What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Hedwig POKRINCHAK, Mary Pokrinchak, and Jordan Pokrinchak, Appellants, v. HOLIDAY HOUSE MOTEL, INC., Appellee.
No. 9978.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 5, 1965.
Decided Nov. 17, 1965.
Edwin B. Fockler, III, Elkton, Md., (Roney & Fockler, Elkton, Md., on the brief), for appellants.
Alleck A. Resnick, Baltimore, Md., (Kartman & Resnick, Baltimore, Md., on the brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and ALBERT V. BRYAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.
HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge:
The plaintiff sought to recover damages consequent upon an alleged deceit perpetrated by the sellers of a motel which' she purchased at public auction. After a verdict of a jury for the defendant, she brought the case here complaining of the Court’s instructions. We affirm, for we find the submission fair and complete.
In response to advertisements she had seen in the New York Times plaintiff, with an adviser or male companion, went to a motel in Maryland on the morning of the afternoon when it was to be put up for public sale. The plaintiff testified that she and her adviser went to the motel office, whereupon they were taken by the manager’s wife into three rooms in one wing of the motel. She did not enter other open rooms in the vicinity of those she saw, but she testified that after her return to the office, she asked to see more of the rooms. The manager’s wife, in his presence, so the plaintiff stated, responded that when she had seen three rooms she had seen them all. Later the manager did show her the heating plant and other facilities.
The plaintiff’s testimony about the alleged statement of the manager’s wife was contradicted by the defendant’s evidence.
Testimony on behalf of the plaintiff indicated that after she purchased the motel at auction, she visited it on several occasions before the final closing and that, the day after she actually took possession, she discovered for the first time that some of the rooms in a wing which she had not inspected were uninhabitable because of severe termite infestation.
The Court submitted the case to the jury on the theory that under the laws of Maryland, recovery for deceit might be had if the manager’s wife made the statement attributed to her by the plaintiff and if it was reasonably understood as a representation that all the other rooms were in comparable condition to that of those she had seen, or if it was-intended to, and did, effectively divert the plaintiff from inspecting other rooms. In either event, however, the jury was told the plaintiff could recover only if the manager’s wife had apparent authority to show the rooms and to speak for the defendant, that is, if the plaintiff reasonably understood that the manager’s wife was acting for and in the interest of the sellers, and only if the jury found that the manager’s wife actually made the statement the plaintiff attributed to her.
The plaintiff contends that she is entitled to recover if the sellers affirmatively misrepresented the condition of the motel or if they obstructed or prevented her discovery of its defects through an inspection of the affected rooms. The Court clearly informed the jury, however, that it might find a verdict for the plaintiff if it found the underlying facts to support either theory of the plaintiff’s claim. In either event, the plaintiff’s case was dependent upon a finding that the wife of the motel manager made the statement attributed to her by the plaintiff. There was no other evidence of an effective misrepresentation or of an obstruction of an inspection. The Court properly instructed the jury that if it found that the manager’s wife made no such statement, they must find for the defendant.
The instruction about the apparent authority of the wife to speak for the sellers was essential and as favorable to the plaintiff as she had any reason to expect. Such a statement in private to the plaintiff by her own adviser or by an obvious interloper in the absence of the sellers or any of their representatives would give rise to no cause of action against the sellers. It is only if the manager’s wife spoke for the sellers or was reasonably understood by the plaintiff to speak for them, that the sellers could be held responsible for her conduct. Indeed, on this phase of the case, the Court’s instructions approached a requirement that the jury find that the sellers were responsible for whatever the wife said; the verdict for the defendant is understandable only in terms of a finding by the jury that the alleged statement was not made, or, if made, that it did not affect the scope of the plaintiff’s inspection.
We conclude that the plaintiff’s criticisms of the Court’s instructions to the jury are unfounded.
Affirmed.
. The plaintiff testified that some of the damaged areas had been covered over with fresh plaster. She did not see the fresh plaster until after she took possession of the motel, however, and, when she did see it, she recognized it as camouflage. Application of the plaster may have been an attempted misrepresentation, but it was not effective, for it did not mislead the plaintiff.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0