What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William H. HAGGARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF TENNESSEE and Honorable Joseph D. Duncan, Judge, Knox County Criminal Court, Knoxville, Tennessee, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 19487.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Feb. 10, 1970.
William H. Haggard, pro se.
Elmer D. Davies, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Tenn., Nashville, Tenn., on brief, for appellees, David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., and Reporter, State of Tenn., of counsel.
Before WEICK, Circuit Judge, and McALLISTER and O’SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judges.
WEICK, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, an inmate of the Tennessee State Penitentiary in Nashville, Tennessee, appeals from an order entered by the District Court denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. The petition sought an order of the District Court commanding a state criminal court judge to furnish him with copies of “court records, legal documents, etc.” pertaining to one of his convictions which formed the basis for his conviction as an habitual criminal.
In 1951, appellant was convicted in the Criminal Court of Knox County, Tennessee, of the crime of burglary, and of being an habitual criminal. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed his conviction and sentence.
Appellant asserts that one of the three prior state court convictions used to enhance his punishment is void because he was an indigent and did not have the assistance of counsel. He relies on Bur-gett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). Appellant’s contention is that he needs the state court records to enable him to prepare a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
The writ of mandamus as such has been abolished by Rule 81(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Statute) federal courts may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions, including writs in the nature of mandamus. Findley v. Chandler, 377 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.1967); Booker v. Arkansas, 380 F.2d 240 (8th Cir.1967); Youngblood v. United States, 141 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1944); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Republican Co., 188 F.Supp. 813 (D.Mass.1960). See 7 Moore’s Federal Practice § 81.07.
Such relief may be granted only in instances where, before adoption of Rule 81(b), the remedy of mandamus would have been available. Petrowski v. Nutt, 161 F.2d 938 (9th Cir.1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 842, 68 S.Ct. 659, 92 L.Ed. 1126 (1948); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Republican Co., supra; Deglau v. Franke, 184 F.Supp. 225 (D.R.I.1960).
It is settled that a federal court has no general jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus where that is the only relief sought. In the absence of special statutory authority it can issue writs of mandamus only as ancillary to and in aid of jurisdiction otherwise vested in it. Hertz v. Record Publishing Co., 219 F.2d 397 (3d Cir.1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 912, 75 S.Ct. 601, 99 L.Ed. 1247 (1955).
In any event, federal courts have no authority to issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties. Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir.1966); Campbell v. Washington State Bar Ass’n, 263 F.Supp. 991 (W.D. Wash.1967).
If we treat this action for mandamus as one for habeas corpus, Ray-born v. Jones, 282 F.2d 410 (6th Cir. 1960), we are met with the statutory condition that a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court must first exhaust the remedies available to him in the courts of the state before resorting to the federal courts for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus he admits that he has presently pending in an appellate court in Tennessee a petition for post-conviction relief. It involves the same issue presented here, i. e., that one of his prior convictions which formed the basis for his conviction as an habitual criminal, is void. In that action the court records, which he seeks here, were available to him under the provisions of Section 40-3813 of the Tennessee Code.
Until appellant has exhausted his state remedies, the federal courts are without authority to grant relief to him in a habeas corpus proceeding. Rayborn v. Jones, supra.
The judgment of the District Court denying the petition for a writ of mandamus is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0