What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BROWN et al. v. SCHWARTZ.
No. 12030.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 7, 1947.
Abe Aronovitz and Sanford M. Swerdlin, both of Miami, Fla., for appellants.
Alan King, of Miami Beach, Fla., for appellee.
Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
Filed under Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, the suit was brought for triple damages plus attorney’s fees for violation of maximum rent regulations. The defense was a general denial. There was a trial to the court without a jury, in the course of which plaintiff testified positively in support of her claim, and defendant Brown testified as positively against it. The district judge, of the opinion that the plaintiff’s testimony was true, found for her for the amount she claimed to have overpaid and attorney’s fees, but awarded her only $2 as damages on the ground that she, herself, was- a party to the violation. The defendants filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. This motion was denied, and defendants have appealed, assigning as error the single ground that the court erred in denying their motion for a new trial.
Calling attention to the fact that the amount awarded was small and the costs of appeal proportionately great, and insisting that it is not the amount involved in, but the badness of the principal established by, the judgment which they are appealing against, appellants earnestly press upon us their árguments for reversal.
Appellee as earnestly insists ■ that the judgment was right in principle, though unduly meager in amount. She invokes the settled rules of state and federal courts alike: (1) That a motion for new trial is directed to the judicial discretion of the trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion; (2) that a motion for new trial on the. ground of newly discovered evidence may not be granted unless (a) the facts discovered are of such a nature that they will probably change the result if a new trial is granted, (b) they have been discovered since the trial and could not by the exercise of due diligence have been- discovered earlier, and (c) they are not merely cumulative or impeaching. Invoking these rules, she points out that appellants’ proof wholly fails to meet them in that: (a) the evidence tendered as newly discovered is not independent evidence going to the merits but merely impeaching evidence; (b) if received on a new trial it would not probably change the result; (c) it was available in the place where the case was tried; (d) the failure to discover and use it can be attributed only to appellants’ negligence ; and (e) that, therefore, the denial of the motion was not the abuse, hut the use, of the trial court’s discretion.
A reading of the affidavits tendered in support of the motion leaves us in no doubt that appellee is clearly right. The testimony was at best impeaching. Nor was it of such a nature as that if.received on another trial it would probably change the result. Plaintiff and defendant Brown met head on with reference to the cashing of a check and what was done with the proceeds. The court, as it had a right to do, credited the tenant and not the landlord. The new evidence could have had no other effect than to impeach her by discrediting her testimony in a manner not going to the merits of the case, and it is settled law that “newly discovered evidence, the effect of which is to discredit, contradict or impeach a witness, does not afford a basis for the granting of a new trial.” If the newly discovered evidence had been of admissions by plaintiff contrary to her testimony, it would not have been merely impeaching because, being admissions, such statements are independent substantive evidence which would tend to contradict the evidence she had given. The evidence purporting to have been discovered here, however, was not of that nature. In addition, no showing is made why the evidence was not earlier discovered nor why it should be regarded as an abuse of the court’s discretion to deny the motion.
The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e).
Moore’s Federal Practice Under the New Federal Rules, Rule 59.02, page 3245 note; 39 Am.Jur., Secs, 156, 176, where a full and satisfactory treatment of the whole subject may be found.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1