What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
HAAS v. RENDLEMAN. In re PIEDMONT ELECTRIC CO.
No. 3364.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1933.
T. W. Lipscomb, of Asheville, N. C. (Joseph W. Little, of Asheville, N. C1., on the brief), for appellant.
J. G. Menimon, of Asheville, N. C. (Junius G. Adams, Jr., and Menimon, Adams & Adams, all of Asheville, N. C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT, and SOPER, Circuit Judges.
PARKER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal in a controversy arising in bankruptcy. The question involved is the validity, as against the trustee in bankruptcy representing creditors, of a deed of trust on certain real estate of the bankrupt. The bankrupt is a corporation, and it is admitted that its corporate seal was omitted from the deed of trust. The contention of tho trustee is that, because of its omission, the registration of the deed of trust was a nullity, and that, not being registered, it was void as against creditors of the bankrupt and the trustee in bankruptcy, who succeeded to their rights. The District Judge sustained the validity of the deed of trust as an equitable lion, notwithstanding the omission of the seal; and the trustee in bankruptcy has appealed.
There is no dispute as to the facts. The deed of trust was executed by the president of the bankrupt corporation with its authority and in its name to secure a loan of $25,-000 made to bankrupt at thei time. Its execution was attested by the signature of the secretary; and the attestation clause recites that bankrupt caused the instrument to be executed in its name by its president and its corporate seal to be affixed, duly attested by its secretary, by authority duly given. No corporate seal was in fact affixed; and the judge below finds that it was omitted by inadvertence and mistake. The execution of the deed of trust was proven before a notary public by tho oath of the president to the effect that he was the president of the corporation ; that the seal thereto affixed was the seal of the corporation; that the instrument was signed and sealed by him in behalf of the corporation by its authority duly given; and that he acknowledged the instrument to be the act and deed of the corporation. The instrument was promptly recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the real estate was situate; tho assistant clerk of the superior court of that county having signed an order adjudging that the certificate of the notary public was correct, and that the execution of the deed of trust had been duly proven and ordering that same be registered. The corporation was adjudged bankrupt on a petition filed more than a year later, at which time the indebtedness secured by tho deed of trust had been reduced by only a very small amount.
It is elementary that questions as to the validity of a deed of trust on land, the necessity and requisites of registration, and the effect of the failure to record as against creditors, or a trustee in bankruptcy representing creditors, are to be determined by the laws of the state where the land embraced in the deed of trust is situate. And there can be no question but that under the law of North Carolina it is essential to the conveyance of land that the deed of conveyance be under seal. If the conveyance be by a corporation, the common seal or some deviee used as and for the seal of the corporation must be affixed. Bailey v. Hassell, 184 N. C. 450, 115 S. E. 166; Caldwell v. Morganton Mfg. Co., 121 N. C. 339, 341, 28 S. E. 475; Avent v. Arrington, 105 N. C. 377, 10 S. E. 991. And, where it appears from the face of a deed or deed of trust that the corporate seal has not been affixed, an order admitting it to probate as a conveyance is unauthorized and registration thereon is invalid; for it is well settled that registration had upon an unauthorized probate is invalid and ineffectual to pass title against creditors and purchasers. Withrell v. Murphy, 154 N. C. 82, 69 S. E. 748; Allen v. Burch, 142 N. C. 524, 55 S. E. 354; Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C. 235; U. S. v. Hiawassee Lumber Co. (C. C. A. 4th) 202 F. 35.
It by no means follows, however, that the deed of trust here is void or that its registration has no effect against creditors, even though it does not pass title as against them. Having been executed with the authority of the corporation, it was valid as a contract to convey the land therein described as security for the debt set forth, even though not under seal; for under the law of North Carolina a contract to convey real estate need not be under seal. Robinson v. Daughtry, 171 N. C. 200, 88 S. E. 252, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1186; Mitchell v. Bridgers, 113 N. C. 71, 18 S. E. 91. And an instrument in form of a deed which has been defectively executed will operate as a contract to convey. Robinson v. Daughtry, supra; Rogerson v. Leggett, 145 N. C. 10, 58 S. E. 596. Likewise as to the order of probate—while, because of the absence •of the seal, it did not authorize the registration of the instrument as a conveyance, it was sufficient, nevertheless, to authorize its registration as a contract to convey, the registration of which is expressly provided for by statute in North Carolina. C. S. §§i 3308, 3309. The deed of trust was valid, therefore, as a contract to convey or give a mortgage; .and, having been duly recorded as such, it was valid against creditors as a lien on the property embraced to the extent of the debt secured, the amount of which was set forth in the instrument as recorded.'
There is this difference between the registration of a conveyance and the registration of a contract to convey: While both, when registered, are good as against creditors, the conveyance is good to the full extent of the title conveyed; the contract to convey, only as to the rights given by the contract which is recorded. The grantee under a duly recorded deed of conveyance obtains a title good as against the creditors of the grantor. The party to receive a conveyance under a duly recorded contract to convey is entitled to a conveyance of title, as against creditors of the party to make conveyance, only upon compliance with the terms of the contract as recorded. The distinction is not of practical importance, in a ease such as this, where the contract as recorded providesi for the giving of security for a debt created at the time, for a court of equity will hold such contract to be an equitable lien on the property, which is in practical effect not materially different from enforcing the terms of a mortgage. The power of equity to enforce such equitable liens arising from contracts to give security is well settled. Ketchum v. St. Louis, 101 U. S. 306, 317, 25 L. Ed. 999; Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654, 17 S. Ct. 453, 41 L. Ed. 865; Hurley v. A., T. & S. F. R. Co., 213 U. S. 126, 29 S. Ct. 466, 53 L. Ed. 729; Johnson v. Root Mfg. Co., 241 U. S. 160, 36 S. Ct. 520, 60 L. Ed. 934; Burrowes v. Nimocks (C. C. A. 4th) 35 F.(2d) 152, 155, 156; Love v. Sierra Nevada Lake Water & Mining Co., 32 Cal. 639, 652, 653, 91 Am. Dec. 602; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) §§ 1235, 1237. The doctrine is stated by Prof. Pomeroy as follows in the paragraph last cited: “As an agreement to give a mortgage creates a lien, so a mortgage which, through some informality or defect in its terms or mode of execution, is not complete and valid as a true and proper mortgage, will nevertheless generally create an equitable lien upon the property described. The intent to give a security being clear, equity will treat the instrument as an executory agreement for such security.”
For the reasons stated, we think that the deeree appealed from is correct, and same is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 0