What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PREBLE CORPORATION v. WENTWORTH et al.
No. 3111.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
June 3, 1936.
Joseph B. Jacobs, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.
William B. Nulty, of Portland, Me., for appellees.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
MORTON, Circuit Judge.
This is a reorganization proceeding under section 77B, Bankr.Act (11 U.S.C.A. § 207). The debtor has appealed from a decree denying confirmation of its plan of reorganization and denying its motion that the value of the interest of the first mortgage bondholders be appraised.
There is no controversy about the facts. The debtor is a Maine corporation owning valuable business reál estate in Portland, Me. It became financially embarrassed, and presented a petition for reorganization under section '77B, which was duly approved and filed. Its principal asset is its real estate. This is subject to a first mortgage made in 1923 to secure an issue of its bonds of which there is now outstanding about $1,205,000. The other assets amount to less than $60,000 and a claim of about $600,000 against a closed bank, which is in litigation and, if established, will not realize more than one-half that amount. The indebtedness is about $1,900,000. The District Judge found that the corporation is insolvent, and his finding is not challenged.
There were several issues of securities junior to the first mortgage bonds, and the creditors and stockholders were by order of court put into eight classes. The required percentage of each of these classes assented to the plan except the first mortgage bondholders. With reference to non-assenting creditors and stockholders — in this case the mortgage bondholders — the statute says that the plan of reorganization shall provide in respect of them “adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their interests, claims,' or liens, if the property affected by such interests, claims, or liens is dealt with by the plan, * * * or by appraisal and payment either in cash of the value either of such interests, claims, or liens,” etc. (section 77B, subsec. (b), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207(b). The statute also provides that “the judge shall confirm the plan if satisfied that (1) it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders, and is feasible.” Subsection (f), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207(f).
When it became apparent that the mortgage bondholders did not assent to the proposed plan of reorganization, the debtor moved for an appraisal of the value of the interest and securities of the first mortgage bondholders in order that the debtor might pay to them under order of the court the value of such interests and securities and thereupon have a discharge of the mortgage. The District Judge after full hearing found:
“(1) The Court is not satisfied that the plan of reorganization offered by the Debt- or is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors and is feasible, for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court filed December 18, 1935.
“(2) The Court is not satisfied that the plan complies with the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 77B, in that the plan does not provide in respect of one class of creditors, to wit, the First; Mortgage Bondholders, of which less than two-thirds in amount have, accepted the plan, adequate protection for the realization by them of the value of their interests, claims or liens.”
“(5) That the Debtor is insolvent, both upon the evidence and upon its oyra admission.”
He also found:
“That the value of the real estate covered by the mortgages is substantially less than the amount of the outstanding first mortgage bonds.”
The evidence is not reported, and these findings must be accepted unless they are clearly inconsistent with the undisputed facts, which does not appear.
In his opinion the District Judge said: “A plan may not be confirmed if it is not fair and equitable, or if it discriminates in favor of one class of creditors or stockholders or is not feasible. In such a case as this, to take the property from the mortgagee upon an appraisal is an attempt to use a supposed or possible value, over and above the appraisal, for the benefit of other creditors and stockholders. If there is any such surplus value, it belongs to the first mortgagee, up to the amount of his debt. If there is none, there is nothing to build on, and there would seem to be no object in having an appraisal, in the absence of a disclosure of a method of raising the money, unless junior interests are prepared to advance the money on a chance of increased value in the future, and there is no information before the court to that effect. A plan cannot be called either fair or feasible' which discloses no method or probability of being carried out unless, perchance, the appraisers make a mistake in valuation.” We agree with this view, and it is decisive. There is no occasion to consider the other questions which were argued.
The decree of the District Court is affirmed, with costs.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1