What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
LACHANCE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT v. ERICKSON et al.
No. 96-1395.
Argued December 2, 1997
Decided January 21, 1998
Rehnquist, G. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Roy W. McLeese III, David M. Cohen, Todd M. Hughes, Lorraine Lewis, Steven E. Abow, and Joseph E. McCann.
Paul E. Marth argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Erickson. John R. Koch filed a brief for respondent Walsh. Neil C. Bonney filed a brief for respondent Kye.
Together with Lachance, Director, Office of Personnel Management v. McManus et al., also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule 12.4).
Jody M. Litchford, James P. Manak, and Wayne W. Schmidt filed a brief for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this action is whether either the Due Process Clause or the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., precludes a federal agency from sanctioning an employee for making false statements to the agency regarding alleged employment-related misconduct on the part of the employee. We hold that they do not.
Respondents Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, Roberts, and McManus are Government employees who were the subject of adverse actions by the various agencies for which they worked. Each employee made false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they were charged. In each ease, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a ground for adverse action, and the action taken in each was based in part on the added charge. The employees separately appealed the actions taken against them to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld that portion of the penalty based on the underlying charge in each case, but overturned the false statement charge. The Board further held that an employee’s false statements could not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee’s credibility, nor could they be considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee’s underlying misconduct. Finally, the Board held that an agency may not charge an employee with failure to report an act of fraud when reporting such fraud would tend to implicate the employee in employment-related misconduct.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management appealed each of these decisions by the Board to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In a consolidated appeal involving the cases of Walsh, Erickson, Kye, Barrett, and Roberts, that court agreed with the Board that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim. King v. Erickson, 89 F. 3d 1575 (1996). Citing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the court held that “an agency may not charge an employee with falsification or a similar charge on the ground of the employee’s denial of another charge or of underlying facts relating to that other charge,” nor may “[d]enials of charges and related facts ... he considered in determining a penalty.” Id., at 1585. In a separate unpublished decision, judgt. order reported at 92 F. 3d 1208 (1996), the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s reversal of the false statement charge against McManus as well as the Board’s conclusion that an employee’s “false statements . . : may not be considered” even for purposes of impeachment. McManus v. Department of Justice, 66 MSPR 564, 568 (1995).
We granted certiorari in both cases, 521 U. S. 1117 (1997), and now reverse. In Bryson v. United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969), we said: “Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions — lying is not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood.” Id., at 72 (footnote omitted). We find it impossible to square the result reached by the Court of Appeals in the present case with our holding in Bryson and in other cases of similar import.
Title 5 U. S. C. § 7513(a) provides that an agency may impose the sort of penalties involved here “for such eause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” It then sets forth four procedural rights accorded to the employee against whom adverse action is proposed. The agency must:
(1) give the employee “at least 30 days’ advance written notice”; (2) allow the employee “a reasonable time, but not less than 7 days, to answer orally and in writing and to furnish . . . evidence in support of the answer”; (3) permit the employee to “be represented by an attorney or other representative”; and (4) provide the employee , with “a written decision and the specific reasons therefor.” 5 U. S. C. § 7513(b).
In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to “put the government to its proof” by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” The Court of Appeals stated that “it is undisputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment,” 89 F. 3d, at 1581, and we assume that to be the ease for purposes of our decision.
The core of due process is ingful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985). But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this action that a “meaningful opportunity to be heard” includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.
It is well established that a testify does not include the light to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986); United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980); United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978). Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993), we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendant’s sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial.
Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong, 431 U. S. 174 (1977). There we said that “the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood... does not justify perjury.” Id., at 178. Similarly, one who files a false affidavit required by statute may be fined and imprisoned. Dennis v. United States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966).
The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish these eases on the ground that the defendants in them had been under oath, while here the respondents were not. The fact that respondents were not under oath, of course, negates a charge of perjury, but that is not the charge brought against them. They were charged with making false statements during the course of an agency investigation, a charge that does not require that the statements be made under oath. While the Court of Appeals would apparently permit the imposition of punishment for the former but not the latter, we fail to see how the presence or absence of an oath is material to the due process inquiry.
The Court of Appeals also relied on its fear that if employees were not allowed to make false statements, they might “be coerced into admitting the misconduct, whether they believe that they are guilty or not, in order to avoid the more severe penalty of removal possibly resulting from a falsification charge.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-17a. But we rejected a similar claim in United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41 (1978). There a sentencing judge took into consideration his belief that the defendant had testified falsely at his trial. The defendant argued before us that such a practice would inhibit the exercise of the right to testify truthfully in the proceeding. We described that contention as “entirely frivolous.” Id., at 55.
If answering an agency’s investigatory question could expose an employee to a criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 67 (1906); United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980). It may well be that an agency, in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the charge, would take into consideration the failure of the employee to respond. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976) (discussing the “prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify”). But there is nothing inherently irrational about such an investigative posture. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U. S. 36 (1961).
For these reasons, we hold that a Government agency may take adverse action against an employee because the employee made false statements in response to an underlying charge of misconduct. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
Reversed.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 73