What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
Floyd F. CAVITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 82-1411.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 12, 1983.
Reginald LaBunker and Gary R. Terrill of McCullough, Wareheim & LaBunker, Topeka, Kan., for plaintiff-appellant.
Jim J. Marquez, U.S. Atty., Karen Humphreys, Asst. U.S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., and Joseph S. Friedman, Trial Atty., Office of the Gen. Counsel, Social Security Div., Dept, of Health and Human Services, Baltimore, Md., for defendant-appellee.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and McWIL-LIAMS and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a district court judgment upholding the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ denial of disability insurance benefits to Floyd F. Cavitt. Jurisdiction is based on 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse.
1. Background
To ensure uniformity in adjudication of claims for disability benefits, the Secretary has since 1979 employed a systematized sequential evaluation scheme to determine whether claimants are disabled. The scheme is set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1982).
Progressing through the steps of the scheme, the Secretary found that Cavitt was not performing “substantial gainful activity;” that Cavitt had a severe physical impairment, namely, a spinal injury; that Cavitt’s impairment was not listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Social Security Regulation No. 4 and was not equivalent to a listed impairment; and that Cavitt could not do “past relevant work.” Therefore, the Secretary proceeded to the last step in the sequential scheme.
The Secretary then made the determinations required by the last step of the scheme. Specifically, the Secretary found that Cavitt had the “residual functional capacity” to do sustained “sedentary work,” that Cavitt had graduated from high school, that Cavitt had no transferable job skills, and that Cavitt was thirty-six years old. Having made these determinations, the Secretary turned to Table 1 of Appendix 2 of Subpart P of Social Security Regulation No. 4 to ascertain whether Cavitt was eligible for disability benefits. The Secretary found that under Rule 201.27 of that table a claimant who has the “residual functional capacity” to do “sedentary work,” has a high school diploma, has no transferable job skills, and is thirty-six years old is deemed not to be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Therefore, the Secretary ruled that Cavitt was not disabled. As indicated, the district court upheld that determination.
2. Discussion
Cavitt’s initial argument is that the record does not support the Secretary’s finding that he has the “residual functional capacity” to perform sustained sedentary work. For this reason, Cavitt maintains, it was error for the Secretary to apply Rule 201.27. See, e.g., Proctor v. Schweiker, 526 F.Supp. 70, 75 (D.Md.1981).
We note preliminarily that the role of this Court is to determine on the entire record whether the Secretary’s finding is supported by “substantial evidence.” Lovett v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1981); Cagle v. Califano, 638 F.2d 219 (10th Cir.1981). “Substantial evidence” is more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1083 (5th Cir.1981). It is evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as being adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. at 1427; Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d at 1083.
The record in this case consists primarily of the testimony of Cavitt and the written statements of two physicians who examined him. Cavitt testified that as a result of his spinal injury he is unable to stand for more than one hour or to sit for more than twice that time without experiencing disabling pain. He also testified, however, that he has substantial use of his arms and legs; that he sometimes does household chores for brief periods; that he does not take a prescribed anodyne for his pain; that he submitted two job applications after the date on which he allegedly became disabled; and that he thought he might be able to perform light work in a sitting position for eight full hours day-to-day, but that he was not certain because he had not tried.
The written statements of the two physicians indicated that Cavitt’s injury had resulted in loss of flexibility and extension and that Cavitt was likely to experience acute pain when standing, walking, or lifting. Both physicians concluded that Cavitt’s impairment constituted a severe disability, and one of the physicians stated that Cavitt was totally disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (1982) defines “sedentary work” as follows:
Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
If a claimant cannot perform work falling within this definition for more than a brief period, then it is improper to apply the rules set forth in Appendix 2 of Subpart P of Social Security Regulation No. 4. E.g., Davis v. Schweiker, 536 F.Supp. 90, 98 (N.D. Cal.1982); Proctor v. Schweiker, 526 F.Supp. 70, 75 (D.Md.1981).
We do not believe that a “reasonable mind” would conclude that Cavitt was physically able to perform sustained sedentary work simply because he does some household chores, takes no medication, applied without success for two jobs, and would like to be able to do at least sedentary work on a regular basis. Richardson v. Perales, supra. The evidence in the record, at most, suggests that Cavitt could perhaps do sedentary work for short periods and that Cavitt had a wishful desire to be able to do more. There being, then, insufficient evidence to support the Secretary’s finding that Cavitt could perform sustained sedentary work, the Secretary erred by applying Rule 201.27 of Appendix 2 of Subpart P of Social Security Regulation No. 4.
3. Disposition
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to return the matter to the Secretary for further proceedings consonant with this opinion.
. Cavitt claimed disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423.
. The scheme itself is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1982). Other regulations amplify that provision however. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.-1501 et seq. (1982).
. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(b) (1982).
. Id. (c).
. Id. (d).
. Id. (e).
. Id. (f).
. The administrative law judge who reviewed Cavitt’s claim made these determinations initially, but the Secretary later adopted his conclusions.
. This standard is mandated by statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
. We hasten to note that Cavitt has undergone surgery twice for his spinal injury.
. This opinion is particularly significant, since it was given by Cavitt’s longstanding treating physician. Bowie v. Harris, 679 F.2d 654, 656 (6th Cir.1982); Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1081 (5th Cir.1981).
. Compare Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1081 (5th Cir.1981) (a claimant who because of pain can perform work for only short intervals is unable to pursue gainful employment for purposes of the Social Security Act); Simmons v. Harris, 602 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir.1979) (same).
. Because of our disposition of Cavitt’s initial argument, we will not address his alternative theory attacking directly the validity of the so-called “grids.”
. Other courts have disposed of cases similarly. See, e.g., Spencer v. Schweiker, 678 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir.1982); Perez v. Schweiker, 653 F.2d 997, 1002 (5th Cir.1981).

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0