What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Perry Russell TUNNELL, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 72-3787.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 18, 1973.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 31, 1973.
J. W. Tyner, Jerry Bain, Tyler, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Roby Hadden, U. S. Atty., Tyler, Tex., Richard P. Slivka, Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Tax Div., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.
AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge.
Perry Russell Tunnell was convicted on each of three counts for willfully attempting to evade federal income tax during the years 1965, 1966, and 1967, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1970). The central issue on appeal concerns the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence based on the net worth method. We affirm.
I.
One of the essential elements which the Government had to prove was that taxpayer owed tax on at least some unreported income for each of the three years named in the indictment. Because taxpayer’s records were inadequate, the Government utilized the so-called “net worth method” described and approved in the leading Supreme Court case of Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 125, 75 S.Ct. 127, 130, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954):
In a typical net worth prosecution, the Government, having concluded that the taxpayer’s records are inadequate as a basis for determining income tax liability, attempts to establish an “opening net worth” or total net value of the taxpayer’s assets at the beginning of a given year. It then proves increases in the taxpayer’s net worth for each succeeding year during the period under examination and calculates the difference between the adjusted net values of the taxpayer’s assets at the beginning and end of each of the years involved. The taxpayer’s nondeductible expenditures, including living expenses, are added to these increases, and if the resulting figure for any year is substantially greater than the taxable income reported by the taxpayer for that year, the Government claims the excess represents unreported taxable income. In addition, it asks the jury to infer willfulness from this understatement, when taken in connection with direct evidence of “conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal.” Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 [63 S.Ct. 364, 368, 87 L.Ed. 418].
See also United States v. Newman, 5 Cir., 1972, 468 F.2d 791, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 905, 93 S.Ct. 1527, 36 L.Ed.2d 194 (1973); Lee v. United States, 5 Cir., 1972, 466 F.2d 11. In the present case the Government determined the correct taxable income and tax to be the amounts set out below, compared to the taxable income and. tax actually reported by Tunnell on his returns, as follows:
Government Determination Tunnell Reported
Year Income Tax Income Tax
1965 $ 9,236.73 $ 971.55 $ 181.52 $ 142.08
1966 35,579.77 5,942.14 2,241.98 113.33
1967 34,783.42 7,738.31 (20,864.63) -0-
To rely on determinations of income by the net worth method, it was necessary that the Government establish Tunnell’s opening net worth at the start of 1965 with reasonable certainty, introduce evidence supporting the inference that his net worth increased due to currently taxable income, and negate all reasonable explanations and leads furnished by Tunnell which were inconsistent with guilt. See Holland, 348 U.S. at 132, 135, 137, 75 S.Ct. at 134-136. In examining the record we find that the Government sustained its burden.
Based on a detailed financial analysis, the Government determined Tunnell’s assets on December 31, 1964 to be $57,686.89, including cash on hand, cash in banks, the Pines Motel and Trailer Park, some farm land he inherited, mobile homes, automobiles, trucks, and deferred expenses. But he had offsetting liabilities of $64,447.55, so the Government set his opening net worth at a deficit of $6,760.66, which we find to. be fully supported by the record. Counsel for taxpayer objected to the Government’s introduction into evidence of tax returns for 1962, 1963, and 1964, and when the jury during its deliberations requested the 1963 and 1964 returns, counsel also objected to the district judge’s allowing the jury to see the returns again. These returns were admissible and could be viewed by the jury at its request, because the small amounts of income reflected in these returns were relevant to corroborate the asserted deficit net worth as of December 31, 1964. The returns consistently showed the taxpayer had little income during the prior three years. Furthermore, the district judge gave the jury a proper limiting instruction that the documents could only be considered for the limited purpose of determining Tunnell’s opening net worth.
The Government showed that the likely source of Tunnell’s net worth increases was from taxable income, as opposed to exempt income, by showing that he could have had income from the Pines Motel other than that reported. Appellant objected to testimony that this motel, in addition to providing the taxable income generally expected, also provided Tunnell with an opportunity for income from prostitution activities. This was necessarily admissible to fulfill the Government’s responsibility under Holland of showing a likely source for the unreported income over the three-year period. Tunnell, himself, volunteered the information to a Government agent that he had two to four girls working for him during all three years of 1965 through 1967 and that he made as much as $12,000 from their prostitution in one year. This income was taxable even if it was unlawful. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 1055, 6 L.Ed. 246 (1961).
The only leads furnished by taxpayer as inconsistent with guilt were that he had available $20,000 to $21,000 from the sale of a motel in Galveston during the prior tax year of 1964, that he “floated” checks, and that he borrowed money to live on during the years 1965 through 1967. The sale of the motel was reported on his 1964 return as a loss, and the correctness of that return was not disputed by the Government. Thus no tax was due on the proceeds received from the sale at an amount less than the basis. But contrary to appellant’s assertion in his brief that he had $20,000 available as a result of the sale, testimony by one of two other people with interests in the motel indicates that a promissory note of about $15,000 had to be paid after the sale and the remaining $5,000 from the sale was divided among three people, so that Tunnell probably got less than $2,000.
“Floating” checks was defined as writing a- check in excess of the amount in the bank account but then depositing money from another account in time to cover the check. Evidence indicates that Government agents thoroughly reviewed Tunnell’s assets and liabilities and bank accounts to negate either his borrowing money or his floating checks as sufficient to account for the net worth increases.
II.
As inferred by the Supreme Court from the words “willfully attempts” in the statute, the second and third necessary elements for conviction are evil motive by the defendant Tunnell and an affirmative act to carry out his scheme to evade tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1970); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 63 S.Ct. 364, 87 L.Ed. 418 (1943). See generally United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973). Here the consistent pattern of understating large amounts of income coupled with evidence of inadequate records kept by taxpayer permits an inference of willfulness sufficient to create a jury question. See generally Holland, supra, 348 U.S. at 139, 75 S.Ct. at 137; Holbrook v. United States, 5 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 238, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915, 75 S.Ct. 605, 99 L.Ed. 1249 (1955). The requisite affirmative act can be found in the filing of false tax returns for each year in the indictment.
Appellant raises several other points which we have considered and find to be without merit.
Affirmed.
. Section 7201 reads as follows :
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
. This evidence thus differs from that presented in Armes v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 1971, 448 F.2d 972, 975-976 n. 2, where the evidence of prostitution activities never reached beyond suspicion and innuendo.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0