What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
JOHNSON v. MIDDLEBROOKS, Sheriff, et al. SWAIN v. HICKS, Sheriff, et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
October 25, 1927.
Nos. 4999, 5022.
1. Habeas corpus <§=»54 — Habeas corpus petitions, alleging that trials of criminal prosecutions in state court were affected by mob spirit and violated constitutional rights, held insufficient to show trial by jury was nullity.
Petitions for habeas corpus, alleging that criminal prosecutions in state court were conducted under influence of mob spirit, without regard to defendants’ legal rights under the state and federal Constitutions, that trial, conviction, and sentence to death were without due process of law and void, and that during trial court permitted jury in charge of bailiffs to visit scene of homicide, unattended by trial judge, held insufficient to make out a case of the trials by jury being sham or nullity because of vitiating influences under which they were conducted, for absence of allegations of supporting facts.
2. Habeas corpus <@=>30( I) — Errors of state trial court in criminal prosecution held not reviewable by habeas corpus.
Errors committed by state trial court in trial of criminal prosecutions did not affect court’s jurisdiction to try' the cases, and' cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus.
Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Georgia; William J. Tilson, Judge.
Petitions for habeas eorpus by Wade Johnson against J. C. Middlebrooks, Sheriff of Jones County, Ga., and others, and by James A. Swain against J. R. Hicks, Jr., Sheriff of Bibb County, Ga., and others. Petitions denied, and petitioners appeal.
Affirmed.
Joseph E. Pottle, of Milledgeville, Ga., and W. A. McClellan, of Macon, Ga., for appellant Johnson.
W. O. Cooper, Jr., of Macon, Ga., and J. R. Terrell, of La Grange, Ga., for appellant Swain.
T. R. Gress, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Georgia, for appellees.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and POSTER, Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
These two appeals are from orders denying petitions for the writ of habeas corpus, one of which petitions was sued out by a person who was in custody under process issued under a judgment of a Georgia state court convicting him of rape and sentencing him to death, and the other of which petitions was sued out by a person who was in custody under process issued under a judgment of a court of the same state convicting him of murder and sentencing him to death, both of which judgments were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia.
In the first-mentioned ease the judgment of conviction was attacked on the grounds that it was rendered invalid by the aetion of the court in which the case was tried, in denying a motion for continuance made by the accused, and that, as stated in the petition in that case, petitioner’s “restraint is illegal because his trial, conviction and sentence to death, in the superior court of Jones eounty aforesaid, on the 26th day of May, 1924, was conducted from beginning to end under the spirit of mob domination; that he was hurried to conviction under mob influence, without regard for his legal rights guaranteed to him under both state and federal Constitutions; that his trial, conviction, and sentence to death were without due process of law, and were absolutely null, void, and of no legal effect.” In the other ease, the attack on the judgment of conviction was based on the aetion of the trial court during the trial in permitting the jury, in charge of two bailiffs, to leave the court room, and go to and view the scene of the homicide a short distance from the courthouse, unattended fay the trial judge, and that the trial of the petitioner “from beginning to end was conducted under a mob spirit, although a trial in form was void in substance.”
Neither of the petitions contained allegations of facts furnishing any support for a eonelusion that at the time of the trial there was any mob spirit affecting it, that the trial was dominated by a mob, or that there was any actual interference with the course of justice. Those allegations fall far short of making out a ease of a trial by jury being a sham or nullity, because of vitiating influences under which it was conducted.
The other actions of the trial courts which were made the bases of attacks on the judgments were reviewable by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and were reviewed by that court. If the trial courts erred in those matters, such errors did not affect the jurisdiction of those courts to try the eases, and cannot be reviewed by habeas corpus. Ashe v. Valotta, 270 U. S. 424, 46 S. Ct. 333, 70 L. Ed. 662; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 424, 35 S. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969. Neither of the petitions discloses a state of facts warranting an interference with the execution of the process of a state court, issued under a judgment of conviction rendered by it.
The orders are affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0