What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America v. Michael H. HINKLE, Appellant.
No. 72-1990.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 5, 1973,.
Decided Nov. 7, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1973.
Robert L. Weinberg, Washington, D. C., and John F. Mathews, appointed by this Court, for appellant.
Lee Cross, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, and Warren L. Miller, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and LEVENTHAL and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant was indicted for second degree murder. The evidence showing that Hinkle stabbed the decedent was undisputed. Hinkle, himself, testified that he had no recollection of the events that took place on the evening in question because he was intoxicated. His defense rested on claims of self-defense, provocation, lack of malice, and a contention that the fatal wound was not the one he administered, but one that occurred during the surgery occasioned by the initial wound. The jury found him guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to five to twenty years, to run concurrently with sentences in two other cases.
On appeal, Hinkle raises several challenges to his conviction: failure to hold a coroner’s inquest into the cause of death; improper jury instructions on the definition of malice; failure to allow the jury to consider appellant’s intoxication in deciding whether he acted with sufficient “recklessness” to justify a finding of second degree murder; and failure to grant a subpoena duces tecum for production of the deceased’s juvenile records.
We do not address the issues of whether appellant’s first and last contentions constitute error, for we find that even if they were error, in the context of this case they were harmless. Although appellant was entitled to a coroner’s inquest, Crump v. Anderson, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 173, 352 F.2d 649 (1965), the likelihood that the inquest if held would have produced evidence tending to exculpate him is so remote that we see no justification for reversing, and in effect (since a coroner’s inquest is now impossible), dismissing his homicide charge. Similarly, even if Hinkle were entitled to subpoena the deceased’s juvenile records, it seems inconceivable that they would be of any assistance to him. He claims that they might show prior acts that indicate' a propensity toward violence, and thereby buttress his claim of self-defense. But appellant’s case on self-defense was virtually non-existent, and thus it does not appear that he was harmed by being denied the juvenile records.
Appellant’s claim that the trial court gave an improper jury instruction on malice is a troubling one. He requested the proper instruction as set forth in our decision in United States v. Bush, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 416 F.2d 823 (1969) . Bush prohibited use of the phrase “ ‘malice’ is a state of mind showing a heart regardless of social duty,” and in subsequent cases we have advised that the Bush instruction should be used “to avoid a claim of reversible error.” Carter v. United States, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 437 F.2d 692, 697 (1970) . In the face of these decisions, defense counsel’s request, and his subsequent objection, the court still gave the improper “social duty” instruction. The Government now admits that the court’s instruction was error, but argues it was harmless. We are concerned that the court would simply ignore the proper instruction in these circumstances, but since death was caused by a knife wound, we do not find that appellant was harmed by the erroneous instruction. We hope that in the future, trial courts do not place us in this sort of difficult situation.
We take this occasion to amplify on Bush by condemning interrelated portions of the “old” standard instruction :
“Malice” is a state of mind showing a heart regardless of social duty, a mind deliberately bent on mischief, a generally depraved, wicked and malicious spirit.
In Bush, as indicated above, we set forth the need for eliminating the phrase whereby any violation of “social duty” or “duty” might be equated to malice, even though not dangerous to life or limb. On further reflection, we conclude that similar problems of over-réach are presented by the segment that defines malice in terms of “a mind deliberately bent on mischief, a generally depraved, wicked and malicious spirit.” Juries are to determine whether specific acts have been committed with requisite culpability, not whether defendants have generally depraved, wicked and malicious spirits. A sound replacement for the original sentence would be simply this:
“Malice” is a state of mind showing a heart that is without regard for the life and safety of others.
Here again we recognize that there are eases where the old instruction could lead a jury to misconstrue its role or be otherwise prejudicial; however, the facts before us do not present such a case. Although we do not reverse Hin-kle’s conviction, we trust that our comments on the deficiency of the old “standard” instruction will be given heed.
Appellant also alleges error in the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the difference in the nature of recklessness required for second degree murder, and that required for manslaughter. Although we do not foreclose consideration of this issue in an appropriate case, the facts here do not justify serious consideration of the matter at this time.
Otherwise we find appellant’s trial without error. His conviction is therefore
Affirmed.
. The office of coronor and the statutory requirement of an inquest have been abolished in the District of Columbia.
. See Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 277 F.2d 354 (1960).
. See also United States v. Lumpkins, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 439 F.2d 494 (1970).
. See United States v. Johnson, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 433 F.2d 1160, 1164 n. 27 (1970) ; United States v. McCall, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 444, 460 F.2d 952, 958 (1972).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0