What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Elizabeth WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13248.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
May 26, 1961.
Morton Hollander, Chief, Appellate Section, Arnold Petralia, Atty., U. S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., James P. O’Brien, U. S. Atty., William H. Orrick, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert Tieken, U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., Alan S. Rosenthal, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
F. Raymond Marks, Jr., Frederic D. Houghteling, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffappellee. Overton, Marks, Simons & Houghteling, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and DUFFY and ENOCH, Circuit Judges.
KNOCH, Circuit Judge.
The United States has appealed from judgment rendered for plaintiff in an action to recover the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy.
The facts are largely undisputed. At the time of his death in an automobile accident, on April 1, 1951, Thomas L. Wilson, a member of the United States Air Force, was insured under a five-year term, level premium N.S.L.I. policy in the amount of $5,000, with an expiration date of April 19 or April 20, 1951. In this policy, which was in effect at the time of his death, Thomas Wilson had designated his maternal aunt, Mrs. Susie Brodnax, as principal beneficiary, and his mother, Mrs. Elizabeth Willis, the plaintiff herein, as contingent beneficiary.
On April 3, 1951, the Veterans Administration received a claim from Mrs. Willis, the contingent beneficiary of the current policy, for the proceeds of the policy. Receipt of the claim was acknowledged May 23, 1951. Under date of June 11, 1951, the V.A. wrote Mrs. Willis advising her that her son’s case folder showed a $10,000 N.S.L.I. Certificate effective April 20, 1943, naming Mrs. Broadnax, described as in loco parentis, as principal, and Mrs. Willis as contingent beneficiary; that on June 12, 1946, the amount of insurance was reduced to $5,000; that on March 29, 1951, the insured Thomas Wilson had applied for a renewal of $5,000 N.S.L.I., naming his brother, Robert L. Wilson, as principal, and his niece, Jeannette Wilson, as contingent beneficiary. The V.A.’s letter further stated that the renewal application was unnecessary because the insured Thomas Wilson had died prior to the expiration of the current policy on April 20, 1951. (The stipulation of facts refers to an expiration date of April 19, 1951. This difference is not material. Thomas Wilson had died about 19 days before the expiration of the policy.)
However, the V.A. took the position that the insured had made a valid change of beneficiaries in the renewal application, which would be given full force and effect lacking evidence of another subsequent change of beneficiary. The letter concluded that Mrs. Willis’ claim was disallowed, but that she would be given thirty days’ time to notify the V.A. of her intention to appeal, to file suit in the U.S. District Court, or to furnish evidence of a change of beneficiary subsequent to March 29, 1951, the date of the renewal application; that on the expiration of thirty days, if none of the listed actions had been taken, the insurance would be settled in favor of Robert L. Wilson, who was named as principal beneficiary in the renewal application.
On April 25, 1951, the claim of Mrs. Brodnax, the principal beneficiary under the current policy, was received. This, too, was acknowledged by the V.A. on May 23, 1951, with a following letter on June 11, 1951, in which Mrs. Brodnax was given substantially the same information as Mrs. Willis. No thirty-day stay, however, was granted Mrs. Brodnax. She was told that it was not indicated that she had any interest in the N.S.L.I. policy of her nephew, and that appropriate action was being taken as of that date (June 11, 1951) leading to settlement in favor of Robert L. Wilson.
It is undisputed that the sole evidence on which the government relies to show change of beneficiary is the printed application for a new policy, V.A. Form 9-1658, executed on March 29, 1951, by the insured Thomas Wilson. This form reads in part:
6. Application is hereby made for renewal of National Service Life Insurance' on the Five-Year Level Premium Term Plan, granted under Certificate No. 10159062 in the amount of $5,000.00, for an additional period of five years at the premium rate for my attained age on the effective date of the renewed insurance. It is understood that the renewed insurance, if granted, will become effective on the day immediately following the expiration of the current term period. (See Instr. 2.)
The certificate number “10159062” and the amount of “5,000.00” have been typed on the printed form. Instruction 2 on the reverse side of the form reads:
2. Effective Date of Renewed Insurance
The renewal of the insurance for an additional 5-year period will become effective as of the day following the expiration of the preceding term period.
Thus, on its face, this form, which was signed by the insured, shows an effective date of April 20 or April 21,1951, about nineteen days after Thomas Wilson’s death.
Under date of June 28,1951, Mrs. Brodnax wrote again stating that she had received the correspondence which indicated lack of interest in her deceased nephew’s N.S.L. Insurance. She then went on to inquire about her interest in other insurance carried by him. From this letter, the government infers acquiescence by Mrs. Brodnax in the denial of her claim. In our opinion, the mere statement of receipt of correspondence in which the government asserts that Mrs. Brodnax has no interest in the policy, gives rise to no inference of acquiescence.
Mrs. Willis’ additional claims, to the insurance proceeds, were received on August 8 and October 29, 1951, by the V.A. which merely sent her copies of its earlier letter of June 11th, extending a new thirty-day period in which she might take the three actions suggested in that letter. During this period} Mrs. Willis was the contingent beneficiary only.
On February 26, 1952, the insurance proceeds were paid to Robert Wilson. This action corresponded to the government’s intention as stated in the letters of June 11th. Any reliance on the supposed subsequent acquiescence of Mrs. Brodnax, or on Mrs. Willis’ failure to take one of the three formal actions suggested to her (particularly in the face of her repeated claims to the insurance proceeds) was misplaced and cannot operate as estoppel in this case.
On June 8, 1952, Mrs. Brodnax, the principal beneficiary, died. The instant action was brought on February 3, 1955, within the time limit prescribed in Title 38 U.S.C. § 784(b), which provides for a six-year statute of limitations. Section 784(a) provides that where the V.A. acknowledges indebtedness on a contract of insurance, and there is a dispute as to persons entitled to payment, a suit in the nature of a bill of interpleader may be brought. The government took no advantage of this provision-, electing instead to pay the proceeds to Robert Wilson, named as principal beneficiary in the renewal application form.
The policy in force at the time of the insured’s death named Mrs. Brodnax and Mrs. Willis as principal and contingent beneficiaries respectively. It is the government which asserts that there was a change of beneficiary.
The government contends that the burden of showing a change rests only on one claiming as a substituted beneficiary, and not on the government defending a claim. In this case, however, the government, in paying Robert Wilson, made it unnecessary for him to prosecute his claim as a substituted beneficiary, and thus the government placed itself in his shoes.
We agree that no formal change of beneficiary is essential, so long as the insured’s intent be clear, but we cannot agree with the government that in this ease any clear intent to change the beneficiary, under the policy in existence at the time of the insured’s death, has been demonstrated. There is no evidence other than the designation of beneficiary in the renewal application for a policy which was to become effective about nineteen days after the insured’s death.
The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.
11. Beneficiary Designation (indicate whether principal or contingent) and Selection of Optional Settlement * * *
Relationship Amount Option
Prin: Robert L. Wilson ‘ ' '
5043 S. Forrestville Ave.
Chicago, 111 Brother 100% One
Cont: Jeannette Wilson
Same as above Neice[sie] 100% One

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0