What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MURRAY v. RIO GRANDE MOTORWAY, Inc.
No. 3702.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 19, 1948.
Delbert M. Draper, of Salt Lake City, Utah (Edgar C. Jensen, of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for appellant.
A. H. Nebeker, of Salt Lake City, Utah (S. J. Quinney and Paul H. Ray, both of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for appellee.
Before, BRATTON, HUXMAN and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
MURRAH, Circuit Judge.
Appellant brought this action against appellee, Rio Grande Motorway, seeking damages for personal injuries, alleging that one of the appellee’s buses, on which he was a standing passenger, “suddenly and violently lurched to one side” and hurled him against a seat with such “force and violence” that he was1 ruptured in his left groin.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court sustained a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the movement complained of was no more than the normal jostling or movement of the bus as it traveled along the highway. The appellant appeals from a judgment for the appellee bus company on the directed verdict. Jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship and requisite amount in controversy, and the only question presented here is whether the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on the issue of negligence.
Although the carrier owed the standing passenger the highest degree of care commensurate with the peculiar circumstances involved, the passenger assumed the usual and ordinary jerks and lurches incident to the movement of the bus over the public highways. Wichita Transportation Co. v. Braly, 10 Cir., 150 F.2d 315, 317; United States v. De Back, 9 Cir., 118 F.2d 208; McQuin v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 155 Kan. 111, 122 P.2d 787; Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. Co., 23 Cal.2d 110, 142 P.2d 929; Waite v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 56 Cal.App.2d 191, 132 P.2d 311; McIntosh v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 7 Cal.2d 90, 59 P.2d 959; Morrisey v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 68 Utah 323, 249 P. 1064.
To parapharse the language of the Utah Supreme Court in the Morrisey case, supra, it is common knowledge and experience that passengers on trains and buses may be shaken and jostled by the ordinary lurches and jerks which are unavoidable in the operation of trains and buses over grades and around curves. A permissible inference of actionable negligence arises only when the lurches or jerks .are unusual and extraordinary — such as would not have happened in the ordinary .course of the operation of the bus upon the 'highway. In determining whether the movement of the bus was so unusual as to justify the inference of negligence, the nature of the accident and the effect of the :bus movement upon the passenger may be taken into consideration. McIntosh v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 7 Cal.2d 90, 59 P.2d 959, 961; Waite v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 56 Cal.App.2d 191, 132 P.2d 311, 316.
In support of his allegations appellant testified that at the time of the accident he was enroute to Salt Lake City as a passenger on appellee’s bus. Not being able to obtain a seat on the bus he was standing in the aisle holding with his left hand onto a %ths inch rope which ran through loops around the baggage shelf above the seats. “While so standing there was a violent motion of the bus. It changed direction or jumped. There was an unusual motion and I was propelled against the seat. I struck Miss Snow (a seated passenger) on the shoulder and feel across her lap,” and “as I fell my left groin struck the corner of -the seat.” After regaining his feet he stated to passenger Snow “that the bump 'hurt like everything,” but he did not complain to the driver or notice whether any .of the other passengers had been disturbed ;by the lurch, because “I didn’t even know I was hurt.” It was his impression that -the bus was traveling about 50 miles per hour because he was being “jostled considerably,” but that when the accident occurred he.could not say whether the speed ;.had “lessened or increased.” That there was just an “unusual motion,” but he did not know what caused it.
Passenger Snow testified that she was seated near the aisle where appellant was standing; that somewhere along the trip “he fell against the seat and nearly fell into my lap.” That he apologized and remarked that the fall had hurt him. She did not testify however concerning any unusual motion of the bus. The driver did not recall any unusual or extraordinary incident.
It is suggested, and the trial court was of the opinion, that there was nothing in the evidence to show that appellant’s fall was the result of a sudden and violent lurch; that it could have been the result of the passenger becoming unbalanced while holding onto the sliding baggage rope. The trial court took the view that the facts in this case were analogous to those in the Morrisey case supra, and required the same conclusion. In that case the descriptipn of the jolt or lurch and its consequences as detailed by the witnesses did not characterize it as unusual or extarordinary, but "rather affirmatively showed it to have been a usual or customary incident of railroad transportation. In our case, however, the motion of the bus was described as “unusual” and “violent,” propelling the standing passenger against the seat and across the lap of a seated passenger.
True, appellant was unable to describe with particularity the place or cause of the motion, which he claimed caused his fall and injury. But, he was standing in the bus with his head above the windows, it was dark and he was unfamiliar with the surroundings; he cannot, therefore, be charged with the duty of describing the nature, the place or the cause of the movement which he testified was of sufficient force to propel him against the seat causing an immediately demonstrable injury. We think these circumstances were sufficient to generate a permissible inference of negligence and an issue of fact for the jury.
It is suggested that the evidence conclusively shows contributory negligence, but we think at most it was a question for the jury. Cf. Waite v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 56 Cal.App.2d 191, 132 P.2d 311.
Reversed and remanded, with directions to grant the appellant a new trial in accordance with the views herein expressed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1