What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Jack V. K. RAGAN, Appellant, v. Colonel Weldon W. COX, Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Leavenworth, Kansas, Appellee.
No. 6811.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
June 21, 1962.
Calvin L. Rampton of Pugsley, Hayes & Rampton, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant.
Alan G. Marer, Atty., Dept, of Justice, and Frank 0. House, Major, United States Air Force (Burke Marshall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Newell George, U. S. Atty., and Harold H. Greene, Atty., Dept, of Justice, were with them on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, PICKETT, and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Ragan presented to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas two petitions for habeas corpus, each of which was accompanied by a motion and affidavit for leave to file in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The first petition, identified on the docket of the lower court as No. 3230 H.C., alleged that Ragan was held unlawfully in the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Leavenworth, Kansas, because two military court-martial sentences imposed against him ran concurrently rather than consecutively and had been completely served. The court, without stating any reasons, denied leave to file in forma pauperis.
The second petition, identified as No. 3236 H.C., alleged that Ragan had received a military court-martial sentence of six years and a dishonorable discharge; that after such discharge he had received a second military court-martial sentence of 10 years; that the second sentence was void as the court-martial lacked jurisdiction over him because of the discharge; and that the first sentence had been completely served. Again, the court, without stating any reasons, denied leave to file in forma pauperis.
Subsequently, in each case Ragan filed a motion, with supporting affidavit for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. These were each denied without any reasons being stated and without any certificate that the appeal was not taken in good faith. Ragan then applied to the Court of Appeals in each case for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. The two cases were consolidated as Docket No. 6811. We granted leave “to proceed in this court in forma pauperis” and ordered the certification of the original files to this court. After examination of those files we denied “leave to proceed further in forma pauperis” and dismissed the appeals. On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated our order “insofar as it denies petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis” and remanded the cause for further proceedings.
The only matter before us is the validity of the trial court orders denying leave to file in forma pauperis. These are appealable orders. In Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060, the Supreme Court reversed a denial of leave to appeal in forma pauperis saying:
“Unless the issues raised are so frivolous that the appeal would be dismissed in the case of a non-indigent litigant, Fed.Rule Crim. Proc. 39(a) [18 U.S.C.A.], the request of an indigent for leave to appeal in forma pauperis must be allowed.”
This rule was reaffirmed in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 448, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21, and was amplified by the statement that:
“It is not the burden of the petitioner to show that his appeal has merit, in the sense that he is bound, or even likely, to prevail ultimately. He is to be heard, as is any appellant in a criminal case, if he makes a rational argument on the law or facts.”
While Ellis and Coppedge were each concerned with the allowance in forma pauperis of a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case, the principles there announced should be followed in actions upon motions for leave to file, prosecute, or defend an action or proceeding in the district court without the prepayment of fees and costs. The differences between the provision for appeal in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and for dismissal in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) are not material.
The issues raised by the petitioner were not frivolous. While the trial court may have felt that they were without merit, the Supreme Court has made it clear that merit or lack of merit is not the test. When a district court receives an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it should examine the papers and determine if the requirements of § 1915(a) are satisfied. If they are, leave should be granted. Thereafter, if the court finds that the allegations of poverty are untrue or that the action is frivolous or malicious, it may dismiss the case but in so doing it should clearly state the grounds for such action.
The orders denying leave- to file in forma pauperis in district court cases Nos. 3230 H.C. and 3236 H.C. are each reversed for further proceedings in harmony with this opinion.
. Roberts v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 339 U.S. 844, 845. 70 S.Ct. 954, 94 L.Ed. 1326; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24, 63 S.Ct. 1, 87 L.Ed. 3.
. In § 1915(a) it is said that an appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis “if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” In § 1915 id) it is said that the court “may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.”

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0