What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Bennie Lee DUGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 14646.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Feb. 2, 1965.
Joseph A. Spitalli, Jerold S. Solovy, Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Abraham A. Dash, Department of Justice, Crim. Div., Washington, D. C., Carl W. Feickert, U. S. Atty., E. St. Louis, Ill., Robert F. Quinn, Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert S. Erdahl, Atty., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before SCHNACKENBERG, ENOCH and KILEY, Circuit Judges.
SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.
Bennie Lee Dugan, petitioner, has appealed from an order of the district court denying his motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 to vacate a judgment and sentence entered on July 31, 1962 on his plea of guilty, under which he was sentenced to five years imprisonment and fined $1,000.
Petitioner waived formal indictment and later pleaded guilty to an information which charged that on or about May 13, 1962, in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 5841, he possessed a firearm which was described as “a new long range Winner, 12 gauge single barrel shot gun, bearing serial number 152328, with barrel less than 18 inches in length” without having registered the same with the Secretary of the Treasury, or his delegate, as required by law.
Petitioner’s § 2255 motion was based on the contention that 26 U.S.C.A. § 5841 violated his privilege against self-incrimination and was, therefore, unconstitutional. § 5841 provides:
“Every person possessing a firearm shall register, with the Secretary or his delegate, the number or other mark identifying such firearm, together with his name, address, place where such firearm is usually kept, and place of business or employment, and, if such person is other than a natural person, the name and home address of an executive officer thereof. No person shall be required to register under this section with respect to a firearm which such person acquired by transfer or importation or which such person made, if provisions of this chapter applied to such transfer, importation, or making, as the case may be, and if the provisions which applied thereto were complied with.”
This language indicates to us that only when an individual is in possession of a firearm which has been made, transferred or imported in violation of the Act is he required to register. Statutory provisions which might be violated as to any particular firearm, as referred to in § 5841, may include the following:
(1) 26 U.S.C.A. § 5811, requiring payment of a tax upon the transfer of a firearm;
(2) 26 U.S.C.A. § 5812(b), relating to exemptions of certain transfers upon the making of specified disclosures and proof;
(3) 26 U.S.C.A. § 5813, requiring the affixing of stamps to show the payment of the transfer tax imposed by Section 5811;
(4) 26 U.S.C.A. § 5814, relating to the requirements for a transfer of a firearm;
(5) 26 U.S.C.A. § 5821, imposing a tax on and requiring a disclosure of the making of a firearm;
(6) 26 U.S.C.A. § 5844, relating to the exportation of firearms; and
(7) 26 U.S.C.A. § 5846, relating to the administration and enforcement of taxes and assessments.
If any of these applicable provisions has not been complied with, any person in possession of such a firearm must register it pursuant to § 5841. However registration under § 5841 does not merely constitute a compliance with that act, but may subject the person to prosecution under § 5851, which provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to receive or possess any firearm which has at any time been transferred in violation of sections 5811, 5812(b), 5813, 5814, 5844, or 5846,. or which has at any time been made in violation of section 5821, or to possess any firearm which has not been registered as required by section-. 5841. Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is, shown to have or to have had possession of such firearm, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to-authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such possession to the satisfaction of the jury.”
It is apparent that registration is required under § 5841 only where another section of the Act has not been complied with. Registration would be an admission that another section or other sections of the Act had been violated and. might support a conviction by a court.
We agree with the contention of petitioner that the registration requirement of § 5841 violates the privilege against self-incrimination established by the-fifth amendment to the United States, constitution. Hence he was entitled in-his § 2255 proceeding to have the judgment against him vacated.
In arriving at this decision we are in agreement with the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Russell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402 (1962).
The government argues, uneonclusively we believe, that registration under § 5841 has never been used as a means of in•criminating a registrant. The government further relies on its version of the history of § 5841 to refute the affirmation that registration necessarily incriminates the registrant. We cannot subscribe to this theory in view of the plain language which Congress has used.
The government further argues that a person in entirely innocent circumstances may come into possession of a firearm not previously made or transferred in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Act and his registration of a firearm so acquired would entail no incrimination. However we do not think that the fact that there might be cases where registration would not result in incrimination by the registrant is any answer to the contention that one who is required to register might thereby incriminate himself.
For these reasons we reverse the order from which this appeal was taken and we vacate the judgment of the district court convicting and sentencing petitioner.
Order reversed and judgment vacated.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0