What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William R. KELLAR, Appellant, v. Dr. P. J. CICCONE, Appellee.
No. 20540.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 6, 1971.
William R. Kellar, pro se.
Bert C. Hurn, U. S. Atty., and Frederick O. Griffin, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH LAY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
Of the First Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
This case presents us with facts and circumstances nearly identical to those we considered in Henry v. Ciecone, 440 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1971). For the reasons enunciated in that case, we dismiss this appeal.
Kellar, an unconvictéd person, was assigned on April 23, 1968, to the Federal Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, for treatment until found to be mentally competent, pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246. In his habeas petition, he'alleged that the Medical Center had failed to provide him with proper treatment for his “incurable” mental illness. He requested that he be released from the Medical Center and placed in a state hospital where he might receive adequate psychiatric treatment. Upon the district court’s denial of his petition, Kellar brought this in forma pauperis appeal.
Here, as in the Henry case, the record discloses that after petitioner’s habeas corpus application was denied, the Federal Medical Center determined that he had regained his competency and was capable of standing trial. On about July 15, 1970, fifteen days after the district court denied Kellar’s petition, the Medical Center recommended that Kellar be returned to his committing court. Despite this determination, however, as in Henry, petitioner was not immediately transferred to his committing court, but remained incarcerated at the Medical Center pending appeal. It was not until January 8, 1971, that the United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri filed a motion with this court requesting permission to transfer Kellar to his committing court in Indiana. Acting as promptly as possible, we granted the government’s motion shortly thereafter.
The government confesses that its delay has been “regrettable”. In the government’s brief, the United ' States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri informs us that his office has initiated procedures to avoid such delays in the future. A patient’s transfer pursuant to those procedures shall not, by the fact of the transfer alone, prejudice any appeal rights. See Fed.R.App.P. rule 23(a). We are gratified that the United States Attorney for the Western District of Missouri, in cooperation with the administration of the Federal Medical Center and the United States Bureau of Prisons, has responded to our admonition in Henry, that
[i]t is intolerable that one who is presumed innocent and who has been found competent to stand, trial is detained at the F.M.C. for inordinate and indefensible periods of time. [440 F.2d at 1052]
Since Kellar has been transferred to his committing court to stand trial on the charges brought against him, his appeal presents no actual issue requiring our attention.
Appeal dismissed.
. The appropriateness of the procedures are not now before us, and, therefore, we make no comment on their substance.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1