What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
William C. HARRIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Luther THOMAS, Warden, Kentucky State Penitentiary, et al., Respondent-Appellee.
No. 15889.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 23, 1965.
William C. Harris, in pro. per.
Robert Matthews, Atty. Gen., Martin Glazer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Ky., for appellee.
Before MILLER, CECIL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before the Court on appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, denying a writ of habeas corpus to William C. Harris, petitioner-appellant, herein. The petitioner was tried before a jury and convicted on an indictment charging armed robbery at the January and February 1956 term of the Marion Circuit Court, Lebanon, Marion County, Kentucky. He was sentenced for life to the Kentucky State Penitentiary, at Eddyville, where he is now confined.
The petitioner contends that the court was without jurisdiction to try his case because the trial judge appointed the Lebanon, Kentucky, City Attorney to represent him. His reasoning is that his counsel by virtue of his position had conflicting interests, was hostile to his cause and could not have been effective in assistance. This alleged conflict of interests is the sole basis of petitioner’s claim that his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States have been violated. In support of this claim, he cites Berry v. Gray, D.C., 155 F.Supp. 494. The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from the petitioner’s situation. There the attorney had been elected county attorney and it was his duty to assist the Commonwealth’s Attorney to prosecute criminal offenses. He had issued the warrant for Berry’s arrest and conducted the examination of witnesses before the Grand Jury.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Lyon Circuit Court of Lyon County was denied on May 8, 1963. On June 21, 1963, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Lyon Circuit Court. The court said in its opinion:
“A city attorney is not charged with any of the duties before a grand jury which are imposed by law upon the county attorney, and is in no sense disqualified ex officio to defend an accused at a trial in the circuit court.”
The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari on January 6, 1964. 375 U.S. 976, 84 S.Ct. 493, 11 L.Ed.2d 421.
There are no facts alleged in the petition which would tend to show that counsel was ineffective or that he did not adequately and impartially represent the petitioner. See O’Malley v. United States, 6 Cir., 285 F.2d 733, and Scott v. United States, 6 Cir., 334 F.2d 72.
Lebanon, Kentucky, is a city of the fourth class. Section 69.560 of Kentucky Revised Statutes provides that among the duties of a city attorney of such a city,
“He shall prosecute all pleas of the Commonwealth and all warrants or proceedings instituted for violation of the ordinances or municipal regulations of the city in the police court, * *
There is no claim that petitioner’s case ever came in any way within the scope of the city attorney’s duties in the police court. No cases have been cited to us in support of the claim that the city attorney was disqualified ex officio to defend the petitioner in the circuit court. We agree with the Kentucky Court of Appeals and conclude that the city attorney was not per se disqualified to represent the petitioner by reason of his office.
Specifically, the only neglect of duty charged to counsel is that he failed to introduce witnesses and did not advise petitioner of the process for obtaining out of state witnesses. We said in O’Malley v. United States, supra,
“In the opinion of trial counsel it may be advantageous not to cross-examine a certain witness, or not to use a witness who, although helpful to the defendant in certain respects, could be made a harmful witness on cross-examination. The testimony of prospective witnesses relied upon by a defendant may prove to be overvalued by the defendant and ineffective when fully developed and analyzed by defense counsel in his pretrial preparation.” 285 F.2d at 734.
The witnesses to whom the petitioner refei’s are not named and there are no allegations of facts about which they would testify, nor in what manner they would have been pertinent to petitioner’s case.
“Conclusions, not substantiated by allegations of fact with some probability of verity, are not sufficient to warrant a hearing.” O’Malley v. United States, 6 Cir., 285 F.2d 733, 735, and cases cited.
We find no error on the part of trial judge in dismissing the petition and the judgment of the District Court is therefore affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1