What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COGGINS v. GREGORIO.
No. 1647.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 18, 1938.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 15, 1938.
M. J. McGuinness, of Albuquerque, N. M. , for appellant.
J. O. Seth, of Santa Fe, N. M. (H. C. Denny and H. S. Glascock, both of Gallup, N. M., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
A fall of plaster from the ceiling of a room in an apartment house owned by Gregorio caused personal injuries to Gladys A. Coggins. John F. Coggins, her husband, brought this action against Gregorio to recover on account of expenses incurred for medical and surgical treatment and care and nursing, and for loss of services and other damages.
Trial by jury was waived and the cause tried by the court. The court made special findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it found, among others, these facts :
On September 14, 1936, Gregorio was the owner of certain lands and an apartment house situated thereon in Gallup, McKinley County, New Mexico, known as the Gregorio Apartments. In August, 1935, Cog-gins rented one of such apartments for the use of himself and wife at a monthly rental of $18.00. Coggins continued to rent such apartment on a month to month basis for the same rental until October 1, 1936. On the morning of September 14, 1936, a portion of the plaster of the ceiling of one of the rooms of such apartment fell and struck Gladys A. Coggins. The ceiling of the room had been plastered in 1927 in a good and workmanlike manner. Gregorio had no notice or knowledge of any defects in the plaster or any reason to believe any part of it was likely to fall. A crack in the plaster was called to Gregorio’s attention by Coggins and his wife about two weeks before the plaster fell, but there was nothing to show the nature or extent of the crack or to lead anyone to believe the plaster was likely to fall. The extent of the crack in the plaster was as well known to Coggins and his wife as to Gregorio, and they continued to occupy the room knowing the situation as fully as did Gregorio. Coggins rented the apartment with an understanding during the entire period of the tenancy that all work necessary for keeping such apartment and its furnishings in order was to be done by him and his wife. Coggins and his wife had sole and exclusive right to the possession of the apartment, including such room, under their rental agreement, at the time of the falling of the plaster. Gregorio did not by' act or word conceal from Coggins and his wife any knowledge had by him concerning the condition of the plaster of the ceiling of the room. When the crack was called to Gregorio’s attention he offered to move Coggins and his wife into another room while the ceiling was being repaired, but they refused to move. Certain other work done by Gregorio in the basement of the premises was not the proximate cause of the falling of the plaster. The evidence failed to disclose what caused the plaster to fall.
The trial court concluded that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties; that under the facts Coggins and his wife assumed the risk of safe occupancy; and that Coggins failed to establish negligence on the part, of Gregorio. From a judgment for Gregorio, Coggins has appealed.
In the record proper there appears a purported request of Coggins for special findings of fact and conclusions of law, but these are not incorporated in the bill of exceptions, and may not be considered here. The record contains no challenge by Cog-gins to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings made by the court, no request for a declaration of law that Cog-gins was entitled to judgment, and no motion for a judgment in his favor. A special finding in a jury waived case becomes a part of the record proper the same as a special verdict and the question of its sufficiency to support the judgment arises without contemporaneous objection or exception. But the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings must be appropriately raised by motion for judgment, request for a declaration of law, or other like motion. And such motion or request and the ruling thereon are not part of the record proper and may be incorporated therein only by a proper bill of exceptions.
Since the purported request for findings of fact and conclusions of law was not incorporated in the bill of exceptions, and since no motion for judgment, request for a declaration of law, or other like motion was made, the only question -here presented is the sufficiency of the special findings to support- the judgment.
To constitute the relation of landlord and tenant these elements must be present: Permission or consent on the part of the landlord, subordination to the landlord’s title and rights on the part of the tenant, a reversion in the landlord, an estate in the tenant, and the transfer of possession and control of the premises to the tenant under a contract either express or implied between the parties.
Counsel for Coggins contends that the relation was that of lodginghouse keeper 'and lodger rather than landlord and tenant. The principal distinction between the two relations is that the tenant acquires an interest in the real estate and has the exclusive possession of the leased premises, while the lodger acquires no estate and has merely the use without the actual or exclusive possession. The trial court found that Coggins and his wife had sole and exclusive right to possession of the apartment under the rental agreement.
Under the facts as found by the trial court the relation was clearly that of landlord and tenant and not lodginghouse keeper and lodger.
In Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N.M. 22, 63 P.2d 540, 546, 547, the court quoted with approval from Roberts v. Rogers, 129 Neb. 298, 261 N.W. 354, 356, as follows:
“In the absence of express contract to the contrary, a tenant takes demised premises as he finds them, and there is no implied warranty by the landlord that they are safe or fit for occupancy. The rule of caveat emptor applies. * * * In the absence of contract, no duty to repair leased premises devolves upon the landlord, but, on the contrary, the relation of landlord and tenant devolves that duty upon the tenant. * * * A landlord is under no duty to change the visible form and mode of construction of leased premises in order to make the premises safe for his tenant, nor is he bound to remove obvious sources of danger; as to these the tenant assumes the risk.”
While there is no implied warranty by the landlord that the leased premises are safe or fit for occupancy, the landlord is liable for injuries resulting to the tenant from latent defects in the premises known to the landlord and concealed from the tenant.
Under the facts as found by the trial court Coggins and his wife had the same knowledge as Gregorio with respect to the existing condition of the ceiling and there was no concealment of known latent defects on the part of Gregorio.
It follows that the findings support the judgment and it is accordingly affirmed.
Davis v. United States, 10 Cir., 67 F.2d 737; Greenway v. United States, 10 Cir., 67 F.2d 738; McLeod v. United States, 10 Cir., 67 F.2d 740; Kolton v. United States, 10 Cir., 67 F.2d 741.
Davis v. United States, supra; Greenway v. United States, supra; McLeod v. United States, supra; Kolton v. United States, supra; White v. United States, 10 Cir., 48 F.2d 178.
Davis v. United States, supra; White v. United States, supra; McPherson v. Cement Gun Company, 10 Cir., 59 F.2d 889.
Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo.App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947, 954, 955; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 254, 194 N.E. 745, 747, 99 A.L.R. 216; Dowdy v. Calvi, 14 Ariz. 148, 125 P. 873, 877; Minneapolis Iron Store Co. v. Branum, 36 N.D. 355, 162 N.W. 543, 546, 547, L.R.A.1917E, 298; Williams v. Treece, 184 Mo.App. 135, 168 S.W. 209, 211; Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. Jones, 119 S.C. 480, 112 S.E. 267, 271.
Marden v. Radford, supra; White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250, 253-255, 15 Am.Rep. 28; Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688, 690, 23 L.R.A.,N.S., 667; Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 85 A. 529, 531, Ann.Cas.1914A, 195; Linwood Park Co. v. Van Dusen, 63 Ohio St. 183, 58 N.E. 576, 581.
See, also, Doyle v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 147 U.S. 413, 423-429, 13 S.Ct. 333, 37 L.Ed. 223; Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 62 App.D.C. 391, 68 F.2d 438, 439; Lucas v. Brown, 8 Cir., 82 F.2d 361, 362, 363; Fraser v. Kruger, 8 Cir., 298 F. 693, 696-698, 699; Hatzis v. United States Fuel Co., 82 Utah 38, 21 P.2d 862, 863, 864.
Stumpf v. Leland, 242 Mass. 168, 136 N.E. 399, 400-402. See, also, cases cited in Note 6.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1