What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Leslie Robert GLASS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Patrick John BURMEISTER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Stanley Eugene DAVIS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 8166-8168.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 13, 1965.
Jon D. Boltz, of Wilson & Boltz, Denver, Colo., for appellant Leslie Robert Glass.
Michael F. Morrissey, of Frickey & Morrissey, Denver, Colo., for appellant Patrick John Burmeister.
Gary Hemminger, Denver, Colo. (Bruce Owenbey, Denver, Colo., filed a brief), for appellant Stanley Eugene Davis.
Donald P. MacDonald, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo. (Lawrence M. Henry, U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PICKETT, BREITENSTEIN and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The appellants, Glass, Burmeister and Davis, together with another defendant, Anderson, were charged in a two-count indictment with violations of the Federal Bank Robbery Act. The first count alleged that Anderson and Glass, by the use of firearms, put in jeopardy the lives of employees of the Erie Bank at Erie, Colorado, and stole approximately $7,553.95, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). This count also alleged that Burmeister and Davis did aid, abet, counsel and induce Anderson and Glass in the commission of the robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. The second count alleged that Burmeister and Davis, knowing the money to have been stolen from the Erie Bank, received a portion thereof. All defendants were convicted on the first count; Burmeister was acquitted on the second count; but Davis was found guilty. Anderson and Glass were sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 15 years, Burmeister to 8 years, and Davis to a 6 year term on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. Glass, Bur-meister and Davis have perfected separate appeals.
On July 17, 1964, two armed men entered the Erie Bank, forced the employees into the bank vault, and escaped with about $7,500.00. A short time thereafter, Anderson, Glass, Burmeister and Davis were arrested and charged with the crime. There was evidence that the four defendants had met previously and planned the robbery. Anderson and Glass entered the bank while Burmeister and Davis were in a nearby'bar. Shortly thereafter the four men were together in Boulder, Colorado. After the arrest, Davis was interviewed by an F.B.I. agent and admitted that he had associated with the other three defendants prior to the robbery, but denied any involvement in the commission of the crime. When Anderson was interviewed by an F.B.I. agent, he made a full confession and gave the details of the robbery. When the agent testified as to the confession, the names of Burmeister and Davis were not mentioned. The trial court instructed the jury that the statements of Davis or Anderson could not be considered as evidence of the guilt of any defendant other than the one making the statement. No contention is made that Anderson’s confession was not voluntary or that the evidence did not support the verdicts.
Prior to the trial, Burmeister and Davis filed a motion requesting separate trials. In substance, it was alleged that these defendants had reason to believe that one of the co-defendants had made a confession which implicated them in the crime, and that under the circumstances a fair trial could not be had if this statement were introduced in evidence. They further alleged that they had no criminal records and could not obtain a fair and impartial trial due to the character of their co-defendants, who had extensive criminal records. The denial of this motion is assigned as error. This court has, on numerous occasions, considered the right of a defendant to a severance when the confession of a co-defendant implicates others. We have recognized that it is difficult to remove the prejudicial effect of such a confession by instructing the jury that the confession is hearsay as to other defendants and should not be considered in determining their guilt. In Walton v. United States, 10 Cir., 334 F.2d 343, 347, cert. denied Comley v. United States, 379 U.S. 991, 85 S.Ct. 706, 13 L.Ed.2d 612, we said: “A situation such as this presents a difficult problem for the trial judge in criminal cases where there are multiple defendants who should be tried together, and requires utmost care in the exercise of his broad discretion in determining whether separate trials should be granted to co-defendants. Its action will be upheld unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” See also, DeVauIt v. United States, 10 Cir., 338 F.2d 179; Baker v. United States, 10 Cir., 329 F.2d 786, cert. denied 379 U.S. 853, 85 S.Ct. 101, 13 L.Ed.2d 56; Dennis v. United States, 10 Cir., 302 F.2d 5; Maupin v. United States, 10 Cir., 225 F.2d 680. The record discloses that the court was particularly careful in its instructions to the jury, limiting the consideration of the statements to the defendants who made them. We find no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for severance.
At the close of all of the evidence, Burmeister moved the court to require the prosecution to elect which count of the indictment it would submit to the jury. This motion is without merit. Even if Burmeister could be convicted on only one count of the indictment, it was for the jury to make the determination, which it did, and Burmeister was not prejudiced by the failure of the court so to instruct.
A more difficult question arises as to Davis, who was convicted on both counts and given identical sentences, to run concurrently. Even though Section 2113(c) defines offenses separate and distinct from robbery or larceny, a thief cannot be guilty of bank robbery and also the crime of receiving property which was stolen. Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 5 L.Ed.2d 773; Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407.
The United States argues that Davis was charged, not as a principal, but with aiding and abetting the principals in the robbery, and therefore was not within the rule of the Milanovich and Heflin cases. Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2, one who aids or abets in the commission of an offense is a principal. Reason forbids the construing of a statute so as to permit one charged with aiding and abetting in a bank robbery and also receiving the stolen property to be subject to a greater sentence than those who actually committed the robbery. Cf. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370. Although there was ample evidence to sustain the conviction of Davis on either count of the indictment, we are unable to distinguish this case from Milanovich, which compels reversal and a new trial because both counts were submitted to the jury without an instruction that he could be convicted only on one.
On one occasion during the trial, appellant Glass was in a position to be observed by the jury while he was wearing handcuffs; he thereafter moved for a mistrial. This was an isolated incident occurring in the hallway of the court house. The record does not show that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Way v. United States, 10 Cir., 285 F.2d 253.
The judgments and sentences of Davis are reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
As to Glass and Burmeister, the judgments and sentences are affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0