What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
BOSTON FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 718 v. BOSTON CHAPTER, NAACP, et al.
No. 82-185.
Argued April 18, 1983
Decided May 16, 1983
John F. McMahon argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 82-185 and 82-246 and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 82-185. Thomas A. Bamico, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioners in No. 82-259. With him on the briefs were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, E. Michael Sloman, Assistant Attorney General, and Marc S. Seigle, Special Assistant Attorney General. Kevin P. Phillips filed a brief for petitioner in No. 82-246.
James S. Dittmar argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With him on the brief were Judith Bernstein Tracy, Peggy A. Wiesenberg, and Gerald Gillerman.
Together with No. 82-246, Boston Police Patrolmen’s Assn., Inc. v. Castro et al.; and No. 82-259, Beecher et al. v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cooper, Carter G. Phillips, Brian K. Landsberg, Walter W. Barnett, and Dennis J. Dimsey for the United States; by Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Daniel R. Levinson for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; by J. Albert Wall, Michael H. Gottesman, Robert M. Weinberg, George H. Cohen, and Laurence Gold for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.; by Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Michael S. Wolly, and Erick J. Genser for the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO; by Robert A. Helman, Michele Odorizzi, Daniel M. Harris, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, and Meyer Eisenberg for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith; and by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Nicholas E. Calió for the Washington Legal Foundation.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by J. Clay Smith, Jr., and Herbert 0. Reid, Sr., for the National Bar Association, Inc., et al.; by 0. Peter Sherwood, Clyde E. Murphy, and Barry L. Goldstein for the City of Detroit; by Joaquin G. Avila, Morris J. Bailer, and Carmen A. Estrada for the League of United Latin American Citizens et al.; by Robert L. Harris and Eva Jefferson Paterson for the Officers For Justice et al.; by Judith I. Avner and Anne E. Simon for the National Organization for Women et al.; by Robert H. Chanin, Richard B. Sobol, and Michael B. Trister for the National Education Association; by E. Richard Larson, Burt Neubome, and Paulette M. Caldwell for the National Black Association et al.; and by Robert Lipshutz, pro se, for Robert Lipshutz et al.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Ronald A. Zumbrun and John H. Findley for the Pacific Legal Foundation; by Jack Greenberg and Eric Schnapper for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; by Arthur Kinoy and Michael Ratner for the Affirmative Action Coordinating Center et al.; and by Walter S. Nussbaum and Donald J. Mooney, Jr., for the Detroit Police Officers Association.
Per Curiam.
In these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the District Court’s August 7, 1981, orders enjoining the Boston Police and Fire Departments from laying off policemen and firefighters in a manner that would reduce the percentage of minority officers below the level obtaining at the commencement of layoffs in July 1981. 679 F. 2d 965 (1982). These orders had the effect of partially superseding the operation of the State’s statutory last-hired, first-fired scheme for civil service layoffs, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 39 (West 1979). Following the Court of Appeals’ decision, Massachusetts enacted legislation providing the city of Boston with new revenues, requiring reinstatement of all police and firefighters laid off during the reductions in force, securing these personnel against future layoffs for fiscal reasons, and requiring the maintenance of minimum staffing levels in the Police and Fire Departments through June 30, 1983. See 1982 Mass. Acts, ch. 190, § 25. In light of these changed circumstances, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of mootness in light of 1982 Mass. Acts, ch. 190, § 25.
It is so ordered.
Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2