What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY and Aetna Life & Casualty, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 550, Docket 87-7527.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Feb. 10, 1988.
Decided June 24, 1988.
Andrew L. Frey, Washington, D.C. (Mayer, Brown & Platt, Washington, D.C., Kathryn A. Oberly, Karen L. Whitney, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Steven J. Ahmuty, New York City (Bower & Gardner, New York City, Barry G. Saretsky, Sidney Rosen, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Before LUMBARD, CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges, and LEISURE, District Judge.
Hon. Peter K. Leisure, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:
Brooklyn Law School brought suit in November 1984 in the Eastern District, under diversity jurisdiction, against Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, its insurer, to recover $315,000 in damages suffered in defending five suits prosecuted against the School, its trustees, its faculty, and its students, by William Herrmann, a former professor at the School. Herrmann brought these suits in response to bitter salary disputes with the School that culminated in academic charges against him, a faculty hearing, and his expulsion from his tenured teaching position on September 17, 1975. When Brooklyn Law School called upon Aetna to defend these actions, Aetna disclaimed any obligation to provide a defense or indemnification under Multi-Peril and Excess Indemnity (Umbrella) Policies it issued to the School.
Judge Bartels denied Brooklyn Law School’s motion for summary judgment on May 29, 1987. 661 F.Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). The School now appeals as to indemnification for defense costs in only one of the law suits brought by Herrmann, Herrmann v. Moore, 76 Civ. 2269 (E.D.N.Y.1977), aff'd, 576 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003, 99 S.Ct. 613, 58 L.Ed.2d 679 (1978), alleging conspiracy by the School, its trustees, and members of its faculty to deprive him of his civil rights, to humiliate and humble him, and cause him loss of employment and mental anguish.
On a motion for summary judgment made by the School, Judge Bartels held that the School had failed to show that it was insured against the claim in Herr-mann v. Moore and dismissed the case. Judge Bartels found that Aetna’s Umbrella policy was the only policy which could possibly afford the School coverage for the suit. The court also found that under the terms of that policy, the claims insured against were only those personal injuries resulting from an “occurrence” defined as an “accident ... which is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Based upon this finding, Judge Bartels reasoned that the claim made in Herrmann v. Moore, which alleged conspiracy to cause the harm, was not such a claim and therefore Aetna had no duty to defend and reimburse. In short, there was no liability with respect to claims which alleged that Brooklyn Law School had intentionally caused damage. We agree with the district court and affirm.
New York recognizes a broad insurer’s duty to defend its insured against lawsuits, regardless of how poorly the complaint is worded, or how many claims are raised. Seaboard Surety Co. v. Gillette Co., 64 N.Y.2d 304, 486 N.Y.S.2d 873, 476 N.E.2d 272 (1984); International Paper Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 35 N.Y.2d 322, 361 N.Y.S.2d 873, 320 N.E.2d 619 (1974). The insurer is relieved of its obligation to defend only if there is “no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held to be obligated, or the insurer can show that ‘the allegations of the complaint are solely and entirely within the policy exclusions, and that the allegations, in toto, are not subject to any other interpretation.’ ” 661 F.Supp. at 449 (quoting International Paper Co., 35 N.Y.2d at 325, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 875, 320 N.E.2d at 621).
New York courts interpreting the meaning of an “occurrence,” in policy clauses similar to those at issue here, have determined that liability coverage depends upon whether the alleged injury was intentionally caused or was an unintended, although foreseeable, result of the alleged intentional conduct. The distinction is drawn between
damages which flow directly and immediately from an intended act, thereby precluding coverage, and damages which ac-cidently arise out of a chain of unintended though expected or foreseeable events that occurred after an intentional act. Ordinary negligence does not constitute an intention to cause damage; neither does a calculated risk amount to an expectation of damage. To deny coverage, then, the fact finder must find that the insured intended to cause damage.
Continental Insurance Co. v. Colangione, 107 A.D.2d 978, 979, 484 N.Y.S.2d 929, 930-31 (3d Dept.1985) (citations omitted). See also General Accident Insurance Company of America v. Manchester, 116 A.D.2d 790, 792, 497 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (3d Dept.1986).
A complaint that the insured has conspired to commit certain acts necessarily charges intentional conduct on the part of the defendant-insured. See Federal Insurance Co. v. Cablevision Systems Development Co., 637 F.Supp. 1568, 1577 (E.D.N.Y.1986). It is that conduct which must be examined to determine whether the plaintiff alleges that the insured intended to cause damage or that the damage “was unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.” Mary & Alice Ford Nursing Home Co. v. Fireman’s Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J., 86 A.D.2d 736, 737, 446 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (3d Dept.), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 656, 454 N.Y.S.2d 74, 439 N.E.2d 883 (1982).
In applying this test to a claim that an employer-insured has caused emotional injuries by discharging an employee pursuant to intentional discriminatory practices, the court in Mary & Alice Ford held that insurance clauses identical to those at issue here excluded potential liability from coverage because the injuries allegedly caused by the insured were:
“neither unexpected nor unforeseen, but rather they were the direct and natural consequences of [the employer’s] intentional act. Thus, if the [complainants] succeed in their action, the proof will necessarily establish that there was no accident within the meaning of the insurance policies in question and, therefore [the insurer] will not be liable to indemnify [the insured].”
Id., 86 A.D.2d at 737-38, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
The complaint here alleged that the School conspired intentionally to inhibit Herrmann’s constitutional rights. It is replete with allegations of intentional conduct and injuries. We agree with Judge Bartels’ finding that such allegations, if proven, would not give rise to a covered liability under the terms of the Umbrella Policy. Consequently, Aetna had no duty to defend the action.
Nonetheless, the School also argues that there are allegations in the complaint which, if proven, could result in the insurer’s liability for damages resulting from unintentional conduct or intentional conduct producing unintentional injury. We can see no reason why the court should have imagined what is not in the complaint in order to find liability which was not intended. Herrmann’s complaint may be inartfully drafted but there can be no doubt that the purpose of his action, as determined by the district court, was to hold the School liable for conspiring intentionally to inhibit his rights and intentionally to commit acts to deprive him of his property rights in his tenured position. Liability for injuries caused by intentional acts of the insured is expressly excluded under the Aetna insurance policy definition of “occurrence” as interpreted under New York law.
The School’s final argument is that the Umbrella Policy does not unambiguously exclude coverage of liability for the “mental anguish” injury alleged by Herrmann notwithstanding the complaint’s allegations regarding intent. This argument is based on the policy term “personal injury” which on its face may be read to require insurance coverage, or at least creates an ambiguity regarding the extent of insurance coverage, when a described injury is alleged to have been caused by the insured.
We do not agree with this approach. The focus of New York courts’ construction of such insurance policy language has found the term “personal injury” to be a description of injuries which are covered only if such an injury arises out of an “occurrence.” As we have said, this does not cover injuries from intentional acts.
In light of the consistent interpretation by the New York courts of the parameters of coverage under the insurance terms at issue in this case, we find that Herrmann’s complaint against the School alleged injuries which are excluded from coverage under the Umbrella Policy. As a result, Aet-na was not obligated to defend the School on Herrmann’s complaint of conspiracy or to indemnify the School for any damages suffered from such a suit.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1