What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
HAHN v. ROSS ISLAND SAND & GRAVEL CO.
No. 52.
Argued December 11, 1958.
Decided January 12, 1959.
Dwight L. Schwab argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Herbert C. Hardy.
Ray H. Lafky, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Oregon, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief was Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General.
Arno H. Denecke argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert T. Mautz.
Per Curiam.
By its terms, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act does not apply “if recovery for the disability or death through workmen’s compensation proceedings may . . . validly be provided by State law.” § 3, 44 Stat. 1426, 33 U. S. C. § 903 (a) (emphasis supplied). In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, we recognized that in some cases it was impossible to predict in advance of trial whether a worker’s injury occurred in an operation which, although maritime in nature, was so “local” as to allow state compensation laws validly to apply under the limitations of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205. As to cases within this “twilight zone,” Davis, in effect, gave an injured waterfront employee an election to recover compensation under either the Longshoremen’s Act or the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State in which the injury occurred. It seems plain enough that petitioner’s injury occurred in the “twilight zone,” and that recovery for it “through workmen’s compensation proceedings,” could have been, and in fact was, validly “provided by State law” — the Oregon Workmen’s Compensation Act. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 656.002-656.990. Therefore, the Longshoremen’s Act did not bar petitioner’s claim under state law. But since his employer had elected to reject them the automatic compensation provisions of the Oregon Workmen’s Compensation Act did not apply to the claim. Section 656.024 of that law provides, however, that when an employer has elected to reject the Act’s automatic compensation provisions his injured employee may maintain in the courts a negligence action for damages. Of course, the employee could not do this if the case were not within the “twilight zone,” for then the Longshoremen’s Act would provide the exclusive remedy. Since this case is within the “twilight zone,” it follows from what we held in Davis that nothing in the Longshoremen’s Act or the United States Constitution prevents recovery.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Oregon for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3