What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Waldron V. RHINEHART, Petitioner, v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD of the United States of America, Respondent.
No. 17899.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 20, 1970.
Decided March 16, 1970.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1970.
Andrew J. Conner, Dunn, Wolford & Sesler, Erie, Pa., for petitioner.
Myles F. Gibbons, Gen. Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board, Chicago, 111. (David B. Schreiber, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Charles F. McLaughlin, David D. Lucci, Chicago, 111., Railroad Retirement Board, of counsel, on the brief), for respondent.
Before FORMAN, SEITZ and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FORMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by Waldron V. Rhinehart from a decision of the Railroad Retirement Board [Board] denying his petition for a supplemental annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228c(j) (1) [Act].
The appellant’s normal retirement date would have been February 8, 1967, his 65th birthday. However, on February 1, 1966, his job as a wire operator in Erie, Pennsylvania was abolished by the New York Central Railroad. At that time he had three alternatives available to him in planning his future. They were: (1) accept another job in a relocated area on the Railroad, (2) resign, accept a separational allowance and apply for unemployment benefits, and (3) resign, accept a separational allowance and apply for an early retirement annuity as provided for in the Act. After ruling out alternative (1) as posing an inconvenient travel problem, he alleges that as a result of incorrect information conveyed to him by the Railroad and Union authorities concerning his eligibility for a life insurance policy, he chose alternative (3). His annuity became effective March 1, 1966.
On October 30, 1966, the following provision was added to the Act:
“An individual who is entitled to the payment of an annuity under section 228b of this title * * * and had a current connection with the railroad industry at the time such annuity began to accrue, shall be entitled to have a supplemental annuity accrue to him * * *."
Section 3(a) of Public Law 89-699 states:
“The amendment made by section 1 (enacting subsection (j) of this section) of this title shall be effective with respect to individuals whose annuities under section 2 of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 are first awarded on or after July 1, 1966, * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
The “first awarded” requirement in § 3(a) has only one exception which is inapplicable in the instant case.
In December 1966, two months after the enactment of the above two provisions, the appellant wrote to the Board’s Division of Claims Operation requesting that the effective date of his annuity be changed from March 1, 1966 to February 1, 1967. Essentially, he asked to change from alternative (3) to alternative (2) and thereby receive his normal retirement annuity. He asked for this change because, meanwhile, he had discovered that the information given him concerning his eligibility for a life insurance policy was in error. This request was denied by the Division of Claims Operation and the appellant was informed of this decision by two letters sent to him in January and May of 1967. Appellant appealed and a referee was appointed to hear the case. The referee reversed and granted the appellant’s request to change the effective date of his retirement from March 1, 1966 to February 1, 1967. The referee noted, however, that this did not thereby entitle him to the supplemental benefits. In April 1968, the Bureau of Retirement Claims denied appellant’s claim for supplemental benefits. This was appealed to the Board’s Appeals Council and it affirmed the Bureau’s decision of July 22, 1968. Finally, on appeal to the Board it was again affirmed on September 12, 1968. It is from this decision that appellant appeals to this court.
In denying appellant’s claim for supplemental benefits, the Board noted that the Act specifically provides that only those employees receiving their “first award” after July 1966, are entitled to these extra benefits. It was the Board’s opinion that there was no room for interpretation concerning this prerequisite for the award of supplemental benefits. That appellant may have been misled in his initial decision was considered to be irrelevant. Since the appellant’s first award was on March 1, 1966, it was held that he did not fit within the clear and explicit language of the Act. The change in his effective date of retirement as a result of the referee’s decision was decided not to affect the fact that the annuity was first awarded prior to July 1966. The Board added that the Congressional history indicated that the words “first awarded” were incorporated in the Act in order that “an annuitant could not qualify for a supplemental annuity by withdrawing his application on which an award had been made before July 1966 in order to have an award made after that time.”
On this appeal, it is essentially the appellant’s contention that the Board’s decision to construe the words “first awarded” in a narrow fashion and thereby deny to him the supplemental benefits, was without a basis in the Act or in the legislative history. He asserts that the cancellation of his 1966 award had the effect of making his 1967 award the first award, thereby bringing him within the terms of the Act. He further argues that the amendment to the Act providing for these benefits was intended for a special class of employees of which he is a part. He adds that there is no evidence tending to show that he changed his effective date only to receive the benefits. Finally, he states that since the words “first awarded” are not defined by the Act his interpretation is as reasonable as that of the Board’s. It is noteworthy, however, that the appellant cites no authority in support of any of his arguments.
Initially, a decision of the Board cannot be upset if it has warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in the law. If this criteria is satisfied, the administrative decision must be upheld. Here, it is admitted that the appellant’s first award was made prior to July 1, 1966, the initial date for awarding supplemental benefits under the Act. The question of whether his March 1966 award is the “first award” within the meaning of the Act is a matter of interpretation and we find the Board’s interpretation a reasonable one. The Act is specific and it only allows one exception to the requirement that the annuity must have been granted after July 1966, and this exception is inapplicable here. Moreover, the legislative history supports the Board’s decision that the term “first awarded” was specifically intended to prevent annuitants from changing their dates of retirement so as to fall within the provisions of the Act.
After examining the appellant’s contentions we cannot say that the Board’s decision was unreasonable or without a basis in law. Accordingly, the petition of Waldron V. Rhinehart to reverse the decision of the Railroad Retirement Board of September 12, 1968 will be dismissed.
. The Board’s decision is subject to review by this court under § 11 of the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228k in conjunction with § 5(f) of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 355(f).
. 45 U.S.C.A. § 228e(j) (1) (1969 Supp.).
. 45 U.S.C.A. § 228c, p. 208 (1969 Supp.).
. Appeal of Waldon V. Rhinehart, R.R.B. No. [ A-XXX-XX-XXXX ], Claims Appeal Docket No. 1307 reproduced in Appendix pp. 3-6.
. The legislative history indicates that the supplemental benefits were intended in part to provide an increase in annuities to those annuitants who were not beneficiaries of the 7 percent increase in benefits granted by legislation in 1965. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 3576-78 (89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1966). The appellee states that the appellant is receiving such increased benefits. Appellee’s brief, p. 20.
. See, e. g., National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944); Brotherhood of Railroad Train, v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 410 F.2d 353, 357 (3 Cir. 1969). See also Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 228k in conjunction with Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 355(f).
. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, supra, p. 3584.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0