What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Alvin FRANKEL, Administrator of the Estate of Louis Benham, Jr., Deceased v. PHILADELPHIA SUBURBAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Inc., and Joseph McMadden, a minor, Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Company, Inc., Appellant.
No. 18108.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued March 3, 1970.
Decided March 17, 1970.
Norman Paul Harvey, Liebert, Harvey, Herting, Short & Lavin, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Lynn L. Detweiler, Swartz, Campbell & Detweiler, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before SEITZ, VAN DUSEN and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Company, Inc. (Transportation Company) appeals from the denial of its motions for judgment n. o. v. and a new trial. It contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that the behavior of its employee, the operator of a trolley car, was negligent and that this alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's decedent. In addition it maintains that the instructions by the trial judge on the “sudden emergency” doctrine were erroneous and thus grounds for a new trial.
Decedent, a passenger in an automobile operated by Joseph MeFadden, Jr., died when McFadden’s automobile collided with a trolley operated by the Transportation Company. The accident occurred when the driver of the automobile travelling north suddenly turned east without signalling, and collided with Transportation Company’s .trolley car that was proceeding south on its right of way which ran parallel to the public street.
In a suit under diversity jurisdiction against both the driver of the automobile and the Transportation Company, the jury returned a verdict against both defendants thereby finding that the negligence of each was the proximate cause of the accident.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, we conclude that a jury question existed as to the liability of .the Transportation Company.
There is testimony that although the trolley operator saw the automobile about to cross its path without stopping, he did not apply the brakes of the trolley until the time of impact. The operator testified that when the automobile turned east, the trolley was going ten to twenty miles per hour and was twenty to twenty five feet from the north side of the intersection. Although the Transportation Company argues that failure to apply the brakes was not the proximate cause of the accident because even if the operator had applied the brakes he could not have avoided the collision, evidence in support of this conclusion is not established in the record. The cases of De Angelis v. Burns, 404 Pa. 230, 171 A.2d 762 (1961) and Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965), relied on by the Transportation Company, are therefore not apposite.
Plaintiff’s witness, Smith, a physicist, after examining the scene of the accident, testified that the trolley was proceeding at 32.5 miles per hour. To offset the possibility that the jury verdict against it was based only on such speed, the Transportation Company cites cases for the proposition that speed alone does not constitute evidence of negligence. However, even if we accept the contention that speed alone is not conclusive on the issue of negligence, the evidence that .the operator observed a car turning in front of the trolley and did not slow down, would clearly permit an inference of negligent conduct unrelated to speed.
Indeed, in view of the contradictory testimony as to .the speed of the trolley, a jury might well draw the inference that the trolley operator accelerated instead of braking the trolley in order to “beat the car” through the intersection. Of course, if this alternative conclusion were believed by the jury, it could find that the operator acted negligently under the circumstances.
The Transportation Company complains that the trial judge did not charge, as a matter of law, that a sudden emergency existed and that the jury should examine the conduct of the operator in light of what an ordinary person might do in a sudden emergency. Instead, the trial judge left to the jury the question whether a sudden emergency not caused by the operator did, in fact, exist. He then instructed the jury that if it found such emergency did exist, the operator was required only to exercise his best judgment under the circumstances. In view of the conflicting testimony regarding the speed of the trolley car, we do not believe that the trial judge was in error in permitting the jury to decide whether a sudden emergency not occasioned by the operator’s negligence did, in fact, exist.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
. The issues of liability and damages were separated. After the liability verdict against both defendants, the plaintiff’s claim for damages were settled with each defendant contributing one half, pending the outcome of the appeal.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 7