What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Mamie E. FELDER et al., Appellees, v. HARNETT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and G. T. Proffit, Superintendent of the Schools of Harnett County, Appellants.
No. 9695.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 1, 1965.
Decided July 30, 1965.
I. Beverly Lake, Raleigh, N. C. (Robert B. Morgan, Lillington, N. C., on brief), for appellants.
J. LeVonne Chambers, Charlotte, N. C. (Conrad 0. Pearson, Durham, N. C., Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, and Derrick A. Bell, Jr., New York City, on brief), for appellees.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and SOBELOFF, BOREMAN, BRYAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
PER CURIAM:
The School Board has appealed from an order requiring it (1) to admit the infant plaintiffs to the schools of their choice, (2) until the Board adopts some other non-discriminatory plan, to advise all pupils and parents of a free choice of schools at the time of initial assignments and at such reasonable intervals thereafter as the Court might approve, and (3) to abandon all burdensome or discriminatory practices and procedures. We affirm the District Court’s order, for it was plainly right.
There has been no commingling of the Caucasian and Negro races in the schools of Harnett County. The School Board suggests that this is the result of the voluntary acts of parents when initially enrolling their children. Notices of preschool clinics are published in the spring of each year without instructions as to the particular primary school to which the child should be taken. In no instance, says the Board, has a child been refused admittance to a pre-school clinic when presented there, and in no instance has a child been refused subsequent enrollment in the school at which he was presented for the clinic.
It is true that more than ten years ago, North Carolina repealed its laws requiring separation of the races in the schools, laws similar to others which had then been declared unconstitutional, and substituted its Assignment and Enrollment of Pupils Act (G.S.N.C. § 115-176 et seq.) When, in the ensuing years, however, there had been rigid adherence to the custom of separation of the races in the schools, conformity cannot be said to have been a free exercise of a right of choice, a right which the School Board had never acknowledged. Indeed it is clear that this School Board has never intended to operate under a freedom of choice plan, for even now it loudly protests that part of the District Court’s order requiring that it do so, contending that freedom of choice in assignments and transfers would produce chaotic conditions.
The School Board contends that it has complied with North Carolina’s Assignment and Enrollment of Pupils Act. Since we had declared that act facially constitutional, the Board reasons its practices are unassailable. When such a statute is applied to discriminate against Negro pupils, however, it is given an unconstitutional application. We-have held too frequently to need repeating that criteria may not be used to screen and deny Negro applicants to a particular school if they are not used in the same manner to screen and deny white applicants similarly situated.
The appeal presents no issue which has not long since been settled beyond all question.
Affirmed.
. Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 4 Cir., 345 F.2d 310; Jeffers v. Whitley, 4 Cir., 309 F.2d 621.
. Carson v. Warlick, 4 Cir., 238 F.2d 724, 728.
. Green v. School Board of City of Roanoke, Virginia, 4 Cir., 304 F.2d 118; Dodson v. School Board of City of Charlottes-ville, Virginia, 4 Cir., 289 F.2d 439; Jones v. School Board of City of Alexandria, Virginia, 4 Cir., 278 F.2d 72.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 4