What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse M. MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 78-1957.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 17, 1979.
Jesse M. Moore, pro se.
M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gilbert E. Andrews, Robert E. Lindsay, George L. Hastings, Jr., Attys., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., Charles E. Graves, U.S. Atty., Cheyenne, Wyo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DOYLE, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
LOGAN, Circuit Judge.
Jesse M. Moore was convicted by a jury of a criminal misdemeanor on three counts of failure to file an income tax return as required by section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Timely appeal of the conviction was taken to this Court.
The contentions Moore raises on appeal are that he had no opportunity to present any evidence to the jury or acquaint the jury with his defense, sections 6012 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code are unconstitutionally vague, the direct graduated income tax is unconstitutional, wages from labor cannot be directly taxed because they are not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment provides a defense to a charge of failure to fill out an income tax return.
The evidence at trial established that Moore had gross income of $18,788 in 1974, $7,799 in 1975, and $20,349 in 1976, which was sufficient in each year to trigger the filing requirements of section 7203. Moore did file a Form 1040 for each year, but did not attach the required W-2 statements. The returns contained no information except for the following statements: “Not over $91” on the 1974 form, and “Object: Fifth Amendment” on the 1975 and 1976 forms.
I
Moore first argues that he was not allowed to present any evidence to the jury or to acquaint the jury with his defense. Although Moore was acting as his own counsel and was not familiar with trial procedure, the record shows he was given full opportunity to present his case. In only one instance was Moore in any way prevented from presenting information to the jury. This was during his opening argument when the court informed him that any legal arguments he had should be made in his closing speech to the jury. Moore was always asked by the court whether he objected to evidence being introduced and whether he would like to cross-examine. He cross-examined government witnesses on two occasions. He expressly informed the court at three different times that he had no witnesses to offer. He was allowed to give his version of the law to the judge and to argue freely to the jury in closing. We conclude, therefore, that this argument is without merit.
II
Moore next argues that sections 6012 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code are unconstitutionally vague for failure to specify clearly who has to pay taxes or file returns. This argument is without merit. The language of these sections is quite clear. In the years in question section 6012(a), stated in pertinent part,
Returns with respect to income taxes ... shall be made by the following:
(1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year a gross income of [$750] or more, except that a return shall not be required of an individual . ..
(iii) who is entitled to make a joint return under section 6013 and whose gross income, when combined with the gross income of his spouse, is, for the taxable year, less than [$2,800 in 1974, $3,400 in 1975, $3,600 in 1976] ....
Section 7203 states in pertinent part,
Any person required under this title to pay any ... tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return .. ., ... who willfully fails to pay such . .. tax, make such return, . .. shall ... be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
In addition, section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code declares that there is a tax imposed on every individual whose taxable income exceeds the totals set out in tables in that section.
Moore also mentions that Code section 3402 and its regulations provide for voluntary agreement to pay taxes. These provisions concern the withholding arrangements between employer and employee and do not affect the ultimate liability for payment of taxes.
III
Moore challenges the constitutionality of the direct progressive income tax. The Supreme Court has found this tax valid under the Sixteenth Amendment. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916); Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115, 36 S.Ct. 281, 60 L.Ed. 554 (1916). Defendant also argues that the income tax laws are unconstitutional as applied to him because wages received for labor are not “income” and so they cannot be directly taxed. The Supreme Court has defined “income” as used in the Sixteenth Amendment as “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined .... ” Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207, 40 S.Ct. 189, 193, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920). The Supreme Court eases are controlling on these issues.
IV
Last, Moore raises a Fifth Amendment defense, claiming that his right against self-incrimination allows him to refuse to provide any information on a tax return. The Supreme Court has held the Fifth Amendment is not a defense for failing to make any tax return, United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927), although a Fifth Amendment objection can be raised in response to a particular question on the return if the question calls for a privileged answer. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976). This Court held in United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012, 98 S.Ct. 725, 54 L.Ed.2d 755 (1978) that a tax return containing no information but a general objection based on the Fifth Amendment did not constitute a return as required by the Internal Revenue Code, and did not contain a claim sufficiently specific to invoke Fifth Amendment protection. That case is controlling here. Thus, we hold that Moore’s blanket objection is not a valid claim of the Fifth Amendment.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0