What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
R. OLSEN, Appellant, v. RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, INC., Appellee.
No. 6691.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 18, 1961.
Submitted on briefs without oral argument.
Before PICKETT, LEWIS and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
This is an action initiated by R. Olsen as plaintiff-owner against the defendant Railway Express Agency, Inc. for damages caused by the Express Agency to three objects of art shipped from New York City to Oklahoma City. The defendant carrier admits liability under 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11) and the sole issue at trial and upon appeal is the determination of the proper measure of damages. The trial court granted judgment for $885, a sum equivalent to the cost of repair, shipping expense to the place of repair and return, plus an allowance for depreciation. The judgment was premised upon expert testimony relative to market value, a factor which plaintiff asserts was erroneous in view of the nature of the damaged property, the circumstances of the shipment and the subjective feelings of the owner, Mr. Olsen.
Plaintiff Olsen is a resident of Oklahoma City. While in New York City in 1958, Olsen purchased a number of objects of art from a dealer for shipment to his Oklahoma home. Among such objects were a Last Supper scene, a Meissen Clock and Base and a Concerto Group for which Olsen paid the respective amounts of $3,500, $1,100 and $1,200. Each was damaged in transit, with the greatest damage occurring to the Last Supper.
The parties are not in dispute as to the nature of the property shipped or as to the extent of the physical damage suffered. The Meissen Clock and Base and the Concerto Group were but slightly damaged and the appellant owner is satisfied with the judgment allowing repair costs and depreciation for those items. The Last Supper portrayal was broken in half, and although capable of being repaired, is subjectively valueless to Mr. Olsen in less than perfect condition. He asserts the value of this item as perfect to be his purchase price, $3,500; the value as damaged to be nil; and he claims damage in the amount of $3,500 for this item.
The Last Supper piece is a porcelain work of art made by Fabris of Milan, Italy. It is admittedly an object of art having an artistic value that varies with the eye of the individual beholders. It is of contemporary manufacture and has no special value from antiquity; it is neither original nor unique art as duplicates exist and can be obtained; it is not of museum quality, a term indicating the highest of quality and value.
To determine, in the language of 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11), “the full actual loss” occasioned when properties are damaged in transit by a carrier, reference is usually made to the standard of market value of the damaged property at point of destination compared to the market value of the property in an undamaged condition. New York, Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U.S. 591, 13 S.Ct. 444, 37 L.Ed. 292; Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U.S. 97, 40 S.Ct. 504, 64 L.Ed. 801. The change in market value is not, itself, the statutory liability imposed but in most instances is the obvious and fair method of determining actual loss. The nature of the property damaged may, however, clearly indicate that change in market value does not compensate for actual loss. Such is the case when household goods, heirlooms and similar articles having a peculiar but recognized utility or intrinsic value to the owner are involved. In such ease the law will lean heavily upon the subjective value to the owner excluding any fanciful or unduly sentimental valuations. It is sometimes said that a market value, indicative of true value, does not exist for household goods and this in spite of a common market for secondhand properties of this nature.
The work Last Supper cannot with complete satisfaction be compared with either a common commodity or with goods having a recognized intrinsic value to the owner. This object of art has no market value in Oklahoma City, the point of destination for its shipment. It was purchased in New York City and can be replaced there. And while Mr. Olsen’s testimony and theory that the value of the Last Supper portrayal, undamaged, to him is reflected in his purchase price of $3,500 and that he simply does not want the object in the condition after transit, are understandable we believe the evidence negatives this standard as a determination of actual loss.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the rule is not absolute that where no market value exists at point of destination the instrinsic value to the owner is the limit of inquiry into actual loss. Reference can and usually should be made to value at the nearest advantageous market. V Williston on Contracts, § 1378, p. 3850. And in the instant case we believe that under the totality of circumstances the trial court’s award of cost of repair, transportation costs, and allowance for depreciation reflects actual loss as closely as the nature of the case allows.
Affirmed.
. “ * * * any common carrier * * * shall be liable * * * for any loss, damage, or injury to sucb property caused by it or by any common carrier * * * for tbe full actual loss, damage, or injury to sucb property caused by it or by any sucb common carrier * *
. Olsen paid $3,500, $1,100 and $1,200 for the three objects. Experts in the commerce of such works of art set the fair market value of the objects immediately before damage to be $1,475, $625 and $525. The trial court adopted the latter values in determining the amount allowed for depreciated value after repair.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0