What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Virginia L. MUSI and Genaro Musi v. Joseph DeSARRO and Jack Boyd. Joseph DeSarro, Appellant.
No. 15925.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Nov. 4, 1966.
Decided Dec. 19, 1966.
George M. Weis, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Weis & Weis, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Herman C. Kimpel, Pittsburgh, Pa., (Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellees.
Before GANEY, SMITH and FREEDMAN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
The sole question in this Pennsylvania diversity action is whether Boyd, the driver of appellant’s tractor trailer, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The wife appellee and her husband brought suit for personal injuries and property damage against appellant and Boyd, his driver. Appellant asserted a counterclaim against appellees for damage to his tractor trailer and cargo. A jury trial resulted in a verdict against appellees on their claim and in favor of appellant on his counterclaim. The district court subsequently entered judgment N.O.V. for the appellees on the counterclaim and this appeal followed.
The accident occurred at 2:30 A.M. at a right angle intersection in Sewickley, Pennsylvania. The negligence of the wife, who was the driver of appellees’ passenger car, is conceded, as indeed it had to be. She had driven across the intersection in the face of a flashing red signal, without stopping. Boyd, who was on his way to Pittsburgh to deliver a cargo of cattle, testified that as he approached the intersection he noticed that the traffic signal facing him was flashing “caution or amber”. Nevertheless, he went into the intersection and did not reduce his speed or look to his right or left. He testified that when he first observed appellees’ car, he saw it out of the corner of his eye. It was then too late for him to apply his brakes to avoid the collision, because the car was only fifteen feet away from him.
These facts make it clear that appellant’s driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and that the court below therefore properly entered judgment N.O.V. against appellant on his counterclaim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has laid down time and again the rule that an operator of a motor vehicle who does not look for moving traffic on an intersecting street as he approaches the intersection is guilty of negligence as a matter of law, even though he proceeds with the traffic light in his favor. See Moore v. Smith, 343 F.2d 206 (3 Cir. 1965), collecting the Pennsylvania cases. It has therefore consistently held that contributory negligence is established as a matter of law if the evidence demonstrates that a party entered an intersection without looking to the side; this duty continues, albeit to a lesser degree, even if he has a green or flashing yellow light in his favor. Smith v. United News Co., 413 Pa. 243, 196 A.2d 302 (1964), green light; Lewis v. Quinn, 376 Pa. 109, 101 A.2d 382 (1954), green light; Allega v. Eastern Motor Express Co., Inc., 378 Pa. 1, 105 A.2d 360 (1954), flashing yellow light.
Since there was no conflict in the testimony of appellant’s driver that he did not look to his right before entering the intersection, and therefore did not observe the appellees’ automobile, which was coming toward him, his contributory negligence was established as a matter of law. This bars appellant’s counterclaim, for Pennsylvania maintains in its full rigor the rule that one cannot recover damage “if his negligence contributed in any degree, however slight, to the injury.” Crane v. Neal, 389 Pa. 329, 333, 132 A.2d 675, 677 (1957). We have recognized this principle in two recent cases. Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co. Inc., 364 F.2d 558, 562 (3 Cir. 1966); Rodriguez v. Brunswick Corp., 364 F.2d 282, 285 (3 Cir. 1966).
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 6