What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Emerson Lee JONES, Appellant.
No. 11138.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 2, 1967.
Decided Nov. 8, 1967.
George W. Farley, Richmond, Va., (Court-appointed counsel) for appellant.
Michael Morchower, Asst. U. S. Atty., (C. V. Spratley, Jr., U. S. Atty., on brief) for appellee.
Before BOREMAN, BRYAN and CRAVEN, Circuit Judges.
BOREMAN, Circuit Judge:
Emerson Lee Jones was indicted for violation of 50 U.S.C.A.App. §§ 456(j) and 462 in failing to report for and perform civilian service as ordered by his Selective Service Board in lieu of induction into the Armed Forces. After a trial to the court without a jury, he was convicted and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. On appeal he challenges the propriety of his Selective Service classification as ultimately determined by his local board and the refusal by the board to reopen his case when he allegedly provided it with prima facie evidence of his entitlement to a ministerial exemption. We affirm.
On several occasions we have discussed questions arising in this area. Therefore, as the instant case involves matters which we have considered and determined so recently a comparatively brief discussion here should suffice.
Although Jones’ Selective Service file reveals a rather lengthy history of interviews and correspondence incident to his classification, the pertinent facts can be summarized briefly. On registering with the Selective Service System in January 1964, Jones informed his local board that he was a conscientious objector and a “minister” of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society (Jehovah’s Witnesses) and that he desired to avail himself of the ministerial exemption. Following receipt of notice of an initial 1-A classification (denoting immediate availability for active duty), Jones appeared personally before the board. However, his attempt to secure a change in his classification being unsuccessful, he filed an appeal with the Appeal Board which in turn referred his case to the Department of Justice. Finally in June 1965, acting on the recommendation of the Department of Justice, the local board classified Jones as a conscientious objector. For the next eleven months and until May 1966, when he was ordered by the local board to report for civilian work, Jones continued his efforts to have the board reopen his case and reconsider his claim to a ministerial exemption. The board, however, refused to do so.
Our view of this case makes unnecessary a more detailed review of the facts. We need mention only that his file reveals that Jones was formally ordained into the Witness ministry in 1956, and during the period here involved held positions as ministry school servant, book study conductor, Bible study servant, and assistant presiding minister. By virtue of these various offices, Jones not only participated in the door-to-door evangelistic endeavors of his faith, but also conducted weekly classes in the techniques of this type of preaching and directly supervised the activities of twelve brothers. The district court further found that the board was warranted in deciding that Jones devoted approximately fifty hours a month to his various ministerial tasks while at all times engaging in secular employment for approximately forty hours a week.
While the record undoubtedly reveals Jones’ ever-increasing religious activity, his offices and activities do not establish him as a minister within the meaning of 50 U.S.C.App. § 466(g) (1). His duties and religious works may vary from those of some of his fellow believers in the variety of tasks he performs and in the titled offices he holds, and he may exercise a certain degree of authority over his class and over the twelve men whose activities he directs. But nowhere do we find any evidence that Jones is the religious leader of his congregation; rather it appears that he is simply an active worker within the congregation, engaged primarily in the usual Witness tasks of spreading the beliefs of their faith and of teaching others within the church to be more effective in their proselytizing endeavors. Apparently the congregation servant is the member of the local Witness group who performs the functions normally performed by ordained ministers of other religions and who is regarded by the members of the congregation as their religious leader. Jones admits he has never held this position. As we have observed previously, Congress intended to provide the ministerial exemption for the leaders of religious faiths but not for the members generally, whatever may be their titles within their sects. See United States v. Stewart, 322 F.2d 592, 594 (4 Cir. 1963).
Under these circumstances we cannot say that the Board’s refusal to classify Jones as a minister and to grant him a ministerial exemption was without basis in fact. His conviction is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
. See, e. g., United States v. Jones, 382 F.2d 255, No. 11,115 (4 Cir. August 29, 1967); United States v. Jackson, 369 F.2d 936 (4 Cir. 1966); United States v. Stewart, 322 F.2d 592 (4 Cir. 1963). See also Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132 (1953); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946).
. The Government’s witness, an Air Force officer assigned to the office of the Virginia State Director of Selective Service, had with him at trial Jones’ Selective Service file, a photostat of which was introduced into evidence.
. Ordination into the Witness ministry is by baptism into the faith. Jones was twelve years old at the time of his baptism/ordination.
. His file revealed that Jones informed the board that he was devoting fifty hours a month to his ministerial duties. At trial, however, Jones testified that he had told the board that he was engaging in ministerial functions for ninety hours a month. The district court credited the board’s records in this respect and we cannot say that this determination was incorrect.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0