What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re FINN. Appeal of MORRIS PLAN INDUSTRIAL BANK OF NEW YORK.
No. 7577.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
April 10, 1941.
Henry W. Parker, of New York City, for appellant.
Russell C. MacFall, of Ridgewood, N. J., for appellee.
Before BIGGS, CLARK, and GOODRICH, Circuit Judges.
BIGGS, Circuit Judge.
The bankrupt, Roy George Finn, is alleged by the appellant, The Morris Plan Industrial Bank of New York, to have made certain material false statements to it in connection with obtaining a loan for $675 and the appellant contends that for this reason the bankrupt is not entitled to his discharge, citing the provisions of Section 14, sub. c(3), of the Bankruptcy Act as amended, 52 Stat. 850, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32, sub. c(3). The appellant filed objections with the referee who overruled them and granted the discharge. Upon petition for review the District Court affirmed the referee’s order. The appeal at bar followed.
The appellant contends that the bankrupt stated in his loan application to it that he was not making installment payments. In answer to the question upon the application, “Are you making installment payments on a loan or for merchandise? If so, to whom ?”, the bankrupt wrote the word “None”. The information thus furnished by the bankrupt was certainly one of the considerations which caused the appellant to grant the loan and the answer given by him was not true. He had become indebted to the Paterson Wimsett System for a loan of $300 upon which he was obligated to make monthly installment payments. The Paterson Wimsett System loan had been made to the bankrupt only a few weeks prior to the time of his application to the appellant for a loan.
The referee found as a fact that the answer, “None”, given by the bankrupt was not given with the intention of deceiving the appellant; that the appellant must have known that the answer was false because the bankrupt was already indebted to it for a prior loan at the time the application was executed and that the appellant may have made the loan because the bankrupt had a “. . long record of perfect payments.”
Section 14, sub. c, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32, sub. c, expressly provides, “ * * * That if, upon the hearing of an objection to a discharge, the objector shall show to the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the bankrupt has committed any of the acts which, under this subdivision c, would prevent his discharge in bankruptcy, then the burden of proving that he has not committed any of such acts shall be upon the bankrupt.”
The burden was upon the bankrupt to prove that he had not committed any of the acts prohibited by the statute. Here the bankrupt made a false statement. The ruling of the referee that this false statement was immaterial because the bankrupt did not intend to deceive the appellant is erroneous as a matter of law. The statement was material if the appellant relied on it in making the loan. The evidence is overwhelming that the appellant did rely on it.
That the bankrupt knew that the statement was false when he made it is almost beyond conjecture. He is and was employed by the Borough of Glen Rock as a policeman. That the mind of a man of modest affairs would not advert to a loan of $300 recently incurred by him and upon which very recent payments had been made is inconceivable. It is not necessary, however, to go this far. Express knowledge of falsity is not necessary. It is enough if he who obtains credit makes the false statement carelessly and with reckless indifference. Morimura, Arai & Co. v. Taback, 279 U.S. 24, 33, 49 S.Ct. 212, 73 L.Ed. 586; In re Lassman, D.C., 32 F.Supp. 830, affirmed Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Lassman, 2 Cir., 116 F.2d 473; Klecka v. Shuttles Bros. & Lewis, 5 Cir., 115 F.2d 573; Woolen Corp. of America v. Gitnig, 3 Cir., 33 F.2d 259. That the bankrupt gave the answer “None” upon his application with reckless indifference is well illustrated by the question asked him on direct examination before the referee, “You did tell him [the appellant’s assistant manager] that you owed the Paterson Wimsett System $120?”, and the bankrupt’s answer, “He did not ask me that.”
The decree of the court below is re-versed and the cause is remanded to the court below with directions to deny the bankrupt his discharge.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1