What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
WERNER MACHINE CO., INC. v. DIRECTOR OF DIVISION OF TAXATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OF NEW JERSEY.
No. 63.
Argued March 5-6, 1956.
Decided March 26, 1956.
Charles Goodwin, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Halsey T. Tichenor, III, and Leopold Frankel.
Harold Kolovsky, Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for- appellee. With him on the brief were Grover C. Richman, Jr., Attorney General, and Lawrence E. Stern and David D. Furman, Deputy Attorneys General. Ned J. Parsekian, Deputy Attorney General, was on a Motion to Dismiss.
Per Curiam.
The State of New Jersey imposes on each domestic corporation “an annual franchise tax ... for the privilege of having or exercising its corporate franchise” in the State. This tax, as applied to appellant, is measured by the corporation's “net worth,” which is defined as the sum of the corporation’s issued and outstanding capital stock, paid-in or capital surplus, earned surplus and undivided profits, other surplus accounts which will accrue to the shareholders (not including depreciation reserves), and debts owed to shareholders owning 10 percent or more of the corporation’s stock. Appellant is a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, and is therefore subject to the tax. In assessing appellant’s tax for 1952, the Tax Commissioner included in appellant’s net worth the value of certain federal bonds held by appellant, thereby increasing the amount due by $320.07. Appellant protested, claiming that under R. S. § 3701, 31 U. S. C. § 742, these bonds were immune from state taxation. The New Jersey courts upheld the Commissioner’s assessment, and this appeal contests the validity of the state statute as so applied.
Appellant contends that this tax is not in reality a franchise tax, but is rather in the nature of a direct property tax on the immune federal obligations. Corporate franchises granted by a State create a relationship which may legitimately be made the subject of taxation, Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 599-600; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 162; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S. 379, 388; and the statute expressly declares this to be a franchise tax. Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has, on independent examination, found this to be “a bona fide franchise tax.” While this is, of course, not conclusive here, Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U. S. 143, we find no basis in this instance for not accepting the state court’s conclusion that this tax is not imposed directly on the property held by the corporation. Cf. Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 495-496.
Appellant argues further that even if this is a franchise tax, it must fall because its effect is the same as if it had been imposed directly on the tax-exempt federal securities. Since the tax remains the same whatever the character of the corporate assets may be, no claim can be sustained that this taxing statute discriminates against the federal obligations. And since this is a tax on the corporate franchise, it is valid despite the inclusion of federal bonds in the determination of net worth. This Court has consistently upheld franchise taxes measured by a yardstick which includes tax-exempt income or property, even though a part of the economic impact of the tax may be said to bear indirectly upon such income or property. See, e. g., Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, supra; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, supra; Pacific Co. v. Johnson, supra. We have only recently adhered to this principle in another aspect of this field of taxation. See Society for Savings v. Bowers, supra, at 147-148. New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U. S. 665, on which appellant relies, is distinguishable, in that it did not involve a franchise tax, but rather a tax whose legal incidence this Court found to be upon the intangible assets of the corporation.
Since as applied here this is a permissible tax on the corporate franchise, the decision below must be
Affirmed.
N. J. Laws 1945, c. 162, N. J. S. A. §§ 54:10A-1 et seq.
Id., §§ 54:10A-4 (d)(5).
Werner Machine Co. v. Director of Division of Taxation, 17 N. J. 121, 125, 110 A. 2d 89, 91.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1