What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COMPARET v. UNITED STATES.
No. 3534.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 3, 1947.
Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr. (of Shuteran, Robinson & Harrington), of Denver Colo., for appellant.
Jason D. Lee, of Washington, D. C. (A. Devitt Vanech, Asst. Atty. Gen., Max M. Bulkeley, U. S. Atty., of Wray, Colo., and Roger P. Marquis, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRATTON, HUXMAN and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
MURRAH, Circuit Judge.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the fair market value of appellant’s property, taken by the Government under right of eminent domain, should have been determined as of June 15, 1942, the date on which the Government took and acquired title to the property, or as of the date of trial in the condemnation proceedings.
Acting under authority of the Condemnation Act of August 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C.A. § 257 and the Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. 177, 50 U.S.C.A. 171a, the United States on June 15, 1942 filed a petition to condemn certain lands in Adams County, Colorado, for the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 156.36 acres of which were owned by appellant, and an order of immediate possession was entered the same day. On November 30, the United States deposited the sum of $13,445.43 with the Clerk of the Court, as estimated just compensation under its declaration of taking and on December 5, the court decreed title in the United States.
The estimated compensation, tendered by the Government, was not satisfactory to appellant and on June 20, 1945, trial was commenced to determine “just compensation” for the tract of land. At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jury that it should “value the land taken by the Government, according to its actual fair market value on the 15th day of June, 1942, which was the date upon which the United States acquired title to the property”.
Although all of appellant’s testimony in the trial pertained to the 1942 land values, and no objection was made to the court’s instruction, she now contends on appeal that it was an erroneous statement of the law and she was entitled to have the jury determine the fair market value of her land as of the date of trial. In support of this contention appellant cites many Colorado cases holding that the present market value of land means market value at the time of trial, and invokes the statutory rule that condemnation proceedings in a Federal court “shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings” afforded by the law of the state in which the court sits. 40 U.S.C.A. § 258. But, this statute is procedural only. It does not, and could not, “affect questions of substantive right, — such as the measure of compensation, — grounded upon the Constitution of the United States”. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 283, 87 L.Ed. 336, 147 A.L.R. 55. See also United States v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 3 Cir., 158 F.2d 874; United States v. Kansas City, 10 Cir., 159 F.2d 125.
When on June 15, 1942 the petition of condemnation was filed and an order of immediate possession entered, appellant was deprived of her property and the United States had the right of possession. Estimated compensation was thereafter tendered into court and an order vesting title in the United States was entered — nothing more was required other than a judicial proceedings to determine whether the sum tendered by the United States was “just compensation” as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment. When the Government acquired possession in 1942 there was a “taking” of appellant’s property for public use; compensation therefor was then due and payable, and under the Federal rule of decisions its fair market value should be determined as of that date. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 44 S.Ct. 471, 68 L.Ed. 934; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 43 S.Ct. 354, 67 L.Ed. 664; United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S. 163, 41 S.Ct. 281, 65 L.Ed. 566; 11,000 Acres of Land v. United States, 5 Cir., 152 F.2d 566; Lewis Eminent Domain, 3d Ed., Section 705, p. 1220.
Moreover, since no objections were made to the crucial instruction of the court until after the verdict of the jury, the complaint comes too late for cognizance on appeal. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 51, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c;, Krug v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 8 Cir., 120 F.2d 296; Hupp Motor Car Corporation v. Wadsworth, 6 Cir., 113 F.2d 827; Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson, 5 Cir., 117 F.2d 412; Baltimore & O. R. R. v. Corbin, 73 App.D.C. 124, 118 F.2d 9.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0