What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
K. H. BUTLER & CO., Inc., v. A CERTAIN FUND OF MONEY, etc.
(Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted October 13, 1925.
Decided November 2, 1925.)
No. 4231.
War 12 — Repayment of loan between corporations having inierioekisig directorates held not to raise presumption of fraud; money for repayment being raised personally by sole stockholder of borrowing corporation.
Where corporation A, owned by three German nationals, made substantial loan to corporation B, owned and controlled by A’s secretary, who, on Alien Property Custodian’s seizure of assets of corporation A, and demand for payment of loan, as security delivered stock of corporation B to Alien Property Custodian, who placed the same directors in charge of both corporations, and such secretary thereafter individually borrowed money to repay loan made to corporation B, and obtained return of stock of corporation B. held, on reorganization of corporation B, money paid corporation A could not be recovered in suit by corporation B against Alien Properly Custodian, under Trading with the Enemy Act, § 9 (Oomp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115%e), on . theory that there had been in fact no loan, but only a wrongful withdrawal of corporate assets of corporation B, and that, in view of the interlocking directorates, the repayment raised a presumption of fraud; there being no evidence to support such an inference.
Appeal from the Supremo Court of the District of Columbia.
Suit by K. H. Butler & Co., Inc., against a certain fund of money, Thomas W. Miller, as Alien Property Custodian, and Frank White, as Treasurer of the United States. From a decree overruling exceptions to the report of the special master, confirming the report and dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
A. K. Nippert, of Cincinnati, Ohio, and William Sabine, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
D. H. Stanley and Peyton Gordon, both of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN OESDEL, Associate Justices.
ROBB, Associate Justice.
Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia overruling appellant’s exceptions to the report of a special master, confirming that report, .and dismissing the bill which had been filed under the provisions of section 9 of the Trading with the Enemy Act (40 Stat. 419 [Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115^20]).
The case involves transactions between two New York corporations, appellant K. II. Butler & Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Butler Company), and the Felix Schoeller Paper Company, Inc. (referred to as the Paper Company); the assets of the latter company having been seized by the Alien Projicrty Custodian. The Paper Company was incorporated on April 15, 1915. Ferdinand Selvurmann was elected president and treasurer and Hermann Lange secretary. At the outbreak of the World War and subsequently its entire capital stock was owned by three German nationals residing in Germany.
Prior to the incorporation of the Butler Company on August 10, 1916, the business taken over by that company was owned and conducted by Lange. It was alleged in the bill, the evidence showed, and the special master found that Lange was the sole equitable owner of the entire capital stock of the Butler Company, and its active and sole head. On or about October 5, 1916, an agreement was entered into between these two corporations, whereby the Paper Company was to loan money to the Butler Company to an extent warranted by the business of: the latter and within the means of the former. Between October 6, 1916, and September 7, 1917, loans were made under this agreement to the amount of $107,504.55. Subsequently the Alien Property Custodian seized the stock of the Paper Company and caused new directors to be elected. These directors, finding evidence of the indebtedness of the Butler Company, entered into negotiations with Lange looking to the liquidation of that indebtedness, which Lange not only admitted, but undertook to liquidate. To that end Lange turned over the stock of the Butler Company to the new. directors as security for such payment, which enabled him to continue the business of the Butler Company.
Thereupon the directors of the Paper Company were elected directors of the Butler Company, and, following this, Lange personally raised the money with which to liquidate this indebtedness and the stock of the Butler Company was returned to him. On this point the special master found: “The evidence in this case shows, and indeed the plaintiff’s own allegation is, that the money which was paid by the Butler Company to the Paper Company was raised by Lange personally, and there is no evidence whatever that any coercion or duress was practiced upon him in the endeavor to get him to raise it. The allegation of the bill is that Lange ‘was allowed to cause the plaintiff’ to borrow this money. The evidence indicates that he borrowed the money individually, and so far as this record discloses there is nothing to induce the belief that he was not as anxious as were the Alien Property Custodian’s directors to see that the money was paid.”
Subsequently there was a reorganization of the Butler Company, and this suit was filed upon the theory that Lange borrowed no money from the Paper Company, but, instead, with, the aid of Sehurmann, wrongfully withdrew that amount from its assets, and that, inasmuch as there was an interlocking directorate when the money was recovered from the Butler Company, the situation “raised a presumption of fraud, and placed upon the Paper Company the burden of proving the propriety and fairness of the transaction.”
We see no escape from the conclusion reached by the learned trial justice. At the time of the transaction between the two companies resulting in the loan, Lange was in legal contemplation the Butler Company. He not only was the owner of all its stock, but its active head, authorized to negotiate the loan. The loan was made prior to the seizure of the Paper Company by the Alien Property Custodian, the materiality of which seems to have been overlooked by counsel for appellant.’ Lange himself liquidated the indebtedness. There is not a word of evidence even tending to refute this established fact. The stock of his company was returned to him and the transaction closed. Yet we are asked to presume that he borrowed no money from the Paper Company, and that the money he subsequently paid was obtained from .the assets of the Butler Company, although there is no evidence upon which to base such an inference.
We conclude, therefore, that it is quite immaterial where the burden of proof rested, since the decree was right under any view of the case, and accordingly is affirmed, with costs.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0