What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Edwin SAWYER, Alice Frame, Lorene Hildebran and Doris Larsen, Appellants, v. Stanley L. DAVIS, Executor of the Estate of Doil S. Hunter, Deceased, Appellee.
No. 19394.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
March 27, 1969.
John D. Randall, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellants and filed brief and reply brief.
Keith Mossman, Mossman & Grote, Vinton, Iowa, for appellee.
Before MATTHES, MEHAFFY and LAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin the defendant from opening a spendthrift trust under the Last Will and Testament of their deceased grandmother. Plaintiffs seek their alleged distributive share of the estate, a one-fourth interest, outside of the trust and the return of certain interest and attorney fees previously charged against their share of the estate resulting from proceedings in the state courts.
The federal district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the Iowa Supreme Court and the District Court of Iowa in and for Benton County had previously adjudicated the same issues raised in the complaint, relying upon Sawyer v. Sawyer, 152 N.W. 2d 605 (Iowa 1967) ; In re Estate of Hunter, Probate No. 11,231, District Court of Iowa in and for Benton County. After the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint (June 27, 1968), plaintiffs filed an amendment to their complaint (July 3, 1968). Upon the defendant’s failure to respond to the amended complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion for default. On July 25, 1968, Judge McManus denied the motion for default judgment on the ground that the amended complaint was a nullity since the original complaint had been dismissed. Plaintiffs have seemingly abandoned this point on appeal.
Although we are fully satisfied as to the propriety of the federal district court’s rulings, we find that the cause must be dismissed for lack of jurisdictional amount. Defendant’s motion for dismissal challenged jurisdiction of the federal court on the stated ground that the amount involved was less than $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs. Attached to said motion were the inventory and appraisal of the estate properties and the final inheritance tax return filed in the state probate proceedings. Plaintiffs did not offer any counter evidence, nor is any contained in the record before this court. It remains undisputed that the total estate appraised before taxes was $66,261.70. The net taxable estate was $61,849.14. Included in the estate was $29,043.70 of joint property not includable in the trust at issue. Additionally, the state court had ordered approximately $4,200 to be paid out of the plaintiffs’ one-fourth share. Notwithstanding this latter fact, plaintiffs’ one-fourth share amounts to only $8,200. There exists no contradiction of these facts on the record. Plaintiffs asserted in oral argument on appeal that these figures are not accurate and that they will prove at trial that not all of the property set aside as joint property was proper. These allegations appear nowhere in the complaint nor were they substantiated in any way before the trial court.
Where the amount in controversy is challenged in an appropriate manner, it has long been settled that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish the jurisdictional amount, and if the burden is not met, the complaint must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936) ; 1 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.92 [3.-1] at 838-839 (1964).
As eárly stated by this court:
“It is not the amount claimed in the prayer for relief which determines the jurisdiction of the court, if the unmistakable fact and legal certainty be that the plaintiff could not have had any reasonable expectation that she could recover, exclusive of interest and costs, an amount within the jurisdiction of the court. In such a case it is the duty of the court to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, although the ad damnum clause demands judgment for a sum sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.” New York Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 255 F. 958, 959 (8 Cir. 1919).
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
. Plaintiffs challenge the jurisdiction of the state probate court in this proceeding. Plaintiffs filed special appearances attacking the jurisdiction of the probate court. These were overruled. Plaintiffs did not appeal. Their attempt collaterally to attack the state jurisdiction in the federal court overlooks fundamental principles of res judicata. The determination of jurisdiction by the state court was not appealed and this question is no longer subject to collateral attack. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963) ; Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling- Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931) ; Restatement, Judgments § 9 (1942).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0