What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Oscar E. COX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHESAPEAKE OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 73-1304.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 29, 1973.
Decided March 14, 1974.
Certiorari Denied June 17, 1974.
See 94 S.Ct. 3184.
Bruce H. Keidan, Keidan & Keidan, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert A. Straub, Southfield, Mich., for defendant-appellee.
Before CELEBREZZE and PECK, Circuit Judges, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff sued his railroad employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, (hereinafter “F.E. L.A.”) for injuries sustained while performing voluntary overtime work as a wrecker in defendant’s Canadian operations. Normally, plaintiff worked in and around Detroit and did not, except on this one occasion, cross into Canada.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that F.E.L.A. does not apply to railroad employees injured outside the territorial United States. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on this issue the District Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant-appellee defends this decision on the authority of New York Central R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 45 S. Ct. 402, 69 L.Ed. 828 (1925). In Chisholm, a case strikingly similar on its facts to the one at bar, the Supreme Court, after noting that the “case presents nothing beyond a question of construction,” held that F.E.L.A. does not have extraterritorial effect. 268 U.S. at 31, 45 S.Ct. at 402.
Plaintiff-appellant argues that Chisholm does not stand for the proposition that Congress did not intend F.E.L.A. application for railroad employees injured while temporarily working outside the United States, but rather that the decision reflected contemporary conflicts of law principles that stressed lex loci delictus theories. Appellant further asserts that conflicts of law principles have undergone profound changes since 1925, and that under currently accepted theories, variously known as “significant contacts,” “significant relations” or “governmental interests” tests, United States law (in this case F.E.L.A.) would be applied.
While it is true, as appellant asserts, that a number of federal and state courts have begun to reject the lex loci delictus test method of determining applicable law, Chisholm remains a firm restriction on the extra territorial application of F.E.L.A. Indeed, the Supreme Court apparently added to this resolve in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581, 73 S.Ct. 921, 927, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1952), wherein it stated that, “[w]e have held [F.E.L.A.] not applicable to an American citizen’s injury sustained in Canada while in service of an American /employer.” Appellant has failed to demonstrate any reasonable basis for our holding that the Supreme Court has abandoned the Chisholm decision, however desirable such a course may be.
The District Court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over this case:
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Romero v. Int’l Term. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1952) (Jones Act); McClure v. United States Lines Co., 368 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 121 U.S.App. D.C. 338, 350 F.2d 468 (1965).
. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 2