What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
CARTER v. SNOOK, Warden of U. S. Penitentiary.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
October 24, 1928.
No. 5315.
Frank A. Doughman, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
J. W. Henley, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.
Before WALKER and BRYAN, Circuit Judges, and DAWKINS, District Judge.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order discharging a writ of habeas corpus, which was issued pursuant to the prayer of a petition whieh was filed on February 4,1928. That petition complained of the detention of the petitioner in the United States penitentiary at Atlanta under a judgment, rendered in a consolidated ease on December 6, 1926, which, on petitioner’s pleas of guilty to two counts in one indictment, to three counts in another indictment, and to two counts in another indictment, sentenced him to be confined in said penitentiary for a period of eight years, commencing on the day he is committed to said penitentiary, and to pay the sum of $8,000 fine. Petitioner was committed to said penitentiary on December 8, 1926. The counts to which petitioner pleaded guilty charged sundry violations of the National Prohibition Act. The offense charged in each of five of those counts —a second offense of selling intoxicating liquor in violation of section 3, title 2, of the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA § 12)— was punishable by a maximum fine of $2,0.00 and imprisonment of not more than five years.
This court has decided that where a defendant, convicted on two or more counts of an indictment charging separate offenses of the same kind, was given a sentence in gross for a term of imprisonment not exceeding the sum of the terms whieh might have been imposed under the counts separately, the sentence, although it may he irregular, is not a nullity, and the defendant cannot be discharged on habeas corpus. Blake v. Moyer, Warden (C. C. A.) 208 F. 678.
But, even if the sentence of imprisonment in question properly could be regarded as a nullity to some extent, it was not a nullity except as to the part of the sentence which was in excess of the term of imprisonment 'which lawfully could be imposed on the conviction of the petitioner on one of the counts to which he pleaded guilty; and petitioner was not entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus prior to the expiration of the five-year term of imprisonment to which he was subject to be sentenced under any one of several counts on which he was convicted. De Bara v. United States (C. C. A.) 99 F. 942. It follows that the order discharging the writ was not erroneous, the five-year term of imprisonment imposable upon petitioner’s conviction under any one of several counts to which he pleaded guilty not having expired when the petition was sued out, and when the writ was discharged.
That order is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0