What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Howard B. PASHMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHEMTEX, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 1265, Docket 87-7240.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued June 18, 1987.
Decided July 17, 1987.
Philip Esterman, New York City (Gideon J. Karlick, Esterman & Esterman, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Wayne A. Cross, New York City (Karen J. Pordum, Reboul, MacMurray, Hewitt, Maynard & Kristol, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Before OAKES, MESKILL, and PRATT, Circuit Judges.
GEORGE C. PRATT, Circuit Judge:
This appeal from a grant of summary judgment against plaintiff Howard Pash-man requires us to assess the meaning of “pretax profits”, as used in Pashman’s employment agreement with defendant Chem-tex, Inc., 664 F.Supp. 701. This agreement called for Pashman to receive a “participation of ten [10] percent of the pretax profits on all sales made by” him. Because the meaning of this contract is clear, and as applied to the sale at issue entitled Pash-man to no more, and perhaps less, than he has already received, we agree with the district court that Pashman raises no “genuine issue of material fact”, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
Much of the factual background of this case is undisputed. In 1977 Pashman went to work for Chemtex as a salesman of paint plants. His compensation was established by a clause in his employment contract that provided:
Your compensation for these services will be a participation of ten [10] percent of the pretax profits on all sales made by you. A draw against this participation in the amount of $3,500 per month will be paid to you monthly. Participation will be paid, net of draws, on the basis of 50% payable on contract effectuation and 50% payable on the acceptance of the plant by the customer.
Under this agreement Pashman participated in the sale of only one plant, to Egyptian businessman Adel Khalil. The plant was to be constructed in Egypt.
By the terms of the sale, Chemtex agreed to sell its “equipment, formulae, and technical services” to Khalil for $7.6 million. Khalil, Chemtex, and another party (Issa Nakleh) formed an Egyptian corporation, the Egyptian-American Paint Company, to facilitate the transaction and eventually purchase the plant from Khalil. Chemtex holds 36.67% of the equity in the company, Khalil holds 60%, and Nakleh the remaining 3.33%.
In April 1981, three years after negotiating the Egyptian sale, Pashman quit his job at Chemtex. Based on his draw-against-commission, he had received a total of $162,752 from Chemtex.
Later in 1981 the terms of the sales agreement between Chemtex and Khalil were altered. The sales price increased from $7.6 million to $10.1 million, and Chemtex formed an Austrian subsidiary, as a condition of obtaining Austrian financing, to export many of the materials and equipment to be used in the project.
In 1985, Pashman filed suit against Chemtex alleging that he should receive 10% of the $10.1 million sale price received by Chemtex, less the $162,750 he had already drawn. While his prayer for relief asked for damages of $5 million, it appears that his actual claimed damages are $847,-250.
Chemtex moved for summary judgment, submitting documents showing it had actually lost money on the transaction, approximately $722,000. Since the deal generated no profits for Chemtex, it argued that Pashman is entitled to no commission and thus that Pashman was in fact $162,750 ahead.
In response, Pashman argued that the term “profits” in his contract actually meant “gross revenues”, and that Chem-tex’s accounting — which deducted costs from total revenues — was therefore inaccurate, creating an issue of fact as to actual profits.
Judge Walker concluded that the term “pretax profits” was clear on its face, saying that “as a general rule, a court should not interpret the word 'profits’ as synono-mous with ‘revenues,’ but instead read the term ‘profits’ as referring to ‘revenues minus costs.’ * * * Plaintiff has provided no evidence to show that a different meaning was intended when the parties used the term ‘pretax profits’ in plaintiffs employment contract.” Pashman v. Chemtex, Inc., 664 F.Supp. 701, 704 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Pashman now appeals.
DISCUSSION
It is plain that the district court was correct in stating the general rule that profits are not equal to revenues. Indeed, we would have thought that no citation was necessary for the proposition. If citation is needed, the cases mentioned by the district court, Catalano v. J.C. MacElroy Co., 13 A.D.2d 914, 215 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1st Dep’t 1961), and Martin v. City of New York, 264 A.D. 234, 35 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1st Dep’t 1942), provide sufficient support. Perhaps the first rule of accounting is that the black ink of profit is not entered into the ledger until expenses are deducted from gross revenues.
Chemtex’s gross revenues on the Khalil sale are agreed by the parties to be $10.1 million. Thus, the only dispute centers on how much Chemtex was entitled to deduct as expenses in calculating pretax profits.
We begin by noting what is not at issue on this appeal. Since Pashman did not below challenge the propriety of each individual cost deducted by Chemtex, he cannot seek to create an issue of fact on appeal by claiming that this or that expense was not proved by Chemtex. See Bailey Enterprises, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 11 56.27, at 56-1557 (2d ed. 1985) (“An appellant may not, as a general rule, overturn a summary judgment by raising in the appellate court an issue of fact that was not plainly disclosed to the trial court.”). Pash-man’s vague challenges below about the “audit trail” submitted by Chemtex in justification of its claimed expenses did not suffice to raise a genuine issue of fact. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 968-69 (2d Cir.1983).
Pashman must therefore stand or fall on his claim that each and every one of the “costs of sale” claimed by Chemtex is invalid simply by reason of Chemtex’s purchase of an equity share in the joint venture with Khalil. This step, according to Pashman, served to make Chemtex its own “customer”—in effect, the purchaser as well as the seller of the plant—and magically transformed the costs into “capital investments”, leaving the entirety of the gross revenues, $10.1 million, as “profits”. This is the issue of fact Pashman articulates in his brief on appeal as precluding summary judgment.
We disagree. This means of financing the paint plant, far from making Chemtex the purchaser of the plant, instead was merely a means of bringing about the sale. It is undisputed that purchasing the equity share in the project was a necessary expense for Chemtex to close the deal and obtain financing for it. It is further undisputed that Pashman was well aware of this necessity when he negotiated the deal for Chemtex. Under these circumstances, it borders on the frivolous for Pashman to claim that the costs Chemtex incurred on this sale were really the company’s “capital expenses”.
Indeed, under the circumstances of this transaction, the $1.9 million Chemtex spent toward purchasing its share in the paint company was itself a cost of the sale. While this is true only to the extent that the cost ($1.9 million) exceeds the value of what Chemtex received for it (the equity share in the project), Pashman does not dispute the statement of John M. Ryzewic, a Vice-President of Chemtex, in his affidavit that “[bjecause of the Project’s massive delay and cost overruns, the volatile nature of Egypt and Egypt’s foreign exchange problems, Chemtex currently treats its equity participation * * * as a 100 percent selling expense.” In other words, the value of Chemtex’s equity share is zero.
In relying solely on the form of and label attached to the transaction, Pashman fails to raise any issue of fact. The mere fact of a purchase of equity will not blind us to the true nature of the underlying transaction; Chemtex sold a paint plant to Khalil, and incurred certain expenses in doing so-including having to purchase equity in the paint company. Pashman has not produced any evidence that the equity expenditure's usefulness extended beyond facilitating the Egyptian plant sale. Moreover, Pashman has not intelligibly argued that the purchase of equity in this case altered the character of other project expenses to make them "capital expenditures".
Pashman has thus not shown that Chem-tex incorrectly calculated its net loss on the transaction. As of the date of the motion for summary judgment, Chemtex had lost some $722,000 on the deal, meaning that Pashman is entitled to no commission. Indeed, since he has already drawn $162,750 against his commission, he would not be entitled to further compensation until net profits pass $1.6 million. Thus, even if the $1.9 million in equity is not deducted from Chemtex’s revenues, there was still no issue of fact raised, since it would bring Chemtex into the black on the transaction only to the extent of $1.2 million. In fact, since Pashman is entitled to only half his commission until the project is actually completed, he would be ineligible for any further compensation (beyond the $160,000 he has already received) until profits exceed $3.2 million (when the 5% to which he is thus far entitled would be more than $160,000).
In short, on any conceivable construction of the facts, Pashman is not entitled to any further compensation for the Egyptian sale. In order to succeed he would have to be able to show that costs are not costs, that a plant that is not now and likely never will be completed is complete, and that a necessary expense of completing a sale is in reality a “capital expenditure”. We decline to subject defendant and the judicial system to the burden of such a futile quest.
Affirmed. Chemtex’s request for sanctions is denied.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0