What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
SMITH v. UNITED STATES (two cases).
Nos. 6329, 6330.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 17, 1932.
See, also, 43 F.(2d) 173.
Henry E. Kahn, of Houston, Tex., for appellant.
H. M. Holden, U. S. Atty., of Houston, Tex.
Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denied June 29, 1932.
BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from convictions on two indictments charging violations of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA). The only error assigned is that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to appellant’s plea of immunity from prosecution. The facts as alleged in that plea as a bar to both indictments are these: A prohibition agent named Cheatham was indicted in a state court of Texas for transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of a statute of that state (Pen. Code 1925, art. 666). Upon Cheatham’s application, the ease against him was removed to the federal District Court, where it was prosecuted by the state attorney, and defended by the United States attorney, pursuant to 28 USCA § 76. Appellant appeared as a witness at that trial and testified for the prosecution, in obedience to a subpoena. On his direct examination he testified, without objection on his part, that he caused two other men to place in an automobile liquor which Cheatham later transported, and also that he was under indictment for violating the federal prohibition law. But none of his evidence even remotely related to the facts of the instant eases. On cross-examination, after his claim of privilege to refuse to answer was overruled, he made the general admission that he and the two men who put the liquor in the automobile for Cheatham to get were in the liquor business together.
The prohibition agent Cheatham was entitled to have the ease against him removed to the federal court. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 46 S. Ct. 185, 70 L. Ed. 449. But the removal merely changed the forum; the ease still remained a state case, and did not become one charging a violation of the National Prohibition Act. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. Ed. 648; Carter v. Tennessee (C. C. A.) 18 F.(2d) 850; Miller v. Kentucky (C. C. A.) 40 F.(2d) 820. Appellant’s rights as a witness were therefore precisely the same as they would have been had Cheatham’s ease been tried in the state court. Article 694 of the Penal Code of Texas provides that no person shall be excused from testifying against one accused of violating the state prohibition laws upon the ground that his testimony will tend to incriminate him, “but no person required to so testify shall be punishable for acts disclosed by such testimony.” The immunity thus conferred by the state statute does not protect a witness from prosecution by the United States, for violations of the National Prohibition Act, but such witnesses can only claim the immunity granted by the federal statute, 27 USCA § 47; Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372, 26 S. Ct. 73, 50 L. Ed. 234, 4 Ann. Cas. 689. It doubtless is true that the immunity granted by the just cited federal statute must, in order to comply with the Fifth Amendment, afford protection from prosecution in the state courts. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 585, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819. The section of the National Prohibition Act granting immunity (27 USCA § 47) meets this test, as it completely protects from prosecution any natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena of any court in any suit or proceeding growing out of any violation of that act, testifies concerning any transaction, matter, or thing under investigation. Although the language used is broad enough to include witnesses for the defense, it was clearly intended to protect only witnesses who appear in obedience to a subpoena and testify truthfully on behalf of the government. United States v. Ernest (D. C.) 280 F. 515; Brady v. United States (C. C. A.) 39 F.(2d) 312. Appellant was a witness, not for the United States, but for the state of Texas, and therefore he does not bring himself within the protection of the federal immunity statute. Besides, since his testimony in Cheatham’s ease had no relation or relevancy to the charges upon which he was tried and convicted, his plea of immunity presented no defense. Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 33 S. Ct. 226, 57 L. Ed. 450, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 128. It affirmatively appears that the government has not taken any advantage of him, or sought to punish him for anything he did in connection with the offense of which Cheat-ham was convicted, or to use any of his testimony in Cheatham’s case against him.
The judgments are affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0