What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. DOBBINS.
No. 5407.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Sept. 13, 1934.
Prank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and Helen R. Carloss, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Joseph A. Lamorelle and William H. S. Wells, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
Before DAVIS, Circuit Judge, and DICKINSON and PAKE, District Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge.
Heretofore, this court determined the law' applicable to this ease on facts which were substantially like those now before the court and in a controversy between the same parties. Dobbins v. Commissioner, 31 F.(2d) 935, 936 (C. C. A. 3). ■ The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in effect has asked that we reconsider the questions involved in that ease in view of subsequent decisions of the courts which he -believes are contrary to our decision.
Briefly, the facts set out before and in this case are as follows:
Edward T. Dobbins died testate and left his residuary estate in trust. The income of the trust was payable to his sister and brother, Mary and Murrell, for the life of Mary. Murrell died and under his will his wife, Emily, received his interest for the life of Mary in the trust. The Commissioner assessed an estate tax against the interests in the trust. Emily died, leaving a will, the effect of which gave, among other things, her son, the taxpayer, T. Munroe Dobbins, one-half of Murrell’s interest in the trust for the life of Mary. The estate of Emily Dobbins paid an estate tax on the interest for the life of Mary in the trust estate. Prior to the termination of the trust estate by the death of Mary, the taxpayer received one-half of the share of the income of the trust of his father, Murrell, and, after the death of his sister, Laura, two years prior to the termination of the trust with the death of Mary, the taxpayer became entitled by the terms of Laura’s will to the whole of his father’s share in the life estate in the trust.
In 1929, the year here involved, the taxpayer received $27,729.67 from the trust of the estate of Edward. The Commissioner included this amount in the taxpayer’s gross income for 1929. On the authority of Dobbins v. Commissioner, supra, the Board of Tax Appeals disallowed the determination of the Commissioner and upheld the taxpayer. The Commissioner petitioned this court for a review.
Section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2022) excludes from gross income property acquired by bequests, devises, or inheritances and exempts it from taxation. The income to property held in trust is taxable to the trustee except that a deduction is allowed the trustee on income which is to be distributed currently to beneficiaries. Sections 161 and 162 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA §§ 2161, 2162). In a case within, the exception the beneficiary is taxable.
The important thing is not to confuse income from inheritances with inheritances. The Commissioner, himself, twice treated the value of the interest of Murrell in the trust as an inheritance or legacy by imposing the estate tax on that interest. In our former opinion we expressed our judgment in the following language:
“While the fund here taxed might have been income to the estate of Murrell, it was a legacy in the hands of Emily M. Dobbins, received not from Edward T. Dobbins or his estate, but from Murrell Dobbins, under the residuary provisions of his will, and as such it was not taxable to Emily.”
The Commissioner relies on several subsequent decisions. The most recent of these, Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365, 54 S. Ct. 221, 78 L. Ed. 365, held that a trustee was entitled to deduct income to the trustee paid over to the beneficiary, a widow, who elected to take under the terms of her husband’s will. The Commissioner in that ease argued that the election was the equivalent of purchasing an annuity and, therefore, the payments over were taxable to the trustee as in Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148, 51 S. Ct. 374, 75 L. Ed. 916, 73 A. L. R. 1534, wherein the will directed payment to the annuitant without reference to the existence or absence of income.
The fact is that in this case the amounts received by the taxpayer were distributions of a fund received under the will of Emily from the estate of Murrell. The taxpayer did not receive income on any fund. Section 22 (b) (3) of the act, 26 USCA § 2022 (b) (3), expressly excludes from gross income the value of property received by bequest. The exemption is plain, and only by a total disregard of the laws relating to testamentary dispositions of property could we hold that the fund received by the taxpayer was income to him.
Waud v. United States (Ct. Cl.) 48 F.(2d) 444, and Darcy v. Commissioner, 66 F.(2d) 581 (C. C. A. 2), were cited by the Commissioner to show that in a proper case there was no objection to subjecting property to both estate and an income tax.
The decisions in these eases are not apposite to the questions involved in the ease at bar and do not affect it.
The order of redetermination of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0