What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
William J. GOODSON, Petitioner, v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent.
No. 78-1074.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Jan. 15, 1979.
Decided March 16, 1979.
Alan Wasserman, Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, for petitioner.
Arthur A. Arfa, Gen. Atty., Railroad Retirement Bd. with whom Dale G. Zimmerman, Gen. Counsel, and Edward S. Hintzke, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Railroad Retirement Bd., Chicago, Ill., were on brief, for respondent.
Before LEVENTHAL and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges and 0BERD0RFER , United States District Court Judge for the District of Columbia.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(a).
PER CURIAM:
This case comes before the court on appeal from a decision of the Railroad Retirement Board. We remand this case for further proceedings.
Appellant, a former laborer for the Union Pacific Railroad, is currently receiving an annuity under section 2(a)4 of the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 228b(a)4. In order to receive this annuity, appellant had to demonstrate that medical factors precluded continued performance of his regular occupation.
The issue is whether appellant is also entitled to a determination of a “period of disability” under section 3(e) of the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 228c(e), which would increase his benefits. To qualify for these higher benefits, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity.” The Board held that appellant failed to meet this standard.
Appellant suffers from a spinal condition that causes severe back and neck pain. To alleviate this pain, appellant must be placed in traction at least twice a day. The Board acknowledged that appellant’s condition was painful, but stated that the pain was not so severe as to render appellant totally disabled. In reaching this decision, the Board relied on the testimony of several physicians, and stressed the diagnosis of appellant’s personal physician, Dr. Shanks. The doctors concluded that appellant could perform sedentary work not requiring extensive bending from the neck, and on that basis the Board concluded that appellant was capable of performing substantial gainful employment.
Appellant's counsel has moved to supplement the record to introduce a letter from Dr. Shanks indicating that his conclusion that appellant was capable of performing sedentary work was premised on appellant’s continued use of the traction therapy. If appellant must be placed in traction several times a day, he clearly cannot work on a full time basis. “Ability to work only a few hours a day or to work on an intermittent basis is not ability to engage in a ‘substantial gainful activity’ . . .” Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1973). This is not to say that the Board must demonstrate that a claimant is capable of working an eight hour day, for under certain circumstances part time employment may constitute substantial gainful activity, e. g., Wesley v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 385 F.Supp. 863, 866 (D.C.D.C. 1974). But the Board must demonstrate that a claimant can engage in “(substantial services with reasonable regularity in some competitive employment .” Rivas v. Weinberger, supra, 475 F.2d at 258.
The court recognizes that the Board need not demonstrate the existence of particular jobs for which appellant would actually be hired, Meneses v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 143 U.S. App.D.C. 81, 84, 442 F.2d 803, 806 (1971). But once appellant demonstrated that he was unable to continue in his former occupation, the Board had the burden of showing the existence of work in the national economy for a person of appellant’s age, education, work experience and physical disabilities, id. In appellant’s case part of his physical disability is the need to undergo traction several times a day. The Board must ascertain whether there is gainful activity available for a person of appellant’s age and skill (or lack of it) who requires traction to the extent appellant requires it.
On the record before us, two matters are unclear. First, we are unable to determine whether the Board considered the continued need for the traction treatment in determining that appellant’s pain did not preclude the performance of substantial gainful employment. Second, assuming the Board did consider the use of the traction in evaluating appellant’s pain level, it is unclear whether the Board’s decision that appellant was capable of engaging in substantial activity rested on a showing of the availability of part time employment.
The Board's opinion requires clarification. On further consideration, it has the latitude to decide that the supplement to the record warrants a change in result. The Board’s order is vacated and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with the foregoing.
. At oral argument it was stated that if appellant qualified for the increased benefits he would receive an additional $200 a month. Appellant would also receive a lump sum payment of approximately $10,400 for back benefits due through December 31, 1978. In addition, by paying an eight dollar monthly premium, appellant would receive Medicare benefits even though he is under sixty-five.
. Section 3(e) of the Railroad Retirement Act incorporates the definition of disability found in section 216 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416. It is in section 216 of the Social Security Act that the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” language can be found. Because of the reliance on the Social Security Act’s definition of disability, many courts have relied on Social Security precedents in reviewing Railroad Retirement Act cases, e. g., Goodwin v. Railroad Retirement Board, 546 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1977), and we shall do so here.
. The motion is hereby granted. We note that appellant was not represented by counsel before the Board. The Board’s counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the Board might reasonably find “that the traction could be applied before and after working hours.” However, the Board did not focus on that point in its decision, and in our view granting the motion would be in the interest of justice.
. See note 3, supra.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0