What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
SALDANA v. UNITED STATES.
No. 176.
Argued March 20, 1961.
Decided April 3, 1961.
Stephen R. Reinhardt, acting under appointment by the Court, 364 U. S. 807, and Herbert A. Bernhard, by special leave of Court, pro hac vice, argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Foley, Beatrice Rosenberg and Theodore George Gilinsky.
John T. McTernan, A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Per Curiam.
The petitioner was convicted on four counts of a five-count indictment charging offenses under the narcotics laws. 21 U. S. C. § 174. He complains of a number of alleged trial errors. In addition, he points to a series of events occurring during the course of the prosecution which, he says, operated to deprive him of constitutionally guaranteed rights. It is unnecessary to detail here the course of those proceedings, since we are advised that a change in the calendar system of the District Court for the Southern District of California insures that what occurred in this case will not occur again.
During oral argument in this Court the Solicitor General suggested that the combination of circumstances in this case, beginning with one judge’s clearly expressed intention to impose a five-year sentence, and ending with another judge’s imposition of a twenty-year sentence under the indictment, was not consistent with that regularity and fairness which should characterize the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. In the light of the Solicitor General’s suggestion, and upon an independent examination of the record, we have concluded that a due regard for the fair administration of justice requires that the convictions under counts 3, 4, and 5 of the indictment be set aside. 28 U. S. C. § 2106; see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U. S. 115, 124; Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U. S. 1, 14; Marshall v. United States, 360 U. S. 310. Cf. Petite v. United States, 361 U. S. 529. The conviction under count 2, to which the petitioner originally pleaded guilty, is affirmed.
Because of this disposition of the case, we do not reach for consideration the alleged trial errors with respect to •limitation of cross-examination, sufficiency of the evidence of a “sale” under count 5, and instructions to the jury as to entrapment.
So ordered.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2