What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the second listed appellant. If there are more than two appellants and at least one of the additional appellants has a different general category from the first appellant, then consider the first appellant with a different general category to be the second appellant.

Opinion:
Ralph A. RENFRO; Josephine Renfro, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 89-3007.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Aug. 10, 1989.
Decided Sept. 18, 1989.
Richard J. Marco (argued), Marco & Marco, Medina, Ohio, for Ralph A. Renfro and Josephine Diane Renfro, plaintiffs-appellants.
Colleen C. Cooney (argued), Office of the Pros. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, for Cuyahoga County Dept, of Human Services, defendant-appellee.
Before KEITH and GUY, Circuit Judges, and HULL, Chief U.S. District Judge.
The Honorable Thomas G. Hull, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
KEITH, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, Ralph A. and Josephine Diane Renfro (“the Renfros”) appeal the district court’s order dismissing their § 1983 action and pendent state claims against the Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services (“DHS”). The district court dismissed the Renfros lawsuit pursuant to DHS’s motion. The district court held that the Renfros failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I.
The Renfros are foster parents licensed by DHS. In August, 1981 a fourteen-month old girl, Sonya Ellison, was placed with the Renfros. Sonya remained with the Renfros without mishap until September, 1987. In June of 1987, DHS arranged a visit between Sonya and her natural father. According to the Renfros, this visit and the anticipation of future visits caused Sonya to experience severe emotional problems. Sonya became anxious, had nightmares and wet herself daily. As a result of this change in Sonya’s behavior, the August visit was cancelled. DHS scheduled another visit with Sonya’s father for September 11, 1987. When Sonya was picked up for the September visit, a DHS social worker discovered a three inch bruise on Sonya’s bottom. DHS immediately investigated this suspected child abuse and refused to return Sonya to the Renfro home. The Renfros claim that Sonya received the bruise when she fell off her scooter.
DHS did not conduct a hearing on Sonya’s removal until March 25, 1988, despite repeated requests from the Renfros and the guidelines of the Foster Family Manual. Dissatisfied with the hearing and the failure of DHS to return Sonya to their home, the Renfros filed this action.
II.
The Renfros contend that DHS’s investigation was incomplete and not conducted in the best interest of the child. Moreover, the Renfros argue that the six month delay in holding the required hearing and DHS’s failure to provide them with a post-hearing report summarizing the reasons for Sonya’s removal, deprived them of their constitutionally protected liberty interest without due process of law. The Renfros allege that their six year relationship with Sonya is a liberty interest entitling them to the due process protections of the United States Constitution.
While this court recognizes the strong emotional bond that might evolve in a foster care situation, we hesitate to characterize this relationship as a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The nature of the foster care relationship is distinctly different from that of the natural family; namely, it is a temporary arrangement created by state and contractual agreements. See Sherrad v. Owens, 484 F.Supp. 728 (W.D.Mich.1980), aff'd., 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.1981).
Under Ohio law, the rights and limitations of the foster care relationship are clearly defined. Foster parents have no mechanism to challenge the removal of a foster child from their care; they have no statutory right to a hearing either before or after the child has been removed; nor are they entitled to a written explanation for the agency’s action or an appeal. Ohio Admin.Code § 5101:2-47 (Title IV-E Program, 1988) and § 5139,23-04 (Standards for For Foster Homes; Approval, Non-Approval, Revocation Process, 1988). The temporary nature of the foster care relationship provides sufficient notice to all participants that their rights are limited. Therefore, the Renfros argument that these rigid legal guidelines ignore the special relationship which developed during the six years Sonya was in their care is insufficient to support a § 1983 action. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the Renfros complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
. Since the district court properly dismissed the federal claim it was also appropriate to dismiss the pendent state claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Question: What is the nature of the second listed appellant whose detailed code is not identical to the code for the first listed appellant?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 6