What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry BOWENS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14067.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
June 21, 1963.
Jerome M. Katz, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
James P. O’Brien, U. S. Atty., John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and SCHNACKENBERG and CASTLE, Circuit Judges.
CASTLE, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant, Henry Bowens, prosecutes this appeal in forma pauperis from the judgment order of his conviction and sentences under a two-count indictment charging unlawful sale and concealment of narcotics in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 4705(a) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 174.
The defendant predicates his claim of reversible error on the fact that a government agent stated to a government-employed informer, under subpoena as a witness for defendant, that such witness need not go to the office of counsel for defendant for an interview unless he chose so to do. The defendant contends, in substance, that such statement, under the circumstances involved, constituted (1) an endeavor to impede or influence a witness in contravention of the standards for the administration of justice in the federal courts, and (2) an interference with the functions of counsel which deprived the defendant of the benefit of the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel.
The record discloses that Houston L. Garner, the government’s “special employee”, was called as a defendant’s witness at the trial and testified in response to examination by defendant’s court-appointed trial counsel. The witness had been interviewed five days prior thereto by such counsel. The record indicates that this interview took place in the court library. The witness had not appeared at the office of counsel for defendant the prior afternoon as such counsel had requested in the morning of that day when the case was first called for trial and the witness had appeared in court in response to the subpoena issued at defendant’s request.
It is an event which occurred on that morning which forms the basis of defendant’s claim of reversible error. Defendant’s counsel was conversing with Garner in a corridor of the court house when government agent Dennis Dayle approached them. Defendant’s counsel requested Garner, “to please be in [counsel’s] office at 2 p. m., this afternoon, that [he] wanted to talk to him further”. Dayle told Gamer, “[w]ell, you don’t have to go there if you don’t want to”. Defendant’s counsel related the incident to the trial judge when court opened and complained of the statement made by the government agent to the witness. The trial judge pointed out, “I think the advice is sound. He [the witness] has the right to determine that question for himself” but did state to the witness, “[t]hat is entirely within your right. I would recommend that you do see him, that you do talk to him, but I cannot enforce it”.
The defendant does not challenge the legal correctness of the statement made by Dayle — that it was within the discretion of the witness as to whether he would appear at the office of defense counsel for the purpose of interview. But defendant contends that because Garner’s employment as an informer was under the direct and exclusive supervision and control of government agent Dayle the latter’s gratuitous advice, under the circumstances, is to be inferred to have had the effect of impeding defense counsel’s access to information, by influencing the witness under subpoena by the defendant to be less than cooperative in the matter of submitting to pre-trial interview, with the result that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in the preparation of his defense and in the trial of the case.
We are of the opinion that the record affords no basis for such an inference. The defendant’s trial counsel did interview Garner five days prior to his testifying. And then did call and examine him as a defense witness. Defendant points to nothing which in our opinion establishes that he was in any manner prejudiced by the statement made by Dayle. The record discloses no breach of any right of the defendant.
That defendant had caused Garner to be subpoenaed is of no import. Rule 17(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, indicates the subpoena is to be used to compel attendance of a witness at the trial. “The rule does not authorize the government or the defense to subpoena a witness and require him to report at some place other than where the trial is to be held.” United States v. Standard Oil Company, 7 Cir., 316 F.2d 884. Cf. Durbin v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 415, 221 F.2d 520, 522.
Reversible error must rest on something more substantial than unsupported inference. And here the record negates prejudice to the defendant.
Mr. Jerome M. Katz of the Chicago Bar is commended for the able presentation he made of defendant’s case as counsel by appointment of this Court on defendant’s appeal.
The judgment order of the District Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1