What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Archie P. SHERAR, Appellant, v. Joseph M. CULLEN, District Director Internal Revenue Service, et al., Appellees.
No. 71-1558.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
July 3, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 13, 1973.
Archie P. Sherar pro se.
Stephen F. Eilperin (argued), Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. G., James L. Browning, Jr., U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., Walter H. Fleischer, Thomas J. Press, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Honorable Otto R. Skopil, United States District Judge, Portland, Oregon, sitting by designation.
OPINION
Before ELY and KILKENNY, Circuit Judges, and SKOPIL, District Judge.
ELY, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Sherar was discharged from his position as an Internal Revenue Service field agent following his refusal to furnish records for a personal tax audit. After fully exhausting his administrative remedies, Sherar filed this action in the United States District Court seeking restoration of his government position together with the back pay and other benefits lost because of the discharge. The District Court granted the appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
Sherar contends that dismissal from government service, based solely upon a refusal to submit to an allegedly unwarranted and unreasonable audit request, constitutes a penalty wrongfully imposed upon the exercise of fourth amendment rights. He also argues that the Internal Revenue Service was particularly anxious to see him dismissed because he had allegedly given a Senate Subcommittee information that would later be used in public hearings to the embarrassment of the Service. The Government, to the contrary, argues that appellant’s dismissal followed substantial compliance with applicable procedures, that dismissal is a matter solely within executive discretion, that the termination was not arbitrary or capricious, and that Sherar’s claim that the requested audit was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment is wholly without merit.
The District Court did not reach appellant’s fourth amendment contentions, ruling, instead, that:
“ . . . the scope of review in the District Court of this type of administrative proceeding is limited, probably limited as you can get, to the determination of the existence of past due process and a substantial basis for the results of the procedure which is employed in connection with the exercise of discretion.”
We disagree.
In See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967), the Supreme Court reversed appellant’s conviction for refusing to permit a representative of the city fire department to enter and inspect his locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of any municipal ordinance had occurred therein. The Court held that:
“(W)hile the demand to inspect may be issued by the agency, in the form of an administrative subpoena, it may not be made and enforced by the inspector in the field, and the subpoenaed party may obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffei’ing penalties for refusing to comply.”
Id. at 544, 545, 87 S.Ct. at 1740. Compare Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (holding that where welfare benefits were terminated because the recipient refused to be interviewed in her home, no search under the Fourth Amendment was involved, that even if it were a search it was not unreasonable, and that even if there were an unreasonable search, the welfare recipient had waived the right to object by accepting benefits).
More specifically, in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964), the Court held that when a challenge to an administrative summons for a tax audit is “rejected by the hearing examiner and the witness still refuse(s) to testify or produce, the examiner is given no power to enforce compliance or to impose sanctions for noncompliance.” Id. at 445, 84 S.Ct. at 512. Instead, the Court ruled, if the Secretary of the Treasury insists on enforcing the summons, he must proceed under 26 U.S.C. § 7402(b), which grants jurisdiction to the District Courts of the United States “by appropriate process to compel such. attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.” Id.
Thus, contrary to the administrative procedure followed in Sherar’s case, under § 7402(b) the taxpayer is afforded the complete protection of a judicial determination based upon adversary proceedings in which any of his challenges to the summons can be fully aired. “In such a proceeding only a refusal to comply with an order of the district judge subjects the witness to contempt proceedings.” 375 U.S. at 446, 84 S.Ct. at 512. Furthermore, the governmental interest in conducting a reasonable tax audit is also protected because the court, based upon its hearing, has full power to determine if the administrative summons should be enforced.
The See and Reisman decisions, and the statutory procedures of § 7402(b), reflect the obvious concern that there be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), for example, the Supreme Court held that an attorney could not be disbarred solely because he claimed his privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to provide records and testimony for an investigation into his alleged professional misconduct. “In this context ‘penalty’ is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privlege ‘costly.’ ” Id. at 515, 87 S.Ct. at 628. In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), a companion case to Spevack, police officers were convicted in a state court of conspiring to obstruct justice. During their trial, the prosecution was allowed to introduce inculpatory statements taken by investigators after the officers had been advised that refusal to give answers would lead to discharge from their positions. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that “Thé choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination its the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent.” Id. at 497, 87 S.Ct. at 618. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (a statute offering the owner of goods in a forfeiture action an election between producing a document or forfeiture of the goods at issue was held to be a form of compulsion in violation of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (a person has the right “to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . , . for such silence”); Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm’r., 392 U.S. 280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968) (public employees, like all other persons, are entitled to the benefit of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and they may not be faced with proceedings which present them with a choice between surrendering their constitutional rights or their jobs); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20 L. Ed.2d 1082 (1968) (“the mandate of the great privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty of the loss of employment”).
In the present case, the Internal Revenue Service placed Sherar in the untenable position of having to decide whether to submit to an allegedly unreasonable and unwarranted tax examination, o.r, should he refuse, to suffer the penalty of dismissal. This was clearly a penalty that infringed upon the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches because, as a practical matter, the only manner by which a taxpayer can prevent an unreasonable search is to withhold his records pending judicial determination in enforcement proceedings. Cf. Elliott v. American Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1943) (“The remedy against forced improper disclosure, and the opportunity for testing its propriety is simply to refuse to disclose and to have the District Court rule upon the matter in enforcement proceedings”). If the rule were otherwise, the right to be free from unreasonable searches would not exist except at the discretion of the tax collector.
In so holding, we do not reach the question of whether Sherar is correct in his contention that the audit was, as a matter of fact, an unreasonable and unwarranted demand. We hold only that in the absence of prior judicial determination of that question, his discharge was unwarranted. Reisman v. Caplin, supra.
Since Sherar submitted the requested tax records to the auditor following his discharge, the required enforcement proceedings under § 7402(b) would now be moot. Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the District Court, with directions to order Sherar reinstated to his former position within the Internal Revenue Service. The District Court will also determine the amount of back pay and benefits, if any, which are due to Sherar because of his illegal discharge.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1