What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
STEINGUT et al. v. GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK et al. UNITED STATES v. SAME (two cases).
Nos. 177-179, Docket 20262-20264.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 7, 1947.
Before AUGUSTUS N. HAND, CHASE and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
Natanson, Pack & Scholer of New York City, for Receivers, plaintifis-appellants-appellees.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, of New York City (Albert R. Connelly, Samson Selig, Samuel L. Scholer and L. D. Simpson, all of New York City, of counsel), for inter-venor-appellee, Millard.
Borris M. Komar, of New York City (David L. Sprung, of New York City, of counsel), for intervenor-appellant, Tillman.
Davis Polk Wardwell Sunderland & Kiendl, of New York City (John W. Davis, Ralph M. Carson, William C. Cannon, Francis W. Phillips, Edward J. McGratty, Jr. and William R. Meagher, all of New York City, of counsel), for Guaranty Trust Co. as appellant-appellee in the U. S. action and appellee-appellant in the receivers’ action.
John F, X. McGohey and Daniel • M. Sandomire, both of New York City (John F. Sonnett and Paul A. Sweeney, both of Washington, D.C., and Alexander N. Sack, Howard N. Meyer, Louis W. Bookheim, Jr., Lester S. Jayson and Joseph K. Reich-bart, all of New York City, of counsel), for the United States.
FRANK, Circuit Judge.
The facts are amply stated in the very able opinion of Judge Rifkind, D.C., 58 F. Supp. 623. We agree with that opinion.
We do not, however, entirely agree with the trial judge with respect to the interest. See D.C., 60 F.Supp. 103. He held that interest on the deposits should be computed at the contracted rates up to June 16, 1933, the effective date of the Banking Act of 1933, § 11(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 371a, prohibiting the payment of interest on demand deposits by member banks of the Federal Reserve System; and that interest, after the date when the actions were commenced, should be computed at 4%. We accept these conclusions, except as to the 4% rate.
The judge reasoned thus: (1) Had the suits been brought by the depositor, the Russo-Asiatic Bank, or by the Russian Government, the rate, after breach, would have been at 6%, this being the rate prescribed by the New York statutes as to contracts made and to be performed in New York. (2) But, because the claims had been transferred to the United States, Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 296, 61 S.Ct. 995, 997, 85 L.Ed. 1361, applied, and required the determination of the interest as damages for delay, regardless of the local statute.
We think the Royal Indemnity case in-apposite. There a federal collector of internal revenue had accepted a surety bond filed with him by a taxpayer to accompany a claim for abatement of income tax. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in part rejected the abatement claim and demanded the unpaid amount of the tax, together with interest. The taxpayer did not pay the interest. In a suit against the surety for the interest, the Court held that “the rule governing the interest to be recovered as damages for delayed payment of a contractual obligation to the United States is not controlled by state statute or local common law. In the absence of an applicable federal statute it is for the federal courts to determine, according to their own criteria, the appropriate measure of damage, expressed in terms of interest, for nonpayment of the amount found to be due.” The Court cited Board of County Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 350, 352, 60 S.Ct. 285, 84 L.Ed. 313. There the United States brought suit, on behalf of an Indian, for recovery of taxes paid to a county. The law of the state precluded recovery of interest on taxes illegally collected. The Court (308 U.S. 350, 60 S.Ct. 288) said, “In ordinary suits where the Government seeks, as between itself and a private litigant, to enforce a money claim ultimately derived from a federal Irnvp- * * * this Court has chosen that rule as to interest which comports best with general notions of equity.” As to interest on the claim in question, the Court held that the state law was inapplicable, stating that, in such cases, “the state law has been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state law was the source of the right but because recognition of state interests was not deemed inconsistent with federal policy.” We think, therefore, that the Royal Indemnity doctrine must be limited to suits to enforce money claims “ultimately derived from a federal law. This interpretation is borne out in subsequent cases in which the Royal Indemnity case has been cited. Thus it was cited in Prudence Corporation v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95, 62 S.Ct. 978, 982, 86 L.Ed. 1293, to support the proposition that in “the interpretation and application of federal statutes, federal not local law applies.” So, too, it was cited in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366, 63 S.Ct. 573, 575, 87 L.Ed. 838, which related to “the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues.”
In the instant case, the claims did not “ultimately derive from a federal law” or from a contract made between the bank and the United States. Here the United States is, in effect, an assignee of the Russian government which, in turn, acquired the claims from the defendant’s depositor. The rights thus derive from contracts made between that depositor and the defendant. Accordingly, we hold that the state statute governs and that the proper rate of interest from the date of the breach was 6%.
The United States argues that the breach occurred at least as early as 1918, when the defendant, by entries on its books, purported to assert that it no longer owed anything on account of the deposits. We cannot agree. As the deposits were debts payable on demand, nothing was due and payable until a demand. We agree with the trial judge that the demand of the refugee directors of the Russo-Asiatic Bank was not effective. Accordingly, no effective demand was made until the United States instituted the present actions.
It has been held in New York that a trustee or other fiduciary may be liable for conversion of money, even if it is not earmarked. This seems to us to be the explanation of cases cited by the United States, for, in each of those cases, the bank appears to have knowingly participated in or aided such a‘conversion, and in New York the rule is that interest is allowed as a matter of right in cases of conversion. We find no New York decisions to the effect that, absent any fiduciary relation or participation in a fiduciary’s breach of his obligation, a bank is guilty of conversion merely- because it makes entries on its books showing a cancellation of all or any part of its obligations to a general depositor, when the fact of such conduct has not been communicated to the depositor.
Modified on appeals of the United States in the actions brought by it; affirmed on all the other appeals.
Emphasis added.
Of. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 06 S.Ct. 582, 90 U.Ed. 743, citing Board of Commissioners v. United States.
Ho said (60 F.Supp. at pages 705, 106) : “The plaintiff advances two earlier alternative dates: (1) the date of the defendant’s refusal to pay on demand of the refugee directors; (2) the date of tho acquisition of the claims by the United States through the Litvinov Assignment. Neither of these positions is, in my judgment, valid. Tho demand of the refugee directors does not rise to the dignity of a transaction ‘valid when entered into,’ Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 1938, 304 U.S. 126, 140, [58 S.Ct. 785, 82 L.Ed. 1224] so as to be given effect after recognition of Soviet Russia, for the purpose of starting an interest liability in favor of the United States, especially when the claim of the United States is incompatible with the claim asserted by the refugee directors. Nor can the refusal to pay on demand of the refugee directors justify the contention of the United States that, when it acquired the claims, a demand was futile, Tillman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 1930, 253 N.Y. 295, 171 N.E. 61. Recognition of Russia and tho execution and delivery of the Litvinov Assignment were major events full of significance. From tho fact that tho directors’ demand was refused prior to them tho inference may not be drawn that it would again ho refused if made by the United States after their occurrence.”
Even assuming, arguendo, that there can be an anticipatory breach of an obligation to pay money, the doctrine of anticipatory breach could not be operative here, because no notice of intention not to pay was communicated by the defendant to the Russian government.
Wryrnn v. Pistor, 141 App.Div. 104, 125 N.Y.S. 970; George Haiss Mfg. Co. v. Becker, 198 App.Div. 123, 189 N.Y.S. 791; Muller v. Naumann, 85 App.Div. 337, 83 N.Y.S. 488; cf. Gordon v. Hostetter, 37 N.Y. 99; People ex rel. Zotti v. Flynn, 135 App.Div. 276, 120 N.Y.S. 511; Miller v. Miles, 58 App.Div. 103, 68 N.Y.S. 565.
Holden v. N. Y. & Erie Bank, 72 N.Y. 286; Reynolds El. Co. v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 55 App.Div. 1, 67 N.Y.S. 397; cf. Cahan v. Empire Trust Co., 2 Cir., 9 F. 2d 713, 719, reversed on other grounds, 274 U.S. 473, 47 S.Ct. 661, 71 L.Ed. 1158, 57 A.L.R. 921.
Cf. Muller v. Naumann, 85 App.Div. 337, 83 N.Y.S. 488.
Cahan v. Empire Trust Co., 2 Cir., 9 F.2d 713, 719; Einstein v. Dunn, 61 App.Div. 195, 70 N.Y.S. 520, affirmed 171 N.Y. 648, 63 N.E. 1116; George Haiss Mfg. Co. v. Becker, 198 App.Div. 123, 189 N.Y.S. 791.
Cf. Southwick v. First Nat. Bank, 84 N.Y. 420, 431.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2