What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
INMATES OF the SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Thomas S. EISENSTADT, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees, Frank A. Hall, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 73-1377.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard March 6, 1974.
Decided April 8, 1974.
Terence P. O’Malley, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom Robert H. Quinn, Atty. Gen., and Walter H. Mayo, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. were on brief, for appellant.
Max D. Stern, Boston, Mass., with whom Burnham, Stern & Shapiro, Matthew Feinberg, Boston, Mass., and Stanley A. Bass, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, New York City, were on brief, for Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, appellees.
Lawrence J. Ball, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, Mass., with whom Kevin F. Mo-loney, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for Sheriff of Suffolk County, and others, appellees.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, ALD-RICH and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL,
Circuit Judge.
The Massachusetts Commissioner of Correction appeals from an order of the district court entered in aid of its judgment rendered in an action brought by inmates of Boston’s Charles Street Jail (the “Jail”). 360 F.Supp. 676 (D.Mass. 1973). The inmates had sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaining of unconstitutional conditions at the Jail, and the court, after extended proceedings, had found that the “quality of incarceration at Charles Street is ‘punishment’ of such a nature and degree that it cannot be justified by the state’s interest in holding defendants for trial; and therefore it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 360 F. Supp. at 686. Defendants in the inmates’ action were the Commissioner and officials of Suffolk County, including the sheriff, master of the Jail, and county commissioners. Though the Jail is administered by the county rather than the state, the Commissioner holds significant statutory responsibilities and powers relevant to the Jail, infra.
In the court’s judgment entered June 20, 1973, from which they took no appeal, all defendants, including the Commissioner, were enjoined from housing in any cell at the Jail after November 30, 1973, more than one inmate awaiting trial. The court remarked in its opinion that achieving single cell occupancy would likely require a reduction in the population, and that defendants should consider transferring inmates to other state and county institutions. Id. 360 F.Supp. at 690. The transfer of women inmates to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Framingham, a state facility for women controlled by the Commissioner, was mentioned as a means to free additional cells, the women’s section at Charles Street being underutilized.
By mid-November, the court had been advised by the Suffolk County officials that they could not comply with the November 30 deadline for ending multiple cell occupancy since there was no place under their control to put the surplus inmates. Appellant Commissioner, doubtless hard pressed by budgetary and other constraints, offered no cooperation; yet it had become apparent that the unconstitutional crowding at the Jail could be relieved immediately only through the use of space and facilities outside Suffolk County which the Commissioner alone had the statutory power to command.
Faced with the County’s dilemma, the district court ordered the Commissioner to cooperate with the sheriff to arrange for a transfer of female inmates from the Jail to other institutions. The situation remained static, however, and four days later the court, after calculating the maximum number that could be accommodated at the Jail under a single cell plan, and after ascertaining that there were sufficient vacancies elsewhere for the overflow, entered the order from which the Commissioner has appealed. It requires the Commissioner to transfer all women confined at the Jail to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Framingham, or to any other state or county facility for the detention of women inmates, pursuant to his statutory authority to effect statewide transfers. The order also requires male detainees with state felony records to be transferred to other state or county institutions whenever needed to ensure single cell occupancy at the Jail. In its memorandum accompanying the order, the court stated that the Commissioner was “the only person in the Commonwealth” in a position to arrange for the confinement of the women inmates elsewhere than at the Jail; and likewise that only the Commissioner had the necessary authority to transfer male detainees.
Appeal from the order was taken solely by the Commissioner. Suffolk County officials support it. We hold the order to be valid.
Appellant does not argue to us that unconstitutional conditions at the Jail could be better relieved by a different plan, or that facilities exist in Suffolk County for the surplus inmates. Indeed, he could scarcely do so, since the court entered the order only after the Commissioner and other defendants were unable to come up with any reasonable alternative. Nor does appellant claim that compliance is impossible.
Appellant’s contention is simply that the district court lacked power to order him to make transfers “without a showing of unconstitutional conduct on his part.” However, appellant underestimates his own statutory duties respecting the Jail and its inmates, as well as the district court’s equitable powers to remedy violations of the Constitution. See, e. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-burg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971).
When the inmates’ complaint was filed, the Commissioner, besides his unique state-wide transfer powers, had “general supervision of jails and houses of correction,” M.G.L. c. 124, § 1(a). This has recently been sharpened to present language directing him to “establish . . . minimum standards for the care and custody of all persons committed to county correctional facilities”, and to secure compliance with such standards. M.G.L. c. 127, § 1A. See also M.G.L. c. 127, § IB; c. 124, §§ 1(d), (q). He is also authorized to inspect county institutions, and county officials are, in turn, to report annually to him. M.G.L. c. 127, §§ IB, 10. His powers at such facilities further extend to prisoner classification, id. § 21, and the furnishing of consultation services, technical assistance, and grants-in-aid, id. § 1A. In sum, while the day-today funding and management comes from the county, the Commissioner has major statutory responsibilities bearing precisely on the issues raised in the inmates’ suit.
It is apparent why authority has been so centralized. The county jails and institutions are part of a state-wide system of detention and corrections. The Jail holds those awaiting felony.trials in a major session of the state court. Many detainees will thereafter serve their sentences in state institutions managed by the Commissioner. Inmates and their records are moved daily between state-managed and county-managed institutions. The Jail cannot be viewed in splendid isolation from the rest of the Commonwealth.
Given both the practicalities of the situation and his statutory role, the Commissioner may not disavow any responsibility for conditions at the Jail or from reasonable measures to bring them up to constitutional standards. The question is not one of his personal fault; an official may be enjoined without proof of fault. “The result, not the specific intent, is what matters.” Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972). Nor is there refuge in the distinction between malfeasance and non-feasance. See Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969). Doubtless there comes a point at which an official, having no statutory responsibility whatever over certain matters, has a right not to be forced to participate in a rescue operation; but this ease does not even approach that point.
The Commissioner’s links with county institutions in the integrated system are more than enough to support remedial relief of this nature. See Washington v. Lee, 263 F.Supp. 327, 332-333 (N.D. Ala.1966) (three-judge court), aff’d 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968). Cf. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 232-233, 84 S.Ct. 226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964); Hart v. Community School Board, 42 U.S.L.W. 2428, 2429 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1974). The district court allowed the defendants a fair chance to work out remedies among themselves; and doubtless it will continue to respect the expertise of the Commissioner and the practical difficulties he may face. But it need not perpetuate inhuman conditions out of an overly-nice solicitude for the division of powers and duties between county and state officials where together they share a joint responsibility for the proper functioning of the Jail.
The Commissioner’s legal position is additionally weakened by his failure to appeal from the judgment of the district court. There is independent merit to appellees’ argument that the Commissioner is now foreclosed from claiming that he is not a proper party to this action and that no injunction could be issued againt him. F.R.A.P. 3, 4. On appeal from a collateral order, the underlying judgment is immune from attack. 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice jf 110.14[1] (2d ed. 1973). Furthermore, prior to entry of the final judgment the Commissioner had unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on essentially the same ground advanced here; had he wished to preserve the point, he should have appealed from the judgment. But whether the appeal is narrowed, or whether it is seen as raising the broader issue asserted by the Commissioner, we find it to be without merit.
Affirmed.
. M.G.L. c. 27G, § 52A: “Persons held in jail for trial may, with the approval of the district attorney ... be removed by the commissioner of correction to a jail in another county . . . . In addition, such persons, if they have been previously incarcerated in a correctional institution of the commonwealth under sentence for a felony, may, with the approval of the district attorney, be removed by the commissioner of correction to a correctional institution of the commonwealth, . . . . ”
M.G.L. c. 127, § 97: “The commissioner may transfer any sentenced prisoner . . . with the approval of the sheriff of the county . . . from any jail or house of correction to any such [state correctional] institution ... or from any jail or house of correction to any other jail or house of correction.”
. Tlie term “county correctional facilities” covers jails as well as county houses of correction. M.G.L. c. 125, § 1(d), (f) ; c. 126, § 4.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 21