What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GREEN v. CITY OF STUART.
No. 7695.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 18, 1936.
Rehearing Denied March 6, 1936.
_ „ _ , Carro l Dunscombe, of Stuart, Fla.,, for appe an .
A. O. Kanner, of Stuart, Fla., for appellee- •
' Before FOSTER,- HUTCHESON, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
„ a1 The appellant sued the appellee, the city of Stuart, a Florida municipal corporation to recover the balance, including interest, alieged to be due on three promissory notes, for $5 00Cl each, executed by appellee on May 19, 1926, and made payable to the order of Osceola Golf Club; appellant’s amended declaration alleging “that the said notes were, indorsed in blank by the payee, Osceola Golf Club, and assigned and delivered before maturity by the said Osceola Golf Club for value received to the plaintiff.” The appellee set up as defenses: (1) That said notes were given for the balanee of the purchase price of ten acres of land which appellee agreed to buy from the Osceola Golf Club for a ball park and athletic field, and that at the time of the execution of said agreement and said notes one Stanley Kitching was serving as one ofthe dul7 elected< qualified, and acting commissioners of appellee, and at the same time was a stockholder of said Osceola Golf Club, and that therefore said attempted sale of land was wholly null and void, and that the consideration thereof has wholly failed; (2) that the action of the appellee in entering into said agreement for the purchase of land for an athletic field' and ball park was wholly illegal and void, in that said agreement was not for a mu-nicipal purpose and was wholly unauthorízed, and that appellee did not have power, under its charter or the laws of the state of Florida, to make such agreement; (3) that the description of land contained in the , j £ i ir r-i -u ¿ n deed of the Osceola Golf Club to appellee and be morgage of appellee to said Osceola Golf Club to secure the payment of the ^ , . , , ., notes sued on was meaningless and void,ir-n-p-ir and that said Osceola Golf Club never .cor-rected said deed, and never made a proper conveyance to appellee, although often re-quested to do so. By way of replication to appellees pleas, the appellant set up: That appellee’s governing body, by resolution adopted on March 9, 1929, provided for the issue, under a described act of the Legislature of Florida, of bonds of the appellee h1 the amount of $198,000, and that said bonds or the proceeds from the sale thereof shall be used exclusively for the purpose 0f refund¡ng 0f certain notes and obligations of appellee, aggregating the sum of $198,000, which are set out in a list or schedule attached to that resolution, and are ratified and declared to be valid obligations, the above-mentioned notes made by appellee to the Osceola Golf Club being included m that list or schedule; and that an thfi L islature of Florid ap_ d A a 2Ó 1929 (Sp.Acts Fla.1929, c. 14407) authorizi the issue b appellee 0f bonds in an amount not exceeding $210)000 for e of liquidating the outstand floating btedness of appellee, and validating said indebtedness, after referring to ^ description of such indebtedness con-tarmed “ above-mentioned resolution of appellee’s governing body expressly validated said indebtedness m all respects,
The appellee contended that it was without power under its charter to buy land for a ball park and athletic field, and in support of its first above mentioned defense invoked the following provision of the charter: “Officers and employees of the city may hold more than one office in the City Government but shall not be interested in the profits or emoluments of any contract, work or service for the municipality, and any such contract in which any member is, or may become interested, shall be declared void by the Commission.”
In the trial there was evidence to the following effect: When the above-mentioned resolution of appellee’s governing body of March 9, 1929, was adopted, whereby the notes sued on were ratified, Stanley Kitching was not a member of appellee’s governing body. When the Osceola Golf Club made the above-mentioned sale, possession of the land which was the subject of that sale was delivered to appellee, which retained possession of that land. The description of the land contained in Osceola Golf Club’s deed to appellee was furnished by appellee’s engineer. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, appellee moved for a directed verdict in its favor, on grounds including the following: That there was an attempt to validate or ratify a contract prohibited by law; that there was an attempt to carry out an act not authorized for a municipal purpose; that there was no proof contradicting or disproving appellee’s defense based on the indefiniteness of the conveyance of the Osceola Golf Club to appellee. In granting that motion, the court, after mentioning the fact that, when appellee paid to the Osceola Golf Club part of the purchase price of the land, Mr. Kitching was a commissioner of appellee and was also a stockholder and interested in the Osceola Golf Club, stated: “We must apply the law of Florida, which is the law governing this case in reference to the validity and indemnity of the contracts of a City, and prevent City Officials from dealing -with the City in matters in which they are interested, and I shall direct a verdict for the defendant in this case under the law.”
It appears that the action of the court in directing a verdict in favor of the appellee was the result of the conclusion that the notes sued on were void and unenforceable, because, when appellee entered into the transaction of which the giving of those notes was a part, one member of the governing body of the appellee was a member of the club which was the payee in those notes, and as such member had a financial interest in that transaction.
The failure of the court, in stating the ground of its ruling, to mention what was done to the end of validating the notes sued on, indicates that the court regarded as ineffectual the attempts of appellee’s governing body and of the Legislature of Florida to validate those notes. The part of the above set out provision of appellee’s charter to the effect that any contract of the appellee in which any member of its governing body is, or may become, interested shall be declared void by the commission does not indicate a purpose to deprive the appellee of the power, at a time when no member of its governing body is interested in a contract theretofore attempted to be made by the appellee when one member of its governing body was interested in that contract, to ratify that contract, which, when it was entered into, was void or voidable by reason of a member of appellee’s governing body being interested in it. So far as we are advised, when appellee’s governing body adopted the above resolution of March 9, 1929, ratifying the notes sued on, after Stanley Kitching had ceased to be a member of appellee’s governing body, no legal obstacle stood in the way of that action. In the absence of a statute forbidding such municipal action, it was within the power of appellee’s governing body to ratify the notes sued on in the manner adopted. Cady v. City of Watertown, 18 Wis. 322; City of Fort Wayne v. Railway Co., 132 Ind. 558, 32 N.E. 215, 18 L.R.A. 367, 32 Am.St.Rep. 277, 282 ; 3 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, § 1257. So far as we are advised, nothing stood in the way of the Legislature of Florida validating the notes sued on. Any lack of power of appellee to bind itself by those notes when they were executed was cured by the above-mentioned act of the Florida Legislature. Anderson v. Santa Anna Tp., 116 U.S. 356, 364, 6 S.Ct. 413, 29 L.Ed. 633; White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Vallette, 21 How. 414, 16 L.Ed. 154. The court erred in ruling that the notes sued on are invalid.
In the circumstances disclosed, the alleged insufficiency of the description in the Osceola Golf Club’s deed to appellee of the subject of the conveyance did not constitute a defense to appellant’s action. It appears that appellee got the land it intended to buy. A misdescription of the land in the seller’s deed entitled appellee to have that instrument so reformed as correctly to describe that land. 23 R.C.L. 335. But the insufficiency of the deed’s description of that land did not entitle appellee to keep that land and be exempt from the obligation to pay the agreed price of it.
The judgment is reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1