What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
William McBEE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Archie WEAVER, Sheriff of Knox County, Tennessee, et al., Respondent-Appellee.
No. 16254.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 1, 1966.
Ed R. Davies, Nashville, Tenn., and William E. Badgett, Knoxville, Tenn., for appellant.
Henry C. Foutch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for appellee. David W. McMackin, Special Counsel, Nashville, Tenn., on brief, George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., and Reporter, Nashville, Tenn., of counsel.
Before EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge, and BROWN, District Judge.
Honorable Bailey Brown, Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in a trial in Knox County, Tennessee in 1954. In 1961, this court determined that such conviction was void because petitioner had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that he was forced to trial on the same day that his lawyer was employed. Mc-Bee v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1961).
Petitioner was retried in 1962 (represented by the employed lawyer who had represented him at the first trial) and was convicted of murder in the second degree. At this trial, the testimony of two witnesses for the State, who had-testified at the first trial but who had since died, was read in evidence over the objection of petitioner’s lawyer. This conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee (McBee v. State, 213 Tenn. 15, 372 S.W.2d 173 (1963) ) and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari. 377 U.S. 955, 84 S.Ct. 1633, 12 L.Ed.2d 499 (1964).
In 1964, petitioner filed another habeas corpus petition in the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by the admission in evidence of the transcript of the testimony of the two witnesses who had testified at the first trial. The District Judge denied the petition without a hearing and petitioner has appealed.
Subsequent to the denial of the second petition for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). In Pointer, the majority holding is that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation includes the right to a “complete ■ and adequate opportunity to cross-examine” and that this right is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In its opinion in the prior habeas corpus proceeding (296 F.2d 235), this court refers to actual prejudice to petitioner in the inability of his counsel to effectively cross-examine the witness Stewart, who was one of the witnesses whose testimony was read at the second trial. We conclude that this language in the opinion is dictum. We so conclude because it was not necessary to the decision of this court that petitioner had been unconstitutionally denied effective assistance of counsel and that therefore petitioner’s conviction was void.
In the instant case, as stated, the District Judge held no evidentiary hearing and did not have the benefit of the decision in Pointer. Whether an accused has had “complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine” is a question of fact in the first instance. Under Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), issues of fact in habeas corpus proceedings must first be heard by District Judges and their findings are binding upon appellate courts unless “clearly erroneous.” Rule 52(a), F.R.Civ.P. On remand, the district Judge can hold a hearing on this issue of fact with the standards of Pointer in mind.
Reversed and remanded for further consideration in the light of Pointer v. State of Texas, supra.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0