What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Randolph SMITH, Appellant, v. HERTZ RENT-A-CAR and Bernard Heyl.
No. 16425.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 1, 1967.
Decided May 23, 1967.
Alphonso A. Christian, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V. I., for appellant.
Thomas D. Ireland, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V. I. (Maas, Ireland & Bruno, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, V. I., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARIS, FREEDMAN and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
Of the First Circuit, sitting by designation.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Randolph Smith, from an order of the District Court of the Virgin Islands reversing on appeal a judgment of the Municipal Court of the Virgin Islands in his favor against Hertz Rent-A-Car. The suit was brought to recover damages to the plaintiff’s automobile resulting from a collision which occurred on January 20, 1965 in St. Thomas between the plaintiff’s automobile and an automobile driven at the time by defendant Bernard C. Heyl, to whom Hertz had rented it. Prior to bringing suit and within 8 days after the accident the plaintiff had recorded a lien for his claim of damages against the Hertz automobile with the Commissioner of Public Safety pursuant to 20 V.I.C. § 542.
The plaintiff’s suit in the municipal court was brought within 30 days after the accident against Hertz Rent-A-Car, the owner of the automobile, and against Heyl, the driver of it. The latter had left the island in the meantime, however, and was not personally served. Nor was any effort apparently made to obtain extraterritorial service upon him through the use of the motor vehicle long arm statute, 20 V.I.C. § 543. The general long arm statute, 5 V.I.C., subtitle 4, had not then gone into effect. The plaintiff accordingly prosecuted the action against the defendant Hertz Rent-A-Car alone.
At the trial the municipal court found that the accident was due to the negligent operation of the Hertz car by defendant Heyl but that Hertz was not responsible for Heyl’s negligence since no agency relationship existed between them but merely the relationship of bailor, and bailee. The court, therefore, concluded that a personal judgment for the plaintiff’s damages could not be rendered against defendant Hertz Rent-A-Car. But it entered a judgment which while ostensibly against Hertz was specifically limited to satisfaction out of the value of the Hertz automobile pursuant to the statutory lien. Smith v. Hertz Rent-A-Car, M.C.V.I.1965, 5 V.I. 267. On appeal by Hertz Rent-A-Car the district court reversed, holding that since Hertz was not liable for the negligence of its bailee, Heyl, the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment in any form against Hertz. Smith v. Hertz Rent-A-Car, D.C.V.I.1966, 262 F.Supp. 431, 5 V.I. -. The present appeal by plaintiff followed.
On this appeal the plaintiff urges that under the statute the owner of a motor vehicle may be held liable, at least to the extent of the value of the vehicle, to one who is injured or whose property is damaged by it while being operated by a bailee of the owner even though the owner is not legally responsible for its bailee’s negligence which caused the accident. We do not agree that the Virgin Islands statute authorized such a result.
The statute in question, 20 V.I.C. § 542, is as follows:
“ § 542. Lien for damages to person or property
Any person who is injured by a motor vehicle or whose property is damaged thereby shall have a lien against such motor vehicle for his claim of damages, if he records such lien with the Commissioner of Public Safety within a period of 8 days from the date of injury or damage and if he commences an action against the owner of the motor vehicle in a court of competent jurisdiction within a period of 30 days from the date of injury or damage. The transfer of the property in the motor vehicle during such period shall not divest the injured or damaged person of his right of lien thereon.”
Upon examining the language of the statute it will be seen that the lien which it authorizes for an injured person’s claim for damages is closely connected with and, in fact, actually conditioned upon the commencement of an action against the owner of the motor vehicle upon the claim. It thus appears that the statute contemplates an award of damages in a personal action against the owner and that there is no intention to authorize a proceeding in rem against the motor vehicle itself for the recovery of the damages. This is not to say that in an action against the owner of the vehicle recovery is to be limited to his individual negligence alone. On the contrary, the injured party in his action against the owner is certainly entitled to assert every ground of liability which the law provides. This includes the right to hold the owner responsible for injuries caused by the negligence of others for whose actions he is vicariously responsible. Thus, under the principles of the common law in force in the Virgin Islands a principal may be held responsible for the negligence of his agent, and an employer for the negligence of his employee, acting within the scope of their responsibilities. Restatement, Agency 2d §§ 219, 251.
In some states by statute liability has been expressly imposed upon the owner of a motor vehicle for personal injuries or property damage caused by any person using or operating his motor vehicle with his permission, express or implied, and the imposition of such extended liability has been held constitutional. Young v. Masci, 1933, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S.Ct. 599, 77 L.Ed. 1158; Robinson v. Bruce Rent-A-Ford Co., 1927, 205 Iowa 261, 215 N.W. 724, 61 A.L.R. 851. And under other state statutes the bailor of an automobile has been expressly made responsible to third persons for harm caused by the negligence of his bailee acting within the agreed limits of the bailment. Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 1928, 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163, 61 A.L.R. 846; Rent-A-Car Co. v. Belford, 1932, 163 Tenn. 590, 45 S.W.2d 49; Annotation 61 A.L.R. 866; 7A Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, § 5237. See, also, Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 1932, 284 U.S. 335, 52 S.Ct. 144, 76 L.Ed. 323; Hamon v. Richards, 1963, Del.Super., 190 A.2d 612. But since such statutes create a new right of action, giving a remedy against a person who would not otherwise be liable, they must be strictly construed. Cook v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 1936, 12 Cal.App.2d 608, 55 P.2d 1227; Dodson v. Imperial Motors, Inc., 6 Cir. 1961, 295 F.2d 609, 613. It is perfectly clear that thus construed, while 20 V.I.C. § 542 affords the plaintiff a prejudgment lien to enforce the owner’s personal liability under existing law, it does not create an action in rem or impose such extended vicarious liability upon the owners of motor vehicles in the Virgin Islands.
Little need be said with respect to the plaintiff’s argument that the statute authorizes the lien to be enforced to secure payment of a judgment recovered in a suit brought against a driver of a motor vehicle who is not its owner. The short answer to this argument is that there is not a word in the statute with respect to the institution of such a suit. On the contrary, as we have pointed out, the lien is tied in with and its existence conditioned upon the commencement of an action against the owner. Thus, the lien would not even comé into existence if suit were brought solely against the non-owning driver of the vehicle. Moreover, it would require explicit language to authorize the taking of a motor vehicle and the application of the proceeds of its sale to the payment of a judgment recovered against a third party for whose negligence the owner is not responsible. While it is not uncommon for statutes to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he had entrusted it, Van Oster v. State of Kansas, 1926, 272 U.S. 465, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354, such statutes, since they provide for the forfeiture of the -property of an innocent owner, must be strictly construed.
It necessarily follows from what has been said that Hertz Rent-A-Car, not being responsible for the negligence of Heyl under the law of the Virgin Islands, was entitled to judgment in its favor in the present action and that upon the entry of that judgment the lien which the plaintiff has recorded against the Hertz automobile will be extinguished.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1