What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BURNDY CORPORATION, Appellant, v. F. L. CAHILL and National Connector Corporation, Appellees.
No. 16878.
United States Court ol Appeals Eighth Circuit.
April 20, 1962.
George M. Szabad, of Blum, Jolles, Haimoff, Szabad & Gersen, New York City, Charles A. Cox, of Maslon, Kaplan, Edelman, Joseph & Borman, Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief, for appellant.
Arlen C. Christenson, of Lindquist, Fraser & Magnuson, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee National Connector Corporation.
Sherman Winthrop, of Oppenheimer, Hodgson, Brown, Baer & Wolff, St. Paul, Minn., Robert B. Hawkins, St. Paul, Minn., on the brief, for appellee F. L. Cahill.
Before SANBORN and MATTHES, Circuit Judges, and GRAVEN, District Judge.
SANBORN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff, Burndy Corporation (Burndy), in an action brought against F. L. Cahill and National Connector Corporation (National) on April 3, 1961, for an injunction to compel performance of the provisions of an employment contract between Burndy and Cahill and to recover damages for its breach. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy.
Cahill is the Director of Sales and Marketing for National, having entered its employ on January 5, 1961. Prior to December 15, 1960, he had been the Sales Manager of the Toledo Facility of Burndy’s Omaton Division, under an employment contract entered into by him with Burndy in Ohio on June 10, 1959, which contract contained a restrictive covenant under which Cahill agreed not to accept employment with any competitor of Burndy for two years after termination of his employment with that company. The contract also contained provisions against the use by Cahill of confidential information, including lists of customers, knowledge of their needs, technology, etc., acquired by him from Burndy while in its employ. Cahill voluntarily terminated his employment with Burndy on December 15, 1960.
Burndy makes and sells thousands of types and sizes of electrical conductors for use in the electrical and electronics industries, including connectors for customers’ requirements. It markets its products throughout the world. National is a competitor of Burndy in the manufacture and marketing of connectors, and was or became aware of Cahill’s employment agreement with Burndy. Cahill, on behalf of National, has been dealing with customers of Burndy with whom he formerly dealt while Sales Manager for its Toledo Facility, and has been in contact with Burndy’s suppliers in attempting to obtain from them items that Burndy provides for certain of its customers.
The facts, which we have generally and briefly stated above, are taken from Burndy’s complaint, which states its claim in much greater detail. The record on appeal consists of the complaint; an amendment to it; the motion of the plaintiff for a preliminary injunction, filed April 27, 1961; the motion of the defendants, filed May 5, 1961, to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; the Memorandum and Order of the District Court, dated August 4, 1961, granting the motion to dismiss (reported in 196 F.Supp. 619); the Clerk’s notice of entry of judgment; the notice of appeal; and the docket entries of the District Court.
The District Court was convinced that the restrictive covenant of the employment contract between Burndy and Ca-hill, which contained no geographical limitation, was void on that account under applicable Ohio law. The grounds for that conclusion are fully stated in the court’s carefully considered opinion. It is the contention of Burndy that the court has misconceived the applicable law of Ohio, and that there are valid reasons to believe that the Supreme Court of that State would not now rule that a restrictive covenant such as that in suit entered into by a sales manager of a division of a corporation doing a world-wide business and his employer was void from its inception and a complete nullity.
We are of the opinion that whether the views of the District Court as to the applicable law of Ohio are or are not correct, there is sufiieient doubt about the law of that State relating to restrictive covenants to entitle Burndy to a trial on the merits of its claim and thus to enable it to make such a record in the trial court as Burndy thinks will or may entitle it to the relief for which it asks, or some part of it. In Thomason v. Hospital T. V. Rentals, Inc., 272 F.2d 263, 266, this Court said:
“The attitude of this Court toward attempts to terminate litigation, believed to be without merit, by dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement has been adequately stated in Publicity Building Realty Corp. v. Hannegan, 8 Cir., 139 F.2d 583, 586-587, and restated in Lada v. Wilkie [8 Cir., 250 F.2d 211], supra, at pages 212-213 of 250 F.2d. No matter how reasonably it may be surmised or predicted that a plaintiff will be unable to establish on a trial the claim stated in his complaint or to obtain any relief, he is, nevertheless, entitled to make the attempt unless it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to any relief. Conley v. Gibson [355 U.S. 41], supra, at pages 45-48 of 355 U.S., at pages 101-103 of 78 S.Ct. [2 L.Ed.2d 80].”
See, also, Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, 8 Cir., 151 F.2d 411.
We shall go no further than to say that we think the plaintiff is entitled to a trial.
The order appealed from is vacated and the ease is remanded with directions to reinstate the plaintiff’s complaint and try the case on the merits.
. The restrictive covenant in suit is quoted in full in the opinion of the District Court, 196 F.Supp. 619, 620, and need not be requoted by us.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1