What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".

Opinion:
NORTH TEXAS LUMBER CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
February 15, 1929.
No. 5318.
Joseph J. Eckford, of Dallas, Tex. (Paul T. McMahon, of Dallas, Tex., on the brief), for petitioner.
Mabel Walker Willebrandt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key and Randolph C. Shaw, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., and C. M. Charest, General Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Thos. P. Dudley, Jr., Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C. (Shelby S. Faulkner, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and FOSTER, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
In this case tbe material facts as found by tbe Board of Tax Appeals are these:
Petitioner, a Texas corporation, negotiated with tbe Southern Pine Company for the sale of certain timberlands, in 1916. On December 27, 1916, tbe price was agreed upon and tbe purchaser was satisfied as to the title. The purchaser was solvent, but required a few days to borrow some $200,000 to complete tbe purchase. An option was granted for ten days, tbe loan was arranged, and tbe purchaser telegraphed petitioner on December 30, 1916, that it would exercise tbe option and was prepared to complete the purchase. Petitioner agreed at once, but the deed was not delivered until January 5,1917.
Petitioner’s books are kept on the accrual basis. Petitioner allocated tbe profit from tbe sale to tbe year 1916 and made a supplementary return to that, effect. Tbe Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, found tbe profit to be $79,057.95, allocated it to tbe year 1917, in which year it was collected, and determined a deficiency of taxés for that year of $19,733.90. On appeal the Board approved the aetion of the Commissioner. This, we think, was error.
Profits accrue when they are fixed and an enforceable liability is created. Allen v. Armstrong, 58 App. Div. 427, 68 N. Y. S. 1079; Holmes, Federal Taxes (6th Ed.) p. 1248. Of course, delivery of the deed was necessary to vest legal title in the purchaser, but between the parties the transaction was complete and their rights vested on December 30, 1916. Petitioner could on that day have tendered tbe deed and demanded payment and, if refused, could have maintained a suit for tbe purchase price. Tbe subsequent delivery of tbe deed and collection of tbe purdíase price did not change conditions as they existed on December 30, 1916, as to the amount of profit derived from tho sale or its accrual.
Regardless of when the purchase money was paid, as petitioner kop1' books and made returns on the accrual basis, he was obliged to allocate tho profit from the transaction to tho year 1916. During that year all tho events necessary to fix the amount of tho profit had occurred. This conclusion finds support in the reasoning of the court in U. S. v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 423-441, 46 S. Ct. 131, 70 L. Ed. 347, in which it was held that taxes on munitions manufactured in 1916 for which a reserve had been set up should bo deducted as an expense of that year, although paid in 1917. The same reasoning applies to profits earned in one year though not actually received until the following year, when tho books are kept on the accrual basis. See Am. Nat. Co., Receiver, v. U. S., 274 U. S. 99, 47 S. Ct. 520, 71 L. Ed. 946.
The petition is granted, and the judgment is reversed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?

Choices:
local
neither local nor national
national or multi-national
not ascertained

Answer: 3