What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
UEBERSEE FINANZ-KORPORATION, A. G., v. McGRATH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUCCESSOR TO THE ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN.
No. 178.
Argued January 2, 1952.
Decided April 7, 1952.
Thurman Arnold argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Edward J. Ennis and Harry M. Plotkin.
James L. Morrisson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Baynton, Myron C. Baum and Joseph Laujer.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia for the return of certain of its property vested by the Alien Property Custodian in 1942 under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 411, as amended by the First War Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839. The District Court found for the Custodian, 82 F. Supp. 602, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 88 U. S. App. D. C. 182, 191 F. 2d 327. We granted certiorari, 342 U. S. 847.
The following facts were found by the District Court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals upon an abundance of evidence in the record. In 1931, Wilhelm von Opel, a citizen and resident national of Germany, owned certain shares of stock in the Adam Opel Works, a German corporation largely owned by General Motors Corporation. Wilhelm had an agreement with General Motors to sell his shares at a price. In 1931, he became alarmed at business conditions in Germany and desired to get his stock out of the country to save his investment for himself and his family from the economic and governmental influences there prevailing. In that year, he and his wife entered into what was known under German law as a usufruct agreement with their only son, Fritz, who had not lived in Germany since 1929 and for that reason was not subject to the German restrictions upon the handling of this property. By this agreement, Wilhelm’s title to the shares in the Adam Opel Works was transferred to Fritz. The instrument provided as follows:
“The usufruct in the shares is not assigned to Fritz von Opel. It remains with Wilhelm von Opel and his wife . . . until the death of the survivor of them. However, 20% of all dividends and interest received will accrue to Fritz von Opel.”
The instrument provided further that if Fritz died before his parents and without issue, the transfer was to be void and was to revert to his parents, the transferors. If the parents died before Fritz, he was to have the property as an advancement, to be deducted from his share in his parents’ estate. The usufruct income not drawn by the parents was also to be accounted for by Fritz as an advancement.
After much expert testimony, the District Court found the law of Germany pertaining to such usufruct agreement to be as follows:
“52. A right of usufruct, once established, is under German law an in rem right in property. A person having a usufruct in property has a right:
“(a) to the enjoyment of the property or, in the case of money or securities, to the income from the securities;
“(b) to co-possession of the property together with the person holding legal title to the property;
“(c) to a voice in the management of the property insofar as the maintenance and preservation of the usufructuary’s rights under subsection (a) above are concerned;
“(d) to prevent the sale or disposition of the property as a result of his right to co-possession ;
“(e) the German Civil Code does not mention whether the usufructuary, for the protection of his income, has any voting rights. In the absence of a decided case the legal commentaries speculate in three different directions. One position is that the title owner has all voting rights and the usufructuary no voting rights whatsoever. The second position is that the title owner has a voting right for all measures which have nothing to do with income while the usufructuary can vote in regard to income. The third position is that the usufructuary has all the voting rights.” R. 60-61; 82 F. Supp. 602, 605.
Under this agreement, Wilhelm and his wife had a usufruct in the Adam Opel stock transferred to Fritz. The latter, on October 17, 1931, sold the usufruct property to General Motors, in accordance with the contract which Wilhelm had with that company. In order to protect the several interests involved, the proceeds of the sale were transferred to petitioner, a Swiss corporation acquired by Fritz for this purpose. Eventually these funds were used to purchase stocks, later transferred to petitioner, in corporations organized under the various states of the United States, from which derived the stocks vested by the Alien Property Custodian. Fritz owned 97% of the stock of petitioner. Under the German law, as found by the District Court, a usufructuary may follow the ascertainable proceeds of the original property subject to the usufruct. Therefore, the stocks purchased by petitioner with the proceeds of the sale of the usufruct property were subject to and were treated as subject to the usufruct agreement.
On June 7, 1935, Fritz placed all but three shares of the capital stock of petitioner in a safety deposit box in Zurich, Switzerland, and gave the key thereto to Hans Frankenberg, who received it as agent of Wilhelm von Opel. Frankenberg had become the managing director of petitioner at Wilhelm’s request in 1932, and exercised control over petitioner’s investments until the vesting of the property herein involved. By the delivery to Wilhelm’s agent of the key to the box containing petitioner’s stock, there was thus transferred to Wilhelm possession of the res, subject to the usufruct; and the usufruct agreement was thereby consummated. Fritz also engaged in activities on behalf of petitioner concerning its investments, but under the guidance of Wilhelm or his agent, Frankenberg.
Neither Wilhelm nor his wife ever drew any income from the usufruct. An oil lease owned by one of the American corporations whose stock was purchased with proceeds from the sale of the Adam Opel shares to General Motors, was sold, and the proceeds of that sale used to pay a fine of Wilhelm in Germany. Expenses of a trip by Wilhelm to South America and one to Hungary were paid by petitioner and charged against the income account of Fritz.
Petitioner owned all the stock of a subsidiary Hungarian corporation engaged in the mining of bauxite in Hungary, and in 1939 and 1940 guaranteed a loan by a Swiss bank to this corporation for its operations. The loan was repaid in November 1942. The United States was at war with Hungary from December 13, 1941. During October, November, and December 1941, the Hungarian corporation shipped bauxite to Germany and had a contract to do so until the end of 1942.
In 1942, the Alien Property Custodian vested the stocks held by petitioner in several American corporations and all the right, title, and interest of petitioner in and to a certain contract with another American corporation. All of the stocks had been acquired from the proceeds of the original usufruct property.
From October 5, 1931, the date of the usufruct agreement, the usufruct property was controlled, used, and in all ways handled and directed by Wilhelm and his managing agents. The interest of Fritz in petitioner was wholly subordinated to that of Wilhelm. Fritz had the bare legal title and the right to 20% of the income from the property. Wilhelm is now dead. His wife, a daughter, and the son, Fritz, still survive.
Petitioner was in this Court on the pleadings in this case in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A. G., 332 U. S. 480. There, it was alleged in the complaint that petitioner was not an enemy or ally of an enemy, and that at no time specified in the complaint had the property in question been owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by an enemy, an ally of an enemy, or a national of a designated enemy country; that none of the property had been owing or belonging to or held on account of or for the benefit of any such person or interest. This Court construed these allegations “to mean that the property is free of all enemy taint and particularly that the corporations whose shares have been seized, the corporations which have a contract in which respondent has an interest, and respondent itself, are companies in which no enemy, ally of an enemy, nor any national of either has any interest of any kind whatsoever, and that respondent has not done business in the territory of the enemy or any ally of an enemy.” P. 482. The complaint alleging such facts was held to be sufficient as against a motion to dismiss, and the case was sent back for trial. Upon the trial, the facts were found as above stated.
However, from the facts found, it is clear that petitioner for all practical purposes was, to the extent of 97%, largely owned, managed, used, and controlled by Wilhelm von Opel, a national of Germany. The findings demonstrate that petitioner was a corporate holding company acquired for the purpose of enabling Wilhelm to control and use his property as he saw fit. His interest was paramount and controlling. The interest of Fritz was wholly and in reality subordinated to Wilhelm’s, except as to the right of Fritz to receive 20% of the income from the usufruct property. Petitioner was neutral in name only. Its enemy taint was all but complete because of the predominant influence and control of Wilhelm. Wilhelm had and used the substance, while Fritz had the bare legal title; and such right as this gave Fritz, he exercised or failed to exercise in complete subordination to the will of his father. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said:
“This case does not involve a diluted 'taint’; it involves the ownership by enemy nationals of the economic benefits of American business.” 88 U. S. App. D. C. at 183, 191 F. 2d at 328.
Before 1941 the property here involved could not have been vested, because this petitioner was a corporation of a neutral country, Switzerland, unless such corporation was shown to be doing business in an enemy country or in the country of an ally of an enemy. Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457; Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A. G., supra. But on December 18,1941, Congress amended the Trading with the Enemy Act by the passage of the First War Powers Act, 1941, 55 Stat. 839, and gave respondent power to vest any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof in said property. However, under § 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, one not an enemy, as defined in § 2 of said Act, can recover any interest, right, or title which he has in the property so vested. As construed by this Court in Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A. G., supra, § 2 included in the word “enemy” all corporations affected with an “enemy taint.” Since we find petitioner to be so affected because of the direct and indirect control and domination by an enemy national, Wilhelm von Opel, petitioner cannot recover under § 9 (a).
It is suggested that vested property must be returned unless there is proof of actual use of the property for economic warfare against the United States. The crucial fact is not the actual use by an enemy-tainted corporation of its power in economic warfare against the United States. It is the existence of that power that is controlling and against which the Government of the United States may move. The Government does not have to wait for the enemy to do its worst before it acts. Cf. Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268 at 306.
As the District Court said, it would be difficult “to find a stronger case of enemy taint in vested property short of full ownership by an enemy than exists in this case. ■ The neutral aspect of ownership in the property is insignificant . . . .” 82 F. Supp. at 606.
In view of the decision today in Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, ante, p. 156, consideration must be given to an effort of petitioner to open the case for the assertion of the rights of Fritz von Opel.
Petitioner attempted at the end of the litigation in the District Court to have the case reopened for the purpose of asserting and establishing the nonenemy status of Fritz von Opel. Because of the failure to diligently and timely assert the interest of Fritz, the District Court refused to reopen the case for further consideration of such separate interest.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as to petitioner, but in view of the novel holding in Kaufman, the Court is of the opinion that its decision in Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, is applicable. We accordingly vacate the judgment of the court below and remand the cause to the District Court for consideration, in the light of Kaufman and this opinion, of any application that may be made on behalf of Fritz von Opel within 30 days from the date of remand, and in all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 4