What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Douglas EAMES, Appellant, v. The CITY OF LOGAN, UTAH, a Municipal Corporation; Newell G. Daines, in his Individual and Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Logan, Utah; Does 1 through 25, Inclusive, Appellees.
No. 83-1544.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
May 13, 1985.
Elliott Levine, Anderson & Holland, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant.
W. Scott Barrett, Barrett & Brady, Logan, Utah, for appellees.
Before SEYMOUR and DOYLE, Circuit Judges, and CARRIGAN, District Judge .
Honorable Jim R. Carrigan, United States District Judge, District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.
This matter seeks a review of a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah. That court ordered a dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The plaintiff was Director of Parks for the City of Logan, Utah. As the head of such a city department, he was classified as an employee at will and was subject to dismissal without cause. On May 11,1982, he was suspended from his job by the Mayor of Logan. No reasons were given for the suspension, pending the outcome of an investigation. On June 7,1982, the City concluded its investigation and terminated plaintiff. Again, no reasons were given for the City’s actions. A great deal of publicity surrounded plaintiff’s suspension and termination, including rumors of criminal misconduct.
Plaintiff then brought a § 1983 suit against defendants City of Logan and the Mayor, claiming that they had violated his due process and equal protection rights by “willfully, knowingly and purposely [depriving him] of his right to a hearing prior to the termination of his employment * * *.” Plaintiff also claimed the defendants’ actions amounted to retaliation for exercising his right of free speech.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Two hearings were held on the motion. On October 14, 1982, the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, reasoning that because plaintiff had not requested a hearing, no deprivation had yet occurred. At this hearing, defendants indicated that they had always been willing to grant plaintiff a hearing if so requested; moreover, defendants stated they would still provide a hearing upon request. Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order, Fed.R. Civ.P. 59(e), arguing that he was being forced to exhaust administrative remedies. At the Rule 59 hearing on December 7, 1982, the district court again determined that plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The court also noted in addition that plaintiff’s First Amendment allegation was conclusory and required expansion in order to set forth a claim. Plaintiff was given leave to amend his complaint. He took no action, and the court entered an order on March 31, 1983, dismissing the complaint without prejudice.
The matter presented has to do with the failure of plaintiff to state an actionable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. The plaintiff states the issue differently. He argues that the district court erred in requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies as a condition precedent to bringing his § 1983 action.
The district court did not require plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies against the mandate of Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). Rather, the district court found that plaintiff’s failure to ask for a “name-clearing” hearing went to the issue of whether Logan City deprived him of his constitutional rights.
In reviewing the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief, we read the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ronsick v. Phariss, 286 F.2d 316 (10th Cir.1960).
The question which is presented for determination is whether plaintiff had either a property or liberty interest in employment which would support a § 1983 claim alleging a violation of constitutional rights stemming from his termination.
It is undisputed that plaintiff has no property interest in his job which warrants due process protection under Utah law. Section 10-3-1105 of the Utah Code. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). When as here there is a liberty interest rather than a property interest, the due process remedy is “an opportunity to refute the charge.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, id., and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), established the right to a name-clearing hearing for a government employee allegedly stigmatized in the course of his discharge. This right arises when there is a danger of foreclosure of the community, due to derogatory reasons for being fired. Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir.1977).
A liberal reading of plaintiff’s complaint convinces us that plaintiff’s allegation of a liberty interest violation was adequate to withstand defendants’ motion for dismissal. Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that defendants’ words and actions stigmatized him, McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 642-43 (10th Cir.1981); that the stigmatization affected a tangible employment interest, id. at 643; and that the defendants’ remarks were untrue, Williams v. West Jordan City, 714 F.2d 1017, 1021 (10th Cir.1983), citing Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). Plaintiff’s failure to earlier request a name-clearing hearing does not defeat his claim. He may still be entitled to a hearing if he can prove at trial that his liberty interest was indeed violated. McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d at 643.
The district court noted that the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim might have had merit, but that it was too conclusory to allow a judgment on its merit. The court gave plaintiff ample opportunity to remedy the inadequacies of the complaint, which plaintiff failed to do. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that the district court was in error in dismissing the First Amendment claim made by plaintiff.
We remand this case for trial only on the alleged violation of plaintiff’s liberty interest.
. Plaintiffs complaint reads in pertinent part:
8. Each of the individual Defendants, here, separately and in concert engaged in the illegal conduct herein mentioned to the injury of the Plaintiff and deprived Plaintiff of the rights, privileges and immunities secured to Plaintiff by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Speciffically [sic], each of the individual Defendants, without authorization of law, acted willfully, knowingly and purposefully to deprive Plaintiff of his right to a hearing prior to the termination of his employment and pursuant damage to his retirement, pension, and/or social security benefits.
9. Pursuant to the willful acts alleged in paragraph 8, defendants determined to cause Plaintiff damage to his character and reputation in his community and field of endeavor by creating an aura of suspicion as to possible misconduct and criminal charges relating to the performance of Plaintiff's duties as the Director of Parks for the City of Logan, Utah. This was accomplished through the words and actions of the Defendants during the period of approximately May 11, 1982 to the present.
10. Plaintiff was never made aware of the specific charges for which he was being investigated; was never told the identity of the witnesses supplying the investigative material and basis for the charges; was never supplied with the results of the investigation pursuant to which his dismissal was based upon; was never given a hearing or opportunity to refute the charges, and present his own witnesses and evidence all prior to his employment and accompanying benefits being terminated and infringed.
11. These actions were taken in order to deprive the Plaintiff of a fair hearing in violation of his rights of due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
12. Plaintiff avers that had he been given a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with basic and elementary due process, he could demonstrate with substantial and credible evidence that the action of suspension, on May 11, 1982, and termination, on June 7, 1982, by Defendants, was arbitrary, capricious and perjorative [sic] without any basis in truth or fact.
. But see McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d at 643 (stating that the truth or falsity of an employer’s statements concerning the termination of an employee is not relevant in determining the existence of a liberty interest violation).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1