What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CLAWSON v. UNITED STATES.
No. 13105.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Aug. 28, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 5, 1952.
Strong & Schwartz, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant.
Walter S. Binns, U. S. Atty. Ray H. Kinnison, Bernard B. Laven, Assts., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before MATHEWS, BONE and ORR, 'Circuit Judges.
BONE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was charged in an information with failure to file an individual income tax return.for the taxable year of 1946 in violation of 26 U.S.C.A. § 145(a). Pertinent portions of that section are set out in the margin. A jury found appellant guilty as charged.
The pertinent facts, briefly stated, are these: In November 1943 appellant purchased a restaurant for $11,000, paying $5300 down, and agreeing to pay the balance in stated monthly installments. He •concealed his ownership of the restaurant (and the liquor license appurtenant thereto) by putting them in the name of his ■stepfather, Waldemar Johanson.
In February 1944, appellant organized “Clawson Enterprises, Inc.,” which issued 120 shares of corporate stock. In applying to the Commissioner of Corporations for California, one Charles E. Hicks, represented himself as owner of the restaurant equipment which was being transferred to the corporation for 117 shares of the stock. The 117 shares were put in Hicks’ name because, according to appellant, he did not want to have an attachment against him. It is not disputed that Hicks made no claim that he was the owner of the stock; he merely held same in his name for appellant. All of the restaurant equipment was, at the time of incorporation, owned by appellant under the purchase of November 1943.
The supervisory structure of the corporation (Clawson Enterprises, Inc.) was set up as follows: Appellant, Raymond W. Clawson, President and Director; Kathleen Clawson, Vice President and Director; Charles E. Hicks, Secretary and Treasurer; Waldemar Johanson, Director. Although one share each of stock was issued to and in the name of appellant, Waldemar Johanson, and Kathleen Clawson, delivery thereof was never made and the stock remained in the stock book.
Appellant sold all of the corporate assets in March 1946 for $40,000. The corporation thereupon ceased to do business and no Board of Directors meetings were held thereafter. However, subsequent to that date and during 1946, appellant used portions of the $40,000 (by drawing checks on the corporate bank account) to pay his rent, life insurance, to purchase clothing, etc. From May to December 1946, the amount of $11,212.05 was thus withdrawn by appellant.
Other sums from the $40,000 proceeds of the sale of corporate assets were spent as follows by appellant:
$9,500.00 — purchase of yacht, “Arte-mus” in March 1946.
8,782.60 — improvement on the “Arte-mus”.
12,000.00 — paid to appellant’s ex-wife (Phyliss Clawson) to purchase a house and furniture.
The yacht (Artemus) was purchased in the name of appellant’s wife. Appellant sold the Artemus in September 1946 for the sum of $57,750, directing the purchaser to make the check therefor payable to him (appellant), explaining that the yacht was in his wife’s name for business reasons, but that he (appellant) was the actual owner.
The $57,750 received from the sale of the yacht Artemus was used by appellant, in part, as follows:
$16,750 — purchase of the yacht “Conqueror”, November 1946.
8.000— repayment of personal loans to Sunset & Vine Loan Co.
11,000 — repayment personal indebtedness to Auto Finance Co.
8.000— repayment of personal loans to Markwell & Co.
The foregoing synopsis of the facts is not intended to portray the entire background of this prosecution. Rather it constitutes merely an authoritative resume, in capsule form, of the transactions upon which appellant was convicted.
As we view the matter, the sole question is whether appellant had a gross income of $500 or more for the taxable year 1946. That sums far in excess of the statutory minimum were received by appellant during that year is not disputed. Appellant’s principal contention, however, is “ * * * that any income received by a corporation in which appellant had an interest or which he controlled, did not constitute income to appellant personally so as to make it obligatory upon appellant to file an individual income tax return.” (Emphasis ours) Simply phrased, appellant says that any money received by him was either (a) income to the corporation, rather than to himself, individually, or (b) repayment of loans made by him, or (c) funds to be used by appellant on behalf of the corporation or (d) loans to the appellant by the corporation or by other persons, or (e) funds received by appellant improperly, which were, in fact, the property of the corporation.
It is, of course, true as appellant points out that only true income can be considered in determining whether appellant was obliged to file an individual tax return, and that the prosecution has the burden of establishing any money received as being true income. This proposition of law is too familiar to make comment necessary.
That the prosecution successfully carried this burden is made evident 'by the verdict of the jury, rendered under proper instructions. Appellant contends that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain that verdict. But our examination of the evidence reveals that it would be difficult to find a record which furnishes more solid support for the verdict rendered.
The evidence compels the conclusion that the corporation, created by appellant, was a mere dummy. The fact, and not the form, is decisive. Appellant himself was the real owner of all of its capital stock. He completely controlled the corporation. He commanded the income. The facts before us are reminiscent of, but even stronger than, Currier v. United States, 1 Cir., 1948, 166 F.2d 346, where that court correctly recognized the enterprise as “ * * * an essentially individual ownership business * * * being run in a corporate form.” From these facts, the jury could properly have found that appellant received constructive dividends which he was under no obligation to repay. Facts adduced to support this theory were alone sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
But the prosecution’s case did not end there. The government introduced other evidence, independent of that previously adverted to, upon which the jury might well have found appellant guilty. This evidence revealed that appellant derived a profit of $20,377.35 from the purchase and sale of the yacht Artemus, both of which events occurred in 1946. The jury was told by the purchaser of the Artemus that appellant directed him to make out the check, in payment therefor, to him (appellant), stating that he was the actual owner, even though the yacht appeared in his wife’s name. The jury was free to believe this testimony. It clearly indicated the receipt of sufficient gross income to necessitate the filing of an individual income tax return for the year 1946.
We have examined the other errors specified by appellant. All of them are without merit. There is no insufficiency in the showing of guilt. The judgment is accordingly affirmed.
. “Failure to file returns * * *. Any person required under this chapter * * *, or required by law or regulations made under authority thereof to make a return * * * who willfully fails to * * * make such return * * * at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, of imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, * *
. Appellant testified that he did so because he (appellant) had been previously convicted of a felony.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1