What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state of the state agency associated with the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation.

Opinion:
PALMER OIL CORP. et al. v. AMERADA PETROLEUM CORP. et al.
NO. 301.
Argued April 25, 1952.
Decided May 12, 1952.
Mark H. Adams argued the cause for appellants in No. 301. With him on the brief were Charles E. Jones and Coleman Hayes.
Reford Bond, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants in No. 302.
R. M. Williams argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Harry D. Page and Booth Kellough for the Amerada Petroleum Corp., W. H. Brown for the Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., Gentry Lee and R. O. Mason for the Cities Service Oil Co., Villard Martin for the Foster Petroleum Corp., Archie D. Gray and James B. Diggs, Jr. for the Gulf Oil Corp., Earl A. Brown and Robert W. Richards for the Magnolia Petroleum Co., Rayburn L. Foster, Harry D. Turner and Mr. Williams for the Phillips Petroleum Co., V. P. Crowe for the Stephens Petroleum Co. et al., M. Darwin Kirk for the Sunray Oil Corp. and Ferrill H. Rogers for the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, appellees.
Per Curiam.
These two appeals challenge the constitutionality of Okla. Stat., 1941 (Cum. Supp. 1949), Tit. 52, §§ 286.1-286.17, providing for unitized management of common sources of supply of oil and gas in Oklahoma. This statute was repealed by the Oklahoma Legislature on May 26, 1951, Okla. Laws 1951, c. 3a, § 16, p. 142, and we ordered the causes continued in order to determine the effect of this repeal on the matters raised in these appeals. 342 U. S. 35 (1951). After being advised by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that this repeal had no effect on these causes, we noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument.
Appellants contend that this statute and an order issued thereunder by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission impair their contractual rights in violation of U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, and amount to a denial of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, appellants argue that the statute is an unreasonable exercise of the State’s police power and an unreasonable delegation of legislative and judicial power to private groups. In addition, appellants maintain that the statute is too vague and indefinite to furnish the Commission with any reasonable guide for the issuance of orders approving unitization plans, and that the evidence does not support the Commission’s findings of fact.
In the light of our previous decisions, appellants have failed to raise any substantial federal questions and the appeals are therefore dismissed. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939); Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 435, 436, 437 (1934); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
Dismissed.

Question: What is the state of the state agency associated with the administrative action?

Choices:
Alabama
Alaska
American Samoa
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Federated States of Micronesia
Florida
Georgia
Guam
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Marshall Islands
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Northern Mariana Islands
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Palau
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virgin Islands
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
United States
Interstate Compact
Philippines
Indian
Dakota

Answer: 41