What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GIUSTI v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
February 18, 1925.)
No. 4396.
Criminal law <S=»394 — 'Testimony based on illegal search held inadmissible.
A search warrant for the search of a building “operated as a grocery store” gave no authority to search residential rooms above the store, nor was it justified by the fact that, after their unlawful invasion of such rooms, the officers detected the odor of mash, and their testimony based on what they there found was inadmissible oyer objection.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas; William B. Sheppard, Judge.
Criminal prosecution by the United States against Antonio Giusti. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
O. S. York, of Galveston, Tex., for plaintiff in error.
H. M. Holden, TJ. S. Atty., and Edwin R. Warnken, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Houston, Tex., for defendant in error.
Before WALKER, BRYAN and FOSTER, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
On January 15, 1924, an information in three counts was filed by the United States attorney, charging the plaintiff in error, hereinafter called the defendant, in the first count with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor, in the second count with unlawfully possessing property designed for the manufacture of intoxicating liquor, and in the third count with unlawfully manufacturing intoxicating liquor.
The undisputed facts are that one Melton, a prohibition officer, secured a search warrant on his own affidavit to search certain premises in the city of Galveston. The search warrant, without naming any one as the offender or the proprietor, purported to authorize the search of “a certain building located on northeast comer of Twenty-Eighth and Avenue L, city of Galveston, Texas, operated as a grocery store.” There was no other description of the building, and it was not stated to be a residence or apartment house.
Melton executed the warrant, together with Cheatam, another prohibition officer. They went to the grocery store described in the search warrant and searched, hut did not find any liquor or other unlawful property. They then went through the store into a back room and up a flight of stairs, and after they got in the hall they smelled mash. They then went into a room and found six 50-gallon stills, some 1,850 gallons of mash, and 13 gallons of whisky. They destroyed the stills and mash and took possession of the whisky. They did not know who operated the grocery store, but it was not the defendant. There were two apartments upstairs, in one of which the owner of the grocery store lived, and the other apartment, occupied by the defendant, in which the stills, mash, and whisky were found. There was no one in this apartment when the search was made, but the defendant appeared on the scone shortly thereafter and was arrested. The only testimony on the trial was that of the two prohibition officers.
A motion to quash the search warrant was overruled. In the view we take of the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the technical objections made to the search warrant. The law applicable to search warrants in prohibition eases has been considered by the courts so frequently that it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the underlying principles. This ease is ruled and controlled by the decision in Pressley v. United States (C. C. A.) 289 F. 477. Giving the warrant full effect, it did not authorize the search of separate and distinct premises, although in the same building, as it covered the grocery store and nothing else. When the officers invaded the upper part of the building, they did so unlawfully, and there was no justification to make further search, because they then discovered the odor of mash. The evidence of the officers was objected to, and the objection was overruled. At the close of the case a motion was made for a directed verdict, and this was also denied.
The objection to the evidence should have been sustained. On a full disclosure of the circumstances, the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. Because of these errors, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the ease remanded, with instructions to grant a new trial.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0