What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case. If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Peter THOMAS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant, Appellee.
No. 90-1490.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard Oct. 3, 1990.
Decided Oct. 19, 1990.
Anthony M. Fredella with whom Fredella & Wheeler was on brief for plaintiff, appellant.
Bruce S. Harrison with whom Mark J. Swerdlin, Shawe & Rosenthal, Leonard M. Singer and Csaplar & Bok were on brief for defendant, appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, TIMBERS, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.
Of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant Peter Thomas attempts to appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, granting defendant-appellee Morton International, Inc.’s motion to dismiss. Not having timely filed a notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements of Fed.R.App.P. 4(a), Thomas now argues that his timely motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal, which he filed in the district court, should be regarded by us as the informal and functional equivalent of a notice of appeal.
We are unable to accept appellant’s contention. We start with the premise — not seriously contested by appellant — that the filing of a timely notice of appeal is an essential prerequisite to our appellate jurisdiction. E.g., United States v. Gibson, 568 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.1978). We recognize, as Fed.R.App.P. 3(c) provides, that an appeal “shall not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal.” The history behind this proviso indicates that courts have, at times, interpreted the formal requirements of a notice to appeal liberally, especially in cases of uncounseled persons like pro se prisoners, where letters evidencing a desire to appeal have been accepted as timely, informal notices of appeal. See, e.g., Bach v. Coughlin, 508 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.1974). Appellant here, however, was and is represented by counsel, and his motion for extension of time in no way purported to place the court and opposing party on notice that he was at that time appealing, and that the motion was meant functionally to be the requisite notice of appeal. Rather the motion was a request to the court for additional time within which to file the required notice. To treat such a request for extra time as the notice itself would be to render the notice requirement meaningless. Thomas’ attorney clearly recognized the difference between the two documents when, out of time, he later filed a notice of appeal. His earlier motion to extend time was something altogether different. As no timely notice was filed, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.
We direct the Clerk to send a copy of this opinion to appellant personally as well as to his counsel.
Appeal dismissed. Costs to appellee.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1