What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
In re Norman STUMES, Petitioner.
No. 82-1609.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 11, 1982.
Decided June 22, 1982.
Timothy J. McGreevy, Dana, Golden, Moore & Rasmussen, Sioux Falls, S. D., for petitioner.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and HARRIS, Senior District Judge.
The Hon. Oren Harris, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to review an order of the District Court staying the execution of this Court’s mandate pending action by the Supreme Court of the United States on a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by respondent Herman Solem. The District Court’s order entered on May 10, 1982, relies on 28 U.S.C. Section 2101(f) as authority for its ruling. We are not persuaded that Section 2101(f) grants the District Court this authority. The statute provides that in any case in which the final judgment of any court is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, the execution and enforcement of such judgment may be stayed for a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari. The statute further provides that the stay “may be granted by a judge of the court rendering the judgment or decree or by a justice of the Supreme Court . . . . ” It appears, therefore, that only a judge of this Court, or a justice of the Supreme Court, is empowered by 28 U.S.C. Section 2101(f) to stay the execution or enforcement of this Court’s judgment. Respondent Solem could have applied to this Court for a stay of its mandate, but he did not do so, and this Court’s mandate issued on April 23, 1982.
We are nevertheless of the opinion that relief by mandamus would be inappropriate in the circumstances of this case. This Court’s opinion, filed on March 1,1982, did not direct the District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus unconditionally. Our order was that the writ be issued “discharging Stumes from custody unless the State commences proceedings to try him again within such reasonable time as the District Court may fix.” Stumes v. Solem, 671 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1982). The District Court’s stay order of May 10, 1982, in effect does no more than hold that the reasonable time within which Stumes should be retried should be determined with the fact in mind that the State has applied for review in the Supreme Court. The District Court, in other words, seems to have taken the view that it would be unreasonable to release petitioner, or to require that the State begin to try him again, before the Supreme Court has acted on the State’s petition. Certainly this is not an unreasonable view, and we are not prepared to say that the District Court abused its discretion, though, as indicated above, we cannot agree with its reliance upon 28 U.S.C. Section 2101(f).
The State’s petition for certiorari was filed on April 30, 1982. In the ordinary course, the Supreme Court can be expected to grant or deny the petition before the Court rises at the end of its present term, some time around the end of this month.
The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0