What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".

Opinion:
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., v. Charles H. PHILLIPS CHEMICAL CO.
No. 292.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Dec. 7, 1931.
For former opinion, see 53 F.(2d) 342.
Taylor, Durey, Pierson & Comley, of Stamford, Conn. (H. H. Ramsey and Edward S. Rogers, both of New York City, Allen M. Reed, of Chicago, Ill., and Norris E. Pierson, of Stamford, Conn., of counsel), for appellant.
Marsh, Stoddard & Day, of Bridgeport, Conn. (Harry D. Nims and Wallace H. Martin, both of New York City, and Vincent L. Keating, of Bridgeport, Conn., of counsel), for appellee.
Before MANTON, L. HAND, and AUGUST ÜS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.
We have held the registered trade-mark “Milk of Magnesia” invalid because it was not in the actual and exclusive use of the defendant, or its predecessors, during ten years next preceding February 20, 1905, as required by section 5 of the Federal TradeMark Act (15 USCA § 85), and also because the defendant had abandoned the mark. But we said that this invalidity of the mark “Milk of Magnesia” did not affect the defendant’s other trade-mark “Leche de Magnesia.” In reaching this conclusion about “Leche de Magnesia,” we gave too little consideration to tho fact that the name “Leche de Magnesia” ought not to have been registered under section 5 when “Milk of Magnesia” was an invalid trade-mark because not in the exclusive use of the defendant during the ten-year period, and when “Leche dó Magnesia” might readily he taken for the English mark.
In the first place each mark employs the word “Magnesia,” and that fact when the compounds on which “Milk of Magnesia” and “Leche de Magnesia” are used are identical is likely to result in confusion. Moreover, “Leche” being the Spanish for “milk” is a word that has always been known to the many Spaniards in the United States and Porto Rico and readily beeomes understandable by others. Thus it stands on quite a different footing from words taken from the language of Hottentots or Patagonians which might be so unfamiliar as to be in effect fanciful or arbitrary terms. That “Milk of Magnesia” is sold in the United States and called for under the name “Leche de Magnesia” is apparent from the record (pages 132-136) and from the inherent probabilities of the ease. Consequently “Leche de Magnesia” is the ready equivalent of “Milk of Magnesia” to many people.
It has been the general practice of the Patent Office and of the courts to deny registration to any misleading term even where it only becomes misleading through the understanding of a foreign language. This is a sound rule which has long been followed. The words “exclusive use” in section 5 of the Trade-Mark Act have been regularly interpreted to mean exclusive use not only of the-specific mark, but also of any other confusingly similar mark or term. In re Maclin-Zimmer-McGill Tobacco Co., Inc., 49 App. D. C. 181, 262 F. 635; In re Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 46 App. D. C. 512; Barclay v. Carter Medicine Co., 41 App. D. C. 240; Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. v. Old Lexington Club Distilling Co., 31 App. D. C. 223; Eastman P. M. Co. v. Comptroller-General, L. T. N. S. 195. See also Orange Crush Co. v. California Crushed Fruit Co., 54 App. D. C. 313, 297 F. 892; Marsh Capron Mfg. Co. v. Bates Machine & Tractor Co., 53 App. D. C. 235, 289 F. 633.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that the complainant was entitled to a decree canceling the trade-mark “Leche de Magnesia,” as well as the mark “Milk of Magnesia,” and the 'decree of the District Court is accordingly in all respects affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?

Choices:
local
neither local nor national
national or multi-national
not ascertained

Answer: 2