What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
J. V. McNICHOLAS TRANSFER CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
No. 10130.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
March 18, 1946.
David C. Haynes, of Youngstown, Ohio, for appellant.
Norman A. Emery, of Harrington, Iiuxley & Smith, all of Youngstown, Ohio, for appellee.
Before HICKS, ALLEN, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
HICKS, Circuit Judge.
The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, appellee, a common carrier oí freight and passengers, had ' a freight station at Youngstown, Ohio. Appellant, J. V. McNicholas Transfer Company of Youngstown, did a general cartage business by means of motor trucks. On January 14, 1943, appellant, herein called the Trucker, and appellee, herein called the Railroad, entered into a contract in writing wherein the Trucker agreed to transport freight in less than carload lots between the station of the Railroad and the places of business of shippers or consignees, at Youngstown. The contract had the following provision, to wit:
"(3) To be responsible for, and to protect, save harmless and indemnify Railroad from and against, all fines, penalties, loss, damage, cost and expense suffered or sustained by Railroad or for which Railroad may be held or become liable by reason of * * * (b) injury (including death) to persons or property, or other causes whatsoever, in the event an attempt should be made to hold Railroad liable therefor, in connection with Trucker’s business or operations hereunder; * * * ”
On October 27, 1944, George Sharrer brought an action for damages for personal injuries against the Railroad in an Ohio Court of Common Pleas. He alleged in his complaint that he was a motor truck driver for the Trucker and that while engaged in transferring a large casting from the railroad station to his truck, he was injured by the negligence of one of the Railroad’s employees, in the loading of castings. The Railroad called upon the Trucker to defend Sharrer’s action and upon its refusal to do so, the Railroad brought this action by which it seeks a declaration of rights under the above mentioned contract. The District Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It found as a fact that Sharrer was injured while performing services for the Trucker in the handling and transportation of less than carload freight at Youngstown. This finding was unexcepted to.
■ The court found as a matter of law that under the contract the Railroad was “protected against any claims and resulting damage which grow out of the handling and transportation of less than carload freight at Youngstown, Ohio, by the defendant.” We think that this conclusion is correct and that by the plain provisions of paragraph 3 of the contract as above quoted, it was the legal duty of the Trucker to protect, save harmless and indemnify the Railroad from any loss or damage suffered or sustained by it or for which it might become liable by reason of injuries to Sharrer.
The Trucker’s contention, set out in six paragraphs of its brief, may be summarized as follows: First, that the contract did not contemplate indemnity to the Railroad for damages caused by the negligent acts of its employees; and second, because the Railroad as a matter of law could not contract against the consequences of its own negligence.
The first proposition is untenable. The contract provides indemnity to the Railroad for damages by' reason of injury to persons or property “or other causes whatsoever * * * in connection with Trucker’s business or operations hereunder. * * * ” The provision • is plain and injuries caused by the negligence of. the Railroad’s employees are not excepted.
The second contention cannot be sustained. 'It is based upon the contention that the injury to Sharrer was p'roximately caused by the negligence of the Railroad but this is no more than a mere presumption. The court made no finding as to the cause of the -injury. It is true that a copy of Sharrer’s petition against the Railroad for damages sets forth that his injuries were caused by the negligence of its employee, but, accepting this allegation as true, we are yet confronted with the clear cut proposition of law that there is no rule of public policy which forbade the Railroad from entering into the contract upon which it here reliés. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Louisville & N RR Co., 6 Cir., 24 F.2d 347, 348, and cases there cited. As a general rule a railroad may contract against the effects of its own negligence (Santa Fe R. v. Grant Bros., 228 U.S. 177, 185, 33 S.Ct. 474, 57 L.Ed. 787; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 6 Cir., 140 F.2d 898; see also Dingledy Lbr. Co. v. Erie RR Co., 102 Ohio St. 236, 131 N.E. 723) ; except in cases where it undertakes by such contract to secure immunity from liability to shippers as common carriers. It is obvious that the contract here involved does not fall within the excepted class.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1