What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Walter J. TROTTER and George D. Slabaugh for Themselves and for and in Behalf of Eugene Zynda, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET ELECTRIC RAILWAY and MOTOR COACH EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA, DIVISION 1303; Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AFL-CIO, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14770.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Nov. 9, 1962.
Dee Edwards, Detroit, Mich., for appellants.
Argued by and on brief Ralph W. Cole, Detroit, Mich., for Division 1303.
Thomas F. Chawke, Detroit, Mich., for Amalgamated Assn, of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, AFL-CIO.
Before MILLER, Circuit Judge, and BOYD and McNAMEE, District Judges.
SHACKELFORD MILLER, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Central Greyhound Lines, hereinafter referred to as Greyhound, owned and operated three suburban bus lines or divisions in the Detroit, Michigan, area and also an interstate highway division out of Detroit. Each of these four divisions constituted a separate seniority district. Prior to May 1, 1953, its bus drivers had seniority only in the district where they worked, with no right of interchange of seniority between the suburban districts or between a suburban district and the highway district. If a driver wanted to work in another district, suburban or highway, he started in as a new man at the bottom of the seniority roster in that district.
The defendant union, as bargaining agent for the Greyhound employees, included in the collective bargaining agreement of May 1, 1953, an interchange of seniority provision, which provided that highway drivers hired prior to that date, transferring to a suburban division, would have a seniority date as of May 1, 1953, on the suburban seniority roster, and suburban drivers hired prior to that date would have a seniority date of May 1, 1953, on the highway roster and on each of the other suburban seniority rosters. This seniority provision was continued in each subsequent collective bargaining agreement between the union and Greyhound and was in effect on March 1, 1958.
On March 1, 1958, Greyhound sold its suburban lines to Great Lakes Transit Company, hereinafter referred to as Great Lakes. While negotiations for the sale were pending the union officers became concerned about the job rights of its members and the possibility that Great Lakes would not hire the Greyhound suburban drivers, and entered into negotiations for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of these employees. As a result of its efforts, Great Lakes agreed to hire all or any of the suburban drivers who elected to become its employees and assumed the contractual obligations of the employer under the collective bargaining agreement then in force. Greyhound and Great Lakes granted the drivers a period of 90 days in which to decide, each for himself, whether he wanted to continue on the suburban work as an employee of Great Lakes with his existing seniority rights or whether to transfer to the highway district of Greyhound with seniority rights in that district as provided by the collective bargaining agreement of May 1, 1953.
Of approximately 190 suburban drivers at the time of sale, approximately 61 of them elected to transfer to the Greyhound highway district. They obtained seniority in the highway operation as of May 1, 1953, in accordance with the May 1,1953, bargaining agreement. The remaining suburban drivers elected to remain on the suburban districts as employees of Great Lakes. They have had steady employment since then with the seniority which they had as employees of Greyhound.
This action was filed as a class action by two of the suburban drivers who transferred to the Greyhound highway district. The complaint alleges that as a result of the sale, the number of bus drivers employed and to be employed by Greyhound had been reduced and that it was incumbent upon the union to negotiate an agreement with Greyhound which would fairly apportion the remaining jobs among all the employees of Greyhound, but that the union, notwithstanding its duties to fairly and indiscriminately represent all the Greyhound employees, had failed to do so and had arbitrarily agreed with Greyhound that the plaintiffs shall not be permitted to exercise seniority rights on the remaining jobs based on a seniority date earlier than May 1, 1953. The complaint alleges that this agreement did not reflect relevant factors such as total seniority, safety records, employment history and other pertinent matters, and thus unjustly discriminated against the plaintiffs with-reference to seniority and other job rights in favor of the highway drivers. The complaint asks that the union be enjoined from causing Greyhound to discriminate against them in their employment, and that Greyhound be enjoined from giving any force and effect whatsoever to any agreement limiting the seniority of plaintiffs, or any of them, to May 1, 1953, in assignment of work, leaves of absence or any other incidents of their employment based on seniority.
The District Judge held that the seniority. rights of the plaintiffs were derived from and controlled by the provision of the collective bargaining agreement of May 1, 1953, Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526, 69 S.Ct. 1287, 93 L.Ed. 1513, and that there was no competent proof of a breach of the duty of fair representation of the membership of the union in connection with the sale of March 1, 1958. He entered judgment dismissing the complaint.
Appellants rely strongly upon Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173, Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187, Mount v. Grand International Brotherhood of Loc. Eng., 226 F.2d 604, C.A. 6th, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 967, 76 S.Ct. 436, 100 L.Ed. 839 and Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 116 F.Supp. 3, D.C. These cases are examples of the now well settled rule that the bargaining representative of employees has the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against any employee or group of employees. Whether the bargaining representative has acted fairly and impartially and without hostile discrimination depends upon the facts of each case. As was said in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338, 73 S.Ct. 681, 686, 97 L.Ed. 1048 :
“Inevitably differences arise in the manner and- degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.”
In the present case the suburban drivers acquired certain seniority rights in the highway district by the collective bargaining agreement of May 1, 1953, which they did not have before. The sale <of the suburban operations in 1958 did not destroy those rights. The suburban drivers who elected to transfer to the highway district did so with seniority rights as provided by the bargaining agreement of May 1, 1953. They were not required to transfer and those who did not elect to transfer retained their existing seniority rights as suburban drivers and have had steady employment with Great Lakes since then. Appellants’ real complaint appears to be, not that any existing seniority rights were taken from them or that other suburban drivers acquired rights which were not available to them, but that in connection with the sale they did not acquire better seniority rights than they already had under the May 1,1953, bargaining agreement. We do not think that this constituted discrimination against them within the meaning of Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., supra, and Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, supra.
Appellants also contend that under the provisions of Section 163 of the Constitution of the union they are entitled to greater seniority rights than they now have under the bargaining agreement of May 1,1953. This section reads in part as follows:
“In case of a reduction in the forces of labor on any street railway or bus system affecting the employes who are members of this Association, the rules of reduction shall be as follows: * *
The claim is made that the sale of the suburban lines constituted “a reduction in the forces of labor” and that their rights are those provided by the provisions of that section instead of by the bargaining agreement of May 1, 1953. We are of the opinion that the sale of the suburban lines did not constitute “a reduction in the forces of labor” within the meaning of that section.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99