What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Nathaniel VINCENT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 18311.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
June 7, 1966.
Nathaniel Vincent, pro se.
Richard D. FitzGibbon, Jr., U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., and John A. Newton, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before VOGEL, Chief Judge, MEHAFFY, Circuit Judge, and McMANUS, District Judge.
MEHAFFY, Circuit Judge.
Vincent appeals from an order of the United States District Court denying a motion to vacate his sentence under a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition.
Petitioner was convicted on a two-count indictment charging violations of the narcotics laws, 26 U.S.C. § 4724(b) and 21 U.S.C. § 174. He was sentenced to consecutive ten-year terms and upon appeal to this court we affirmed the judgment of conviction. Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988, 85 S.Ct. 1363, 14 L.Ed.2d 281 (1965), reh. denied, 381 U.S. 947, 85 S.Ct. 1775, 14 L.Ed.2d 713 (1965).
This collateral attack questions the validity of Count II of the indictment by claiming that it includes two felonies. Count II charged unlawful receipt and concealment of nareotics but only the “concealment” charge was submitted to the jury. And it is settled that when a statute denounces several acts as a crime, an indictment drawn in the language of the statute is not duplicitous if the acts are pleaded conjunctively in one count. Cordova v. United States, 303 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1962). See also Robison v. United States, 329 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859, 85 S.Ct. 115, 13 L.Ed.2d 61 (1964).
This court has repeatedly ruled that after conviction, challenges directed to the sufficiency of the indictment or information are not reviewable on appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate sentence, except in the rare case comparable to Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455 (1939). Williams v. United States, 344 F.2d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 857, 86 S.Ct. 112, 15 L.Ed.2d 95 (1965); Moore v. United States, 337 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 994, 85 S.Ct. 712, 13 L.Ed.2d 614 (1965); Taylor v. United States, 332 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1964); Jackson v. United States, 325 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1963); Ware v. United States, 309 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1962); Roth v. United States, 295 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1004, 82 S.Ct. 639, 7 L.Ed.2d 543 (1962); Link v. United States, 295 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 1003, 82 S.Ct. 638, 7 L.Ed.2d 542 (1962).
Count II was not invalid because it charged both “receipt” and “concealment” of narcotics, but in any event it is not properly reviewable here.
Other assignments of error relate to the introduction in evidence of the narcotics and petitioner’s confession. Both questions were answered on the direct appeal of this case. We ruled that the arrest was valid and that there was no improper search and seizure, and in any event petitioner was seen to have abandoned the narcotics in a trash receptacle where they were immediately retrieved by the officers. In summarizing the facts in our former opinion, we pointed out that the confession was voluntarily made shortly after petitioner was booked and within ten minutes after commencement of questioning. In fact, when petitioner was caught red-handed and confronted with the evidence against him, he not only confessed his part in the transportation and concealment of the narcotics, but also disclosed their source. The undisputed facts simply do not provide a reasonable basis for contending that the narcotics were improperly admitted into evidence.
For the first time, petitioner questions the voluntariness of his confession and the impropriety of being questioned without an attorney, but offers no supporting allegations of fact for either contention. Since neither contention was argued in the District Court application, they cannot be raised here for the first time. See Way v. United States, 276 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1960).
Another cogent reason for not considering these evidentiary questions is the well-settled rule that if matters are not raised on direct appeal, or if raised and disposed of in such an appeal, they will not be reviewed in a § 2255 proceeding. Butler v. United States, 340 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 847, 86 S.Ct. 92, 15 L.Ed.2d 87 (1965); Franano v. United States, 303 F.2d 470, 472 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 865, 83 S.Ct. 125, 9 L.Ed.2d 102 (1962).
The belated assignment of but different reasons to raise issues already carefully considered on direct appeal furnishes no basis for collateral attack. Petitioner’s contentions are frivolous and without merit.
The judgment of the District Court denying the motion to vacate the sentence is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0