What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Edgar Vernell FUTRELL, Appellant, v. Donald WYRICK, Appellee.
No. 83-1387.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 12, 1983.
Decided Sept. 15, 1983.
John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Rosalynn Van Heest, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellee.
L. Steven Goldblatt, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Before HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Edgar Futrell appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He is serving 45 years in the Missouri State Penitentiary for his role in a 1976 armed robbery. FutrelPs present appeal challenges the district court’s admission of a series of mugshots and the jury’s viewing of those mugshots at his trial. Futrell contends that admission of the mugshots violated his right to due process, his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, and his sixth amendment right to present evidence in his own behalf.
At the inception of Futrell’s trial, the government marked a series of nine photographs for identification. Each photograph included a frontal pose along with a profile pose and one of the nine was a photograph of Futrell. Several witnesses had previously picked out Futrell’s photograph from a spread of mugshots, thus the government argued that the photographs were relevant to the issue of identification. Defense counsel argued that introduction of Futrell’s mugshot would be far too prejudicial because it would be “tantamount to telling the jury that * * * [Futrell] had prior police contact.” The district court admitted the photographs as relevant to the issue of identification, and the government agreed not to pass the photographs to the jury or to refer to the photographs as “mugshots.” Near the end of the trial, over defense counsel’s objection, the jury was allowed to view the group of photographs.
[I] Habeas corpus relief will not be granted unless the error allegedly constituting a denial of due process was “of such magnitude that it fatally infected the trial and failed to afford petitioner the fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process.” Harris v. Wyrick, 634 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 916, 101 S.Ct. 1994, 68 L.Ed.2d 308 (1981). Thus, the standard to be applied in assessing the merits of a habeas corpus petition is much more stringent than the balancing of probity against prejudice that the district court engages in to determine the admissibility of mugshots as evidence at trial. United States v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 414, 420-21 (7th Cir.1975).
This court has recognized the potentially prejudicial effect of exposing a jury to mugshots. United States v. Watts, 532 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847, 97 S.Ct. 131, 50 L.Ed.2d 119 (1976). In this case, however, the introduction of the mugshots into evidence cannot be said to have violated notions of fundamental fairness. The manner in which the photographs were introduced was unexceptionable. The photographs were never referred to as “mugshots” and all police data was removed from them. Further, the jury was allowed to view the photographs but was not allowed to handle them. While a separate presentation of frontal and profile poses would have been preferable, Watts, supra, 532 F.2d at 1217, we cannot say that failing to separate the poses rendered Futrell’s trial fundamentally unfair. In similar circumstances a dual view mugshot was held admissible where police data was deleted. United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 263-64 (2d Cir.1980).
Futrell also claims that the admission of the photographs into evidence chilled the exercise of his fifth amendment right not to testify and his sixth amendment right to testify and present evidence. We cannot agree. Because the admissibility of the photographs had been entirely resolved before Futrell made his decision not to testify, his trial strategy was based on complete knowledge of the circumstances.
Although we may have decided the issue of admissibility of the mugshots differently had we presided at Futrell’s trial, we cannot say that the district court’s admission of the mugshots rendered Futrell’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0