What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re DAWSON. STATE FINANCE CO. v. DUNN.
No. 7095.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Sept. 6, 1933.
Goldman & Altman, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Carey & Gorfinkel, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before WILBUR, SAWTELLE, and GARRECHT, Circuit Judges.
SAWTELLE, Circuit Judge.
On April 30, 1932; EL Ward Dawson was adjudicated a bankrupt in the District Court. Thereafter appellant filed with the referee in bankruptcy a petition in reclamation, setting forth that on April 13, 1932, the bankrupt borrowed from appellant the sum of $1,147; that on said date, as evidence of the loan, the bankrupt made, executed, and delivered to appellant his promissory note in the sum of $1,147; that on said date, simultaneously with the execution of the note and as security for the payment thereof, the bankrupt executed and delivered to appellant a chattel mortgage upon a certain Cadillac automobile; that the bankrupt had failed to make any payment upon said note; “that in accordance with the option contained in said chattel mortgage in the event of the failure to make payments when they become due, or in the event of the adjudication as a bankrupt of the mortgagor (bankrupt herein), your petitioner has elected to take possession of said automobile and to sell the same in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 101 of said chattel mortgage;” and petitioner prayed for an order requiring the trustee in bankruptcy to pay to petitioner the amount of the promissory note executed by the bankrupt or an order directing the trustee to deliver to petitioner the said Cadillac automobile.
The referee in bankruptcy denied the petition in reclamation on the ground that the mortgage is void as against creditors of the mortgagor, for the reasons that (1) no copy of the promissory note is attached to the mortgage; (2) the mortgage fails to set forth the name of the maker of the note; (3) the mortgage fails to set forth the due date of the note; and (4) the mortgage fails to set forth the interest rate of the note, as required by section 2056 of the Civil Code of California, the slate wherein the mortgage was executed.
The District Court affirmed the order of the referee; followed by this appeal.
Section 2956 of the Civil Code of California preseniles the form of a mortgage on personal property, which form includes a description of the property mortgaged and a description of the debt for which the mortgage is given, specifying the amount of the debt, the date due, the amount of interest payable thereon; and, in. the event the mortgage is given to secure the payment of a note, the form is to contain a description of the note.
The mortgage in question, so far as material here, reads as follows:
“This, chattel mortgage, made and executed this 13th day of April, 1932, by II. Ward Dawson, residing at 304 Hillside, Piedmont, California, mortgagor, and State Finance Company, a corporation, mortgagee, witnesseth:
“The said mortgagor hereby mortgages to the said mortgagee the following described automobile * * * as security for the payment of a promissory note of even date herewith, in the amount of Eleven Hundred Forty-Seven and/100 Dollars ($1,147.00).”
Appellant contends that section 2956 of the Civil Code does not require that a chattel mortgage set forth the due date of the note secured thereby, and further contends that “the mortgage which is before the court in the instant case, while not stating in so many words the names of the parties to the note, does clearly and definitely disclose the fact that the mortgagor was the maker of the note, and that the mortgagee was the payee.” Appellant also insists that the requirements of section 2956 are not mandatory, and that the mortgage in suit substantially complies with the provisions of that section.
In Kahximan v. Jones, 203 Cal. 254, 263 P. 537, the Supreme Court of California held invalid a mortgage which did not set f 03 th the due date of the notes executed therewith. It is there said:
“In the instant case the mortgage merely recited that it was given ‘as security for the payment of four promissory notes totaling $5,329.14, and also the repayment of all advances by the mortgagee or assigns to the mortgagor not exceeding the sum of $300/ etc. This mortgage was dated March, 1920; and the notes which were introduced in evidence and asserted to be those secured by the mortgage were dated December, 1933, and recited that they were renewals of notes given during the years 1918 and 1919'.
“It thus appears that the mortgage on its face would give no notice to third persons as to the due date of the debt secured thereby.”
In the light of that decision, and in view of the binding effect on this court of a decision by a state Supreme Court construing its own statute [National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Milligan, 10 F.(2d) 483], we cannot uphold appellant’s contention that section 3956’ does not require that a chattel mortgage set forth the due date of the note secured thereby; and accordingly it cannot be said that the mortgage here involved complies substantially with the provisions of the section.
The order of the District Court approving the order of the referee in bankruptcy is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1