What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Kenneth FARLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel E. HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellee. Arnold K. RILEY; Carolyn B. Riley; Tamara Riley; Robert J. Wright, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Daniel E. HENDERSON; aka Dan Harris; James Lowell; Jerry Borsch; Tom Honte; Randy Jones; Mervin Lakin; Sandra Ramsey; Board of Medical Examiners, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 87-1777, 87-2275.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 14, 1989.
Decided May 17, 1989.
Kenneth Farley, pro se.
Robert J. Wright, Noti, Or., pro se and for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jane E. Beach, Jones, Skelton & Hoehuli, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants-appellees.
Before POOLE, FERGUSON and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants in these two consolidated actions are members of the Holy Spirit of God Church.' Both actions raise the identical issue: Whether the arrest of “psychic surgeon” Gary Magno by Phoenix police officer Daniel Henderson deprived appellants of their first amendment free exercise rights. We conclude that it did not and affirm the dismissal of both actions.
Magno professes to be a “psychic surgeon.” Officer Henderson engaged in an undercover police investigation of Magno. As a result of information gathered during this investigation, Henderson obtained a warrant and arrested Magno for medical fraud under an Arizona fraud statute, Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann § 13-2310, on August 9, 1986.
Appellants Arnold, Carolyn, and Tamara Riley and Robert Wright paid the bail monies necessary to secure the release of Magno, his wife, and assistants who were arrested with Magno. The Rileys and Wright filed a pro se complaint in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that their first amendment right to the free exercise of their religion was violated by the investigation and arrest of Magno. Named as defendants are: Henderson; James Lowell, a member of the Arizona Chapter of the National Council Against Health Fraud; Jerry Borsch, Director of Investigations for the Arizona Board of Medical Directors; Tom Honte, a Scottsdale police detective; Randy Jones, a private citizen; Mervin Lakin, M.D.; Sandra Ramsey, a Special Agent of the Arizona State Attorney General’s Office; and the Arizona Board of Medical Examiners. Appellant Farley also filed a pro se action against Henderson alleging a similar claim under the first amendment.
The same attorney represented appellees in both actions. Similar motions to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment were filed in both actions. Both motions were granted. Farley’s action was dismissed on February 9, 1987, and the action filed by the Rileys and Wright was dismissed on May 15, 1987. In a separate order filed on June 18, 1987, the district court granted the motion filed by Henderson and Jones for attorneys’ fees and costs against the Rileys and Wright.
Appellants appeal the dismissal of their first amendment claims. The Rileys and Wright also appeal the award of attorneys’ fees. Appellees request attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal.
First Amendment
We have jurisdiction to consider the merits of appellants’ claims under 28 U.S. C. § 1291 (1982). Because matters outside the pleading were presented to and not excluded by the district judges in both actions, we treat appellees’ motions as motions for summary judgment under Fed.R. Civ.P. 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 629 (9th Cir.1987). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630.
Appellants contend that Henderson’s arrest of Magno deprived them of their first amendment rights to exercise freely their religious beliefs. Both complaints allege the deprivation of the right to experience spiritual surgery in furtherance of their religious belief in the power of the Holy Spirit.
In order to succeed on their claims under section 1983, appellants must demonstrate that a person acting under color of state law, custom, or practice has deprived them of a federally protected right. Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 796 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1986). “The protection that the First Amendment provides to ‘legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion,’ does not extend to conduct that a state has validly proscribed.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 108 S.Ct. 1444, 1451, 99 L.Ed.2d 753 (1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1050, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987)). Because Magno was arrested under a valid Arizona statute, first amendment free exercise protection is, as a matter of law, unavailable to appellants.
Appellants do not appear to challenge the validity of the Arizona fraud statute. They do argue that psychic surgery is not a fraud. This latter argument may be interpreted as support for the contention that because Magno was not actually guilty of fraud, they are not precluded from relying on the free exercise clause. Whether or not psychic surgery is a valid means of healing a diseased individual or whether Magno is ultimately convicted of the fraud charge is irrelevant to resolution of appellants’ claims. Appellants’ claims were therefore properly dismissed.
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
The Rileys and Wright contend that the award of attorneys’ fees against them was improperly granted. Because no notice of appeal from the order granting attorneys’ fees was filed, we lack jurisdiction to review the award. Culinary & Serv. Employees Union, Local 555 v. Hawaii Employee Benefit Admin., 688 F.2d 1228, 1282 (9th Cir.1982) (“Where no notice of appeal from a post-judgment order awarding attorneys’ fees is filed, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the order.”). We decline the request made by Henderson and Jones for attorneys’ fees on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
. Appellants allege that Magno is a practitioner of "spiritual surgery." Otherwise known as "psychic healers" or "psychic surgeons,” such individuals allegedly use psychic powers to remove tumors and other diseased tissues from patients without making any surgical incision or using any surgical equipment.
. The complaint also alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 18 U.S.C. § 241, and an antitrust claim. Appellants do not appeal the dismissal of these claims.
. The complaint also alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 and 18 U.S.C. § 241. Farley does not appeal the dismissal of his claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241. He is precluded from bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 because he has failed to allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1155 (6th Cir.1980) (section 1986 claim is dependent upon predicate section 1985 claim).
. Attached to the complaint filed by the Rileys and Wright is the affidavit of clinical psychologist Lee Fulos. Pulos states that he has studied the "psychic surgeons” and has personally witnessed over 8000 “psychic operations” from within several feet of the operations. He states that only between 2-5% of the operations contain any fraud, and those that do usually involve lesser known healers. He speaks of spiritual surgery as being a "real valid phenomena” that "has helped thousands ... from chronic illness.”
. To hold otherwise would discourage the enforcement of laws in situations in which the conduct at issue is even remotely connected to a religious belief.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 3