What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. DISTRICT COURT FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
Docket No. 19396.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Dec. 1, 1948.
Leonard J. Emmerglick of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
William Watson Smith, of Pittsburgh, Pa., opposed.
Before L. HAND, Chief Judge, and SWAN and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
We dismissed the plaintiff’s petition on October 28, 1947, because we thought that it was properly a part of a second possible appeal in the action, over which we should have no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed our order, holding that, regardless of whether it would have jurisdiction over a second appeal — a question as to which it reserved judgment— the petition raised only the question whether the district court had acted in accordance with our mandate; and that this was not so inextricably enmeshed in a second appeal that we should not decide it, even though we shall not have jurisdiction over a second appeal itself. It remitted the case without any expression of opinion, for us to decide the petition on the merits.
The prayer for relief is twofold: (1) That we direct the district court to strike out from Article XII of the judgment a clause, which gives leave to “Alcoa” to apply to the district court “for a determination of the question whether it still has a monopoly of the aluminum ingot market in the United States”; and (2) that we direct the court to dismiss “Alcoa’s” petition, filed in accordance with the leave so granted. The purport of the article as a whole may be compressed as follows: after the Surplus Property Administrator shall have propounded an overall plan for the disposal of government owned aluminum plants, the Attorney General may ask the district court (1) to dissolve “Alcoa” in whole or in part; (2) to enforce the plan, “if the same shall establish competitive conditions” in the industry; (3) for such other relief as will “establish” such conditions, if the plan does not; and, on its part “Alcoa” may ask the court to decide “whether it still has a monopoly of the aluminum ingot market.” The plaintiff’s position, as we understand it, is that the clause which gives leave to “Alcoa” to ask the court to decide whether it still has a monopoly, is equivalent to making that issue determine the question of dissolution. We do not so interpret it; it must be read in harmony with the leave given to the Attorney General which we have just quoted, and, when it is so read, the article as a whole conforms 'with our mandate, in which we tried to make it plain that the final judgment must secure the establishment of those “competitive conditions” which the Anti-Trust Acts, 15 U.S. C.A. § 1 et seq., demand. Dissolution is one remedy which may be necessary to that end; and in any event it will not depend upon the single issue whether “Alcoa” at thé time of the judgment shall have a monopoly of the ingot market. On the contrary, it will depend upon what is “Alcoa’s” position in the industry at that time: i. e., whether it must be divided into competing units in order to conform with the law. The continuance of the monopoly in ingot aluminum may in the court’s judgment be enough to justify dissolution; but its absence will forbid neither dissolution, nor any other remedy. We, therefore, deny the prayer for the deletion of the challenged clause in Article XII.
We also deny the prayer to direct a dismissal of “Alcoa’s” petition. The plaintiff apparently wishes the initiative to rest in its hands alone; but we know of no principle, either at law or in equity, that a defendant may not bring on an action or any proceeding in an action, for determination, when the plaintiff unreasonably delays doing so. If it be the plaintiff’s understanding that it stands in this respect upon a footing different from that of a private suitor, we cannot agree. Only by virtue of the challenged passage in Article XII does “Alcoa” retain any power to stir the plaintiff to action; and it was within its rights to avail itself of that power as it did. Now that the Attorney General has also made use of the leave given him to move under Article XII, there is no reason why the court should not proceed to decide the two petitions together.
The petition is denied.
United States v. Caffey, 2 Cir., 164 F.2d 159.
334 U.S. 258, 68 S.Ct 1035.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1