What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Robert Austin WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, LOCAL BOARD NO. 105, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MINNESOTA, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 71-1011.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
June 10, 1971.
Morton Hollander, Chief, Appellate Section, L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert G. Renner, U. S. Atty., J. F. Bishop, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellants.
No argument was made by appellee.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, HEA-NEY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
The government brings this appeal from the issuance of an injunction by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota enjoining the defendants from inducting the plaintiff into the armed services. We reverse.
The facts of this case are fully set out in the lower court’s opinion, published at 319 F.Supp. 509. For the purposes of this appeal, the facts can be briefly stated:
(1) On July 10, 1969, the Local Board issued its order to the plaintiff to report for induction on August 6, 1969. On two subsequent occasions, the order was postponed by authority of the state director for reasons not relevant here.
(2) On July 23, 1969, the registrant’s wife took a test for pregnancy which proved negative.
(3) On September 5, 1969, a pregnancy test on the registrant’s wife proved positive. It has been established medically that the conception occurred prior to July 10, 1969, the date of the issuance of the order for induction.
(4) On September 13, 1969, the registrant requested the Local Board to reopen his I-A classification and grant him a III-A fatherhood deferment. He submitted a physician’s verification of pregnancy and a completed information questionnaire.
(5) On February 18, 1970, the Local Board refused to reopen the registrant’s classification.
(6) The registrant’s wife gave birth to a child on March 30,1970.
(7) On April 13, 1970, the registrant requested a reopening and reclassification on the basis of the birth of his child.
(8) On May 21, 1970, the Local Board again refused to reopen.
(9) On August 6, 1970, the registrant instituted the present action to enjoin his induction.
(10) On October 2, 1970, the injunction was granted. The lower court held that a conception occurring prior to the mailing of an Order to Report for Induction, which cannot be and is not discovered until after the mailing, is nevertheless grounds for a III-A fatherhood deferment.
On appeal, the government raises two issues: (1) the scope of pre-induction review under 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3), and (2) the scope of the fatherhood deferment.
We dispose of this case by holding that the lower court erred in granting relief since the applicable regulations did not entitle the registrant to a III-A fatherhood deferment. In Ryan v. Hershey, supra, we held that 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(c) (3) is a valid exercise of Presidential discretion and that it precludes the granting of the III-A fatherhood deferment on account of unborn children unless the registrant notifies his Local Board of the pregnancy prior to the issuance of his induction order. In our view, this regulation establishes a valid criterion for the issuance of the deferment and is not superseded or modified by 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2, the regulation governing the reopening of classifications subsequent to the issuance of an order to report for induction.
Nor do we think that the actual birth of the registrant’s child entitles him to the fatherhood deferment. While § 1622.30(c) (3) speaks specifically only to the situation of a deferment because of unborn children, we believe it evidences a general regulatory scheme to grant fatherhood deferments to only those individuals who, at the time of the issuance of their order to report for induction, have children or have notified their local board of their wife’s pregnancy. Since the regulations permit the fatherhood deferment to be granted upon notification of conception, we think it understandable that the regulations do not specifically prohibit the granting of the deferment upon the birth of a child after the issuance of an induction order. The regulations obviously recognize the close relationship between pregnancy and birth and do not intend that these events should be considered separate justifications for the fatherhood deferment.
The order of the District Court is reversed. The case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. At oral argument, a question arose concerning the validity of these postponements. We have examined the Selective Service files and have found that both of the postponements were authorized by the state director, were for a specified period of time and were accompanied by the proper notice to the registrant. It is, therefore, clear that the postponements were properly granted. Zerillo v. Local Board No. 102, 440 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1971).
. Wo consider the scope of the fatherhood deferment and applicable regulations as of the time of the relevant events in this case. The deferment has subsequently been suspended. See, Ryan v. Hershey, 445 F.2d 560 n. 11 (8th Cir. 1971).
. This case does not involve the III-A hardship deferment. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.-30(b) [now 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(a)].

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99