What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Dr. David C. FARSHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alan CAMPBELL, as Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission, William F. Foege, as the Director of the Center for Disease Control, Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Resources, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 78-2972.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Unit B
March 5, 1981.
David C. Farshy, pro se.
William L. Harper, U. S. Atty., Robert J. Castellani, 1st Asst. U. S. Atty., Carl H. Harper, Regional Atty., Myles E. Eastwood, J. Diane Everett, Asst. Regional Attys., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, TUT-TLE and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Farshy was a research microbiologist at the Communicable Disease Center, an agency of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In the district court he sought review of agency determinations that (1) upheld the classification of his job description; (2) denied him a within-grade pay increase; (3) upheld his unsatisfactory performance rating; (4) upheld his dismissal from employment; (5) upheld CDC’s resolution of various grievances. Also he contended, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, that he had been denied constitutional rights in CDC’s employment decisions. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. We affirm.
The record consists of approximately 15 volumes, more than 5,000 pages. The district judge required the defendants to file briefs relating the law to the facts and then entered a careful, precisely drawn opinion supporting the summary judgment. It will serve no purpose to restate here the myriad details and many facets of Farshy’s long simmering dispute with his employer, the government. Rather we approach his contentions in more generalized fashion.
In numerous respects Farshy contends that agency procedures have not been properly followed, in others that the agency acted in bad faith and without substantial evidence. With respect to some of his complaints Farshy has not demonstrated that he suffered any prejudice, which is a prerequisite to reversal. Surprise Brassiere Co. v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 1969); Pacific Molasses Co. v. FTC, 356 F.2d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1966). In other matters, there is no showing that the agency employed inappropriate factors or was arbitrary or capricious in its conclusions.
On his claim that he was denied open and formal hearing on review of his performance rating, neither the statute then in effect, 5 U.S.C. § 4305(d), nor the Constitution requires the full spectrum of a judicial due process proceeding.
Farshy contends he was unlawfully dismissed. Nearly all of his arguments relate to evidentiary matters. We agree with the district court that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the agency’s action.
The claim that the agency violated Farshy’s First Amendment rights by refusing to publish his research papers is frivolous.
Farshy has raised one point that brought on considerable discussion at oral argument and caused the court to call for supplemental briefs. Under 5 U.S.C. § 4305(a) an employee can seek an impartial review of his performance rating within the agency, and he can appeal this informal review to a Board of Review. The agency assigned an employee to investigate or review Farshy’s unsatisfactory performance rating and to make a report and recommendation to the Office of Personnel and Training of the Office of the Secretary of HEW. The employee investigated the matter and recommended changing Farshy’s rating to satisfactory. The Director of OPT reviewed the material submitted and the recommendation and concluded that the unsatisfactory rating should be sustained; also he told Farshy of his right to an appeal to the Board of Review. Farshy contends that the report and recommendation by the employee constituted the in-agency review and that the Director of OPT could not decline to follow it. We agree with the defendants that the “one impartial review” within the agency could be bifurcated into a review and recommendation done by an employee and a final decision by the Director, this latter decision being the final agency action that triggers the right to an appeal to the Board of Review.
We have fully considered and reviewed Farshy’s contentions, recognizing that he appears pro se and has great difficulty in appreciating the complexities of the rules and procedures — regulations, statutory, and constitutional — that relate to his claims. We find no constitutional error and no basis on which to set aside agency action.
AFFIRMED.
. Such as the claim that his job description did not accurately describe his duties, causing him to have a lower GS rating than he should have had, and his claim that he was arbitrarily denied a within-grade salary increase.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0