What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joey Lee MOON, Appellant.
No. 73-1334.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 17, 1973.
Decided March 6, 1974.
Ralph Edwards and John J. Bahnak, Jr., St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
Donald J. Stohr, U. S. Atty., and Thomas Earl Loraine, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before LAY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and EISELE, District Judge.
G. THOMAS EISELE, District Judge, Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Joey Lee Moon, was charged by juvenile information with possession of a firearm which had not been registered to him pursuant to the relevant provision of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d), which reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person—
******
(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record.
The district court convicted him of violating such provision following a bench trial. Moon brings this timely appeal contending that § 5861(d), as applied, violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. We reject this contention and affirm.
The facts disclose that the police, while investigating a motor vehicle accident, observed and removed a sawed-off shotgun from Moon’s automobile. Moon claimed that he found the gun and that he kept it for two weeks to “show off.” On these facts, the trial court rendered a guilty verdict.
. On appeal, Moon argues that since he had found an abandoned weapon, any prosecution against him for possession of the weapon would be unreasonable and, therefore, a denial of due process. We disagree.
In order to convict Moon, the government had to establish the following elements: (1) that defendant knowingly possessed the firearm; (2) that the object possessed was in fact a firearm; and (3) that such firearm was unregistered. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). The government made such showing here. The prosecution needed to prove no more.
In United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1971), the court stated, in response to a charge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, that “possession of such firearm, if unregistered, whether abandoned or not, is prohibited.” Moreover, in Milentz v. United States, 446 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1971), we said that “specific intent to violate the law [§ 5861(d)] is not a necessary element of the crime,” but we stressed that the act of possession of the weapon must be “willing and knowing.” Id. at 113, 114. The prosecution made a showing that Moon was not merely an innocent finder but rather a possessor of the weapon who kept the shotgun in his automobile for two weeks for “kicks” and to “show off” to his friends.
Thus, we hold the conviction proper and the appeal without merit.
Affirmed.
EISELE, District Judge, concurs in the result.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0