What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ORIENT PETROLEUM CO. v. WICHITA STATE BANK & TRUST CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
December 15, 1926.)
No. 4646.
I. Interest <§=50 — Mortgages <§=300, 581(4) —Insufficient tender held not to deprive holder of right to foreclose and recover interest and attorney’s fees.
Holder of a mortgage, held not deprived of the right to foreclose and collect interest and attorney’s fees, because of an insufficient tender, made on condition that it be accepted in full payment.
2. Appeal and error <§=1073(7) — Method of computation is immaterial to defendant, if total is not excessive.
The method of calculation in a lump sum judgment is immaterial to the debtor, if lie is not required to pay more than he justly owes.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas; William H.. Atwell, Judge.
Suit in equity by the Wichita State Bank & Trust Company against the Orient Petroleum Company. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
W. P. Davis and George A. Smoot, both of Wichita Palls, Tex. (Smoot & Smoot, of Wichita Palls, Tex., on the brief), for appellant.
Preston B. Cox and Joseph S. Dickey, both of Wichita Palls, Tex. (Cox & Pulton, of Wichita Palls, Tex., on the brief), for appellee.
Before WALKER, BRYAN,- and POSTER, Circuit Judges.
BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
The appellee bank sued the appellant company to foreclose a vendor’s lien on certain land. There was a balance past due on the purchase price of $10,000, represented by purchase-money notes, which provided for interest and 10 per cent, attorney’s fee.
Before suit the company, claiming that it was entitled to $1,870.95, the balance of a trust fund which the bank had received, and for which it had failed to account, made a tender of approximately $8,150 in full settlement of the balance due on the notes, and after suit repeated the - tender by proper plea. The District Court, after hearing the evidence, held that, though a trust fund had existed, it had been completely exhausted by proper payments, and entered a decree in a lump sum for $10,767.69, which upon calculation appears to represent principal and interest, and an amount of about $200 as attorney’s fee. There was no evidence that appellee had agreed to pay its attorney the fee of 10 per cent, provided for in the notes. The only question is whether, by reason of the rejection of appellant’s claim, the decree is excessive.
The bank, as party of the first part, J. M. Lawrence and his associates, as parties of the second part, and W. F. Davis and* his associates, as parties of the third part, entered into a contract from which it appears that the parties were each claiming first liens upon certain oil land, which was in the hands of a receiver. In pursuance of that contract, I. W. Keys, attorney for the bank, became purchaser, at the receiver's sale, as trustee for the parties of the first and second part; the parties of the third part organized a corporation, and in its name purchased ■ the land from Keys, executed the mortgage now being foreclosed to the bank to secure a part of the purchase money, and deposited $7,564 with the bank in the name of Keys, trustee, for the purpose of discharging the expenses of the receivership, and of the balance of the debts due the parties of the first and second part, including advances for insurance, taxes, and other incidental expenses, constituting liens on the land, and defined in the contract to be “the sum of $1,118.72, to be paid to W. B. Paddock, as attorney for second. parties,” advances by the first party, and the costs of the receivership.
The amount of $1,870.95, which it is claimed Keys was not authorized as trustee to pay out, and for which the bank is sought to be held responsible, is made up of the following items:
(1) $600, which Keys drew out on a cheek payable to himself. Keys was not a witness, and there was no witness who gave a satisfactory explanation of this item.
(2) $900, for which Keys gave a cheek to Cox, his law partner. Cox testified that he paid out $594.08 to take up a lien held by the bank, and $373.72 to Paddock, attorney for Lawrence and his associates, the parties of the second part to the contract. Cox therefore paid out $67.80. more than he received. But Keys had paid Paddock $851.71, and appellant contends that credit could be given only for $257.63, to make up the $1,-118.72, payable to Paddock in his capacity as attorney for his clients. If that contention be correct, an overpayment of $116.09 was made, and there was properly chargeable only $851.71, leaving $48.29 unaccounted for on this item.
(3) $305.25, which was paid, not to Keys, but to Cox, on a claim for interest asserted by Lawrence and his associates. In any view the bank could not be held liable for this item, as Cox was not selected to handle the trust funds.
(4) $65.70, also paid by appellant to the firm of Cox & Keys, in settlement of a claim which was, so far as we can determine from the evidence, a proper charge.
The evidence discloses that all payments made by Cox, under the second item, were chargeable to appellant; that $1,118.72 was payable to Paddock in settlement of a fee; and that the excess over that amount was paid in the discharge of a lien held by the parties, of the second part to the contract. The result is'that there was a possible failure to account for the first item of $600. Assuming, without deciding, that the bank was responsible for the handling of trust funds by Keys, we are of opinion that the record fails to disclose reversible error.
There being only $600 for which the bank could possibly have been held to account, the tender, made as it was upon condition that it be accepted in full settlement, was insufficient, and did not deprive the bank of the right to foreclose its mortgage and collect interest and attorney’s fee. After appellee had been forced to sue to collect the amount due, it was proper that appellant be held liable for an attorney’s fee, based upon the whole amount involved. It appears to be the rule in Texas that only a reasonable amount, and not the amount stipulated in notes providing for attorney’s fees, can be collected, in the absence of proof that the party suing had agreed to pay to his attorney the amount stipulated in the notes sued on. Texas Land & Loan Col v. Robertson, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 85 S. W. 1020. A- reasonable attorney’s fee for the foreclosure of the $10,000 mortgage could well be held to be greater than the amount of $600 which was subject to possible rejection as a part of the trust fund. The decree is not subject to be reversed, because there was included in it an erroneous item which was more than offset by the exclusion of a proper item of a larger amount.
The method of calculation in a lump sum ■ judgment is immaterial to the debtor so long as he is not required to pay more than he justly owes. A careful consideration of the evidence convinces us that no reversible error of which appellant can complain was committed.
The decree is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1