What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Charles Ray TIPPITT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE et al., Respondents-Appellees.
No. 71-1077.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
July 29, 1971.
Charles Ray Tippitt, in pro. per.
Eugene E. Siler, Jr., U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., on brief, for respondents-ap-pellees.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The issue on this appeal is whether a prisoner who has been released from a federal prison after serving his maximum sentence minus good time is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the United States Board of Parole.
Tippitt began to serve his ten year sentence on March 6, 1964, for the interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle and the sale or receipt of the vehicle in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-13. He was discharged from custody on February 3, 1970, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4163. He subsequently was arrested on October 20, 1970, upon a mandatory release violation warrant for parole violation and was returned to the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia, and appeared before the Parole Board at its April 1971 meeting. The Parole Board assigned him a new parole date of July 14, 1971.
Tippitt contends that he has served the maximum permissible sentence and that he should not have been treated as if he were released on parole. He argues that § 4163 and § 4164 of 18 U.S.C., are in conflict and that a mandatory release should not be subject to the terms and conditions of parole.
Section 4163 reads in part as follows: “Except as hereinafter provided a prisoner shall be released at the expiration of his term of sentence less the time deducted for good conduct.”
Section 4164 provides as follows: “A prisoner having served his term or terms less good-time deductions shall, upon release, be deemed as if released on parole until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced less one hundred eighty days.” In dismissing the petition District Judge Mac Swinford correctly held that § 4163 must be read in conjunction with § 4164. Judge Swinford said:
“Section 4163 makes it mandatory for those prisoners who have accumulated good behavior credits to be released when their accumulated good behavior time plus the time actually served equals the maximum length of the imposed sentence. The release itself is mandatory, but the freed prisoner is subject to regulation by the parole board for that period of time (less 180 days) which he did not have to serve because of good behavior credit. Good behavior allowances do not commute the sentence, but only enable the prisoner to obtain an earlier release.”
We concur in this holding, which is. in accord with the decision of this court in United States ex rel. Jacobs v. Barc, 141 F.2d 480 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 751, 64 S.Ct. 1262, 88 L.Ed. 1581. See also Williams v. Ciccone, 415 F.2d 331 (8th Cir.); Robinson v. Willingham, 369 F.2d 688 (10th Cir.); Allen v. Heer, 361 F.2d 481 (6th Cir.).
It appears that Tippitt was accorded a parole violation hearing as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 4207. No other issue of substance is presented on this appeal.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1