What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
ROBINSON v. UNITED STATES.
(Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted February 8, 1927.
Decided March 7, 1927.)
No. 4525.
Criminal law <S=»1169(5) — In robbery prosecution, admitting evidence that defendant and another were engaged in keeping house of prostitution held error,, not cured by instruction.
In prosecution for robbery committed in house of prostitution, it was error for court to permit witness to testify that for six months she had been luring men to defendant’s house and dividing money received with defendant, nor was such error cured by court’s instruction that testimony was to be considered only as explaining the presence of the witness in defendant’s house at the time involved.
Appeal from the Supreme Court of District of Columbia.
Sylvia Robinson and another were convicted of robbery, and the defendant named alone appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
J. A. O’Shea and J. H. Burnett, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Peyton Gordon and W. H. Collins, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
MARTIN, Chief Justice.
The appellant, together with one Ruth Mills, was tried, convicted, and sentenced upon a charge of robbing one L.eo Lagaña of his poeketbook, containing $290, at a certain time and place in the District of Columbia. The appellant alone has appealed.
The testimony tended to prove that Lagana was lured by Ruth Mills to the house of appellant for the purpose of prostitution; that appellant was present in the house at the time, and let them in at the door; that Lagaña and the woman Mills went into a bedroom and were upon the bed together, when he felt the woman take his poeketbook from his pocket; that he then jumped up, shouting, "I have been robbed,” and found his empty pocketbook lying upon the bed; that at the time he entered the house with the woman his pocketbook contained $290 in bills, on one of which he had previously written the figures “300”; that a search was immediately made by Lagaña and a policeman for the money, and it was found under a couch upon which appellant had seated herself as soon as the search began.
At the trial the government called one Ailene Davis as a witness. She testified that she was present when Lagaña and Ruth Mills came into the house; that she saw appellant take off her shoes and tiptoe from the kitchen back to the door of the room into which they had gone; that when appellant returned to the kitchen she had some paper money with her; that witness then left the house by appellant’s orders. In the course of her examination in chief the witness was permitted to say, over the objection and exception of the defendant, that for a period of six months preceding this event she used to go to the defendant’s house for the purpose of luring men there, and had at divers times brought men there, and that she always divided the money received by her with the appellant, Robinson.
The court in its general charge to the jury instructed them that “the testimony of the witness Ailene Davis concerning the relations and financial transactions with Sylvia Robinson was not to be considered by the jury,- in so far as being evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged in the indictment, or any other crime, but was merely admitted for the single purpose of explaining the presence of the witness Davis in the house of the defendant Sylvia Robinson at the time of the commission of the alleged offense charged in the indictment.”
We think it was error for the trial court to permit the witness Davis to tell the jury that the defendant, with the assistance of witness, had been engaged in keeping a house of prostitution during the six months preceding the time of the alleged robbery. That fact simply reflected upon the defendant’s character, which had not been put in issue. It did not tend to' prove the crime charged,.nor to connect the defendant with it if committed; nor did it have any possible connection with the charge of robbery, which was then on trial. Billings v. U. S., 42 App. D. C. 413; Ambrose v. U. S., 45 App. D. C. 112; Ellis v. District, of Columbia, 45 App. D. C. 384; Boyd v. U. S., 142 U. S. 450, 12 S. Ct. 292, 35 L. Ed. 1077; Bishop’s New Cr. Proc. (2d Ed.) § 1120.
Nor do we think that this error was effectually remedied by the trial court’s instruction to the jury to consider this testimony only “for the single purpose of explaining the presence of the witness Davis in the house of the defendant Sylvia Robinson at the time of the commission of the alleged offense charged in the indictment.” Such an explanation was neither necessary nor relevant, and, moreover, the fact of her presence there was not denied. It may be noted that the court did not withdraw the irrelevant testimony from the jury, but simply instructed them concerning its application in the case. It had, however, no lawful application to the issue raised by the charge of robbery.
Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the lower court, and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent hérewith.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 3