What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
M. L. LEE & CO., Inc., v. AMERICAN CARDBOARD & PACKAGING CORPORATION, Murray Toll and Jacquelyn Toll, Martin L. Levy, Milton D. Blauner & Co., Inc., Milton D. Blauner, Charles H. Sulzberger, and Hallowell, Sulzberger, Jenks, Kirkland & Co. (Additional Defendants on Counterclaim). MILTON D. BLAUNER AND CO., Inc., v. AMERICAN CARDBOARD & PACKAGING CORPORATION, Murray Toll and Jacquelyn Toll, Martin L. Levy, M. L. Lee & Co., Inc., Milton D. Blauner, Charles H. Sulzberger, and Hallowell, Sulzberger, Jenks, Kirkland & Co. (Additional Defendants on Counterclaim). American Cardboard & Packaging Corporation, Murray Toll and Jacquelyn Toll, Defendants, and American Cardboard & Packaging Corporation, Debtor in Chapter XI Proceedings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Cause No. 29181), and Anthony J. O’Connell, Receiver of said Debtor in said Chapter XI Proceedings, Appellants in Both Cases.
Nos. 18071-2.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued March 19, 1970.
Decided April 8, 1970.
Arnold R. Ginsburg, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
Richard P. Brown, Jr., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, Pa. (J. Wesley Oler, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellees.
Before McLAUGHLIN, FREEDMAN and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
These appeals, consolidated under Rule 3(b), Fed.R.App.P., bring before us for review identical orders and judgments entered in a consolidated non-jury trial before the district court. The defendants-appellants in each case are the same. The plaintiff-appellee in each case is a securities underwriter. Each plaintiff sued on a promissory note in the amount of $18,750.00 made by American Cardboard & Packaging Corporation and its principal stockholders, Murray Toll and Jacquelyn Toll. When these suits were filed the defendants-appellants asserted in their answer that the notes were to be paid only out of the proceeds of a public offering of securities to be issued by American Cardboard & Packaging Corporation, and underwritten by plaintiffs.
The defendants-appellants also filed counterclaims, and joined as additional defendants on the counterclaims a number of officers, directors and stockholders of the plaintiff underwriters, and a third underwriter. The counterclaim alleged that by a letter agreement of September 21, 1961 the underwriters had agreed jointly to underwrite a public offering of American Cardboard common stock; that in reliance on this agreement the corporation retained counsel and accountants who prepared and filed a Registration Statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, amended its articles of incorporation, recapitalized, and made certain capital expenditures; that the underwriters distributed copies of a preliminary prospectus between January 15, 1962 and March 16, 1962; that the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a letter of comment on the preliminary prospectus on March 20, 1962; and that between March 20, 1962 and May 28, 1962, when a market break occurred in the stock market, the underwriters neglected and refused to furnish the necessary information for completion of the Registration Statement or to go forward with the underwriting. These alleged derelictions by the underwriters were claimed to have resulted in a deterioration of the corporation’s working capital position which eventually forced it to resort to the federal courts in a Chapter XI proceeding. The underwriters’ conduct was alleged to be a breach of the September 21, 1961 contract. Alternatively, the corporation asserted common law fraud and promissory estoppel as bases for liability of the underwriters, assuming there was no such contract. Finally, it was alleged that the underwriters’ conduct was a device, scheme or artifice to defraud the defendants-appellants in violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.-10b-5 (1969); and of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964).
The district court heard the testimony of seven witnesses and received in evidence numerous exhibits. It made detailed findings of fact, all of which are amply supported by the record. Most significant for this appeal are findings:
(1) as to the two notes, each in the amount of $18,750.00, that there was no agreement or understanding that these were to be paid only out of the proceeds of a public offering of the corporation’s stock;
(2) that the September 21, 1961 letter which the defendants-appellants call a contract was a letter of intent only;
(3) that counsel for the corporation explained to the corporation’s president the purpose and effect of a letter of intent and the fact that there was no assurance the contemplated issue would be completed or would be successful;
(4) that the proposed underwriters did attempt, by distributing copies of the “Red Herring” preliminary prospectus, to stimulate interest by brokers and customers in the proposed public offering;
(5) that a deterioration of activity had begun to manifest itself with respect to smaller stock issues, as early as February, 1962, that such deterioration continued, and that the May 28, 1962 market break brought about a virtual termination of new issue activity;
(6) that there was no evidence to support a finding as to the amount of damages sustained by reason of the expenditures allegedly made in reliance upon the assumption that the public issue would succeed;
(7) that there was no device, scheme or artifice to defraud, no misleading or untrue statement of fact, and no act, practice or course of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
These findings of fact may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Rule 52 (a), Fed.R.Civ.P. A review of the record convinces us that far from being clearly erroneous they are clearly correct.
In the district court, Judge John Morgan Davis denied plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings holding that the counterclaim sufficiently alleged a cause of action under Rule 10b-5. M. L. Lee Co. v. American Cardboard and Packaging Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D.Pa. 1964). That interlocutory decision is not before us and the issue which dt discusses has been eliminated by the findings of fact made at the trial by Judge Fullam. Whether or not a misstatement, or even a relied upon but unfulfilled promise made by an underwriter to a prospective issuer in connection with an abortive underwriting, gives rise to civil liability under Rule 10b-5 is an important issue more appropriately decided in a case where such a decision is compelled by the facts. See, e. g., United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 590, 77 S.Ct. 529, 1 L.Ed.2d 563 (1957); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936); Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 439 (3 Cir. 1969); National Chemsearch Corp. v. Bogatin, 349 F.2d 363 (3 Cir. 1965); Forsman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 280 F.2d 315, 319 (3 Cir. 1960).
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1