What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
PITTSBURGH TOWING CO. v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY BARGE LINE CO. et al.
No. 319.
Decided November 7, 1966.
Ernie Adamson for appellant.
Arthur L. Winn, Jr., Samuel H. Moerman, J. Raymond Clark and James M. Henderson for appellees.
Per Curiam.
The motion to dismiss is granted for failure of appellant to comply with the time requirement of Rule 13 (1) of the Rules of this Court in docketing its appeal. This appeal was docketed 22 days after expiration of the 60-day period provided by the Rule. During that period, appellant made no application for an enlargement of time, either to the District Court or to a Justice of this Court (see Rule 13 (1)), nor did any explanation accompany the untimely docketing of the appeal. The jurisdictional statement itself is silent on the subject. Not until appellee moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 14 (2) did appellant comment upon its default. Its reply to the Motion to Dismiss states that the “delay was occasioned by a misunderstanding between Counsel for appellant.” It does not elaborate.
This Court has been generous in excusing errors of counsel, but if there are to be rules, there must be some limit to our willingness to overlook their violation. While we are inclined to be generous in exercising our discretion to forgive a mistake and waive the consequences of negligence, fairness to other counsel and to parties with business before the Court as well as due regard for our own procedures leads us to believe that this case does not warrant our indulgence.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0