What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SAVE THE DUNES COUNCIL, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Manuel LUJAN, Jr., individually and as Secretary of the Interior, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 89-2412.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 22, 1990.
Decided April 10, 1990.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 11, 1990.
Edward W. Osann, Jr., Chicago, Ill., Patrick A. Parenteau, Washington, D.C., Donald J. Evans, Evans & Evans, Valparaiso, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.
Andrew B. Baker, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Atty., Paul A. Rake, Douglas B. Stebbins, Charles W. Webster, Eichhorn, Eichhorn & Link, Hammond, Ind., Jeffrey P. Kehre, Jacques B. Gelin, Dept, of Justice, Land & Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee.
Paul A. Rake, Charles W. Webster, Eich-horn, Eichhorn & Link, Hammond, Ind., for amicus curiae, Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
Before CUMMINGS, FLAUM, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
. As originally filed, the present appeal named William P. Clark as defendant-appellee. Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 43(c)(1), we have substituted his successor at the Department of the Interi- or as the appropriate defendant-appellee in this proceeding.
PER CURIAM.
This is a mandamus action brought by the Save the Dunes Council, Inc. (“Council”) to compel the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) to purchase Crescent Dune owned by amicus curiae Northern Indiana Public Service Company (“Nipsco”).
In August 1978 the Secretary filed suit in the court below to condemn part of the Crescent Dune, namely, Tract No. 96-101 of area III-B. Nipsco objected to the condemnation, which supposedly had been authorized by Congress in 16 U.S.C. § 460u-12. However, this 1976 provision required the Secretary to acquire the entire Crescent Dune within two years for $800,-000. On September 7, 1983, Nipsco and the United States submitted a stipulation and joint motion to dismiss the condemnation suit on the ground that the land was “no longer required by the plaintiff.” This prompted the Council on October 19, 1983, to seek mandamus to compel the Secretary to acquire Tract No. 96-101 of the Crescent Dune for the Indiana Dunes National Lake Shore. On April 10, 1986, the district court granted the Council’s motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the Secretary to withdraw the stipulation and joint motion to dismiss filed in the condemnation proceeding. Approximately two months thereafter, the Secretary filed a motion to vacate the preliminary injunction and to dismiss the mandamus proceeding. This motion was granted on May 8, 1989, causing the Council to file the present appeal.
The Council is a not-for-profit corporation whose primary purpose has been the preservation of the Indiana Dunes for public use and enjoyment. The Secretary is in charge of administering the National Park Service, including the national park known as the Indiana Dunes National Lake Shore. The Council lobbied successfully for the passage of the following 1976 statute:
The Secretary shall acquire the area on the map referred to in section 460u of this title as area III-B [the Crescent Dune] within two years from the effective date of this section [October 18, 1976] only if such area can be acquired for not more than $800,000, exclusive of administrative costs of acquisition, as adjusted by the Consumer Price Index: Provided, That the Secretary may not acquire such area by any means after two years from the effective date of this section.
16 U.S.C. § 460u-12.
The statute was meant to add the entire Crescent Dune to the National Park which had been established in 1966. In the Senate Report covering the above statute, the Crescent Dune was described as follows:
This is a highly scenic sample of dunes shoreline, with crescent-like formation of the beach that makes a pleasant little bay frequently used for swimming. There are impressive saddle-shaped dunes, 80 feet high, behind the beach that serve as a buffer between the scenic Mount Baldy area to the west and the NIPSCO generating plant.
S.Rep. No. 1189, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, 5636-5637.
This area was meant to be used for a boat anchorage and for beach use.
In acting for the district court, the magistrate explained why the Council was being denied mandamus. He pointed out that the Secretary was only authorized to acquire the entire area III-B (not just Tract No. 96-101) and then only if it could be acquired for not more than $800,000. At the same time that it passed the statute authorizing the purchase, Congress had received an estimate valuing the property at $1,762,000. S.Rep. No. 1189, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, 5636-5637. Therefore it was obvious that Congress’ enactment of this legislation was unrealistic since the Crescent Dune could not be purchased for $800,000. Indeed another independent appraiser in the following year estimated the fair market value of this property at $1,109,750. Government Br. 20 n. 12. Therefore, as the magistrate concluded, objectively speaking, “there could be no dispute that the Secretary did not have the authority under the statute to acquire” area III-B. Furthermore, on its face the statute did not permit the Secretary to purchase less than the entire area III-B.
Since Congress did not authorize the acquisition of the Crescent Dune for more than $800,000 and since it was impossible to acquire it for $800,000, the Secretary had discretion to abort his August 1978 condemnation action. Therefore mandamus will not lie. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 860; Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir.1984), certiorari denied, 474 U.S. 830, 106 S.Ct. 94, 88 L.Ed.2d 77. While we sympathize with the Council’s aim to enlarge the Indiana Dunes National Lake Shore by adding area III-B, its remedy is to seek an amendment to 16 U.S.C. § 460u-12. We are not empowered to effectuate that relief.
The judgment for the defendant is affirmed.
. The fact that any prospective purchase of the land would be beyond the “within two years" requirement of the statute is not at issue here, having been resolved in the Council’s favor in an earlier proceeding. Council App. at A6 n. 1.
. In its principal brief before us, the Council advocates compelling the Secretary to purchase the entire area III-B, not just Tract No. 96-101 (Br. 7-8, 16).
.Prior aspects of this litigation are described in United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir.1985), certiorari denied sub nom. Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v. United States, 476 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1956, 90 L.Ed.2d 364, where we affirmed the district court’s denial of the Council's motion to intervene in the condemnation action.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1