What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
George SILBERNAGEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lloyd VOSS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12427.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
April 1, 1959.
John F. O’Melia, Rhinelander, Wis., O’Melia & Kaye, Rhinelander, Wis., for appellant.
Charles F. Smith, Wausau, Wis., John E. Bliss of Smith, Okoneski, Puchner & Tinkham, Wausau, Wis., for appellee.
Before HASTINGS, PARKINSON and KNOCH, Circuit Judges.
HASTINGS, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff (appellee) brought this action in the district court to recover damages for personal injuries suffered in his attempt to aid or rescue his maid, Clara LaFine, who is not a party. Defendant’s answer denying liability to the maid was withdrawn during the trial; and the trial court, with defendant’s consent, found as part of the special verdict that defendant was liable to the maid. The jury found both plaintiff and defendant to have been causally negligent, apportioned the negligence under the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Statute, Wis. Stat. § 331.045 (1957), 85% to defendant and 15% to plaintiff, and returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $21,886.13, on which judgment was rendered and from which this appeal is taken.
A detailed recital of the facts surrounding the accident to the maid, the attempted rescue by plaintiff and his subsequent injuries will serve no good purpose here. It is sufficient to say that the maid had fallen over a log guard rail fence, admittedly negligently constructed by defendant, and landed on a grass plot near the bottom of a six foot retaining wall. Plaintiff heard the loud noise resulting from falling of the log and a ladder the maid had been using, and ran out of his cottage. He saw the missing log from the guard rail, the ladder and the maid lying on the ground below. Apparently believing that she was in grave danger or imminent peril or in need of immediate help, plaintiff proceeded at once to her aid or “rescue” by descending the retaining wall to the ground and in so doing turned his left ankle and fell on and crushed his left leg at about the knee with the resulting injuries for which damages were sought in this suit.
A number of errors are relied upon by defendant for reversal. Defendant contends that plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the rescue doctrine since there was no evidence of “grave danger or imminent peril to the life or health” of the rescued in this case. However, the defendant made no motion for a directed verdict at the trial; and, under well-established principles, questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict are not preserved on this appeal. Hamblen v. Kazlauski, 7 Cir., 1958, 259 F.2d 754, 756; Irvin Jacobs & Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 7 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 794, 799, 37 A.L.R.2d 889; Flint v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 2 Cir., 1944, 143 F.2d 923, 925. Nor is this one of those exceptional cases which renders inapplicable the general rule. Irvin Jacobs & Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, supra.
Defendants also charged error in the use of the words “in apparent” in the following question submitted to the jury for a special verdict:
“At and immediately prior to plaintiff’s injuries was plaintiff engaged in an attempted rescue of a person in apparent grave danger or imminent peril?” (Our emphasis.)
However, defendant waived objections as to the use of this language in oral argument on this appeal. Further, we find no error in the form of the question; it was properly phrased to elicit an answer as to whether the situation in this case was such as to induce a reasonable belief on part of plaintiff that the maid was in imminent peril. See 19 A.L.R. 10-11.
The issue remaining for our determination is whether defendant is entitled to a new trial because of certain allegedly prejudicial statements made by the trial court and because of the exclusion by the trial court of certain testimony proffered by defendant.
The defendant claims prejudice resulting from the trial court’s comments made during the course of defendant’s cross-examination of the plaintiff and during his examination of the witness, Babich. It appears from the record that during the cross-examination of plaintiff, certain questions were asked relating to plaintiff’s lack of medical training as qualifying him to render first aid to the injured maid. The court interrupted this line of questioning with the statement: “I don’t think a person would have to have any first aid training or any special training to go to the help of a person who is in distress as this woman apparently was. He doesn’t need any special training, and he doesn't have to be a doctor to go to her assistance and render aid to her.” Earlier the court had interrupted to ask plaintiff whether he “had reason to believe she was hurt.” We find nothing improper or prejudicial to defendant in these questions and comments by the court.
Defendant called witness Babich, who had taken the photographs of the scene of the accident about a year after plaintiff’s injury, and attempted to show that this witness had used an alternate route from the top of the retaining wall where the log was dislodged to the place where the injured maid had fallen to the ground below. The inference was that plaintiff could and should have used this same alternate route without sustaining any injury to himself in attempting to effect the rescue. The trial court’s observation that there was no emergency existing at the time the photographs were being taken and other comments with respect to changed conditions a year after the accident were proper and not prejudicial. We have considered the other statements by the court objected to by defendant and find no prejudicial error as to them.
We also find no error in the trial court’s rejection of the proffered testimony of defendant’s witness Bloom, a disabled war veteran. Defendant offered to show that Bloom had conducted an experiment three years after the accident to demonstrate that Bloom, in his crippled condition, had safely used the alternate route above referred to and had traveled the required distance in 30 seconds. This went to the charge that plaintiff was rash and reckless in choosing the direct route to attempt the rescue and was related to the percentage of total negligence attributable to plaintiff. The court properly sustained plaintiff’s objection to this testimony on the ground that it was highly irrelevant and immaterial. In point of time, the experiment was too remote, being three years after the accident in question, and it was made under different physical conditions and at a time when there was no emergency existing. “We cannot say that there is such a similarity between the experiment and the occurrence in the case before us to find reversible error in the exclusion of the testimony.” Bish v. Employers Liability Insurance Corp., 5 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 62, 70. Further, the extent to which experiments may be admitted is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ibid. We find no abuse of that discretion here.
Finding no reversible error on the part of the trial court in the conduct of this trial, and believing that substantial justice has been done, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1