What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ben G. MILTON, d/b/a Service Check Company, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17197.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
Decided Sept. 15, 1967.
Adrian B. Fink, Jr., Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant.
Joseph Kovner, Tax Division, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee. Mitchell Rogovin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Joseph Kovner, Lawrence B. Silver, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief. Merle M. McCurdy, U. S. Atty., Bernard J. Stuplinski, Asst. U. S. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel.
Before McCREE and COMBS, Circuit Judges, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court determining that the United States, as holder of money orders issued by appellant in the amount of $7300.00, was entitled to recover this amount from appellant. The opinion of the District Court, reported at 253 F. Supp. 89, recites the facts as stipulated by the parties and therefore we do not repeat them here.
Appellant claims that the United States failed to follow Ohio procedures in perfecting its lien on the money orders and unauthorizedly named itself payee, and therefore cannot be regarded as a holder of the instruments. Further, appellant contends that he properly stopped payment of the money orders. Finally, he contends that the return of $7300.00 to Birns constituted payment of the money orders, and therefore serves as a defense to the claim of the United States.
For the reasons stated in the District Court’s conclusions of law, we find that the United States was properly in possession of the money orders and that it had authority to name the payee. Burke v. Jenkins, 128 Ohio St. 86, 190 N.E. 238 (1934) and Hartington National Bank v. Breslin, 88 Neb. 47, 128 N.W. 659, 31 L.R.A.,N.S., 130 (1910), the two cases cited by appellant in support of the proposition that a negotiable instrument can be enforced against the maker or drawer thereof only if blanks are filled in strict accordance with the authority given, are distinguishable from the instant ease. In both those cases, the maker of the instrument had intended that a specific payee be named. In this case, appellant did not require that the name of any particular person be filled in as payee. Since the United States was in possession of the money orders and was named therein as payee, it was a holder under the Ohio law then applicable. O.R.C. § 1301.01 (T).
The District Court held that appellant had no right to stop payment on the money orders, and that his attempt to stop payment could therefore not defeat the claim of the United States. As appellant points out, it is the general rule that a cashier’s check or money order drawn by a bank upon its own funds cannot be stopped, but there is a split of authority as to whether payment on a draft drawn by one bank upon another can be stopped. 107 Á.L.R. 1463. The money orders in the instant case were drawn by appellant upon the First National Bank of Akron, and appellant argues that payment could therefore be stopped. It must be recognized, however, that the question of whether a drawer can stop a drawee from paying an instrument is distinct from the question of whether the drawer can avoid his own obligation under the instrument. See International Firearms Co., Ltd. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911, 160 N.E.2d 656 (1959); 107 A.L.R. 1463, 1467. Regardless of appellant’s power to stop the First National Bank of Akron from paying the United States, he was obligated to make such payment unless he had available a defense good against a holder. See Cross v. Exchange Bank Co., 110 Ohio App. 219, 168 N.E.2d 910 (1958); O.R.C. § 1301.64.
Appellant suggests that he does have a defense against the claim of the United States, namely that in returning $7300 to Birns he paid the money orders and thereby discharged his obligation. Birns, however, was not the holder of the money orders at the time this payment was made, and the payment of this money could therefore not discharge appellant’s obligation. O.R.C. §§ 1301.34, 1301.86.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1