What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CRUMP v. HILL.
No. 9053.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
May 24, 1939.
W. W. Venable, of Clarksdale, Miss., and Robert N. Somerville, of Cleveland, Miss., for appellant.
F. H. Montgomery, of Clarksdale, Miss., and J. C. Roberts, of Cleveland, Miss., for appellee.
Before FOSTER, HUTCHESON, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
What is in question here is whether though no notice of appeal was actually filed in time, the filing with the Clerk before the appeal time had run of waiver of service of notice of and entry of an appearance to an appeal, together with a designation of the record on appeal by both appellant and appellee, perfected, and gave this Court jurisdiction of, the appeal. Appellee, urging that an actual filing of the notice of appeal required by Rule 73 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, within the time allowed for filing it is jurisdictional and therefore may not be waived, insists that the appeal should be dismissed for want of such filing. Appellant, urging that the filing of the waiver of service of notice of, and entry of appearance to, the appeal makes any other filing of notice unnecessary and that to grant the motion would be a sticking in the bark of form and a denial of substantial justice, insists that the motion should be denied.
This is the record. On October 27, 1938, judgment went against appellant. On December 22, 1938, he procured from ap-pellee her written acknowledgment of service of notice of appeal and of designation of record on appeal and her entry of appearance, and on the same day filed it together with designation of record and transcript of testimony with the Clerk. On January 2, 1939, appellee prepared and filed with the Clerk her designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be contained in the record on appeal. On February 21st, appellant’s counsel, advised, as he states in his brief, by the Clerk of this Court that the record should contain a notice of appeal, filed with the Clerk of the Court below a notice of appeal as follows:
“To Hon. Fred H. Montgomery, of Attorneys for Mrs. Ivy G. Hill, Defendant, ClarksdaJe, Miss.
“Notice is hereby given that C. H. Crump, plaintiff, above named, hereby appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, from the final judgment against him entered in the above action.
“W. W. Venable,
Of Attorneys for plaintiff.
“Filed: This 21st day of February,
1939. Hubert D. Stephens, Jr., Clerk, By M. A. Cook, D. C.”
Appellee insists that the notice of appeal required by Rule 73 has but taken the place of the allowance of appeal formerly required and that, as under the former practice, application for and allowance of an appeal within the three months was jurisdictional, Kiehn v. Dodge County, 8 Cir., 19 F.2d 503, Robie v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 8 Cir., 40 F.2d 871, Donaldson v. Baltimore Acceptance Corp., 3 Cir., 38 F.2d 215, Robertson v. Morganton Full Fashioned Hosiery Co., 4 Cir., 95 F.2d 780, so the filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional here.
Appellant on his part insists that since under the new Rules no application to or order of the District Judge is required for an appeal, but an appeal is a matter of right, and only the filing of notice is necessary to start it, it will not do to press the analogy here between appeal by notice, and appeal by application and allowance, to the point of insisting that one is the equivalent of the other, and that as the application for, and the granting of, an appeal cannot be waived, the filing of notice under Rule 73 cannot be. Admitting that the actual filing of notice is jurisdictional, where the ap-pellee had not as here waived the notice and entered her appearance, he insists that what has occurred here is the complete equivalent of such filing. He points out that in addition to her waiver of service of notice of appeal and entry of appearance, which appellant duly and timely filed, appellee has actually joined in the perfection of the appeal under the Rules by filing, on her part and within time, a designation of record contents.
We agree with appellant. It is true that Rule 73 does specifically provide that the only thing necessary to be done to perfect an appeal is to file notice thereof with the Clerk, making it the duty of the Clerk to see that notice thereof is served, and that a literal compliance with the Rule requires timely filing of the notice with the Clerk. The reason for the Rule, however, to set the appeal in motion by mere notice without judicial action, makes it quite clear we think that the appellant, when he procured from appellee and filed, her waiver of notice, her acceptance of designation, and her entry of appearance, just as effectively started his appeal as if he had merely filed the notice of appeal with, and left its service to, the Clerk. It is true enough that the starting of an appeal within the time fixed is jurisdictional and that good practice requires conformity to the formal requirements of the Rule. But it would we think be a harking back to the formalistic rigorism of an earlier and outmoded time, as well as a travesty upon justice, to hold that the extremely simple procedure required by the Rule is itself a kind of Mumbo Jumbo, and that the failure to comply formalistically with it defeats substantial rights.
If the appellant had not by filing his notice of appeal in February, when too late to be effective, called attention to the technical point now urged, we think it would hardly have occurred to appellee or to anyone else that what appellee and appellant did to perfect the appeal had not been effective to do so. The ill-advised late filing of that notice can have no effect upon the jurisdiction of this Court already established by the prior proceedings. It must be disregarded, as surplusage, its filing as a superfluous act.
Long before its filing and well within the time fixed by the Rules, appellant, in complete accordance with their spirit and in substantial accordance with their letter, had filed with the Clerk a complete equivalent of a notice of appeal, appellee’s waiver of service of such notice and of designation of record contents, and her appearance to the appeal. By Rule 1 it is provided that the rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, and by Rule 61 that the Court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
We think that it was substantial compliance with the letter of Rule 73 to file, instead of the notice of appeal, the waiver of service thereof and appearance thereto, but if this ruling does violate its letter, it certainly accords with and gives effect to its substance and spirit. Indeed, it would we think be an exhibition of unsound reasoning and a clear abuse of judicial discretion for us to start the Rule off barnacled with the rigid and rigorous holding appellee’s motion seeks.
The motion to dismiss is denied.
“I, F. H. Montgomery, of Counsel for Appellee, Mrs. Ivy G. Hill, defendant in the Court below, hereby acknowledge service of notice of appeal and designation of record. I hereby and herewith enter the appearance of the said Mrs. Ivy G. Hill in all respects as if she had been formally served with notice of appeal and Appellant’s designation of record hereby waiving formal service of said papers. Witness my signature this 22nd day of December, 1938. F. H. Montgomery. Filed: This 22 day of December, 1938.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1