What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ralph Michael LEPISCOPO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 72-2958
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 29, 1972.
Ralph Michael Lepiscopo, pro se.
John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., Anthony M. Arnold, Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.
Before WISDOM, GODBOLD and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal is taken from the denial of a motion to vacate the conviction and sentence of Ralph Michael Lepiscopo, a federal prisoner. We affirm.
Appellant contends that he is entitled to § 2255 relief because the district court refused to appoint a fellow inmate “jailhouse lawyer” to represent him at his second trial. On retrial after a reversal by this Court, Lepiscopo was again convicted and that judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Lepiscopo, 5th Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 258, cert. denied 1970, 400 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 255, 27 L.Ed.2d 254.
The district court stated findings and conclusions in its final order in part as follows:
“At both trials petitioner waived counsel and ably conducted his own defense. Notwithstanding petitioner’s waiver, able counsel was appointed to represent him. At the court’s request counsel was present in the courtroom at all times during trial and available to petitioner. Furthermore, the court knows of no constitutional authority which commands that an inmate defendant is entitled to have a ‘jailhouse lawyer’ appointed to represent him.” (Footnotes omitted)
We agree with the district court’s ruling. On the appellant’s later direct appeal, we held that “The record amply illustrates that . . . [Lepiscopo] was competent to waive, and did validly waive, representation of counsel in the entire proceedings below. It is further apparent that Lepiscopo ably and aggressively served as his own counsel with a degree of competence which few laymen could exceed.” 429 F.2d at 261.
There can be no doubt that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 1938, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Gideon v. Wainwright, 1962, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799. Nevertheless, an accused also has the right to defend himself at his trial, provided that he has knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel. See Hawkins v. United States, 5th Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 738, 739; United States v. Odom, 9th Cir. 1970, 423 F.2d 875; Minor v. United States, 8th Cir. 1967, 375 F.2d 170, cert. denied 1967, 389 U.S. 882, 88 S.Ct. 131, 19 L.Ed.2d 177.
Here there is a strong showing of valid waiver of counsel.
A person accused of a criminal offense “is entitled to such counsel as is reasonably likely to render and who does render reasonably effective assistance.” Moore v. Beto, 5th Cir. 1972, 458 F.2d 386. The courts are not required, however, to furnish an indigent defendant with any particular attorney who may be desired. See Brown v. Craven, 9th Cir. 1970, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170; Raullerson v. Patterson, D.Colo. 1967, 272 F.Supp. 495. This latter rule is all the more applicable to a “jailhouse lawyer,” who is unlikely to have any formal training in the law, and who would not be subject to the ethical obligations which are imposed on members of the bar. Indeed, Lepiscopo’s fellow inmate would be prohibited by the district court’s Local Rules from practicing before it because he is not a member of the bar.
It seems hardly necessary to add that the appellant’s reliance on Johnson v. Avery, 1969, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718, is misplaced. In the Johnson case the Supreme Court held that “unless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.” 393 U.S. at 490, 89 S.Ct. at 751. At both of Lepiscopo’s trials, however, the district court offered him full and proper assistance of counsel, which he chose to waive.
Affirmed.
. Filed pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.
. United States v. Lepiscopo, 5th Cir. 1969, 409 F.2d 843.
. Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Rule 1, Attorneys. We find nothing objectionable about this Rule.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1