What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
McCOLGAN v. CLARK et al. In re SNYDER.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
December 20, 1926.)
No. 4898.
1. Bankruptcy <©=>123 — Creditor, conniving in bankrupt’s retention of interest in property sold under power, held disqualified from voting for new trustee.
Where petition of one of two creditors to reopen estate and elect new trustee was granted on ground that bankrupt connived with M., the other creditor, to retain interest in property sold under power given to M. in trust deed, held, that M. was disqualified to vote for new trustee, and petitioning creditor was qualified, notwithstanding latter’s agreement with bankrupt for contingent, interest in property recovered from M. by trustee.
2. Bankruptcy <©=>446 — Claim of no cause of action' against creditor held determinable by trial court, and not on petition to revise.
Claim that no cause of action was established against bankrupt’s creditor, to whom property was sold under power, must be determined by trial court on issues properly made by pleadings, and not by Circuit Court of Appeals on petition to revise order confirming referee’s order disqualifying creditor from voting for new trustee on reopening of estate.
Petition for Revision of an Order of the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Northern District of California, in Bankruptcy; Frank H. Kerrigan, Judge.
In the matter of Albert E. Snyder, bankrupt. On petition of Adelaide McColgan, as administratrix of the estate of Daniel A. McColgan, deceased, to revise an order of the District Court sustaining referee’s order disqualifying petitioner from voting for new trustee, and in permitting another creditor to vote for such trustee.
Affirmed.
Keyes & Erskine, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.
Glensor, Clewe & Van Dine, of San Francisco, Cal., for respondents.
Before GILBERT and RUDKIN, Circuit Judges, and JAMES, District Judge.
Rehearing denied January 31, 1927.
JAMES, District Judge.
On November 16, 1917, Albert A. Snyder, upon his voluntary petition, was adjudged a bankrupt. A trustee was appointed who discovered no assets other than property of the value of $100 which was awarded to the bankrupt as exempt. Two creditors, who filed elaims with due proof, were Daniel A. McColgan, who asserted a debt owing him of $60,525.35, and Charles H. Clark, who claimed $675. The McColgan claim was represented to be for a balance due over and above the price received for certain real property, which had been made the subject of a trust deed in favor of Daniel A. McColgan, securing an original indebtedness of the bankrupt to MeColgan in the sum of $90,525.35. Discharge of the bankrupt from his debts was allowed on February 2,1918.
The creditor Clark, by Ernest Clewe, his attorney in fact, on October 3, 1923, filed a petition in the District Court to have the estate of the bankrupt reopened and a second trustee elected. This petition alleged that since the closing of the estate the petitioner had learned that the bankrupt owned an interest in certain real property which had not been scheduled or administered upon in the bankruptcy proceeding. R. McColgan, representing himself to have been a copartner of Daniel A. McColgan, moved to set aside the order reopening the bankruptcy proceeding. Snyder filed an affidavit in opposition to this motion. The motion was by the court denied. A petition to review and revise,'brought in this court by R. McColgan, was dismissed, the court holding that petitioner had no standing in the bankruptcy proceeding which entitled him to question the order reopening the bankrupt estate. McColgan v. Clark (C. C. A.) 4 F.(2d) 627.
The matter of the election of a trustee was afterwards taken up before the referee. Adelaide McColgan, representing the estate of Daniel A. McColgan, deceased, sought to vote her claim for a trustee. The referee held that, inasmuch as the property claimed to be unadministered in the bankrupt estate was an interest in the property sold under the trust deed referred to, thé McColgan interest was adverse to that of the other creditor and to the bankrupt, and the McColgan claim was disqualified to vote. On the other hand, it was shown that the attorney who represented the Clark claim had an agreement with the bankrupt for a contingent interest in all property which might be secured from the McColgans by the trustee, and which might remain i after creditors had been paid. Because the bankrupt would bé permitted thus indirectly, but nevertheless certainly, to select the trustee to manage his estate, petitioner herein objected to the Clark elaim being voted. The referee overruled the objection. The District Court sustained the action of the referee on both questions. It is the last-mentioned order that petitioner asks to have revised and annulled.
An inspection of the record discloses that the order reopening the bankrupt estate depended altogether for support upon the assertion of the bankrupt that he had connived with Daniel A. MeColgan and Reginald MeColgan, copartners, to whom he admitted owing large sums of money, to have instituted bankruptcy proceedings and to allow the' McColgans to elect the trustee, and bring the proceeding to a close, all the while owning an interest in the real property which was sold by Daniel MeColgan under the power given by a trust deed to said MeColgan; that the McColgans agreed to hold the interest of the bankrupt, which he alleged to be of the value of more than $50,-000, secretly and for his benefit, and to thereafter convey same to him; that this agreement was later repudiated by the McColgans. This charge the McColgans vigorously denied.
The ease of the bankrupt is one deserving small consideration in a court of justice, and, were it not for the claim of the one creditor, Clark, there would be little reason for allowing the cause to proceed further. Clark’s interest appears to be involved in that of the bankrupt, but in a measure that situation, finds its justification in the fact that Clark’s claim cannot be paid unless the bankrupt’s interest, as he asserts it to be, can be established against the McColgans. We have not here to review the strength of the showing made before the District Court upon which the order reopening the estate was made, or the decision refusing to vacate that order, but only whether, as a matter of law, the referee was justified in refusing to allow the MeColgan elaim to be voted at the election of a trustee, and in overruling the objection made by the MeColgan interest to the voting of the Clark elaim at the same meeting of creditors.
In the' condition of the -estate as the referee found it to be at the time of the election of the last trustee, interests of no creditors were involved, except that of Clark and that of the MeColgan estate. Necessarily the MeColgan estate would be adversary to any effort of the trustee to recover the only property that can be brought into the bankruptcy court. True, the interest of the bankrupt is tied to that of the creditor Clark. But, as there are no other creditors entitled to participate in dividends, and as the bankrupt is interested as greatly as Clark in recovering the property, a situation is presented which takes from the rule denying the right of a bankrupt to influence the selection of a trustee its reason. The trustee selected seems to have met with the approval of the referee. No error appears in the overruling of objections to the voting of the Clark claim on any of the grounds expressed by the MeColgan interest.
As to the contention that no valid cause of action was shown to exist against the Mc-Colgans, that question must be left for the determination of a trial court, where defenses of the bar of the statutory limitation or sufficiency of the evidence may be heard and tried under issues properly made up by pleadings. What has been decided herein is not to be taken as a determination that the referee is bound to authorize the trustee to proceed and bring an action against the McColgans to recover property, or as an intimation that a sufficient ease of facts was presented by the bankrupt and the creditor, Clark, in their affidavits as filed before the referee, to require such an order to be made.
The order of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0