What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. MERRIMACK MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
No. 85-1936.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 9, 1986.
Decided Feb. 28, 1986.
Gary B. Mims (Brault, Palmer, Grove & Zimmerman, Fairfax, Va., on brief), for appellant.
Mary McGowan (Joseph P. Dyer, Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse, Fairfax, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and SNEEDEN, Circuit Judges, and SENTELLE, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
SENTELLE, District Judge:
Merrimack Mutual was the insurer of one David Weitz under a homeowner’s policy including personal liability coverage. Weitz was operating a motorboat belonging to Barry Goldberg. Goldberg was injured by the apparently negligent operation of the boat by Weitz. Safeco at the time was the insurer of Goldberg under a boat owner’s liability insurance policy. Merrimack defended Weitz against the claims of Goldberg and paid a settlement of $165,-000. At various stages of the GoldbergWeitz controversy, Merrimack demanded Safeco’s participation in defense and ultimately demanded contribution to the settlement. Safeco denied coverage and brought this declaratory judgment action. Safeco’s denial was grounded on a policy provision which Merrimack argued was invalid under Virginia’s omnibus insurance statute. There being no dispute of facts, the court below took the case on cross-motions for summary judgment and allowed the motion of Safeco. We agree with the district court that the omnibus statute does not invalidate the coverage limiting clause involved in this case and, therefore, affirm.
The Safeco boat owner’s policy covering Barry Goldberg at the time of the injury provided liability coverage for bodily injury under provisions which defined “insured” to include “any person using such boat with the permission of the named insured provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission,____” Safeco concedes that at the time of Goldberg’s injuries Weitz was operating the boat as a permissive user within the scope of the permission of the owner and is, therefore, an insured within the meaning of the policy. However, Safeco denies coverage based on the following limitation on the scope of such coverage:
This policy does not apply:
5. to bodily injury to the named insured or any relative if a resident of the same household.
Merrimack, recognizing the existence of the limiting language of paragraph 5, nonetheless argues that Safeco’s liability coverage applies, asserting that paragraph 5 is an unlawful exclusion under Virginia’s “omnibus statute” prescribing the required terms and prohibited exclusions of insurance contracts. The basic statute is found at Section 38.1-381(a) of the Virginia Code and reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance, ... covering liability arising from the ... use of any ... boat or other watercraft, shall be issued or delivered in this state to the owner of ... such watercraft ... unless it contains a provision insuring the named insured and any other person ... using the ... boat or other watercraft ... with the consent, express or implied, of the named insured, against liability for death or injuries sustained, or loss or damage occasioned within the coverage of the policy or contract as a result of negligence in the operation or use of such ... watercraft ... by any such person..... [Emphasis added.]
Many cases under this statute and its predecessor statute, Section 4326a of the Code of Virginia, have upheld various exclusions limiting liability coverage. Notably, Jenkins v. Morano, 74 F.Supp. 234 (E.D.Va.1947), applied Virginia law to a factual situation closely analogous to the one involved in this case. In Jenkins, the issue involved an automobile rather than a motorboat but, as in this case, the named insured owner of the vehicle in question was injured by the negligence of a permissive user and the insurer denied coverage under a contract provision excluding application to bodily injury claims of the named insured and certain related persons. The district court, applying Virginia law, found the contract language valid under the Section 4326a provision comparable to and to similar effect as the present omnibus clause. This holding apparently correctly stated the law of Virginia and continues to be good law except that the legislature in 1966 amended the omnibus clause by enacting Section 38.1-381(a2), which reads:
Any endorsement, provision or rider attached to, or included in, any such policy of insurance which purports or seeks in any way to limit or reduce in any respect the coverage afforded by the provisions required therein by this section shall be wholly void.
Merrimack argues that this provision renders invalid the contract language relied upon by Safeco. In support of this proposition, Merrimack argues the decision in Southside Distributing Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 213 Va. 38, 189 S.E.2d 681 (1972). In that case, the Virginia Supreme Court voided an exclusion upon which Travelers relied. That exclusion applied where the permissive user and the injured party were both employees of the named insured. Recognizing that it had previously allowed such exclusions, the court held:
We conclude the purpose of Section 38.1-381(a2) was to prohibit the issuance of policies containing exclusions permitted under our previous interpretation of the “omnibus clause”. Otherwise, the statute would accomplish nothing. Accordingly, we hold that the “omnibus clause”, as amended by Section 38.1-381(a2) prohibits any exclusions from policy coverage except those expressly provided for by statute.
Merrimack asserts that this language should be controlling in the instant case.
Merrimack’s argument, however, ignores a further decision of the Virginia Supreme Court six years after Southside. That case, Transit Casualty Co. v. Hartman’s Inc., 218 Va. 703, 239 S.E.2d 894 (1978), upheld a limitation in the scope of coverage of an automobile liability policy which excluded payment for damage to property owned by the named insured. Two insured vehicles owned by Hartman’s collided. The collision carrier, under a separate policy, sought subrogation against the liability carrier, who asserted the relevant limitation. The court deferred to the maxim that an insurance contract, like any other contract, should be interpreted to give effect of the intention of the parties. Noting that the policyholder could have procured collision insurance from the liability insurer for an additional premium had he chosen to do so, the court declined to work a conversion of the policy, noting that:
[Construction of the contract urged by Hartman would produce the strange result that what is clearly only a policy of liability would be converted into a combination liability and collision policy, with no extra premium required for the additional coverage. Such a result not only would subvert the obvious intention of the parties but also would create a new contract different from what was contemplated when their bargain was struck.
Id., 239 S.E.2d at 897.
It appears to us that the court below correctly determined that Merrimack, like the insured in Hartman’s, supra, is attempting to convert a liability policy into a policy covering first-party loss. The court below correctly determined that the Virginia Supreme Court has held that the Legislature of Virginia did not by the enactment of the omnibus clause intend to accomplish any such result. What the legislature did intend was not an expansion of coverage but a prohibition of nonstatutory exclusions within the coverage afforded. In Hartman’s, as in the case at bar, the controverted provision of the policy is not an exclusion from coverage afforded but rather a limitation upon the coverage in the first instance to third-party rather than first-party losses.
In this case, as in Hartman’s, the named insured could have obtained coverage for at least a portion of his own damages had he chosen to contract for it and pay the premiums. At the time Goldberg contracted for the Safeco coverage, he was afforded the opportunity to obtain medical payments coverage for his own bodily injuries or injuries to others excluded under paragraph 5 above. He in fact contracted for $1,000.00 per person medical coverage.
In the Hartman’s decision, the Virginia court relied in part on its earlier holding in Bankers & Shippers Insurance Co. v. Watson, 216 Va. 807, 224 S.E.2d 312 (1976), where the court defined the purpose of the relevant portion of the omnibus statute to be the protection of the public from losses caused by the negligence of permissive users of insured vehicles. This thread of protecting the innocent public runs throughout the decisions of the Virginia court from Jenkins through Southside through Bankers & Shippers to Hartman’s. In Hartman’s, that policy of Virginia law was done no violence by the limiting language. The same is true in the case at bar.
It would, therefore, appear that the court below applied the law of the State of Virginia without error, and its decision is
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 0