What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BOHBRINK v. MALONE.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
May 28, 1926.
Rehearing Denied September 18, 1926.)
No. 3674.
I. Automobiles <@=221 — Wife of driver of oar, struck while standing at its side by overtaking car, held not responsible, relative to contributory negligence for stopping of car without lights.
Plaintiff, struck by overtaking car while standing at night, waving flash light, on road beside car driven by her husband, which he was repairing after it had gone dead and had stopped, without lights, with half of width on pavement, 'held not responsible for such stopping, relative to contributory negligence.
•2. Automobiles <@=245(77) — 'Whether wife of driver of car, stopped without lights for repairs, was guilty of contributory negligence in not getting out of way of overtaking car, held for jury.
Whether wife of driver of car, stopped, at night, without lights, with half of width on pavement, when it went dead, who during repairs stood beside ear waving flash light, was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to step out of way of overtaking car, held under circumstances question for jury.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Illinois.
Action by Effie Malone against Herman W. Bohbrink. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Adlai H. Rust, of Bloomington, HI., and Rudolph J. Kramer, of East St. Louis, Ill., for plaintiff in error.
Dan McGlynn, of East St. Louis, Ill., for defendant in error.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
So far as is necessary for the consideration of the only question raised in this ease, the undisputed facts are as follows:
On October 6, 1924, defendant in error, with her husband and four other persons, was traveling in a Ford car over, route No. 15 of the highway system of Illinois. The general direction of this highway is east and west, but at the point where the accident happened it runs north and south. The concrete portion of the highway is 18 feet wide, and at the point in question there was ample space on either side of the concrete surface to safely run and stand a car for the purpose of repairs. While the car was moving north about 10 o’clock at night, the driver noticed that the engine was not operating properly. To use his own language, “the coil began to sing” and the car “went dead and stopped.” He drove it off the pavement “as far as he could run it before it stopped.” This left the ear standing about 1% to 2 feet over the east edge of the pavement, or about one half on the paved part and the other half on the shoulder or dirt portion of the road. The defendant in error got out on the right side of the ear, and one of the passengers held a flash light for the driver to fix the coil. The driver asked his wife, defendant in error, to eome around on the west or pavement side of the ear and hold the flash light for him, which she did. The car was of an old type, and when the engine went dead the lights went out. Defendant in error stood on the pavement side of the car with her left foot on the running board and her right foot on the pavement. Her husband was in the ear working on the coil. While they were in this position, she heard and saw the car of plaintiff in error approaching from the south. As it approached, defendant in error waved the flash light to stop or warn the driver of it, but plaintiff in error, not seeing the signal, came on, his car struck the right leg of defendant in error and she was seriously injured. The Ford car was not touched.
The declaration charged that the plaintiff in error so carelessly, negligently, and improperly drove his car that he ran into and struck defendant in error while she was using due care for her own safety. Plaintiff in error pleaded contributory negligence, alleging that defendant in' error did not use care for her own safety. The ease was tried by a jury, At the close of all the evidence plaintiff in error requested the court to instruct the jury to find him not guilty. Refusal to so instruct is the sole error insisted upon, and upon this it is urged that upon the undisputed facts defendant in error was so clearly guilty of negligence contributing to her injury that she cannot recover.
Two grounds for the contention are urged: (a) That it was negligence to stop the ear upon the highway without any lights; and (b) that defendant in error, after she saw the ear of plaintiff in error approaching, could easily have stepped around the front of the Ford into a place of safety; and her failure to do so was such negligence on her part as to preclude a recovery. The stopping of the car on the highway without lights was not the act of defendant in error, and she did what she could to overcome this failure by waving the flash light when the other car was approaching. The ease comes to this: May we say as a matter of law that defendant in error was guilty of negligence or failed to use due care for her own safety in failing to step aside out of the way of the approaching ear, or was this question properly left to the jury?'
In Grand Trunk v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485, the Supreme Court said:
“There is no fixed standard in the law by which a court is enabled to arbitrarily say in every case what conduct shall be considered reasonable and prudent, and what shall constitute ordinary care, under any and all circumstances. The terms 'ordinary care,’ 'reasonable prudence,’ and such like terms, as applied to the conduct and affairs of men, have a relative significance, and cannot be arbitrarily defined. What may be deemed ordinary care in one case, may, under different surroundings and circumstances, be gross negligence. The policy of the law has relegated the determination of such questions to the jury, under proper instructions from the court. It is their province to note the special circumstances and surroundings of each particular case, and then say whether the conduct of the parties in that ease was such as would be expected of reasonable, prudent men, under a similar state of affairs. When a given state of f aets is such that reasonable men may fairly differ upon the question as to whether there was negligence or not, the determination of the matter is for the jury. It is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them, that the question of negligence is ever considered as one of law for the court.”
See, also, Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353, on page 368, 16 S. Ct. 1104, 41 L. Ed. 186.
There was evidence in the case as to whether the night was light or dark, as to the distance the lights on the ear of plaintiff in error lighted the road ahead of him, and of other attendant circumstances. There was ample room for plaintiff in error to pass safely and still stay well over on his side of the paved- roadway. It was the duty of the jury to note the special circumstances and. surroundings as they appeared to defendant in error, and then say whether, in the light of all of them, she acted as an ordinarily prudent person would act in a similar state of affairs. We cannot say that all reasonable men would draw the same conclusion as to the conduct of defendant in error under the circumstances shown.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0