What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BROWN v. NORFOLK & W. RY. CO.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
June 3, 1927.
No. 2537.
1. Master and servant @=>137(4) — Railroad held not liable for death of employee, carrying commercial coal taken from car in railroad yard in violation of instructions.
Where mason’s helper of railroad bridge repair crew, who was also “kitchen flunkey” on camp train, while camp train temporarily stopped in railroad yard on its way to take crew to repair a bridge, and while he was carrying commercial coal taken from ears in yard, which coal employees were forbidden to use, was killed by a passenger train naming 35 miles an hour, held, that railroad was not liable for negligence, in view of evidence that station signal was sounded by locomotive, and that as soon as engineer discovered decedent’s perilous position he applied his brakes and did everything in his power to avoid injuring him.
2. Appeal and error @=>714(2) — Appellate court cannot consider as part of record matters considered in other cases not before it.
Appellate court cannot consider as part of record matters considered in other cases not before it.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke; Henry Clay McDowell, Judge.
Aetion by W. L. Brown, as administrator of the estate of W. E. Brown, deceased, against the Norfolk & Western Railway Company. Judgment for defendant (12 E. [2d] 319), and plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
William H. Werth, of Tazewell, Va., for plaintiff in error.
S. K. Eunkhouser, of Roanoke, Va., and Joseph M. Sanders, of Bluefield, W. Va. (E. M. Rivinus, of Philadelphia, Pa., Eunkhouser & Apperson, of Roanoke, Va., and Sanders, Crockett, Fox & Sanders, of Bluefield, W. Va., on tho brief), for defendant in error.
Before ROSE and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and MeCLINTIC, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff’s intestate, W. E. Brown, was employed by defendant as a member of a mason’s crew, and at the time of his death was being transported, with other members of the crew, on a “camp train,” to repair a bridge used in interstate commerce. He had been assigned to the position of “kitchen flunkey” on tho camp train, and as such he had, in addition to his duties as mason’s helper, the duty of keeping the kitchen and dining ear supplied with water and coal. The train made a temporary stop at tho Plat Top railway yard to enable the shifting engine which was pulling it to do certain shifting in the yard. During this stop the crew had no duties to perform, but were directed to remain in the cars, as the train was liable to he moved towards its destination at any moment. While the train was standing in the Elat Top yards, decedent took a sack and crossed the main line railway tracks to a third track, upon which stood some cars loaded with commercial coal, which the employees of defendant had been forbidden to use. He climbed upon one of the ears, placed a bushel or more of coal in the bag, and throw it to the ground. He then climbed down from the car, picked up the bag of coal, and started acróss the track, when a bystander halloed to Mm that a train was approaching. Before he could get out of the way he was struck and killed by tho train, which was a regular passenger train running at the rate of 35 miles an hour.
At the conclusion of the evidence the District Judge directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the evidence did not disclose that the defendant was guilty of any negligence. Without adopting all of the reasomng of the Distriet Judge, we think that this conclusion was correct. The evidence conclusively establishes that the station signal was sounded by the whistle of the locomotive, and that, as soon as the engineer discovered decedent in a perilous position, he applied his brakes and did everything in his power to avoid injuring him. We do not think that there is any evidence that the train was running at an excessive rate of speed. Plaintiff introduced a rule of defendant providing that, when within yard limits, trains must run with great care and under the control of the engineman. But the uncontradicted evidence established that this rule had no application to passenger trains, and had never been applied to them.
In this court plaintiff cited eases in which the company had relied upon the rule in question as applicable to passenger trains; but there was nothing of the sort in the record in this case, and we cannot consider as a part of the record what may or may not have been shown or done in a ease not before us. We have carefully examined the record, and we fail to find any substantial evidence which would justify the conclusion that, in the operation of the train which struck and killed decedent, defendant failed to give proper signals or was guilty of other negligence. t
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
The late Circuit Judge BOSE, who sat in the hearing of this case, concurred in the decision that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed, but died before this opinion was prepared.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1