What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES ex rel. BROWN v. HILL, Warden.
No. 5592.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Dec. 6, 1934.
Robert Brown, pro se.
Frank J. McDonnell, U. S. At'ty., of Scranton, Pa., and Plerman F. Reich, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Sunbury, Pa., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Robert Brown was indicted, tried, and convicted in the district of New Jersey for passing and possessing counterfeit bills. On December 8, 1932, the court imposed a sentence that he “be committed for the term of five years in a Federal Penitentiary * * *, term to commence October 15, 1932.” He was promptly committed and thereupon began serving his sentence.
It is clear from the words of the sentence that the term of imprisonment was five years. It is equally clear that, in fixing the date for commencement of the term prior to the date of sentence, the learned trial judge intended to give the prisoner the benefit of the time he had been imprisoned before conviction. Later, when at the next term of court, namely, on February 14, 1933, his attention was called to the then recent Act of June 29, 1932 (18 U. S. C. § 709a [18 USCA § 709a]), which provides specifically and exclusively that a “sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of a crime in a court of the United States shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary * * * for service of said sentence,” the judge amended the five-year sentence to one of four years three hundred and ten days, to run, presumably, from the date of the amendment. This new term of imprisonment was in effect a five-year term from the date of commitment (as provided by the statute) less the period of imprisonment after the date of commitment, the benefit of which the learned court tried to give the prisoner.
The prisoner, conceiving that the first sentence was wholly invalid because it stated a date for the commencement of the term otherwise than as provided by the Act of June 29, 1932, and contending that the amendment of the sentence was in legal effect a new sentence imposed after the term at which he was first sentenced, and imposed in his absence, and therefore invalid, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which the learned judge, in the Middle district of Pennsylvania, to whom it was addressed, dismissed. The appeal is from the order of dismissal.
We are constrained to hold that the commitment under the sentence of December 8, 1932, was valid, and therefore the relator is in lawful custody. The court had jurisdiction of the case and of the prisoner and jurisdiction to impose the five-year term of imprisonment which was within the punishment prescribed by the statute under -which the prisoner was tried, convicted, and committed. It follows the sentence of imprisonment for five years was lawful. The court’s direction that it should begin on October 15, 1932, did not make inoperative the provision of the statute which says it should begin when the prisoner is received in the pentitentiary. In other words, the court fixed the term; the law named the time of its commencement. We are therefore of opinion that the effort of the trial court (inadvertently made in behalf of the prisoner) to fix the commencement of the term at a date earlier than that provided by the statute was error and in consequence invalid; yet it affected the validity of the sentence only to that extent, leaving the rest of the sentence as though the court had said nothing about the commencement of the term. This vulnerable part of the sentence in no way vitiated the remainder of the sentence; hence it did not operate as a restraint of the relator’s liberty. He is restrained of his liberty by force of the valid five-year sentence. The invalid limitation upon the sentence made by the early date for its commencement was nothing more than an attempt to shorten the duration of the valid restraint of his liberty under the five-year sentence.
We reach this conclusion on a finding that the case falls within recent pronouncements which the Supreme Court has made in respect to writs of habeas corpus. McNally v. Hill, 291 U. S. 131, 55 S. Ct. 24, 26, 79 L. Ed. —-. It said: “Under the statute in its present form [chapter 14, Title 28 U. S. C. (28 USCA § 451 et seq.)] the writ may issue ‘for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty’ * * * [“unless,” venturing to interpolate, for present purposes, the words of section 455, Title 28 U. S. C. (28 USCA § 455) “it appears from the petition itself the party is not entitled thereto”]. Considerations which have led this court to hold that habeas corpus may not be used as a writ of error to correct an erroneous judgment of conviction of crime, but may be resorted to only where the judgment is void because the court was without jurisdiction to render it, * * * lead to the like conclusion where the prisoner is lawfully detained under a sentence which is invalid in part.”
In the absence of an opinion by the learned trial judge in dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we find he probably held, as we do, that the sentence of imprisonment for five years, imposed upon the relator on December 8, 1932, was valid, in that it was within the law and therefore within the jurisdiction of the court, and that the service of the five-year seiitence commenced not on the earlier date inadvertently mentioned in the sentence nor on the later date of the nugatory amendment, but on the date of the commitment as fixed by statute.
Therefore, it appearing “from the petition itself” that the relator is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, the order of the District Court dismissing his petition is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0