and, indeed, the Government concedes this fact. Merely because the'Resolution itself may not award gratuity pay for holidays worked is no ground for vitiating a wage agreement which does.
The Government points to the 1943 Presidential Directive to federal agencies, under which all holidays except Christmas were to be considered as regular workdays for the duration of the war, and urges that the Directive indicated a policy against the payment of gratuity pay for holidays worked. Clearly, the Presidential Directive was not intended to abrogate the wage agreement.
We need not stop to consider the anomalous results which would stem from the Government’s position. Since the agreement provided for gratuity pay for holidays worked, respondent was entitled to such pay. Accordingly, the judgment below is
Affirmed.
The parties have stipulated that - the' disposition of the claim of -respondent K.elly will be determinative of claims filed by 613 other employees of the Printing Office.
52 Stat. 1246, 5 U. S. C. § 86a.
28 Stat. 601, 607, § 46.
8 Comp. Dec. 322 (1901); 13 Comp. Dec. 40 (1906); 3 Comp. Gen. 411 (1924).
See Digest of Provisions of Law Fixing Pay for Employees in the Executive Branch of die Federal Government (U. S. Civil Service Commission, 1945), at p. 94, note 2; H. R. Rep. No. 514, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix, p. 94, note 2.
Thus, under the Government’s view an employee who worked five hours on a- holiday would receive his regular compensation plus premium pay, or seven and one-half hours’ pay; if he stayed home all day, he would receive eight hours’ pay.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0