What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jorge Luis OLIVA-GAMBINI, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 89-1312.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
July 24, 1990.
Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender and Janine Yunker, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellant.
Michael J. Norton, Acting U.S. Atty., and Kathryn Meyer and David M. Gaouette, Asst. U.S. Attys., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges and COOK , District Judge.
Honorable H. Dale Cook, Chief Judge, Northern District of Oklahoma, and United States District Judge, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Jorge Oliva-Gambini pled guilty to three counts of distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (1988). In sentencing Oliva-Gambini, the district court allowed a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, but refused to give another two-point reduction for minor-participant-in-the-offense status. Oliva-Gam-bini appeals the denial of minor-participant status, and we affirm.
The parties stipulated below to the relevant facts. On February 3, 1988, Oliva-Gambini sold 32.5 grams of cocaine to an undercover agent; on February 29, 1988, he sold 28 grams to the same agent; and on July 26, 1988, he sold 33 more grams of cocaine to this agent. Surveillance conducted prior to the three sales revealed “that although Mr. Oliva-Gambini supplied the cocaine to the agent, he was not the source of the cocaine and was less culpable than other individuals involved.” Rec., vol. I, doc. 2, at 2 (emphasis added).
At Oliva-Gambini’s sentencing hearing, he argued that he should be given a two-point reduction for his minor participation in the offense. The Sentencing Guidelines provide a two-point reduction “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (hereinafter Guidelines) § 3B1.2(b) (Nov.1989). The Commentary to the Guidelines explains that “a minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” Guidelines § 3B1.2, comment (n. 3) (emphasis added). The Commentary adds that this section was designed to provide “a range of adjustments for a defendant who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant.” Id. (background).
Oliva-Gambini argues that the parties’ stipulation that “he was not the source of the cocaine and was less culpable than other individuals involved,” rec., vol. I, doc. 2, at 2, warrants the minor-participant finding. The district court did not initially address this argument, however. Instead, the court stated that “this minor role in the offense ... is not applicable to this crime.... [Wjhen it comes to the drug traffic trade, I don’t see any minor role. Even users don’t have a minor role. It takes everybody’s participation to make it happen.” Rec., vol. II, at 11.
We must “give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988). This due deference standard requires that where a mixed question of law and fact is essentially factual, judicial administration concerns will favor the district court, and so we will review the district court’s determination under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (10th Cir.1990). However, where the question requires that we consider legal concepts in the mix of fact- and law, and that we exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles, then judicial administration concerns require that we review the question de novo. See id. at 1469. The question here is whether the minor-role provision of the Sentencing Guidelines applies at all to drug offenses. This issue necessitates an analysis of legal concepts, and so we consider it de novo.
Although it is true that it takes “everybody’s participation” to make a drug deal happen, the Sentencing Guidelines clearly envision that the categories of “minimal participant” and “minor participant” will be applied to those involved in drug trafficking. The Commentary to section 3B1.2, for example, specifically refers to participants in the drug trade. The district court therefore erred when it concluded that one convicted of distribution of cocaine could not be a minor participant within the meaning of the Guidelines.
After stating its view regarding minor participants and the drug trade, however, the district court alternatively found that “hand-to-hand sales, three of them, in my judgment, the Defendant having admitted that conduct is not entitled to any reduction for a minor role in the offense.” Rec., vol. II, at 11-12. We review this determination under the clearly erroneous standard, since this question is essentially a factual one. See Roberts, 898 F.2d at 1468-69; see also United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1529 (10th Cir.1990) (“primarily factual” application of guidelines subject to clearly erroneous standard of review).
As we have held, “[t]he government shall bear the burden of proof for sentence increases and the defendant shall bear the burden of proof for sentence decreases.” United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.1990). Oliva-Gambini has presented us with no evidence to support his argument for a minor participant sentence decrease. He did not designate the Presentence Report as part of the record, and we have only the stipulated statement that he was not the source for the cocaine and was less culpable than other individuals involved. As the Government points out, Oliva-Gambini was the person who made contact with the undercover agent, accepted the money, and provided the agent with the cocaine. These facts in no way suggest that Oliva-Gambini was less culpable than most other ■participants, or that he was substantially less culpable than the average participant in the distribution of cocaine.
Because there are no facts suggesting that the district court was clearly erroneous in determining that Oliva-Gambini was not a minor participant, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
. The Application Notes state that "[i]t is intended that the downward adjustment for a minimal participant ... would be appropriate ... for someone who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marijuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” Guidelines § 3B1.2, comment, (n. 2).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0