What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
KIELEMA v. CROSSMAN, Immigration Inspector.
No. 8963.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 21, 1939.
Arthur J. Mandell, of Houston, Tex., for appellant.
Douglas W. McGregor, U. S. Atty., and Brian S. Odem, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Houston, Tex., for appellee.
Before FOSTER, HUTCHESON, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
McCORD, Circuit Judge.
Mees Kielema, an alien, was arrested and taken into custody by the United States Immigration Inspector at Houston, Texas, on August 24, 1936. After a prolonged hearing the Assistant Secretary of Labor issued a warrant on January 14, 1938, directing the deportation of Kielema to The Netherlands. On April 11, 1938, Kielema petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The court discharged the writ on April 20, 1938, and remanded Kielema to the custody of the Immigration Inspector for deportation. From the order of dismissal Kielema has taken this appeal.
Following his arrest Kielema was advised that he was to be accorded a hearing and the warrant of arrest was read and explained to him. The warrant charged that “he has been found managing a house of prostitution, or music or dance hall or other place of amusement, habitually frequented by prostitutes, or where prostitutes gather. That he has been found receiving, sharing in, or deriving benefit from the earnings of a prostitute” in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 155.
Kielema was advised that he had the right to be represented by counsel. Thereupon, he was immediately released and his hearing set for August 25, 1936. He employed counsel and they appeared at the hearing. At the request of his newly acquired counsel the hearing was again continued. When the case was resumed on September 3, 1936, the charges were again explained to the alien in the presence of his counsel and the evidence was presented upon which the warrant of arrest was issued. This evidence consisted of the sworn statements of Grace Joliff Roberson and Thelma Parker. The Immigration Inspector produced the witnesses who had made the ex parte affidavits. These witnesses identified their respective statements and were then fully cross-examined by appellant’s counsel. Kielema was given the opportunity to produce evidence and witnesses in his own behalf which he did.
Kielema contends that he was not given a fair hearing before the immigration authorities. Fie attacks the ex parte statements of the witnesses and asserts that there was no substantial evidence to support the warrant of deportation.
In a deportation proceeding the alien must be accorded a fair hearing. To render a hearing unfair, the defect or practice complained of must have been such as might have led to a denial of justice, or there must have been absent an element deemed essential to due process. The charge of unfairness in this proceeding is without support. The alien was fully advised of the charges against him; was advised of his right to have counsel, and was given the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. He produced witnesses in his own behalf, and was given numerous continuances and delays in which to prepare his case and secure counsel. This was not denial of a fair hearing. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S.Ct. 54, 68 L.Ed. 221; Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 44 S.Ct. 260, 68 L. Ed. 590; Hays v. Zahariades, 8 Cir., 90 F. 2d 3; Chiuye Inouye v. Carr, 9 Cir., 98 F.2d 46; Murdoch v. Clark, 1 Cir., 53 F. 2d 155.
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony was for the immigration authorities. On habeas corpus, if‘the petitioner has been given a fair trial, the court will not disturb the findings of fact of the immigration authorities if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. There was substantial evidence Jo support the findings and deportation order. Lindsey v. Dobra, 5 Cir., 62 F.2d 116; Ranieri v. Smith, 7 Cir., 49 F.2d 537; Jew Hong Sing v. Tillinghast, 1 Cir., 35 F.2d. 559.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0