What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "sub-state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ifeanyi MONU, Appellant.
No. 85-5072.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Nov. 8, 1985.
Decided Feb. 11, 1986.
Dow M. Spaulding, Greensboro, N.C. (Michael E. Lee, Greensboro, N.C., on brief) for appellant.
Paul A. Weinman, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Kenneth W. McAllister, U.S. Atty., Greensboro, N.C., on brief) for appellee.
Before RUSSELL and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge:
Ifeanyi Monu appeals the judgment of the district court convicting him of possession of heroin and marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and of use of the mails to promote an unlawful activity involving controlled substances, in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. Finding no merit in the appellant’s assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
In October 1984 customs agents at Kennedy International Airport opened five packages in the international mail, acting upon detection by a trained dog that the packages contained drugs. Three of the packages contained marijuana; two, heroin. The packages, addressed to “Greg Davis” at a residence in High Point, North Carolina, were resealed and delivered by a postal carrier to the designated address. Law enforcement officers watched the appellant come to the door, receive the packages, and later deposit into a curbside trash can the wrappings from the packages that had contained heroin. The officers then searched the house, pursuant to a warrant. Among other items, they seized 100 grams of 14 percent pure heroin, 35 grams of 18 percent pure heroin, and a triple beam balance scale.
Monu asserts first that the district court erred in admitting testimony in the form of opinions from two expert witnesses. Two investigative agents testified that, whereas the heroin found in the residence occupied by Monu ranged in purity from 14 to 18 percent, heroin upon distribution to users is ordinarily 1 to 3 percent pure. One of the agents also testified that the type of triple beam balance scale found in the house was a “tool of the trade” of heroin distribution. Monu contends that opinions of expert witnesses are admissible only if supported by facts in the record. Because the agents did not offer data or experience to support their opinions, Monu argues that these opinions were improperly admitted.
To the contrary, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 explains that the facts or data upon which an expert bases his opinion need not be admissible in evidence, if these facts or data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject____” The two agents in this case testified that they were relying respectively on 12 and 18 years of experience in investigating heroin distribution, experience that included distinguishing among grades of heroin and investigating the ways that heroin is diluted prior to distribution. We conclude that the experts’ testimony was properly admitted. See United States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574, 1582 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Golden, 532 F.2d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir.1976).
Monu also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on the charge under the Travel Act, in that there was insufficient evidence that he performed the acts required to establish a violation of the Act.
A violation of the Travel Act requires proof of three elements. The defendant must (1) travel in interstate or foreign commerce or use an interstate or foreign facility, such as the mail; (2) intend thereby to promote ah unlawful activity; and (3) subsequently promote or attempt to promote that unlawful activity. United States v. Hayes, 775 F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th Cir.1985). Moreover, the unlawful activity involving controlled substances must be part of a continuous enterprise, not an isolated crime. United States v. Corbin, 662 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir.1981); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811-12 n. 6, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059 n. 6, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971).
In reviewing the district court’s denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal, we must assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See Glosser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). We conclude that a jury could reasonably find that all elements of the crime were satisfied in this case. The government’s evidence showed that Monu received heroin in the mail. The quantity and purity of the heroin suggest Monu’s intent to distribute it. The jury could reasonably find that by unwrapping the packages containing heroin Monu attempted to promote heroin distribution after he used the mail. The requirement of United States v. Corbin that the unlawful activity be part of a continuous enterprise is satisfied by the evidence concerning the triple beam balance scale. This tool indicates that Monu’s receipt of the heroin was part of an ongoing enterprise, rather than an isolated instance of criminal conduct. Cf. Corbin, 662 F.2d at 1073 n. 16.
Because sufficient evidence supports the verdict, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of violating the Travel Act. Nor did the court err in admitting testimony in the form of opinions from the investigative officers.
AFFIRMED.
The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, provides:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to—
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) defines "unlawful activity” to include "any business enterprise involving ... narcotics or controlled substances____” Heroin is a "controlled substance" listed in 21 U.S.C. § 812.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "sub-state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0