What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Mrs. Charlotte L. WORLEY, Adm’x, and C. H. Worley, Jr., a Minor, Appellants, v. Ross V. DUNN, Trustee, et al., Appellees (three cases). Mrs. Charlotte L. WORLEY, Adm’x, and C. H. Worley, Jr., a Minor, Appellants, v. FIRST AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK et al., Appellees. Mrs. Charlotte L. WORLEY, Adm’x, and C. H. Worley, Jr., a Minor, Appellants, v. Robert W. STURDIVANT et al., Appellees.
Nos. 13271-13273,13301,13302.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
March 3, 1958.
Charlotte L. Worley, per se.
Robert W. Sturdivant, Elkin Garfinkle and Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for First American Nat. Bank et al.
Robert W. Sturdivant and Elkin Gar-finkle, Nashville, Tenn., for Sturdivant et al.
Robert W. Sturdivant, Fred Elledge, Jr., Andrew M. Gant, Jr., J. O. Bass, Elkin Garfinkle, William Berry, Nashville, Tenn., for Dunn et al.
Before ALLEN and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District Judge.
SHACKELFORD MILLER, Jr., Circuit Judge.
The several proceedings in the District Court, in which these five appeals were taken, arise out of the bankruptcy of the National Specialty Company. These bankruptcy proceedings, which started in 1951, have had our consideration in three prior appeals. United States v. Worley, 6 Cir., 213 F.2d 509, certiorari denied, 348 U.S. 917, 75 S.Ct. 301, 99 L.Ed. 719, rehearing denied, 1955, 348 U.S. 940, 75 S.Ct. 361, 99 L.Ed. 736; Worley v. Elliott, 6 Cir., 231 F.2d 526, certiorari denied, 352 U.S. 855, 77 S.Ct. 82, 1 L.Ed.2d 66, rehearing denied, 1956, 352 U.S. 937, 77 S.Ct. 229, 1 L.Ed.2d 170; Worley v. National Specialty Co., 6 Cir., 243 F.2d 165. The factual situation is set out in those opinions and need not be repeated here. The present five appeals, prosecuted in forma pauperis, have been heard and considered together by the Court upon the records and briefs and arguments of appellant, Mrs. Charlotte Worley, individually, and as Admin-istratrix of the estate of Claude Henry Worley, deceased, pro se, and the attorneys for the appellees. The voluminous records, in the form presented to us, are very unsatisfactory. The numerous motions, briefs and reply briefs filed by the appellants, obviously drafted and written without the assistance of an attorney, largely fail to clearly present and meet the real issues involved. Our consideration of the records and briefs, however, results in the following conclusions.
Following the denial of petition for certiorari in United States v. Worley, supra, the appellants filed in the District Court on April 21, 1955, a petition for a new trial in said cause, which motion the Trustee in Bankruptcy moved to strike. Following a hearing before Judge Martin, a member of this Court, sitting as a District Judge by designation, an order was entered on May 6, 1957, denying the motion for a new trial and sustaining the motion to strike. An order was also entered directing the Referee to schedule a final meeting of creditors and report his actions therein to the District Court. Appeals No. 13,301 and No. 13,302 complain of these orders. Favorable consideration by this Court of these appeals is foreclosed by our previous rulings in United States v. Worley, supra, Worley v. Elliott, supra, and Worley v. National Specialty Co., supra, which has become the law of the case. We expressly stated in Worley v. Elliott, supra, 231 F.2d 526, 527, referring to our ruling in United States v. Worley, supra, 213 F.2d 509, “Our decision has become the law of the case in this respect and will not be reconsidered by us nor relitigated in the District Court.” We closed the opinion in that case with the statement, “The decrees of the bankruptcy court are affirmed and it is directed to proceed as expeditiously as possible with the final liquidation of the estate.” Appellants’ motion for a new trial filed in the District Court after denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court was properly overruled by the District Judge. In addition to the lack of merit in the motion, obviously, it was not timely. The order directing a final meeting of creditors looking to the closing of the bankruptcy proceedings was clearly proper and in keeping with the directive of this Court in Worley v. Elliott, supra. We now repeat that directive and call appellants’ attention to the fact that there should be an end to a case in litigation, and that when litigants have had their day in court and a final judgment rendered, the successful party and the court should not be burdened with successive efforts thereafter to relitigate the same issues. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Association, 283 U.S. 522, 525-526, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244. See also our previous opinion in Worley v. National Specialty Co., 243 F.2d 165, 166.
Appeals Nos. 13,271, 13,272 and 13,273 arise out of actions filed by the appellants in the District Court. Motions to dismiss on behalf of the appellees in each case were sustained by the District Judge, who filed a written explanation of the ruling.
The claim in No. 13,271 was for salary alleged by Mrs. Worley to be due and owing her by the bankrupt corporation. The District Judge ruled that the exclusive remedy was to file the claim with the Referee in the bankruptcy proceeding; that the United States had not given its consent to the type of action being asserted against it, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427; United States v. Worley, supra; and that the allegations were insufficient to establish liability against the other individual appellees.
The claim in No. 13,272 was for recovery by appellants personally of corporate funds of the bankrupt alleged to have been misappropriated. The District Judge ruled that a stockholder has no personal cause of action against an officer of the corporation for misappropriation of assets, which right of action accrues to the trustee in bankruptcy, and that the proper procedure for the assertion of an unliquidated claim against a bankrupt estate was to file the claim with Referee in Bankruptcy.
The claim in No. 13,273 was the alleged improper settlement of claims by the Trustee in Bankruptcy. The District Judge ruled that the settlements complained of had been expressly approved by the Court in other proceedings after examination of the facts pertaining thereto.
Orders of dismissal were entered on March 4, 1957, in the two cases first above referred to, and on February 26, 1957, in the third case above referred to. Notice of appeal was filed in each case on March 8, 1957. On March 18, 1957, appellants filed in the District Court in each case a motion to dismiss the appeal and that the Court alter and amend its judgment. These motions were also argued before Judge Martin who on May 6, 1957, entered an order in each case which stated that upon consideration of the entire record in the cause and the arguments of the attorneys appointed by the Court to represent the appellants, it appeared that insofar as the motion sought to alter and amend the judgment previously entered, it raised matters that had previously been adjudicated adversely to the appellants, and no error appearing in the judgment, the motion was denied. The present appeals were taken on June 6, 1957, from these orders of May 6, 1957.
In our opinion, the three actions were properly dismissed by the District Judge in the orders of February 26, 1957, and March 4, 1957, and there was no error in the entry of the subsequent orders on May 6, 1957, denying the appellants’ motion to alter and amend the judgment in each ease.
The judgment in each of the five appeals is affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 7