What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Milton A. COREY, d/b/a Corey Financial Planning, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MAST ROAD GRAIN AND BUILDING MATERIALS COMPANY, INC., et al., Defendants, Appellees.
No. 84-1003.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued June 8, 1984.
Decided June 25, 1984.
Joseph F. Dugan, Boston, Mass., with whom Charles R. Capace, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellant.
Norman M. Clement, Boston, Mass., for appellees.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, STEWART, Associate Justice (Retired), and BOWNES, Circuit Judge.
Of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment of dismissal.
Plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident, filed this contract action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Mast Road Grain and Building Materials Company, Inc., a New Hampshire corporation, and Harvey Dupuis, the president of the corporation and a New Hampshire resident. Defendants moved for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff failed to respond within the ten days required by Local Rule 12 of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court therefore dismissed the suit. Plaintiff subsequently moved under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for relief from the judgment of dismissal on the ground of excusable neglect. The district court denied the motion and plaintiff appealed.
The standard of review in the present case is clear: the district court may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. Pagan v. American Airlines, Inc., 534 F.2d 990, 993 (1st Cir.1976). We find no abuse of discretion here. Plaintiff’s conduct and his excuses for noncomplianee with the local rule did not compel a finding of excusable neglect. The district court was entitled to insist upon compliance with its local rule in these circumstances. See In re Harbour House Operating Corp., 724 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.1983) (strictly applying Rule 3(b) of the First Circuit Rules governing bankruptcy appeals).
Plaintiff argues that the court based its denial of relief not upon noncompliance with the rule but upon an incorrect finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction. The court wrote, “Even if I overlook the untimeliness of the plaintiffs filings under Local Rule 12, I am not satisfied that his affidavits sufficiently establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” We do not read this, however, as waiving reliance upon the untimeliness of the filing, but only as stating an added alternative reason. It is well settled that when reviewing a district court’s order for abuse of discretion, “[i]f a single ground supports the ... order, it is not reversible.” Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wisconsin National Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 809 (7th Cir.1980); Nuttall v. Reading Co., 235 F.2d 546, 548 (3d Cir.1956). Since the court could properly decline to excuse plaintiff’s noncompliance with the local rule, we need not consider the court’s alternative proposition that it lacked personal jurisdiction.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1