What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.

Opinion:
WILSON v. BECKETT et al.
No. 8492.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia.
Argued May 1, 3944.
Decided May 15, 1944.
Miss Etta L. Taggart, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Paul D. Taggart, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. W. Cameron Burton, of Washington, D. C, with whom Mr. Thomas B. Heffelfinger was on the brief, for appellees Middleton and Beckett.
Mr. Hubert G. King, of Washington, D. C., for appellee Wilkins.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and EDGERTON and ARNOLD, Associate Justices.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant brought this suit to set aside a deed on the ground that the grantor was mentally incompetent. The District Court, on conflicting evidence, adjudged that the grantor was of sound mind and the deed valid.
A few minutes before the trial appellant’s counsel learned that one of her witnesses, Marie Ryan, was ill and unable to testify. Expecting to produce this witness on the following day, counsel answered ready and went to trial; but Ryan, as it turned out, was not able to appear at any time during the trial. The court refused to grant a continuance for the purpose of taking her deposition. The question is whether this was an abuse of discretion.
Appellant told the court nothing about the nature of Ryan’s probable testimony except that it would be “very important” and would be “along the line of. what Mollie testified to * * * and additional things.” The testimony of the witness Mollie Maxwell had been along at least two divergent lines, one favorable and one unfavorable to the grantor’s sanity. She had testified to eccentricities, some of them gross, on the part of the grantor, who was her employer. She had also testified: “I can’t say that she was crazy, but her mind was bad. If she had been crazy I wouldn’t have been working for her; but her mind was bad, very bad.” The court found as facts that the grantor “eschewed baths” and had “certain eccentricities.” Ryan’s cumulative testimony, and likewise the “additional things” which counsel had in mind but did not disclose, might or might not have been important. If they would in fact have been important, counsel should have made this clear by a definite offer of proof.
On the other hand, a judge is no mere umpire. '“It is the recognized function of a trial judge to see that facts are clearly and fully developed.” He necessarily has a wide discretion in the matter. We think it would have been better practice for the court either to satisfy itself, by questioning counsel, that Ryan’s testimony would not affect the result of the case, or to grant a brief continuance so that appellant might take her deposition. But we are not prepared to rule that the court’s failure to do either of these things was an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
Cf. Cornwell v. Cornwell, 73 App.D.C. 233, 318 F.2d 396; Harrah v. Morgenthau, 67 App.D.C. 119, 89 F.2d 863.
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 74 App.D.C. 52, 63, 120 F.2d 641, 642.

Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 8