What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Carroll Lee SMITH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 9981.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
May 20, 1969.
Certiorari Denied Nov. 17, 1969.
See 90 S.Ct. 273.
Clayton W. Bell, Boulder, Colo., for appellant.
John W. Raley, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. (B. Andrew Potter, U. S. Atty., was with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before WARREN L. JONES, BREITENSTEIN, and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges.
Of the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of appellant’s application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A two-count indictment charged appellant with assault on an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 and with destruction of government property valued at more than $100 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361. A jury found him guilty on each count, and on March 17, 1966, he was sentenced to three-year concurrent terms.
The first claim is that the court improperly denied a motion for continuance of the trial. At his arraignment on January 14, 1966, appellant appeared with retained counsel and pleaded not guilty. The court announced that the trial would be held during the next jury term and no objection was made thereto. On February 28, appellant appeared in court and said that he was discharging his counsel and would obtain new counsel. The court told him that he should get new counsel immediately because the case was going to trial. On March 1, the court set the case for trial on March 9 and instructed the United States Attorney to advise the lawyer whom appellant had indicated he would employ. On March 9, the appellant appeared in court without a lawyer and asked that counsel be appointed. The court said that in anticipation of such a request he had asked attorney Mills to discuss the case with appellant and to be in court. Mills said that he had discussed the case with appellant and would undertake the appointment. When the case came on for trial on March 14, Mills announced that the defense was ready and then filed a motion for continuance on the ground of inadequate time to prepare and inability to secure a witness. The showing was insufficient under our decision in Leino v. United States, 10 Cir., 338 F.2d 154, 156. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. See Smith v. United States, 10 Cir., 273 F.2d 462, 466, cert. denied 363 U.S. 846, 80 S.Ct. 1619, 4 L.Ed.2d 1729, and Brooks v. United States, 10 Cir., 330 F. 2d 757, 758, cert. denied 379 U.S. 852, 85 S.Ct. 100, 13 L.Ed.2d 56.
Appellant says that he was denied a direct appeal from his conviction. He was sentenced on March 17, 1966, with the sentence to begin at the expiration of a state sentence. Two days later he was turned over to the state authorities as an escapee. He was kept in solitary confinement for six months. On October 2, 1967, over a year later, he filed a “Motion for Appeal” wherein he alleges that on the day of sentence he gave an oral notice of appeal. The transcript of the sentencing proceedings shows no such oral notice. No claim is made of lack of knowledge of right to appeal. No showing is made to satisfy the “plain error test” which justifies consideration of a notice of appeal which is filed out of time. See Fennell v. United States, 10 Cir., 339 F.2d 920, 923, cert. denied 382 U.S. 852, 86 S.Ct. 100, 15 L.Ed.2d 90. The claimed error is the denial of the continuance and we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in that regard.
The appellant made two requests for a free trial transcript. One was made five months before the § 2255 motion was filed and the other more than four weeks after the motion was denied. When the case came to this court, we ordered and received copies of the portions of the transcript which we deemed pertinent. In the circumstances, the denial of the transcripts was not error. See Prince v. United States, 10 Cir., 312 F. 2d 252, 253.
Appellant filed a motion under Rule 35, F.R.Crim.P., asking that he be given credit for time spent in pre-sentence confinement. It was denied and no appeal was taken. On this appeal from the denial of the § 2255 motion the point is raised, but it was not raised in the § 2255 proceedings before the district court. Accordingly, the point is not properly before us for review. Tyler v. United States, 10 Cir., 361 F.2d 862, 864. In any event, the point is of no avail. Sentence was passed before the 1966 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3568. The pertinent statutes do not provide for a mandatory minimum sentence. The court imposed identical concurrent terms which were well within the statutory máximums. The denial by the trial court of credit for pre-sentence confinement was within its power.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0