What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MUTUAL BENEFIT HEALTH & ACCIDENT ASS’N v. McCRANIE.
No. 12637.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 30, 1949.
W. Colquitt 'Carter, Atlanta, Ga., Larry E. Pedrick, Waycross, Ga., for appellant.
Benjamin Smith, Jr., Waycross, Ga., for appellee.
Before HOLMES, WALLER, and SIBLEY, Circuit Judges.
WALLER, Circuit Judge.
In application for two insurance policies, one for $1,000.00 and one for $2,500.00, dated May 7 and May 10, 1947, the applicant, by his answers to Questions 13-17, stated that he was sound physically and mentally, that he had never had any disease of the brain or nervous system, had not received any medical or surgical treatment or had any local or constitutional disease within the past five years, had never been operated on by a physician or surgeon, and that he understood and agreed that no insurance would be effected until the policy was accepted by him while in good health and free from injury. (R. 13, 14.) Relying upon the applications the policies were issued.
Within less than sixty days after these policies were issued the insured was killed in an automobile accident, and upon investigation the Company found that the insured had within two months prior to his application been medically discharged from the United States Army with a disability rating of 100%. The Army Medical Department recommended such discharge on the following diagnosis: “Concussion, cerebral, mild, accidentally incurred when patient fell out of a swing at a carnival, Badtoelz, Germany, 25 July 1946.” It appears from the official files of the Veterans Administration that within twelve months prior to the application the insured had fallen from a swing at a carnival in Germany and received an injury which was subsequently diagnosed as cerebral concussion. Shortly after this diagnosis he was returned to duty. Approximately a month later he was hospitalized because of severe headaches, weakness in his right extremities, and faintness. For diagnostic purposes exploratory holes were “burred” in his head in two places while he was under G. O. E. anesthesia. He was soon released from the hospital but his infirmities continued and shortly thereafter he was medically discharged.
Armed with these facts the Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment as to its liability under the two policies. The Company moved for a directed verdict. This motion was overruled and the cause was submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict for the maximum liability under the policies. The Plaintiff’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was denied.
The law of Georgia is clear on the question of the effect of misrepresentations on insurance policies. The Code of Georgia provides:
“56-820. (2479) Application, good faith in making. — Every application for insurance shall be made in the utmost good faith, and the representations contained in such application shall be considered as covenanted to be true 'by the applicant. Any variation by which the nature, extent, or character of the risk is changed shall void the policy.”
“56-821. (2480) Misrepresentation, effect of. — Any verbal or written representations of facts by the insured to induce the acceptance of the risk, if material, must be true, or the policy shall be void. If, however, the party shall have no knowledge, but shall state on the representation of others, bona fide, and shall so inform the insurer, the falsity of the information shall not void the policy.”
The appellate courts of Georgia have held in an unbroken line that a material misrepresentation as to a known fact will avoid a policy if such misrepresentation changes the character or extent or nature of the risk. See: Sovereign Camp of W. O. W. v. Reid, 53 Ga.App. 618, 186 S.E. 759; Gabriles et al. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 70 Ga.App. 6, 27 S.E.2d 111; Preston v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 196 Ga. 217, 26 S.E.2d 439, 450, 148 A.L.R. 897. In the last cited case the Supreme Court of Georgia, speaking through Justice Bell, states: “The rule is contained in the Code, and as we have seen, may be stated in four simple words, substantial increase in risk, but its application will of course depend upon the facts of each particular case, which will necessarily vary and cannot be anticipated further than has been done in such statute.” (Emphasis added.) The Court in that case used the word “substantial” for the first time and the Appellant contends that it establishes a new method of ascertaining the materiality of misrepresentations in Georgia. It seems always to have been the law that slight or unimportant misrepresentations will not avoid the policy. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Busby, 42 Ga.App. 808, 157 S.E. 354.
The courts of Georgia have held that misstatements may be material to risk although insured did not die of the disease with reference to which it is contended false answers were made. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Fendley, 55 Ga.App. 618, 190 S.E. 806. It has been the law, and it seems now to be, that where uncontroverted facts show misstatements or materially fraudulent concealment in answer to questions in application for life insurance, verdict in favor of insurer must be rendered. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Strother, 53 Ga.App. 241, 185 S.E. 373; Rhodes v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 172 F.2d 183.
The answers quoted were clearly false, and without doubt were material and substantially increased the risk. The defendant was entitled to its requested verdict.
Reversed and remanded.
. The following questions and answers are taken from the application for insurance:
“13. Are you sound physically and mentally? Answer * * * Yes.
“14. Have you ever had any of the following diseases? * * * any disease of the brain * * * Name disease, dates, and length of disability. No.
“15. Have you received medical or surgical treatment or had any local or constitutional disease not mentioned above, within the last five years? Answer as to each. No.
“16. Have you ever been operated on by a physician or surgeon? No. * * *
“17. Do you understand and agree that no insurance will be effected until the policy is accepted by you while in good health and free from injury? Yes.”
. Prior to discharge this injury was diagnosed as “concussion, cerebral, severe”.
. The sections above quoted relate to fire insurance but in the following chapter of the Code, relating to life insurance, Section 56-911 states: “The principles before stated as to fire insurance, wherever applicable, shall be equally the law of life insurance.”
. “A ‘material representation’ is one that would influence a prudent insurer in determining whether or not to accept the risk, or in fixing the amount of the premium in the event of such acceptance.” Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Pate, 23 Ga.App. 232, 97 S.E. 874.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1