What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
In the Matter of AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST and Republic National Trust, Debtors (Appellees), v. Neva M. SHANKLIN, etc., Appellant.
Nos. 17641-17643.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 14, 1970.
Emanuel Nadnn, Dayton, Ohio, for appellant.
Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Washington, D. C., J. Kirk Windle, Special Counsel, S.E. C., Chicago, 111., David Ferber, Solicitor, S.E.C., Washington, D. C., for S.E.C.
Alan H. Lobley, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Ind., for the debtors.
Alan I. Klineman, James M. Klineman, Klineman, Rose & Wolf, Indianapolis, Ind., for John I. Bradshaw, trustee in reorganization.
Before DUFFY, Senior Circuit Judge, and KILEY and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.
DUFFY, Senior Circuit Judge.
American National Trust and Republic National Trust are real estate trusts which have been in operation in the State of Indiana. Their principal offices were in Indianapolis, Indiana. These two trusts had common trustees and shared the same offices.
Appellant, Neva M. Shanklin, is the owner of certificates of beneficial interest in both the American National Trust and the Republic National Trust, having invested therein the sum of $30,600.
Involuntary petitions for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act were filed on February 13 and February 26, 1968, against the American National Trust and the Republic National Trust, respectively. A receiver was appointed.
The debtors each filed an answer opposing the approval of the petitions. On April 4, 1968, Shanklin filed a motion to intervene and moved to dismiss the petitions and vacate the order appointing a receiver. A hearing on the approval of each Chapter X petition and on the motions of Neva Shanklin was set for April 26, 1968.
On the morning of the day set for hearing (April 26), the alleged debtors each filed an amended answer consenting to the granting of the petitions, but denying that the petitioning “beneficial interest” holders were creditors. After a hearing at which Shanklin made no objections, the District Court approved the petitions and ordered the reorganization to proceed and appointed trustees.
Petitioners introduced evidence to the effect that in the sale of the certificates of beneficial interest, representations had been made to them that the certificates would be redeemed by the trusts at any time. The Court ordered the petitions for reorganization approved and appointed trustees. Another hearing, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 569 was set for June 28,1968.
On October 22, 1968, Neva Shanklin filed a suit in the Howard Circuit Court in the State of Indiana against Frank L. Gregory and Paul D. Hinkle in their capacity as trustees for each of the two real estate trusts. This suit sought to have set aside the trustees’ vote authorizing the trust consent to the granting of the petitions in reorganization under Chapter X.
The District Court entered an order staying the suit in the Howard Circuit Court, and on December 5, the appellant Shanklin filed a notice of appeal from the order staying such suit.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) was a participant in the hearing before the District Court. The Commission agrees with and concurs in the arguments of the debtors and trustees with respect to three issues: 1) that the petitions for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act were properly approved; 2) that the jurisdiction of the District Court has been conclusively determined by virtue of Section 149 of Chapter X (11 U.S.C. § 549), and 3) that the District Court had jurisdiction to stay the collateral attack on the debtors’ consent to the reorganization.
However, the Commission disagrees with debtors and trustees in the view that appellant has presented no question with respect to the allowances of compensation to various persons. On this point, the Commission argues that the determination by the District Court of allowances to various persons may be reviewed by this Court, but that such a review is not necessary at this time.
The attorneys for the trustees had also been attorneys for the receiver and prior thereto, had represented the petitioning creditors. The District Court made a total allowance of $31,500 as interim fees for the attorneys. The S.E. C. had recommended an allowance of $20,000. The District Court also allowed $24,000 to Bradshaw as receiver-trustee fees. The S.E.C. had recommended $15,000. The District Court also made allowance of $31,495.50 as fees to two accountants.
The generous allowance of fees by the Court is shown by the fact that the allowance made by the Court exceeded the S.E.C. recommendations by the sum of $20,500. The District Court should and undoubtedly will take into consideration the generous amounts of the allowances heretofore made, at the time when the Court fixes the amounts of the final fees. We agree with the S.E.C. that there is no need, at this time, to review the order allowing compensation. Therefore, we make no determination as to our ability to do so under the circumstances of this case.
On this appeal, Shanklin relies principally on her claim that the holders of beneficial interests of the trusts were not creditors and,, therefore, had no standing to sign petitions for relief under Chapter X, and that it follows the District Court had no jurisdiction.
Any such objection should have been presented at the April 26th hearing at which Shanklin was present, or at the June 28th hearing at which the petitions were finally approved and trustees appointed. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 537, Shanklin could have objected then but she did not until December 16, 1968. In the case of In re Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Company v. Stichman, 229 F.2d 616, 620 (2 Cir., 1956), the Court indicated that when objections are not timely or properly made, the Court’s determination of jurisdiction is final. They cited, as we do in the instant case, 11 U.S.C. § 549 — “An order, which has become final, approving a petition filed under this chapter [Chapter X] shall be a conclusive determination of the jurisdiction of the court.” We hold that the order of the District Court affirming the petitions asking for relief under Chapter X and appointing receivers became final.
The next issue raised by appellant is that the District Court had no right or authority to enjoin the Howard Indiana Circuit Court. We disagree! In In re Muntz TV, Inc., 229 F.2d 314, 316 (7 Cir., 1956), we held “Under Section 116 of the Bankruptcy Act, Title 11 U.S.C.A. § 516, the bankruptcy court may enjoin the commencement or continuation of any suit against the debtor and restrain all persons from attempting to enforce a lien upon its property. * * * This is because, under the Constitution, a federal court’s jurisdiction in bankruptcy is paramount and exclusive * * *. Consequently, a bankruptcy court may properly stay any court proceeding which interferes with its exclusive jurisdiction, or violates its express orders. * * *”
The orders of the District Court approving the petitions for reorganization under Chapter X, denying the motions to vacate and stay the collateral attack on debtors’ consent to reorganization, should be and are
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 5