What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Evaristo CARRASQUILLO-RAMOS, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 92-1030.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard Nov. 2, 1992.
Decided Nov. 24, 1992.
Lydia Lizarríbar-Masini, Hato Rey, P.R., for defendant, appellant.
Antonio R. Bazán, with whom Daniel F. López-Romo, U.S. Atty., Hato Rey, P.R., was on brief, for appellee.
Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, SKINNER, District Judge.
Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises out of the district court’s refusal to adjust appellant’s sentence level downward by two points for acceptance of responsibility. Because we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of three counts of drug-related crimes. After the trial, appellant made statements of admittance during an interview with the probation officer. At his sentencing hearing, appellant also stated “I know I did wrong and besides having done it wrong, I’m very repentant, and I ask forgiveness from the court.” Appellant contends that these statements demonstrate the required acceptance of responsibility.
The district judge disagreed, and sentenced him to 48 months imprisonment on counts one and two, and 78 months imprisonment on count three, all to run concurrently. This sentence fell within the applicable guideline range for appellant’s offense level.
We note that the district court’s conclusion as to the downward adjustment is consistent with Application Note 2 of United States Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1, pertaining to acceptance of responsibility. That Note explains that “[tjhis adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.” The Note continues, stating that in “rare situations” a defendant may qualify for the adjustment while still having a trial, but only based upon “pre-trial statements and conduct.”
Appellant contends that he could not admit guilt before trial because his codefend-ants threatened him and his family. Appellant contends that this duress excuses his otherwise untimely admissions. We note, however, that the trial judge knew of appellant’s contention before he rejected the request for the downward adjustment.
We review the district court’s finding in this case with great deference because “the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Uricoechea-Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 167 (1st Cir.1991) (citing United States Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1 comment). We therefore will reverse the finding only if it amounts to clear error. United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 606 (1st Cir.1990). Given this standard, we cannot conclude that the district judge erred in denying the downward adjustment.
The district court had the opportunity to assess appellant’s demeanor and credibility, and evaluate his acceptance of responsibility, including his allegations of threats, in the context of the case as a whole. See id. Due to his assessment of these factors, the district court concluded that appellant did not accept responsibility at the hearing, but merely expressed remorse. This conclusion is bolstered by the presentence report, which expressly found that appellant was not eligible for the reduction because appellant made no pre-trial admissions.
Given the lack of any pre-trial acceptance of responsibility, and the insistence of the Sentencing Guidelines for such a timely acceptance of responsibility, we cannot say that the district judge committed clear error in refusing to apply the downward adjustment.
Affirmed.
. Counts one and two charged appellant with willfully, knowingly and intentionally using a telephone in committing and facilitating the commission of the crime of distribution of cocaine on two separate dates. Count three charged appellant with willfully, knowingly and unlawfully distributing approximately 918 grams of cocaine.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1