What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Edgar Lee SHOBE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 15160.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
April 5, 1955.
Edgar Lee Shobe, pro se.
Edward L. Scheufler, U. S. Atty., and William O. Russell, Asst. U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before SANBORN, JOHNSEN and VOGEL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court entered June 22, 1954, denying a motion of Edgar Lee Shobe under Section 2255, Title 28 U.S.C., to vacate a sentence of five years imprisonment imposed upon him by that court on September 4, 1953. The sentence was based upon Shobe’s conviction by a jury under an indictment charging him and others, under Section 371, Title 18 U.S.C., with having conspired to steal letters containing United States Treasury checks from the mail, to forge endorsement on the checks, and to utter the forged checks as genuine, with intent to defraud the United States.
Shobe and several of his co-defendants, who were convicted by the jury and sentenced by the court, filed on September 9, 1953, a motion for a new trial because of errors of law allegedly committed by the court during the trial. The motion was denied. No appeal was taken by Shobe from his sentence. On November 18, 1953, he filed a motion under Section 2255, Title 28 U.S.C., to vacate the sentence upon grounds which challenged the adequacy of the evidentiary basis for the verdict and judgment, and certain rulings of the District Court during the proceedings culminating in the sentence complained of.
On January 23, 1954, the court denied Shobe’s motion of November 18, 1953, pointing out that Section 2255 was not a substitute for an appeal, and that the grounds stated in Shobe’s motion raised questions reviewable only on appeal.
On April 30, 1954, Shobe filed another motion to vacate sentence, again asserting errors which would be reviewable only on an appeal from the judgment and sentence. The District Court denied the motion of April 30, 1954, upon the grounds: (1) that the questions Shobe sought to raise were not reviewable on a motion to vacate sentence under Section 2255, and that the record conclusively showed that he was entitled to no relief under his motion; and (2) that having theretofore ruled upon a similar motion based on substantially similar grounds, the court was not required to entertain the motion of April 30, 1954.
It is only where a sentence is void or otherwise subject to collateral attack that Section 2255 affords a remedy, and a motion under that Section cannot function as an appeal. Taylor v. United States, 4 Cir., 177 F.2d 194; Dennis v. United States, 4 Cir., 177 F.2d 195; United States v. Jonikas, 7 Cir., 197 F.2d 675, 676; United States v. Rutkin, 3 Cir., 212 F.2d 641, 643; Pelley v. United States, 7 Cir., 214 F.2d 597, 598. The questions raised by Shobe’s motions were questions reviewable only on appeal.
Moreover, the District Court was entirely justified in denying Shobe’s second motion on the ground that it was a “second or successive motion for similar relief” which Section 2255 expressly provides the sentencing court shall not be required to entertain. Moss v. United States, 10 Cir., 177 F.2d 438; Hallowell v. United States, 5 Cir., 197 F.2d 926; Johnson v. United States, 5 Cir., 213 F.2d 492, 494.
The order appealed from is affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2