What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ulpiano VARELA CARTAGENA, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Ramon LOPEZ ROSA, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 7066, 7067.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
June 28, 1968.
Manuel Nelson Zapata, New York City, with whom Santos P. Amadeo and Gerardo Ortiz Del Rivero, San Juan, P. R., were on brief, for appellants.
Charles E. Figueroa, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Francisco A. Gil, Jr., U. S. Atty., and Blas C. Herrero, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., were on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants Cartagena and Rosa are two of three defendants tried under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 472 for conspiracy to pass and for passing counterfeit money. Both were convicted. The third defendant, Rodriguez, was acquitted. Error is principally alleged in the district court’s refusal to grant written and oral motions to sever trial of appellants and Rodriguez on the ground of conflicting defenses and the disclosure by counsel for the latter that his client’s testimony could be substantially damaging to codefendants.
Where, as here, the joinder requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b) are satisfied, relief in this court is available only upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing severance under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 199-200 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 816, 87 S.Ct. 36, 17 L.Ed.2d 55 (1966). We find none on the facts of this case. To be sure, the effect of Rodriguez’ testimony was to exculpate himself and to inculpate appellants. His defense was not that none of the alleged acts occurred or that he did not himself pass counterfeit money but that, having had no knowledge that it was counterfeit, he lacked the requisite mens rea for conviction. His testimony was that he was walking outside his home, was given a ride to town by appellants, and was persuaded to go to the patron saint’s festivities in another town. In the course of an evening of drinking, he and appellant Rosa each made several separate purchases of rum with a twenty dollar bill received from appellant Cartagena on each occasion. At the last stop, when a bill was discovered as counterfeit, appellants left precipitately by car, leaving Rodriguez behind to face the music.
This testimony contained no admissions attributable to appellants. It was unlike the testimony in many conspiracy cases in which incriminating statements by a non-testifying co-conspirator are admissible from the lips of a testifying co-conspirator in a joint trial or not at all. Rodriguez’ testimony in this case would have been competent at appellants’ separate trial had one been granted. Whether Rodriguez were to be tried before or after Cartagena and Rosa, whether at the time of such trial he had been convicted, acquitted or were still an accused, he would in all probability still have been a witness for the government and could have as effectively damaged appellants. We see no prejudice here, to say nothing of a strong showing of prejudice. Sagansky v. United States, supra at 199.
Three other points are raised for the first time in this appeal, without objection having been taken below or noted in the statement of points on appeal as required by our rule 23(2). Neither singly nor in combination do they rise to the level of plain error noticeable under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
The first of these asserted errors is that counsel for Rodriguez, in the course of a lengthy summation stressing credibility, twice mentioned that his client had testified and subjected himself to cross-examination. The record is bereft of any mention of appellants’ silence or any guile or innuendo. It is in sharp contrast to the situation in either Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225 (1st Cir. 1965), or De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). The privilege against self-incrimination of a co-defendant who does not choose to testify does not go so far as to deprive one who does so choose of effective argument in his behalf, so long as it is, as it was here, sensitive to the rights of others. Cf. United States v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 904, 86 S.Ct. 239, 15 L.Ed.2d 157 (1965); United States v. Parness, 331 F.2d 703 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 801, 85 S.Ct. 10, 13 L.Ed.2d 20 (1964).
A second alleged error is that the court charged that all witnesses are presumed to speak the truth and that a presumption “is a deduction or a conclusion which the law requires you to make under certain circumstances. * * * ” Appellants cite our disapproval of such an instruction in McMillen v. United States, 386 F.2d (1st Cir. 1967). But unlike the situation in McMillen where we found plain error, the court below did not fail to give an appropriate instruction as to accomplice testimony, there was no other error interacting with the presumption instruction to elevate it to plain error, and there was adequate corroborating evidence apart from Rodriguez’ testimony.
Finally, appellants charge error in the closing argument of Rodriguez’ counsel who, referring to the evidence that Rodriguez had given a statement to the police, argued that had his testimony varied from the statement, there would have been an attempt to impeach him. Appellants seek to equate this with an improper use of a prior consistent statement. To assert such a ground as plain error indicates only that our strictures in Dichner v. United States, 348 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1965), have not yet reached all of their intended audience.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0