What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Leon D. URBAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 14883.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Oct. 19, 1956.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 20, 1956.
Julien A. Hurley, Warren A. Taylor, Fairbanks, Alaska, for appellant.
George M. Yeager, U. S. Atty., Philip W. Morgan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Fairbanks, Alaska, for appellee.
Before HEALY, ORR, and FEE, Circuit Judges.
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was indicted below on a charge of murder; and on a trial before a jury a verdict of manslaughter was returned against him. This appeal ensued.
There was testimony to the following effect: Appellant and one Myrtle Cathey were joint operators of a small bar known as the Alibi Club, located in the south part of Fairbanks, and the two were living together, as though married, in the back part of the Club. In the early morning hours of January 22, 1955, appellant was at the Alibi Club, from which place he went to another club called the Players, located about a mile distant, knowing that Myrtle was there. Upon his arrival he had a few words with Myrtle and then proceeded to remove her forcibly from the place. He engaged a cab, operated by one Jennings, who testified that he heard the appellant hit the woman several times, knocking her down on the floorboard of the cab; that he then heard him pick her up and knock her against the cab door. Upon arriving at the Alibi Club, according to Jennings, he saw the woman slumped on the back seat and saw blood on her face and down her clothes and on the cab seat. Also, he observed appellant get out of the cab, unlock the door of the Alibi Club, and drag the woman some ten feet into the building by the hair of her head.
Another witness, a Dr. Anderson, responded to a call of appellant on the evening of that same day and observed the woman’s condition. He saw, among other things, gross swellings on both cheek regions and a bruise behind her left ear. He considered these bruises to be recent — within a 24-hour period. Appellant did not call Anderson again until over a week later. Upon responding to the call, the doctor saw the woman at the Alibi Club in the same bedroom as before and noted signs of serious brain injury; whereupon an ambulance was summoned and the woman was removed to a hospital, where she died the following day. Anderson, at the request of the authorities, performed an autopsy and from this determined that the cause of death was from brain damage, the result of external injuries about the face and head and behind the ears. These injuries, he testified, were the product of blows from a fist or blunt object.
In his brief here appellant relies wholly on three points, which his counsel states as follows: (1) The court erred in denying defendant’s motion for an acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s evidence; (2) the court erred in admitting over objection a number of enlarged pictures of the body of the deceased woman, which enlargements, appellant says, were distorted; and (3) the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the law of circumstantial evidence as requested by defense counsel.
Counsel’s argument under his first specification is that there was insufficient evidence to convict. It is apparent from what has already been said that the contention is without merit.
We pass to point (2) of the argument. The pictures referred to in that point are before us, together with the smaller original photos of which they are enlargements. No objection was made to the introduction of the originals. We are unable to discern in the enlargement any distortion. Both groups depict the same bruises, etc., on the body and limbs. We are satisfied that error, if any, in this connection did no prejudice to appellant’s case.
Under his point (3) counsel urges that the court in its charge defining direct and circumstantial evidence erred in failing to advise the jury, as requested, that circumstantial evidence must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis. We think a sufficient answer to the argument is the observation of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150, in which the court considered the same contention, saying that “the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect”. In the case before us the court’s instruction on reasonable doubt was full and adequate.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1