What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. FOX.
No. 189.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Feb. 24, 1942.
Samuel W. Altman, of New York City, for appellant.
John C. Hilly, of New York City, for ap-pellee.
Before L. HAND, CHASE, and FRANK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The accused, Fox,.was convicted of possessing with guilty knowledge a carton of silk stolen while it was “part of * * * an interstate * * * shipment.” § 409, Title 18 U.S.C.A. He raises only one point; i. e. that the silk when stolen had not yet begun to move in interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute. The facts proved were as follows: The silk was in one of a number of cartons which a New York merchant had packed for shipment to another merchant in California. The shipper’s servant made out a through bill of lading for them and a “shipping order” and delivered both along with the cartons — seventeen in all — to the servant of a truckman, doing business in the city who picked them up in a hand-car and took them to the truckman’s place of business. Two other servants of the truckman then put them on a motor truck and — with the two documents mentioned also in their possession — drove to the freight yard of the Erie Railroad in New York. One of the men on the truck took the bill of lading to the receiving clerk of the railroad who signed it and gave it back to him. Upon his return to the truck he agreed with his fellow to withhold the carton in question, and later the two delivered it to the accused under circumstances proving his guilty knowledge. As we have said, the only question is whether the carton had become “part of * * * an interstate * * .* shipment.”
Courts have at times found it difficult to decide what interruption of a movement, intended from the outset to cross a state border, was definitive enough to divide it into two parts, so that the first — if wholly within a state — was not within the Federal power. In Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 6 S.Ct. 475, 29 L.Ed. 715, the logs had actually performed the first leg of a journey which their owner, before he began to move them at all, intended to pass beyond the state. The pause was longer than in Hughes Brothers Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469, 475, 47 S.Ct. 170, 71 L.Ed. 359; but if the original intent is to be the test— as it is generally said to be — it is hard to see any difference between the two cases. Be that as it may, the test of whether a state may tax the. goods is not a safe one for deciding whether Congress has power to regulate them. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 525, 526,42 S.Ct. 397, 66 L.Ed. 735, 23 A.L.R. 229; Lemke v. Farmers’ Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, at page 55, 42 S.Ct. 244, 66 L.Ed. 458; Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 8, 54 S.Ct. 34, 78 L.Ed. 131. The cattle which it was lawful for Minnesota to tax in Minnesota v. Blasius, supra, would have been subject to the Anti-Trust Acts. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 S.Ct. 276, 49 L.Ed. 518. Again, as to the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission over interstate rates, there can be no doubt that jurisdiction attaches as soon as the goods start on the journey, although the first carrier is not to carry them across a state line. Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U.S. 101, 32 S.Ct. 653, 56 L.Ed. 1004; Railroad Comm. of Louisiana v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 229 U.S. 336, 33 S.Ct. 837, 57 L.Ed. 1215. See also Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company v. Hancock, 253 U.S. 284, 40 S.Ct. 512, 64 L.Ed. 907. The nearest case we, have found under the statute at bar is Sharp v. United States, 5 Cir., 280 F. 86, and we do not see that it should make any difference that the goods were already in the same car which was to -carry them out of the state. Wolk v. United States, 8 Cir., 94 F.2d 310, would be flatly in point, were it not that the court held that the truckman was only an agent of the interstate carrier. Indeed, if he had not been, apparently the result would have been otherwise. To that we cannot agree. Although we have therefore not been able to find any authority precisely on all fours, we are satisfied that at least as soon as the goods have finally left the shipper’s possession and have come into the possession of any of those who are to forward them upon an interstate journey, intended to be such from the outset, they become a part of interstate commerce.
Conviction affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0