What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BAIRD v. NEW YORK CENTRAL R. CO.
No. 5241.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
June 28, 1934.
Robert H. Doherty, of Jersey City, N. J. (George S. Hobart, of Newark, N. J., of counsel), for appellant.
Edward J. O’Mara, of Jersey City, N. J., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.
BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
In this ease Mrs. Fannie Baird, administratrix of her husband, Robert Baird, hereafter called decedent, brought suit against the New York Central Railroad Company, hereafter called carrier, to recover damages suffered by her in the death of her husband, caused, as she averred, by reason of the alleged negligence of the carrier while decedent was a passenger on its line. After hearing the proofs submitted by plaintiff, the court below granted a compulsory nonsuit. Thereupon this appeal was taken. After a study of the proofs, we are satisfied the trial judge committed no error in so doing..
The proofs show the decedent, a passenger on carrier’s local train, was safely carried to and delivered at its passenger station at Bergenfield. He lived on the opposite side of the tracks, and the carrier provided a subway, by taking which he could safely pass under the ear tracks. At the end of the.station was Church avenue, a public, municipal highway which crossed the tracks, and decedent, instead of taking the subway, left the station property and sought to pass on the street crossing. When he did so, the crossing gates were down and the warning gong sounding. In that regard a witness for plaintiff, who came to the station to meet his brother who was on the local train, testified that, while it stopped, the express train, which struck the decedent, passed on an adjoining track at the^ rate of fifty miles an hour. His testimony was:
“Q. While the local train was standing there, did yon notice if the crossing bell was ringing? A. It was.
“Q. It was ringing and you could and did hear it? A. Yes.”
The only witness oE the accident testified:
“Q. You saw Mr. Baird struck? A. Yes.
“Q. Will you tell us with reference to the north and south line of Church Avenue where Mr. Baird was when he was struck? On what part of ihe highway was he? A. He was rigid in the roadway.”
Moreover, when the local train stood at the station, it was raining, and the engine, which “was right up against the crossing,” was “letting oil steam,” and had blown a signal to start.
In view of these proofs, it is clear that, when the decedent left the station platform and went on the street, ho. ceased to be a railroad passenger and became a highway pedestrian. It is also clear that the crossing gates were down and the crossing gong sounding. It is also clear the local train engine was blowing steam and was about to start. It is- likewise clear that, in addition to danger from the starting of his own train, decedent was subjected to the further danger of crossing several tracks where trains were likely to pass in both directions. In view of these facts, it is clear to us that, in attempting to chance the crossing, the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, and himself brought about his unfortunate and needless death.
Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0