What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
RANCOURT v. PANCO RUBBER CO.
No. 2815.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Nov. 10, 1933.
Harry Dexter Peek, of Providence, R. I:„ for appellant.
Burton W. Caxy, of Boston, Mass. (Melvin R. Jennéy and Eish, Hildreth, Cary & Jenney, all of Boston, Mass., on the brief).. for appellee.
Before WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and McLELLAN, District Judge..
WILSON, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Massachusetts District Court holding that the-plaintiff was estopped to claim infringement of a reissue patent by a prior judgment of the District Court hp-lding the original patent issued on the same invention was invalid, and' also that the reissue patent was invalid by reason of the delay in applying therefor.
The litigation between these parties over-the original patent was begun by bill in equity filed November 18, 1925, praying for an injunction restraining the defendant from making, using, or vending tap splitting machines embodying the invention of the plaintiff asset forth in its letters patent, No. 1,514,100,. issued November 4, 1924.
To the complaint the defendant answered in January, 1926, denying that it had infringed the plaintiff’s patent, and asserting that the plaintiff’s patent was invalid as involving no advance over the prior art.
It is unnecessary for the purpose of the issues before this court to describe the plaintiff’s alleged invention more fully than to say that it involves a machine for splitting the shank of a rubber or composition tap sufficiently to permit the insertion of a fabric of such toughness and consistency as to prevent the nails, essential to fasten the tap to the shoe at the shank, from pulling out through the bending of the shoe at the shank in walking.
This was accomplished in the plaintiff’s machine by means of a rotary knife, the tap being fed past the knife by pairs of rolls, one pair of which is longer than the others, and extending over the cutting knife, holds the tap firmly in place until the rotary knife enters the shank of the „tap, the other rolls extending no farther than the uncut part of the tap, but sufficiently to hold the tap in place after the knife was once inserted in the shank of the tap.
The alleged infringing machine of the defendant apparently accomplished the same result of feeding the tap past the knife by means of a belt instead of rolls.
The original bill was heard on bill, answers, and proof on November 2 and 3,1927, and the District Court found that the original patent was invalid as containing no patentable invention. Judgment was entered dismissing the bill on November 21, 1927. No appeal was taken from this judgment, but after a lapse of nearly eight months the plaintiff applied for a reissue of his patent, which was granted October 30, 1928, No. 17,122.
On February 15, 1929, the plaintiff brought the bill in equity now pending, alleging an infringement of the reissue patent No. 17,122. The cause was heard on the record in the original suit and the reissue parent, and on May 16, 1930, the District Court handed down an opinion, holding that as the reissue patent must be for the same invention as the original patent, which had already been held invalid, the issue as to the validity of the reissue patent was res judicata.
On appeal to this court the decree of the District Court was reversed on the ground that the present bill was based, in part, on new claims in the reissue patent, and the doctrine of res judicata did not apply, as the issues under the reissue patent were not the same a** under the original bill. 46 F.(2d) 625.
This court remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration on its merits to determine whether the machine described in the specifications and claims of the reissue patent was the same as the machine described in the original patent, and held that if the District Court on further consideration should find that the invention described in the reissue patent was the same as that described in the original patent, the judgment in the prior suit that the machine did not involve a patentable invention would constitute an estoppel and conclude the plaintiff as to that issue in this suit.
This cause was set down for hearing in the District Court, and an opinion was handed down on July 7,1932, dismissing the bill with costs. 5 F. Supp. 185.
The District Court found, first, that the combination of the several parts of the machine constituting the invention described in the reissue patent was the same as that described in the original patent, and held that the judgment in the prior suit, which was not appealed from, estopped the plaintiff from again raising the issue of its patentability in this suit.
The District Court also considered the case from the standpoint of whether the issues in the present suit were different from those in the prior action on the ground that the new claims added in the reissue patent were broader than those contained in the original patent, and held that they were broader — which, however, the plaintiff strenuously denies — but further held that, since the application for the reissue patent was not made for three years and eight months after the granting of the original patent, it is invalid, and dismissed the bill on both grounds.
Since the plaintiff contends that the claims in the reissue patent are no broader than those in the original patent, and that the drawings and specifications in the reissue patent describe exactly the same machine as the original patent, we think the District Court need have gone no farther than to dismiss the bill on the ground that the plaintiff! is estopped by the judgment in the former suit from prevailing in this suit. The plaintiff elected to accept the judgment of the District Court in the former suit that his machine involved no patentable invention. Clearly a reissue patent for the same machine involving the same invention cannot avail the plaintiff in a new suit.
Assuming that the new claims are broader than those in the first patent, we think the District Court committed no error in dismissing the bill on the ground that there was too long delay in applying for the reissue patent. Under the ordinary rule a reissue patent with broader claims will not be granted after two years from the date of the granting of the original patent, Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 26 L. Ed. 783; .Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354, 5 S. Ct. 174, 6 S. Ct. 451, 28 L. Ed. 665, unless a reasonable excuse can be shown for the delay. Wollensak v. Sargent, 151 U. S. 221,14 S. Ct. 291, 38 L. Ed. 137; Topliff v; Topliff et al., 145 U. S. 156, 12 S. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658; Webster Co. v. Splitdorf Co., 264 U. S. 463, 466, 469, 471, 44 S. Ct. 342, 68 L. Ed. 792. The plaintiff cites the fact, as excusing his delay, that during three years of that period he was engaged in supporting his original patent in the court and could not withdraw his original patent without abandoning his suit, and also cites in support of his contention, Gross v. Norris (D. C.) 18 F.(2d) 418, whieh was affirmed in (C. C. A.) 26 F.(2d) 898, without considering this issue. The plaintiff had previously appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals in the ease of Gross v. Frank, and after a decision in that court (293 F. 702) had proceeded within six weeks to apply for a reissue patr ent. The District Court held, in Gross v. Norris, supra (18 F.(2d) 418), that a delay of over two years was thus satisfactorily explained. In the present ease the plaintiff was advised that the patentability of his invention as described in his original patent was denied by the defendant’s answer to his prior suit in January, 1926, and he not only did not appeal from the judgment of the District Court, holding that his original patent contained no patentable invention, but slept on his rights for eight months more before making application for a reissue patent.
Assuming, as the District Court found, that claim 2 and three new claims of the reissue patent are broader than the claims of the original patent, we think the defendant may fairly claim to have acquired intervening rights as to the use of the so-called Donnelly machines, which it began to use even before the machine of the plaintiff was placed on the market, and which it has continued to use after the plaintiff’s machine was held by the District Court in the prior suit not to involve 'a patentable invention, and after the plaintiff had abandoned his rights under his original patent by failing to appeal from the decision.
It is suggested that Donnelly made his machine after seeing the plaintiff’s and copied the principles of it, and, therefore, is not in this court with clean hands; but this is only an inference from the omission of a date from Donnelly’s first drawing that some of the officials and employees went to see the Ban court machine some time in the summer of 1923. To the contrary is the direct testimony of Donnelly and the evidence of some of the officials and employees of the defendant, that the defendant for some time prior to the time when the plaintiff began working on his machine — whieh he did while in the defendant’s employ and withput advising the defendant of what he was doing — had expended considerable sums in an effort to obtain a satisfactory “tap-splitting” machine. The District Court could have as well found from the evidence that the plaintiff got his idea of his invention from discussions which he overheard while in the defendant’s employ.
In any event, the District Court in this suit held that he did not show a reasonable excuse for not applying for his reissue patent within the two year period, or promptly after his original patent was declared invalid. What was a reasonable time within which to apply for a reissue, or what constituted a rea- - sonable excuse for not applying within the two year period, was a question of fact for the sitting justice. We do not find that his finding on this point was clearly wrong.
The decree of the District Court is affirmed, with costs.
Orally.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1