What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
PLUMMER v. CITY OF COLUMBUS
No. 72-6897.
Decided October 15, 1973
Per Curiam.
The Court of Appeals of Franklin County, Ohio, in an unreported opinion, affirmed appellant’s conviction of violating Columbus City Code § 2327.03, which provides: “No person shall abuse another by using menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language.” The Ohio Supreme Court, in an unreported order, sua sponte dismissed appellant’s appeal to that court “for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.” We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis and reverse.
On December 11, 1972, we held that Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 (1972), required the reversal of a previous action of the Ohio Supreme Court that dismissed an appeal from a conviction under § 2327.03. Cason v. City of Columbus, 409 U. S. 1053. Section 2327.03 punishes only spoken words and, as construed by the Ohio courts, is facially unconstitutional because not limited in application “to punish only unprotected speech” but is “susceptible of application to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, supra, at 522. In that circumstance, the Ohio Supreme Court erred when it found no constitutional infirmity in the holding of the Court of Appeals of Franklin County that the ordinance might constitutionally reach appellant’s conduct because “the words as used by the [appellant] are in the nature of ‘fighting words’ and thereby fall within that limit of conduct proscribed by the ordinance . . . For “ ‘[although [the ordinance] may be neither vague, overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged against a particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional over-breadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it may not be applied to him either, until and unless a satisfactory limiting construction is placed on the [ordinance]. The [ordinance], in effect, is stricken down on its face. . . .’” Id., at 521.
Reversed.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0