What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO. v. WHITE.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
September 29, 1925.)
No. 3191.
1. Master and servant <3^>270(8) — Evidence of similar injuries to others under similar conditions held competent.
In an action by an employee for injury alleged to have been caused by poisonous gases, negligently allowed by defendant to escape into the rooms where plaintiff worked, testimony of other employees, who worked in the same rooms, that the gases, had a similar effect on them, was competent; it being shown that they were working under substantially the same conditions.
2. Evidence <@=3558(7) — Physician expert may not be impeached by medical works on which he has not relied.
A physician, testifying from his own experience, as an expert, may not be impeached by medical works on which he has not relied.
3. Courts <3^348 — State rules of evidence govern in federal courts, In absence of federal rule.
The federal courts are governed by the rules of evidence, of the state of which they are administering the law, unless there is a federal rule to the contrary.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Charles F. Lynch, Judge.
Action at law by Paul White against E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Edward L. Katzenbaeh (of Katzenbaeh & Hunt), of Trenton, N. J., for plaintiff in error.
Nathan Rabinowitz, of Paterson, N. J., for defendant in error.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge.
Paul White, an employee of the Du Pont Company, sued it for failure to take reasonable care and precaution to prevent the escape of noxious and poisonous gases from pipos, receptacles, and devices in its factory, where he worked in the manufacturo of chemicals and explosives at Lodi, N. J. The ease was tried to the court and jury, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff. Defendant has brought the ease here on writ of error, and alleges that the eourt erred: (1) In refusing to direct a verdict in its favor; (2) in admitting evidence of injuries suffered by other employees; and (3) in permitting defendant’s expert witness to be asked, in an effort to impeach Mm, whether or not he agreed with certain medical works on which he had not relied as authority for Ms testimony.
We do not think the court erred in refusing to direct a .verdict for defendant. Under the pleadings and evidence, the questions of negligence, proximate cause and assumption of risk were, with projier instructions from the court, elearly for the jury.
The plaintiff called three witnesses, Joseph Dedino, Isaac Belton, and George Castellano, who worked in the same rooms in which plaintiff worked. According to their testimony, the gases in these rooms produced practically the same effect on them as on him. Was their testimony admissible? In evidencing the quality of gas, such as phosgene and chlorine (to which the plaintiff alleges he was subjected by the negligence of the defendant), by instances of its effects upon others who worked in and inhaled it, the natural and logical limitation is that the evidential instances should have occurred under substantially the same circumstances ; otherwise the ill effects might be attributed to the influence of some other element introduced by the differing circumstances. While in the use of this mode of proof unfair surprise and confusion of issues inevitably arise and often serve to exclude the evidence, yet the almost universal attitude of courts at the present time is to admit such evidence, subject to the limitation that the evidential instances took place under conditions substantially similar to the one in issue. Greenleaf on Evidence (16th Ed.) vol. 1, § 14v; 22 Corpus Juris, § 840. la the leading case of Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401, 13 Am. Rep. 55, after, reviewing and carefully considering practically all the authorities, Judge Doe reached the conclusion above stated. The question reduces itself to one of fact; Were the conditions under which the plaintiff and the three witnesses worked substantially similar ? We think that they were sufficiently so to come within the rule and to make the' testimony admissible.
Harry L. Gilchrist, a physician, and chief of the medical division of the Chemical Warfare Service in the War Department, testified as an expert for defendant on the effects of gas upon persons. He said that he was superintendent over all medical matters pertaining to gassed men in the World War; that there were 72,000 gassed casualties in our army, most of which he saw personally; that he was in command of the British hospitals from May until the middle of December, 1917, and saw,- in addition, thousands of cases there and thousands of cases in “French gas hospitals”; that he had seen many men who had been gassed with chlorine and phosgene; and that there was no ease on record in which it had been established that the inhalation of gas produced, fibrosis, which plaintiff claims to have as a result of such inhalation. While Dr. Gilchrist was under cross-examination, counsel for plaintiff read from a book written by Dr. Winternitz of Yale statements opposed to the views of Dr. Gilchrist, and then asked him if he differed with Dr. Winternitz. Objection was made, but was overruled, and the witness was compelled to answer. Was this error?
It is well settled in New Jersey that, when a physician testifies from his own experience as an expert, he may not be impeached by medical works upon which he has not relied as authority for his testimony. It is only when a witness refers to them for his own opinions that they are receivable in evidence, and then only for the purpose of contradicting him. New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. v. Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co., 59 N. J. Law, 188, 35 A. 915; Kingsley v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 81 N. J. Law, 536, 538, 80 A. 327, 35 L. R.A. (N. S.) 338; State v. McRorie, 86 N. J. Law, 401, 92 A. 578; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ammann (C. C. A.) 296 F. 453. The federal court here was administering New Jersey law, and in doing so it must be governed by the New Jersey rules of evidence, unless there is a federal rule to the contrary. But the federal rule and the New Jersey rule are the same on this subject. Davis v. United States, 165 U. S. 373, 377, 16 S. Ct. 353, 40 L. Ed. 499. This testimony Was therefore inadmissible and prejudicial. The vice of the question was that it involved the admission of hearsay evidence, without giving the adverse party an opportunity to cross-examine the author.
The judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1