What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BOWLES, Adm’r, Office of Price Administration, v. ROGERS. SAME v. FEIDLER. SAME v. CELIHOWSKI. SAME v. GLINGLE et al.
Nos. 8741-8744.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
June 12, 1945.
Fleming James, Jr., and Edward H. Hat-ton, Office of Price Administration, both of Washington, D. C., John E. Scott, Office of Price Administration, of Indianapolis, Ind., Thomas I. Emerson, Deputy Administrator for Enforcement, and Abraham Glasser, Sp. Appellate Atty., both of Washington, D. C., and Walter Heddesheimer, Regional Litigation Atty., of Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant.
Walter R. Arnold, of South Bend, Ind., and Don Kitch and John Kitch, both of Plymouth, Ind., for appellees.
Before EVANS, SPARKS, and MIN-TON, Circuit Judges.
MINTON, Circuit Judge.
In these cases only one question is presented for our consideration. In each case the defendant had sold a tractor and various pieces of tractor equipment to individuals who were engaged in the business of farming. Each defendant sold the machinery for a price which was above the ceiling price, and the Administrator sued each defendant for three times the amount of the sale price. The District Court held that the right of action did not belong to the Administrator, and denied him recovery in each case. These appeals were taken by the Administrator to reverse the judgment in each case.
Counsel for defendant Rogers admitted in the oral argument that a farmer is one who is “engaged in business” within the meaning of the statute. This defendant further states in his brief:
“ * * * in the legal acceptance of the term, ‘business’ is appropriate to designate the activity known as farming.” It has been held that “farming” is a “business” for the purpose of deducting losses in income taxes. Spence v. Johnson, 142 Ga. 267, 82 S.E. 646, Ann.Cas.1916A, 1195. The same construction has been given the word “farming” under a statute, providing that slander against a person may consist of charges made “* * * in reference to his trade, office, or profession * * Whipple v. Commissioner, 263 Mass. 476, 161 N.E. 593. Under Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, it has been held that “farming” is a “business.” Bowles v. Silverman, D.C., 57 F.Supp. 990. The sole question presented on this record, therefore, is whether the Administrator may sue for triple the amount of the excess of the sale price over the ceiling price.
The statute which is controlling provides :
“If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may bring an action either for $50 or for treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the court. * * * If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, and the buyer is not entitled to bring suit or action under this subsection, the Administrator may bring such action under this subsection on behalf of the United States. * * * ”
There is no question on the record but that the farmers purchased the machinery for consumption in their business of farming. The individual farmer was not the consumer of the tractor as if it were food or clothing, nor was he the consumer who purchased it for use or consumption “other than in the course of trade or business.” Therefore, the farmer was not entitled to bring the action. If a farmer who is a buyer is not entitled to bring the action, the Administrator may bring it on behalf of the United States.
In this view of the statute, courts of high distinction have concurred. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 5 Cir., 145 F.2d 482; Speten v. Bowles, 8 Cir., 146 F.2d 602; Lightbody v. Russell, 293 N.Y. 492, 58 N.E.2d 508.
We think the right of action in these cases was in the Administrator, and the District Court was in error to hold otherwise. The judgments are reversed.
United States Statutes at Large, Yol. 56, Title II, Section 205(e), 34, 50 U.S. O.A.Appendix 925(e).
Reversed on other grounds June 4, 1945, 65 S.Ct. 1215.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0