What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, ex rel. Everett James PECKHAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph E. RAGEN, Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 11872.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Feb. 20, 1957.
Ernst Liebman, Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. of the State of Illinois, William C. Wines, Asst. Atty. Gen., Francis X. Riley, Chicago, 111., Raymond S. Sarnow, A. Zola Groves, Edward M. White, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel, for appellee.
Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, and MAJOR and SWAIM, Circuit Judges.
MAJOR, Circuit Judge.
Relator, on January 15, 1953, was convicted in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, of the crimé of robbery and as a result of such conviction is now confined in the Illinois penitentiary. The instant proceeding was instituted by the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed by order of the District Court entered June 4, 1956. The court filed a memorandum opinion showing that the dismissal was because of a failure to show an exhaustion of state court remedies. The appeal comes to this court from such order.
For a reason subsequently to be disclosed, we see no point in entering into a detailed discussion of the remedies sought and pursued by relator in the state courts. It is sufficient to note that on or about May 21, 1954, relator filed a petition in the Criminal Court of Cook County for a post-conviction hearing pursuant to Chapter 38, paragraph 826, et seq. of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 1953. This petition alleged a violation of certain constitutional rights. Hearing on the petition, after a number of continuances, was had and a decision rendered on November 23, 1954, adverse to relator. On review, the Illinois Supreme Court by order (not published) affirmed the action of the Criminal Court. The Supreme Court of the United States denied a motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time. 350 U. S. 859, 76 S.Ct. 110, 100 L.Ed. 763. The District Court reasoned on the strength of Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761, that there was a failure to exhaust state court remedies because of relator’s neglect to make timely application to the Supreme Court of the United States for a review of the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court. We think the Darr case supports that reasoning.
Respondent in further support of the order under attack points out that the relator advances contentions in this court different from those presented to the Illinois Supreme Court. Under such circumstances, it is argued that there was a failure to exhaust state court remedies under the decision of this court in United States ex rel. Lilyroth v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 222 F.2d 654. Relator here strongly relies upon the contention that as an indigent person he was entitled to be furnished by the State, at his post-conviction hearing in the state court, a transcript of the trial proceedings in which he was convicted, as well as a transcript of other proceedings had prior to his trial, which the State refused or neglected to furnish. It is asserted by the State that no such contention was made before the Illinois Supreme Court. In support thereof, it is pointed out that the order of that court enumerates the contentions there advanced but makes no mention of the contention relative to the furnishing of a transcript. In our view, we do not need to resolve any doubt which may exist on this score.
On April 23, 1956, the Supreme Court decided Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891. In that case it was .held that the failure of the State to furnish an indigent person with a transcript essential to appellate review was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. Const. Amend. 14.
In response to the Griffin decision, the Illinois Supreme Court, on June 19, 1956, adopted Rule 65-1, effective September 26, 1956 (Supreme Court Rules, Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes, Chap. 110, Sec. 101.65-1). The rule provides: “Any imprisoned person, sentenced prior to April 23, 1956, may file, on or before March 1, 1957, in the court in which he was convicted, a petition requesting that he be furnished with a stenographic transcript of the proceedings at his trial.” The rule further provides that a copy of the petition be served upon the State’s Attorney, who has twenty days to answer. The rule provides that the court shall direct the court reporter to transcribe the original proceedings without charge to the defendant if, upon consideration of the petition and answer, the court finds “(a) that the petitioner was at the time of his convection and is at the time of filing the petition without financial means to pay for the cost of a stenographic transe:’ipt of the proceedings at his trial, jand (b) that a stenographic transcript of the proceedings at his trial, (oil an appropriate portion thereof), is necessary to present fully the errors recited in the petition * * The rule ’further provides that the cost of such transcript shall be paid out of the state treasury.
Relator having been sentenced prior to April 23, 1956, is now and has been since September 26, 1956, provided with a means by which he can obtain a transcript without cost and by which he can obtain a review of the proceedings in which he was Convicted and as a result of which he isj now imprisoned. It should be kept in ¡mind, of course, that by the. terms of the rule the application for the transcript must be made to the state court “on or before March 1, 1957.”
We think the court’s ruling on relator’s petition for habeas corpus was proper under the circumstances existing at the time of its dismissal, any doubt on that scoi inated by the subsequent action of the Illinois Supreme Cour ; which has afforded relator a means by which he can obtain a transcript, thei eby enabling him to test in the Illinois courts the legal-However, e has been elimity of his imprisonment.
The court appreciates the services rendered on this appeal by Mr. Ernst Liebman, court-appointed counsel.
The order appealed from is
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0