What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
THE NICOLAOU MARIA. THE NIDARHOLM. GEORGE NICOLAOU, Limited, et al. v. A/B HELSINGFORS S. S. CO., Limited, et al.
No. 10854.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 19, 1944.
Rehearing Denied July 24, 1944.
WALLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
H. C. Hughes, of Galveston, Tex., for appellants.
M. L. Cook, of Houston, Tex., for appellees.
Before HOLMES, McCORD, and WALLER, Circuit Judges.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
On February 5, 1940, when the Finnish S. S. Nidarholm was moored to the dock in the Houston ship channel, engaged in loading cargo for a voyage under a charter party to Liverpool, she was struck and damaged by the S. S. Nicolaou Maria. Seven days were required to repair the damage, after which the loading and performance of the charter party were resumed. Other litigation has settled the question of liability, and it is agreed that appellees were entitled to damages in the sum of $15,459.86. The only issue below was whether they also were entitled to demurrage for the seven days during which the vessel was detained, and unable to engage in profitable operation. The court below found for libelant, and appellant has appealed.
The Nidarholm finished loading on February 14, 1940, and proceeded to Halifax where she joined a convoy for the voyage across the Atlantic. She reached Liverpool on March 20, 1940, and completed the discharge of cargo in nine days. When in Liverpool, she had another charter party for a voyage to Denmark, but that was frustrated by the German invasion of Denmark on April 9, 1940. She remained in Liverpool awaiting orders and a convoy until April 18, 1940, when she made her return voyage without cargo.
The charter to Liverpool was executed without diminution of the consideration paid. It is not affirmatively shown that the charter party to Denmark might have, been performed but for the delay; nor does the record show how much time would have been required to fulfill that charter, when loading was to begin thereunder, or any other material facts. The record shows that no effort was made to begin performance of the charter prior to its frustration; and it appears that the master of the Nidarholm did not learn of the existence of the charter party until he. reached New York on the return, trip. There are no facts to indicate that other employment would have been available if the vessel had discharged her cargo in Liverpool seven days earlier.
The allowance of demurrage for loss of the use of a commercial vessel pending repairs arising from a collision depends upon whether profits actually have been, or reasonably may be supposed to have been, lost. Detention alone does not entitle an owner to demurrage; it must be shown with reasonable certainty that the vessel would have been employed if she had been in good repair. The burden of establishing that profits were lost was upon the owners of the Nidarholm. We find no such proof in the record.
The delay in completing performance of the charter party to Liverpool was not financially prejudicial to appellees, for the full contract price of the charter party was paid plus all out-of-pocket expenses incurred during the seven-day delay. The evidence also fails to show that profits actually were lost because the delay postponed the availability of the vessel for other employment. It is not probable that the charter to Denmark was remotely affected by the delay, since no effort was made to execute that contract at any time prior to its frustration. No showing is made as to the demand for such vessels in or near Liverpool from March 22 to March 29, 1940, but prevailing conditions may be indicated by the fact that in the succeeding three weeks the ship found no employment and returned to the United States without cargo.
Under these circumstances, any award of demurrage would rest upon surmise and speculation, not upon the basis of proof in the degree of certainty required by law. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court with instructions to disallow the demurrage and recompute the damages and interest accordingly.
The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 17 S.Ct. 510, 41 L.Ed. 937; The Wolsum, 5 Cir., 14 F.2d 371; Cuyamel Fruit Co. v. Nedland, 5 Cir., 19 F.2d 489.
The Conqueror, supra; Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal v. United States. 287 U.S. 170, 53 S.Ct 103, 77 L. Ed. 240; The North Star, 2 Cir., .151 F. 168; Navigazione Libera T. S. A. v. Newtown Creek T. Co., 2 Cir., 98 F.2d 694.
The Winfield S. Cahill, 2 Cir., 258 F. 318; Newtown Creek Towing Co. v. City of New York, 2 Cir., 23 F.2d 486; The Priscilla, D.C., 27 F.2d 921; Roscoe, Measure of Damages in Maritime Collisions, 2d Ed., page 5.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 3