What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ismael PEREA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 73-1004.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 25, 1973.
Decided June 5, 1973.
Richard B. Foley, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard J. Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Victor R. Ortega, U. S. Atty., on brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before BREITENSTEIN, HILL and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
This is a mandamus action against the United States Board of Parole to compel the Board to consider the eligibility of prisoner Perea for parole. The district court granted a motion to dismiss and this appeal followed. Prisoner was convicted of violations of 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) and 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) (1964) and on January 19, 1968, was sentenced to two concurrent five-year terms. Prisoner’s brief indicates that he is eligible for release in July, 1973.
At the time of conviction and sentence the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 7237 were applicable to the offenses. That section provided for a mandatory five-year minimum sentence which could not be suspended. Further, probation could not be granted and parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4202 was unavailable. Section 7237 was repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. The savings provisions of this Act, § 1103(a), 84 Stat. 1294, provided:
“Prosecutions for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of section 1101 shall not be affected by the repeals or amendments made by such section or section 1102, or abated by reason thereof.”
In Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 35 L.Ed.2d 528, the United States Supreme Court resolved the conflict between the circuits, compare United States v. Bradley, 1 Cir., 455 F.2d 1181, and Page v. United States, 10 Cir., 459 F.2d 467, with United States v. Stephens, 9 Cir., 449 F.2d 103, over the effect and applicability of the § 1103(a) savings provisions. The Court held that “a prosecution terminates only when sentence is imposed.” Hence, so long as sentence has not been imposed, § 1103(a) saves the applicability of § 7237. The Court also held that 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a), which provides for determination of parole eligibility by the sentencing court, is made unavailable by the savings provisions of § 1103(a).
We are concerned with 18 U.S.C. § 4202 which provides that a prisoner may be released on parole after serving a portion of his term. Section 7237, in effect at the time of sentence, said that § 4202 should not apply to the narcotic offenses there mentioned. Bradley expressly left undecided the question of the effect of the savings provision on the application of § 4202. That section relates to Board of Parole consideration which comes without the period defined by the Court as encompassed within the term “prosecutions.”
Section 109,1 U.S.C., provides:
“The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.”
The general saving provision of § 109 was originally enacted in reaction to United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 78 U.S. 88, 95, 20 L.Ed. 153, holding that the repeal of a law imposing a penalty is a remission of the penalty. See United States v. Bradley, 1 Cir., 455 F.2d 1181, 1190, affirmed, 410 U.S. 605, 93 S.Ct. 1151, 35 L.Ed.2d 528. In affirming Bradley the Supreme Court did not reach § 109 because it applied the savings provisions of § 1103(a).
United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 402, 9 S.Ct. 99, 32 L.Ed. 480, construes the words “penalty,” “forfeiture,” and “liability” used in the statute which is now § 109 as applicable to criminal offenses and the punishment therefor. The repealed statute, § 7237, provides penalties for narcotic offenses such as present here. United States v. Ross, 2 Cir., 464 F.2d 376, 380. The statute repealing § 7237 did not expressly provide for the abatement or remission of the § 7237 penalties. Accordingly, § 109 applies and forecloses the availability of parole under § 4202.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0