What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NG HEU YIM v. BONHAM, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization.
No. 7944.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Oct. 28, 1935.
Fred H. Lysons, of Seattle, Wash., for appellant.
J. Charles Dennis, U. S. Atty., and F. A. Pellegrini, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Seattle, Wash., for appellee.
Before WILBUR, GARRECHT, and MATHEWS, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing denied Dec. 20, 1935.
MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, a Chinese person, sought admission to the United States, claiming to be a native-born citizen thereof who, as a child, had gone to China, and was entitled to re-enter. A Special Board of Inquiry, appointed under section 17 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 887, 8 USCA § 153, determined, after hearing, that appellant should not be admitted. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor upheld this determination. Appellant then petitioned the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, and, from an order denying his petition, has appealed to this court.
The Secretary’s decision denying appellant admission to the United States is final and conclusive upon the courts, unless it be shown that the proceedings were manifestly unfair or conducted in an unlawful or improper ■ way, or that there was a manifest abuse of discretion. Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352, 358, 47 S. Ct. 346, 71 L. Ed. 680; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 457, 40 S. Ct. 566, 64 L. Ed. 1010; Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 468, 32 S. Ct. 734, 56 L. Ed. 1165; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 675, 32 S. Ct. 359, 56 L. Ed. 606; Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 11, 28 S. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 261, 25 S. Ct. 644, 49 L. Ed. 1040.
Appellant charges that the Board of Special Inquiry and the Secretary of Labor acted unfairly, arbitrarily, and capriciously in rejecting and dismissing from consideration evidence which, appellant says, established his birth in the United States, and which, he says, was “uncontroverted and free from material discrepancy.” This charge is not supported by the record. Appellant produced no birth certificate or other documentary proof that he was born in the United States. He testified before the Board on August 13, 1934, that he was born at Ogden, Utah, on February 2, 1903, and that when he was nine or ten years old he, with his father, mother, two brothers, and a sister, went to China, all of them traveling on the same ship and sleeping in the same room during the voyage. On March 2, 1935, at a further hearing before the Board, appellant testified that, in going to China, he and other members of his family did not travel together or on the same ship, but that he and one brother went on one ship from San Francisco to China, that the other members of his family went first to Mexico, and thence, on another ship, to China, and that his previous testimony on this subject was false. In view of this admitted falsity, the Board and the Secretary were warranted in rejecting the whole of appellant’s testimony. Ngai Kwan Ying v. Nagle (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 166; Yee Sing Jong v. Nagle (C. C. A.) 40 F. (2d) 907; Chin Lim v. Nagle (C. C. A.) 38 F.(2d) 474; Moy Chee Chong v. Weedin (C. C. A.) 28 F.(2d) 263; Weedin v. Ng Bin Fong (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 821.
John Walker, a white witness of good character and unquestioned veracity, testified that between 1900 and 1912 he was well acquainted with Ng Ah Lim, the alleged father of appellant; that Ng Ah Lim and his wife then lived at Ogden, Utah, and had several children, one of whom was a boy known to the witness as Ng Heu Yim; that the witness first saw this boy when he (the boy) was two or three months old; that he was “more or less familiar” with him thereafter until the family left Ogden in 1912 or 1913, the boy being then about nine or ten years old; that the witness did not see the boy again until 1933, at which time he went to the Immigration Office at Seattle for the purpose of identifying, and did then and there identify, appellant as the boy whom he had last seen at Ogden more than twenty years before. The witness stated that he was able to make this identification because of the “very striking resemblance” between appellant and his alleged father; that appellant “looks exactly like I expected him to look. He is just like his father was when I first saw his father, except that he is a little thinner. He looks like he looked when he was a little boy.” Asked if he could positively identify appellant, the witness stated: “He looks like Heu Yim to me. I could be fooled, but I do not think so.”
This is far from constituting “uncontroverted evidence” that appellant was born in the United States. All it amounts to is that the witness Walker believed that appellant and the Chinese boy whom he had known twenty years previously were one and the same person. The Board of Special Inquiry, who saw and observed appellant, did not accept or share this belief. It cannot be said that, in rejecting it, the Board abused its discretion or acted unfairly or improperly. Tang Tun v. Edsell, supra, 223 U. S. 673, page 681, 32 S. Ct. 359, 56 L. Ed. 606; Hung You Hong v. United States (C. C. A.) 68 F.(2d) 67; Au Wee Sheung v. United States (C. C. A.) 44 F.(2d) 681.
No other witness testified that appellant was born in the United States. There is, therefore, no basis for the claim that the Board or the Secretary unfairly, arbitrarily, or capriciously rejected “uncoutroverted” evidence to that effect.
Appellant complains of the Board’s action in rejecting a statement by the Honorable L. B. Schwelienbach, United States Senator from the state of Washington, to the effect that appellant was “the most distinctive looking Chinese” he had ever seen. In his brief appellant refers to Senator Schwelienbach as a “witness” and to his statement as “testimony.” As a matter of fact, the Senator was not a witness and gave no testimony in the case. The statement referred to was contained in a letter to the Commissioner of Immigration. Though not sworn to, it appears to have been given respectful consideration. The Board concluded, however, and we think was justified in concluding, that the Senator’s statement had no materiality “with respect to the identity or admissibility of the applicant.” Appellant’s contention that, in so holding, the Board showed prejudice or unfairness cannot be sustained.
Order affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0