What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GRISON OIL CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. ROGERS OIL & GAS CO. v. SAME.
Nos. 1632, 1633.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 11, 1938.
Chas. H. Garnett, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for petitioners.
Warren F. Wattles, Sp. Asst, to Atty. Gen. (James W. Morris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key and L. W. Post, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.
Before LEWIS, BRATTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
These petitions for review of redeterminations of the Board of Tax Appeals present the common question whether a taxpayer may deduct from gross income as ordinary business expense the amount of intangible costs under a so-called turnkey contract for a drilled and equipped oil well where such amount is segregated from the cost of the equipment and physical property of the well.
The taxpayer in the first case owned an undivided interest of 9.72 per cent, in an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma City. The owner of the remainder of the lease made a turnkey contract in 1933 under which three oil wells were drilled on the lease and fully equipped at the price of $110,-000 each. The taxpayer paid its proportionate share of the cost of such wells, based upon its interest in the lease. The percentage of the intangible drilling and development .costs assignable to the share of the taxpayer was $10,193.71. The taxpayer did not drill or participate in the drilling of any other wells during that year. It elected to treat the intangible drilling and development costs as ordinary business expense, and in its return for that year deducted the sum deemed to represent its aliquot share thereof. The taxpayer in the second case through its authorized agents entered into turnkey contracts in 1932, under which drilling contractors drilled and fully equipped for fixed prices a number of oil and gas wells on leaseholds which it owned in Texas. The portion of the contract prices in the aggregate for drilling such wells allocated by the taxpayer to intangible drilling and development costs was $38,184.32, and such sum represented a reasonable and correct allocation of such costs as distinguished from cost of equipment and other physical property. The taxpayer had ipade similar allocations of costs in previous years and claimed the amount as business expenses, but in those instances the intangible drilling and development costs were covered by separate contracts from the equipment and other physical property, the wells drilled during the taxable year in question being the first that petitioner had drilled under turnkey contracts for completed wells'. In making its return for that year, the taxpayer deducted as ordinary business expense the amount representing intangible drilling and development costs.
The Commissioner, in each instance, disallowed the deduction, treated the expenditure as a capital outlay returnable through depletion, and laid a resulting deficiency; and the Board of Tax Appeals sustained his action.
Subdivision (a) 'of section 23 of the Revenue Act of 1932 provides that all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business shall be deducted in computing net income; subdivision (k) provides that a reasonable allowance shall be made for exhaustion, and wear and tear of property used in the trade or business; subdivision (1) provides that, in the case of oil and gas wells, a reasonable allowance shall be made for depletion and for depreciation of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions; and section 24 provides that no deduction shall be allowed for any outlay for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate. 47 Stat. 173, 179, 181, 183, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 23(a, 1, m), 24 and notes. The pertinent part of Article 236, Treasury Regulations 77, reads: “All expenditures for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas, may, at the option of the taxpayer, be deducted from gross income as an expense or charged to capital account. Such expenditures have for convenience been termed intangible drilling and development costs. Examples of items to which this option applies are, all amounts paid for labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, and supplies, or any of them, which are used (A) in the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of wells; (B) in such clearing of ground, draining, roadmaking, surveying, and geological work as are necessary in preparation for the drilling of wells; and (C) in the construction of such derricks, tanks, pipe lines, and other physical structures as are necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the production of oil or gas. In general, this option applies only to expenditures for those drilling and developing items which in themselves do not have a salvage value. For the purpose of this option, labor, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., are not considered as. having a salvage value, even though used in connection with the installation of physical property which has a salvage value. Drilling and development costs shall not be excepted from the option merely because they are incurred under a contract providing for the drilling of a well to an agreed depth, or depths, at an agreed price per foot or other unit of measurement.”
The validity of the regulation is not open to question. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 10 Cir., 66 F.2d 316, certiorari denied, 290 U.S. 673, 54 S.Ct. 91, 78 L.Ed. 581. The taxpayers rely upon it and contend that the option to deduct from gross income as ordinary^ business expense the intangible drilling and developing costs of an oil or gas well should not be denied merely ■ because the well in each instance was drilled by a contractor under a turnkey contract for a completed and fully equipped well where such costs can be and are segregated from the cost of equipment and physical structures furnished under the contract. It is said that there is no basis in reason or in law for permitting a taxpayer to make the deduction where he buys all material, employs all workmen, and drills and equips a well, and denying the right to another taxpayer who accomplishes the same result through a turnkey contract. The regulation provides by clear and explicit, terms that the option shall apply to expenditures made for items which constitute intangible drilling and development costs; and that drilling and development costs shall not be excluded merely because they are incurred under a contract providing for the drilling of a well at an agreed price per foot or other unit of measurement. It does not go beyond that definite boundary. It fails to provide in express terms or by fair implication that a taxpayer who lets a turnkey contract for a completed oil well may make a deduction for that part of the contract price paid to the contractor which is attributable to items in that class. Sums which a taxpayer expends for intangible drilling and development costs come within the ambit of the option; not part of the amount paid to a contractor for a completely drilled and fully equipped well. These taxpayers did not make payments to anyone for such costs. Instead, one paid its share of the contract price for three completed wells and the other paid in full the agreed prices for several wells. They cannot trace part of the price paid to a contractor for a capital asset of that kind through his hands and deduct as their ordinary business expense any part of the amount which the contractor paid for intangible drilling and development costs. It may be inequitable and seemingly harsh to allow one taxpayer to exercise the option where he purchases the material, employs workmen, and drills and equips the well, and to deny another taxpayer the privilege where he lets a turnkey contract for a completely drilled and fully equipped well for a fixed price. But taxation is a matter of statutes and valid regulations promulgated under authority of law. Equitable considerations aré no warrant for courts to override governing statutes and regulations, to make insertions in their provisions, or to supply omissions in them.
The decisions of the Board find additional support. The regulation extending the option is not new or novel in the scheme of taxation. Corresponding regulations under corresponding provisions in earlier revenue acts have existed for many years, and the Commissioner has uniformly interpreted them as being inapplicable to a taxpayer who causes an oil or gas well to be drilled and equipped under a turnkey contract. The re-enactment of the pertinent provisions in successive revenue acts without substantial change must be treated as congressional approval of the regulation' and of the administrative interpretation placed upon it. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 289, 55 S.Ct. 158, 79 L.Ed. 367; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 55 S.Ct. 756, 79 L.Ed. 1399; Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 56 S.Ct. 289, 80 L.Ed. 263; Commissioner v. McKinney, 10 Cir., 87 F.2d 811.
In the absence of a statute or an authorized regulation providing.otherwise, an expenditure made for the drilling and equipment of a completed oil well under a turnkey contract is a capital outlay returnable through depletion. No part of it may be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
The orders are severally affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1