What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ZIMMERMAN et al. v. DALEY et al.
No. 2680.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit
Oct. 28, 1932.
Guy C. Richards, of Salem, Mass. (Edward S. Underwood, of Lynn, Mass., and Alexander ,G. Gould and ..Harry Shapiro, both of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellants.
Albert A. Schaefer, of Boston, Mass. (Joseph B. Ely and Ropes, Gray, Boyden & Perkins, all of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellees.
Before BINGHAM, ANDERSON and WILSO'N, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs are the .trustees in bankruptcy of the Cass & Daley Shoe Company, a Massachusetts corporation, with a plant located in Salem, adjudicated bankrupt on April 17, 1925. On October 28, 1927, they brought this suit, seeking to recover capital stock of the Farmington Shoe Company, or money damages in lieu thereof. The ease was tried at great length before a master, who filed a long and elaborate report, finding for the defendants. The plaintiffs’ exceptions were heard by Judge Morton in December, 1930. On September 3,1981, in a memorandum of decision, the learned judge said: “At the conclusion of the arguments I felt it. necessary to hold this ease for careful consideration. As a result, I am of opinion that the master’s findings ought not to be disturbed.”
The fundamental question arises under the tenth and eleventh paragraphs of the master’s report, which are as follows:
“10. I find that at the time of the purchase of the Farmington Shoe Company and during all the time covered by the facts in this case until just prior to the petition in bankruptcy in April, 1925, the Cass and Daley Shoe Company was solvent and had committed no act of bankruptcy and that the method of purchase was known by and approved by all the common share holders of the Cass and Daley Shoe Company, and that it was their intention to treat the Farming-ton Shoe Company as a separate corporation, and that the officers of the Cass and Daley Shoe Company then deemed it for the best interests of the Cass and Daley Shoe Company to recognize and approve the loans to the personal accounts of Mr. Cass and Mr. Daley for the purchase of the Farmington Shoe Company as valid and existing loans. I find that the Cass and Daley Shoe Company through its officers and agents deemed it inadvisable to own shares of the Farming-ton Shoe Company as it would have been ultra vires according to the charter of .the Cass and Daley Shoe Company, and preferred to exercise such control as was in the interest of the Cass and Daley Shoe Company through the common ownership of the stock of both companies rather than to treat the shares of the Farmington Shoe Company as an asset or the company as a subsidiary of the Cass and Daley Shoe Company. I find that all of the funds with which the purchase was made came from the Cass and Daley Shoe Company, through loans to Mr. Cass and Mr. Daley personally, and the charges on the books to tho personal accounts of Mr. Cass and Mr. Daley were proper. Tho pur-' chase was paid for through tho medium of cheeks of the Cass and Daley Shoe Company drawn directly to the former owners of the stock, or to John A. Deery, the one who advanced to the owners part of the purchase price.
“11. The corporate records of the Cass and Daley Shoe Company (Exhibit 82) together with the testimony of George A. Dempsey indicate and I find that Mr. Cass, as treasurer, in reading the report of the financial condition of the company for May 30, 1919, reported the nature of the transaction by reading the amount of monies loaned to Mr. Cass and Mr. Daley and explaining that the money had been borrowed by them personally for tho purchase of the stock of the Farmington Shoo Company and that at the annual meeting of August 1,1919, a resolution was passed as follows:
“ ‘Resolved, that all official acts of the board of directors, and all official acts of the other officers of the company up to the present be and tho same hereby are ratified, confirmed and approved, and all minutes and records approved as they appear! ”
The appellant’s counsel concedes that, unless this conclusion was wrong, it is unnecessary to consider the later transactions by which this stock went into the hands of various defendants.
The case is therefore in a very narrow compass. This court is faced with the carefully considered findings of the master and of the court below, in the defendants’ favor.
While payment of the nearly $75,000 for the Farmington stock by tho bankrupt undoubtedly grounds a presumption in favor of a constructive or resulting trust, it is a presumption of fact only. 1 Perry on Trusts (7th Ed.) § 133. Blodgett v. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484, 487; Herlihy v. Coney, 99 Me. 469, 59 A. 952. The case before us falls under tbe familiar rule that a finding of fact, concurred in both by the master who heard and saw tho witnesses and by the District Court, should not be disturbed by this court, unless plainly wrong. It is entirely clear on this record that no finding of plain error can be made. The decree below must be affirmed.
Tbe decree of the District Court is affirmed, with costs to the appellees.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99