What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NORTHERN PAC. RY. CO. v. STANDARD COAL CO.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
December 5, 1927.
No. 7689.
Appeal and error <®=»850(1) — In case tried to court, appellate court cannot re-examine any question of fact entering into general judgment (28 USCA §§ 773, 875).
On review of judgment in a case tried to the court by stipulation, pursuant to Rev. St. §§ 649, 700 (28 USCA §§ 773, 875; Comp. St. §§ 1587, 1668), where there were no requests for or findings of facts or declarations of law, the appellate court cannot re-examine any question of fact entering into the general judgment.
In Error to the District Court of tbe United States for’tbe District of Utab; Tillman D. Johnson, Judge.
Action at law by tbe Northern Pacific Railway Company against the Standard Coal Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
D. R. Frost, of St. Paul, Minn. (B. W. Seandrett, of St, Paul, Minn., and Bagley, Judd & Ray, of Salt Lake City, Utab, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
M. E. Wilson, of Salt Lake City, Utab (A. R. Barnes, of Salt Lake City, Utab, on tbe brief), for defendant in error.
Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and POLLOCK and SCOTT, District Judges.
SCOTT, District Judge.
Plaintiff, in error, tbe Northern Pacific Railway Company, brought this action against the Standard Coal Company, defendant in error, to recover a difference in freight on ten carloads of coal from Standardville, Utab, to Irvin, Wash. Briefly stated, the facts alleged were that the defendant in error over a period from May 4 to May 9, 1921, shipped ten cars of coal to the International Portland Cement Company, by mistake billing them to Irwin, Wash., intending, however, to bill to Irvin, Wash. Standardville maintains no station, and billing of cars was effected at Helper, one station beyond, on tbe Denver & -Rio Grande Railway. Shipments to Irvin, Wash., would in due course move-Denver & Rio Grande north to Ogden, via Oregon Short Line beyond to Huntington, via Oregon & Washington Railroad & Navigation Company beyond to Spokane, and via Northern Pacific to Irvin. In due course shipments would move from Standardville to Irwin, Wash., Denver & Rio Grande Railway, Standardville to Ogden, via Oregon Short Line beyond to Huntington, via Oregon & Washington Railroad & Navigation Company through Wallula Junction to Yakima, and Yakima to Irwin via Yakima Valley & Texas, a short electric line. The Northern Pacific Railway Company has a line physically connected with the Oregon & Washington Railroad & Navigation Compaq ny’s line at Yakima, running direct to Irvin through Spokane. Cars billed from Standardville either to Irwin or Irvin would pass through Wallula Junction.
Before the mistake in the billing was discovered, nine of the ten cars had moved to Yakima; the tenthnar had reached Wallula Junction. Notice was then given to the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company and an order to divert the nine ears to Irvin. Apparently the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company ordered the nine cars back-hauled to Yakima, through Wallula Junction, and on over the Oregon & Washington Railroad & Navigation Company’s line to Spokane, and Northern'Pacific beyond to Irvin. On arriving at destination the Northern Pacific Company collected the freight, and in so doing collected the usual rate, Standardville to Irvin, ignoring the back-haul to Yakima to Wallula Junction. The agreed facts show the legal rate, Standardville to Irvin, Wash., per ton on a car of coal, is $5.62%; Standardville to Yakima, $5.75; Yakima to Irvin, $7.60; there- was a rate then in force, via the Northern Pacific, Yakima to Irvin, of $3.50 per ton.
The cause of action alleged is based upon the rate from Standardville to Yakima and from Yakima to Irvin. The evidence shows that the market value of the coal laid down at. Irvin, Wash., was $7.47% per ton. It will therefore be observed that diverting the shipments on a back-haul to Wallula Junction and thence to Irvin resulted in an entire absorption of the value of the coal, whereas it could have been sent forward over the Northern Pacific on the $3.50 rate. The District Court held that the diverting line was not justified in selecting the route via Wallula Junction and entered a judgment of dismissal.
We are asked to review the case upon the following assignments: (1) The court erred in sustaining the defendant’s motion to dismiss. (2) The court erred in entering judgment of dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. (3) The said judgment is against the law. (4) The said judgment is against the evidence.
Were we at liberty to dispose of the case on its merits, it would be difficult to see wherein the trial court committed any error in the ruling and decision complained of. However, we are mot with an obstacle which prevents our passing upon the assignment presented. The case was tried to the court; a jury having been waived by stipulation in writing, duly filed. Much of the record in the case was made up by stipulated evidential facts, and the balance by the testimony of witnesses. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, and after the plaintiff had rested, defendant’s counsel announced that he had certain motions to present, and thereupon he presented six motions : (1) A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction in the court, for that, inasmuch as the coal could have been shipped from Yakima to Irvin at $3.50 per ton, that charge should have been adopted, and therefore the cause of action roso out of intrastate shipment. (2) A motion to strike all of the evidence introduced to show authority of one Powers to give directions, instructions, etc. (3) A motion to strike out all the testimony of the witness Good. (4) A motion to1 strike out all of the testimony of witness Taylor. (5) A motion that the court make a certain declaration of law, not material to state here. (6) That the court make a certain declaration of law, not material to be stated.
These motions were argued, and at the conclusion of the argument the court made an extended statement, concluding with the announcement that “I am therefore constrained to grant the motion of the defendant at this time to dismiss the action.” Plaintiff in error then requested an exception, and counsel for the defendant in error made a request, and thereafter on the same day a general judgment of dismissal was entered.
Plaintiff in error 'made no requests for findings of fact or declarations of law, and none were made by the court. The finding and judgment of the court was general. Under the rule that has long been well settled by the decisions construing sections 649 and 700 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, being United States Code Annotated, title 28, § 773, and United States Code Annotated, title 28, § 875 (Comp. St. §§ 1587, 1668), we cannot re-examine any question of fact entered into a general finding and judgment of the trial court, where a jury is waived.
It is urged that this case falls within an exception apparently recognized by this court. Myer & Chapman State Bank v. First National Bank of Cody, 248 F. 679. In that ease it was said: I “The ease was suddenly terminated on the court’s own motion, without any reason, so far as the record shows, for either party to anticipate such a termination, and without any opportunity to counsel to present requests, and judgment was immediately entered upon the same day,” etc. In the present case both counsel and presiding judge were exceedingly deliberate in making up the record, and the record indicates that the trial judge was markedly solicitous in his endeavors to have the record made up satisfactorily to counsel. There would be no ground whatever for the conclusion that counsel for plaintiff in error had been deprived of opportunity to make any requests which he desired. In these circumstances, the record in this caso discloses nothing which this court can review.
The cause is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1