What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Henry JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Robert COOPER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 18878, 18924.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 14, 1965.
Decided July 9, 1965.
Mr. John L. Kilcullen (appointed by this court), Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 18,878.
Mr. John A. Shorter, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant in No. 18,924.
Mr. John R. Kramer, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker and Joseph A. Lowther, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Fahy, McGowan and Leven-thal, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The error asserted to infect these convictions of housebreaking and larceny derives from the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful search in connection with an allegedly unlawful arrest. We find no such error.
A police officer in a scout car saw a parked car bearing temporary D. C. tags and a Virginia inspection sticker. Deciding to check the ownership, he approached the driver who, with three other persons (including the appellants), was sitting in it. The driver said the car belonged to appellant Cooper, who was seated on the other side of the front seat. When the officer walked around to talk to him, he observed a blackjack lying on the floor of the car. The possession of a blackjack being illegal (22 D.C.Code § 3214(a)), the officer asked whose it was. When all four denied knowing anything about it, he asked them to get out of the car and told them that he was going to charge them all with the illegal possession. See 23 D.C.Code § 306(a) and (b), providing expressly for arrests without warrant, and for incidental searches, in respect of the possession of illegal weapons. Having already observed a tape recorder and other articles in the car, the officer asked the driver to unlock the trunk, which he did. There a number of other articles were found which were, with the tape recorder, eventually introduced into evidence as stolen. At the scene of the arrest, the officer directed the four to follow him in their car to the station, where the articles in question were removed from the car.
The officer was, it appears to us, fully authorized to make the initial inquiry about the ownership of the car, and, in the course thereof, to make the arrest for illegal possession of a blackjack. The search of the car, as an incident to that arrest, was not so remote from it in point of time or place as to be unreasonable. See Price v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. -, 348 F.2d 68, decided June 10, 1965; Adams v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 364, 336 F.2d 752 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 977, 85 S.Ct. 676, 13 L.Ed.2d 567 (1965).
The judgments appealed from are Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0