What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES ex rel. WILLUMEIT v. WATKINS.
No. 213, Docket 21184.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Jan. 3, 1949.
Eugene H. Nickerson, of New York City, for appellant.
John F. X. McGohey, U. S. Atty., of New York City (Harold J. Raby, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before SWAN, AUGUSTUS N. HAND and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal by the relator from an order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. He is in the custody of the respondent under two orders: one, an order of the Attorney General, dated May 23, 1946, ordering his removal from the United States as an alien enemy; the other a warrant of deportation, dated May 16, 1947 directing that he be deported to Germany.
From the amended petition for the writ, the return thereto and the record of the proceedings before officials of the Immigration Service, the following facts appear: The relator was born in 1905 in Lorraine, then a part of Germany. He came to the United States in 1925, on a German passport, as a quota immigrant charged to the French quota. In 1931 he was naturalized as a United States citizen by a decree of the Superior Court of Lake County, Indiana. In 1941 he crossed the border flom El Paso, Texas, to Juarez, Mexico, and was allowed to re-enter three hours later upon showing his certificate of United States citizenship. In 1942 he pleaded guilty to an indictment charging violation of 50 U.S.C.A. § 34 and was sentenced to imprisonment for five years. While serving this sentence a decree was entered against him with his consent in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois cancelling his certificate of naturalization on the ground that it had been obtained through fraud in that he never intended to renounce allegiance to the German Reich. He was released from imprisonment in April 1946. The following month the Attorney General ordered his removal from the- United States as a dangerous alien enemy, pursuant to 50 U.S. C.A. § 21 and Presidential Proclamation No. 2655, 59 Stat. Part 2, 870. Thereafter,' in October 1946, deportation proceedings were instituted against the relator, which resulted in the issuance of a warrant under date of May 16, 1947, directing his deportation on two grounds: (1) that he was deportable under 8 U.S.C.A. § 214 because at the time of his entry from Mexico in 1941 he was an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigration visa as required by 8 U.S.C.A. § 213; and (2) that he was deportable under 8 U.S.C.A. § 157 because of his conviction in 1942 of violating 50 U.S.C.A. § 34. The writ of habeas corpus was sued out in June 1947 and was dismissed in November 1947 without opinion.
.Because of the appellant’s poverty the court obtained through The Legal Aid Society the services of an attorney to present his case on appeal, and we wish to express our appreciation of the highly competent and helpful manner in which Mr. Nicker-son has performed this gratuitous public service.
It is urged that the appellant cannot be removed as an alien enemy because he falls within none of’ the categories specified in the Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 21, namely, “natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation * * *” Concededly he must be considered a “native” of France. United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, 2 Cir., 164 F.2d 137. Whether the cancellation of his naturalization caused him to become again a “citizen” or a “subject” of Germany would turn upon German law, which was alleged but no proof of which was offered. But a determination of this issue is not essential if the appellant is deportable upon either of the grounds stated in the warrant of deportation.
The first ground for deportation, namely, that the appellant’s entry from Mexico in 1941 was illegal because the cancellation in 1944 of the 1931 decree granting him citizenship requires that that decree be deemed to have been always a nullity so that he must be considered to have been at all times an alien rather than a United States citizen, seems highly doubtful; but this issue also need not be decided in view of our conclusion as to the other ground for deportation.
The other ground is the Act of May 10, 1920 which now appears as 8 U.S. C.A. § 157. This provides that “All aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be convicted” of violating 50 U.S.C.A. § 34, among other specified statutes, may be deported “if the Attorney General, after hearing, finds that such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States”. At the time of the hearing before the immigration officials who found the appellant to be an undesirable resident, he was an alien by reason of the cancellation of his certificate of naturalization, although at the time of his conviction under 50 U.S.C.A. § 34 he was a naturalized citizen. This is precisely the same situation as this court passed upon in United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Watkins, 2 Cir., 167 F.2d 659, and in that case certiorari was denied, 69 S.Ct. 137. The appellant asks us to reconsider the Eichenlaub decision and makes a cogent argument to prove that we were in error in construing § 157 to authorize the deportation of an alien who was a naturalized citizen when he committed the crime which rendered him- an “undesirable resident.” But our construction of the statute was not so plainly erroneous as to induce the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Nor have we been convinced by further argument that Congress did not intend the statute to cover such cases as Eichenlaub’s and the appellant’s. The Act is concerned with the deportation of “undesirable” aliens; the appellant is an alien, and by reason of his conviction may be found to be an “undesirable resident” of the United States whether he was an alien or a citizen when the crime was committed. On the authority of the Eichenlaub case the order is affirmed.
See note 6 A.L.R. 406 and cases there cited.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0