What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. ONE MACK AUTO TRUCK.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
January 5, 1925.)
No. 122.
Customs duties <&=»I30 — Forfeiture provisions of customs laws not applicable to liquor imported in violation of Prohibition Act, prior to Supplemental Act.
Rev. St. § 3062 (Comp. St. § 5764), authorizing forfeiture of vehicles carrying merchandise unlawfully imported, has no application to importation of intoxicating liquors, in violation of National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 1013814 et seq.), prior to enactment of Supplemental Act Nov. 28, 1921.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York; Julian W. Mack,.Judge.
Libel by the United States against one Mack auto truck; David Oshinsky, claimant. To review a judgment dismissing the libel, the United States brings error.
Affirmed.
William Hayward, U. S. Atty., of New York City (Francis A. McGurk, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for the United States.
Kevie Frankel, of: New York City (Jerome C. Jackson, of New York City,* of counsel), for defendant in error.
Before HOUGH and MANTON, Circuit Judges, and LEARNED HAND, District Judge.
LEARNED HAND, District Judge.
The libel set up three counts against the claimant’s motor truek, which had been arrested while carrying two barrels and a crate of whisky, illegally imported into the United States. All were laid under section 3062 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 5764), which condemns a vehicle that carries merchandise so imported. The first count was because the whisky had not been manifested on the vessel which imported it (Rev. St. § 2809 [Comp. St. § 5506]); the second, because it was imported in violation of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138(4 et seq.); the third, because it had been unladen without a permit (Rev. St. § 2872 [Comp. St. § 5563]).
On the trial it appeared that the claimant, who was a licensed truckman in New York City, hired one Croce as the driver of his truck. On April 26,1921, as Croce, with a load of imported potatoes and onions for one Opalinsky, was leaving the wharf, certain persons asked leave of him to put upon the truck the whisky in question to he delivered at a saloon. He consented, the whisky was put on, and shortly afterwards he and the truck were arrested.
The trial was conducted on the theory that Rev. St. § 3062, applied to this situation. The District Judge charged the jury that the claimant was in fact a common carrier, and that as such, under Rev. St. § 3063 (Comp). St. § 5765), the truek was not forfeit unless Croce was privy to the illegal importation. He further charged that the plaintiff had the burden of proving Croce’s complicity. On this charge the claimant had a verdict.
The plaintiff objects that the jury should have decided whether the claimant was a common carrier, and that, once the United States showed reasonable cause for the arrest, the burden of proof shifted to the claimant. The evidence on the issue of common carriage was that the claimant had his offiee in Opalinsky’s shop, for whom he did most of his trucking; on the other hand, that he did it only at the same standard rates which he charged such other customers as he had and that there were a few of these. These facts were proved by the claimant himself, his son, and Opalin sky’s manager.
My brothers think that the case was properly tried on the theory at that time adopted, and would be contented to affirm it, without more; but we all agree that at the time in question Rev. St. § 3062, was not in force. This we think follows from United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U. S. 450, 41 S. Ct. 551, 65 L. Ed. 1043, although the sections there involved were quite different from that at bar. We are, indeed, quite willing to rest our decision upon United States v. Federal Insurance Co., 284 F. 821 (C. C. A. 6), Lewis v. U. S. 280 F. 5 (C. C. A. 6), and McDowell v. U. S., 286 F. 521 (C. C. A. 9). The last two cases, it is true, involved Rev. St. § 3450, which is the corresponding section for internal revenue evasions; but the reasoning strikes us as entirely applicable here, and was so thought by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit when Rev. St. § 3062, came before it in U. S. v. Federal Insurance Co., supra.
The argument, adapted from U. S. v. Yuginovich, supra, is that, when Congress passed section 26, title 2, of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138½mm), it provided milder penalties for unlawfully transporting liquors than Rev. St. § 3062, which forfeits the vehicle regardless of the owner’s, complicity, and without relief to innocent lienors, as does also Rev. St. § 3450 (Comp. St. § 6352). Goldsmith v. U. S., 254 U. S. 505, 41 S. Ct. 189, 63 L. Ed. 376. It is true that the section was ancillary to the collection of customs, as were Rev. St. §§ 2809 and 2872, and that section 26 of the National Prohibition Act cannot .therefore be said to be in pari materia. Nevertheless, the same act— i. e., the carriage of unlawfully imported liquors — is within each statute, and, though each comprehends much more, we understand that within the area of their overlap the later and more lenient provision prevails. So the Circuit Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits thought, and so we think.
That there might be eases in which section 3062 covered the carriage of liquors and section 26 did not, as suggested in U. S. v. Federal Insurance Co., supra, we are quite ready to admit. They must have been before November 21, 1921, and it is only bofore that time that the, question could in any event arise. U. S. v. Stofoff, 260 U. S. 477, 43 S. Ct. 197, 67 L. Ed. 358. The whole matter.has long since become obsolete.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0