What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Alexander L. VINCZE, an Individual; O. K. Transfer Co., a Corporation; Pioneer Truck Rentals, Inc., a Corporation; and Drivers Service, Inc., a Corporation, Appellants, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appellee, Bend-Portland Truck Service et al., Intervenor-Appellees.
No. 16327.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 17, 1959.
John M. Hickson, C. J. Stocklen, Portland, Or., R. B. Maxwell, Klamath Falls, Or., for appellants.
William L. Harrison, Attorney, Interstate Commerce Comm., Sari Francisco, Cal., C. E. Luckey, U. S. Atty., Robert R. Carney, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., William Adams, Portland, Or., for appellees.
Before HEALY and HAMLIN, Circuit Judges, and WOLLENBERG, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
The only question before this Court is whether or not there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the district court’s order enjoining the defendants from engaging in common or contract carriage in interstate commerce without a certificate or permit as required by 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 306(a) and 309(a). F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
The record discloses sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the defendants, acting in concert, are a single operating company engaged in interstate commerce in.violation of §§ 306(a) and 309(a). The evidence briefly stated is as follows: The individual defendant, Alexander L. Vincze, was one of the' original incorporators of both corporate defendants, Pioneer Truck Rentals (hereafter called “Pioneer”), and Drivers Service (hereafter called “Drivers”). He held 98% of the stock of each of these corporations until six months subsequent to the commencement of this action. At. that time Mr. Vincze, while still retaining his 98% of the stock of Pioneer, transferred his stock interest in Drivers to Grant Beeney, a former Pioneer employee. Mr. Beeney, after assigning the Drivers stock to Lome Pratt, also a former Pioneer employee, is once again employed by Pioneer. Pioneer leases trucks to prospective shippers. Drivers furnishes the truck drivers to operate these trucks. Some of the trucks leased by Pioneer are in turn leased to Pioneer by the owner-operators who are employed by Drivers. Defendant O. K. Transfer Company is the owner of certain equipment and has from time to time permitted use of its equipment by the other defendants. Mr. Vincze is the principal stockholder of O. K. Transfer Company. Both Pioneer and Drivers share a single office at Portland and Klamath Falls, Oregon, and Los Angeles, California. Only Pioneer has a telephone listing at the above cities. The solicitation of prospective shippers is done by Pioneer employees who offer the facilities of both Pioneer and Drivers. Drivers’ employees ordinarily sign both the Pioneer’s (truck lease) and the Drivers’ (services of the truck driver) contracts at the time and place of pickup, which is usually the shipper’s place of business. The truck drivers (Drivers’ employees) are. hired, fired, dispatched, and otherwise under the control and direction of Mr. Vincze or other Pioneer employees. Pioneer hired Drivers to perform its clerical and accounting work. Since Pioneer does not have any employees in Klamath Falls, Mr. Pratt, president of Drivers, handles operations for Pioneer in that city. Drivers does not have any employees at Portland or Los Angeles. Certain employees are authorized to draw checks on the account of both corporations.
The brief resume of facts set forth above is typical, but by no means exhaustive, of the evidence supporting the conclusion that A. L. Vincze dominates and controls the operations, personnel, and facilities of Pioneer and Drivers, which, in fact, form a single operating unit - carrying on the business of a common or contract carrier. The facts conclusively demonstrate that the services and facilities of Pioneer and Drivers are intended to be, and in fact are mutually dependent. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that no shipper has ever attempted to use the services of Drivers independently of the services of Pioneer.
The Interstate Commerce Act is designed to regulate all persons who engage as interstate common or contract carriers for the transportation of property. Compliance with the Act can not be evaded by the mere use of form where, as here, the substance and effect of the scheme bring it within the Act’s purview. A subterfuge such as is shown here can not prevail.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 4