What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES MEXICAN OIL CORPORATION v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 6, 1927.
No. 341.
1. Collision <®=>95(7) — 1Tug held at fault in permitting tow to crowd steamer, and jointly liable for steamer’s stranding.
Evidence held to show tug at fault in permitting her tow to crowd steamer onto rocks, and jointly liable with steamer for damage done.
2. Admiralty <§=»M8 — Trial court’s findings as to liability for stranding are conclusive, unless certain error can be found.
Trial court’s findings of fact as to liability for stranding are conclusive, unless certainty of error can be found.
Appeal from the District Court .of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
Libel filed by the United States Mexican Oil Corporation, as owner of the steamship Pearldon, against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, for damages duo to stranding- of the vessel. Prom a decree holding both at fault, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company appeals.
Affirmed.
Burlingham, Yeeder, Masten & Pearey, of New York City (Chauncey I. Clark and A. Howard Neely, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Barry, Wainwright, Thacher & Symmers, of Néw York City (Earle Earwell, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before MANTON, L. HAND, and' SWAN, Circuit Judges.
MANTON, Circuit Judge.
The vessel Pearldon was stranded on January 13, 1921, on a shoal near Shooter’s Island off Newark Bay. Appellant’s tug No. 32 is held responsible therefor, jointly with the Pearldon, and this appeal seeks to review that decree.
The cause of stranding was found to be due to the No. 32 permitting her tow to swing up into Newark Bay so that it was across the course of the Pearldon and crowded her on the rocks at Bergen Point, while she was attempting to navigate clear of the tow. The Pearldon was also held at fault, but no appeal is taken, and we are not now urged to exonerate her from fault. Appellant’s argument is that the Pearldon was not crowded over on the rocks as claimed; also that, if she was crowded, it was not the tow of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company No. 32, but the tow' of another party. While the rule, so often stated, is applicable here — that we will accept the conclusion of the trial judge as to the findings of fact, unless certainty of error can be found (The Perry Setzer [C. C. A.] 299 F. 587; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Campbell [C. C. A.] 8 F.[2d] 223; The Bern [C. C. A.] 261 F. 996) — still we have examined this record, because of the earnest plea of counsel that there is error. The tug and vessel passed each other at the Red and Black Obstruction Buoy. The Pearldon grounded on Bergen Point. When she struck the rocks, the evidence clearly shows that the No. 32 was about abreast of the Pearldon. A tug was made fast to the port bow of the Pearldon, and her master gave ample evidence of the occurrences, ' and the No'. 32 was sufficiently identified. That the Pearldon struck the bottom of£ Bergen Point is established beyond reasonable dispute. It was also proved that it was impossible for the Pearldon to keep in the deep channel, because the No. 32 and her barges were sagging up to the northward. It is also established that they met in this passage at the Red and Black Buoy.
The claim that the tide alone caused the Pearldon to go over on the rocks is unsupported by the proof. The presence of the tow prevented the Pearldon from counteracting the set of the tide at the place. She was pursuing a straight course after passing Buoy S-2 and was making allowance for the set of the tide. Her heading was altered to her port in order to overcome this set of the tide, and she would have cleared the rocks, only she was forced to alter her course, owing to the crowding of the tow. It is idle to claim that a tug other than the appellee’s was involved in this happening.
After striking the rocks on Bergen Point, and before her navigators could again put her under control; she stranded on the shoal to the east of Shooter’s Island. Apparently, injury occurred from both of these strandings. The navigator of the No. 32 is chargeable with the knowledge that an unwieldy tow, with the tide tending to set in toward the Newark Bay, would cause his tow to cross the path of the oncoming vessel. The Aurora (C. C. A.) 258. F. 439. Such navigation is faulty and blameworthy, and the District Court properly sustained the allegations of fault against' the No. 32.
Decree affirmed, with costs.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1