What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ralph Gordon BISHOP, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The MEDICAL SUPERINTENDENT OF the IONIA STATE HOSPITAL, OF the STATE OF MICHIGAN, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 17306.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
May 23, 1967.
Ronald VanBuren, Portland, Mich., for appellant.
Curtis G. Beck, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for appellee.
Before WEICK, Chief Judge, and MILLER and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judges.
Wilbur K. Miller, Senior Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, dismissing the petition of Ralph Gordon Bishop, plaintiff-appellant, for a writ of habeas corpus. The district judge dismissed the petition upon two grounds: one, the appellant had not exhausted his state remedies and, two, he was not then confined within the limits of the Western District of Michigan. Since the district judge dismissed the petition1 without an evidentiary hearing, the question before us is whether the petition states a cause of action.
A brief statement of facts as alleged in the petition will serve to bring the issues into focus. On or about October 8, 1953, the appellant was arrested and a complaint and warrant were issued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan charging him with uttering threats against the President of the United States. On December 9, 1953, the Court ordered the appellant to be committed to the Federal Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, for observation. On or about June 9, 1954, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri released the appellant on a writ of habeas corpus and ordered him returned to the District Court at Detroit, Michigan. On October 18, 1954, a judge of that Court entered an order conditionally releasing jurisdiction, of the appellant to the Probate Court of Wayne County, Michigan. The Probate Court was to determine the sanity or insanity of the appellant. If found insane the District Court released jurisdiction provided appellant was committed as an insane person in accordance with the statutes (presumably of Michigan). If found to be sane he was to be returned to the District Court for further proceedings.
As a result of proceedings in the Probate Court in January 1955, the appellant was found to be mentally ill and was committed to the Ypsilanti State Hospital as a state charge. About two years later the Department of Mental Health of the State of Michigan transferred the appellant to the Ionia State Hospital for the ■Criminal Insane. This hospital, where the appellant was confined at the time he filed his petition in this case, is within the territorial limits of the Western District of Michigan.
On September 22, 1965, the district judge dismissed the appellant’s petition on the ground that he had not exhausted his state remedies as required by Section .'2254, Title 28, U.S.C. Under date of April 22, 1966, in a supplemental opinion, the district judge recited that the appellant had been transferred on April 1, 1966, to the Ypsilanti State Hospital, at Ypsilanti, Michigan, which was in the Eastern District of Michigan. He thereupon ruled that the petition for writ of ■habeas corpus should be filed in the East■ern District of Michigan.
We conclude that this latter ruling of the court is in error. The District Court for the Western District of Michigan, having jurisdiction of the action at the time the petition was filed, did not lose jurisdiction when the appellant was subsequently transferred to the Ypsilanti State Hospital in the Eastern District of Michigan. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243; United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33 (C.A. 7), cert. den. 348 U.S. 964, 75 S.Ct. 525, 99 L.Ed. 752. The motion of the appellee to dismiss is denied.
It is claimed on behalf of the appellant that the district judge for the Eastern District of Michigan was without authority to relinquish jurisdiction of him and ■order him transferred to the Probate Court of Wayne County, Michigan, and "that all of said proceedings are of no legal force or effect. It is further claimed that the appellant is entitled to a hearing under Section 4244, Title 18, U.S.C. to determine his competency for trial.
Section 4244, Title 18, U.S.C., provides that when a district judge has reasonable cause to believe that a person charged with an offense is presently insane or so mentally incompetent that he is unable to understand the proceedings against him or to properly assist in his defense, he may on his own motion cause the accused to be examined as to his mental condition by at least one psychiatrist. For this purpose the judge may order the accused committed to a suitable hospital. This statute further provides that if the report of the psychiatrist indicates a present state of insanity or mental incompetency of the accused the court shall hold a hearing and make a finding with respect to the mental condition of the accused. Under Section 4246, Title 18, U.S.C., if the court finds that the accused is mentally incompetent it may commit the accused to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative.
None of the provisions of these statutes were followed in the release of the appellant to the Probate Court of Wayne County. He was not committed to a hospital, no report was returned, no hearing had, and no commitment to the custody of the Attorney General on a basis of mental incompetency.
It is alleged in the petition that the court released jurisdiction of the appellant on condition that if he be found insane the Probate Court would commit him as an insane person in accordance with the statutes. This condition was met and the appellant was found to be mentally ill and committed to the State Hospital at Ypsilanti, Michigan. We conclude from these facts that the district judge, in reality, released the jurisdiction of the court over the appellant and turned him over to state authorities. We know of nothing that would prevent the District Court from so releasing its jurisdiction over the appellant. It is not unusual for state authorities to turn arrested persons over to federal authorities for prosecution or for federal authorities to turn arrested persons over to state authorities. The appellant has now been in state custody as a state charge for more than twelve years and his remedy is to exhaust the procedures provided by the state of Michigan. Sections 27A.4307, C. L.1948, § 600.4307 [P.A.1961, No. 236] and 14.829, M.S.A., C.L.1948, § 330.39 [P.A.1949, No. 313].
The petition does not state a cause of action and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0