What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Willis W. CARTER.
No. 73-2179.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 24, 1974.
Decided June 7, 1974.
Harry R. Benner, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Warren L. Miller, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellant. Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty. at the time the record was filed and James W. Djgihm, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered appearances for appellant.
William J. Garber, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court) for appellee.
Before McGOWAN and TAMM, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.
Sitting by designation jrarsuant to 28 TJ.S.C. § 291(a).
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal by the United States from an order of the district court granting appellee’s motion to suppress certain evidence seized from him at the time of his arrest. The question for review is whether probable cause existed for the arrest and incident search of appellee.
Both arresting officers testified at the suppression hearing and related the circumstances of appellee’s arrest as follows. ■ On the day of the arrest Officer Jenkins received a telephone call from an informer who stated that a man known to him as “Mousey” was selling narcotics near the corner of Eighth and 0 Streets — known to the police as a place where “any type of narcotics” could be purchased. According to Officer Jenkins, the caller described the man as a heavy-set Negro male about six feet tall and wearing red shorts, a white T- • shirt and a multi-colored cap. The caller also stated that the suspect had a white towel around his neck and was carrying the narcotics in a paper cup. Within three or four minutes of the call Officer Jenkins and Officer Vavrick arrived in the vicinity of Eighth and 0 Streets and were met by the informer. According to the testimony of the two officers, the informer then told them that the suspect had moved to the next block on 0 Street. The officers proceeded to the eight-hundred block of 0 Street- where they saw a man meeting the description given by the informer. The man was sitting on the trunk of a parked car. Beside him was a towel draped over an object which had the shape of a paper cup. The two officers approached the subject from opposite directions. Vavrick seized the cup from behind and Jenkins placed the suspect •under arrest. At the hearing both witnesses identified the appellee as the person they had arrested on 0 Street. The paper cup is alleged to have contained cocaine.
Testimony also discloses that the informant had recently been arrested by Officer Jenkins and had agreed to provide the names of persons who were selling drugs in the District of Columbia. Although the informant had not provided such information prior to the incident under discussion, he had demonstrated to Officer Jenkins a knowledge of the identities of narcotics dealers in various areas of the city which corresponded with police suspicions.
“Probable cause” is a constitutional standard which prohibits arrests unless the arresting officer has knowledge or “trustworthy information” of facts and circumstances which would “warrant a man of reasonable caution” in the belief that the arrestee has committed a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). In the present case the arrest was based not on the policeman’s own knowledge of the facts but on an informant’s representation that appellee was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics on a Washington street. The facts related by the informant, if true, would clearly warrant a reasonable belief that appellee had committed a crime.
The only question, then, is whether this information was trustworthy. An evaluation of the trustworthiness of an informant’s tip requires two inquiries — one focusing upon the credibility of the informant himself and one focusing upon the validity of his conclusion that the arrestee has committed a crime. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). The latter inquiry reveals that the tip was more than just a conclusory accusation. The informant reported that he had seen appellee selling narcotics on the street within view of the telephone booth from which he spoke to Officer Jenkins. There is no danger that the informant had obtained his information “from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar.” Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). By its terms, the tip purports to be based on the first hand knowledge of the informer, a person who had previously demonstrated familiarity with the illicit narcotics trade in the District of Columbia. The first branch of the Aguilar analysis is therefore satisfied.
Our second inquiry with respect to an informant’s report scrutinizes the reliability of the informant himself. The burden of the Government is to show facts and circumstances from which the officers could reasonably conclude that the informant was credible. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 378 U.S. at 114. We think that the Government has met its burden. Having been arrested for petty larceny the day before, the informant had a motive to cooperate with the police. As Officer Jenkins put it, “[the informant] sort of took it that I was going to help him out” in exchange for his cooperation in apprehending narcotics dealers. More significantly, the informant met the officers near the scene of the arrest and gave them additional information regarding appellee’s movements. This confirmed that the informant was in fact in the vicinity at the time of the tip. Finally, the officers were able to corroborate by their own observation all aspects of the suspect’s description, including the presence of a paper cup, before the arrest. Taken together, these three factors would lead a reasonable man to credit the informant’s report.
Since the informant was credible and his information regarding criminal activity had been obtained in a reliable way, the report received by Officer Jenkins was sufficiently trustworthy to create probable cause for appellee’s arrest. The legality of the arrest, of course, validates the accompanying search which produced the evidence at issue. The order of the district court suppressing that evidence is therefore reversed.
So ordered.
. Testimony of Officer Vavrick, Tr. at 26.
. Officer Jenkins testified as follows :
Q Well now, you indicated to the Prosecutor that he he had not given you information before that was either reliable or unreliable.
A I can’t say reliable. I had met him earlier that afternoon when I came on duty and he was giving me verbal information which I could corroborate.
Q What do you mean by that, sir?
A I would ask him questions about certain areas, who was selling narcotics, who I knew was selling narcotics. lie would say So-and-So was.
THE COURT: That would check with your information, as best you had it?
THE WITNESS : Yes, sir.
Tr. at 12.
. Tr. at 14.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0