What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES.
No. 8038.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Oct. 7, 1942.
Decided Jan. 22, 1943.
John E. Laughlin, Jr., of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Paul S. McMahon, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before BIGGS, MARIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.
BIGGS, Circuit Judge.
The Producers Steamship Company filed its capital stock tax return for the taxable year ending June 30, 1936, and set the value of its stock at $6,000,000. Producers began liquidation on November 30, 1936, and was formally dissolved by the action of its stockholder on December 24, 1936. National Steel Corporation, which was its sole stockholder, is its transferee and assignee. Producers, as we have shown, continued in business during a portion of the taxable year ending June 30, 1937. It filed a capital stock tax return for that year, declared an adjusted value for its stock of $2,938,157.65 and paid a capital stock tax of $2,938. It arrived at the adjusted declared value by adding to the amount of its 1936 declaration a sum representing its net income for the current year and deducting therefrom cash in the amount of $129,882.83 and assets of the fair market value of $3,426,474.34 which it distributed in its liquidation.
About four years later, at the request of National, the last board of directors of Producers filed a claim against the United States which asserted that National, as the assignee of Producers, was entitled to recover the amount of the capital stock tax paid by Producers for the taxable year ending June 30, 1937. The basis of this claim and of National’s instant suit may be stated as follows.
Conceding that Producers was compelled to pay a capital stock tax for the year ending June 30, 1937, since it did business within that taxable year, National says that the adjusted declared value of Producers stock for the year ending June 30, 1937, was zero because Producers distributed to National in that year cash and assets which represented the full value of Producers capital stock. In other words, National asserts that since all of the assets of Producers were distributed before the end of the calendar year 1936 and the value of those assets was fixed by Producers at $6,000,000, the adjusted declared value referred to in Section 105(f) of the Revenue Act of 1935, c. 829, 49 Stat. 1014, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, page 796, was zero because $6,000,000 worth of assets had been distributed.
The validity of National’s position turns of course upon the interpretation to be given the word “value” employed in Section 105 (f) (A) of the statute, “the value of property distributed in liquidation to shareholders * * * ”. The United States takes the position that the word value refers to fair market value. National asserts that the word cannot have this meaning because a corresponding section of a subsequent revenue act provides expressly that the declared value should be adjusted downward by the “cash and fair market value of property” distributed in liquidation. Article 43 of Treasury Regulations 64, 1934 Edition, provides in part that the adjusted declared value shall be determined by deducting the value of the property distributed to shareholders in liquidation or partial liquidation and that “The value of such property shall be determined as of the date of such distribution. * * * ” The date of distribution in the case at bar was November 30, 1936. If the Treasury Regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute then the value of the property distributed must be ascertained as of that date. It would follow that the value put upon the assets of the corporation in its original capital stock tax return nearly a year before would not be available as evidence of value and the contention of National must fail. The article of the Treasury Regulation referred to seems to us to constitute a reasonable and proper interpretation of the language of the statute.
We think that Congress in employing the word - “value” in Section 105 (f) (A) of the 1935 Act meant that the property distributed to stockholders should be given its actual or real value. Fair market value is evidence of actual value. The fair market value of the property distributed by Producers to National in accordance with Producers’ own statement on its 1937 return was $3,426,474.34. The value of property distributed cannot be measured in terms of the declared value stated in the original capital stock tax return for the additional reason that the value so declared is an elected value and may be pure fiction. American Viscose Corporation v. Rothensies, 3 Cir., 121 F.2d 186; First Nat. Pictures v. United States, Ct.Cl., 32 F.Supp. 138. The taxpayer in the case at bar put too high a valuation on its capital stock in its original return. That burden must be borne by its successor. It follows that the amount paid by Producers as capital stock tax for the year ending June 30, 1937, was due and owing.
The judgment of the court below, is affirmed.
The appellant refers to this Act as the Revenue Act of 1937. Actually the express provision to which National refers is contained in Section 601(f) (3) (E) (i) of the Revenue Act of 1938. See 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, page 1140.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0