What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
W. HORACE WILLIAMS CO., Inc., v. BROWARD BANK & TRUST CO.
No. 7089.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1934.
Edward E. Fleming, of Miami, Fla., and E. Howard McCaleb, Jr., of New Orleans, La., for appellant.
C. N. McCune, C. A. Hiaasen, and T. F. Fleming, all of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for appellee.
Before BRYAN, SIBLEY, and HUTCH-ESON, Circuit Judges.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
The suit was for $4,125 wired by appellant “For credit of Dye, Merrill & Brennan, Inc. agents Detroit Fidelity & Surety Company.” The claim was that by depositing the amount in the account Dye, Merrill & Brennan, Inc., carried with the bank, the bank had diverted and in effect had converted, the deposit. The bank, not denying that the deposit had been made as claimed, denied that either diversion, conversion, or damage to plaintiff had resulted. It alleged that no part of the moneys had been appropriated by Brennan, Inc., to its own use, but that they had been paid out as already arranged between it and appellant, to the person and on the account for which appellant had intended it. It specifically alleged that the money had been sent in response to a wire request from Dye, Merrill & Brennan Company through whose Mr. F. G. Brennan, as agent under power of attorney, the Detroit Fidelity & Surety Company had gone surety on the bond of Arpin, a subcontractor under appellant. That it had been sent for the purpose of paying it over to Arpin, and that it had been so paid. It was made to appear early in the trial by plaintiff’s proof and the statements of its counsel that this was true, and that the theory of plaintiff’s case was that it had ordered this money deposited to Brennan, Inc., as agents of the surety company for payment to Arpin under the mistaken impression which Brennan, Inc., had indue-ed, that acting ior the surety company after Arpin’s default, they had taken over his subcontract and were finishing it through him for the account of the company. That they had learned since that Brennan, Ine., was not the agent of the Detroit Fidelity & Surety Company, nor authorized to act for it in the matter. That if the bank had deposited the money to the account of Brennan, Ine., as agents of the surety company, the plaintiff would not have lost the money because the company would not have permitted it to be drawn out. Thereafter the trial proceeded, as appellant claims, under a blanket exclusionary ruling extended to all of its depositions offered to show that it was damaged by Arpin’s breach to the extent of more than $4,125, in excess of the penalties of the bond which it did collect, the court being of the opinion that the sole question to be decided was whether the action of the bank re- - suited in injury to the plaintiff by diverting the money from the destination intended. At the close of the ease each moving for a directed verdict, the court instructed for defendant on the ground that the undisputed evidence showed that the money had not been converted, but bad gone as plaintiff had intended it.
Appellant is here urging under one specification of great generality, the errors assigned with equal generality, that the court erred in refusing to permit appellant to read, in rebuttal of defendants’ case, the depositions of Williams, Lane, Leovy, and Wolf. By preliminary motions appellee moved to dismiss the appeal, because not applied for in time, to strike the bill of exceptions because not prepared in accordance with the rules, and that the case be not considered for want of proper assignments and specifications of error. Appellee asserts further that ihere is no plain error on the face of the reeord which, notwithstanding these defects, wo might consider. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The ease was tried to a jury. The appeal for a new trial was applied for and allowed within ample time from the overruling of the motion for new trial.
The motion to strike the record is also denied because while we agree with appellee that the bill of exceptions is verbose, voluminous, extended beyond all reason, and not in compliance with our rules, we are affirming the ease, and the cost of the excess record will fall not on appellee, but on appellant who has caused it.
We agree also with appellee that the assignments of error in the reeord and the specifications in the brief are general, beyond permissible limits, and violative of our rules. In deference, however, to the insistence of appellant that the eourse taken on the trial resulted in depriving it not only of the right result but of an opportunity to rightly prepare, and present its reeord, we have not only considered the specifications, but by a search of the whole record have tested appellant’s claim of prejudice and found it unsupported.
The District Judge was right in the view he took that there was no substance in appellant’s claim against the bank, for Dye, Merrill & Brennan, Ine., to whose credit the bank deposited it, did with'it exactly as the wires between them and Williams proposed should bo done. What appellant is really pressing for is a holding that by a technical departure from the terms of the instructions the bank made itself trustee of the funds, accountable to Williams to see that they were paid out only on the authority of the surety company.
This contention is based on the further untenable one that if the bank had put this money to the credit of “Dye, Merrill & Brennan Inc., agents of the Detroit, Fidelity & Surety Company,” the bank would have thereby obligated itself to appellant to see to the proper application of the funds. In short, appellant makes the unreasonable claim that by depositing to the account of Brennan, Inc., whom appellant not only represented to be, but vouched for as agents of the surety company, the bank obligated itself to appellant as insurer, that the money would not be drawn from the account except by authority of the named principal, and that it is responsible for permitting such deposit though the money went where appellant intended it to go. Maryland Casualty Co. v. City National Bank (C. C. A.) 29 F.(2d) 662; Harris & Co. v. Chipman (C. C. A.) 156 F. 929. A bank is under no such obligation as this, even to the principal. Alexander v. Security Bank & Trust Co. (D. C.) 273 F. 258, at page 262. Its responsibility to the principal arises only when it knows or ought to know that the principal’s funds are being diverted io the agent’s personal use. Farmers’ Bank v. U. S. F. & G. Co. (C. C. A.) 28 F.(2d) 676; Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 274 U. S. 473, 47 S. Ct. 661, 71 L. Ed. 1158, 57 A. L. R. 921.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1