What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
RYAN CAR CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 4309.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Oct. 24, 1930.
James F. Spoerri, Sanders, Childs, Bobb & Wescott and Clarence N. Goodwin, all of Chicago, Ill. (Louis A. Gravelle, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioner.
John G. Remey, of Washington, D. C., G. A. Youngquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Louis Monarch and Morton Poe Fisher, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen. (C. M. Charest, Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and W. E. Davis, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for respondent.
ALSCHULER, SPARKS, and PAGE, Circuit Judges. ’
PAGE, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner asked the Commissioner to assess its 1930 income tax under sections 327 and 328 of the 1918 Revenue Act (40 Stat. 1057). On his refusal so to do, it appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals. Limiting its inquiry to that single question, the Board heard evidence and sustained the action of the Commissioner.
Relying upon Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 275 U. S. 220, 48 S. Ct. 87, 72 L. Ed. 249, and Williamsport Co. v. U. S., 277 U. S. 551, 556, 48 S. Ct. 587, 588, 72 L. Ed. 985, the parties agree that the Board of Tax Appeals had jurisdiction to review the action of the Commissioner in his refusal to make the special assessment, hut the Commissioner is here denying jurisdiction in this court.
In the Williamsport Case, the Supreme Court, referring to the Oesterlein Case, said: “We there held that the exercise of the judgment or discretion of the Commissioner to allow or deny the special assessment provided for in sections 327 and 328 was subject to review by the Board of Tax Appeals.”
If that language means that the Board had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s discretion to proceed or not to proceed under sections 327 and 328, and not that the Board had the discretion to review the assessment after it was made’ under those sections, we are not able to reconcile that holding with our understanding of the Oesterlein Case. But the Supreme Court has said that it did so hold, and the parties here agree that the Board had jurisdiction in this matter. Therefore we proceed on that theory.
The Commissioner denies the jurisdiction of this court largely on the authority of the Williamsport Case, whereof he says: “The question of special assessment is characterized as a ‘power discretionary in character’ which could only he performed ‘by an official or body having wide knowledge and experience with the class of problems concerned’; and one in which the ‘conclusions reached would rest largely upon considerations not entirely susceptible of proof or disproof.’ The court concluded, therefore, that the problem had been confided by Congress to the Commissioner, and ‘could not, under the Revenue Act of 1918, be challenged in the courts —at least in the absence of fraud or other irregularities.’ ”
The question there under consideration was whether the Court of Claims had jurisdiction of an action to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally collected under the 1918 act because the Commissioner had denied petitioner the right to have the lax specially assessed under sections 327 and 328. That action was brought in the Court of Claims fourteen months before the passage of the Revenue Act of February 26, 1926, which was the first act giving Circuit Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board. Section 1226, 26 USCA, being section 1003 of the Act of 1926 (44 Stat. 110), reads:
“(a) The Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the board (except as provided in section 346 of Title 28); and the judgment of any such court shall he final, except that it shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari, in the manner provided in section 347 of Title 28.
“(b) Upon such review, such courts shall have power to affirm or, if the decision of the board is not in accordance with law, to modify or reverse the decision of the board, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice may require.”-
That section was in no way considered in either of the eases above cited. Nearly two years after the passage of the act of 1924, creating the Board of Tax Appeals, the Congress made the above provision, by which the Circuit Courts of Appeals, with a single exception not here material, was vested with “exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Board.” Broader language could not have been used to vest in the Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board. The first part of section 1226(b) is: “Upon such review, such courts shall have power to affirm.” Here again broad language is used. Then follows the provision authorizing the courts, if the decision being reviewed “is not in accordance with law,” to do “as justice may require.” The right, if the ease is not to be affirmed, to take any action that “justice may require,” is in no way limited, except that the court must first find that the decision of the Board is not in accordance with law. There is not in this language anything to except from review in this court anything reviewable by the Board. We are of opinion that Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review any decision, of the Board of Tax Appeals.
Petitioner relies upon two conditions in its business as establishing its right to have an assessment under sections 327 and 328. The first proposition is that, in computing invested capital, respondent excluded $1,500,000 of petitioner’s capital stock, which had been issued for good -will. Petitioner was in the ear-repairing business, and the years in question here followed immediately after the return of the railroads by the government to their owners, when, because of the fact that repairs had not been kept up by the government, it was necessary to make such large repairs that all ear-repairing concerns were doing business. Petitioner did business largely with the New York Central and the Pennsylvania Railroads. It appears that it got its business from those railroads because of the relation of three of its principal stockholders with officers of the railroads in question, and it was admitted, and it is also apparent from the record, that the influence, which the stockholders had with the officers of those railroads, probably could not be sold or passed on to any one else. There seems to have been, in addition to this fact, an absence of all evidence to establish a good will of any value, or at least of any considerable value.
The other element relied upon by petitioner is that the three stockholders in question rendered large service to the company for which they did not receive any salary. That service was what is commonly called a “pull” that those stockholders had with the railroad companies. It is urged that that “pull” took the place of the services of agents of other 'repair concerns, for which services those concerns had to expend large sums of money, and therefore there should have been taken into consideration what would have been fair compensation or salaries for the three stockholders in question.
We are of opinion that the Commissioner, and also the Board of Tax Appeals, had a broad discretion in determining the question as to whether there should or should not have been a special assessment under the sections in question, and that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Commissioner and the Board did not exercise a fair and reasonable discretion in their determination not to allow the special assessment.
The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1