What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Elvin BRICKHOUSE, Jr., Appellant, v. Robert F. ZAHRADNICK, Superintendent of the Virginia State Penitentiary, Appellee.
No. 76-2032.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 14, 1977.
Decided March 28, 1977.
Craig Ellis, Third Year Law Student (Michael E. Geltner, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellant.
Wilburn C. Dibling, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va. (Andrew P. Miller, Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.
DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:
Tried and convicted by the court in 1967, after waiver of a jury trial in accordance with the Virginia practice, under an indictment charging rape, abduction and robbery, the petitioner was sentenced to death on the rape charge and to imprisonment for thirty years on the robbery charge and for twenty years on the abduction charge. The conviction, on appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, was affirmed but, on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the death sentence was vacated and the proceedings were remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the rape charge alone. On remand, the petitioner was resentenced on the rape charge to life imprisonment and this resentencing, on appeal, was affirmed without an opinion. The petitioner then began his habeas proceeding in the District Court. That Court dismissed his habeas petition and this appeal followed.
In his brief in this Court, the petitioner contends that the Virginia criminal procedure for waiver of jury trial and trial by the court is constitutionally defective. In Vines v. Muncy we thoroughly canvassed similar claims and found them without merit. It is unnecessary to repeat here our reasons for such conclusion. The petitioner has, however, raised, an additional claim of constitutional violation which he asserts is •unique to his case. This claim of the petitioner is that his waiver of his constitutional right to a jury trial was illegally coerced by his fear that, because of the then prevailing Virginia rule for excluding from the jury determining both guilt and punishment any person with conscientious scruples against capital punishment, a jury trial before a jury thus restricted would be so likely to result in the imposition of a death sentence as to constitute a violation of due process. He predicates this contention primarily on Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, decided after his trial, which held that the imposition of a death sentence (but not a finding of guilt) by a jury from which persons with conscientious scruples against capital punishment were excluded would deprive a defendant “of his life without due process.” He argues that he would not have waived a jury trial if he had anticipated the decision in Witherspoon, which would have made illegal at his trial the exclusion of any veniremen with conscientious scruples against capital punishment.
The record in this case shows that the petitioner was represented by counsel at the time of his waiver of a jury trial. Petitioner does not suggest that his counsel was incompetent or neglectful of his rights. The trial court found such counsel able and experienced. Petitioner admitted in open court that he had consulted six or seven times with his counsel and that his counsel was fully “acquainted with the facts of [his] case.” He affirmed that after reviewing with his counsel whether he should exercise his right to a jury trial, he had chosen of his own “free will” to waive a jury trial and that this was his “decision,” reached by him without being “influenced by Mr. Madison [his counsel] in making that decision.” Petitioner makes no contention that at the time of his waiver, he was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental faculties.
Under these circumstances, we think Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, conclusive against petitioner’s claim. In Brady the petitioner likened a guilty plea to the waiver of a jury trial and contended that his guilty plea had been coerced because the statute under which he was indicted was, subsequent to his plea, held to be unconstitutional in permitting the imposition of the death penalty for its violation oniy on a defendant who asserted his right to contest his guilt before a jury, thereby placing an impermissible burden on the constitutional right to a jury trial. In denying the contention, the court said (p. 757, 90 S.Ct. p. 1473):
“ * * * A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action. More particularly, absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948), a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.”
We perceive no distinction between Brady and the case before us. In both cases the defendant was waiving a jury trial — in Brady by his guilty plea, in this case by his express waiver. Under his claim in Brady, the defendant entered his waiver because he mistakenly assumed that the statute under which he was charged was valid in its penalty provisions; in the present case, the petitioner claims he entered his waiver because he mistakenly assumed that the procedure for qualifying jurors in a capital case in Virginia was valid. In both cases, the defendant was represented by counsel, with whom he consulted at length and by whom he was fully advised of his rights by his own admission. In both cases the defendant relied on a subsequent judicial decision, which, had he anticipated, would have induced him not to waive, in order to support his claim that his waiver at his earlier trial had been coerced or was involuntary. In neither case, however, did the waivers— in Brady of a right to a jury trial by his plea of guilty, and in this case by his waiver of a jury in favor of trial by the Court— “become vulnerable because [these] later judicial decisions indicate[d] that the [waivers] rested on a faulty premise.” It follows from this principle as established in Brady that the voluntariness of petitioner’s waiver of a jury trial may not be invalidated by any claim of coercion based on failure to anticipate the subsequent decision in Witherspoon.
AFFIRMED.
. The Virginia practice is fully described in Vines v. Muncy (4th Cir. 1977) 553 F.2d 342 (decided March 1977).
. See Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346.
. For this contention, Brady relied on United States v. Jackson (1968) 390 U.S. 570, 572, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138.
. 397 U.S. at 757, 90 Ct. at 1473.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0