What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Charles GUIDA, Appellant, v. W. Raymond NELSON, Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, Appellee.
Cal. No. 851, Docket 78-2102.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Submitted March 22, 1978.
Decided June 20, 1979.
Diana Garfield, Asst. U. S. Atty. for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, Conn. (Richard Blumenthal, U. S. Atty., Dist. of Connecticut, New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for appellee.
Charles Guida, pro se.
Before LUMBARD, FEINBERG and OAKES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Guida, pro se, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institute in Danbury, Connecticut, appeals from an order entered by Judge T. F. Gilroy Daly in the District of Connecticut on August 18, 1978 denying appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Guida claims that the United States Parole Commission improperly issued and executed a mandatory release violator warrant. Finding that appellant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, we affirm.
On March 1,1967, Guida was sentenced in the Southern District of New York to an eight-year term of imprisonment for bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery. On May 19, 1972, with 950 days remaining on his sentence, Guida was mandatorily released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4164. By the terms of the statute, if Guida refrained from further criminal activity, this probationary “as if on parole” release was to become permanent on June 28, 1974.
In May, 1974, however, Guida was arrested on a state bribery charge and on federal and state drug charges. Consequently, the U. S. Board of Parole, now the Parole Commission, on June 6,1974 issued a mandatory release violator’s warrant. Action on the warrant was delayed pending disposition of the charges against Guida.
Guida pled guilty to both the state bribery charge and the federal drug charge (the state drug charge was dismissed), receiving a “time-served” sentence on the bribery charge but a five-year sentence on the federal drug charge. Subsequently, the Parole Board lodged its still unexecuted violator warrant with federal prison officials as a detainer, to ensure that Guida would not be released from custody until the Parole Board could assess Guida’s apparent parole violation and make a parole revocation determination.
Guida’s sentence on the drug charge expired on October 2, 1977. Though Guida was kept in custody pursuant to the violator warrant, the warrant remained unexecuted until January 12,1978. Apparently because the Parole Board itself was not informed of the warrant’s execution until January 12, 1978, Guida did not receive a parole revocation hearing until February 15, 1978.
Following Guida’s revocation hearing, the Parole Board decided to revoke Guida’s mandatory release, to deny him credit on the initial bank robbery sentence for the time spent under mandatory release supervision, and to continue his incarceration on the mandatory release violator warrant until its expiration. Guida did not appeal the Parole Board’s action. Instead, he filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the District of Connecticut. In response to Guida’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but after the Government’s answer to the habeas petition, Judge Daly denied habeas relief on two grounds: first, that Guida had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; and second, that there was no impropriety in the Parole Board’s use of the violator warrant.
We find no error in Judge Daly’s ruling that Guida’s petition must be dismissed because of his failure to pursue any parole board appeals prior to seeking habeas corpus relief in the district court. Other circuits passing upon this question have uniformly held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required before habeas relief be granted. See e. g. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Arnold, 535 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1976); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1974).
Guida has argued in this court that he was not given a revocation hearing within ninety days after he was held pursuant to the violator warrant, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4214(c). Although Guida was held in custody pursuant to the violator warrant beginning on October 2, 1977, the date his sentence on the federal drug charge expired, the violator warrant was not executed until January 12, 1978 and no revocation hearing was held until February 15, 1978. Guida’s claim of a delay in excess of the statutory period thus appears accurate, and he will have the opportunity in further proceedings before the Parole Commission to show what, if any, prejudice may have resulted from the delay.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0