What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MARTIN et al. v. McALLISTER LIGHTERAGE LINE, Inc. et al.
No. 219, Docket 22548.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Argued April 15, 1953.
Decided June 25, 1953.
Frank, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Nathan D. Aron, Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellants.
Foley & Martin, New York City, Christopher E. Heckman and William J. O’Brien, New York City, of counsel, for certain ap-pellees.
Burlingham, Hupper & Kennedy, New York City, Herbert M. Lord, New York City, of counsel, for Manhattan Lighterage Corp., appellee.
Before SWAN, Chief Judge, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Chief Judge.
The appellants are 42 “scow captains,” each of whom was employed on a deck scow by one of the seven appellees. The question presented by the appeal is whether the men are entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S. C.A. § 201 et seq., to recover minimum wages, overtime wages, liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees for work performed during the two year period immediately preceding March 15, 1948, the date the action was commenced. More specifically the issue is whether they are within the coverage of the wage and hour provisions of the Act or are exempted therefrom by virtue of section 13, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a) (14), which exempts "any employee employed as a seaman”. The case was tried to the court without a jury.. Judge Conger made findings of fact and held that the plaintiffs, whose duties were primarily nautical, were exempt from the Act. Accordingly the complaint was dismissed.
Without repeating the facts stated in the trial court’s opinion, 102 F.Supp. 41, familiarity with which will be assumed, we have, for convenience in discussing the appellants’ contentions, set out in the margin the findings of fact relating to their duties. The appellants do not dispute that their .nautical duties were as set out in finding No. 10. They concede that they were seamen part of the time; but because their active nautical duties require only an hour or two in a normal working day, 7- A.M. to 5 P.M., they contend that for most of the time their duties were those of watchmen— a non-exempt classification. We do not agree that during a scow captain’s stand-by time, his duties are like those of a shore-side watchman. While under tow, he has leisure time because the very nature of this type of seafaring job requires no exertion of labor, except that he must be alert to the need for his services, should that need arise. This is likewise true if he is on an empty scow waiting to be taken in tow or for a change in tide which may require a shift of lines. Doubtless his presence on a loaded scow may incidentally deter unauthorized persons from coming on board and may in some measure prevent pilfering of certain kinds of cargo. As Judge Conger said in his opinion: “But even then they [scow captains] were not watchmen in the sense that they were there to prevent pilferage and the like, although they would naturally be a deterrent to such an act. Rather, they were nautical watchmen alert for any damage to the boat through shifting [of cargo] or tide changes or collision; and so for the protection of the cargo.” Their employers did not regard them as cargo watchmen. Nor could they have been effective in that capacity, for they carried no weapons, and many of them were so old as to be physically unable to resist a stalwart intruder. In so far as the appellants attack the trial court’s conclusions as unsupported by the evidence, it will suffice to say that in our opinion the record amply sustains them; we cannot hold the findings of fact “dearly erroneous.”
More than a dozen years ago it was held that barge lenders were “seamen” exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act. Gale v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., 5 Cir., 116 F.2d 27, certiorari denied 313 U.S. 559, 61 S.Ct. 837, 85 L.Ed. 1519. There are no significant differences between the duties of the bargees as there described and those of the appellants in the case at bar. Apparently the Wage and Hour Administrator accepted the classification of the plaintiffs in that case and in July 1943 issued interpretative Bulletin No. 11 in conformity therewith. The appellants rely particularly upon the Administrator’s ruling that “For enforcement purposes, the amount of nonexempt work will be considered substantial if it occupies more than 20 per cent of the time worked by the employee during the workweek.” They assert that the district judge erred in not giving adequate weight to this administrative interpretation. But finding No. 15 finds that the plaintiffs did not perform any substantial amount of nonexempt work. We agree. As stated in Judge Conger’s opinion they were watchmen only in so far as they watched “Cor a nautical assignment to arise.” Compare the exemption extended to radio operators or surgeons who sail as members of a vessel’s crew. Obviously their stand-by time is normally much greater than the/ time spent on active duties. Yet section 783.2(b) of Bulletin No. 11 recognizes them to be within the seaman’s exemption. Nor can we grant the argument that the scow captains who maintain families and homes ashore and go home when not required to remain aboard their vessels should be denied the exemption. This is equally true of the crews of many tugs or ferry-boats.
Finally it is urged that our own decisions require denial of the exemption. In each of those cases the lighterman or bargee spent a large part of his workday in loading or unloading or tallying the cargo, duties normally associated with longshoremen. The present appellants have nothing to do with loading or unloading their scows; their duties with respect to cargo are only to see that it is so placed as not to strain the scow or endanger its stability. The judgment is affirmed.
. For a statement of the legislative history of the exemption, see Weaver v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 6 Cir., 153 F.2d 597, 599, certiorari denied sub nom. Rymar-kiewicz v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 328 U.S. 858, 66 S.Ct. 1351, 90 L.Ed. 1630.
. .Pursuant to stipulation certain of the plaintiffs testified on behalf of all as to their duties, and the defendants presented evidence on the same subject. Proof of damages was postponed until after determination of the issue of defendants’ liability.
. “8. The plaintiffs were paid in accordance with a union contract on a monthly basis. It was not necessary for them to have seamen’s licenses.
“9. The contract prescribed no special working hours, but it provided for ‘premium’ pay to captáins required to be on duty between the hours of 5:00 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. A captain’s monthly pay would be deducted for any day he failed to be aboard his scow [when towed] between 7 DO A.M. and 5 DO P.M.
"10. The plaintiffs’ duties included attending to lines, displaying lights, pumping out bilge water, putting out fenders, examining vessel for damage and leakage, observing of loading and unloading of cargo for proper distribution in scow, taking soundings of depth of water in certain berths, splicing lines and the like. Some plaintiffs made emergency repairs by the use of oakum and cotton and repaired small holes in the deck. In general, the scow captain attends to the welfare of the vessel.
“11. Plaintiffs did not load nor unload any of the scows.
“12. The plaintiffs’ nautical duties did not require more than an hour or two of physical effort except during towing. The rest of the time they slept, ate, relaxed, read or busied themselves in any other fashion they liked until it was necessary to perform another nautical duty.
“13. The plaintiffs were seamen as that term is used in the Fair Labor Standards Act.
“14. The plaintiffs were not watchmen as that term is generally understood.
“15. The plaintiffs did not perform a substantial amount of work not exempt from the Act.”
. 102 F.Supp. at page 43.
. Interpretative Bulletin No. 11 was again promulgated in September 1947 and published in the Federal Register, 29 Code Fed.Reg. § 783 et seq. The most pertinent applicable provisions are as follows:
“§ 783.2 Who is ‘employed as a seaman,’ for purposes of exemption, (a) An employee will ordinarily be regarded as ‘employed as a seaman’ if he performs, as master or subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master abroad a vessel, service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character. In our opinion, this exemption extends to employees performing such service on vessels navigating inland waters as well as on ocean-going and coastwise vessels.
»
“(d) Barge tenders on non-seli'-pro-pelled barges who perform the normal duties of their occupation, such as attending to the lines and anchors, putting out running and mooring lines, pumping out bilge water, and other similar activities necessary and usual to the navigation of barges, are considered seamen within this exemption unless they do a substantial amount of nonexempt work. Loading and unloading and activities relative thereto will be considered noncx-empt work. Employees on seagoing barges would also seem to be employed as seamen if their services are of the type described in paragraph (a) of this section.”
“§ 788.4 Enforcement policy concerning performance of nonewempt work. The Division has taken the position that the exemption provided by section 33(a) (3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act will be deemed applicable even though some nonexempt work (that is, work of a nature other than that which characterizes the exemption) is performed by the employee during the workweek, unless the amount of such nonexompt work is substantial. For enforcement purposes, the amount of nonexempt work will be considered substantial if it occupies more than 20 per cent of the time worked by the employee during the workweek.”
. See § 783.4 quoted in note 5, supra.
. See Anderson v. Manhattan Lighterage Corp., 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 971, 973, certiorari denied 326 U.S. 722, 66 S.Ct. 27, 90 L.Ed. 428; United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549, 60 S.Ct. 3059, 84 L.Ed. 1845.
. See note 3, supra.
. Knudsen v. Lee & Simmons, 2 Cir., 163 F.2d 95; McCarthy v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 2 Cir., 163 F.2d 92; Anderson v. Manhattan Lighterage Corp., 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 326 U.S. 722, 66 S.Ct. 27, 90 L.Ed. 428.
. See note 3, supra.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 42