What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In the Matter of SIERRA TRADING CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation, Debtor-Appellee. Arthur SHERR and Richard Rubin, Petitioners-Appellants, v. L. W. WINKLER, Jr., Trustee, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 72-1537.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 15, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 1973.
Paul B. Rodden, Rodden, Cooper, Woods & Mitchell, Denver, Colo. (C. James Cooper, Jr., and Richard T. Payn-ter, Jr., Denver, Colo., with him on the brief), for petitioners-appellants.
James A. Clark, Denver, Colo., for trustee-appellee.
Before PICKETT, HILL and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is from an order of the United States District Court of Colorado determining the rights of a mortgagee and assignee to oil and gas income that was delivered to a trustee in a proceeding under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act wherein Sierra Trading Corporation sought reorganization. The dispute arises over the division of the costs of drilling and development of producing property in Campbell County, Wyoming. The trial court held that the trustee was entitled to Sierra’s share of the income from these leases without cost “until the wells were in production.”
In 1968 Sierra Trading Corporation was the owner of a number of oil and gas leases in Campbell County, Wyoming, including a one-half interest in those known as the Ute leases. The remaining '50% of the Ute leases belonged to American Petrofina Corporation of Texas which had drilled four producing wells thereon under a prior operating agreement with Sierra. It is agreed that Petrofina had the right to retain its development and production costs from the sale of oil and gas.
On December 16, 1968, Sierra entered into a general agreement with Rapp Oil Corporation wherein Rapp represented that it had $3,000,000 available for a program of drilling and completion of oil and gas wells during the year 1969 on leases owned by Sierra. The unrecorded agreement, which described no leases in particular, required Rapp to drill and develop leases to be designated by the parties, with a portion of the cost of development wells to be paid by Sierra. Pursuant to this agreement Sierra assigned 75% of its interests in oil and gas leases, including a 37%% interest in the Ute leases.
In the course of complying with the contract, Rapp borrowed $1,000,000 from appellants Sherr and Rubin and executed a 20% interest per annum note for that amount. To secure the payment of this note Rapp gave Sherr and Rubin a mortgage on the leases acquired from Sierra and assigned all of its interests in the production income from the Petrofina lease.
In the Chapter X proceedings the court ordered Petrofina to turn over to the trustee all monies then held by it over and above the costs of development and expenses of operation of the oil lease. Pursuant to this order Petrofina delivered to the trustee a total of $248,992.40, which represented a 50% working interest on the four Ute wells through February 11, 1972. As a result of three separate orders following an ev-identiary hearing, the court directed the trustee to pay to Sherr and Rubin the sum of $91,821.08. The court computed this amount by crediting petitioners with 37% % of the income from the Ute leases, net of royalties, and charging them with 50% of the total development costs and 37%% of production costs. Sherr and Rubin concede that their share of the income received by Petrofi-na from production income was chargeable with 37%% of the drilling and development costs, but assert that the court’s division order requires them to pay, in addition, Sierra’s 12%% share of these costs. This 12%% share amounts to $58,788.74 and is the amount appellants seek to recover herein. Although we are unable to independently compute or reconcile exactly the cost figures, the parties are apparently in agreement as to such amounts and the only question presented is the allocation of those undisputed costs.
We think a fair analysis of the various court orders affecting the distribution of the fund is that Sierra or the trustee should receive a 12%% share of the income from the Ute leases without any deduction for costs incurred until the wells were in production and that Rapp, and therefore appellants, should have to bear 50% of the total development costs on all the Ute wells. This conclusion apparently was based on a finding that from all the circumstances Sherr and Rubin “knew or should have known that Rapp was obligated to bear some portion of development costs.” Accepting the court’s conclusion that the mortgage lien and assignment of proceeds do not include development and operational costs, we find no basis for fixing the liability at more than Rapp’s 37%% proportional share of the total expenditure. The owner of a working interest in an oil and gas lease is entitled to its pro rata share of the net proceeds from the production from the lease, which is to be determined by deducting royalties and the necessary expense of development, production and marketing. Shinn v. Buxton, 154 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1946); Torgeson v. Connelly, 348 P.2d 63 (Wyo.1959); 3A Summers on Oil & Gas § 599 (2nd ed. 1958). When Sherr and Rubin accepted the mortgage and assignment as security for the loan, an examination of the abstract of title showed that Rapp owned 37% % of the Ute leases and Sierra 12%%, and as held by the trial court the security was accepted without knowledge of any unrecorded agreement between Sierra and Rapp. It follows that in computing the distribution of the net proceeds from the Ute leases, Sherr and Rubin should be charged with 37%% of the costs of development and production, and Sierra with 12%% thereof.
It is urged that the trustee purchased interest bearing certificates of deposit with the funds acquired from Petrofina and should be required to account for the amount earned through investment of the money belonging to appellants. These funds were never the property of Sierra or the trustee. Petrofina held them for the benefit of the owners of a 50% working interest and the intervention of bankruptcy on the part of Sierra did not affect the rights of others to possession of their share of the funds. Except for the turnover order they would have been paid directly to the assignees. We see no reason why the trustee should receive a windfall by way of interest earned from the investment of money belonging to others and he will be required to account therefor. Sherr and Rubin are not creditors of the bankrupt and cases like City of New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 69 S.Ct. 554, 93 L.Ed. 710 (1949), and Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 67 S.Ct. 237, 91 L. Ed. 162 (1946), have no application.
A question is raised concerning the validity of the 20% interest provision of the notes in question. This is not an issue properly before this court for deter-, mination.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with the views herein expressed.
. The contract provided that Rapp should furnish the necessary funds to pay for the initial well drilled by it on each lease acquired to be drilled. On subsequent development wells Sierra was required to pay its proportionate share of the costs. No special reference was made to allocation of costs which had been expended in the development of the Ute leases.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0