What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BROWN v. UNITED STATES.
No. 5637.
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
Argued Dee. 5, 1932.
Decided Jan. 9, 1933.
James A. O’Shea, John H. Burnett, and Alfred Goldstein, all of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
W. M. Shea and L. A. Rover, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.
YAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.
Appellant, defendant below, Benjamin Brown, was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. From this judgment defendant appeals.
The single assignment relates to an alleged error in the selection of the jury. A list of the jurors composing the regular panel for the trial of criminal cases, consisting of twenty-six persons, was served upon defendant as required by law. Section 1033, R. S. (title 18, § 562, USCA). When it came to impaneling the jury, twenty-five persons whose names were on the list were called and examined, some of whom qualified and others did not. The twenty-sixth juror, when called, did not answer. It developed upon inquiry of the United States attorney that this jnror had been excused by the court on account of a death in his family. Over the exception of the defendant, other jurors were called, qualified, and sworn to try the ease. It is contended that, because the United States attorney had been advised and knew of the discharge of the juror, and that fact had not been disclosed to the defendant, he is entitled to have the judgment vacated and a new trial ordered.
It is unquestionably mandatory upon the district attorney to furnish the lists of witnesses and jurors to the accused, as provided by statute (Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 304, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429), but we think the requirement was fully discharged in the present case. It is conceded that the full list of persons composing the panel in the criminal court in which defendant was to be tried was served on him, and the mere fact that one member of the panel was excused from service by the trial justiee was not prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, or can it he held to have resulted to his disadvantage in securing a fair trial.
It is insisted that defendant was put in an unfair position by reason of the alleged faet that the district attorney was advised of the discharge of the juror in advance of the trial, but this contention we think is not supported by the record. When the matter arose in court, the statement of the district attorney was in the nature of an inquiry of the court in respect of the juror’s discharge. The excusing of a juror from service by the trial justice, on good cause shown, before or at the lime of the trial, and before the jury has been impaneled and sworn, is not an error that will justify the reversal of the judgment.
In the case of Eagles v. United States, 58 App. D. C. 122, 124, 25 F.(2d) 546, 548, where the trial court had excused two jurors of the criminal panel, and it later became necessary to complete the jury from other branches of the court, this court in its opinion said: “It appears that two members of the criminal panel were excused by the court, and the panel was exhausted before a jury was selected. Jurors were then called from the civil court, and the jury was completed. We think that the statutory requirement for service of a copy of the jurors upon the accused at least two days before the trial was satisfied by serving the list of jurors assigned for the trial of criminal eases. It is not charged that any member of the selected jury was disqualified, or was individually objected', to, nor that any one of the appellants exhausted his peremptory challenges in the selection; of the jury.”
There is nothing in the record in. this ease that differs from the situation found to exist in the Eagles Case. No disqualification of a juror subsequently drawn appeal's, nor does it appear that any juror was individually objected to, or that defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges in the selection of the-jury. The analogy is complete.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1