What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Castel VENABLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. William S. NEIL, Warden, Tennessee State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 71-1593.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
June 30, 1972.
Charles L. Hendrix, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., for appellant.
Bart Durham, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for appellee; David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., of counsel.
Before McCREE and KENT, Circuit Judges, and O’SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas eorpus attacking the constitutional validity of petitioner’s conviction on his plea of guilty to second degree murder. Although two contentions were asserted, only one presents an issue cognizable in this proceeding: that petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel appointed to represent him in the state criminal proceedings. He has exhausted available state remedies.
The District Judge stated that petitioner would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing before him on his allegations of ineffective assistance but for the fact that he was not prejudiced thereby because petitioner, by his own statement at the state court post-conviction hearing, was guilty of at least second degree murder for which he received the minimum sentence (10 years) which could lawfully be imposed. The District Judge made no reference to the relationship between the alleged ineffective assistance and two charges of assault with intent to commit murder to which a plea of guilty was also accepted and for which concurrent 3 year sentences to begin after expiration of the murder sentence were imposed.
We have examined the transcript of the state post-conviction proceeding upon which the District Court based its findings, and we observe that assigned trial counsel did not testify. Recognizing that predicting the outcome of criminal trials is at best an uncertain undertaking, we conclude that petitioner may have, with the assistance of counsel, presented an effective self-defense plea at trial. He testified that the victim had cut his throat eight months before the fatal shooting, had threatened his life more than once, and that petitioner shot the victim only because he was going for his knife. The uncontradicted testimony of petitioner is that his appointed attorney spoke to him for only ten minutes and refused to listen to his version of the shooting or to investigate the surrounding circumstances. The serious default of counsel alleged here was not cured when his guilty plea was accepted because he testified that his efforts to explain that counsel’s infidelity compelled it were frustrated. Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970).
We cannot determine from this record whether petitioner’s version of his relationship with his counsel is accurate. If it is, he has been denied a constitutional right. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing with the assistance of counsel and for a determination whether appellant is entitled to habeas corpus relief.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0