What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
COOPER v. GILBERT et al.
No. 193.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 21, 1930.
Eugene Jordan, of Tulsa, OH., for appellant.
Conrad E. Cooper, of Tulsa, OH., for appellees.
Before LEWIS, COTTERAL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
COTTERAL, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by the defendant, Cooper, from an adverse judgment in favor of the receivers of the Turman Oil Company upon a promissory note for $2,900, with interest and costs.
The petition of the receivers sets out their appointment and authority, and alleges the note was executed by Miller & Stuart, to Cooper and indorsed by him, and the oil company became the owner of it before maturity.
In his amended answer and cross-petition, Cooper admits the execution and delivery of the note, but alleges he never held or owned it and it was at all times the property of the company. The particulars of the defense are set forth. Miller & Stuart needed funds to continue drilling oil wells, for the Cotton Belt Oil Company. Harvey, the general manager of, and acting for, the company, informed defendant of its desire to loan them $2,500 for the purpose, requested the use of his name as appearing to make the loan, and proposed the making of a note for $2,900, payable to the order of Cooper, for the use and benefit of the company, the drawing of a sight draft upon it for $2,500, to he paid on surrender of the note by Cooper to the company, and handling the transaction in that way to protect the company against a charge of usury; and Harvey agreed with Cooper that, in allowing the use of his name as payee and indorser of the draft, he should not be liable in the transaction. Relying on the agreement, the defendant drew the draft upon himself, in care of the company, payable to Miller & Stuart, they received the proceeds, and he indorsed the note and delivered it to the company without any consideration to him. The transaction occurred in Oklahoma and is governed by its laws. The note was usurious, reserving interest in excess of 10 per cent., as the company knew, and defendant’s liability in any event was limited to $2,100, on account of a set-off he claimed therefor of $800, being twice the interest charge. If Harvey acted beyond his authority, the company had actual knowledge of the transaction, knew defendant had no interest in the note and indorsed the note over to the company for its use and benefit, upon the agreement he should not be liable in the transaction.
By his cross-petition, Cooper prayed in event judgment should be rendered against him, he be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiffs against Miller & Stuart, and have judgment against - Harvey, if his agreement
By their unverified reply, the receivers denied the averments of the answer, and alleged that, if there was such agreement between Harvey and Cooper, it was a’pretext and device to defraud the oil company, pursuant to their scheme for their benefit, and to enable Harvey to realize a profit of $400, and he had no authority to enter into the agreement, and it was denied; that the company paid the full value of $2,900 for the note, without knowledge of such agreement, and, because of the fraud of Cooper and Harvey, the former is estopped to allege it as a defense, or assert the set-off to his liability by way of usury.
Cooper moved to strike from the reply the averments regarding the agreement and estoppel, and the motion was overruled. He asked leave to make Harvey a party defendant, and this was denied.
The cause was tried to a jury in October, 1929. Cooper testified for the defense, and was the only witness called. The substance of his direet testimony was as follows: On or about February 13, 1924, Harvey approached him, at Ardmore, Okl., regarding the loan to Miller & Stuart, telling him he (Harvey) had a chance to make $400, and asked if he could take the note in Cooper’s name, informing him there would be no liability on his part, the company would take the note, and Miller & Stuart would pay it. A draft was then prepared, attached to the note for $2,900, and delivered to Harvey. Cooper received nothing out of the transaction, acting merely at the request of Harvey. He knew the loan was only $2,500, the note was for $2,900, and $400 was commission on the loan. A draft exhibited was drawn by Cooper for $2,500, payable to Miller & Stuart, upon the Exchange National Bank at Tulsa, and credited later to Miller & Stuart.
Cooper testified on cross-examination: The draft was handed to Mr. Harrell, manager of the Cotton Belt Company, which was under Harvey’s supervision. The $2,500 was to go to Miller & Stuart. Harvey received $400 out of the transaction. He (Cooper) knew Harvey was working for the oil company and in charge of its Oklahoma business, but subject to orders from the New York office. In April, 1928, in a suit of the oil company against Harvey and others, he testified he understood the $2,900 note exhibited to him was the same as that sued upon in this suit, he identified a draft for $2,900 drawn by the Cotton Belt Petroleum Company to the American National Bank of Ardmore, and he further stated he loaned to Miller & Stuart $2;500 on the $2,-900 note. Those answers he said “were true then and now.” The $2,900 note was indorsed by him a few days after it was drawn. When' he indorsed the note, it was in the possession of Harvey, and was then handed to him. He understood Harvey was thereby enabled to make $400 commission from the oil company. The proceeds of the $2,500 draft were used to make the loan. A sight draft for $2,900, payable to the order of the Exchange Trust Company, signed “Cotton Belt Petroleum Company, L. E. Cooper,” was handed to Cooper. He denied preparing it or indorsing his name on it, or ever seeing it before. He and Harvey were cordial friends, engaged in business, and together went to Ardmore from Tulsa and back to Tulsa. It was admitted by the parties that the oil company paid $2,900 on the note in suit.
There was a demurrer by the plaintiffs to the evidence offered in defendant’s behalf, and it was sustained. Thereupon both parties joining in a request for a directed verdict, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs, and it was returned by the jury for $2,900 and the interest, as provided by the note in suit.
Cooper assigns seven errors for reversal of the judgment. Of these the first two relate to the refusal of his motion to strike portions of the reply. The contention is the authority of Harvey to enter into the agreement with Cooper is alleged and not denied under oath, wherefore it was admitted, by section 287, Comp. Okl. Stat. 1921, as ruled in First National Bank v. Elam, 126 Okl. 93, 258 P. 892, and Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Rogers, 46 Okl. 67,148 P. 161. The statute provides that allegations of any appointment or authority shall be taken as true unless denied under oath. But the motion disclosed no such ground, and it was not brought to the attention of the court. It is therefore not subject to review on appeal. Bankers’ Surety Co. v. Town of Holly (C. C. A.) 219 F. 96. The note was prima facie evidence of Cooper’s debt; and, as it appears the evidence was introduced without objection, or suggestion Harvey’s authority was admitted by the pleadings, the verification of the denial was waived. Burford v. Hughes, 75 Okl. 150,182 P. 689; Hutchinson Gin Co. v. Latimer County Nat. Bank, 106 Okl. 159, 233 P. 438.
The third assignment is that there was error in the refusal to make Harvey a party defendant. But the joinder of parties severally liable on the same instrument is optional with the plaintiff. Section 222, C. O. S. 1921; Johnson v. Cullinan, 94 Okl. 246, 221 P. 732; Goodrich v. Williamson, 10 Okl. 588, 63 P. 974; Modern Woodmen v. Terry, 69 Okl. 191, 171 P. 720. Additional parties are justified only where it clearly appears they have or claim to have some interest in the controversy or they are essential to a complete determination of the suit. Sections 219, 224, C. O. S. 1921; Enid O. & P. L. Co. v. Champlin, 113 Okl. 170, 240 P. 649. Harvey is not such a party, and there was no error in not ordering him to be made a party.
In the fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments, the complaint is the court erred in sustaining plaintiffs’ demurrer to the evidence and directing a verdict in their favor. Thus the merits of the case are presented, which counsel have elaborately discussed. The defense was that the oil company was not a holder of the note in due course, as it was bound by the knowledge of Harvey in the authorized loan transaction, and that, as Cooper loaned his name as a mere accommodation to Harvey, the defense of noneonsideration is open to Cooper. It does not appear Harvey was authorized to do more than effectuate the loan. In so doing, undoubtedly, by the general rule, notice to Harvey of a transaction done within the scope of his agency would bind his principal. But the rule has an exception where the agent acts adversely to the interest of his principal. Morgan, Baldwin & Co. v. Kanola O. & Ref. Co., 102 Okl. 26, 226 P. 335. The transaction was of that character, as its object was to obtain a commission for Harvey, whereas it was his duty to account for all profits to his principal. Roxana Pet. Co. v. Goldrick, 113 Okl. 298, 242 P. 228; 2 C. J. 692, 697, 700. The defense of nonconsideration was open to Cooper. But it appears the note transaction was adopted to enable Harvey to realize a profit, and, if so, a consideration secured for him by Cooper was sufficient to bind the latter, even if the note was an accommodation and he received no personal benefit from it. Fleming v. Gamble (C. C. A.) 37 F.(2d) 72.
By the seventh assignment, the defense of usury is asserted, as allowed by the Oklahoma statute. It is available to an indorser on a note. Ladd v. Ardmore State Bank, 43 Okl. 502,143 P. 170. However, in this ease, the oil company had no actual or legal notice of the excessive charge, effected as it was by means of the collusive arrangement between Harvey and Cooper, and paid full value for the note. Cooper cannot he heard to plead usury when by a scheme in which he knowingly participated the profit claimed to constitute the usury was realized by Harvey and withheld from the oil company.
The judgment of the District Court was for the right party and it is accordingly affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99