What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. DANG MEW WAN LUM.
No. 8346.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Feb. 8, 1937.
Ingram M. Stainback, U. S. Atty., J.. Frank McLaughlin, Asst. U. S. Atty., and' Ernest J. Hover, U. S. Department of Labor, Immigration, and Naturalization Service, all of Honolulu, T. IT., and H. IT. McPike, U. S. Atty., of San Francisco, Cal.
Before WILBUR and GARRECHT, Circuit Judges, and NETERER, District Judge.
NETERER, District Judge.
The appellant seeks reversal of the order of naturalization and cancellation of naturalization certificate of appellee.
No brief is filed by the appellee, nor does any one appear on her behalf. It is stated in appellant’s brief that appellee has not employed counsel, although advised to do so.
The petition for naturalization is sufficient, and among other things shows that appellee was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, May 29, 1894, and is of the Chinese race and is married to Lum Chew Hung. She was married May 2, 1910, at Dai Char, Chungshan, China. Her husband was born at Dai Char, Chungshan, China, February 3, 1886. Appellant entered Honolulu, United States, for permanent residence. She has no children. She departed for China from Hawaii May 16, 1907, steamship Siberia. Her last foreign residence was Macao, Chungshan, China. She came to the United States of America from Hongkong, China, and made lawful entry in the United States at ITonolulu, under the name of Dang Mew Wan Lum on October 19, 1934 on the steamship President Hoover. She qualified for citizenship on belief in organized government, disbelief in polygamy or in the practice thereof, and intention to become a citizen of the United States and the renunciation of all foreign allegiance and particularly with China; is able to speak the English language and had filed no former petition.
Motion was made to dismiss the petition for the reason that appellant, being of the Chinese race, is ineligible to naturalization unless she is entitled to admission under section 4 (a), Act of March 3, 1931 (8 U.S.C.A. § 369a).
Having departed from the United States in 1907 and married a Chinese in China May 2, 1910, which marriage endures, and not returning to the Territory of Hawaii and the United States until October 19, 1934, she is not within the amendment of July 2, 1932 (8 U.S.C.A. § 368b).
The Provisional Government obtained in the Hawaiian Islands from January 17, 1893, to July 4, 1894. She was at birth a citizen of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands. The Republic of ITawaii began July 4, 1894, and continued to August 12, 1898. By article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Hawaii she became a citizen of said republic at its inception and so remained during its life (to August 12, 1898). By the Organic Act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, § 4 (31 Stat. 141, 8 U.S.C.A. § 4), she, together with all other citizens of said republic, were naturalized as citizens of the United States, but when she married an alien ineligible to citizenship in 1910 she lost her citizenship.
The Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2534, § 3 (34 Stat. 1228), provides: “Any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband.” The Act of Sept. 22, 1922, c. 411 § 7, 42 Stat. 1022, 8 U.S.C.A. § 9 repealing section 3, Act of March 2, 1907, provides that “Such repeal shall not restore citizenship lost under such section.”
The Act of July 3, 1930, c. 835, § 2(a) (46 Stat. 854, 8 U.S.C.A. § 369), provides that a woman having lost her citizenship by marrying an alien eligible to citizenship, if she did not expiate herself by some affirmative act, may be naturalized. The Act of March 3, 1931, c. 442, § 4(a) (46 Stat. 1511, 8 U.S.C.A. § 369a), provides that any woman having lost her citizenship before March 3, 1931, by residence abroad after marriage or by marriage to an alien ineligible to citizenship if she has not acquired other nationality by her affirmative acts, may be naturalized. This section also makes eligible to citizenship a woman who was at birth a citizen of the United States of whatever race. Appellant was not at birth a citizen of the United States. And the further provision (8 U.S.C.A. § 368b) that a woman born in Hawaii prior to June 14, 1900, shall, if residing in the United States on July 2, 1932, be considered a citizen of the United States at birth does not qualify appellant, as she was not residing in the United States on said date.
This act created a right, upon a fixed status, but petitioner is not within the status, since she was not a citizen of the United States at birth, nor was she a resident of the United States July 2, 1932. The high privilege of citizenship is within the exclusive power of Congress to confer, Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255, and the court must strictly construe the acts granting the privilege, U. S. v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463-467, 48 S.Ct. 328, 329, 72 L.Ed. 654. See, also, In re McIntosh (D.C.) 12 F.Supp. 177.
The order is reversed and the trial court directed to dismiss the petition and enter an order canceling and recalling the certificate of naturalization issued:

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1