What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Alvin R. CAMPBELL et al., Defendants, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 5847.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Heard April 4, 1962.
Decided May 22, 1962.
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1962.
Melvin S. Louison, Taunton, Mass., and Lawrence F. O’Donnell, Boston, Mass., for appellants.
William J. Koen, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U.S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
WOODBURY, Chief Judge.
This opinion supplements the opinion of this court of November 7, 1961, 296 F.2d 527, wherein, while retaining jurisdiction generally, we directed return of the original papers to the district court for further proceedings before another judge. Further proceedings were had as directed and the court’s findings and conclusions are before us on briefs and arguments.
Before turning to those findings and conclusions a brief résumé will be helpful.
This court originally affirmed the appellants’ sentences for bank robbery, giving only brief consideration to the question of their right under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, to have access to a so-called “Interview Report” of the FBI agent who investigated the robbery the day after it happened. Campbell v. United States, 269 F.2d 688, 690 (C.A.1, 1959). On certiorari, Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 at pages 93, 94, 81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961), the Supreme Court described the Interview Report and its origins and basis in detail and remanded to the District Court for further findings, saying that the aid of extrinsic evidence was required to answer four specific questions. These questions in substance were: (1) Whether the FBI agent, Toomey, wrote down what the witness, Staula, told him at the interview, and if so, whether Toomey gave Staula the paper to read to make sure that it was right and did Staula sign it? (2) Was the Interview Report the paper described by Staula or a copy of it? (3) If the Interview Report was neither the original nor a copy of the paper Staula described, what became of the paper? and (4) “In any event, even if the Interview Report was not the original or a copy of the paper Staula described, had Staula read over and approved the Interview Report? * * * Or was the Interview Report a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement which the agent had recorded contemporaneously ?”
The District Court on that remand held a further hearing after which it made findings of fact and drew conclusions of law and the case again came before this court on appeal. Campbell v. United States, 296 F.2d 527 (C.A.1, 1961). We found the hearing unsatisfactory in a number of respects. Nevertheless, we found it adequate to provide the answers to some of the questions propounded by the Supreme Court.
As we understood the opinion of that Court in this case subsection (1) of section (e) of the Jencks Act defining the statutory meaning of a “statement” as “ * * * a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him” covered not only statements written by the witness himself but also statements orally made by a witness but written down by someone else provided the witness “signed or otherwise adopted or approved” the writing although it did not follow the words of the witness “substantially verbatim.” And we held that subsection (2) of section (e) quoted in the margin was limited to oral statements of a witness taken down contemporaneously by a stenographer or recorded mechanically or electrically or in some equivalent way, which would assure production by transcription, perhaps later, of a “substantially verbatim recital” of what the witness said.
Applying the facts as then found, indeed the undisputed facts, to our understanding of the statute we held that the Interview Report was not a statement within (e) (2), because it was not in Staula’s words but in Toomey’s. Moreover, the Interview Report cannot qualify as a statement under this subsection because Toomey’s recording onto the disk, which was later transcribed and became the Interview Report, was not contemporaneous with Staula’s oral statement to Toomey. Toomey interviewed Staula around noon but did not dictate from his notes onto the disk until evening. This answered in the negative the last part of the fourth question propounded by the Supreme Court and the only one with respect to subsection (e) (2). Wherefore we concluded that the Interview Report was not producible under subsection (e) (2) but could only be producible if it were a “statement” within the definition of subsection (e) (1).
We thought the findings of the court below on the question of the producibility of the report under this subsection were not completely satisfactory. Nevertheless we found the record made at that hearing adequate to answer some of the other questions propounded by the Supreme Court. We found on Toomey’s testimony, Staula had not testified, that at the interview Toorney took longhand notes of what Staula said, occasionally using symbols and abbreviations; that after the interview Staula was not shown the notes and did not sign or initial them, but that Toorney had recited the “substance” of the notes back to Staula and that Staula had said that Toorney “had the story straight.” Then we found that Toorney attended to other matters for the rest of the day and that evening dictated his so-called Interview Report onto a disk in a machine. In doing so we found that Toorney had not dictated his notes but had first rearranged them in chronological order and then, relying primarily on his notes but also on his memory, and using his own language, had dictated a report that “reflects the information in the notes.” We found that Toorney sent the disk to the Boston office of the FBI to be transcribed and upon receipt of the transcription a few days later checked it against his notes and finding it accurate destroyed his notes in accordance with standard FBI practice. Toorney did not show his report to Staula and did not interview him again.
These findings disposed of most of the Supreme Court’s questions. However, Staula had not been called to testify at that hearing and at the trial he had testified that, although he could not clearly remember, he thought that “ * * * they wrote down what I said, and then I think they gave it back to me to read over, to make sure that it was right. And I think I had to sign it. Now, I am not sure.” Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 89, 81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961), footnote 2. There being a discrepancy between this testimony and Toomey’s, and Staula not having testified at the hearing on the Supreme Court’s remand, we, while retaining jurisdiction generally, remanded to the District Court “ * * * for further hearings and findings, with Toorney and Staula both to testify, as to whether Staula signed or otherwise adopted or approved the notes, in order that the mandate of the Supreme Court be fully complied with.”
After a hearing on this remand the court below found, 199 F.Supp. 905, that Staula had not signed his approval of Toomey’s notes. Nor did it find that Toorney had purported to read his notes back to Staula in just the order or in the exact words written down by Toorney on his pad. It did find, however, that: “At the end of the reading, Staula told Toorney that what the latter had written [actually on the undisputed testimony Staula never saw what Toorney had written] was to the best of Staula’s knowledge what had happened, and that to the best of his knowledge it was true.” And the court below found that in its opinion there was “ * * * no difference of any substance, and hardly any difference in form or order of presentation between what Toorney repeated to Staula and what Toorney had jotted on the pad, or between what Toorney had jotted on the pad and that portion of what Staula told Toorney which had any value as possible testimony at any stage of this case.” On the basis of these and similar findings of close correspondence between Toomey’s notes, what Toorney had recited to Staula from those notes and what Toomey had dictated on the disk from which his Interview Report was transcribed, the court below concluded that in its opinion the latter was a “substantially verbatim recital” of what Staula had said to Toomey.
These latter findings go to the verge, if not perhaps beyond the scope, of our mandate. However, even if we were to accept them our opinion would not be changed.
Slight changes in phraseology can often work vast changes in meaning. And in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959), the Court, referring to legislative history, said that Congress felt it would “ * * * be grossly unfair to allow the defense to use statements to impeach a witness which could not fairly be said to be the witness’ own rather than the product of the investigator’s selections, interpretations and interpolations.” Moreover, to determine what language appearing in the Interview Report had actually been used by Toomey and approved by Staula when Toomey recited from his notes to Staula after the interview, imposes a subtle and exceedingly difficult if not impossible problem for the district court. Furthermore, to delete from the Interview Report the words not approved by Staula would result in his being confronted on cross-examination with his words out of context. Therefore we think we must assume that when the Court in its opinion in the present case at pages 93 and 94 of 365 U.S., at page 421 of 81 S.Ct. used the word “copy” in the questions it propounded with respect to subsection (e) (1) it meant just what it said and not something less than a copy, barring perhaps minor misspellings, typographical errors and the like.
Construing “copy” as used by the Court as meaning not almost a copy or anything less than a copy, we now categorically answer the Supreme Court’s questions as follows: (1) Toomey did not write down what Staula told him at the interview but at the most only the essence or substance, in part in his own words, of what Staula told him and Toomey did not give the paper to Staula to read or read it to him word for word to make sure that it was right nor did Staula sign it; (2) the Interview Report was neither the paper described by Staula nor a copy of it; (3) that paper was destroyed by Toomey in accordance with FBI practice and (4) Staula did not read over and approve, indeed he never even saw, the Interview Report. The second part of question (4) we have already answered.
Judgments will be entered affirming the judgments of the District Court.
. With respect to this question the Court commented that in either event the Report would be a producible statement under § (e) (1) of the Act, for that section is not limited in its application to statements actually written by a witness but includes statements written by another if signed by the witness or “otherwise adopted or approved” by him in which event a signature was not necessary.
, The Court said that if Staula had read over and approved the Interview Report it would be admissible under § -(e) (1) even though “not related” to the paper Staula described.
. Commenting on the second part of this question the Court said: “If extrinsic evidence established this, the report would be producible under subsection (e) (2).”
. “(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement.”
, The court below, no doubt from an excess of caution, allowed counsel for the defendants over government counsel’s objection to elicit evidence bearing upon producibility under subsection (e) (2) and made findings on that evidence. Adhering to the views previously expressed we shall not comment on that evidence or the findings based thereon.
. The foregoing discussion applies to subsection (e) (1) not to subsection (c) (2) containing the “substantially verbatim” phrase.
. We considered the consequences flowing from this in the opinion which this one supplements.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0