What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Fred James DUNLAP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED-GEORGIA COMPANY, Aeronautical Machinists Local 709 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 84-8329.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
, OD 100r March 28, 1985.
Penelope W. Rumsey, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas H. Christopher, J.R. Goldthwaite, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for Lockheed-GeorSia Co.
Before RONEY and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this labor action because plaintiff’s complaint was not both filed and served within the applicable six-month statute of limitations contained in Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela-turns Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(b). Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Plaintiff was laid off by Lockheed on August 15, 1972. His seniority rights with T ,, ’ , . / f. Lockheed were to expire under the pertinent collective bargaining agreements if he was not recalled within 48 months of the date he was laid off. Plaintiff was rehired jn June of 1981. Discovering that some employees with less seniority than he had retained their seniority rights, plaintiff fned a grievance on June 17, 1981. A second grievance was filed in July. The Union decided not to prosecute his griev-anee on August 20,1981. Lockheed agreed on same date, and because neither his union nor his employer agreed to prosecute, plaintiff’s case was not taken to arbitration.
While plaintiff did not receive formal written notice of the Union’s decision until September 10, 1981, the record indicates he knew of the Union’s final decision shortly after it was made on August 20, and before the written confirmation of September 10. Plaintiff filed this action on March 9, 1982. Lockheed was served on March 16, 1982. The Union was served on March 29, 1982.
Our decision in this case is controlled by Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 742 F.2d 612 (11th Cir.1984), and Simon v. Kroger Co., 743 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir.1984). Both of these cases, on facts substantially the same as those here, held that the applicable limitation statute requires both the filing and service of the complaint within six months of the cause of action’s accrual. Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), held the following six-month statute controls a hybrid breach of contract/duty of fair representation claim, the type of claim at issue here:
[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made____
29 U.S.C.A. § 160(b).
Even if plaintiff’s claim did not expire until March 9, 1982, it is undisputed that neither the Union nor the company was served within the limitations period. Lockheed was not served until March 16, the Union March 29. The district court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment was correct.
AFFIRMED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0