What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Madison WILSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 18141.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
April 11, 1963.
Elke, Farella & Braun, and Jerome I. Braun, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Brockman Adams, U. S. Atty., and Payton Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., for appellee.
Before CHAMBERS and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and JAMES M. CARTER, District Judge.
JAMES M. CARTER, District Judge.
The appellant was convicted by a jury ■of offenses involving heroin, charged in a six count indictment. Four prior convictions were charged by a supplemental Information. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years on each •count, the sentences to run concurrently.
The case raises only two questions:—
1. Was there a violation of Section ■605 of the Federal Communications Act, where a federal agent listened in on a telephone conversation ?
2. The validity of the inference of unlawful importation and knowledge thereof from the shown possession of heroin under Title 21 U.S.Code § 174.
This is a small horse soon curried.
I
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act; (b7 U.S.C.A. § 605).
Gibson, an agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics without appellant’s consent, by use of a “Twinfone”, listened in on two conversations wherein a special employee of the Bureau of Narcotics talked to appellant. The calls were made from pay stations to appellant.
The device was attached to a receiver of a telephone and automatically created an extension. It is on sale to the public in various stores. The trial court found that the device was similar to a second extension on a telephone.
The narcotic agent did not testify to the contents of the conversation, but the special employee did.
There is a serious doubt as to whether the appellant’s contention is available to him on this record, since it does not appear that the agent of the Bureau of Narcotics testified to the conversations overheard. Obviously the testimony of the special employee, concerning his conversation with the appellant, does not run afoul of the prohibitions of the Federal Communications Act.
Assuming for argument that the point is available, the case law is clearly adverse to appellant. Rathbun v. United States, (1957) 355 U.S. 107, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134; Carnes v. United States, (5 Cir. 1961) 295 F.2d 598; Williams v. United States, (9 Cir. 1961) 290 F.2d 451; Rayson v. United States, (9 Cir. 1956) 238 F.2d 160; United States v. Bookie, (7 Cir. 1956) 229 F.2d 130; Flanders v. United States, (6 Cir. 1955) 222 F.2d 163.
The cases hold that testimony as to a telephone conversation listened to with the consent of only one of the parties to the conversation, does not constitute an interception under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, (47 U.S.C.A. § 605); and (except for Ray-son and Bookie which did not reach the question) that such testimony does not become inadmissible simply because it was recorded by or overheard by an electrical or mechanical device attached to an extension telephone or telephone wiring at the locality of the consenting party.
II
The validity of the ■ available inference under Section 17b, U.S. Code, Title 21.
This case involved heroin which was shown to be in the actual rather than the constructive possession of appellant. Appellant makes a frontal attack upon the cases that have previously considered and held the inference permitted by the section to be proper: Yee Hem v. United States, (1925) 268 U.S. 178, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904; Rodella v. United States, (9 Cir. 1960) 286 F.2d 306; Hernandez v. United States, (9 Cir. 1962) 300 F.2d 114; See Harris v. United States, (1959) 359 U.S. 19, 79 S.Ct. 560, 3 L.Ed.2d 597. We reject appellant’s contention.
Furthermore, counts I, III and V were laid under Section 4705(a) U.S. Code, Title 26. As to these counts, the inference permitted by Section 174 U.S. Code, Title 21 was not applicable. The appellant received the same sentence on each of the six counts, the sentences to run concurrently.
If the appellant was validly convicted of any of the six counts, the judgment should be affirmed. King v. United States, (9 Cir. 1960) 279 F.2d 342; Sinclair v. United States, (1929) 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692; Wilson v. United States, (9 Cir. 1963) 313 F.2d 317.
Finding no merit in the appeal, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1