What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Edna D. FREEMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Jose RAMON NOGUERA, Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, Defendant, Appellee.
No. 5864.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
March 5, 1962.
Enrique Cordova Diaz, San Juan, P. R., with whom Walter L. Newsom, Jr., and Brown, Newsom & Cordova, San Juan, P. R., were on brief, for appellant.
Juan A. Faria, Asst. Solicitor Gen., San Juan, P. R., with whom J. B. Fernandez-Badillo, Solicitor Gen., San Juan, P. R., was on brief, for appellee.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and ALDRICH and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Sitting by Assignment.
ALDRICH, Circuit Judge.
This was an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico upholding a transfer tax on death, including a penalty for failure to file a notification of death with appellee Secretary of the Treasury. Appellant is the widow and sole heir of the decedent. She and decedent resided at all times in the state of Michigan, where the shares of stock whose transfer is sought to be taxed were physically located. The constitutional power of Puerto Rico to impose this death duty is unquestioned. State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 1942, 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 86 L.Ed. 1358. We agree with appellee that the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, March 24, 1961, interpreting the effect and meaning of the Puerto Rico statute in his favor could not be said to be inescapably wrong, and we affirmed this portion of the judgment by order dated September 7, 1961.
A more difficult question remains with respect to the penalty. The statute requires the notification of death to be filed by “every administrator, executor, or trustee * * * or person lawfully authorized to administer the estate * * in Puerto Rico.” 13 L.P.R.A. § 893 (1955). The statute defines administrator as including “any heir, relative or other beneficiary of any decedent, who may have charge of the disposition and apportionment of the property of such deceased.” 13 L.P.R.A. § 882. The Supreme Court held that appellant, as universal heir of the decedent, must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be in charge of the disposition of the property, and hence responsible for the filing of the notice. However warranted such a presumption may be under Puerto Rico law, where we understand personal property normally goes directly to the heirs rather than through a court-appointed fiduciary, it is of doubtful validity in Michigan. In that state, as in all states of the Union with which we are familiar, personal property must pass to and through a court-appointed fiduciary. See Michigan Stat.Ann. § 27.3178(122) (1943), Comp. Laws 1948, § 702.52 There are many reasons why a widow may not be, or may decline to be, so appointed. We could not sustain this penalty if its imposition must depend upon the correctness of the court’s presumption that appellant was the administratrix.
It is true, as we read the opinion, that the court’s language indicated that it was a necessary condition that appellee establish the identity of the party charged with filing the notice. Cf. Del Toro v. Tax Court, 1945, 65 P.R.R. 58. But this is not to say that the statute might not have been interpreted, had the court recognized the need, to mean that the stated penalty of an increase in the tax could be collected without such establishment. In this respect the important matter is the receipt or non-receipt of the notice, and not the identity of the individual .responsible. At the same time we note that the statute as a whole is couched in terms of a duty upon the administrator, and a fine is imposable upon him personally. Certainly in respect to criminal liability identity must be directly established without benefit of presumptions. Nor can there be substituted an obligation, as suggested by appellee, on the heir to come forward and show who is the administrator if he is not.
We are sensitive of the fact that it is the right, as well as the duty, of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to interpret its own statutes. We think this question of statutory interpretation should be remanded to that court for further consideration.
Appellant’s other contention does not require discussion.
Judgment will be entered vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico with respect to the penalty and remanding the action to that court for further proceedings.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0