What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 81-1948.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 17, 1982.
Decided March 17, 1982.
Linda B. Weisel (argued), William A. Lubbers, Gen. Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy Atty. Counsel, Robert E. Allen, Acting Associate Gen. Counsel, Elliott Moore, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Noble K. Gregory (argued), William Gaus, Anne E. Libbin, Kevin M. Fong, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner; Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, Cal., of counsel.
Before ADAMS and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges, and VanARTSDALEN, District Judge.
Honorable Donald W. VanArtsdalen, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
In this appeal, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. petitions for review of a final order of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Board cross-files for enforcement. The Board determined that Chevron committed an unfair labor practice when it suspended an employee who had jumped on the hood of an automobile driven by a non-striker, on the ground that such conduct is protected strike-related activity. We conclude that the employee’s conduct was not so protected, and accordingly we decline to enforce the Board’s order.
I.
For more than four months, a Chevron facility in Richmond Beach, Washington was the object of an economic strike conducted by members of the Petroleum Workers Union. On the second day of the strike, Fred Legg, a participating striker, jumped on the hood of an automobile being driven out of the facility by Tim Meeson, one of Chevron’s gate guards. Legg remained on the hood for 1.3 miles, repeatedly beating on the windshield. The car then halted at a stop sign, and another automobile filled with strikers struck Meeson’s car from behind. At that point Legg was ordered to remove himself from Meeson’s hood by Dennis Lindsey, a policeman who had observed the incident. No injuries or property damage resulted from this incident.
Approximately two months later, when the strike had been concluded, Chevron notified Legg that, as a result of the incident recounted above, he was to receive a disciplinary suspension of ten working days. The suspension began on April 30, 1980, coincident with the end of the strike. Shortly thereafter, Legg filed a grievance with the NLRB.
At a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), Legg testified that he leaped onto the hood of Meeson’s car to save himself from being run over. The ALJ, noting that this testimony was “singularly unconvincing,” found that Legg had “placed himself on the hood to harass Meeson.” Appendix at 4. In addition, the ALJ credited police officer Lindsey’s testimony that “Meeson proceeded slowly enough for at least a substantial portion of the distance to have permitted Legg to dismount with safety” and that “Legg recurrently hit the windshield during some if not all of the distance.” Id.
Despite these findings, the ALJ concluded that Legg’s activity constituted protected strike-related activity, and hence that Chevron’s suspension of Legg violated sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRB adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ. The Board ordered Chevron to cease and desist from such practices, to expunge from its records any reference to the disciplinary suspension of Legg, to notify Legg in writing of the expungement, to make Legg whole for any loss of earnings, benefits, or seniority suffered as a result of the suspension, and to post appropriate notices. Chevron has petitioned this Court for review of the Board’s order, and the Board has moved for enforcement of its order.
II.
As this Court recognized decades ago, Congress must have contemplated that minor acts of misconduct would go hand-in-hand with most strikes. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939), modified on other grounds, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940). In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court has noted that a “trivial rough incident” or a “moment of animal exuberance” does not convert otherwise peaceful picketing into violence. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293, 61 S.Ct. 552, 555, 85 L.Ed. 836 (1941). Thus, minor breaches of the peace adjacent to picket lines ordinarily are tolerated as the inevitable concomitant of the right to strike. See, eg., North Cambria Fuel Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 177, 181 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 970, 71 L.Ed.2d 110 (1981) (use of obscenities without a physical attempt to interfere with nonstriking truck drivers around the picket area protected under the Act); Associated Grocers of New England, Inc. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1335 (1st Cir. 1977) (spitting on a company security car as it passed picket area; protected); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1967) (namecalling, swearing, and fist shaking; protected); NLRB v. Buitoni Foods Corp., 298 F.2d 169, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1962) (minor scuffling on the picket line; protected).
More egregious acts, on the other hand, have not enjoyed such statutory protection. In NLRB v. W. C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1977), for example, this Court held that conduct amounting to “intimidation and threats of bodily harm” was not protected by the Act. Id. at 527. There the employer discharged a striker who had followed a truck to a delivery point that was far from the picket line, threatened the driver, and partially blocked his egress. The Court concluded that such conduct “was not merely spontaneous picket line activity,” Id. at 528, and that the misconduct was “ ‘such that, under the circumstances existing, it may reasonably [have] tend[ed] to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected under the Act.’ ” Id. (quoting Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850, 852-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826, 85 S.Ct. 52, 13 L.Ed.2d 35 (1964)). The employer thus did not violate the Act when it discharged the employee under these circumstances. See also NLRB v. E-Systems, Inc., 642 F.2d 118, 121-23 (5th Cir. 1981) (bending an aerial on a car not protected under the Act); Associated Grocers, supra 562 F.2d at 1337 (following a nonstriker’s car away from the strike site and temporarily blocking its way; not protected); NLRB v. Otsego Ski Club, 542 F.2d 18, 19 (6th Cir. 1976) (throwing an egg at a nonstriker’s car; not protected); and NLRB v. Cambria Clay Products Co., 215 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1954) (physical assault upon nonstriking employee; not protected).
We conclude that, under the standards articulated in McQuaide, the conduct at issue here — jumping on the hood of a non-striker’s car and continually pounding on the windshield as the nonstriker attempted to drive on a public road — “reasonably tendfed] to coerce or intimidate,” and hence is unprotected by the National Labor Relations Act. We arrive at this conclusion for a number of reasons. For one thing, the activity occurred away from the picket line, on a public highway. The misconduct was prolonged in duration. More important, Legg’s behavior consisted not of a verbal threat but of a physical act that could have resulted in serious injury. Finally, while recognizing that- it is not dispositive, we note that Legg’s intent, throughout the incident, was to harass and intimidate Meeson.
In concluding that Legg’s conduct was protected, the Board relied in part on the fact that Meeson did not testify and that there was no evidence that Meeson’s vision “was seriously impaired for any great distance or that he had cause to be apprehensive that, should he pull off the road and stop, he would be in danger from the strikers.” Appendix at 5. As this Court has made clear, however, no such evidence of subjective perception on the part of the harassed employee is required in a proceeding of this sort. In McQuaide, supra, we stated flatly: “Rather than focus on either the subjective intent of the striker or the perception of the ‘victim,’ we adopt an objective standard to determine whether conduct constitutes a threat sufficiently egregious to justify” the imposition of sanctions by the employer. 552 F.2d at 527. See also Local 542, International Union of Operating Engineers v. NLRB, supra, 328 F.2d at 852-53 (“That no one was in fact coerced or intimidated is of no relevance. The test of coercion and intimidation is not whether the misconduct proves effective [but rather whether] under the circumstances existing, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected under the Act”). Under this standard, Meeson’s subjective perceptions and reactions, while arguably relevant, need not be demonstrated.
III.
The Board, of course, is “entitled to deference in drawing the line between strike misconduct and protected activity,” North Cambria Fuel Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d at 181. In concluding that Legg’s conduct was not sufficiently serious to remove him from the protection of the Act, however, the Board appears to have misapplied well-settled legal standards and overlooked relevant precedents. The behavior at issue here simply cannot be characterized as a “moment of animal exuberance” on an otherwise peaceful picket line. The act was not peaceful; the context was not the picket line. Accordingly, we will grant Chevron’s petition for review, and will deny enforcement of the Board’s order.
. The ALJ incorrectly relied on the Board’s decision in McQuaide, 220 NLRB 593 (1975), which was reversed in relevant part by our decision in the same proceeding. 552 F.2d 519.
. The McQuaide approach has been adopted by at least one other circuit. See Associated Grocers of New England, Inc. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1st Cir. 1977).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1