What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HUFFMAN v. UNITED STATES.
No. 3074.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 7, 1945.
Owen F. Renegar, of Oklahoma City, Old., for appellant.
Robert E. Shelton, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Old. (Charles E. Dierker, U. S. Atty., of Oklahoma City, Old., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and IIUXMAN, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 640, 50 U.S. C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq., the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration instituted in the United States Court for Western Oklahoma an action against L. H. Pluffman to enjoin the demanding or receiving of rentals on certain properties in Oklahoma City in excess of those established by Maximum Rent Regulation No. 53. The defendant appeared, a hearing was had, and a preliminary injunction was granted. While the injunction was in force and effect, the defendant violated it by demanding and receiving rentals in excess of the maximum legal rate and by the serving of a notice to vacate. The Administrator, on behalf of the United States, filed in the court an application for an order to show cause why Huffman should not be punished for contempt. An order to-show cause was entered. No response was interposed, but a stipulation was filed which disclosed the receipt of excess rentals and the giving of the notice to vacate. The court adjudicated the defendant to be in contempt and imposed a fine of $1,000. The order contained a provision that in the event the defendant should furnish the court with satisfactory proof that restitution of overcharge had been made to any tenant involved in the action, the fine would be reduced by an amount equal to the restitution. The appeal is from that order.
Appellant does not question the procedural manner in which the violation of the restraining order was presented to the court for consideration. He challenges the order imposing the fine on the ground that it is unreasonable and unconscionable. Section 268 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S. C.A. § 385, empowers a district court to punish-by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, for contempts. There is nothing in the statute which limits the punishment, except the reasonable discretion of the court. And since the matter rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court, an order imposing punishment on a contemnor will not be disturbed on appeal for being unreasonable unless the discretion has been grossly abused. In Rapp v. United States, 9 Cir., 146 F.2d 548, the defendant in the trial court was found guilty of six acts of criminal contempt in charging and receiving rentals exceeding in amount those fixed in the pertinent Maximum Price Regulation, in violation of a preliminary injunction; and she was sentenced to imprisonment for terms aggregating ninety days and to pay fines, in the aggregate amount of $1,500. The judgment was not attacked for' being excessive, but it was sustained on appeal. In United States v. Lederer, 7 Cir., 140 F.2d 136, certiorari denied 322 U.S. 734, 64 S.Ct. 1047, 88 L.Ed. 1568, the defendant was charged with contempt committed by the making of sales of meat in violation of a preliminary injunction which restrained him from selling at prices in excess of those fixed in the applicable Maximum Price Regulation. He was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for a year and a day. The sentence was expressly attacked on the ground of being excessive, and it was upheld. Here, there were five separate and distinct violations of the restraining order, and there is no room for doubt that they were deliberate and flagrant. It cannot be said in these circumstances that the punishment was unreasonable or unconscionable.
It is further contended that the order appealed from cannot stand because it imposes punishment for the violation of a temporary injunction in a civil action in which no final judgment has been entered. To sustain the contention, cases are cited and relied upon in which it is held that a proceeding as for civil contempt for the violation of a preliminary injunction entered in a civil action cannot be maintained after such preliminary injunction has been superseded by the final judgment. There are well recognized differences between a proceeding as for civil contempt and a proceeding for criminal contempt for the violation of a preliminary injunction or other restraining order where the violation occurred before the injunction or order has been merged into final judgment but the proceeding in contempt is instituted after-wards. Be those differences as they may, there is no present need to consider them because here the preliminary injunction in the civil action was in force and effect at the time the excess rentals were received and at the time the notice to vacate was served, and it is not shown that such injunction has ever been terminated either ■by dissolution or by being merged into final judgment. So far as the record discloses, it may still be in force and effect. And the power of the court to impose punitive punishment for its violation is not open to doubt. Carter v. United States, 5 Cir., 135 F.2d 858; Rapp v. United States, supra; Taylor v. Bowles, 9 Cir., 147 F.2d 824.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1