What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Dallas O. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
Misc. 3283; No. 22261.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Jan. 15, 1969.
Certiorari Denied May 19, 1969.
See 89 S.Ct. 1762.
Mr. Dallas O. Williams, pro se.
Messrs David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Robert S. Bennett, Asst. U. S. Attys., entered appearances for respondent.
Before Wright and Leventhau, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case is before us on appeal from the District Court’s refusal to file petitioner’s motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
When the application was before us previously, the file did not contain any statement of the reasons of the district judge and accordingly we had to remand in order to obtain those reasons. The district judge has filed a Memorandum of his reasons that was not provided in the first instance, but has been supplied in accordance with our order of remand.
In 1960 we held that it is not proper for a district judge to deny leave to file a habeas corpus petition without prepayment of costs unless he expresses his reasons, using whatever form he considers most convenient — informal memorandum, recitals in an order, or findings. The requirement that he state his reasons minimizes the possibility of an arbitrary abuse of power. As Judge Burger pointed out, a statement of reasons is necessary, if only to set forth whether the action is taken for reasons going to the lack of merit or because the applicant is not considered to qualify as a pauper.
We have prepared this opinion, again restating the applicable legal requirement, because the response to our remand came in the form of a Memorandum, which the district judge caused to be mimeographed, stating that in view of petitioner’s own comment at sentencing time, “I am at a loss to know why the appellate court remanded the case to this court to state its reasons why the filing of Williams’ petition was denied.” Another paragraph reads: “If, under the circumstances of this case considering the files and records, the Court of Appeals wants Williams’ dilatory and merit-less motion filed, then all they have' to do is to say so, for I have no intention of allowing it to be filed.”
These comments not only reflect an unawareness of the legal duty resting on the district judge, as delineated in the opinion cited above, but may also have contributed to a misunderstanding of the function of the district judge by other district judges and the public, advised through the press of the contents of the mimeographed Memorandum. The confusion quickened by the judge’s failure to heed applicable legal principles may well have been sharpened by the tone of his Memorandum.
This court’s order in no way indicated that the petition was required to be filed. It only asked that the district judge indicate why it was not filed. Where the district judge has considered the matter, it is easy for him to make a brief statement identifying the point or record reference that shows the petition is without merit; this avoids the necessity that the appellate court, less familiar with the record, will have to do unnecessary work in perusing the papers. The appellate court rightly gives deference to the reasons set forth by the district judge, if supported in the record, but it is hardly in a position to accord such deference when the reasons have never been stated by the district judge.
Fortunately, the Memorandum of the district judge included, in addition to the remarks already noted, a statement of his reasons for rejecting the petition. Now that the district judge has performed his function and stated his reasons for refusing leave to file the petition, we can perform ours, and state that they are satisfactory.
We take this occasion to note, what this court has previously indicated by order, that it would facilitate judicial administration of these matters if the district judge would simply file the pleading and deny it for lack of merit rather than deny leave to file the document with the court.
Petition denied.
. While petitioner’s caption is “Answer to Memorandum,” that suffices for purposes of jurisdictional requirement.
. Tatem v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 230, 275 F.2d 894 (1960).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 1