What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MILLER v. SIEGMUND.
No. 7446.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 11, 1935.
Henry H. Brooks, of Austin, Tex., for appellant.
O. W. Sandstrom, of Austin, Tex., for appellee.
Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, trustee, brought this suit to set aside a transaction, by which a deposit of $2,000 in money and certain personal property passed from the bankrupt to appellee, on the ground that it created a preference under, the provisions of section 60 of the National Bankruptcy Act (11 USCA § 96), and was made with an intent and purpose on the part of the bankrupt to hinder, delay, and defraud its creditors, in violation of section 67 of the said act (11 USCA § 107). There was judgment in favor of appellee dismissing the suit. This appeal followed.
From the findings of facts by the court, which are fully supported by a stipulation as to the facts, the following material facts appear:
The bankrupt, Haston Body Works, Inc., entered into an agreement with J. V. Siegmund, appellee, to lease a building from him, to be erected according to plans and specifications furnished by it, to be used as an automobile repair shop and garage and a filling station. The building was erected at a cost of over $40,000 by Siegmund, and a lease was entered into for a period of ten years from May 1, 1931, for a consideration of $49,800, payable in installments of $415 per month in advance. The filling station was subleased by the bankrupt for a period of five years from May 1, 1931, at a rental of $150 per month. The lessee1 agreed to deposit $2,000 in cash, give a chattel mortgage on certain tools, equipment, and furniture in the leased building, estimated to be worth $5,000, and to assign the sublease of the filling station as security for any damages that might accrue from a breach of the lease by it. The agreement was carried out on October 31, 1931. At that time the bankrupt was solvent.
In September, 1932, the rent in arrears amounted to $1,650. Demand was made for payment, and the bankrupt admitted it was unable to pay, and would continue to be unable to pay. Appellee advised the bankrupt that he would forfeit the lease and foreclose the chattel mortgage. The parties then entered into an agreement, as a result of which the deposit of $2,000 and certain property covered by the chattel mortgage, but not all of it, having a fair market value of $2,000 and rental value of $20 per month, was transferred to appellee, in settlement of past-due rent and damages for the breach. The lease was surrendered, and appellee went into possession of the building. The deposit was applied to the payment of the overdue rent under the terms of the lease. Appellee accepted the property transferred, in full settlement of any damages accruing from the breach of the lease, and took possession of the premises. The bankrupt at that time was insolvent, to the knowledge of both parties, and was adjudicated bankrupt on October 31, 1932. After taking possession of the premises, appellee was unable to make a new lease for the unexpired term of the bankrupt’s lease, but rented the building, and the personal property turned over, to Bert Haston, having no connection with the bankrupt, from month to month, at $235 per month, until June 24, 1933. Hasten was then unable to continue payment of that amount, and the rent was reduced to $200 per month in order to keep a tenant. Appellee continued to collect the rent of the filling station at $150 per month. He could not have rented the property to any one else for more than $330 per month, including the filling station, at the time the lease was breached. It is unnecessary to refer to the other findings of fact.
The District Court found that the parties were in absolute good faith, and there was no intention to hinder, delay, or defraud other creditors; that the chattel mortgage and lease, in all its provisions, were valid when entered into; that the subsequent transaction by which the property was transferred amounted to no more than the enforcement of a valid lien created more than four months before and not affected by the bankruptcy; that appellee had suffered damages exceeding $6,000.
We agree with the conclusions of the District Court. Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 29 S. Ct. 436, 53 L. Ed. 772, 16 Ann. Cas. 1008; Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516, 25 S. Ct. 306, 49 L. Ed. 577; Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, Inc., 55 S. Ct. 150, 79 L. Ed.-, decided December 3, 1934.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1