What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SMITH et al. v. CLEVELAND PNEUMATIC TOOL CO.
No. 10708.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
April 22, 1949.
Arnold M. Edelman, of Cleveland, Ohio (Howell Leuck and D. J. Lazear, both of Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellants.
John J. Reidy, of Cleveland, Ohio (Fals-graf, Reidy & Pangrace and John J. Reidy, all of Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARTIN, McALLISTER and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants brought this action under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219, prior to the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 251 et seq, on behalf of themselves and approximately 6,000 other employees of the appellee to recover unpaid compensation and liquidated damages in the total amount of $10,000,000. Appellants claimed compensation for unpaid working time of 40 minutes per day consisting of waiting periods during which they were required to be present and available for work, and resulting from the failure on the part of appellee to provide adequate facilities regulating the commencement and termination of a day’s work. They also claimed compensation for unpaid working time resulting from a rule of the appellee under which any employee who reported for work three or more minutes late was required to work fifteen minutes, without being paid therefor.
On August 22, 1947, following enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act on May 14, 1947, the appellee moved the Court to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction. On November 10, 1947, the appellants moved for leave to file a second amended and supplemental complaint, which alleged that they were entitled to be paid for the 40 minutes per day periods referred to “because of an express provision of a contract in effect at the time between them as employees, thru the collective bargaining representatives, and the defendant.” On March 31, 1948, the District Court denied appellants’ motion to file the second amended and supplemental complaint and sustained appellee’s motion to dismiss the action. This appeal followed.
The District Court’s order was made prior to our decision, but in accordance with the ruling therein, in Fisch v. General Motors Corporation, 6 Cir., 169 F.2d 266, in which the Portal-to-Portal Act was discussed and -its constitutionality upheld. We agree with the additional ruling of the District Judge, for the reasons indicated by him in his memorandum opinion, that the Portal-to-Portal Act is applicable to the 40-minute periods of time referred to, and that the filing of the second amended and supplemental complaint was not authorized.
The opinion of the District Judge did not discuss the 15-minute periods of time above referred to. We are of the opinion that they are not covered by the provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act in that it was part of the regular working time covered by the contract of employment during which appellants performed the usual and routine duties of their respective jobs. However, the amount of such unpaid working time is not disclosed by the complaint, but is merely included generally, in addition to the 40-minute periods,'as a part of the total unpaid working time for which the recovery is sought. Obviously, it was not a daily occurrence for any particular employee. It was offset to some extent, if not entirely, by the instances in which the employee was paid for the full quarter hour, although starting work late, but before the 3-minute period elapsed. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the de minimis rule is applicable. Frank v. Wilson & Co., 7 Cir., 172 F.2d 712. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 LEd. 1515.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0