What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Shahid El Hussein MUHAMMAD o/c Maynard Prater, Relator-Appellant, v. Hon. Vincent R. MANCUSI, as Warden of Attica State Prison, Attica, New York, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 809, Docket 33951.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued May 25, 1970.
Decided Oct. 22, 1970.
Edmund R. Schroeder, Morton E. Grosz, Milton Adler, New York City, for appellant.
Brenda Soloff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before WATERMAN, FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The one issue presentéd by this appeal from the denial, without a hearing, of appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Metzner, J., is whether an examination at the FBI headquarters in New York City of a briefcase and wallet which were in defendant’s possession at the scene and time of his arrest in the public lobby of a bank was unconstitutional as an “unreasonable search.”
Following a robbery of money orders from a camera store located in the Bronx, the FBI was informed by a bank employee that appellant was in a branch office of the bank and was seeking to cash suspect money orders. Two FBI agents went to the bank forthwith and, upon ascertaining that the money orders in question were ones taken in the camera store robbery, there arrested appellant, made a limited search of his person, and took from him a briefcase he had been carrying. Appellant was taken directly to FBI headquarters where he was questioned, and his personal effects, including the briefcase, were examined. The briefcase contained 44, and his wallet 4, of the stolen money orders.
At appellant’s trial in state court for the camera store robbery, the money orders discovered by the search at FBI headquarters were, over objection, introduced into evidence as those stolen from the camera store. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to serve a term of from 15 to 30 years in prison. After appealing his conviction without success to the state appellate courts certiorari review was denied by the United States Supreme Court, Muhammad v. New York, 392 U.S. 944, 88 S.Ct. 2288, 20 L.Ed.2d 1406 (1968).
Appellant recognizes that the warrant-less search of the briefcase and the seizure of the money orders would have been proper if the search had been conducted at the time of his arrest in the lobby of the bank, but he claims, relying upon the rule in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), reaffirmed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), that the Government was foreclosed from searching it and seizing its contents without a warrant after he and the briefcase had been removed from the scene of the arrest.
This contention is entirely frivolous. Nothing could be more consistent with a decent regard for the preservation of appellant’s right to human dignity than the act of the officers here in not publicly overhauling appellant's personal effects in the lobby of the bank. Officers may indeed promptly conduct more thorough searches of an arrested person and of the personal effects in his possession at the time of his arrest at a more convenient place than the spot of arrest. We have so held in the past subsequent to Preston, e. g., United States v. Frankenberry, 387 F.2d 337 (2 Cir. 1967); United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d 184 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 862, 87 S.Ct. 116, 17 L.Ed.2d 88 (1966). And, in accord with an able opinion of Judge Coffin of the First Circuit, United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 491-493 (1 Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037, 90 S.Ct. 1355, 25 L.Ed.2d 648 (1970), demonstrating that the reasoning of the above cases, and numerous other cases like them, has not been overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), we now hold here, subsequent to Chimel.
Moreover, we do not find Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) apposite. Here the challenged search is a search of a suspect’s person and of his personal effects in his immediate possession at the time of his arrest when there was probable cause to effect that arrest. The examination of appellant’s briefcase at the FBI headquarters presents no‘different constitutional issue than a search there of his suit pockets, or hatband, would present.
The order below is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1