What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Earl C. SMITH, Appellant, v. B. J. RHAY, Superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, Washington, Appellee.
No. 15794.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
April 18, 1958.
Earl C. Smith, in pro. per.
John J. O’Connell, Atty. Gen., Michael R. Alfieri, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Washington, for appellee.
Before BONE, POPE and CHAMBERS, Circuit Judges.
BONE, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Southern Division.
Appellant is presently imprisoned at the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla, Washington for a term of not more than twenty years pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County of Spokane, upon a plea of guilty by appellant to an information filed against him in that court, charging him with manslaughter.
Appellant’s principal contention is that the Washington state courts denied him due process of law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution in that state law requires that he be informed by the court before pleading to a charge against him that he has a right to counsel provided by the state if he cannot afford to hire counsel of his own choosing. It is appellant’s contention that this information must come only from the court itself, and that anything less than a literal compliance with this lav/ of the State of "Washington is a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We cannot agree with this contention. The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment are substantive, not procedural. This Court cannot interfere with the processes of state courts in administering their various state criminal codes unless the defendant is substantively denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Here, the substantive problem involved is whether appellant was really adequately informed of his rights as a defendant in a criminal action. The record we set out in the margin, ****conclusively shows that appellant was as fully informed as it is possible to so inform a person, and that appellant appeared to fully understand, (and we think he did fully understand) the meaning of what he was being told. The fact that this information did not come from the court itself but from the prosecuting attorney in the presence of the court, presents a matter of form and not of substance. The record leaves no doubt that appellant was correctly told at the proper time and in plain English exactly what rights he had and could enforce. To hold that his rights were overridden would be a disservice to the law.
Nor does this Court find merit in appellant’s contention that the statute specifying the penalty for manslaughter is unconstitutional as repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it permits a judge to sentence one who has been convicted of manslaughter as for a felony on the one hand, or as for a gross misdemeanor on the other hand. In Daloia v. Rhay, 9 Cir., 252 F.2d 768, 770, this Court in disposing of an identical contention raised concerning the Washington statute specifying the penalty for assault in the second degree said:
“The crime defined in this statute is a felony, because it is one which, under the terms of the statute, ‘may’ be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary. It is no less a felony because, under the statute, a fine may be imposed as an alternative to a penitentiary sentence. Nor does such a statute deny equal protection of the law because it provides for a wide range between the minimum and the maximum sentence which may be imposed for the same crime.” (Footnotes omitted.)
This reasoning is equally applicable to the case at bar.
We have made a thorough search of the record and find no valid reason for granting the relief appellant seeks at our hands. It would appear that he seeks at this late date to change his plea and have his case retried in this Court. We cannot aid appellant on this sort of a plea. A conviction upon his plea of guilty is equally as final in its effects as a jury verdict.
The record convinces us that appellant has been awarded all the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The order of the lower court denying appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
. RCW 10.40.030 (Refers to Revised Code of Washington.)
. Foster v. People of State of Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 67 S.Ct. 1716, 91 L.Ed. 1955; Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158.
. The following appears in the record as occurring on the 16th day of February, 1954 before the Honorable Charles W. Greenough, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for the County of Spokane:
“Mr. Evans (Prosecuting Attorney): [After ascertaining that appellant’s true name was Earl Clarence Smith and reading the information filed against appellant to him] Mr. Smith, you were in my office yesterday, were you not?
“The Defendant: Yes, sir.
“Mr. Evans: And it was explained to you at that time that you would be charged with manslaughter in this case?
“The Defendant: That is right.
“Mr. Evans: And you understand the nature of that charge? Was it explained to you?
“The Defendant: Yes sir.
“Mr. Evans: You were told, were you not that you would be brought into court today at which time you would be permitted to enter your plea of guilty or not guilty to this charge?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“Mr. Evans: Were you also told at that time that you would be entitled to a jury trial if you wanted it?
“The Defendant: That is right.
“Mr. Evans. Were you told that you would be entitled to have an attorney appointed for you if you did not have any funds ?
“The Defendant: That is right.
“Mr. Evans: You have had twenty-four hours to think about it, and you are aware, are you not, that you do not have to plead at this time but could have further time?
“The Defendant: That is right. I understand that I have more time.
“Mr. Evans: You understand that you can have more time?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“Mr. Evans: You made a confession in this case, Mr. Smith. Was there any inducement offered to you to make such a confession ? ♦
“The Defendant: No.
“Mr. Evans: Did anybody threaten you?
“The Defendant: No.
“Mr. Evans: Did anybody offer you any promises of any kind?
“The Defendant: No.
“Mr. Evans: As a matter of fact, did you know until yesterday what the charge would be in this matter?
“The Defendant: No, I did not.
“The Court: Do I understand, then, Mr. Smith, that you are ready to plead to the charge one way or the other at this time?
“The Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: And that you do not wish the advice of a counsel — an attorney?
“The Defendant: I do not.
“The Court: And you do not care to have your plea deferred for the additional period of a few days to enable you to think the matter over further?
“The Defendant: I do not.
“The Court: Are you ready to plead to this charge at this time?
“The Defendant: I am.
“The Court: What is your plea to the charge of manslaughter as filed in this court on this date by the Prosecuting Attorney, the charge being read to you by the Prosecuting Attorney, guilty or not guilty?
“The Defendant: Guilty, your Honor.”
. The pertinent statute reads as follows:
“Manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than twenty years, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both fine and imprisonment.” RCW 9.48.060.
. RCW 9.11.020.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1