What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
INDEMNITY INS. CO. OF NORTH AMERICA v. HINKLE.
No. 10016.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
April 28, 1942.
As Amended May 27, 1942.
Richard H. Switzer and Yal Irion, both of Shreveport, La., for appellant.
Harry V. Booth, of Shreveport, La., for appellee.
Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges,
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
Appellee recovered a judgment in the court below for damages for injuries sustained when she slipped and fell as she was leaving Michael’s Cafeteria in Shreveport, Louisiana. It is contended on appeal that the trial court committed error in overruling appellant’s motion for a directed verdict, because appellee’s evidence did not make out a case for the jury, and because the evidence disclosed, as a matter of law, that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence. Appellant was the public liability insurer of the cafeteria.
There is no dispute as to the exact scene of the accident or the structure and condition of the premises at that place. As appellee stepped from the interior of the cafeteria into the foyer leading to the street, her foot slipped upon the sloping tile surface of the floor of the foyer and caused her to fall. The premises were in perfect condition and were well lighted, but it was claimed that the extreme slope of the floor, being surfaced with slippery tile and partially obscured from view by the paneling of the door entering thereon, created a hazardous condition that rendered the foyer unsafe for the use to which it was put.
We deem it unnecessary- to make an extended statement of the facts. The plaintiff’s evidence may be summarized as follows: Three building contractors, who. were qualified as experts, testified that they had examined the foyer and were of the opinion that the foyer floor was dangerous; seven witnesses, other than the plaintiff, testified that they had slipped upon the surface of the foyer while attempting to leave the cafeteria under similar conditions; and there was evidence from which the Jury reasonably might have inferred that the operator of the cafeteria, at a date prior to the accident, and upon learning of a fall sustained in • the foyer by another patron of the cafeteria, apprehended the hazardous condition in the foyer and placed a rubber mat there, which had been worn out and taken up prior to the date the appellee fell.
We think this evidence was sufficient to -justify the submission of the case to the -jury, and to. support its finding that the foyer was not a reasonably safe place for use as a walkway. Under the law of Louisiana it is the duty of a store-keeper to provide his patrons a reasonably safe place in which to transact business with him.
The pleadings charged that appellee was contributorily negligent in that she was devoting no attention to where or how she was walking, and was not maintaining a proper look-out. Ther.e is no direct evidence in the record to show that, at the time of the accident, appellee was not exercising ordinary care for her safety. This defense apparently is grounded solely upon the theory that, since appellee was familiar with the physical structure of the floor, she was charged with knowledge of the hazard it presented to any one walking over it, and was negligent in voluntarily assuming that risk or in proceeding over the tile without exercising whatever greater than ordinary degree of care was necessary to pass across the foyer safely.
It was not shown that appellee had ever before encountered difficulty in passing over the foyer floor, or that she had known or heard of any one slipping upon the tile surface. She was entitled to assume that the establishment would be maintained in a condition rendering it unnecessary that she be constantly alert for her safety. Whether the dangerous condition, found by the jury to exist by reason of the construction of the foyer floor, was or should have been known to this appellee who occasionally had walked over it, was, under the evidence, a question for determination by the jury.
The judgment is affirmed.
Farrow v. John R. Thompson Co., 18 La.App. 404, 137 So. 604; Grigsby v. Morgan & Lindsey, La.App., 148 So. 506; Ransom v. Kreeger Store, La.App., 158 So. 600; Walsh v. Whitney National Bank, La.App., 4 So.2d 553.
Ransom v. Kreeger re, La.App., 158 So. 600.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1