What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Jerald Lee EVERS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and El Paso County Jail Sheriff, Mike Sullivan, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 77-1896.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Submitted April 7, 1978.
Decided July 17, 1978.
Michael L. Griffith, Topeka, Kan., for petitioner-appellant.
James P. Buchele, U. S. Atty. and Mary K. Briscoe, Asst. U. S. Atty., Topeka, Kan., for respondents-appellees.
Before SETH, PICKETT and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order for the United States District Court for the District of Kansas denying Jerald Lee Evers’ § 2255 motion challenging his plea of guilty on the ground that the trial court failed to advise him at the time he entered his plea of the maximum possible sentence which could be imposed. We affirm.
The record reflects that Evers was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas with a violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312. He entered a plea of guilty on September 17, 1974. Evers was sentenced on November 20, 1974 to two years probation under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010. The colloquy between the court and Evers at the entry of the plea complied with the requirements of Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., except that the court did .not advise Evers that the maximum possible sentence which could be imposed under the Youth Corrections Act was six years. Evers was advised that he could receive a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that it was error for the district court not to advise Evers that the maximum possible sentence under the Youth Corrections Act was six years. See, e. g., Freeman v. United States, 350 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1965); cf., Robinson v. United States, 474 F.2d 1085 (10th Cir. 1973).
Shortly after being released on probation, Evers was arrested on marijuana charges in Texas. Jurisdiction over Evers as a probationer was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3653. Thereafter, that court revoked Evers’ probation following a probation revocation hearing. Evers was then sentenced to a straight five year term of imprisonment. He subsequently filed this action for post-conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In the district court and on appeal, Evers claims that McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) mandates that his plea be set aside and that he be allowed to plead anew. Ev-ers strongly urges McCarthy established a per se rule requiring reversal of a guilty plea whenever there is a violation of Rule 11, regardless of the nature or extent of the violation. We disagree.
Not every violation of Rule 11 requires that the plea be set aside. In United States v. Hamilton, 553 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1977) , we adopted the “miscarriage of justice” test established by the Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974). Both Davis and Hamilton were post conviction cases. Hamilton pled guilty to drug charges. He was not advised of the mandatory parole term required by the drug statutes either at the time he entered his plea or at sentencing. We held that in failing to advise Hamilton of the required parole term, the district court violated the requirements of Rule 11. Nevertheless, we found on the record that Hamilton’s plea was voluntary and that he was not prejudiced by the trial court’s error. We held that a guilty plea will be set aside on collateral attack only where to not do so would result in a miscarriage of justice, or where there exists exceptional circumstances justifying such relief. We reaffirmed Hamilton in another special parole term case, Eaton v. United States, 579 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1978) .
We think Hamilton and Eaton control here. Our review of the record convinces us that the error in failing to advise Evers of the maximum six-year term was at best technical. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Evers’ claim. During the course of such hearing, Evers admitted that he was informed he could receive a five-year term of imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. As noted, Evers was ultimately sentenced to five-years imprisonment following revocation of his probation. As in Hamilton, we are convinced that Ev-ers’ plea was voluntary. He was not prejudiced nor misled by the failure of the district court to advise him of the maximum six-year term of imprisonment. We hold that he was not entitled to relief.
When this case was docketed the parties were notified the appeal would be decided on the original record without oral argument. The parties were advised pursuant to Local Rule 9(d) that they could simultaneously file a memoranda in support of their respective positions. We now have before us appellant’s memorandum. We have thoroughly reviewed the files and records in this case and are convinced the decision of the district court was correct.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1