What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
NEWSWEEK, INC. v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al.
No. 97-663.
Decided February 23, 1998
Per Curiam.
Effective January 1, 1988, Florida exempted newspapers, but not magazines, from its sales tax. See Fla. Stat. §§ 212.08(7)(w), 212.05(1)(i) (Supp. 1988). In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court found this classification invalid under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. See Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1304 (1990), vacated and remanded, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 499 U. S. 972 (1991), reaff’d, 604 So. 2d 459 (1992). In the wake of this ruling, Newsweek, a magazine, filed a claim for a refund of sales taxes it had paid between 1988 and 1990. See Fla. Stat. § 215.26(1) (Supp. 1998) (“The Comptroller of the state may refund ... any moneys paid into the State Treasury”).
When the Department of Revenue denied the refund, Newsweek filed suit, alleging the State’s failure to accord it retroactive relief violated its due process rights under McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18 (1990). The Florida trial court granted summary judgment against Newsweek, and the District Court of Appeal affirmed. Although acknowledging McKesson’s requirement of “meaningful backward-looking relief” when a taxpayer is forced to pay a tax before having an opportunity to establish its uneonstitutionality, the District Court of Appeal held: “McKesson is distinguishable because that holding was expressly predicated upon the fact that the taxpayer had no meaningful predeprivation remedy.” 689 So. 2d 361, 363 (1997). The court interpreted Florida law to permit prepayment tax challenges by filing an action and paying the contested amount into the court registry, posting a bond, or obtaining a court order approving an alternative arrangement. See id., at 363-364 (citing Fla. Stat. § 72.011 (1987)). The court concluded Newsweek was afforded due process because it could have pursued this prepayment remedy without suffering onerous penalties. See 689 So. 2d, at 364.
The District Court of Appeal’s decision failed to consider our decision in Reich v. Collins, 513 U. S. 106 (1994). There, the Georgia Supreme Court had rejected a taxpayer’s refund claim filed pursuant to a general refund statute, dismissing any due process concerns because a predeprivation remedy was available. See id., at 110. While assuming the constitutional adequacy of Georgia’s predeprivation procedures, we nonetheless reversed because “no reasonable taxpayer would have thought that [the predeprivation procedures] represented, in light of the apparent applicability of the refund statute, the exclusive remedy for unlawful taxes.” Id., at 111 (emphasis deleted). Until the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling, the taxpayer had no way of knowing from either the statutory language of case law that he could not pursue a postpayment refund and was relegated to a predep-rivation remedy. See id., at 111-112. We emphasized a State “has the flexibility to maintain an exclusively predepri-vation remedial scheme, so long as that scheme is ‘clear and certain.’ ” Id., at 110-111. But a State may not “bait and switch” by “holding] out what plainly appears to be a ‘clear and certain’ postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the disputed taxes have been paid, that no such remedy exists.” Id., at 111, 108.
Under Florida law, there was a longstanding practice of permitting taxpayers to seek refunds under § 215.26 for taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hardaway Contracting Co. v. Lee, 155 Fla. 724, 21 So. 2d 211 (1945). At Florida’s urging, federal courts have dismissed taxpayer challenges, including constitutional challenges, because §215.26 appeared to provide an adequate postpayment remedy for refunds. See Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (“The district courts shall not enjoin . . . any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State”); see, e. g., Osceola v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 893 F. 2d 1231, 1233 (CA11 1990); Rendon v. State of Fla., 930 F. Supp. 601 (SD Fla. 1996). This Court, too, has interpreted Florida law to provide a postpayment remedy. See McKesson, supra, at 24, n. 4 (“It appears . .. Florida law does not require a taxpayer to pay under protest in order to preserve the right to challenge a remittance in a postpayment refund action”). The State does not dispute this settled understanding. The effect of the District Court of Appeal’s decision below, however, was to cut off Newsweek’s recourse to § 215.26. While Florida may be free to require taxpayers to litigate first and pay later, due process prevents it from applying this requirement to taxpayers, like Newsweek, who reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment refund when paying the tax.
Newsweek is entitled to a clear and certain remedy and thus it can use the refund procedures to adjudicate the merits of its claim. We grant the petition for a writ of certio-rari, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1