What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Macaria Navarro de HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
No. 72-2494.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
June 11, 1974.
John F. Sheffield (argued), Norman B. Silver, Esq., Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.
Dzintra I. Janavs, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Frederick M. Brosio, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., U. S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Joseph Surreck, Regional Counsel, I&NS, San Pedro, Cal., Bernard Hornbach, I&NS, San Francisco, Cal., District Director, I&NS, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.
Before TRASK and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and POWELL, District Judge.
Honorable Charles L. Powell, United States District Judge from the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Macaría Navarro de Hernandez (Petitioner) appeals from a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals which upheld the Immigration & Naturalization Service order for her deportation. This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.
The petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, was admitted to the United States on a permanent resident visa on April 26, 1967. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1), deportation proceedings were brought against the petitioner in 1970 on the grounds that at the time of her entry she was excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (31), for knowingly and for gain assisting the illegal entry of another alien. Evidence in support of this charge presented at the deportation hearing included: (1) a sworn statement made by the petitioner on August 17, 1965, during detention by United States officials in which the petitioner confessed to having attempted that day to bring two aliens into the United States for $100 compensation; (2) a sworn statement made by the petitioner on April 7, 1970, (shortly before the deportation proceedings were formally begun) which identified the 1965 statement as genuine and affirmed the truthfulness of the statements contained therein; this statement further included the admission that the petitioner was returned to Mexico in 1965 because she had smuggled two men into the country; (3) sworn statements of the two individuals who the petitioner allegedly smuggled into -the United States who identified “Mjs. Navarro” as the smuggler. On the basis of this evidence and the petitioner’s failure to refute or rebut her previous sworn testimony, the Special Inquiry Officer ordered deportation. This order was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals and the petitioner now seeks review.
Petitioner attacks the proceedings on the ground that she was denied her right to cross-examine the persons who had stated that she had smuggled them into the United States from Mexico and also upon the ground that for reasons of fairness and justice the Immigration & Naturalization Service should be es-topped from deporting petitioner.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) states that:
“[T]he alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government ft
Here, petitioner argues, the affidavits of the two smuggled aliens were improperly admitted into the record of the hearing before the Special Inquiry Officer. These affidavits identified petitioner as the person who undertook for money to smuggle them into the United States on August 16, 1965. Objection was made upon the ground that the statements were hearsay and that the witnesses were not available for cross-examination at this October 1970 hearing. The Special Inquiry Officer admitted the affidavits provisionally upon the condition that the affiants be produced in person for cross-examination. Two adjournments of the hearing were ordered in order to give the Immigration & Naturalization Service an opportunity to produce the witnesses. A record of the unsuccessful search for them was then introduced, and their affidavits were then admitted. At the conclusion of the hearing the Special Inquiry Officer rendered an oral decision granting voluntary departure or deportation to Mexico if voluntary departure was not made.
In Navarrette-Navarrette v. Landon, 223 F.2d 234 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 351 U.S. 911, 76 S.Ct. 700, 100 L.Ed. 1444 (1956), we held:
“An alien, in deportation proceedings, must be afforded due process of law, including a fair hearing. But it is well settled that administrative tribunals, such as here involved, are not bound by the strict rules of evidence which apply in judicial proceedings.”
In that case on facts remarkably similar to those here, written statements of four aliens were admitted without production of the individuals in person. We held that this failure did not render the proceeding unfair where it was shown that their whereabouts were unknown after a search had been made to locate them. Their absence is of even less consequence here where the affidavit of petitioner herself, corroborates the information contained in the affidavits under question.
Finally, the petitioner asserts that the government is estopped from deporting her because it originally granted her permanent resident status. Reliance is upon a number of cases supporting this argument. Since appellant’s briefs have been filed the Supreme Court in United States Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 94 S.Ct. 19, 38 L.Ed.2d 7 (1973), has held that except for “affirmative misconduct” on the part of the Government, the United States could not be estopped from denying citizenship under the facts existing there. Id. at 8, 94 S.Ct. 19. We find nothing in the facts here which could distinguish Hibi and hold that estoppel is not applicable.
We have reviewed the administrative record including the Transcript of Hearing and find nothing upon which a reversal could be justified. The decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is affirmed.
. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (31) provides in pertinent part:
Excludable classes of aliens
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission in the United States: . . .
“(31) Any alien who at any time shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0