What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
GEORGE CAMPBELL PAINTING CORP. v. REID et al., MEMBERS OF NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al.
No. 673.
Argued April 30, 1968.
Decided June 10, 1968.
Albert A. Blinder argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Theodore M. Ruzow and Stephen Hochhauser.
Paul W. Hessel argued the cause for appellee New York City Housing Authority. With him on the brief were Harry Levy and I. Stanley Stein. Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee Attorney General of New York. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, and Brenda Solojf, Assistant Attorney General.
Me. Justice Fortas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Public Authorities Law of New York, § 2601, provides that a clause must be inserted in all contracts awarded by a public authority of the State for work or services to provide that upon refusal of “a person” to testify before a grand jury, to answer any relevant question, or to waive immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, such person and any firm or corporation of which he is a member, officer, or director shall be disqualified for five years from contracting with any public authority, and any existing contracts may be canceled by the public authority without incurring any penalty or damages.
During 1964, appellant, a closely held family corporation, entered into three painting contracts with appel-lee New York City Housing Authority. Each of these contained the standard disqualification clause. The contracts were executed by appellant’s president, George Campbell, Jr., who was also a director and stockholder of the corporation.
Early in 1965, appellant became aware that the District Attorney of New York County was conducting an investigation before a grand jury of alleged bid rigging on public contracts, including those of appellant. Thereafter, George Campbell, Jr., resigned as appellant’s president and director and divested himself of his stock. He remained in appellant’s employ as an “estimator.”
A few weeks thereafter, Campbell was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. He refused to sign the waiver of immunity. In due course, the Public Housing Authority notified appellant that, pursuant to the provision in its contracts, the contracts were terminated and Campbell and the corporation were disqualified from doing business with the Authority for five years.
After proceedings in the lower courts of New York, the New York Court of Appeals denied relief to appellant. It held that the disqualification was valid and that § 2601 of the Public Authorities Law is constitutional, citing Gardner v. Broderick, 20 N. Y. 2d 227, 229 N. E. 2d 184 (1967) (reversed this day, ante, p. 273). The Court of Appeals also rejected appellant’s claim that it should not have been disqualified because Campbell resigned as president and director before he was called to testify. We noted probable jurisdiction. 390 U. S. 918 (1968).
We do not consider the constitutionality of § 2601 of New York’s Public Authorities Law or the validity or effect of the contract provisions incorporating that section. Appellant’s claim is that these provisions operated unconstitutionally to require its president, Mr. Campbell, to waive the benefits of his privilege against self-incrimination. But appellant cannot avail itself of this point, assuming its validity. It has long been settled in federal jurisprudence that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is “essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.” It “cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.” United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 698, 699 (1944); see also Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U. S. 612, 622 (1911); Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 382-385 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 74-75 (1906). If a corporation cannot avail itself of the privilege against self-incrimination, it cannot take advantage of the claimed invalidity of a penalty imposed for refusal of an individual, its president, to waive the privilege. Since the privilege is not available to it, appellant, a corporation, cannot invoke the privilege to challenge the constitutionality of § 2601 of the Public Authorities Law. A fortiori, it cannot assail the validity of the provision in the contracts into which it entered, incorporating the substance of that section.
As to appellant’s claim that its due process rights were denied by the imposition of the penalty despite Mr. Campbell’s purported resignation from managerial positions, we do not reach the abstract legal question that is urged upon us. We see no reason to disturb the finding of the New York Court of Appeals that “the resignation was tendered and accepted solely for the purpose of avoiding the statutory disqualification,” and the conclusion of that court that the purported resignation should be disregarded for purposes of this case.
Affirmed.
Section 2602 provides for disqualification on the same basis without reference to any contractual clause.
The Court of Appeals noted that § 2603 of the Public Authorities Act vests the State Supreme Court with jurisdiction, for stated reasons, to remove the disqualification.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1