What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION and Joseph Mackin, Appellants, v. Jerome KURTZ, Commissioner, et al.
No. 79-1086.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 11, 1980.
Decided May 20, 1980.
Murray S. Horwitz, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, and Crombie J. D. Garrett, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellees.
Myron C. Baum, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellees.
William E. Persina, Associate Gen. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Robert M. Tobias, Gen. Counsel, National Treasury Employees Union, Washington, D. C., was on brief, for appellants.
Before BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, TAMM, Circuit Judge, and JUNE L. GREEN, U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (1976).
Opinion for the court filed by District Judge JUNE L. GREEN.
Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge BAZELON.
JUNE L. GREEN, District Judge:
The issue in this ease is whether the District Court held correctly that appellants’ failure to exhaust their contractual remedies bars consideration of this suit. For the reasons stated below, we answer in the affirmative.
I.
Appellant Joseph Mackin, a Revenue Agent in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Philadelphia District Office, received a written reprimand for failing to report a bribery attempt. In response, Mr. Mackin and the appellant union, the National Treasury Employees Union (the Union) filed simultaneously a grievance and a lawsuit.
The grievance sought removal of the letter of reprimand from Mr. Mackin’s personnel file, because the IRS employee who originally interrogated him tape recorded their conversation without giving any Miranda -like warnings or assurances allegedly required by §§ 634.32(1) and 634.5(2) of the Internal Revenue Manual. The grievance alleged, inter alia, violation of Article 33, § 1(e) of the Multi-District Agreement (Agreement) between the IRS and the Union, which states that “No bargaining unit employer (sic) will be the subject of a disciplinary action except for reasons which will promote the efficiency of the service.”
Mr. Mackin requested and the IRS agreed to waive Steps 1 and 2 of the grievance procedure. A Step 3 meeting was held between Mackin and his counsel, and the Chief of the Philadelphia District Collections Division. At this meeting, appellants argued that the IRS failed to follow its procedures and had used improper tactics by obtaining information from Mr. Mackin without issuing warnings or assurances. The IRS Chief denied the grievance, ruling that Mr. Mackin was properly given a written reprimand for failing to report an apparent bribe.
No appeal was filed, although a Step 4 hearing before the District Director was available within 10 days of an adverse Step 3 decision. If Step 4 were also adverse, Mr. Mackin could have requested arbitration.
The lawsuit alleged violation of the Internal Revenue sections cited above, sought destruction of the tape from the initial interrogation, prohibition of the use of the information gleaned from the investigation in any proceeding against Mr. Mackin, and a declaratory order that the IRS should obey the regulations at issue.
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court declared that jurisdiction existed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for the alleged violation of the agency regulations at issue, but that it could not be invoked properly since Mr. Mackin had failed to pursue his grievance.
II.
The Agreement clearly could have provided Mr. Mackin with the relief he sought both in his grievance and lawsuit. Article 33 § 6.C states that the arbitrator’s authority and jurisdiction are “confined exclusively to the validity of the disciplinary action.” In our view, the word “validity” encompasses the procedural irregularity alleged here. Indeed, the appellant so argued in his grievance. Further, there is no practical difference between the relief sought in the grievance and lawsuit. While appellants sought destruction of the tape, such relief would be highly unlikely. Even in criminal cases, exclusion of tainted evidence, not destruction, is the rule. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(f); 3 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 673 (1978 Supp.).
Contractual remedies existed to afford appellant the relief he sought in court: Mr. Mackin’s record could have been cleared, and the IRS put on notice that such methods of investigation would not be tolerated.
The general rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable to labor-management disputes where the issue is subject to a contractual grievance and arbitration procedure. Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). This rule applies where, as here, the issue involves alleged violations of the employer’s regulations which are subject to the grievance procedure. Weitzel v. Portney, 548 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1977).
Appellants’ argument that the violations of the Internal Revenue Manual alleged here create a separate and independent cause of action is foreclosed by the failure to attempt exhaustion of the contractual remedies. Weitzel v. Portney, supra, at 493.
The decision of the District Court is
Affirmed.
. The Internal Revenue Manual is the instructional handbook for inspectors of the Internal Security Division of the IRS. Section 634.32(1) requires Miranda -like warnings to be given to a subject or suspect (employee or non-employee) of a criminal investigation where prosecution is anticipated. Section 635.5(2) requires assurances of right to silence and non-prosecution where it has been ascertained that the employee will not be prosecuted.
. Appellants’ argument that the definition of “grievance” in Article 35 § 2 of the Agreement excludes remedying violations of the Internal Revenue Manual is undermined by their conduct in contesting the reprimand on these very grounds at the grievance hearing.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0