What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Leonard J. BJORGO, Executor of the Estate of Edith Bjorgo, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Diet J. WEERDEN, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14707.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
March 5, 1965.
Lowell H. Jacobson, James A. Brand-vik, Chicago, 111., Westbrook, Jacobson & Brandvik, Chicago, 111., of counsel, for plaintiff-appellant.
D. Kendall Griffith, John M. Moelmann, Chicago, 111., for defendant-appellee.
Before DUFFY, KNOCH and CASTLE, Circuit Judges.
DUFFY, Circuit Judge.
This suit was brought by plaintiff as the executor of the estate of his deceased wife. The named defendant was a National of The Netherlands who resides in and is a citizen of that country.
The suit is an action for damages resulting from an automobile collision which occurred on July 30, 1963, in the State of Nebraska. The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The summons herein was served on the Secretary of State for the State of Nebraska.
The complaint alleged plaintiff was a resident of Park Ridge, Cook County, Illinois, and that he was appointed executor of the estate of Edith Bjorgo by the Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois.
Defendant filed a motion asking that the service of summons be quashed, alleging the service of process was insufficient in that it was not made within the territorial limits of the State of Illinois. This motion was argued before the Court on February 20, 1964. Plaintiff’s counsel stated “I will not at this stage contest any further their motion to quash the service of the process at this stage.” The Court entered a minute order stating “By agreement order service of summons quashed.” At the same time, it was ordered that the cause be continued to March 23, 1964 for a report on status.
On March 10, 1964, defendant filed “an amended motion to quash.” This motion stated counsel was “appearing specially for the purpose of quashing the service of process and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint,” pursuant to Rule 12(b). The trial court then set a schedule for the filing of briefs.
On March 23, 1964, plaintiff filed a reply to defendant’s motion to amend and dismiss, and requested the Court to enter an order that defendant had submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Court.
On March 25, 1964, defendant filed an answer alleging defendant had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and alleged that defendant’s original motion to quash service was unresolved by the Court on the date when the additional motion to quash was filed; that the minute order indicating that service of summons was quashed on February 20, 1964, incorrectly reflected the status of the record; that the docket entry and minute order were not known to the defendant and that what defendant’s counsel attempted to do was to amend the motion to quash which counsel believed to be still pending before the Court.
On. April 6, 1964, the amended motion, answer and reply came on for hearing before the District Judge. There was an extended colloquy between the Court and counsel. The Court stated: “The problem, of course, is that you say that by appearing to quash the service, defendant has waived the jurisdictional question. I don’t think that follows at all. But if it does, I will vacate the previous order quashing service and let the defendant appear specially here to challenge the jurisdiction or on my own motion I will dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction * * *” Later, the District Judge said: “Yes. I vacate the previous order quashing, and I grant the motion today to quash and dismiss.” Thereafter, and on April 6, 1964, the following order was entered:
“On the Court’s own motion it is
“Ordered that the order entered on February 20, 1964, quashing service of summons herein be and it hereby is vacated and set aside.
“It Is Further Ordered that the amended motion of the defendant to quash service of summons and to dismiss this suit is granted, and that this cause be and it hereby is dismissed for want of prosecution.”
It is apparent there was considerable confusion about the first order entered on February 20, 1964. This order purported to quash the service of the summons and unless there were some other service on defendant which was valid, that would be the end of the case. Yet, the order also provided that the cause be continued to March 23, 1964.
When the confused situation came to the attention of the District Judge, he vacated the former order so as to get a fresh start. The amended motion again asked that the service of the summons be quashed and also, that the cause be dismissed. This latter provision was advisable so as to clear the Judge’s docket if the service of process were ordered quashed.
In the amended motion, the defendant did not ask the Court to take any affirmative action which was inconsistent with her position that she was not properly served with process. In fact, the motion stated defendant was “appearing specially for the sole purpose * * * Although the distinction between a special and a general appearance no longer prevails under Federal Rules, the statement in the amended motion does emphasize that defendant was attempting to avoid submitting herself to- the jurisdiction of the Court.
Under the circumstances of this case, we do not think that defendant did submit to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. We also are of the view that the trial court properly exercised its discretion by vacating the confusing order of February 20, 1964.
Finding no error in the order of the District Court quashing service and dismissing the case, that order is
Affirmed.
. It is apparent that the Court intended to use the word “jurisdiction” instead of “prosecution.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0