What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
George Robert PETERSEN, Appellant, v. Walter DUNBAR, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Appellee.
No. 19867.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 25, 1966.
Elizabeth Truninger, Berkeley, Cal., for appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., of Cal., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald W. Tochterman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Cal., for appellee.
Before BARNES, MERRILL and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.
MERRILL, Circuit Judge:
Seeking discharge in habeas corpus appellant challenges the validity of a felony sentence imposed upon him by the California state courts. He contends that such sentence amounts to an increase in a previously executed sentence and constitutes double jeopardy. At issue is the power of the state courts to impose a sentence of imprisonment following revocation of probation when, as a condition of probation, the defendant had already suffered jail detention.
Appellant, having pleaded guilty to the crime of uttering a bad check (California Penal Code, § 476a), was, on October 6, 1958, placed on probation for a period of two years conditioned on his making restitution and spending the first four months of his probationary period in road camp. In June and again in August, 1960, he was arrested and jailed for drunkenness, and in October, 1960, based upon these probation violations, probation was revoked. Appellant was then sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison for the term provided by law.
The crime under California law is a felony/misdemeanor, the character of the crime depending upon whether sentence is to state prison or to county jail. Here the sentence imposed in October, 1960, was a felony sentence.
Appellant contends that when he was ordered to spend four months in road camp, this amounted to a misdemeanor sentence which could not, upon revocation of probation, be converted into a felony sentence without constituting double jeopardy.
Placing appellant on probation did not, however, amount to imposition of sentence. Under California law a court in granting probation may either suspend imposition of sentence or impose sentence and suspend its execution. While it does not appear from the record before us that the court expressly stated that imposition of sentence was suspended, it is clear from appellant’s recital of what had occurred that no sentence was imposed and that he could not have been misled into supposing otherwise. Appellant quotes the judge as saying:
“I’m placing you on probation for two years with the first four months in the road camp. Restitution is ordered and you will obey all rules of probation. I am giving you back time of 44 days already served.”
Appellant contends that where jail detention is ordered this amounts to a sentence notwithstanding the fact that it is specified as a condition of probation. Under California law jail detention may be ordered as a condition of probation (California Penal Code, § 1203.1) and when so ordered it is not regarded as punishment; it is regarded as part and parcel of the supervised effort toward rehabilitation which probation constitutes. People v. Bennett, 120 Cal.App.2d 835, 262 P.2d 59 (1953). See People v. Banks, 53 Cal.2d 370, 385 n. 8, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 679 n. 8, 348 P.2d 102, 112 n. 8 (1959).
Appellant persuasively argues that punishment is punishment, no matter what name you may apply to it. We accept arguendo appellant’s characterization of his road camp duty as punishment. Still, such pre-sentence probationary detention was not imposed as the court’s judgment of the penal price appellant should pay for his crime. It was imposed as a condition to appellant’s opportunity, by good behavior, to avoid further detention. The probationary period of detention, then, was not payment in full but at most was payment on account, with opportunity to secure forgiveness of the balance due. Sentence subsequently imposed was not, then, a double penalty or increased penalty. It was the unforgiven balance due.
Appellant contends that the balance should have been struck at the outset. He protests that in granting probation the court indicated its appraisal of what constituted appropriate punishment for the bad check offense and that the subsequent felony sentence in effect amounts to felony punishment for his violation of probation. He argues that suspension of imposition of sentence invites the judge improperly to take irrelevant circumstances into consideration in fixing the extent of punishment for the crime involved.
We fail to see how this argument shows a deprivation of a constitutional right, but in any event we cannot agree. Punishment is supposed not only to fit the crime but also to fit the criminal and adjustments downward in light of subsequent rehabilitation progress are the practice today through parole. If there be any merit in appellant’s argument, the obvious alternative, still available to the judge, is to start at the top instead of at the bottom — to impose the maximum sentence at the outset, suspend its execution and subsequently vacate it if probation is successful, or, should probation be revoked, reduce it to the extent, if any, then felt suitable.
Finally appellant contends that-under California law in the case of a felony/misdemeanor a felony sentence cannot be imposed after jail detention has been ordered as a condition of probation. He refers to California Penal Code, § 1203.1, which provides that following probation violation the court “shall have authority to modify and change any and all such terms and conditions and to reimprison the probationer in the county jail within the limitations of the penalty of the public offense involved.”
But this deals with continuing probation and a modification of its terms. Section 1203.2 deals with revocation of probation. This section provides:
“Upon such revocation and termination the court may, if the sentence has been suspended, pronounce judgment after said suspension of the sentence for any time within the longest period for which the defendant might have been sentenced.” Judgment affirmed.
. That road camp duty may well have been felt in this case to be an essential factor in rehabilitation, rather than punishment, appears from appellant’s recital of what occurred at the time probation was ordered. He states that the judge inquired whether the district attorney had anything to say and that the district attorney responded: “Well, this guy shouldn’t go scotfree. He ought to be sent out to the county farm for six months to dry out that booze.”

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1