What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gilbert Lewis WHITFIELD, Appellant.
No. 19425.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
May 29, 1969.
Gilbert L. Whitfield, filed briefs pro se.
Veryl L. Riddle, U. S. Atty., and Daniel R. O’Neill, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., filed brief of appellee.
Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Chief Judge, VOGEL, Senior Circuit Judge, and HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is a timely in forma pauperis appeal from a final order denying defendant’s Rule 35, Fed.R.Crim.P., motion to correct sentences imposed upon him for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 472 and 18 U. S.C. § 473. The defendant, on July 29, 1966, received two ten year sentences for his conviction on two counts of uttering counterfeit obligations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 and another ten year sentence upon his conviction for dealing in counterfeit obligations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 473. All three sentences ran concurrently.
The defendant was arrested on May 31, 1966. By reason of his inability to provide bail, he was incarcerated continuously from the date of his arrest to the date of his conviction, a period of sixty days.
He contends on this appeal that he is entitled to have the sentences imposed reduced by the period of his pre-sentence incarceration either under (1) the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3568, as amended in 1966, or (2) the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3568, as they existed at the time of his sentencing.
The defendant’s contention that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3568, as amended in 1966, require a reduction of his sentence is without merit. That statute which requires that “the Attorney General shall give any such [convicted] person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed” was not in effect at the time of the defendant’s sentencing and is not retroactive. Noorlander v. United States, 404 F.2d 603, 604 (8th Cir.1968); Bandy v. United States, 396 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1004, 89 S.Ct. 494, 21 L.Ed.2d 469 (1968). The defendant is, therefore, entitled to relief only if he qualifies under the terms of the 1960 version of § 3568:
“* * * The Attorney General shall give any such [convicted] person credit towards service of his sentence for any days spent in custody prior to the imposition of sentence by the sentencing court for want of bail set for the offense under which sentence was imposed where the statute requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence. * * *”
We do not believe he so qualifies: the statutes under which the defendant was sentenced did not require a mandatory minimum sentence, Noorlander v. United States, supra; and the sentences imposed under § 472 were less than the maximum and were concurrent with the sentence under § 473. United States ex rel. Saco v. Kenton, 386 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir.1967).
Neither Dunn v. United States, 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.1967), nor Stapf v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 367 F.2d 326 (1966), can be relied upon by this defendant. The Court, in each case, stated that a defendant sentenced under the law as it existed prior to 1966 was entitled to credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing even though the statutes under which he was sentenced did not require a mandatory minimum sentence. In each case, however, the Court was directing its attention to situations in which a maximum sentence was imposed. In Stapf, the Court stated:
“Wherever it is possible, as a matter of mechanical calculation, that credit could have been given, we will conclusively presume it was given. * * *” 367 F.2d at 330.
Here, the defendant was sentenced for less than the maximum and the presumption referred to in Stapf applies. It is possible that the sentencing judge considered the defendant’s pre-sentence incarceration when he gave less than the maximum penalties under the § 472 convictions.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0