What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Lewis E. TERRY, Appellant, v. SUPERINTENDENT OF FIELD UNIT #9, Appellee.
No. 71-1682.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1972.
Lewis E. Terry, pro se.
Overton P. Pollard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, SOBELOFF, Senior Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL, Circuit Judge.
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Lewis E. Terry, a Virginia prisoner, seeks a certificate of probable cause to appeal an order of the district court refusing him habeas corpus relief.
On November 14, 1969, Terry pleaded not guilty to and was convicted of the separate offenses of assault and brandishing a firearm by a judge of the Bot-etourt County Court sitting without a jury. He was sentenced to serve six months in jail and to pay a fine of $500.00 for the brandishing conviction and he was sentenced to serve twelve months in jail and to pay a fine of $500.00 for the assault conviction. His total jail sentence was thus eighteen months. He appealed and was given a trial de novo in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County on January 7, 1970. He pleaded not guilty to the charges, was tried by a jury, and again convicted. He was sentenced by the jury to serve twelve months and to pay a fine of $100.00 for each offense. His total jail sentence was thus increased to two years. The reasons for this increased sentence do not affirmatively appear in the state court records.
Terry’s first claim is based on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In Pearce the Supreme Court said that “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear.” 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. 2081. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Terry need not exhaust his state court remedies on this claim. Manns v. Allman, 324 F.Supp. 1149 (W.D.Va.1971). For the reasons stated in Levine v. Peyton, 444 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1971), however, we disagree with the district court’s second conclusion that Pearce does not apply to a jury sentencing. Therefore, in light of Levine and in light of Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1970), which applied Pearce to a trial de novo, we hold that Terry is entitled to have his increased sentence vacated.
It is therefore ordered that six months of Terry’s twelve month sentence for brandishing a firearm be vacated and the respondent is directed to adjust his release date accordingly.
The district court’s decision dismissing Terry’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to exhaust state court remedies is affirmed.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, a certificate of probable cause to appeal is granted and the judgment of the district court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1