What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
Charles T. COLEMAN, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dave FAULKNER, Sheriff Tulsa County, Robert Duckert, Captain Tulsa County Jail, Sheriff's Department, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 80-2073.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 8, 1982.
Charles T. Coleman, Sr., pro se.
S.M. Fallis, Jr., Dist. Atty. of Tulsa County, and James F. Raymond, Asst. Dist. Atty., Tulsa, Okl., for defendants-appellees.
Before BARRETT, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R. App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This is an appeal from an order of the federal district court dismissing Charles Coleman’s section 1983 action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Mr. Coleman alleged that the Sheriff of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, and his deputy had deprived Mr. Coleman of his property without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment. For purposes of this appeal, we treat Mr. Coleman’s allegations as true since his case was dismissed on the pleadings. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 1850, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976).
The police took $290.00 from Mr. Coleman when they arrested him for murder. They thought he had stolen it from his victim. The state apparently intended to use the money as evidence against Mr. Coleman in his murder trial, but instead relied on other evidence in obtaining a conviction. Under Oklahoma law, a sheriff who obtains allegedly stolen property must hold it subject to the order of the magistrate who determines its owner. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1321, 1322 (West 1958). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the sheriff’s duty exists even if the accused is not later tried for theft. Hodgson v. Hatfield, 112 Okl. 134, 240 P. 69 (1925). In Hodgson, a murderer stole money from his victim. The arresting sheriff took the money but later gave it to the murderer’s lawyer at the murderer’s request. The court found the sheriff liable to the estate of the murder victim. In the instant case, the defendants admit that they have the money, but fear personal liability if they release it to Mr. Coleman. They maintain that Mr. Coleman’s remedy is to seek an order from the trial court for its return pursuant to section 1322.
Mr. Coleman has a cause of action under section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment if he has been deprived of property by state action without due process of law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). The trial court dismissed Mr. Coleman’s suit for failure to exhaust his state judicial remedies. Section 1983 does not require exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). However, the existence of a state remedy may provide due process. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), the Supreme Court held that although due process usually requires some predeprivation procedure, “the impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process can, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking, satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.” Id. at 539, 101 S.Ct. at 1915 (footnote omitted). It would have been impractical for the state to hold a hearing to determine ownership prior to seizing potential evidence from Mr. Coleman. If the state has provided him an adequate post-deprivation remedy, it has done all that the fourteenth amendment requires.
While the Oklahoma statute appears on its face to provide due process, Mr. Coleman asserts that he has no way to avail himself of the remedy it provides. He alleges that he is indigent and cannot retain counsel, that the state will not provide him with counsel for such a proceeding, and that prison officials will not permit him to appear in court on his own behalf.
The trial court did not consider Mr. Coleman’s allegation that the remedy provided by the state is constitutionally insufficient for an indigent prisoner. If that allegation is true, Mr. Coleman has stated a cause of action under section 1983.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the federal district court dismissing this action and remand for consideration of Mr. Coleman’s allegation.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. Section 1983 provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Supp. VI 1980.
. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for acts “under color” of state law. State action under the fourteenth amendment is a subset of action under color of state law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753 & n. 18, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). Hence the latter need not be separately proved for a cause of action under section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment.
. Although the seizure of the money was intentional, there was no time for a predeprivation hearing since Mr. Coleman was trying to eat it when he was arrested. These are unique facts. We do not mean to suggest that a postdeprivation remedy is adequate for other intentional deprivations. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 527, 545-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1908, 1918-1923 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 3