What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Michael MAGNONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Joseph V. MAGNONE and Rose Magnone, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 1151, 1145, Dockets 90-6006, 90-6008.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued April 18, 1990.
Decided April 25, 1990.
Jed Rubenfeld, New York City, Asst. U.S. Atty. for the S.D.N.Y. (Otto G. Ober-maier, U.S. Atty. for the S.D.N.Y., Marla Alhadeff, Asst. U.S. Atty., of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
H.J. Gartlan, Jr., New York City (Finkel-stein Bruckman Wohl Most & Rothman, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Before TIMBERS, PRATT and MINER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Magnone and Joseph V. and Rose Magnone appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Michael B. Mukasey, Judge, dismissing their suits for abatement of interest on tax deficiency assessments. We affirm for the reasons given by Judge Mukasey in his thorough opinion reported at 733 F.Supp. 613. We write only to clarify the circuit law.
In 1987 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed plaintiffs for tax deficiencies in the tax years 1974-1976. In 1988 plaintiffs paid all taxes due for those years as well as the interest accrued in 1979. They did not pay the interest accrued for the other years. Relying on 26 U.S.C. § 6601(c), they filed for an abatement of the interest charges claiming IRS delay. When the IRS failed to respond, plaintiffs commenced these suits seeking refund of the interest. Judge Mukasey held that jurisdiction was lacking because plaintiffs did not satisfy either the full-payment rule or the prior-claim rule; and that no claim had been stated because under the applicable statute the suits were not authorized for the particular tax years at issue.
First, the full payment rule requires as a prerequisite for federal court jurisdiction over a tax refund suit, that the taxpayer make full payment of the assessment, including penalties and interest. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 78 S.Ct. 1079, 2 L.Ed.2d 1165 (1958), aff'd on rehearing, 362 U.S. 145, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960). Since plaintiffs had paid accrued interest only for the year 1979, they did not make the required full payment of the interest accrued from the delinquencies up to the time of payment.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend they complied with the single-year rule which provides that the jurisdictional prerequisite is satisfied when a taxpayer makes “full payment of a tax liability for any given year.” Green v. United States, 618 F.2d 122, 220 Ct.Cl. 712, 713 (1979). We agree with Judge Mukasey’s interpretation of the rule that a payment of interest “constitute^] full payment only if it includes all interest relating to the year for which the deficiency has been assessed, but not if it is simply one year’s worth of interest on a past deficiency”, as it was here. Thus, under either rule plaintiffs have not met the jurisdictional requirement.
Second, under the prior-claim rule, a taxpayer must bring the claim for refund to the IRS as a prerequisite to jurisdiction for the suit in federal court. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Consequently, in pursuing such a suit, a taxpayer may not raise different grounds than those brought to the IRS. Union Pacific RR Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 437, 442 (Ct.Cl.1968).
In their IRS claim, plaintiffs relied on 26 U.S.C. § 6601(c) and sought suspension of all interest accrued on each of the three deficiency assessments. Their federal court complaint relied on 26 U.S.C. § 6404(e) and sought abatement only of that interest which had accrued on those deficiencies in the year 1979. As Judge Mukasey described in detail, these claims are entirely different and therefore cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the prior-claim rule.
Finally, section 6404(e), on which plaintiffs now rely, applies only to “interest accruing with respect to deficiencies or payments for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1978.” Pub.L. No. 99-514, § 1563(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2762 (1986). We agree with Judge Mukasey’s interpretation that § 6404(e) applies “only to interest accruing on deficiencies for tax years after 1978.” He correctly held that “[h]ere, the challenged interest accrued with respect to deficiencies and payments for the years 1974, 1975 and 1976, which are clearly earlier than December 31, 1978. Consequently, plaintiffs cannot sue for those years”.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is affirmed in all respects.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0