What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
J. C. SNELL, Inmate, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Herman SHORT, Police Chief, Houston Police Department, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 76-3229
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1977.
J. C. Snell, pro se.
Joseph G. Rollins, Sr. Asst. City Atty., Otis H. King, City Atty., Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge and GEWIN and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Snell, a Texas prisoner, brought this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants, who are or were officials of the Houston Police Department, wrongfully deprived him of a sum of money. The money was seized by the police as evidence in the robbery investigation that resulted eventually in Snell’s conviction. After Snell’s trial, the police turned the money over to the robbery victim’s insurer. Snell claims that the failure of the police to return the money to him deprived him of property without due process of law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that the statute of limitations borrowed from state law had run.
The parties agree that the applicable Texas statute provides a two year period within which suit must be brought, and there can be no dispute that the statute is triggered, barring some infirmity, when the cause of action accrues. The district court held that the statute began running against Snell when his common law wife went to the police and demanded return of the money. This demand occurred before Snell was taken into custody on the robbery charge. Snell contends that the refusal of the police to release the money at the time of the demand was not constitutionally impermissible, because the money was being held as evidence. Thus, argues Snell, his § 1983 action did not arise at that point. Instead, Snell suggests, the civil rights action accrued only when the police no longer had a legitimate interest in withholding the money from its true owner. Snell identifies that point as the termination of his robbery trial.
The district court order does not explain the rationale behind the holding that the § 1983 action accrued at the time Snell’s wife demanded and was refused return of the money. Nor does the court cite any authority on point. The court may have rested its conclusion upon an analogy to the common law tort of conversion. When possession of property is lawful at the outset, as it was here, conversion occurs when the possessor refuses the owner’s demand for return of the property.
We think the analogy is inappropriate on these facts. Under Texas law, an officer in possession of property alleged to have been stolen cannot release the property except upon the order of a court or magistrate. Tex.Crim.Pro. Code Ann. art. 47.01 (Vernon 1966). An officer’s lawful possession of property under article 47.01 during the pendency of a criminal prosecution does not become wrongful simply because demand has been made for return of the property. Cf. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 389 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Civ.App.1965) (demand made after criminal case dismissed held to trigger conversion); Reiner v. Marceau, 338 S.W.2d 285 (Tex.Civ.App.1960) (demand made after officer’s failure to comply with procedural rules regarding custody of property held to trigger conversion). Thus, a Texas court would not have held the police conduct here to have been a conversion at the point when the officers refused Snell’s wife’s demand for return of the money. The conversion action could accrue only after the police lost the protection of article 47.01.
We do not doubt that, in applying the sweeping mandate of § 1983 to the great variety of human conduct, a district court may seek the aid of common law analogues to the federal claim, but here we believe the grafting should be done anew to take account of the application of the state law concepts to the peculiar facts of this case. We therefore remand the case to the district court for a reconsideration of the statute of limitations issue. We decline to reach any of the other issues raised by the parties on this meager record.
VACATED and REMANDED.
. Snell claims he inadvertently left the money in a taxi cab and that the money was not robbery loot. The police apparently took the money from the cab company before Snell could claim it. The sum involved is alleged to be $3,553.34.
. Section 1983 contains no statute of limitations, so the analogous state statute must be borrowed. Bryant v. Potts, 528 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1976); Boshell v. Alabama Mental Health Board, 473 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1973).
. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5526 (Vernon 1958).
. When Snell’s wife went to the taxi cab company to get the money, see note 1 supra, a robbery detective who was there told her that the money already had been seized by the police. Snell alleges that his wife immediately proceeded to the police station and asked for the money.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0