What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
KALIS v. LEAHY.
No. 10757.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Dec. 13, 1950.
Decided Jan. 31, 1951.
Writ of Certiorari Denied May 7,1951.
See 71 S.Ct. 797.
Mr. Leo A. Rover, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Clarence G. Pechacelc, Washington, D. G, was on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. James F. Reilly, Washington, D. G, with whom Mr. Eugene B. Sullivan, Washington, D. G, was on the brief, for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, BAZELON, and FAHY, Circuit Judges.
FAHY, Circuit Judge.
Rose Kalis, the appellant, brought an action in the District Court against the executor of the estate of Annie A. Kilroy, deceased, for services as companion and nurse. She alleged the decedent promised to take care of her, implying that some provision to that effect would be made in her will, which was not done. The trial judge granted the motion of the executor to dismiss the complaint on the ground the action was barred by § 18-518 of the D.C. Code (1940), as amended June 24, 1949, because not filed within three months after the executor had rejected the claim.
The section in question provides that when a claim is exhibited against an executor which he thinks his duty requires him to dispute or reject he may retain assets proportioned to the -amount of the claim. If within nine months (as the statute read prior to June 24, 1949), or three months (as the amendment of that date provides), after he disputes or rejects the claim suit is not commenced upon it, “the creditor shall b’e forever barred; * * The effect is that if a claimant desires the executor to hold assets for his claim he must follow this special procedure. Otherwise he may sue. within three years.
The relevant, chronology, set forth in the margin, shows that appellant’s action was filed within nine but not within three months after rejection of the claim.
We think it clear the cause of action arbse upon the death of the decedent on September 19, 1948. This is stated in a negative manner in West v. Bauduit, 1929, 59 App.D.C. 74, 75, 33 F.2d 370, 371, as follows:
“ * * * The action for services must be brought within three years from the time the services were performed, but if the agreement was that they were to be compensated for by a provision in the will, then no cause of action arose until the death of the decedent, * *
In Tuohy v. Trail, 1901, 19 App.D.C. 79, 88, it is said that where it was understood by both parties that compensation for services should be made by a will and this is not done, an action lies to recover their value. It is implicit in this statement that the action accrues when the party dies without making compensation by will, especially as the court goes on to say that if such a contract be found by the jury the statute of limitations would -not bar the action, meaning, no doubt, that the statute would not begin to run until the death. We construe Clawans v. Sheetz, 1937, 67 App.D.C. 366, 92 F.2d 517, to like effect. There this court in holding that the limitation of nine months was not applicable to a suit on a rejected claim which had not been authenticated, said that the three-year general period applied in such a case.
Rejection of the claim, which sets in motion the running of the shorter period within which suit must be filed under the special procedure, does not fix the time of accrual of the cause of action itself. Whether this shorter or the three-year period applies, the claimant would be pursuing the same cause of action, namely, the claim against the estate for services rendered the decedent.
We have, then, a case in which, after the cause of action had arisen, but before the choice of procedure had been acted upon, 'Congress reduced the time within which a suit could be filed under the special procedure which was subsequently followed. There is no constitutional barrier which precludes holding this shortened period applicable to a claim in existence when the change was enacted, provided a reasonable time remained within which to-sue. Terry v. Anderson, 1877, 95 U.S. 628, 633, 24 L.Ed. 365. The question is simply whether Congress intended the amendment to apply to claims then existing against estates under administration when Congress intervened.
The general rule which aids the courts in arriving át the intent of Congress as to the time a statute takes ef-. feet in relation to conditions when it is enacted is that it will not be given retroactive effect unless this is required by-explicit language or necessary implication. United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co., 1926, 270 U.S. 1, 3, 46 S.Ct. 182, 70 L.Ed. 435; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. U. S. for Use and Benefit of Struthers Wells Co., 1908, 209 U.S. 306, 314, 28 S.Ct. 537, 52 L.Ed. 804. To apply the June 24, 1949, amendment to this case, however, would not in any precise sense offend this rule were the claim considered apart from the fact that administration of the estate had begun; for while it is true the cause of action had arisen when the amendment was approved, the claim had not been presented or rejected. Therefore, the period of limitation, whether three or nine months, had not then begun to run.
Administration of the estate, however, had begun. This is important because the amendment in question is but one of several made by the same statute. Eight periods of time, other than the one now involved, and all having to do with the administration of estates, are affected by the amending statute; seven periods are shortened and one appears for the first time. An examination of these other amendments discloses that they deal with periods which begin to run either from the death of the decedent, the appointment of the personal representative, or the service of summons upon an absent executor. To apply them to estates already in the process of administration would be giving a retroactive effect — the shortening of periods which had begun to run — not required by “explicit language or by necessary implication.” Furthermore, it would make such application of very questionable validity in some instances because of the quite limited period left for action. Indeed, in some cases conformance might be impossible. In these circumstances it is reasonably clear that Congress did not purpose any general application of the amending statute to estates in process of administration. The problem therefore narrows to whether we should isolate the amendment of § 18-518 from the other eight, and hold that Congress intended it to apply to such estates but that its companion amendments should not.
The answer is not clear; but in view of the general intent of the Act as a whole, considered with the substantial reduction from nine to three months made in § 18-518, we do not think we should attribute to Congress an unexpressed, purpose to differentiate with respect to this one amendment. In view of the uncertainty as to the legislative intent preference should be given by the court to a construction which precludes application of the particular amendment to claims against estates in process of administration at the time of its enactment. This gives effect to the amendment of § 18-518 in a manner which is consistent with the general intent of Congress evidenced by the amending statute as a whole. Accordingly, the nine months limitation governs this case and the suit was brought within time.
Reversed.
. Act of June 24, 1949, c. 242, 63 Stat. 268.
. September 19, 1948......................Death of Annie A. Kilroy.
October 5, 1948..........................Admission of decedent’s last -will and testament to probate; qualification of appellee as executor.
June 24, 1949............................Amendment of § 18-518 of the D. O. Code (1940), reducing the period for bringing suit on rejected claims from 9 months to 3 months.
October 27, 1949.........................Rejection of appellant’s claim by appellee as executor.
May 12, 1950............................. .The commencement of the instant suit by appellant in the District Court.
. It is not necessary to consider a variation of this proposition which might result from the fact that an action could not reach the appropriate defendant until appointment of an executor or administrator.
. They are summarized as follows: (a) In § 18-501 which provides that on the death of a person not domiciled in the District of Columbia so much of his estate therein as may be necessary to pay claims of creditors there domiciled shall be subject to administration of the probate court, the time within which such claims shall be prosecuted is reduced from one year to six months; (b) the time prescribed by § 20-806 within which an executor, who was not present at probate but is within the District, must appear, or else administration may be otherwise granted, is reduced from twenty to five days when he is summoned, and from thirty to ten days when he is given notice by publication; (c) the time prescribed by § 18-401 within which an executor, administrator or collector, after his appointment, shall make true inventory, is reduced from three to two months; (d) the time specified in § 18-407 within which an executor or administrator shall return a new inventory, or acknowledges receipt of the articles contained in the inventory filed by a collector, is reduced from three to two months; (e) the provision of § 18-526 that an executor or administrator who, after one year, has paid away assets to discharge just claims shall not be answerable for any claim of which he had no knowledge or notice by its exhibition legally authenticated, is changed to a period of six months; and the provision of the same section conditioning the above by requiring that at least six months before he shall make distribution he shall cause the specified advertisement to be published, is changed by reducing the period to three months; and (f) the requirement of § 20-601 that every executor and administrator shall render to the probate court his first account within twelve months from the date of his letters is amended by adding the proviso that said account may be rendered six months from such date.
. Cf. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. U.S. for Use and Benefit of Struthers Wells Co., supra, where the Supreme Court, when faced by an analogous problem of “splitting"’ the intent of Congress, held that the provisions of the amendatory statute there involved should not be construed to apply retroactively as to one matter and prospectively as to others. 209 U.S. at page 316, 28 S.Ct. 537.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0