What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ROYAL ROUTE COAL CO. v. BURCH.
No. 12997.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
June 9, 1950.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, 1950.
Frank E. Everett, Jr., Vicksburg, Miss., for appellant.
Landman Teller, Vicksburg, Miss., for appellee.
Before HOLMES, WALLER, and BOR-AH, Circuit Judges.
WALLER, Circuit Judge.
The effectiveness of a release from liability by an uncompensated signer confronts us here.
Appellee Burch, while driving a vehicle 'belonging to his employer, O’Neill-McNamara Hardware Company, was involved in a collision with a vehicle owned by, and at the time in the service of, the appellant, Royal Route Coal Company. Appellee received injuries believed at the time to be of such minor consequence that he declined to seek medical attention.
The Maryland Casualty Company, insurer of appellee’s employer as well as the appellant, sent its representative to investigate the accident, with the result that he made a settlement with appellee’s employer in the exact amount necessary to repair the Hardware Company’s vehicle. Upon Solicitation of his employer and the adjuster, appellee also signed the release with his employer. A draft was issued naming as payees the appellee, his employer, and the garageman who had agreed to repair the vehicle for the amount of the settlement and draft. Appellee did not receive, and was not expected to receive, any part of this sum.
A short time after this transaction the injuries sustained by appellee were found to be not entirely minor and he later brought this action against the appellant for damages.
Relying, for its defense, upon the release, appellant successively, but unsuccessfully, moved for dismissal, summary judgment, and directed verdict. 'The Court below, deeming the issue as to the release to be one of equitable cognizance, submitted the validity of the release to a jury as a separate issue. The jury returned an advisory and separate verdict holding the release invalid for lack of consideration, which finding was adopted by the trial Court. It also rendered a second verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff in the sum of $3,500.00
In addition to the finding of the jury that the release was without consideration, the Court independently reached the same conclusion, stating:
“The Court concludes as a matter of law to adopt the findings of fact of the jury and in addition thereto makes its own findings of fact that the release was without consideration and should be set aside as being void.
* * * * * *
“The Court concludes as a matter of law that in this ease the release signed by the plaintiff and plead by the defendant was without consideration and void and an order may be entered accordingly.”
We think there was ample evidence in this case to justify the jury and the lower Court in finding as facts that the settlement made by the Casualty Company was only a settlement of the damages to appellee’s employer for the exact amount for which the garageman had agreed to repair the motor vehicle; that no part of the funds paid was intended to he paid to, nor ever paid to, the appellee; that appellee was requested to sign the release without any intention whatever of compensating him for any injuries that he had received in the collision. The evidence is clear that he was not called upon to sign this release in settlement for any liability to him.
The judgment of the lower Court is
Affirmed.
. The release reads as follows:
“In consideration of the payment of Two hundred sixty eight & 16/100 ($268.-16) Dollars to O’Neill-McNamara Hdw. Co. and S. 0. Burch in hand paid by Royal Route Coal Co. & Solomon Jefferson (hereinafter called Payer (s) ). We do hereby release and forever discharge said Payer(s) from any consequences of the accident hereinafter described any and all claims of any and every nature as a result of an accident which occurred on or about January 14th, 1948.
“It Is Further Understood and Agreed, that this release is intended to cover all actions, causes of action, claims and domands for, upon, or by reason of any damage, loss or injury which may be traced either directly or indirectly to the aforesaid accident, as now appearing or as may appear at any time in the future, no matter how remotely they may be related to the aforesaid accident. And this Release is executed with the full knowledge and understanding on my or our part that there may be more serious consequences, damages or injuries as the result of the accident aforementioned than now appear, and that more serious and permanent injuries, even to the extent of death, may result from the injuries sustained in the accident aforementioned.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1