What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Marvin MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEOPLE OF the STATE OF CALIFORNIA, James Musick, Sheriff of the County of Orange, Cecil Hicks, District Attorney for the County of Orange, the Municipal Court of the County of Orange, Harbor Judicial District, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 75-1384.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
April 11, 1977.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 6, 1977.
Burton Marks, Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for plaintiff-appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Frederick R. Millar, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., Cecil Hicks, Jr., Dist. Atty., Oretta D. Sears and Cliff Harris, argued, Deputy Dist. Attys., Santa Ana, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Before CHAMBERS and ELY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, District Judge.
Honorable Gus G. Solomon, Senior District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
For the background of this obscenity case, one should examine Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973) and Miller v. California, 418 U.S. 915, 94 S.Ct. 3206, 41 L.Ed.2d 1158 (1974) (Miller II).
After Miller II was decided, Miller came to the United States District Court for the Central District of California with a petition for habeas corpus on his state incarceration, the penalty on his original Orange County, California, conviction. He still has a few days to serve on his jail sentence which awaits the outcome of this appeal before time serving begins again.
In his petition for habeas corpus in a conclusory way (inter alia), he asserts the state conviction was infirm because of double jeopardy, collateral estoppel and res judicata, all arising out of other trials in Los Angeles County (next door to Orange) preceding in time the Orange County conviction. The contentions are attractive.
In argument, Miller’s counsel advises that the issues were repeatedly asserted at every stage of the passage of the case through the California state courts. Counsel for the People of the State of California disagrees with the statement and denies the three points were really presented along the state route.
So we come to this: If Miller’s counsel is correct in his recollection, all of his present contentions were concluded by Miller II, supra. If counsel for the People is correct in his recollection, then the habeas corpus has no business being here on issues not presented to the state courts.
As to issues raised by the habeas corpus petition and not mentioned above, the district court was clearly correct.
The trial court’s order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 1