What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
OWENS v. CONTINENTAL SUPPLY CO.
No. 993.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 11, 1934.
C. M. Oakes, of Tulsa, Okl. (Christy Russell,, of Tulsa, Okl., on the brief), for appellant.
W. N. Banks, of Independence, Kan. (J. F. Lawrence, of Tulsa, OH., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, McDERMOTT, and BRATTON, Circuit Judges.
McDERMOTT, Circuit Judge.
For a valuable consideration, appellant executed and delivered to appellee his negotiable promissory notes for $33,787.39, which are duo and unpaid. Appellant transmitted the notes to appellee with a letter, describing them fully, and providing:
“Payment of said' notes is secured by a lien on my riverbed leases in Sections 5 and 17, Township 18 North, Range 7 East, Creek Connty, Oklahoma, such lien to ho evidenced at a later date by regular form mortgage. I am arranging now to discharge two small items which are secured by chattel mortgage and conditional sales contract, both of which are of record, but upon payment of such items the mortgage and conditional sales contract will be released, whereupon the mortgage, to be executed to' you, will be a first and prior lien. Pending the execution of such mortgage, there is one other item of approximately $500 adjustment of which can and will be made without payment by issuance of credit memorandum in the adjustment of accounts and claims due me.
“Unless unforeseen delays develop, these items can he disposed of in sufficient time to permit the execution of the above mentioned mortgage to your company on January 15th, 1932. In the meantime no liens or encumbrances will be created that might take priority over the mortgage to be executed to your company.
“Yours very truly, O. O. Owens.”
Appellee brought its bill to foreclose the lien on the riverbed leases, and for judgment on the notes. The bill alleged a more detailed and definite description of the leases set forth in the letter.
In answer, appellant alleged that he executed the notes in order to secure further credit for -supplies and with the oral understanding and agreement that he would not be required to pay them according to their tenor, but might pay them a.t bis convenience. That it was not intended that the agreement to execute a mortgage should create a lien on the property therein described.
No motion for judgment notwithstanding the answer was intex'posed. Without objection, the trial court heard the conflicting stories of the oral negotiations leading up to the execution of the notes and the lien, the gTeat preponderance of which supports the decree below.
The errors assigned and specified are objectionably indefinite. The principal ones are founded upon the assumption that appellant’s version of the oral negotiations was found by the trial court to be true. But the trial court found otherwise, and we concur. Another error specified is that there was no evidence to identify the “river-bed leases in sections 5 and .17, township 18 north, range 7 east, Creek County, Oklahoma.” The hill identified them more specifically and that allegation, being undeniod, stands admitted. Equity Rule 30 (28 USCA §'723). The last error assigned is that appellant only agreed to execute a mortgage, hut did not carry out his agreement. The letter clearly creates a present charge or lien upon the property described. It recites “Payment of said notes is secured by a lien * * * such lien to be evidenced at a later date by regular form mortgage.” Can such a present lien be divested, by appellant’s failure to carry out Ms agreement to execute a formal mortgage evidencing such lien ?
Clearly not. Equity treats that as done which ought to be done. A valid agree-! ment to execute a mortgage will be enforced in equity against the maker or third persons who have notice thereof or who are volunteers. “It is an equitable mortgage,” said Justice McLean in King v. Thompson, 9 Pet, 221, “and in a court of chancery, is as binding on the parties as i f a mortgage in form, had been duly executed.” In Re Strand Music Hall Co., 3 Do Cox, J. & S. 147, Lord Justice Turner held that where the parties, by their agreement, intend to ereate a charge upon property, equity will give effect to thei t intention, notwithstanding any mistake which may have occurred in the attempt to effect it. Stox*y, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, early laid down the same rule. Vol. II, § 1231. This rule has been uniformly followed in the coux’ts of the United Stales. Among other cases, see White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Vallette, 21 How. 414, 422, 10 L. Ed. 154; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199, 206, 23 L. Ed. 829; Ketchum v. St. Louis, 101 U. S. 306, 316, 25 L. Ed. 999; Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654, 664, 17 S. Ct. 453, 41 L. Ed. 865; United States v. Shelby Iron Company, 273 U. S. 573, 47 S. Ct. 515, 71 L. Ed. 781. See, also, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurispxmdenee, § 1237; Jones on Mortgages, §§ 162, 163. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in an elaborate opinion, has followed this general rule. Carter v. Sapulpa & I. R. Co., 49 Okl. 471,153 P. 853, 855.
The errors assigned are without merit. Because we have discussed them, it must not be assumed that we hold, even inferentially, that a defense was pleaded by the answer, or that the evidence offered in support thereof was admissible, j The decree is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1