What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
SHOWN v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
May 17, 1926.
Rehearing Denied June 21, 1926.)
No. 4695.
1. Criminal law <@=>424(I)— Evidence of admissions by conspirator held competent against others as against objection that conspiracy had come to an end (Volstead Act [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138'/I et seq.]).
In prosecution for conspiracy to violate .Volstead Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 1013814 et seq.), evidence of admissions by one of alleged conspirators held competent against others; there being question for •jury as to whether conspiracy had come to an end.
2. Conspiracy <S=>48.
Evidence held sufficient to go to jury in a prosecution for conspiracy to violate Volstead Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 1013814 et seq.).
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the District of Idaho; Frank S. Dietrich, Judge.
Claud Shown was convicted of conspiracy to violate Volstead Act, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Hugh N. Caldwell, of Caldwell, Idaho, for plaintiff in error.
H. E. Ray, U. S. Atty., Wm. H. Langroise, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty., and Sam S. Griffin, Asst. U. S. Atty., all of Boise, Idaho.
Before GILBERT, HUNT, and RUD-KIN, Circuit Judges.
GILBERT, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff in error and three others were convicted under an indictment which charged them with conspiracies to violate the Volstead Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 1013814 et seq.) and with the commission of violations thereof. The plaintiff in error was found guilty of conspiring to manufacture intoxicating liquor, conspiracy to sell intoxicating liquor, and manufacturing.intoxicating liquor, and jointly with others operating a stillhouse. The sole question presented on the writ of error is whether he was entitled to an instruction that the jury acquit him of the charges.
The evidence was that at Nampa, Idaho, the plaintiff in error was boarding at a hotel where others of the conspirators lodged, and that he was on intimate terms with them, that he owned an automobile, that he was associated with some of his codefendants in the use of automobiles, and one night when he and Hickman, one of his codefendants, and a man employed by the latter to haul supplies out to the stillhouse, drove up to a garage, the plaintiff in error exchanged cars with Hickman, and that Hickman paid for gasoline for the truck and two automobiles. It was shown that at the time of the arrest of Hickman and other defendants they were found in possession of the ear of the plaintiff in error which was then being used for transporting moonshine whisky. Robinson, one of the eodefendants of the plaintiff in error, stated to the sheriff who made the arrest that the plaintiff in error was connected with the operation of the still.
It is urged that the testimony was incompetent, that it was a declaration of one of the conspirators after the conspiracy had been abandoned, and that under the ruling of the trial court it was received only as against Robinson. The sheriff testified that he had a conversation with Robinson, not in regard to the still, but in regard to the whisky that was seized elsewhere on July 23, 1924, when some of the defendants were •arrested, that the conversation was had a day or two after the arrest. On objection, the court ruled the testimony as to the whisky would be taken only as against Robinson. On cross-examination, however, counsel for one of the defendants elicited the fact that the witness gave to the sheriff the names of those who were connected with the still and mentioned the plaintiff in error as one of them. This was received without objection, it was drawn out by the defense, and it clearly was competent testimony to go to the jury. The defendants were operating a large still in which were found nineteen 52-gallon barrels of bran and sugar mash in a high state of fermentation and all of the utensils of distillation, also a small quantity of moonshine whisky. At the time of Robinson’s conversation with the sheriff, the still had just been seized. Even if objection had been made to the testimony on the ground that the conspiracy had' come to an end, the objection would not have been sustainable. There was nothing to show that the conspiracy had come to an end. Whether or not it was ended would have been a question for the jury. Simpson v. United States (C. C. A.) 289 F. 188. The instructions of the court are not in the record, and we must presume that they properly covered all legal questions presented. We think the evidence against the plaintiff in error was sufficient to go to the jury.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0