What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. ONE 1952 CHEVROLET PICK-UP TRUCK, MOTOR NO. KBA248554 et al.
No. 14828.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 9, 1954.
Jesse W. Shanks, Asst. U. S. Atty., Joseph E. Brown, U. S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for appellant.
Webb M. Mize, Gulfport, Miss., Jacob Davis Guice, Biloxi, Miss., R. W. Thompson, Jr., Gulfport, Miss., Rushing & Guice, Biloxi, Miss., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and HOLMES and BORAH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the United States from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern Division of the Southern District of Mississippi, condemning and forfeiting a 1952 Chevrolet pick-up truck owned by C. E. Anderson, the appellee, but remitting the forfeiture in favor of Anderson, as claimant. At the time of the trial appellee, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, held title to the truck under a conditional sales agreement. In the court below there were two claimants, C. E. Anderson and General Motors Acceptance Corporation, neither hostile to the other, and, in his opinion and order awarding the truck to C. E. Anderson, the trial court found it unnecessary to discuss or deal with the petition of General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
Basing its claim to a reversal of the judgment on two propositions, the United States is here insisting that findings 10 and 11, on which the remission of the forfeiture in favor of Anderson was based, are without support in, indeed are flatly contradicted by, the undisputed facts that Anderson regularly used the truck to transport liquor in violation of Mississippi state law.
Pointing out that the sale and transportation of whiskey, either tax paid or non tax paid, within the state of Mississippi, is a violation of its laws, though in certain areas of the state, particularly along the Gulf Coast, violation of state law is tolerated by local law enforcement officers, the United States cites our decision in United States v. One 1950 Model Mercury Sedan, 5 Cir., 207 F.2d 528. So pointing, it insists that, the matters discussed and the reasons advanced by the district judge for his decision wholly aside, the remission of forfeiture in favor of an admitted violator of state law was directly contrary to, indeed in the teeth of, the applicable statute, requiring a claimant to prove “that he had at no time any knowledge or reason to believe that it [said vehicle] was being or would be used in the violation of laws of the United States or of any State relating to liquor”.
The two claimants opposing these views, insist that the challenged findings are supported by evidence and that the judgment should be affirmed.
We find ourselves in agreement with appellant’s views. Because we do, we find it unnecessary to consider or discuss the theoretical correctness vel non of the conclusions of law of the district judge or the reasons given for his opinion and judgment, based, as they are, on a complete ignoring of the undisputed facts as to state law violations. It will suffice to say that the showing made of these violations required a denial of the remission sought and that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the United States for forfeiture of the truck, denying all claims for its remission.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
. Reported in 111 F.Supp. 231.
. “I. The claimant failed to prove compliance with the conditions precedent to remission as set out in Section 3617 Title 18 U.S.C., and therefore the court was without authority to grant the remission of the forfeiture.”
“II. Under the evidence in this case the court abused its discretion in allowing remission of the forfeiture and such action was arbitrary.”
. “10. O. E. Anderson had no knowledge as to whether Rene Quavas was engaged in illegal liquor traffic.”
“11. C. B. Anderson had no knowledge or reason to believe that the vehicle was being or would be used in violation of laws of the United States or of any State relating to liquor.”
. It was stipulated and agreed between the parties that the said Chevrolet Pick-Up Truck was being used at the time of its seizure in violation of the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States; that C. E. Anderson was the owner of said vehicle, and that General Motors Acceptance Corporation owned an interest in said vehicle by virtue of being the as-signee of a certain conditional sales contract executed between Jay Jay Motor Company, Gulfport, Mississippi, and C. E. Anderson, and that the only question to be decided by the Court was whether the several claimants complied with the requirements of Section 3617 Title 18 U. S.C.
It was established by uncontroverted evidence, including that of Anderson himself, that at the time of the purchase of said vehicle and prior thereto C. E. Anderson was the proprietor and operator of the Beach Club, a liquor bar located near the Edgewater Beach Hotel just off Highway 90 between the Cities of Gulfport and Biloxi, Mississippi, where he dispensed tax paid distilled spirits for sale; that Rene Cuevas, the driver of the vehicle, was at the time of its seizure and prior to the purchase thereof in the employ of C. E. Anderson and acted and served as a bartender in said Beach Club, dispensing tax paid distilled spirits for sale to the public, and on numerous occasions used the subject vehicle with the consent of C. B. Anderson for private purposes and for business purposes of Anderson, part of which was to haul tax paid whiskey from Grover Graham, a wholesale liquor dealer, to Anderson’s establishment, the Beach Club, although Anderson denied knowledge of or permission for Cuevas to use the vehicle at the time of its seizure. The government further proved that C. E. Anderson had been in the liquor business for several years prior to the seizure of the vehicle and that he had such a reputation with the law enforcement officers.
It was further shown that General Motors Acceptance Corporation did not make any “bootleg hazard” investigation of C. E. Anderson, the purchaser of said vehicle, at the time of or prior to the acquisition of its interest therein as required by subsection (b) (3) Section 3617, Title 18 U.S.C.
. Subsection (b) Section 3617 Title 18 U.S.C.
. Claimant General Motors Acceptance Corporation, while no long having “any pecuniary interest in this automobile * * * files its brief in this court because it has been served with notice of appeal and a copy of the brief of the United States”, and because “it desires to file this brief in order if possible to sustain the findings of the learned judge in the court below.”

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0