What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Marshall P. O’BRIEN, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 91-1871.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard June 4, 1992.
Decided Aug. 6, 1992.
Robert K. Lamere, by appointment of the Court, with whom Sullivan & Worcester, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for defendant, appellant.
Gary S. Katzmann, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom A. John Pappalardo, Acting U.S. Atty. and David L. Douglass, Dept, of Justice, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for ap-pellee.
Before CYR, Circuit Judge, RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.
Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Marshall P. O’Brien challenges his conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm on two grounds: first, that a mistrial was warranted because a Government witness had improper contact with members of the jury, and second, that the court incorrectly defined reasonable doubt in its jury charge. We hold that a sufficient inquiry was made to support the court’s finding that the witness’ communication with the jurors was harmless, and that the jury charge as a whole adequately conveyed the meaning of reasonable doubt. We affirm.
Motion for Mistrial
On the third day of trial, defense counsel informed the court that Matthew Moráis, a police officer who had been summoned as a Government witness, engaged in a conversation with three jurors in the corridor during a recess. On that basis, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The judge then conducted a full examination of Mo-ráis and permitted defense counsel and the prosecutor to voir dire him.
Moráis responded to the judge’s request for the full conversation as follows: “Just that they were locked out of the [jury] room, they were waiting for someone to get in, as far as being — a juror in the federal level, that you didn’t have to serve on a local level, and taking the train in. That was it; transportation, getting here. Other than that, that’s it.” When asked whether, at any point, there was anything said about the case, Moráis answered in the negative. Other information elicited during questioning from the court, prosecutor, and defense counsel includes: Moráis was aware, with no doubt in his mind, that the persons with whom he had been conversing were jurors for this trial. He knew which door went to the jury room, and had watched the jurors come and go as recess had occurred. He had been standing in that general location in the corridor during the course of the trial with other police officers involved in the case. He had been told not to have conversations in the hall. He had been a witness five or six times before, and a police officer for five years. He was a potential witness in the case. Although Moráis’ name had been referred to by another officer who testified in the case as being present during part of the investigation of the crime, Moráis did not testify. He did not identify himself to the jurors, was not wearing a uniform, and did not indicate from where he came or for what reason he was in the building.
After questioning Moráis, the prosecutor sought to have the court conduct an individual voir dire of the three jurors as to what they heard, and what impact it would have on their ability to deliberate fairly. Defense counsel sought only a mistrial and stated that such an inquiry of the jurors “would be worse than the disease.” Upon further discussion with the court, defense counsel objected to any further inquiries of the jury. The court sustained the objection, but denied the motion for mistrial on the ground that there was no basis for finding or suspecting that the discussion was about the case or that the discussion would taint the jury in any fashion.
Since Officer Moráis knowingly had an unauthorized communication with the jury, there is a presumption of prejudice that the Government must overcome by showing no effect on the jury. United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 457 (5th Cir.1980). Any unauthorized private communication between jurors and persons associated with the case is presumptively prejudicial, unless its harmlessness is or becomes apparent. Only communications between jurors and others which concern the case require further inquiry. See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Doe, 513 F.2d 709, 711 (1st Cir.1975). In other words, any unauthorized communication between any person who is associated with the case, or who has an interest in the outcome of the case, and a juror would have the potential for being prejudicial. The court would then need to conduct sufficient inquiry to determine whether the communication was harmless. On the other hand, unsequestered jurors usually have frequent communication outside the courtroom with persons not connected with the case. In those instances where it is shown that there was a communication about the case, the communication would be deemed prejudicial unless shown to be harmless.
Moráis was connected with the case. It was, therefore, incumbent on the Government to show that the communication was harmless. A review of the record supports the district court’s conclusion that sufficient evidence was produced to demonstrate that the communication would not affect the jury, and thus the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir.1987). The record shows that the communication was not about the case. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451. The judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel each questioned Moráis immediately after the conversation took place. The conversation had nothing to do with the case, and Moráis never identified himself as a policeman or a potential witness. A communication, which is unrelated to the case, between a person involved with the case and a juror might be deemed prejudicial. Such a communication, however, could not possibly have a prejudicial effect when the jury did not know that the communicant was involved with the case.
A Tenth Circuit Case is similar on the facts. A juror and a federal agent who had been sitting at the prosecutor’s table during the trial had a conversation in the restroom during a recess. The agent and the juror exchanged greetings which brought a response from the juror that he felt “sleepy.” At that time, the agent remarked, referring to a tape recording which the Government put into evidence, “[w]ell, this may put you to sleep.” The court determined that the conversation was merely a “casual, time-of-the-day greeting” and was not prejudicial to the defendants. See United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.1987). The Day case presented a more challenging issue than this case. Unlike the federal agent in Day, Officer Moráis did not sit at the prosecutor’s table, he was unknown to the jury, and he did not discuss any aspect of the case with the jurors, and did not testify.
Even if Officer Moráis knowingly violated the judge’s instruction not to talk to the jury, the record does not show that the discussion was about the case or that it would taint the jury in any way. The presumption of prejudice was overcome by the voir dire examination of the witness, and the defendants presented no rebuttal evidence demonstrating actual prejudice.
The defendant cites cases in which juror contact was deemed presumptively prejudicial and resulted in mistrial even though there was no discussion of the case itself. In those cases however, the party involved in the improper communication had a substantial role in the case. Moráis was only a potential witness, virtually unknown to the jurors, and in fact did not testify. There is nothing to show that the jurors could identify him as being the officer referred to by another witness. See, e.g., United States v. Betner, 489 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1974) (prosecutor had conversation with jury panel during recess); Richardson v. United States, 360 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.1966) (principal prosecution witness had private conversation with juror); Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.1963) (Assistant United States Attorney had conversation with juror during recess).
The defendant’s argument that the district judge did not go far enough in its investigation to establish that no prejudice would result from the communication fails because it was defense counsel who objects ed to an additional inquiry of the jurors concerning the improper contact. “When a colorable claim of jury misconduct surfaces, the district court has broad discretion to determine the type of investigation which must be mounted.” United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir.), cert denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 139, 112 L.Ed.2d 106 (1990).
Reasonable Doubt
At the conclusion of the trial, the court in its instructions to the jury defined reasonable doubt as follows: “A reasonable doubt is a doubt in the mind of a reasonable juror who is seeking the truth. Reasonable doubt exists when, after weighing and considering all the evidence, using reason and common sense, jurors cannot say that they have a settled conviction of the truth of the charge.” After the charge, defense counsel objected to the court’s definition, and asked the judge to charge the jury using the “hesitate to act in the most important of your affairs” language in defining reasonable doubt. The district court judge ruled that the First Circuit has suggested that the “hesitate to act” language should not be used and thus refused to modify the charge. We find no error.
Contrary to O’Brien’s argument, the district court’s refusal to include the phrase “hesitate to act in the most important of your affairs” in its instruction on reasonable doubt does not constitute reversible error. This Court has previously criticized instructions which compare reasonable doubt to the decisional standard used by individual jurors in their own affairs as trivializing the constitutionally required burden of proof. United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 29 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1686, 114 L.Ed.2d 81 (1991); United States v. Sorrentirio, 726 F.2d 876, 882-83 (1st Cir.1984); United States v. Cranston, 686 F.2d 56, 62 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir.1982); Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1978).
There are First Circuit cases in which we have affirmed the use of the phrase “hesitate to act” in defining reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 346 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Del Toro Soto, 676 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.1982). In Del Toro Soto, we suggested the phrase “hesitate to act” rather than “willing to rely and act upon,” Del Toro Soto, 676 F.2d at 17, and in Munson, we affirmed an instruction that reasonable doubt “would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in regard to some transaction of importance and seriousness.” Munson 819 F.2d at 346. The language used or suggested in each instruction was an attempt to make the instruction less personalized to the jurors or an attempt not to reduce the Government’s burden of proof. See Drake, 673 F.2d at 20 (comparing reasonable doubt standard with important decisions in juror’s own life impermissibly reduces Government’s burden of proof). Such instructions do not contradict our disapproval of defining reasonable doubt in terms of decisions relating to affairs in a juror’s life. Noone, 913 F.2d at 28.
The momentous decision to acquit or convict a criminal defendant cannot be compared with ordinary decision-making without risking trivialization of the constitutional standard.... We have yet to suggest, however, that equivalent constitutional concerns are occasioned by analogizing reasonable doubt to the deci-sional standard employed by the “reasonable person” customarily hypothesized by courts of law as an objective decision-maker less vulnerable to subjective contamination than the “flesh and blood” variety. Nonetheless, we admonish against the use of any such instruction, as an altogether unnecessary embellishment that risks juror misunderstanding of the reasonable doubt standard.
Noone, 913 F.2d at 29 (citation omitted).
No cases have been called to our attention in which a district judge must use the “hesitate to act” language when defining reasonable doubt. So long as the charge, taken as a whole, correctly conveys the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, no reversible error exists. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 138, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); Munson, 819 F.2d at 346; Del Toro Soto, 676 F.2d at 17; Drake, 673 F.2d at 20. This Court has emphasized that reasonable doubt does not require a specific definition. United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148, 1160 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 54, 116 L.Ed.2d 31 (1991).
The defendant contends for the first time on appeal that the district court used language in its charge regarding settled conviction as to the truth of the charges, which fails to emphasize to the jury the seriousness of their decision making role, and has the potential for impermissibly reducing the Government’s burden of proof. This argument is reviewable only for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 and 52(b). Read as a whole, the jury instructions comply with the teachings of this Court, and accurately placed the burden of proof.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0