What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Iris C. TILLERY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles PARKS, District Director of Internal Revenue Service, and The United States of America, by and through John E. Green, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 78-1915.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued July 11, 1980.
Decided Sept. 9, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 28, 1980.
Joan I. Oppenheimer, Atty., Tax Division, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (M. Carr Ferguson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gilbert E. Andrews and Crombie J. D. Garrett, Attys., Tax Division, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., with her on brief; Larry D. Patton, U. S. Atty., Oklahoma City, Okl., of counsel), for defendants-appellants.
Riley Brock, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before McWILLIAMS, McKAY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff and her husband own their Oklahoma homestead as joint tenants. The husband defaulted in his obligation to pay $29,759.45 in withholding taxes as the responsible officer of two corporations. The Internal Revenue Service filed federal tax liens for the unpaid taxes against all of the husband’s property, including his interest in the homestead.
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to the homestead. The district court granted relief on the authority of our decision in United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973), and ordered the tax liens discharged as against the homestead property. The narrow issue raised by the Government’s appeal is whether federal tax liens arising solely through the tax liability of one spouse may attach to his interest in the homestead of both spouses in Oklahoma. We hold they may.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, provides that the amount of a delinquent taxpayer’s liability “shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” 26 U.S.C. § 6321. State law determines whether the taxpayer has “property” or “rights to property” to which the tax lien may attach. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513, 80 S.Ct. 1277, 1280, 4 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1960). See In re Carlson, 580 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (10th Cir. 1978).
The taxpayer here, plaintiff’s husband, owns an undivided half interest in the property. See Clovis v. Clovis, 460 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Okl.1969); Reynolds, Co-ownership of Property in Oklahoma, 27 Okla.L.Rev. 585 (1974). Due to the homestead nature of this property, Oklahoma law places certain restrictions upon the joint owners and their creditors for the protection of the family. Nevertheless, these constitutional and statutory restrictions do not negate the proprietary interest of the taxpayer. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “all that section 6321 requires is that the interest be ‘property’ or ‘rights to property.’ It is of no statutory moment how extensive may be those rights under state law, or what restrictions exist on the enjoyment of those rights.” United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1970).
Plaintiff contends, however, that our decisions in United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973), and Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944), govern the instant case and preclude the attachment of a federal tax lien on homestead property. Hershberger was an action brought by the United States to foreclose on the Kansas homestead of a husband and wife to satisfy the unpaid tax liability of the husband. We refused to order sale of the property, holding that “[wjhile [the wife] is living on the property, the government may not enforce its tax lien against the homestead.” 475 F.2d at 682. Previously in Jones we said that “a wife is granted an indivisible and vested interest in homestead property, and one which cannot be subjected to levy and sale for the satisfaction of the Federal tax liability of her husband.” 144 F.2d at 480. We went on to hold, however, that the husband’s property was not exempt from sale because the common-law marriage purporting to create the homestead right failed to ripen into a legal marriage under Oklahoma law. In neither Hershberger nor Jones was the propriety of attaching a lien to the husband’s interest in homestead property at issue. Those cases dealt solely with foreclosure.
In holding for plaintiffs here, the district court erred by not drawing a distinction between the attachment of a federal tax lien pursuant to section 6321 and its enforcement in a foreclosure action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7403. Congress has provided that in a foreclosure action brought under section 7403, a court may decree a sale of any property subject to a tax lien. Consequently, we held in Hershberger that a court has equitable discretion to decide whether to order foreclosure. But no such discretion lies under section 6321. It provides that a lien shall attach to all the property of a delinquent taxpayer. Thus, the inquiry ends once it is determined that the husband has a property interest, of whatever extent, in the homestead.
Indeed, Hershberger itself recognized the validity of the lien as against the husband’s interest in his Kansas homestead property. There, we said “§ 6321 imposes a lien upon delinquent taxpayer’s real and personal property,” before we added “it does not necessarily follow that § 7403 requires the courts to satisfy this lien via a tax foreclosure sale.” 475 F.2d at 679. And in United States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1974), we cited Hershberger for the proposition that “once the validity of the lien has been established,” the court has discretion under section 7403 whether to order foreclosure.
We hold that the lien in this case properly attached to the husband’s undivided one-half interest in his Oklahoma homestead. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court.
. See, in pertinent part:
Okl.Const. art. 12:
“§ 1. Extent and value of homestead . . .
“The homestead within any city, town, or village, owned and occupied as a residence only, shall consist of not exceeding one acre of land, to be selected by the owner: Provided, That the same shall not exceed in value the sum of five thousand dollars, and in no event shall the homestead be reduced to less than one-quarter of an acre, without regard to value . . .
“§ 2. Exemption from forced sale — Consent of spouse to sale — Mortgages
“The homestead of the family shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale for the payment of debts, except for the purchase money therefor or a part of such purchase money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and material used in constructing improvements thereon; nor shall the owner, if married, sell the homestead without the consent of his or her spouse, given in such manner as may be prescribed by law; Provided, Nothing in this article shall prohibit any person from mortgaging his homestead, the spouse, if any, joining therein; nor prevent the sale thereof on foreclosure to satisfy any such mortgage.”
31 Okl.Stat.Ann. (Supp.1979-1980):
“§ 1. Property reserved to heads of families — Exemption from attachment, execution or other forced sale
“The following property shall be reserved to every person owning a home and residing therein or to the head of every family residing in the state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for the payment of debts except as herein provided.
“1. The home of such person or head of family. The homestead of the family shall consist of the home of the family whether the title to the same be lodged in or owned by the husband or wife.”
. Section 7403 gives the Government authority to bring an action in district court to enforce a tax lien of the United States against the property of the delinquent taxpayer. In pertinent part, subsection (c) states: “The court . may decree a sale of such property, by the proper officer of the court, and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States.” 26 U.S.C. § 7403(c).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0