What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LOCAL NO. 380 INTERNATIONAL UNION, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, and Flambeau Plastics Corporation, Intervenor.
No. 17104.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
June 9, 1969.
Kenneth R. Loebel, Goldberg, Previant & Uelmen, Milwaukee, Wis., for petitioner.
Walter S. Davis, Russ R. Mueller, Davis, Kuelthau, Vergeront & Stover, Milwaukee, Wis., for intervenor.
Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Charles N. Steele, Atty., N.L. R.B., Washington, D. C., Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nancy M. Sherman, Atty., N.L.R.B., for respondent.
Before KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and KILEY and FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judges.
KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Petitioner, Local 380, International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, seeks review and revocation of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board issued June 27, 1968, reported at 172 NLRB No. 33, dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint against the intervenor, Flambeau Plasties Corporation. This Court has jurisdiction under § 10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, Title 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The alleged unfair labor practice occurred in Bara-boo, Wisconsin, at the intervenor’s plant there.
The facts are largely stipulated. The petitioner was certified as the collective bargaining representative of the production and maintenance workers at inter-venor’s plant in March, 1963. In May, 1965, after a number of unfair labor practices by intervenor, it entered into a one-year contract with the petitioner.
Prior to and during negotiations for a successor agreement, intervenor committed further unfair labor practices. On September 15, 1966, the intervenor withdrew recognition from petitioner asserting a good faith doubt as to the petitioner’s continued majority.
Meanwhile a strike had begun on June 15, 1966.
On May 25, 1967, the Trial Examiner found that the intervenor had violated § 8(a) (5). The Board’s Order adopting the Examiner’s decision was entered October 13, 1967. In its opinion, filed August 2, 1968, in Flambeau Plastics Corporation, petitioner, v. NLRB, respondent, and Local 380, International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, intervenor, 7 Cir., 401 F.2d 128, cert. den. January 13, 1969, 393 U.S. 1019, 89 S.Ct. 625, 21 L.Ed.2d 563, this Court ordered enforcement of the Board’s direction that intervenor bargain with petitioner, and on application offer reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions to all strikers, dismissing, if necessary, persons hired after the strike began.
Prior to the filing of the Board’s Order of October 12, 1967, on July 18, 1967, petitioner wrote intervenor that the strike would be “terminated” on July 20, 1967, and demanded resumption of bargaining on the basis of the decision made two months before by the trial examiner whose recommendation was adopted in the Board Order described above.
On July 20, 1967, sixty-one of the strikers sent individual but identical applications for reinstatement to the in-tervenor. These included the following statement:
Further, I make this application for reinstatement with the understanding that Flambeau Plastics will continue to recognize and commence bargaining with my duly designated bargaining representative * * * in regard to my wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. * * * I am no longer striking, but on the contrary I am willing and available to return to work, but not if it means that I must subsidize an employer who imposes unlawful conditions upon my reinstatement.
On July 24, 1967, intervenor replied to the petitioner that it continued to doubt its majority and to the applicants for reinstatement that it was “prepared to consider an unconditional offer * * * to return to regular, full-time employment * * * ” and setting a time for such application at the personnel office.
July 26, 1967, fifty-eight of the applicants wrote again stating:
[Y]ou are conditioning any consideration of my reinstatement on my foregoing my right to presently engage in collective bargaining, which right the National Labor Relations Act affords to me. * * * I am willing to return to work with all the rights that the law affords to me including the right to bargain collectively * * * I have not insisted on any conditions * * * other than those * * * conditions imposed by virtue of law. As to the conditions imposed by law, I believe I have the right to insist on their present enforcement.
On July 31, 1967, intervenor answered that:
You should understand clearly that Flambeau asks you to waive no rights guaranteed to you under Federal or State law as a condition to your returning to work. By the same token, you cannot demand Flambeau to waive any rights guaranteed to it by Federal or State law as a condition to your returning to work. We fully intend to comply with the processes which you invoked to assert what you believed to be your rights.
The majority of the Board found that these requests for reinstatement conditioned return to work on agreement to resume bargaining with the union, and no unconditional application having been made, the intervenor had not committed a violation of § 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act in rejecting these applications. We agree.
A request for reinstatement demanding that the employer remedy the unfair labor practice which the strike protests is a conditional request and the employer is not required to reinstate the applicant. Golay & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 7 Cir., 1966, 371 F.2d 259, cert. den. 387 U.S. 944, 87 S.Ct. 2079, 18 L.Ed.2d 1332.
Whatever may be said of the numerous unfair labor practices in its history, the intervenor did assert its willingness • to leave the determination of the validity of its conduct to the processes of the Act and announced its intention to comply with the decision ultimately reached through these processes, an event which occurred after all the briefs had been filed in this appeal. The intervenor did not ask returning employees to forego their right of representation.
We have studied the cases on which the petitioner relies and find them distinguished on their facts. For example, it was the employer who imposed conditions to reinstatement in Phelps Dodge Corporation v. NLRB, 1941, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 and Portage Plastics Co., 1967, 163 NLRB No. 102.
We find reasonable the Board’s refusal to distinguish between employees’ continuing to strike in protest against a refusal to bargain which occurs during an unfair labor practice strike and a new strike to protest the new unfair labor practice.
We agree with the Board that it did not reach the issue in NLRB v. Fleet-wood Trailer Co., 1967, 389 U.S. 375, 88 S.Ct. 543, 19 L.Ed.2d 614 which petitioner cites as setting down guidelines. The offers to return in Fleetwood were evidently conceded to be unconditional. The Court there held that the rejection of such offers could be supported by legitimate and substantial business justifications but that the burden of such a defense was on the employer and that he did not sustain it by a mere showing that jobs were unavailable on the precise date of the applications. The intervenor here based his rejection of the offers on the nature of the offers themselves. We do not agree with the petitioner that the Board was unduly technical in its view of the offers to return to work. The exchange of correspondence made it clear that the employer would reinstate on an unconditional application leaving the ultimate decision to the “processes of the Act.”
The petition for review is denied.
Denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0