What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Roger Larson EPPS, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Lovic Moultrie INGRAM, Appellant.
Nos. 14765, 14766.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 22, 1971.
Arthur G. Murphy, Sr., Baltimore, Md., on brief for appellant, Roger Larson Epps.
Benjamin L. Brown, Baltimore, Md., on brief for appellant, Lovic Moultrie Ingram.
George Beall, U. S. Atty., and Charles G. Bernstein, Asst. U. S. Atty., on brief for appellee.
Before WINTER, CRAVEN and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Roger Larson Epps and Lovic Moul-trie Ingram were charged as codefend-ants in a three-count indictment with violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a) (bank robbery by force and violence, or by intimidation) (count one), with violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(b) (unarmed bank robbery) (count two), and with violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(d) (armed bank robbery) (count three). At the close of the government’s case, motions for acquittal with regard to count three were granted. A jury convicted Epps and Ingram of counts one and two. Epps was sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen years on count one, and ten years on count two, the sentences to run concurrently. Ingram was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years on count one, and ten years on count two, the sentences to run concurrently. In this appeal, the government has filed a motion to affirm the judgments summarily.
Both Epps and Ingram challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict them of count one. We think the note, handed to the teller by Epps, which stated, “Put all your money in this bag and nobody will get hurt,” sufficient under the circumstances to permit the jury to find that the bank robbery had been committed by intimidation within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a).
Both also challenge the admission into evidence during the government’s rebuttal and hence, after the judgments of acquittal on the charge of armed bank robbery, of two boxes of cartridges. Reliance is placed upon United States v. Laker, 427 F.2d 189 (6 Cir. 1970), which held that admission of a gun in a prosecution for unarmed bank robbery is error.
Even if the scope of the decision in Laker is sufficiently broad to include the admission of ammunition, without the admission of a gun, in a prosecution for unarmed bank robbery, it is inapplicable here. The admission of the ammunition was proper to impeach the credibility of Epps. After Epps’ motion for a judgment of acquittal on the armed bank robbery count of the indictment was granted, Epps testified in his own behalf. In his direct testimony he said that he did not have a gun while he was in the bank. On cross-examination he repeated that he did not have a gun and he added that he had neither seen a gun nor any bullets on the person of his co-defendant or in the car which he drove to the bank. Admission into evidence of bullets recovered from the car was thus permissible impeachment of Epps’ credibility in the latter denial. The district judge did not abuse his discretion in the receipt of this evidence.
Ingram additionally claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aiding and abetting under both counts one and two. We have carefully reviewed the evidence, and find it ample to convict him.
Although not raised by the appellants in their briefs, we think the imposition of the ten year concurrent sentences plain error. Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. Foster v. United States, No. 13,849 (4 Cir., December, 1969) (Mem. Dec.); Holland v. United States, 384 F.2d 370 (5 Cir. 1967); see Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1956).
While we grant the motion for summary affirmance of the judgments on count one, we remand as to the judgments on count two with directions to vacate the ten year sentences.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 1