What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ella HOPSON, Appellant, v. Karl ASCH, County Prosecutor, Union County, New Jersey and George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General for the State of New Jersey, Appellees.
No. 71-1082.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 19, 1972.
Decided March 14, 1972.
Richard I. Samuel, Lerner, David & Littenberg, Newark, N. J. (Stephen Nagler, American Civil Liberties Union of N. J., Newark, N. J., on the brief) for appellant.
Elson P. Kendall, Asst. Prosecutor, Elizabeth, N. J. (Karl Asch, Union County Prosecutor, Elizabeth, N. J., on the brief) for appellee Asch.
Michael R. Perle, Dept. of Law and Public Safety, East Orange, N. J. (George F. Kugler, Jr., Atty. Gen. of N. J., Trenton, N. J., on the brief), for appellee Kugler.
Before ADAMS and JAMES ROSEN, Circuit Judges, and STAPLETON, District Judge.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing the complaint filed by appellant, Ella Hopson.
Ella Hopson was indicted on two counts. The first count charged her with inciting an assault upon a police officer of the City of Linden, New Jersey, on September 19, 1968, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S. 2A:148-10(b). The second count alleged Ella Hopson committed an assault and battery upon the same police officer on the same occasion in violation of N.J.S. 2A:90-4(a).
Appellant was convicted on the first count, N.J.S. 2A: 148-10 (b) and acquitted on the second count, N.J.S. 2A:90-4(a). Her appeal from the conviction is pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. After she was convicted but prior to appeal, Ella Hopson filed a complaint in the district court seeking to permanently enjoin the enforcement of N.J.S. 2A:148-10 and a declaratory judgment determining that the statute is violative of the Constitution of the United States.
In her complaint she alleges N.J.S. 2A: 148-10 is void and unconstitutional on its face in that the statute (a) violates the fundamental guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of thought and freedom of belief, and the freedom of citizens to petition their government for a redress of grievances, all of which are guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, (b) is overly broad and vague and its over-broad sweep has a chilling effect upon the exercise of rights guaranteed to all citizens by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and (c) violates the guarantees of due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment in that its provisions are vague and indefinite and fail to meet the requirement of certainty in statutes which are enforced by criminal sanctions.
The recent cases of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) are dispositive of appellant’s arguments. The national policy forbids federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances, Younger. Declaratory relief is also improper when a prosecution involving the challenged statute is pending in a state court at the time the federal suit is instituted, Samuels. We do not find any facts or circumstances which would remove this case from the general rule. The language in Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 244, 46 S.Ct. 492, 493, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926) cited in Younger is appropriate:
“The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford protection.” (emphasis supplied)
We are satisfied that the complaint does not disclose a bad faith state prosecution or harassment by the prosecutor.
The order of the district court dated December 11, 1970 is affirmed.
. On December 11, 1970 the district court judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenged the constitutionality of N.J.S. 2A :148-10 which, in pertinent part, reads as follows :
“Any person who, in public or private, by speech, writing, printing or otherwise, advocates, encourages, justifies, praises or incites:
b. Assaults upon any of the armed forces of the United States, the national guard, or the police force of this or any other state or of any municipality; . Is guilty of a high misdemeanor.”
. Prior to trial Ella Hopson moved to dismiss the indictment for substantially the same reasons advanced on this appeal. The motion was denied. State v. Hopson, 109 N.J.Super. 382, 2&3 A.2d 205 (Law Div. 1970).
See also State v. Cappon, 118 N.J.Super. 9, 285 A.2d 287 (Law Liv. 1971) where the court declined to dismiss an indictment for an alleged violation of N.J.S. 2A:148-10(b) where defendant contended that the staute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments in that the said statute is vague and overbroad.
. State v. Hopson, Docket No. A-1672.
. On May 1, 1971 appellant sought to file an “offer of proof” of facts which she claims fall within the allegations of paragraph 10 of her complaint which alleges that “the existence of said statute [N.J.S. 2A:148-10] among the laws of New Jersey and the enforcement of it has the immediate purpose and effect of harassing and intimidating plaintiff and thousands of other citizens and of deterring and discouraging plaintiff and these thousands of others from the immediate exercise of rights, privileges, and immunities secured to them by the Federal Constitution and in particular the rights of freedom of speech and association.” The offer involves charges of “harassment” by the Mayor and members of the linden Police Department. The only “offer of proof” in-volving defendant Karl Asch is that “The prosecutor of Union County had sufficient records in his possession to be aware of the actions being taken by the police officers. Notwithstanding this knowledge, he proceeded through two prosecutions of the plaintiff under a patently unconstitutional statute.” This so-called “offer of proof” is not verified and is signed by the attorney for appellant. The cavalier conclusion that the prosecution of Ella Hop-son was under a “patently unconstitutional statute” does not make it so. The Civil Rights Act should not be misused as a device for federal review of a pending state criminal proceeding. Cf. Rodes v. Municipal Authority of Milford, 409 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1969).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0