What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Enoch MCQUEEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John P. WHITLEY, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 92-4815.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 23, 1993.
Rehearing Denied May 19, 1993.
See also 386 So.2d 364.
Enoch McQueen, pro se.
Before JOHNSON, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
I.
Enoch McQueen was convicted of simple burglary in 1970 and served his nine-year sentence. In 1979, he was convicted of aggravated burglary, and the trial court enhanced his sentence based upon the 1970 conviction. McQueen challenges his sentence in the 1979 conviction, alleging it was improperly enhanced by the 1970 conviction.
McQueen previously attacked his 1979 conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding, alleging several constitutional errors. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of that petition. McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852, 106 S.Ct. 152, 88 L.Ed.2d 125 (1985). Later, McQueen filed a second habeas petition, seeking relief from his 1979 sentence because his 1970 conviction, which was used to enhance the 1979 sentence, allegedly was tainted by an unconstitutional jury instruction. We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this second petition, holding that McQueen had not exhausted his state remedies. McQueen v. Blackburn, 833 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.1987).
McQueen now has exhausted his state remedies and challenges the enhancement of his 1979 sentence by his 1970 conviction. The district court sua sponte ordered McQueen to file a response under rule 9 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings explaining why his petition should not be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. McQueen responded, and the district court dismissed his petition for abuse of the writ. The district court granted McQueen a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
II.
The district-court raised abuse of the writ sua sponte, as the court lawfully may do. United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 n. 9 (5th Cir.1993); Woods v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 321, 323 n. 3 (5th Cir.1991) (citing cases). McQueen then had the burden of showing cause and prejudice. Saahir v. Collins, 956 F.2d 115, 118 (5th Cir.1992) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1474, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991)). To show cause, the petitioner must prove that some objective factor external to the defense prevented him from raising the claim earlier. Saahir, 956 F.2d at 118. These factors include interference by government officials or the reasonable unavailability of the factual or legal basis for a claim. Id.
Before deciding whether McQueen has proven adequate cause, we must digress. McQueen alleges that the district court erred in even requiring him to show cause, as he has not ever challenged the 1970 conviction in a federal habeas petition. McQueen’s first habeas petition challenged his 1979 conviction, while his second petition was dismissed without prejudice. The second petition, like the one before us, alleges that McQueen’s 1979 sentence should not have been enhanced by his prior conviction, as he asserts that his 1970 conviction was unconstitutional. In other words, McQueen purports to challenge his 1970 conviction here, while his first petition challenged his 1979 conviction.
We agree with McQueen that the second petition has no bearing on this issue. That petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.
The question then becomes whether McQueen’s third petition challenges his 1970 conviction or his 1979 conviction. McQueen argues he has not abused the writ as a matter of law because his current petition challenges his 1970 conviction, while his first petition challenged his 1979 conviction. We disagree.
A prisoner challenging an earlier conviction used to enhance a conviction for which the prisoner is presently incarcerated meets the jurisdictional “in custody” requirement, see Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) (per curiam), because such a petition is challenging the sentence for the later conviction as enhanced by the earlier conviction, not the earlier conviction itself. Here, McQueen challenges his 1979 sentence on the ground that the sentence was enhanced by an earlier allegedly unconstitutional conviction. In other words, the petition seeks relief from the 1979 sentence; the 1970 conviction provides the alleged error justifying such relief. Because McQueen’s third petition, like his first, implicates the 1979 offense, his third petition constitutes an abuse of the writ, absent cause and prejudice. The fact that the first petition assailed McQueen’s 1979 conviction, while the third petition attacks his 1979 sentence, is of no moment, as a petition cannot present fragmented, successive petitions by challenging a conviction and its consequent sentence seriatim.
We now address the question of cause. The district court gave petitioner a chance to offer an explanation as to why he did not raise his claim in his first application. His only response was that his second application was dismissed without prejudice. As we conclude above, however, the issues raised in the third petition could have been raised in the first petition, making the second petition irrelevant. Because McQueen has not offered any showing of cause, the district court properly dismissed McQueen’s petition for abuse of the writ, and its judgment is AFFIRMED.
. There is no evidence in the record of a prior habeas attack on the 1970 conviction.
. The jury instruction apparently was unconstitutional, as the Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently has held. See State v. Searle, 339 So.2d 1194 (La. 1976). The Louisiana courts, however, have refused to apply Searle retroactively. See State v. Spears, 363 So.2d 479 (La.1978).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1