What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PIEDMONT FIRE INS. CO. v. AARON et al.
No. 5108.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 8, 1943.
Charles E. Ford, of Washington, D. C., and Alexander H. Sands, of Richmond, Va., for appellant.
William Davis Butts, of Newport News, Va., for appellees Mrs. D. E. Roles and Mrs. Walter Rooks.
Tazewell Taylor, of Norfolk, Va., and Allan D. Jones, of Newport News, Va. (Jones, Blechman & Jones, of Newport News, Va., on the brief), for appellee Harry J. Aaron.
PARKER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a suit for a declaratory judgment. On September 11, 1942, one Harry J. Aaron, a fur dealer, instituted an action at law in the Circuit Court of Newport News, Virginia, to recover on a contract of insurance evidenced by a binder issued by an agent of the defendant Piedmont Fire Insurance Company. A few days later, the insurance company filed a suit for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asking that the binder be declared null and void on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement, and that the insurance company be declared not liable under the binder, either to Aaron or to persons who had stored with him furs which were claimed by him to be covered by the binder. A number of these persons were made parties to the suit as representatives of a numerous class, and two other insurance companies which had issued policies covering the loss were joined as defendants. The action instituted in the state court was promptly removed by the insurance company into the federal court, in which the suit for declaratory judgment had already been commenced; and an order was entered that the two causes be consolidated. Later, upon motion of Aaron that the issue as to liability on the binder be tried before a jury, an order was entered that it be so tried and that the suit for declaratory judgment be dismissed.
An affidavit filed with this court, the allegations of which are not controverted by the insurance company, shows that Aaron has made settlement with all except ten of the 976 persons who had stored furs with him; that settlement has been made with eight of these ten claimants by other insurance companies who have agreed to await the outcome of this suit for the adjustment of their claims; that the total of the ten claims does not exceed $1,500; and that Aaron is willing to deposit that sum in the registry of the court to assure the settlement of the claims. It was stated, without contradiction, that the situation at the time of the pretrial conference preceding the entry of the order of dismissal was not substantially different. There was no controversy between the insurance companies as to the liability of the companies joined as defendants in the suit for declaratory judgment. There, was, consequently, but one substantial issue left in the case and, as stated by the judge below, that issue was fully determinable in the action on the binder, which was first instituted and which was retained within the court’s jurisdiction when the order dismissing the suit for declaratory judgment was entered.
It is clear, we think, that the order appealed from should be affirmed. The question as to whether the insurance company was liable on the binder was one for trial by jury whether arising in the action on the binder or in the suit for declaratory judgment. “Ordinarily when the defense of fraud may be interposed to an action at law on the policy and such action is imminent or pending, there is no occasion for equitable relief and the parties will be left to their rights as determined in the suit at law”. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 59 S.Ct. 657, 661, 83 L.Ed. 987; Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 55 S.Ct. 310, 79 L.Ed. 440; Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Co., 296 U.S. 64, 56 S.Ct. 1, 80 L.Ed. 47; Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188, 63 S.Ct. 163, 87 L. Ed. -. Express provision is made in the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for jury trial of “issues of fact triable by a jury”. 28 U.S.C.A. § 400(3); Rule 57 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. following section 723c; Moore’s Federal Practice, vol. 3, p. 3231; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed., pp. 399, 403
Contention is made that recovery on the binder could be had only in equity, and that under the Rules of Civil Procedure trial by jury was not mandatory for that reason. It has long been established, however, that recovery at law may be had upon the contract for temporary insurance which the binder evidences. 26 C.J. 51; 29 Am. Jur. 143; Kerr v. Union Marine Ins. Co., D.C., 124 F. 835, 837; Ellis v. Albany City Fire Ins. Co., 50 N.Y. 402, 10 Am.Rep. 495; Angell v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 59 N.Y. 171, 17 Am.Rep. 322; Hicks v. British American Ins. Co., 162 N.Y. 284, 56 N.E. 743, 48 L.R.A. 424; Sanford v. Orient Ins. Co., 174 Mass. 416, 54 N.E. 883, 75 Am.St.Rep. 358; Chenier v. Insurance Co., of North America, 72 Wash. 27, 129 P. 905, 48 L.R.A.,N.S., 319, Ann.Cas. 1914D, 649; National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Jones, 165 Va. 606, 183 S.E. 443; Lea & Adcock v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 168 N.C. 478, 84 S.E. 813.
Since there was no occasion to retain the declaratory judgment suit for the determination of the rights of those who had stored furs with Aaron or the liability of the other insurance companies, and since the only issue remaining in the case would necessarily be tried in the same way in the action to recover on the binder as in the suit for declaratory judgment, there was no occasion to complicate the record or the procedure by retaining that suit, and the order dismissing that portion of the consolidated proceeding was properly entered. It is true that the pendency of another proceeding in which relief can be granted does not necessarily preclude the maintenance of a suit for declaratory judgment. Ætna Casualty & S. Co. v. Yeatts, 4 Cir., 99 F.2d 665. The granting of declaratory relief, however, is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court; and the discretion is properly exercised by dismissing the suit when it is apparent that it will serve no useful purpose. Ætna Casualty & S. Co. v. Quarles, 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 321; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Boyle Const. Co., 4 Cir., 123 F.2d 558; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620.
There was no error and the order appealed from will be affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1