What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MORRIS v. PREFABRICATION ENGINEERING CO. et al. PREFABRICATION ENGINEERING CO. et al. v. MORRIS.
No. 12772.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
April 7, 1950.
Harry L. Duránt, Miami, Fla., N. J. Durant, Miami, Fla., for appellants and cross-appellee.
Thos. McE. Johnston, Miami, Fla,, for appellee and cross-appellants.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and WALLER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
WALLER, Circuit Judge.
This action was brought to rescind a contract and to recover a deposit of $4,000' paid as an advance on the purchase price of certain wedges and bolts under that contract. The lower Court on a former trial found for the plaintiff and entered a judgment for $4,000, less the value ($20.25) of 675 bolts and wedges delivered by the defendant and admittedly used by the plaintiff.
On appeal this Court sustained the findings of the trial Court that time was of the essence of the contract; that defendant had failed to ship within the time provided for in the contract; and that plaintiff had a right to, and did, rescind in July, 1943. Our opinion stated, however, that it not being shown that the bolts and wedges which had been shipped prior to the rescission were of no intrinsic value, plaintiff should have returned the goods or offered to return them, or, more properly, that the lower Court was in error in not requiring an accounting for all the bolts and wedges shipped prior to the date of rescission. We, therefore, reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion. Morris v. Prefabrication Engineering Co., 5 Cir., 160 F.2d 779.
The only question remaining was the amount of credit to be given to the defendant for the 42,180 bolts and wedges shipped prior to the rescission, the answer to which is dependent upon whether, because of the lateness of their delivery, these bolts and wedges had only a salvage value to plaintiff, or whether the unit prices of such bolts and wedges should govern.
The record on the prior trial reflected the total quantity of bolts and wedges shipped before rescission, as well as the unit price of the bolts, but the unit price of the wedges was not shown. On remand, plaintiff moved in the Court below for a summary judgment in the amount of $3,954.-50, predicated upon the allowance of the negligible salvage value of the bolts and wedges or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment for $2,734.60, predicated upon the allowance of the full unit price of the bolts and wedges delivered before rescission. Plaintiff attached to its motion an affidavit of a Mr. Johnson by which it sought to show the salvage value of the wedges to be $5 and — in the alternative— the unit value to be 30, in the event salvage value were not adopted.
The Court granted summary judgment for the lesser sum of $2,734.60, predicated upon the allowance of the full unit price for the wedges and bolts delivered before rescission. The defendant appealed from the entry of such judgment and the plaintiff cross-appealed, urging that the judgment should have been for the greater sum of $3,954.50.
The defendant contends that the alternative motion for summary judgment by the plaintiff in the sum of $2,734.60 constituted an admission, so to speak, by the plaintiff that the amount in controversy was not in excess of $3,000, by virtue whereof the lower Court had no jurisdiction.
We hold this assignment not to be well taken. At the time of the commencement of the action the requisite jurisdictional amount was involved, and the fact that the plaintiff alternatively reduced the amount of its demand in its motion for summary judgment in conformity to the law applied by this Court in the previous appeal would not, ipso facto, divest the Court of jurisdiction where, as here the plaintiff, in good faith, claimed an amount in excess of $3,000, with legal interest and costs, even though the amount awarded was less than the required jurisdictional amount. Service Finance Corporation v. Coppard, 5 Cir., 116 F.2d 488.
The defendant next insists that the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted because there was a genuine issue as to amount of damages and that he was deprived of the right to a trial and the introduction of competent evidence as to the true value of the articles in question. He also urges that the entry of the summary judgment was erroneous because there was nothing in the affidavit of Mr. Johnson to show that he was qualified to give an opinion as to the value of the articles involved.
We cannot agree with the defendant. We think a summary judgment was proper in this instance and served the very purpose for which Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., was intended in putting an end to vexatious and interminable litigation when no- material fact was at issue. The judgment for the lesser amount, sought in the alternative, could not in any wise prove harmful or detrimental to the defendant inasmuch as the record shows that the wedges could not have cost more than the bolts, and that the bolts, according to defendant, had a unit price of 30. It was this maximum unit price of 30 for the wedges that was accepted by the Court as presented by the plaintiffs affidavit. We fail to discern any right in the defendant to receive in rescission of his contract a price greater than he would have been entitled to had he fulfilled his contract. Moreover, defendant is not advantageously situated to complain of the lower Court’s acceptance of the unit price of the wedges as set out by the plaintiff’s affidavit since he failed to file a counter affidavit or to avail himself of subsection (f) of Rule 56 intended to serve, and capable of serving, those in the position in which he deems himself. Board of Public Instruction v. Meredith, 5 Cir., 119 F.2d 712; U. S. v. Freeman, D.C. Mass., 37 F. Supp. 720; Fletcher v. Krise, 73 App.D.C. 266, 120 F.2d 809.
The plaintiff, cross-appellant, complains of the entry of the summary judgment for the alternative and lesser amount on the ground that only the negligible salvage value should have been allowed as a deduction to the defendant, but we think that in the absence of a seasonable return, or an effort to- so return, the bolts and wedges, the contention is without merit.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed both as to the appeal and the cross-appeal.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1