What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GOLO SLIPPER CO. v. HAMILTON SHOE STORES CO. et al.
No. 200.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Aug. 21, 1930.
E. M. Boddington, of Kansas City, Kan. (Ered Robertson and W. E. Stiekel, both of Kansas City, Kan., on the brief), for appellant.
J. Francis O’Sullivan, of Kansas City, Mo. (George Halpem, Maurice 3. O’Sullivan, and O. H. Stevens, all of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.
Before COTTERAL, PHILLIPS, and McDERMOTT, Circuit Judges.
COTTERAL, Circuit Judge.
In a suit filed on April 10, 1929, a receiver was appointed by the trial court on that day to take charge of and dispose of the property of the Hamilton Shoe Stores Company, for the benefit of creditors, and on the next day was named as ancillary receiver in the Western district of Missouri. The company had been operating stores in Kansas and Missouri.
On June 20, 1929, the appellant, located at New York City, filed with the receiver a claim for $1,542.60 (as corrected), for which a priority was sought, arising from the sales of footwear it had made to the company, on the ground that the deliveries were actually made to and accepted by the receiver. The demand was denied priority and allowed only as a general claim. Prom that action this appeal has been taken.
The controversy was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts. This shows that the shipments were made on orders given by the company in November, 1928; that the shipments were made by freight on- April 2 and by express on April 8; that three of them amounting to $729.90 were received on April 10, three of them amounting to $315, on April 11; and the last amounting to $497.-70, on April 12; that the receiver took actual physical possession of the stores on April 12, 15, and 17, when the merchandise shipped was in the stores and had been commingled with the other merchandise. It was also stipulated that appellant did not exercise a right to stop the merchandise in transit, and did not file any application to reclaim or replevy it, or to have it segregated at the stores.
There were communications between appellant and the receiver, in which the former stated it expected a return of the merchandise, as the deliveries were made when the company was in the receivership, and urged a prompt return of it. The receiver advised appellant of his appointment, of his pro- . posed operation of the stores and reorganization of the company, and later, by a letter of May 24, that he found on investigation the merchandise was delivered before the receivership, except as to small amounts, for which appellant would be entitled to a priority, suggesting the filing of a claim therefor or for redelivery of the merehan-disc for action, by tbe court, without which he had. no authority to act, except by way of dividends to general creditors.
Counsel for appellant state the controversy to be whether the receiver was vested with title to the merchandise which had not yet been delivered at the time of his appointment, and they contend he had no right to receive or take into his possession merchandise to which the title of the company was not then complete.
Appellant had the burden of establishing the facts' essential to its claim. It is settled law that, in the absence of a different agreement, delivery to a carrier at the location of the seller constitutes delivery to the purchaser, and title vests in the latter at that time. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., v. United States, 231 U. S. 363, 34 S. Ct. 65, 58 L. Ed. 269; 23 R. C. L. 1423, 1424 ; 35 Cyc. 172. But appellant wholly failed to prove an agreement for delivery of the merchandise that would take the case out of this general rule. The showing was only that the sales were made on credit and on orders given five months prior to shipment. The title to the merchandise therefore vested in the company at the time of delivery to the carriers, and this antedated the receivership. The sale contracts had been fully performed by appellant, and nothing remained to discharge them, but payment by the company. It was immaterial whether the receiver’s possession dated from the time when he was appointed or when he took physical possession of the stores.
We are not called upon to determine the rights of appellant, had it sought to rescind the sale contracts and replevy or otherwise reclaim the merchandise. Although demands were made upon the receiver for its return, this was not justified as long as the contracts of sale stood in force, and the title had passed from the appellant. Having elected to affirm the contracts by presentation of its claim, its remedy was limited to the price at which the merchandise was sold. Its claim to priority failed because it was merely a creditor to that extent and it had no better right to payment than the other creditors.
It is obvious that the complaint of appellant is based on the misconception that title to the goods had not passed to the company. It is true, as counsel insist, that title does not pass if any act remains to be done to complete it. But it had vested before the bill was filed or the receiver was appointed. Appellant’s claim was not bettered by the correspondence with the receiver. As a neutral party, he was not authorized to prejudice the interests of creditors, especially since the statement in his letter was expressly conditioned on action by the court.
We are of the opinion that the deeree of the District Court must be, and it is accordingly, affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1