What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Melvin PRIDGIN and Melvin Pridgin, Administrator of the Estate of Julia Pridgin, deceased, Appellants, v. Jennie Elizabeth WILKINSON, Martin Wilkinson, and Sherman Wilkinson, Appellees.
No. 6759.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 7, 1961.
Sam Goodkin, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellants.
Joseph A. Sharp, Tulsa, Okl. (Rucker, Tabor, Best, Sharp & Shepherd, Jack M. Thomas, and O. H. “Pat” O’Neal, Tulsa, Okl., on the brief), for appellees.
Before BRATTON, PICKETT, and HILL, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
This action for damages arose out of a traffic accident on a highway in Oklahoma in which a Ford automobile driven by Sam Washington Fain and a Cadillac automobile driven by Jennie Elizabeth Wilkinson collided. Julia Pridgin, mother of Fain, was riding in the Ford. She suffered injury from which she died. Melvin Pridgin, surviving husband of Julia Pridgin, in his individual capacity and as administrator of her estate, instituted the action against Jennie Elizabeth Wilkinson and Martin Wilkinson. Sherman Wilkinson, husband of Julia Wilkinson, was later joined as a defendant. A verdict was returned for the defendants; judgment was entered on the verdict; , and plaintiff appealed.
It was expressly pleaded in the answer that Fain was plaintiff’s agent, servant, and employee; that he was guilty of negligence in the operation of the Ford; and that such negligence contributed to or commingled with the negligence of the defendants in producing the accident and resulting damage. But there was no evidence even hinting that Fain was the agent, servant, or employee of plaintiff, Melvin Pridgin. Fain was the son of Julia Pridgin, but not of Melvin. He apparently was her son by a former husband. Other than such kinship, there is no showing whatever of any relationship between plaintiff Melvin Pridgin and Fain.
It is the well established general rule of law in Oklahoma that negligence oh the part of the driver of an automobile is not imputed to a mere passenger. Saint Louis & San Francisco Railroad Co. v. Bell, 58 Okl. 84, 159 P. 336, L.R.A. 1917A, 543; San Springs Railway Co. v. McWilliams, 170 Okl. 85, 38 P.2d 539; Banta v. Hestand, 181 Okl. 551, 75 P.2d 415; Midland Valley Railroad Co. v. Pettie, 196 Okl. 52, 162 P.2d 543. And the rule applies even though the driver and the passenger are kinspeople, such as . husband and wife, or otherwise. Hasty v. Pittsburg County Railway Co., 112 Okl. 144, 240 P. 1056; Shefts Supply Co. v. Purkapile, 169 Okl. 157, 36 P.2d 275; Stillwater Milling Co. v. Templin, 182 Okl. 309, 77 P.2d 732; Danner v. Chandler, 204 Okl. 693, 233 P.2d 953; Loyd v. Campbell, 208 Okl. 212, 254 P.2d 986; Muenzler v. Phillips, Okl.Sup., 276 P.2d 221; Franklin v. Shelton, 10 Cir., 250 F.2d 92, certiorari denied, 355 U.S. 959, 78 S.Ct. 544, 2 L.Ed.2d 533.
The evidence disclosed that Fain owned and was operating the Ford automobile; that he and his family resided in Oklahoma; that Julia Pridgin resided with her husband in Arkansas; that Fain and his. family were going to a certain place in Arkansas to visit relatives ; that Julia Pridgin was going to a different place in Arkansas, there to rejoin her husband in their home; and that other than driver and passenger, no relation in connection with the trip existed between Fain and his mother. The court instructed the jury in substance that if Fain was guilty of negligence in the operation of the automobile he was driving, recovery of damages could not be had for the injury and death of Julia Pridgin. Nothing was said in specific or technical language respecting imputed negligence or any exception thereto. But the clear import of the instruction was that if Fain was guilty of negligence recovery for the injury and death of his mother could not be awarded. As given, and without more, the instruction was clearly erroneous. But no objections were made or exceptions taken to the instructions and therefore the error was not preserved for review on appeal as a matter of right. Garden City Co. v. Bentrup, 10 Cir., 228 F.2d 334.
, Plamtiff submitted to the court a re- , , . , ,. ... . , quested instruction which was a substan~r. . , „ ,, . tially correct statement of the law of , . ,. , . , . .. Oklahoma relating to imputed negligence in a case of this kind The instruction , „ . . bears a notation that it was refused and is initialed by the trial judge. Rule of Civil Procedure 51, 28 U.S.C., provides in presently pertinent part that a party may not assign as error the failure to give a requested instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the grounds of his objection. No effort was made to comply with the rule. The record fails to indicate that any objection or exception in any form or at any time was made or taken to the refusal to give the instruction. Having failed to comply with the rule, no question relating to the failure to give the requested, instruction was preserved for review as a matter of right. Ziegler v. Akin, 10 Cir., 261 F.2d 88; Lohr v. Tittle, 10 Cir., 275 F.2d 662.
While plaintiff failed to preserve „ . ,, . . , / for review as a matter of right any error, either in the instructions given or in the refusal to give the requested instruction relating to imputed negligence, an ... , , . appellate court has power m a proper , ., , ... . case to consider errors to which no ob- ... . ,. , , jeetions were made or exceptions taken. 1.,,. , ,, , . , But the power should be exercised spar- . . X „ . f. mgly and only m the interest of justice. ci -h ttt , , .■ ono Smith v. Welch, 10 Cir., 189 F.2d 832.
We think this is an exceptional case in which the power should be exercised in the interest of justice. The record as a whole lends itself readily to the conclusion that the error in the instructions of the court and in the refusal to give the requested instruction may well have been a generating factor which culminated in a verdict not warranted under the law of Oklahoma as applied to the evidence. Due to the error in the instruction and the refusal to give the requested instruction, the jury may well have returned the verdict in the misconception that although Julia Pridgin was a mere passenger, since Fain was negligent in the operation of the auto- ... , , . f ., mobile he was driving, no recovery could , , . „ , .. , . ,. ., had for her injury and death. And . „ ,, ... ;. , . , if the verdict was predicated upon such . ,. ... . ,. . , , a misconcePtlon °f the Wry, the judgment should not be permitted to stand,
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0