What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
JACOBSON v. RICHARDS & HASSEN ENTERPRISES, Inc., et al.
No. 135, Docket 21136.
United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.
Feb. 4, 1949.
Herbert N. Bobrow and Curtis & Eberlein, all of New York City, for appellant.
Bigham, Englar, Jones & Houston, of New York City (John M. Aherne and John L. Conners, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before L. HAND, Chief Judge, and SWAN and CHASE, Circuit Judges.
CHASE, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents questions relating to the liability of the operator of a check room in a New York City restaurant for the misdelivery of a fur coat accepted for safe keeping. Diversity is the basis of jurisdiction. After trial by court the check room operator was held liable for the full value of the coat and has appealed from the judgment entered. D.C., 80 F.Supp. 917.
The court found upon ample evidence that the appellant, Richards, & Hassen Enterprises, Inc., to be hereinafter called the concessionaire, had purchased for a valuable consideration from Belplaza Corporation, the owner and operator of the Belmont-Plaza Hotel in the City of New York, the right to operate the check rooms in the hotel. The concessionaire by written contract agreed to supply suitable operatives acceptable to the owner; to indemnify it against liability or loss; and not to make any charges for the service. Its remuneration consisted of the gratuities which might be given its operatives by the patrons, such "tips” being turned in to the concessionaire by the operatives who were paid fixed salaries. The operatives accepted articles for safe keeping and gave the patrons checks upon the production of which the articles were to be returned. They were authorized by the concessionaire to deliver articles checked without the production of the check, provided the patron was unable to* produce it, if the article was identified by description.
One of the check rooms in the hotel thus operated by the appellant was in a restaurant called the Glass Hat. This restaurant was on the ground floor and had an outside entrance from 50th Street and another from the hotel lobby. One evening the appellee with her husband and another couple entered the Glass Hat by the 50th Street entrance and were seated at a table by a waiter employed by the hotel. Each of the ladies wore a fur coat and at the suggestion of the waiter each let him take her coat to check. He left the coats at one of the concessionaire’s check rooms in the restaurant and was given one check for both. He gave that check to the plaintiff’s husband.
When later in the evening the coats were called for at the check room and the check for them produced, only the coat belonging to the appellee’s friend was there. Although the appellee’s coat was demanded it was not and never has been returned to her.
The undisputed evidence shows that about an 'hour after the waiter had checked the two coats a man and a woman told the concessionaire’s operative at the check room that they wanted the mink coat which the waiter had checked with the other coat. The check room girl was told that the check was with their friends in the restaurant but that the.y didn’t want to go back to get it. They were asked to describe the coat and did so by correctly giving initials which were inside it and the makers’ name on the label. The girl then delivered ' the coat to them. They were impostors. The court found that this misdelivery was grossly negligent. It was held that the appellant was a bailee liable for the conversion and judgment against it was entered for $4,500. The restaurant owner was sued also but the complaint was dismissed as to it and no appeal has been taken from that order.
The appeal from this judgment is based upon the ground that no conversion or gross negligence was proved and upon the alternative ground that, if there was a conversion, or gross negligence, the • liability of the appellant is limited by Sec. 201 of the New York General Business Law, Consol.Laws. c. 20.
We accept the finding that the misdelivery of the coat was grossly negligent for the familiar reason that on the evidence it was not clearly erroneous. Indeed, it was well supported for the only excuse given for not producing the check as was normally required, was merely the inconvenience of going to get it from friends still in the restaurant. But without that, the appellant who was clearly a bailee of the coat was guilty of conversion even on the assumption that it was a gratuitous bailee. Such was the rule at common law. Rest., Torts Sec. 234; Williston, Contracts, Sec. 1038 at n. 6; Hall v. Boston & W. R. Corp., 14 Allen, Mass., 439, 92 Am.Dec. 783; Baer v. Slater, 261 Mass. 153, 158 N.E. 328, 54 A.L.R. 1328. The New York rule is in accord. Lockwood v. Bull, 1 Cow. N.Y., 322, 13 Am.Dec. 539; Kowing v. Manly, 49 N.Y. 192, 10 Am.Rep. 346; Sonn v. Smith, 57 App.Div. 372, 68 N.Y.S. 217. Dalton v. Hamilton Hotel Operating Co., 242 N.Y. 481, 152. N.E. 268, dealt with the effect of a rebuttable presumption of negligence arising from nondelivery on demand’and is not to the contrary nor is Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Company, 236 N.Y. 425, 141 N. E. 904, in. which there was no misdelivery but only a failurh to take up negotiable bills of lading upon delivery.
On the question of limitation of liability a decision of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court is controlling. In Marks v. Planetary Recreations, Inc., - Mise. -, 86 N.Y.S.2d 487, this partial defense was pleaded by a check room operator who was not the proprietor of the restaurant. It was stricken on motion at. Special Term and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed ille order without opinion. 274 App.Div. 993, 85 N.Y.S.2d 316. That being so, whether notices were posted as the statute requires as a condition upon limitation is irrelevant.
Judgment affirmed.
The pertinent part of that statute reads: “ * * * ; as to property deposited by guests or patrons -in the parcel or check room in any hotel or restaurant, the delivery of which is evidenced by a check’ of receipt therefor and for ’which no fee or charge is .exacted, the proprietor shall not be liable beyond Seventy-five dollars, unless such value in excess of seventy-five dollars’ shall be stated upon delivery and a written receipt, stating such value, shall be issued, but he shall in no event be liable beyond one hundred dollars, unless such loss occurs through his. fault or negligence.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1