What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James C. HENLEY, Appellant, v. D. M. HERITAGE, Warden, U. S. Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, Appellee.
No. 21381.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 26, 1964.
Chester E. Wallace, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
Julius M. Hulsey, Asst. U. S. Atty., Gus L. Wood, Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., Charles L. Goodson, U. S. Atty., for appellee.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, BELL, Circuit Judge, and WHITEHURST, District Judge.
BELL, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus. Henley was convicted in 1960 in the United States District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, on three separate indictments of burglarizing United States Post Offices. The court orally pronounced sentence as follows:
“In the case of James Carson Henley, in Case No. 12,860, it is the judgment of the Court that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement for a period of five years; that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement for a period of five years in Case No. 12,861; and that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for confinement for a period of five years in Case No. 2021; these sentences to run consecutively.”
The sole question presented is whether this pronouncement of sentence failed adequately to specify the sequence in which the three sentences were to be served. If the sequence is not adequately specified, the sentences must be deemed to run concurrently. Cf. United States v. Daugherty, 1926, 269 U.S. 360, 46 S.Ct. 156, 70 L.Ed. 309, where the test was stated as follows:
“Sentences in criminal cases should reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them. The elimination of every possible doubt cannot be demanded. Tested by this standard, the judgment here questioned was sufficient to impose total imprisonment for 15 years made up of three 5-year terms, one under the first count, one under the second, and one under the third, to be served consecutively, and to follow each other in the same sequence as the counts appeared in the indictment. This is the reasonable and natural implication from the whole entry. The words, 'said terms of imprisonment to run consecutively and not concurrently,’ are not consistent with a 5-year sentence.”
We hold that the clear meaning of the above quoted language is that the sequence of sentences is to follow the order in which the sentences were announced, and that consequently, the prisoner is entitled to no relief. The facts together with the reasoning of the court in Young v. United States, 8 Cir., 1960, 274 F.2d 698, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 1961, 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853, support our conclusion. Like the present case, Young involved sentences imposed on three separate indictments. The court held that the sequence should follow the order in which the sentences were announced. The only differences betwen Young and the present case are, first, that in Young the sentencing court pronounced sentence in the numerical order of the indictments, and second, the written commitment order made it clear that the order in which the sentences were announced was the sequence intended. We do not deem either of these differences significant. See also Fleish v. Swope, 9 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 310, where the court imposed sentences on separate counts of the same indictment in the numerical order of the counts, and Valdez v. United States, 5 Cir., 1957, 249 F.2d 539, where sentences were imposed in reverse numerical order of the counts. Both cases held that the sequence followed the order in which the sentences were imposed.
Since we hold that the orally pronounced sentence adequately indicated the sentence sequence, it is of no consequence that the judgment and commitments were ambiguous in this regard. Rule 43, F.R.Crim.P., requires that the defendant be present when sentence is announced by the court, and Rule 32(b) requires that the judgment of conviction shall set forth the sentence. It follows that where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment and commitment, the former must control. See Kennedy v. Reid, 1957, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 400, 249 F.2d 492; Payne v. Madigan, 9 Cir., 1960, 274 F.2d 702, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 1961, 366 U.S. 761, 81 S.Ct. 1670, 6 L.Ed.2d 853. See also our recent case of Paccione v. Heritage, 5 Cir., 1963, 323 F.2d 378 cert. denied 377 U.S. 955, 84 S.Ct. 1632, 12 L.Ed.2d 498, for language of a judgment somewhat similar to that of the oral sentence here. The language of the judgment in that ease cleared up an ambiguity in the oral sentence, and it was held that the judgment and sentence together adequately specified the sentence sequence.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0