What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Charles E. HOFMANN, Appellant, v. John J. SCHAEFER and Brewery Workers Local Union No. 1010, I. B. T., Appellees.
No. 80-1863.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 7, 1981.
Decided May 6, 1981.
Alfred E. Clasing, III, William J. Blondell, Jr., Baltimore, Md., for appellant.
Marvin Poe Sklar, Baltimore, Md., for appellees.
Before PHILLIPS and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and ANDERSON, District Judge.
Honorable G. Ross Anderson, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Hofmann brought suit under Title I of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415. He alleged that the bylaws of his union local had been misinterpreted in order to deny him eligibility to challenge the incumbent president of the local, appellee Schaefer, in an upcoming union election. At a hearing on Hofmann’s motion for a temporary restraining order, the district court found that Hofmann’s claim was not one properly addressed under Title I and therefore dismissed his suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Under § 101(a)(1) of Title I of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), every union member must be afforded the equal right and privilege to nominate candidates and vote in union elections, and any member whose rights under section 101(a)(1) have been infringed may bring suit in a federal district court, § 102 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 412. Under § 401 of Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 481, every member of a union in good standing is made “eligible to be a candidate to hold office.” A complaint alleging a violation of section 401, however, is properly addressed to the Secretary of Labor for investigation and the possible institution of suit by the Secretary. § 402 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 482.
In Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140, 85 S.Ct. 292, 296, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964), the Supreme Court stated that “possible violations of Title IV of the Act regarding eligibility [to be a candidate for union office] are not relevant in determining whether or not a district court has jurisdiction under Sec. 102 of Title I of the Act.” Therefore, the Court held that suits “basically relating ... to eligibility of candidates for office ... fall squarely within Title IV of the Act and are to be resolved by the administrative and judicial procedure set out in that Title.” Id. at 141, 85 S.Ct. at 296.
Because Hofmann’s claim is one basically relating to his eligibility as a candidate for union office, it is, under the holding in Calhoon, a claim properly addressed to the Secretary under Title IV rather than the courts under Title I. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hofmann’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0