What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NAZZARO v. UNITED STATES.
No. 431.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Feb. 26, 1932.
Forrest C. Northcutt, of Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Jean S. Breitenstein, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Denver, Colo. (Ralph L. Carr, U. S. Dist. Atty., of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for the United States.
Before LEWIS and McDERMOTT, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
JOHNSON, District Judge.
The appellant Dominick Nazzaro, James Mareno, Tony Chris toff, and Martin Diulio were indicted by the grand jury for violation of the National Prohibition Law (27 USCA). The indictment contained four counts. The first charged that the defendants sold intoxicating liquor, to wit, several drinks of whisky, at the Alpine Café, in the town of Aguilar, county of Las Animas, state of Colorado, on November 23, 1929. The second count charged the sale of four drinks of whisky by the defendants at the same place on July 5, 1939. The third count charged the defendants with the possession of intoxicating liquor at the same place on the 5th of July, 1939. The fourth count charged the defendants with the maintenanceóf a common nuisance in the said premises, on July 5, 1939, and theretofore, by keeping and selling intoxicating liquors therein.
The defendant Mareno entered a plea of guilty. The other defendants entered pleas of not guilty and stood trial. After the jury had been impaneled, the district attorney dismissed the first count of the indictment. At the conclusion of the evidence,, each of the defendants on trial moved the court to direct a verdict in his favor. The court granted the motion of the defendant Diulio, but denied the motions of the defendants Nazzaro and Christoff. The jury found the defendant Christoff guilty on the second,, third, and fourth counts and the defendant Nazzaro guilty on the second and fourth, counts of the indictment. The defendant Nazzaro has appealed the case to this court, and assigns the denial of his motion for a directed verdict as error. This assignment we believe to be-well taken. The facts of the case not in dispute or stated favorably for the government are as follows:
On July 5, 1939, appellant operated a pool hall in the building in which the Alpine Café was located.’ A hall separated the pool, hall and café. Doors from each opened into the hall. Both pool hall and café had been in operation since in November, 1929.
During the time from November, 1929, to July 5, 1930, the pool hall was owned and operated by the appellant alone. Until about-the middle of April, 1939, he had been a partner with the defendant Mareno in the operation of the café. In April he sold his interest in the café to the defendant Christoff. The building in which the pool hall and café were located was owned by one Poma, appellant’s father-in-law. Christ-off and Mareno continued to occupy the premises after the sale to Christoff under some arrangement made by or through appellant with Poma, the owner. Appellant visited the café once a week and collected the rent from them, and turned it over to his father-in-law.
Intoxicating liquor was sold on the premises by Mareno and Christoff on July 5, 1930, and at divers times prior to that date. Except the weekly visits to collect the rents, appellant was not in the café, and he had nothing to do with any of the sales of intoxicating liquor made in the café after he sold his interest to Christoff.
Upon the facts so far stated, it is quite clear that appellant could not be justly convicted for the sale made on July 5th charged in the second count or for the maintenance of the nuisance on said premises as charged in the fourth count of the indictment. However, in addition to the above facts, it appears that, during the time appellant was interested in the café, Mareno had charge of the business and operated the café; that intoxicating liquor was sold there by Mareno during that time, and that appellant knew of such sales and shared in the profits.
It is the contention of the government that, because of this knowledge, appellant must have known that the illegal traffic in intoxicating liquor would be continued on the premises, and that, having negotiated for the occupation of the premises by Christoff and Mareno with this knowledge, he became an aider and abettor of their subsequent violations of the national prohibition law. With . this contention we cannot agree. There is no evidence in the record that, at the time of the sale of his interest in the café to Christoff, appellant agreed to obtain a lease of the premises from his father-in-law for Christoff and Mareno with the understanding that liquor would continue to be sold by them on the premises. Appellant was not the owner of the premises. He had no authority to lease the premises except as the agent of Poma, the owner, and, the lease having been made, it is not shown that he had authority to terminate it or to evict the tenants. Cardinal v. United States (C. C. A.) 50 F.(2d) 166.
In the face of the presumption of innocence which always accompanies a defendant in a criminal prosecution, it seems quite clear that there is no substantial evidence in the record which sustains the contention that appellant was an aider and abettor of Mareno and Christoff in the violations of the prohibition law committed by them during the period that they were the owners and operators of the café.
For the purpose of upholding the conviction of appellant upon the fourth count of the indictment, counsel for the government in their brief say that: “It must be remembered, however, that the evidence for the prosecution showed that Nazzaro was directly connected with the maintenance of the nuisance for nearly six months. During that time he was a partner of Mareno and shared the profits arising from the sale of intoxicants. He knew that whiskey was sold as part of the regular bill of fare. Surely, under such circumstances, he is guilty as a principal.”
Continuing, they say counsel for appellant “urge that the indictment charged the maintenance of a nuisance on July 5, 1930, and that Nazzaro sold out to Christoff on April 19th, 1930.”
And in answer to this contention counsel for the government, continuing, say: “Of course the prosecution is not bound by the exact day alleged. The nuisance is shown definitely to have been participated in by the appellant in the period between November, 1929, and April, 1930. This was within the statute of limitations and is, we submit, sufficient to sustain the conviction.”
Counsel for the government seem to overlook the fact that the indictment charged appellant, jointly with Christoff, with the maintenance of a common nuisance on July 5, 1930, and prior thereto. At the trial counsel dismissed the count of the indictment charging a sale in November, 1929, and secured a conviction of both Nazzaro and Christoff for the sale of July 5, 1930, and for the maintenance of a nuisance at that time and prior thereto. Christoff was not guilty of any sale made prior to the time that he became interested in the business, nor could he be convicted of the maintenance of a nuisance on the premises prior to that time. It is quite true, as counsel say, that the evidence showed the appellant Nazzaro was a party to the sales of liquor and to the maintenance of a nuisance upon the premises during the time he had been connected with the business. It is also true, as counsel say, that the prosecution was not bound by the exact date alleged in the indictment. But the government is bound to charge in separate indictments defendants accused of independent offenses. Christoff had nothing to do with any offense committed by Nazzaro during the time Nazzaro was interested in the business from November, 1929, to April, 1930. And, as we have seen, Nazzaro may not be convicted for the offenses committed by Christoff after that date.
Hence we have Christoff convicted upon the second and fourth counts off the indictment for offenses committed between April and July 5, 1930, and the defendant Nazzaro convicted under the same counts of the indictment for offenses committed between November, 1929, and the middle of April, 1930.
The questions here discussed were considered in Coco v. United States (C. C. A.) 289 F. 33. See, also, Latses v. United States (C. C. A.) 45 F.(2d) 949.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the motion of the defendant Nazzaro for a directed verdict in his favor should have been sustained.
Reversed

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1