What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Appeal of CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
November 1, 1927.
No. 33.
1. Collision <@=105(7) — Contention of one of two ferryboats, colliding on trips in fog, that she was practically stii! off her slip, held established by weight of evidence.
The contentions of the ferryboat C. between which and the ferryboat P. there was a collision while they were crossing the Hudson in a fog, that when the P. was sighted the C. was lying just off her slip and practically still, waiting for the slip to be clear, held established by the more credible testimony and the weight of the evidence.
2. Collision <@=100(2) — Ferryboat at such speed in fog as to be unable to prevent collision after seeing other still in water held at fault.
That a ferryboat, colliding in a fog with another practically still in the water, was proceeding at a speed too great to enable her to stop within the -distance at which she could see the other, held to place the responsibility on her.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
In the m'atter of the petitions of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, as owner of the ferryboat Plainfield, and of tbe New York Central Railroad Company, as owner of the ferryboat Catskill, for limitation of liability. From a decree granting limitation, and holding both boats a-t fault for collision, their owners appeal.
Modified.
On the morning of February 3, 1923, in foggy weather, a collision occurred in the Hudson river between the ferryboat Plain-field, owned by the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, and the ferryboat Catskill, owned by tbe New York Central Railroad Company, resulting in injury to persons and property. Each ferryboat owner filed a petition for limitation of liability, and filed its claim for damages to its own vessel in the proceeding of the other. Originally there was also a personal injury claim filed against each vessel, but by agreement between the petitioners this claimant was paid and withdrew from the proceedings. The two causes were tried together. Each ferryboat contended that its engines had been stopped before the other had been sighted; that it was practically still in the water, or just gathering sternway,. when the collision occurred; and that without fault on its part it was rammed by the other vessel traveling at excessive speed. The District Court found both vessels at fault and, damages having been fixed by stipulation, entered a final decree granting the limitation of liability and allowing each vessel a recovery of half of its damages against the other. Each has appealed. Modified.
Kirlin, Woolsey, Campbell, Hickox & Keating and Macklin, Brown, Lenahan & Speer, all of New York City (Robert S. Erskine and Horace L. Cheyney, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellant Central R. Co. of New Jersey.
Bigham, Englar & Jones, of New York City (Leonard J. Matteson, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant New York Cent. R. Co.
Before MANTON, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Circuit Judge.
The evidence presented a sharp conflict of testimony on all of the important issues of fact, and, if the District Judge had made detailed findings, we should hesitate to disturb them. Inasmuch, however, as he made no comment on the credibility of any witness, and no finding of the specific facts upon which is predicated his conclusion that both vessels were at fault, we have found it necessary to examine the record and determine for ourselves, as best we can, the truth of the matter.
The Plainfield was on a trip from Communipaw, N. J., to her slip at Liberty street, New York. In a general sense, she crosses and comes up the Hudson river. The Catskill was on a trip from Weehawken, N. J., to her slip at Cortlandt street, New York. In a general sense, she-was bound down the river. Her slip was the middle one of five slips which lie between Pier 13 to the north and Pier 11 to the south. The distance between these piers is about 500 feet. The Plain-field’s slip was adjacent to and south of the New York Central slip, for which the Catskill was bound. On the end of Pier 11 is a fog bell of the Central Railroad of New Jersey. Another fog bell is located on the rack between the New York Central’s slip and the Pennsylvania’s slip adjacent on the north.
The collision occurred at a point close to the ferry slips above mentioned at about 8:55 a. m., Catskill’s time. Her clock was probably somewhat slower than the Plainfield’s, for the latter left Communipaw at 8:52 a. m., her time, and her usual running time to her New York slip is about 7 minutes. In the vicinity of the slips the fog was very dense. Both vessels were blowing proper fog signals. When they sighted each other, they were, according to both captains, only about 75 feet apart on crossing courses; the Catskill having the Plainfield on her starboard bow. The tide was flood. After the collision each vessel proceeded to her slip.
As to the foregoing facts there is substantial agreement, but in respect to all other material facts the stories of the two ferryboats are in great conflict.
The Plainfield contends in .her pleadings that the collision occurred about 200 feet off the end of Pier 11. The testimony of her wheelsman and her lookout is to this effect. Her master seems to place it a little farther north. He says he was headed straight for his slip, which he had in full view. He says, also, that, having previously stopped his engines, he was-just drifting inshore when the Catskill suddenly appeared on his port side, coming with “good speed.” He immediately put the engines full speed astern, and his boat was still in the water at the moment of impact. He testified that the angle of collision was a right angle, the bow of the Catskill striking the port side of the Plainfield about 45 feet from her bow. Eour other members of the crew corroborated in various particulars the master’s version of the events.
The witnesses for the Catskill locate the place of collision farther north, just off her slip. Her master says he fixed her position by the fog bell on Pier 11, which bore dead ahead, and the bell on the Pennsylvania rack, which was abreast of the pilot house. With her engines stopped, she was just stemming the tide and waiting for the ferryboat Utica to come out of the Catskill’s slip. While the Catskill was lying in this position, the Plain-field suddenly appeared out of the fog, about 50 feet away and nearly abreast on the starboard side. The Catskill’s engines were immediately ordered full speed astern, and were backing when the Plainfield rode over the Catskill on the starboard bow. After only a few turns of the propeller, the Catskill’s stern struck the end of Pier 13, indicating that she was moving astern and close to Pier 13 at the moment of the collision. Immediately after the collision the Utica left the slip and passed aeross the bow of the Catskill. Pour other members of her crew and five passengers on the Catskill corroborate various details of this version of the accident. There were seven of the Catskill’s passengers, «ailed as witnesses for the personal injury claimant, whose testimony was less favorable to her.
We are satisfied that the weight of the evidence fixes the location of the collision where the Catskill contends it was, rather than off Pier 11, as the Plainfield contends. The fact that the Catskill backed into Pier 13 immediately after the accident, and the fact that the Utica, in leaving the slip crossed her bow, give corroboration to the testimony of her crew and certain of her passenger witnesses as to her location. Furthermore, it seems inherently improbable that she would so far have lost her way as to have passed hef slip and proceeded down to Pier 11 at good speed, because of the slip bell and the bell on Pier 11.
The location of the Catskill has a hearing on the disputed question of her speed. It gives imobability to her story that she had stopped, waiting for her slip to be clear. Moreov.er, the only witnesses who can be regarded as disinterested are the passengers not involved in the collision as injured persons or as friends of the injured. They had no reason to favor the Catskill. On the other hand, had she been guilty of the negligence charged, they would have been likely to feel outraged and to testify willingly to her faults. Their testimony substantiates her story in many of its details, and particularly in respect to her cessation of nearly all speed when she got abreast of her slip. The character of the damage which she suffered also gives persuasive -evidence that, if she was not actually moving backward at the moment of impact, her speed was much less than that of the Plainfield. The boats came together at an acute angle, and the overhanging guard of the Plainfield swept the starboard bow, shed, and deck of the Catskill, moving from aft forward. Not only do the witnesses so testify, but the photograph of the damage, particularly the bent davit, makes this very clear. Damage of this character is not, we think, consistent with the theory of the surveyor that the Plainfield was still and the Catskill the forward moving vessel.
It is urged that Capt. Penney’s report to the local inspectors refutes the Catskill’s claim that she stopped her engines for a minute or two before the Plainfield was sighted, and contains an admission that she had too much headway, to avoid the collision. We fail to find any essential inconsistency between his testimony and his report. But at most the report would be but an admission, •and subject to refutation by other testimony. It would serve no useful purpose to review in detail all the testimony of the 26 witnesses. We have read it with care, hut it suffices to ^ say that we are satisfied that the more credible testimony and the weight of the evidence establish that the Catskill was practically still in the water when the Plainfield was sighted, and immediately thereafter started her engines full speed astern. We find that the Plainfield was proceeding at a speed too great to enable her to stop within the distance at which she could see the Catskill. Responsibility for the collision is therefore hers. The Rosaleen, 214 F. 252 (C. C. A. 2).
The decree must he modified, to exonerate the Catskill, and to hold the Plainfield solely responsible.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1