What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Harold B. CLAYTON, Appellant, v. BLACHOWSKE TRUCK LINES, INC. and Duane Blachowske, Individually, Appellees.
No. 86-5330.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 9, 1987.
Decided April 7, 1987.
Jeffrey G. Stephenson, St. Paul, Minn., for appellant.
Gary G. Wollschlager, Fairmont, Minn., for appellees.
Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Harold B. Clayton brought this action against Blachowske Truck Lines, Inc. (Bla-chowske Lines) and Duane Blachowske (Blachowske) alleging that he was wrongfully terminated due to his status as a member of the Minnesota National Guard, in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3). Clayton also alleged state-law claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unlawful discharge, breach of an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of Minn.Stat. § 192.34 and § 181.64. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Clayton’s claim under 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) and dismissed without prejudice the remaining counts. 640 F.Supp. 172. Clayton appeals. We affirm.
Clayton began working for Blachowske Lines on January 9,1984, and worked there as a safety director until he was terminated on May 31,1984. In job interviews prior to being hired, Clayton informed Blachowske, president of Blachowske Lines, that he was a member of the Minnesota National Guard and was obligated to attend drills one weekend per month, as well as a two-week period each summer. Blachowske replied that this obligation was not a problem, but that since Saturday was a very important business day Clayton would be required to work those Saturdays that he was not engaged with the Guard.
Clayton states that he was given four reasons by Blachowske for his discharge: (1) “screwing up” on a permit for a truck, (2) missing too many Saturdays from work, (3) taking long lunch breaks, and (4) not spending enough time in coveralls with the drivers. Clayton asserts that the only Saturdays he missed were those required for his Guard obligations. He argues that the other reasons given for his discharge were pretextual. He concedes that he left work at approximately noon on the other Saturdays, but claims that he had been given permission to leave early.
Blachowske contends that Clayton was given the following reasons for his termination: (1) His inability to adequately obtain the permits essential for the operation of Blachowske Lines, (2) his inability to communicate with and work with the drivers for whom he had responsibility as safety director, (3) his failure to adequately establish a safety inspection program for Blachowske Lines, (4) his continued and repeated absences from work on Bla-chowske Lines on those Saturdays on which he was not obligated to report to the National Guard for active duty, and (5) for his general inability to perform his job and for causing general disruption in the office of Blachowske Lines. Additionally, Bla-chowske contends that Clayton charged a substantial number of long-distance phone calls to Blachowske Lines’ account.
38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who [is employed by a private employer] shall not be denied retention in employment or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve Component of the Armed Forces.
The Supreme Court has stated that this section was “enacted for the significant but limited purpose of protecting the employee-reservist against discriminations like discharge and demotion, motivated solely by reserve status.” Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 559,101 S.Ct. 2510, 2516, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981).
In a thorough memorandum opinion, the district court found that even when viewed in the light most favorable to Clayton, the record showed that he had not been terminated solely because of his Reserve status. It therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Clayton’s pendent state claims. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
Finding no error of fact or law, we affirm the judgment on the basis of the district court’s opinion. See 8th Cir.R. 14.
. The Honorable Diana E. Murphy, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1