What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
Daniel UNTERMYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald HELLBUSH, San Mateo County Probation Officer, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 72-2422.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Jan. 2, 1973.
Paul K. Robertson, Palo Alto, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Grannuchi, Karl S. Meyer, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
Before HAMLEY, KOELSCH, and WRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus, attacking his conviction in the California state court for possession of marijuana. The district court denied the petition and, on this appeal, we affirm that disposition. Appellant was given a suspended sentence by the state court judge and is now on probationary status.
Appellant was stopped in a motor vehicle by a local police officer in Ather-ton, California. Marijuana was discovered in the vehicle, the officer seeing it in plain view. Untermyer here contests only the constitutionality of the initial stop, contending that the marijuana subsequently discovered should have been suppressed as the fruit of that stop.
Late in November, at 11:00 p.m., the police officer was patrolling in a residential area in which burglaries had recently been committed. He saw a small foreign car, darkened, parked in front of a darkened home. Appellant was walking from the house to the car. As the officer approached, appellant entered on the passenger side of the vehicle, and the car drove ahead 25 to 30 feet before the headlights were turned on. After following in his patrol car for a quarter of a mile, the officer stopped appellant’s car.
The reason given by the officer for the stop was that his suspicions had been aroused by the circumstances related above and he stated that his intention was to identify the occupants of the vehicle. On these facts, the district court determined that the police stop of the car did not constitute arbitrary or harassing action. The court correctly stated the rule in this circuit:
“The standard applicable under the Fourth Amendment to vehicle ‘stops’ by police for investigatory purposes, as distinguished from the more rigorous probable cause standard applicable to an arrest, is whether the ‘stop’ is based on a founded suspicion.”
Our statement of the rule in Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966) has since been reaffirmed since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). The Supreme Court has concluded that the Terry standard is no different from our own. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In that case, the Court said:
“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923.
The unusual circumstances and appellant’s unusual conduct were such as to lead the local police officer “reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 2