What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Charles McCORKLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. W.E. JOHNSON, Warden, Joseph Kolb, Chaplain, Freddie V. Smith, Commissioner, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-7478
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 24, 1989.
P. David Bjurberg, David Christy, and Beth Jackson Hughes, Asst. Attys. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., for defendants-appel-lees.
Before VANCE, JOHNSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED on the basis of the memorandum opinion entered by the district court on July 13, 1988. (Attached hereto as Appendix.)
APPENDIX
In The United States District Court For The Southern District of Alabama Southern Division Charles McCorkle, Plaintiff, vs. W.E. Johnson, et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 84-0918-C
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action was referred to the Magistrate for submission of recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate submitted recommendations, and timely objections to those recommendations were filed by the plaintiff. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the court has made a de novo determination of those portions of the Magistrate’s recommendations to which objections were made.
Charles McCorkle, a state prisoner confined in the Holman facility, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for the deprivation of his First Amendment right to freely exercise his chosen religion. The defendants are prison officials who allegedly impinged on the plaintiff’s practice of the Satanic “religion” by denying plaintiff’s request for access to certain Satanic books and articles, including The Satanic Bible, The Satanic Book of Rituals, and a Satanic medallion. Their defense is three-fold: (1) Satanism is not a religion entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) assuming it is a religion, the plaintiff is not a sincere believer in Satanism; and (3) access to the requested books and medallion would pose a threat to the security of the prison. The Magistrate held that all three defenses were valid and recommended that judgment be entered in favor of the defendants.
The threshold questions of whether Satanism is a religion and, if it is, whether plaintiff is a sincere believer need not be decided since it is clear that, even if these questions are answered affirmatively, the challenged prison policy does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as it is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. When it is alleged that a prison policy impinges on an inmate’s constitutional rights, the policy is valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Giving the deference that is due to the officials charged with prison administration, see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977), the court finds that the policy at issue in the present case successfully withstands this scrutiny; it is not an exaggerated response to the situation.
There are several factors which are relevant in determining the reasonableness of this policy. First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the prison restriction and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2262 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3232, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984)). The restriction at issue here clearly meets this standard. The prohibition on Satanic materials such as those requested by the plaintiff is justified by the defendants’ concern for institutional security and order. It is an informed and measured response to the violence inherent in Satan worship, and to the potential disorder that it might cause within the prison.
Testimony at the evidentiary hearing turned gruesome when the plaintiff recounted two of the rituals espoused by The Satanic Book of Rituals. The fertility ritual includes the sacrifice of a female virgin, preferably a Christian. Also explained in this book, according to the plaintiff, is the initiation ritual. Wrist-slashing, blood-drinking, and the consumption of human flesh — usually fingers — are some of the gory highlights of this ceremony. The plaintiff quipped that hopefully the person whose flesh is eaten is alive at the end of the ritual.
Candles, a common item in many religious ceremonies, are also used in the Satanic rituals. However, the candles preferred by the plaintiff and other Satanists are not made of wax or paraffin; instead, they are made from the fat of unbaptized infants.
An inmate witness subpoenaed by the plaintiff testified that he has observed the plaintiff performing certain Satanic rituals within Holman Prison on several occasions. According to this testimony, the plaintiff, as part of these rituals, drew his own blood by slicing his wrist or using a needle, and burned paper. Mr. McCorkle has also asked other inmates for their blood. Approximately three years ago, one inmate got highly irritated when the plaintiff requested that he donate a vial of blood for use in the worship of Satan.
The teachings of The Satanic Bible, which the plaintiff claims to wholeheartedly believe, and desires to study, also present a significant threat to security and order within the prison. W.E. Johnson, Warden of Holman Prison, testified that upon review of The Satanic Bible, he concluded that persons following its teachings would murder, rape or rob at will without regard for the moral or legal consequences. Moreover, Warden Johnson thought that the plaintiff’s safety would be threatened if other inmates became aware of the contents of The Satanic Bible. Accordingly, he denied plaintiff’s requests.
Testimony from proclaimed Satanists, and an independent review of the book, confirms Warden Johnson’s conclusions about the beliefs of Satanists. A “master counselor” of a Satanic sect testified that the premise underlying all of the teachings in The Satanic Bible is that life should be lived according to individual desires without regard for conscience or consequences. Certain portions of the book are somewhat harsher. For instance, in the chapter entitled “The Book of Satan,” author Anton Szandor LaVey states that right and wrong have been inverted too long. He challenges readers to rebel against the laws of man and God. Furthermore, LaVey declares that hatred of ones enemies is of utmost importance; revenge should be a top priority.
Clearly, practices such as those described above, and the beliefs that encourage them, cannot be tolerated in a prison environment since they pose security threats and are directly contrary to the goals of the institution. Allowing the plaintiff access to the requested books and medallion would only encourage such behavior. Thus, it cannot be said that the policy in question is arbitrary; rather, it is logically connected to the governmental interests asserted.
A second factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction is that alternative means of exercising the asserted right remain open. Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. The inquiry here is whether, under the restrictions imposed, the plaintiff is deprived of all means of practicing his “religion.” See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2406, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). Testimony at trial revealed that the plaintiff and other members of the various Satanic sects in Holman Prison are practicing Satanists despite the deprivation of the books and medallion requested by the plaintiff. Moreover, plaintiff indicated that he wears a duplicate medallion and has memorized portions of both The Satanic Bible and The Satanic Book of Rituals. Clearly, the restrictions about which plaintiff complains have not foreclosed all avenues of his worship of Satan.
A third consideration in the reasonableness inquiry is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally. Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. Warden Johnson justifiably believes that books and memorabilia that teach hatred for one’s fellow man and disrespect for laws and legal order, and that encourage and explain the practice of violent acts such as flesh-eating and blood-letting, pose substantial threats to prison security and order, and are contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the institution. Consequently, the plaintiff’s asserted right to freely worship Satan can be exercised only at significant costs to guards, other prisoners, and society in general. Where such a trade-off is necessary, the choice made by prison officials should not be lightly set aside by the court since such judgments are peculiarly within their province. See Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2263, (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2806, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974)).
Finally, the presence of workable alternatives is evidence of the unreasonableness of the restrictions imposed. Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. Plaintiff, however, has not offered any alternatives that would fully accomodate his asserted rights at a de min-imis cost to the valid penological interests that gave rise to the imposed restrictions.
The restrictions challenged by the plaintiff are reasonably related to valid penological interests. Accordingly, the court refuses to substitute its judgment on difficult matters of prison administration for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a prison. See O’Lone, 107 S.Ct. at 2407. The court will by separate document enter final judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint on the merits.
DONE this 13 day of July, 1988.
Emmett R. Cox
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE SITTING BY DESIGNATION

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 3