What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
POTTASH et al. v. SOUTHERN COTTON OIL CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
March 6, 1926.)
No. 3389.
1. Sales <§=>85(2) — Contract that, if goods were lost, they were not to be replaced by seller, referred to loss In transit, and not to loss by fire while in seller’s possession.
Contract for sale of merchandise, providing that, if goods were lost, they were not to be replaced by seller, held to refer only to loss of cargo shipments in transit, and loss by fire while still in seller’s possession did not excuse delivery.
2. Sales <§=>201(4) — Title to merchandise sold f. o. b. Philadelphia held to remain in seller until merchandise was placed aboard cars for shipment.
Under contract for sale of merchandise f. o. b. Philadelphia, fixing future shipping dates, title remained in seller until merchandise was placed aboard cars for shipment.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Oliver B. Dickinson, Judge.
Suit by the Southern Cotton Oil Company against Max Pottash and another, trading as Pottash Bros. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.
Affirmed.
B. D. Oliensis, of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs in error.
Benjamin O. Frick, of Philadelphia, Pa. (Evans, Bayard & Frick, of Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel), for defendant in error.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY,, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
On-March 31, 1919, the firm of Pottash Bros, wrote the Southern Oil Company: “We herewith confirm sale to, you this afternoon, of 200,000 second-hand 100 lb. cotton seed meal bags measuring 22x40, all in good order, of minimum 8 oz. material, at price of' five and one-half (5%^) cents each f. o. b.. Philadelphia, for shipment August, September, and October, 1919.”
On the day following, the Oil Company replied: “We have your letter of the thirty-first, confirming' sale to us of 200,000 secondhand cotton seed meal bags, measuring 22x40 inches, at 5%0 f. o. b. Philadelphia, for shipment in August, September, October.”
In pursuance of this correspondence, the Oil Company, on April 18th, prepared and forwarded to Pottash Bros, a regular bill of sale embodying the above provisions, which, the latter signed and returned to the Oil Company. On failure of Pottash Bros, to make deliveries under the contract, the Oil Company, a corporate citizen of New York, brought suit against Pottash Bros., citizens of Pennsylvania, and recovered a verdict for the difference between the contract price and the market prices at the dates of delivery. On entry of judgment thereon, Pottash Bros, sued out this writ.
At the trial the defendant contended that, as the bill of sale provided, “If goods lost, not to be replaced by us,” and that as the defendants’ warehouse was totally and accidentally destroyed by fire on July 12, 1919, and in it bag's which they had assembled to meet the contract, they were not liable for nondelivery under the contract.
It is quite clear from the context that the words, “if goods lost, not to be replaced by us,” referred to loss of cargo shipments in transit, and had no application to a loss by fire under the conditions here involved. The present case, therefore, narrows down to a question of title, namely: Had the title to the assembled bags passed to the oil company when they were burned? That question the court decided in favor of the plaintiff, saying, “I charge you as a matter of law that the bags which were the subject-matter of this contract belonged to the seller — that is, to the defendants — up until they had put them aboard the ears for shipment to the plaintiff,” and only left to the jury to find the quantum of damages, which is not here complained of. The court committed no error in so holding.
The written contract, which has not been changed, determined the relative rights of the parties when it fixed delivery under the contract as “f. o. b. Philadelphia,” and the time of shipments as August, September, and October. The proofs that the sellers had, or were getting together, bags to meet their contract, and of the buyers knowing of that fact, in no way changed the contract, and that unchanged contract in no way deprived Pottash Bros, of their absolute ownership- of the bags until they were delivered, and conferred no title on the -buyer until the fact and time of delivery provided by the contract happened. The fire made delivery more of a hardship, but it did not prevent Pottash Bros, in any way from thereafter doing what the Oil Company had to do, namely, go into the market and buy the bags that should have been delivered under the contract.
Finding no error in the court below, its judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2