What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CLARK, Atty. Gen. v. E. J. LAVINO & CO.
No. 9709.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 7, 1949.
Decided June 1, 1949.
See also 72 F.Supp. 497.
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Washington. D. C. (David L. Bazelon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Gleeson, U. S. Atty., James P. McCormick, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., James L. Morrisson, Washington, D. C., Attorneys, Department of Justice, on the brief), for appellant.
Joseph W. Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa. (Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., Thomas F. Mount, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and O’CONNELL and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.
BIGGS, Chief Judge.
The Attorney General, the Honorable Tom C. Clark, as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, has appealed from the judgment of the court below directing E. J. Lavino & Company (“Lavino”) to turn over and deliver to the Custodian the sum of $25,000, insofar as the judgment failed to award interest.
In July, 1941 Lavino became indebted to Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. (“Kawasaki”), a Japanese shipping corporation, for $72,753.27, the sum representing freight charges for the carriage of freight in one of the latter’s vessels. Lavino paid Kawasaki $47,753.27 but retained $25,000, claiming this amount as a set-off against damages which Lavino' asserted it sustained because of Kawasaki’s breach of a prior contract in failing to deliver to Lavino a shipment of chrome ore, whereby, Lavino alleges, it was damaged- to the extent of $24,-759.
On July 30, 1942 the Custodian, having determined that Kawasaki was an enemy national within the meaning of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1 et seq., issued two vesting orders, No. 77 and No. 80, by virtue of which all property of any nature whatsoever owned or controlled by, payable or deliverable to Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. and to Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, another Japanese corporation, or to their American branches, vested in the Custodian. These vesting orders were served on Lavino on August 7, 1946.
On September 12, 1946 the Custodian issued a turnover directive to Lavino, directing it to pay $25,000 to the Custodian, this sum, as we have said, being the balance due Kawasaki' for transportation of freight. The order was served on Lavino on October 15, 1946. Upon Lavino’s refusal to comply with the directive, the Custodian filed a petition in the court below, pursuant to Section 17 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 17, in which he prayed that an order be entered requiring Lavino to “ * * * deliver $25,000 with interest thereon from September 5, 1942 to the petitioner * * * In its answer Lavino set forth its claim of set-off claiming damages by reason of alleged prior breach of contract but admitted that $241 was due Kawasaki. This amount is the difference between the $25,000 retained by Lavino and its claimed damages of $24,-759. Lavino asserted that it stood ready and willing to turn over the $241 to the Custodian.
The court below entered judgment for the Custodian for $25,000 and interest from September 5, 1942. Lavino then moved to vacate -the judgment, contending that the Custodian was not -entitled to interest. The -court vacated the order, and, after a rehearing on the sole question of interest, entered judgment directing that the “ * * * respondent [Lavino] forthwith turn over and deliver to the petitioner [the Custodian] the sum of $25,000”, interest being omitted from the judgment.
The Custodian has -appealed, contending (1) that he is entitled to interest at a reasonable rate on the amount of $25,000 from October 15, 1946 (the date of the service of the turnover directive) to the date of Lavino’s compliance therewith, and (2) that he is entitled to interest at 6% on the sum of $25,000 from July 1, 1941 (the date Lavino became indebted for transportation to Kawasaki) until October 15, 1946 (the date of service of the turnover directive). Contention (2), supra, is based on the law of Pennsylvania which provides that interest at 6% accumulates on indebtedness from the date the debt should have been paid. Lavino for its part contends that the suit is possessory in character; that its purpose is to compel the transfer of a debt, and that under the Act the court below had no authority to do more than to direct the transfer to the Custodian of an amount of money equivalent to the debt. It follows, says Lavino, that the Custodian is not entitled to interest as a matter of law, citing Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Company, 2 Cir., 169 F.2d 932, 936, certiorari denied 335 U.S. 910, 69 S.Ct. 480.
The narrow question presented by the instant appeal is whether the Custodian is entitled to interest, and, if so, from what beginning date. The Act makes no provision for payment of interest where, as here, there is noncompliance with the Custodian’s demand that enemy property be turned over to him. In Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co., supra, under circumstances analogous to those at bar the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, one judge dissenting, that there is “ * * * no reason to suppose that Congress intended the Custodian to get interest during the period elapsing between his demand for payment and the entry of judgment.” We cannot agree. Although Congress did not deal with interest in the Act the absence of an express provision respecting it does not preclude its award.
In Board of Com’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349, 350, 60 S.Ct. 285, 287, 84 L.Ed. 313, where, as in the instant case, the question was the right of the United States to collect interest prior to judgment in a suit to recover taxes wrongfully collected from an Indian ward of the United States by a county of the State of Kansas, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, pointed out that, “The issue is uncontrolled by any formal expression of the will of Congress.,” and said, “In ordinary suits where the Government seeks, as between itself and a private litigant, to enforce a money claim ultimately derived from a federal law, thus implying a wish of Congress to collect what it deemed fairly owing according to the traditional notions of Anglo-American law, this Court has chosen that rule as to interest which comports best with general notions of equity. United States v. Sandborn, 135 U.S. 271, 281, 10 S.Ct. 812, 815, 34 L.Ed. 112; Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 34 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed. 596. Instead of choosing a rigid rule, the Court has drawn upon those flexible considerations of equity which are established sources for judicial law-making.” Compare also Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373, 68 S.Ct. 5, 92 L.Ed. 3; Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289, 295, 296, 61 S.Ct. 995, 85 L.Ed. 1361. The Act creates the obligation to turn over on demand the property of the alien, not only to keep such property from being used for the benfit of the enemy but also to “affirmatively compel the use and application of foreign property” in “the interest of and for the benefit of the United States.” See H. R. Rep. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. pp. 2-3; 55 Stat. 839, 50 U.S.C.Appendix, § 5(b) (1).
When the Custodian served his turnover directive upon Lavino the latter had an immediate duty to comply. The statute requires an immediate transfer of the property to the Custodian without resort to the courts by the holders of the property. On surrender of the property Lavino could have at once filed suit under Section 9 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 9, and in that proceeding could have litigated fully and adequately its claim of set-off. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245, 246, 41 S.Ct. 293, 65 L.Ed. 604, and Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566-568, 41 S.Ct. 214, 215, 65 L.Ed. 403. As was said in the Garvan case, “The occasion of the duty is a demand after a determination by the-President and it is hard to give much meaning to the words ‘which the President after investigation shall determine is so ' * * * held’ unless the determination and demand call the duty into being.” Lavino, in disregard of that legal duty, refused- to comply with the turnover directive, retáining the ' sum ■ of $25,000, though Congress had created a remedy adequate for its relief in Section 9 of the Act. Lavino had the use of the money during the period of retention.
We conclude that the United States is entitled to interest from the date of service of the demand, viz., October 15, 1946, to the date of the judgment of the court below. To hold otherwise would place a premium upon disobedience to the mandate of the statute and reward the recalcitrant. See the cases cited, supra, and the brief dissent of Judge Clark in the Manufacturers Trust Co. case, supra.
We cannot agree with the contention of the Custodian that the law of Pennsylvania has -any application here. We are adjudicating a federal question arising under an Act of Congress, and, in the absence of an applicable federal statute, it is for the federal court to aw;afd, according to its own criteria, appropriate damages expressed in terms of interest. Compare Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, supra, 313 U.S. at page 296, 61 S.Ct. 995, 85 L.Ed. 1361. As the duty to transfer the property arises only on demand by the Custodian, such a demand, followed by non-compliance, constitutes - the condition precedent necessary to accrual of interest on the debt for the benefit of the Custodian. But there is no statute and no acceptable legal theory which would award interest prior to the Custodian’s demand. Indeed to award the Custodian interest on the sum demanded prior to the date of the turnover directive would penalize the debtor for delays by the Custodian wholly beyond the debtor’s control. To impose such a burden on the debt- or would not be just.
The judgment of the court below will be reversed with the direction to award interest on the sum of $25,000 from the date of service of the turnover directive, viz., October 15, 1946 to the date of judgment in the court below. Interest on the judgment when modified should of course follow the usual rule.
By Executive Order No. 9788, effective October 15, 1946, 11 F.R. 11981, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 6 note, the'Attorney General succeeded to the powers and duties of the Alien Property Custodian. For the purpose of convenience we shall employ the term “Custodian” as referring either to the Alien Property Custodian or to the Attorney General.
Though the turnover directive re-required Lavino to turn over the “. . . property with all dividends, accumulations and increment thereon . . .", there is no showing that the fund received any accumulations or increment or that Lavino received any dividends. The notice of appeal raises but one question: viz., the failure to award interest in the judgment.
Tbe relation of this Japanese corporation to Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. does not appear from the record. No question concerning the status of the second Japanese corporation is raised by the parties.
Section 17 provides as follows: “The district courts of the United States are hereby given jurisdiction to make and enter all such rules as to notice and otherwise, and all such orders and decrees, and to issue such process as may be necessary and proper in the premises to enforce the provisions of this Act, with a right of appeal from the final order or decree of such court * *
The Custodian contends that under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., the court below should have granted him the relief to which he was entitled even though he demanded interest on the $25,000 only from September 5, 1942.
See, however, Section 16 of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 16, which provides that “Whoever shall wilfully . . . refuse to comply with any order of the President issued in compliance with the provisions of this act, shall, upon conviction be lined not more than $10,000, or, if a natural person, be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both.” In this connection see Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245, 41 S.Ct. 293, 65 L.Ed. 604.
Interst on the judgment is not in issue here.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0