What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". Your task is to classify the scope of this business into one of the following categories: "local" (individual or family owned business, scope limited to single community; generally proprietors, who are not incorporated); "neither local nor national" (e.g., an electrical power company whose operations cover one-third of the state); "national or multi-national" (assume that insurance companies and railroads are national in scope); and "not ascertained".

Opinion:
NATIONAL ROOFING CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION et al., Petitioners, v. Peter J. BRENNAN, Secretary of Labor, Respondent.
No. 73-1082.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Oct. 29, 1973.
Decided April 30, 1974.
Ira J. Smotherman, Jr., McNeill Stokes, Atlanta, Ga., Michael J. Hamblet, Chicago, Ill., for petitioners.
Harlington Wood, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Eloise E. Davies, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before KILEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and PELL and SPRECHER, Circuit Judges.
KILEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
Petitioners, representatives of employers in the roofing industry, filed their petition in this court, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(f), to set aside a safety standard promulgated by respondent Secretary, acting by virtue of § 6(a) and (b) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., to protect workers on sloping roofs of buildings. We deny the petition.
OSHA is the “first comprehensive effort by the federal government to regulate safety and health conditions in the workplace.” In enacting OSHA Congress stated that the purpose is “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and ■healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
The Secretary was authorized in OSHA, § 651(b)(3), to set mandatory standards for safety and health of employees. In promulgating the standard before us he followed the statutory procedures in § 655(b). Briefly stated, those procedures are as follows: When the Secretary receives or develops information upon which he determines a standard is needed, he may request recommendations from an advisory committee appointed by him. He then submits his proposal and the information he has received or developed to the committee. Upon receiving the committee’s recommendations, he publishes the proposed standard and affords interested persons an opportunity to submit written data or comments.
Should objections be made to the proposal, and upon a request for a hearing, the Secretary is to publish in the Federal Register a notice specifying the proposal and set a time and place for a hearing. After the hearing he “shall” promulgate, or determine not to promulgate, the standard.
I.
Petitioners contend that the standard is void because the composition of the advisory committee appointed by the Secretary did not comply with the requirement of § 656(b) that the committee be representative of employers as well as employees and public representatives.
A.
Section 656(b) provides that any advisory committee appointed by the Secretary shall consist of not more than fifteen members and must include one or more designees of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW); “an equal number of persons qualified by experience and affiliation” to present the views of employers and employees; one or more representatives of state safety and health agencies; and “such other persons as the Secretary may appoint who are qualified by knowledge and experience . . . including one or more representatives of professional organizations of technicians or professionals specializing in occupational safety or health . . . ”; but the number of professionals appointed cannot exceed the number appointed as representatives of HEW and state agencies.
Petitioners argue that no roofing industry member was appointed and that general contractors on the committee do not adequately represent them.
The Secretary, before the effective date of OSHA, had exercised his authority under the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act of 1969, 40 U.S.C. § 333 et seq. (CWHSSA) by appointing a nine-man advisory committee to make recommendations for a, safety standard to protect employees working on sloping roofs. After enactment of OSHA he enlarged the committee to the new requirements of fifteen members.
It is not sufficient to charge that because a roofing subcontractor is not appointed to the committee, petitioners are ipso facto prejudiced. There is nothing to show that, although roofing contractors may be the group most affected by the standards, general contractors in conjunction with worker representatives and the other representatives are not competent to determine suitable safety standards for employees working on sloping roofs. The testimony does not show that the general contractors prejudiced petitioners’ position at the hearing. On the contrary, on this record the interests of the petitioners and the general contractors are plainly the same: general contractors must absorb the cost of safety devices required by the standard and they may be liable for subcontractor violations.
Absent a showing of “specific prejudice” suffered by petitioners, we see no substance in the contention urged by petitioners that failure to appoint a representative of the roofing industry violated § 656(b). United States v. Pierce Auto Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 527-529, 66 S.Ct. 687, 90 L.Ed. 821 (1946).
B.
Petitioners argue also that the CWHSSA and OSHA advisory committees were improperly composed. We consider this argument frivolous.
As his affidavit before us states, CWHSSA member MacCollum was not appointed as an employer representative as petitioner erroneously contends, but as a public member. And, contrary to petitioner’s claim, OSHA committee member Anania, an acting chief of the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, was a proper HEW desig-nee. Finally, there is no merit in the claim that the CWHSSA committee had an unequal number of employer and employee representatives. Petitioners’ contention that Mr. Burks was a public member is contradicted by a Department of Labor release announcing his appointment as a “management representative.”
We hold that the standard before us is not void for failure of the Secretary to meet the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 656(b) of OSHA in composing the advisory committee which recommended the standard. None of the cases referred to in petitioners’ brief aids them in their contentions.
II.
The challenged safety standard states:
A catch platform shall be installed below the working area of roofs more than 16 feet from the ground to eaves with a slope greater than 4 inches in 12 inches without a parapet. In width, the platform shall extend 2 feet beyond the protection of the eaves and shall be provided with a guardrail, midrail, and toeboard. This provision shall not apply where employees engaged in work upon such roofs are protected by a safety belt attached to a lifeline.
The “16 feet” height and “4 inches in 12 inches” slope standard departs from the standards previously promulgated by the Secretary of 20 feet for industry in general (the “national consensus”) and 10 feet for construction work, and a 3 inches in 12 inches slope requirement.
Petitioners contend that the departure is not supported by “substantial evidence in the record as a whole,” and is “capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable.”
Testimony, contentions and arguments, for petitioners at the hearing, and before us, are, first, that the 16 feet height is unnecessary — since overprotection makes workers careless, and less expensive devices are available; is without precedent; and compliance with it is too costly.
The testimony that the 20 feet height was the appropriate standard implies that protection at some height was needed. Whether that should be 20 feet or 10 feet or 16 feet was considered by the committee. The 20 feet standard was rejected for the reason that a safer standard was needed in order to protect against falls from lower roofs which resulted in more serious injuries. The Secretary recognized the factor of cost of catch platforms and left room in his promulgation for “temporary parapets,” to be built by contractors, which could qualify under the standard as alternatives to catch platforms. We think this will enable those covered by the standards and sensitive to the costs involved for catch platforms to use ingenuity in providing less costly alternatives which could qualify. Finally, the committee could well have ignored the claim that overprotection makes workers careless.
The fact that the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) adopted the “national consensus” standard of 20 feet, and that several states had adopted the same or greater height standards, is not binding on the Secretary. In fact, OSHA was enacted to supply the protection Congress deemed lacking in state regulations. He is required under § 655(a) to determine whether a standard different from the “national consensus” would result in improved safety or health.
Similarly, while a layman would see little difference, perhaps, between a 4 inches and 5 inches in 12 inches slope, it was within the Secretary’s discretion to choose the more gentle slope. As one committee member stated, “You can work on a 4 inch roof. You get up to 5 inches or 6 inches and this is real tough.”
Petitioners also argue that safety belts, which can be used in place of scaffolds, are dangerous, since ropes purporting to hold the workers safely have caused tripping of employees and more injuries than that protection prevented. The committee properly recognized the self-serving element implicit in this argument and cited the experience of iron workers who originally resisted safety belts but have come gradually to accept them as effective safety equipment.
Finally, petitioners argue that the majority of injuries to employees engaged in roofing were due not to the lack of adequate safety protection but to negligence of workers, and that catch platforms in preventing falls could cause greater injury than the falls, and that the best protection against employee injury was efficiency on the part of employers and due care on the part of employees. Apparently the committee found, as we find, this argument unpersuasive. There is no showing in the statistics to bear out the first argument with respect to the negligence of workers, no convincing testimony that catch platforms would cause greater injuries, and the statistics would seem to indicate that employers have not performed their part in providing effective equipment for their employees.
The committee knew of the 273 fatal or near-fatal falls from roofs in .one year from sloping, and even flat, roofs caused by holes therein, tripping on loose shingles, or the weather, as well as the high injury rate among roofing and sheet metal workers.
An abundant record of oral and written statements, statistics, and testimony underlies the Secretary’s standard. As previously noted, the advisory committee is made up of representatives of employers, employees, technical and professional organizations, and state agencies, and the HEW designate. Reading the transcript of the committee’s final meeting has satisfied us that the committee members understood and considered the oral and written testimony at the hearing and were well informed about the petitioners’ viewpoints and about what safety standards were reasonable. The fundamental issue for the committee was whether the 16 feet height, 4 inches in 12 inches slope, or the 20 feet height, 5 inches in 12 inches slope, was appropriate to protect employees. We conclude that there is “substantial evidence in the record as a whole” to support the standard promulgated by the Secretary, Chicago v. FPC, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 458 F.2d 731, 744-745 (1971), and that the standard is not “capricious” or “arbitrary.”
III.
Finally, petitioners contend that the challenged standard is unconstitutionally void in violation of their equal protection and due process rights and because of the standard’s vagueness. There is no merit in the contention.
Petitioners argue that the 16 feet height standard before us — with potential civil and criminal liabilities attached for its violations — applied to the construction industry is more restrictive than the 20 feet standard applied to employers outside the construction industry ; that the standard bears no rational relationship to the purpose of OSHA; and that the discrimination is so unjustifiable as to violate due process under Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954).
Under the applicable regulations, the 16 feet standard covers all “substantial” roofing work, including “work for construction, alteration and/or repairs including painting and decorating.” While we are not persuaded by the Secretary’s argument that because 1926.-451 (u) (3) covers construction work, and 1910.28(s)(3) covers maintenance work, the former is more dangerous, we agree with his argument that all persons doing the same kind of work on roofs are subjected to the 16 feet standard; that he addresses safety problems “by one step at a time”; and that his failure to apply that standard to the varying situations at this time is not a basis for a claim of invidious discrimination.
We therefore hold that the Secretary did not deny due process to the roofing industry by not applying the 16 feet standard at this time to the roofing maintenance industry. A rational “one step at a time” approach defeats a constitutional claim. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972). What the Secretary has done here is to select one phase of the construction industry for a remedial standard. He may have passed over, temporarily, another phase of the industry, but that neglect is not a denial of constitutional rights.
We need not discuss petitioners’ claim that the standard is so “vague and unintelligible” to those in the industry as to deny them due process. A reading of the testimony and oral statements in the record is sufficient to convince us that the standard is neither.
For the reasons given, the petition is denied.
. Petitioners are an association of roofing contractors and individual roofers. The roofing and sheet metal industry was selected one of five “target industries” of the Occupational Safety and Health Act because in 1969 its record was 43 disabling work accidents per one million man hours as compared to 14.8 injuries for all manufacturing enterprises.
. (f) any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this section may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promulgated file a petition challenging the validity of such standard with the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such standard. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Secretary. The filing of such petition shall not, unless otherwise ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the standard. The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.
. Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 88 Harv.L.R. 988 (1973).
. OSHA Compliance Operations Manual, Chapters VII, X (1972).
. The original advisory committee was formulated under CWHSSA. That the Secretary could temporarily make use of it for Ms OSHA responsiMlities is clear from the Senate Report: “It is the intent of the committee that the Secretary will develop health and safety standards for construction workers covered by Public Law 9-54 [CWHSSA] pursuant to the provisions of that law and that the Secretary will utilize the same mechanisms and resources for the development of health and safety standards for other construction workers newly covered by this act [OSHA].” On August 25, 1972 the nine-member CWHSSA committee was expanded to the fifteen-member OSHA committee.
. Madden v. International Organization, etc., 259 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1958); Madden v. Int. Hod Carriers, 277 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 261 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1958); Pinkett v. United States, 105 F.Supp. 67 (D.Md.1952).
. 29 C.F.R. 1926.451 (u) (3).
. Section 655(a) : “[T]he Secretary shall, as soon as practicable during the period beginning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two years after such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard any national consensus standard, . . . unless he determines that the promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees. ft
. Section 655(f), Judicial Review, provides: “The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.” See Chicago v. FPC, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 458 F.2d 731, 744-745 (1971) ; Associated Industries v. Dept. of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2nd Cir. 1973).
. Written comments were aimed at the cost of making catch platforms which would range upward of $750.00 and in some instances exceed the cost of the roofing.
. The purpose of the 16 feet level was to include two-story buildings and exclude single-story buildings. 37 Fed.Register 27599, Dec. 16, 1972.
. Including New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New Jersey.
. Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 34 La.L.R. 102 (1973).
. In early 1970, “[p]rivate industry and state regulation were not doing an adequate job of insuring health and safety in the workplace.” Gross, Occupational Safety and Health Act: Much Ado about Something, 3 Loyola Univ.L.J., 247, 249 (1972).
. 29 U.S.C. § 666.
. 29 C.F.R. 1910.28 (s) (3).
. 29 C.F.R.. 1910.12(b).

Question: This question concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "private business (including criminal enterprises)". What is the scope of this business?

Choices:
local
neither local nor national
national or multi-national
not ascertained

Answer: 3