What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William Tyrone HARRIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W. J. ESTELLE, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 77-2238
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 9, 1978.
William Tyrone Harris, pro se, Melvyn C. Bruder, Dallas, Tex. (Court-appointed), for petitioner-appellant.
John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Joe Dibrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief Enforcement Div., P. E. George, David M. Kendall, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for respondent-appellee.
Before RONEY, GEE and FAY, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir., see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal is from a district court judgment denying relief to petitioner in a habe-as corpus proceeding. Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief comes more than twenty years after his 1952 murder conviction in a state court in Texas. The conviction was affirmed in Harris v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 37, 253 S.W.2d 44 (1952). Since petitioner was denied representation by counsel in his appeal from the conviction, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals permitted the petitioner an out-of-time appeal in 1973. This Court also ordered that petitioner be granted an out-of-time appeal or a new trial. Harris v. Estelle, 487 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1973). Petitioner claims that the failure of the State to provide a verbatim transcript precluded him from taking an effective out-of-time appeal and from having effective representation of counsel on appeal. Since petitioner was provided with a suitable alternative to a verbatim transcript, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
At the outset it must be noted that petitioner exhausted state remedies as to his claim that the absence of a verbatim transcript prevented him from effectively appealing his conviction. Petitioner bases his additional claim of ineffective representation by counsel, however, on the failure of the State to provide a verbatim transcript. Because petitioner’s claim of ineffective representation of counsel is founded on his contention that the record was insufficient, a determination that the reconstructed record was a suitable alternative makes it unnecessary for this Court to pass on whether petitioner’s claim of ineffective representation was adequately presented to the State courts.
It is well established that the lack of a verbatim transcript is not a constitutional defect when a suitable alternative is provided. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194, 92 S.Ct. 410, 414-415, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971); Morgan v. Massey, 526 F.2d 347, 348 (5th Cir. 1976); Mack v. Walker, 372 F.2d 170, 172-174 (5th Cir. 1966). Quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963), the Supreme Court reiterated in Mayer, supra, that
Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are permissible if they place before the appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the appellant’s contentions arise. A statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative statement based perhaps on the trial judge’s minutes taken during trial or on the court reporter’s untranscribed notes, or a bystander’s bill of exceptions might all be adequate substitutes, equally as good as a transcript.
Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are appropriate particularly where state appellate rules provide a procedure for reconstruction of the trial record, and indigents and nonindigents are treated the same. See Morgan v. Massey, supra, and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).
Petitioner obtained the same type of record provided to nonindigent defendants. Pursuant to Article 759 of the 1925 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (in effect in 1952) the State did not provide a verbatim transcript of any criminal trial proceedings. Only a statement of facts in narrative form was available to defendants in criminal cases.
Petitioner was given an opportunity to supplement the record of his criminal case at an evidentiary hearing in state court. Several witnesses from the original trial testified to material events which occurred at trial. Petitioner was allowed to bring out facts about his trial that were not reflected in the original record. A verbatim transcript of that proceeding was prepared and made a part of the record.
Although the state trial court found that petitioner could not have had a meaningful out-of-time appeal because the original trial transcript was incomplete, the Criminal Court of Appeals reversed. Noting that pertinent witnesses who appeared at the original trial gave testimony at the eviden-tiary hearing on points concerning petitioner’s claims of reversible error, the Criminal Court held that the evidence adduced was sufficient to rule on the claimed errors, and affirmed the conviction.
Petitioner asserts that Texas laws permit a narrative statement of facts to substitute for a verbatim transcription of the record only when bills of exception are filed by trial counsel. The record shows that trial counsel did file two bills of exception. Further, under Texas criminal procedure laws, petitioner was entitled to file additional bills of exception in the out-of-time appeal. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. arts. 36.20 and 40.-09(6), (6a) and (16). Petitioner’s assertion, therefore, must fail.
Petitioner was provided a statement of facts in narrative form in accordance with state law. The record provided petitioner was the same type of record given to all defendants in criminal cases, including nonindigent defendants. At a subsequent evidentiary hearing petitioner was given an opportunity to adduce evidence to supplement the record. Witnesses from the trial testified at the hearing to facts surrounding petitioner’s claims of error. For these reasons we conclude that a suitable alternative to a verbatim record was provided, and petitioner was not denied an effective appeal.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0