What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Raymond J. FLEMING, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 6259.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Heard May 6, 1964.
Decided May 27, 1964.
Cornelius T. Finnegan, Jr., Lowell, Mass., for appellant.
A. David Mazzone, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
ALDRICH, Circuit Judge.
The defendant, after a trial consuming two court days, was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery of a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). On appeal he alleges that the evidence was insufficient to convict, and that the court should have granted a mistrial because of improper argument by the prosecuting attorney. He also makes an objection, which we do not find merits discussion, to a statement by the court in its charge, and to the denial of a motion for a new trial. This last raises no new matter.
The bank in question was robbed on Tuesday morning following Labor Day by two armed men wearing stocking masks and gloves. Only defendant has been arrested. The eye-witness testimony, necessarily limited to broad physical characteristics, could be found applicable to defendant so far as it went. Defendant lived in Lowell. The automobile, fully identified as the one used by the robbers, had been stolen in Lowell the Saturday before. It was recovered promptly after the robbery. It bore an old, doctored, plate, traced to a Lowell junk yard, and contained, inter alia, stocking masks and gloves. A fingerprint, described by a government expert as fresh, was found inside on the door window on the side occupied by the robber whose general appearance corresponded with defendant’s. The expert, who was unshaken on cross-examination, testified that it was a “beautiful impression” and unquestionably the defendant’s.
At the time of his arrest, near the end of September, the defendant denied any connection with the car. He stated he was unable to account for his whereabouts Labor Day weekend, or at the time of the robbery. When, in jail, he was confronted with the fingerprint identification he acted in a nervous manner, and kept hitting the wall with his hand, saying “How,” but making no reply to the question “How what ?” This evidence, taken as a whole, was ample to withstand a motion for acquittal
No evidence was offered on behalf of the defendant. In the course of the government’s argument the prosecutor twice referred to defendant’s pretrial inability to account for his whereabouts in such broad terms that it included comment upon his failure to take the stand. He was each time promptly rebuked by the court, who informed the jury the argument was improper and that there was no burden on the defendant to explain his whereabouts. Thereafter the prosecutor referred to the defendant’s failure to produce an expert. The court immediately interrupted, stating, “I think that is the plainest violation of an obligation resting upon the Government in this case. The Government has the burden of proof and the defendant has not any burden to offer any evidence, his own, expert evidence or lay evidence.” The court thereupon offered to declare a mistrial. Counsel for the defendant, after conferring with the defendant, stated that the defendant did not wish a mistrial. The defendant now argues that the court should, nevertheless, have granted one.
Defendant had full opportunity — in fact the court asked him twice — - to obtain the relief he now seeks, but he declined. To refuse a mistrial and elect to take his chance with the jury, and then seek a second chance, is not a procedure that appeals except in the gravest instances. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 1943, 318 U.S. 189, 199-201, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704. See cases cited in Reiss v. United States, 1 Cir., 1963, 324 F.2d 680, at 683, cert. den. Jacobs v. United States, 376 U.S. 911, 84 S.Ct. 667, 11 L.Ed.2d 609. Nor is it normally proper for a court, sua sponte, to grant a mistrial over defendant’s objection, thereby raising serious problems of double jeopardy. See generally, Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 1272, 1276-80 (1964). The only question we see on this appeal, and one to which, although not advanced by defendant, we have given serious thought, is whether this was such a grave situation that we should seek to fashion a remedy, not to give defendant a new trial, for if this were all he is entitled to, he has waived it, but to discharge him altogether because the government should not be permitted to prosecute further. Cf. Downum v. United States, 1963, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100; see generally, Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 1656 (1963). Without deciding whether there could be such a result, we would not reach it here unless we felt the prosecutor’s misconduct had been grossly prejudicial and grossly negligent, or had been in bad faith. With respect to this last, while we find it difficult to understand how he could have repeated the error for which he had already been corrected, still the district court must be the best judge of the prosecutor’s behavior, and we feel sure that if it thought he had acted in bad faith it would have so indicated.
Turning to the other aspect, the prosecutor’s errors fell into two categories. As to the first insofar as his argument related to defendant’s statement, when questioned by the police, that he was unable to account for his whereabouts, there is no suggestion that this was unfair. To the extent that it encompassed defendant’s failure to offer an explanation in the courtroom, the confusion of the extrajudicial and the courtroom silence might reasonably result in the minds of the jury in any event, quite apart from any government comment. This is not a case where the prosecutor brought to the jury’s attention something it was unaware of before. The government’s argument, while of course improper, could at least be said to have afforded the court an opportunity, not only to instruct the jury generally, but to point out the particular distinction which it was to draw. The court reacted immediately, and dealt again with the subject in its charge. Under all the circumstances we are not prepared to say that any marked prejudice remained.
The prosecutor’s comment upon the failure of the defendant to call an expert is somewhat different. There are instances when, after laying a proper foundation, comment on a defendant’s failure to produce witnesses other than himself is justified, see Graves v. United States, 1893, 150 U.S. 118, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021; cf. discussion in Commonwealth v. Domanski, 1954, 332 Mass. 66, 70-71, 123 N.E.2d 368, and such comment has been held permissible in a number of cases. See, e. g., Garcia v. United States, 5 Cir., 1963, 315 F.2d 133, cert. den. 375 U.S. 855, 84 S.Ct. 117, 11 L.Ed. 2d 82; Bisno v. United States, 9 Cir., 1961, 299 F.2d 711, 721-22, cert. den. 370 U.S. 952, 82 S.Ct. 1602, 8 L.Ed.2d 818; United States v. Brothman, 2 Cir., 1951, 191 F.2d 70; United States v. Beekman, 2 Cir., 1946, 155 F.2d 580, 584; Morrison v. United States, 8 Cir., 1925, 6 F.2d 809. While this was not such a case, the court, as already stated, took strong and immediate action, and, again, we do not believe marked prejudice remained.
Judgment will be entered affirming the the judgment of the District Court.
. While this episode is not a strong piece of evidence we think the jury might properly believe it more likely that defendant was asking himself, “How did I slip up?” rather than, “How could this have happened since I was not in the car?”
. Defendant’s contention that a special standard of proof must be applied in eases resting upon circumstantial evidence is erroneous. See Dirring v. United States, 1 Cir., 1964, 328 F.2d 512, 515, and cases cited.
. In Downum the district court granted a mistrial, so that the question came up squarely on the matter of double jeopardy.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0