What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
ARMCO INC. v. HARDESTY, TAX COMMISSIONER OF WEST VIRGINIA
No. 83-297.
Argued April 17, 1984
Decided June 12, 1984
Richard R. Dailey argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Edward H. Hein and Michael J. Rufkahr.
Robert Digges, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of West Virginia, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Chauncey H. Browning, Attorney General, and Jack C. McClung, Deputy Attorney General.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Washington by Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and Leland T. Johnson and Timothy R. Malone, Assistant Attorneys General; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Lawrence R. Velvet, Elaine D. Kaplan, and Stefan F. Tucker.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal an Ohio corporation claims that West Virginia’s wholesale gross receipts tax, from which local manufacturers are exempt, unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce. We agree and reverse the state court’s judgment upholding the tax.
I
Appellant Armco Inc. is an Ohio corporation qualified to do business in West Virginia. Its primary business is manufacturing and selling steel products. From 1970 through 1975, the time at issue here, Armco conducted business in West Virginia through five divisions or subdivisions. Two of these had facilities and employees in the State, while the other three sold various products to customers in the State only through franchisees or nonresident traveling salesmen.
West Virginia imposes a gross receipts tax on persons engaged in the business of selling tangible property at wholesale. W. Va. Code § ll-13-2c (1983). For the years 1970 through 1975 Armco took the position that the gross receipts tax could not be imposed on the sales it made through franchisees and nonresident salesmen. In addition, because local manufacturers were exempt from the tax, see § 11-13-2, Armco argued that the tax discriminated against interstate commerce. After a hearing, the State Tax Commissioner, who is appellee here, determined that the tax was properly-assessed on the sales at issue, and that Armco had not shown the tax was discriminatory. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversed, holding that the nexus between the sales and the State was insufficient to support imposition of the tax.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court and upheld the tax. -W. Va.-, 303 S. E. 2d 706 (1983). Viewing all of Armco’s activities in the State as a “unitary business,” the court held that the taxpayer had a substantial nexus with the State and that the taxpayer’s total tax was fairly related to the services and benefits provided to Armco by the State. Id., at-,-, 303 S. E. 2d, at 714, 716. It also held that the tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce; while local manufacturers making sales in the State were exempt from the gross receipts tax, they paid a much higher manufacturing tax. Id., at-,-, 303 S. E. 2d, at 716-717.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 464 U. S. 1016 (1983), and now reverse. Since we hold that West Virginia’s tax does discriminate unconstitutionally against interstate commerce, we do not reach Armco’s argument that there was not a sufficient nexus between the State and the sales at issue here to permit taxation of them.
It long has been established that the Commerce Clause of its own force protects free trade among the States. Boston Stock Exchange v. State-Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 328 (1977); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). One aspect of this protection is that a State “may not discriminate between transactions on the basis of some interstate element.” Boston Stock Exchange, supra, at 332, n. 12. That is, a State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.
On its face, the gross receipts tax at issue here appears to have just this effect. The tax provides that two companies selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it. Thus, if the property was manufactured in the State, no tax on the sale is imposed. If the property was manufactured out of the State and imported for sale, a tax of 0.27% is imposed on the sale price. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436, 459 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (similar provision in Washington, “on its face, discriminated against interstate wholesale sales to Washington purchasers for it exempted the intrastate sales of locally made products while taxing the competing sales of interstate sellers”); Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 664, 192 P. 2d 976, 979 (1948) (invalidating Washington tax).
The court below was of the view that no such discrimination in favor of local, intrastate commerce occurred because taxpayers manufacturing in the State were subject to a far higher tax of 0.88% of the sale price. This view is mistaken. The gross sales tax imposed on Armco cannot be deemed a “compensating tax” for the manufacturing tax imposed on its West Virginia competitors. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 758-759 (1981), the Court refused to consider a tax on the first use in Louisiana of gas brought in from out of State to be a complement of a severance tax in the same amount imposed on gas produced in the State. Severance and first use or processing were not “substantially equivalent event[s]” on which compensating taxes might be imposed. Id., at 759. Here, too, manufacturing and wholesaling are not “substantially equivalent events” such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out of State. Manufacturing frequently entails selling in the State, but we cannot say which portion of the manufacturing tax is attributable to manufacturing, and which portion to sales. The fact that the manufacturing tax is not reduced when a West Virginia manufacturer sells its goods out of State, and that it is reduced when part of the manufacturing takes place out of State, makes clear that the manufacturing tax is just that, and not in part a proxy for the gross receipts tax imposed on Armco and other sellers from other States.
Moreover, when the two taxes are considered together, discrimination against interstate commerce persists. If Ohio or any of the other 48 States imposes a like tax on its manufacturers — which they have every right to do — then Armco and others from out of State will pay both a manufacturing tax and a wholesale tax while sellers resident in West Virginia will pay only the manufacturing tax. For example, if Ohio were to adopt the precise scheme here, then an interstate seller would pay the manufacturing tax of 0.88% and the gross receipts tax of 0.27%; a purely intrastate seller would pay only the manufacturing tax of 0.88% and would be exempt from the gross receipts tax.
Appellee suggests that we should require Armco to prove actual discriminatory impact on it by pointing to a State that imposes a manufacturing tax that results in a total burden higher than that imposed on Armco’s competitors in West Virginia. This is not the test. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U. S. 159, 169 (1983), the Court noted that a tax must have “what might be called internal consistency — that is the [tax] must be such that, if applied by every jurisdiction,” there would be no impermissible interference with free trade. In that case, the Court was discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to reflect the business conducted in the State. A similar rule applies where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce. A tax that unfairly apportions income from other States is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce. See also id., at 170-171. Any other rule would mean that the constitutionality of West Virginia’s tax laws would depend on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other States, and that the validity of the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the particular other States in which it operated.
It is true, as the State of Washington appearing as amicus curiae points out, that Armco would be faced with the same situation that it complains of here if Ohio (or some other State) imposed a tax only upon manufacturing, while West Virginia imposed a tax only upon wholesaling. In that situation, Armco would bear two taxes, while West Virginia sellers would bear only one. But such a result would not arise from impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce but from fair encouragement of in-state business. What we said in Boston Stock Exchange, 429 U. S., at 336-337, is relevant here as well:
“Our decision today does not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry. Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other States for a share of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We hold only that in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State.”
The judgment below is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The company’s Mining Division mined, cleaned, and sold coal in the State, and part of the Metal Products Division sold various construction and drainage products through an office in the State staffed by three employees. The Metal Products Division’s metal buildings were sold in the State exclusively by two franchised dealers resident in the State. The Steel Group and the Union Wire Rope Group had no office in West Virginia but sold steel and wire rope through nonresident traveling salesmen who solicited sales from customers in the State.
For the years 1971 through 1975, § ll-13-2c provided, in relevant part:
“Upon every person engaging or continuing within this state in the business of selling any tangible property whatsoever, real or personal, . . . there is . . . hereby levied, and shall be collected, a tax equivalent to fifty-five one-hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the business, except that in the business of selling at wholesale the tax shall be equal to twenty-seven one-hundredths of one percent of the gross income of the business.” 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
The tax on wholesale gross receipts was 0.25% prior to 1971. 1959 W. Va. Acts, ch. 167.
West Virginia Code § 11-13-2 (1983) provides an exemption for persons engaged in the State in manufacturing or in extracting natural resources, and selling their products. For the years at issue here, it read as follows, in relevant part:
“[A]ny person exercising any privilege taxable under sections two-a [extracting and producing natural resources for sale] or two-b [manufacturing] of this article and engaging in the business of selling his natural resources or manufactured products ... to producers of natural resources, manufacturers, wholesalers, jobbers, retailers or commercial consumers for use or consumption in the purchaser’s business shall not be required to pay the tax imposed in section two-c [§ ll-13-2c] of this article.” 1955 W. Va. Acts, ch. 165, §2; 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
The Commissioner waived statutory penalties on the disputed amount because he found that Armco’s objections were a “good faith effort to interpret a substantial question of law.” App. to Juris. Statement 49a.
West Virginia Code § ll-13-2b (1983) imposes a manufacturing tax of 0.88% on the value of products manufactured in the State. The value of the product is measured by the gross proceeds derived from its sale. If the product is manufactured in part out of State, the sale price is multiplied by that portion of the manufacturer’s payroll costs or total costs attributable to West Virginia. As relevant here, the tax is imposed on “every person engaging or continuing within this state in the business of manufacturing, compounding or preparing for sale, profit, or commercial use, . . . any article . . . substance or . . . commodity.” Prior to 1971, the tax rate was 0.8%. 1967 W. Va. Acts, ch. 188; see 1971 W. Va. Acts, ch. 169.
One would expect that a manufacturing tax might be larger than a gross receipts tax since an in-state manufacturer normally benefits to a greater extent from services provided by the State than does a transient wholesaler. Cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977) (state tax will be upheld if it is “fairly related to the services provided by the State”).
The court below relied upon Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199 (1961). That case does not control because the statute there merely laid a nondiseriminatory tax on a particular kind of business, operating freezer ships in Alaska. This was deemed a different business from operating a cannery in Alaska, on which a different (in fact, higher) tax was imposed. See id., at 205. There is no dispute that Armco and the exempt West Virginia manufacturers operate in precisely the same business of wholesaling in that State. That an exemption is required to ensure that the gross receipts tax will not apply to the latter makes this clear. The same is true of Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117, 119-120, 121 (1941)., The latter ease in any event was decided under the now rejected notion that only “direct” burdens on interstate commerce were disapproved, while “indirect” burdens that were the result of taxation of intrastate commerce were constitutional. See id., at 120, and n. 4; Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 750 (1978). This distinction also appears to have governed the definition of the business in which the taxpayer was engaged.
We acknowledge our recent dismissal for want of a substantial federal question of a case raising, inter alia, a nearly identical challenge to the West Virginia gross receipts tax. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Rose, 459 U. S. 807 (1982). We may find it necessary not to follow such a precedent when the issue is given plenary consideration. See, e. g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979).
What was said in a related context is relevant:
“It is suggested, however, that the validity of a gross sales tax should depend on whether another State has also sought to impose its burden on the transactions. If another State has taxed the same interstate transaction, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade are undeniable. But that, for the time being, only one State has taxed is irrelevant to the kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a particular moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might mitigate the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on commerce.” Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 256 (1946).
The court in Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 30 Wash. 2d 658, 662-664, 192 P. 2d 976, 978-979 (1948), found this language dispositive in invalidating a Washington tax scheme identical to that here. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72 (1963) (deleterious effects on free commerce of Louisiana’s tax would be exacerbated “[i]f similar unequal tax structures were adopted in other States”).

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
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Federal Labor Relations Authority
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Farmers Home Administration
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Federal Power Commission
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Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
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Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
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Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 116