What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
TORRES et al. v. AMERICAN R. CO. OF PORTO RICO.
No. 4122.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
July 24, 1946.
Writ of Certiorari Denied Nov. 18, 1946.
See 67 S.Ct. 204.
V. Gutierrez Franqui, of San Juan, P. R. (L. E. Dubon and E. Ramos Antonini, both of San Juan, P. R., on the brief), for appellants.
Henri Brown, of San Juan, P. R. (Enrique Cordova Diaz, of San Juan, P. R„ on the brief), for appellee.
Before EDGERTON (by special assignment), MAHONEY and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.
Appellee railroad paid its employees wages which were less than they were entitled to under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, §§ 6, 7, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207. Appellee afterwards paid them somewhat less than half of the balance due and, on the theory that appellee could pay no-more, the employees executed releases in full. A large number of employees, the present appellants, afterwards brought this suit to recover the amounts which still remained unpaid. The court found that ap-pellee had paid all it could pay “and thereafter continue operations or avoid insolvency”. The court concluded that the release agreements were valid and that the appellants were not entitled to recover.
We think the court erred. Whether enforcement of the statutory rights of appellants will benefit or injure them, their employer, or the community is legally immaterial. The case is governed by Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 and D. A. Schulte, Inc., v. Salvatore Gangi, 66 S.Ct. 925. The Brooklyn case decides that, in the absence of a bona fide dispute between the parties, an agreement to accept less than the full amount due under the Act, including liquidated damages, is invalid. It does not appear that there was any dispute between the parties to the present suit when the releases were executed. The Schulte case decides that even the existence of a dispute regarding coverage does not validate an agreement to accept less than the full statutory amount. The existence in the present case of a question of policy cannot have a greater e/fect. The Act does not exempt employes who are in financial difficulties. “ ‘While in individual cases, hardship may result, the restriction will enure to the benefit of the general class of employees in whose interest the law is passed, and so to that of the community at large.’ ” Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, supra, 324 U.S. at page 713, 65 S.Ct. 905, 89 L.Ed. 1296.
Fort Smith & Western Railroad Co. v. Mills, 253 U.S. 206, 40 S.Ct. 526, 64 L. Ed. 862, on which appellee relies, is not in point. In that case, which arose under the Adamson Law, 39 Stat. 721, 45 U.S. C.A. §§ 65, 66, the question was no. whether employees could require their employer to comply with the law but whether the District Attorney could requ' ,-e the receiver of a railroad to comply with the law when the receiver and the employees were agreed in wishing to disregard it.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: This question concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 5