What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ESTATE of Evelyn McGLOTHLIN, Deceased, Ray McGlothlin, Jr., Executor, and Ray McGlothlin, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 23161.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1967.
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 23, 1967.
Ronald M. Mankoff, Wentworth, T. Durant, Durant, Mankoff & Davis, Dallas, Tex., for petitioners.
Mitchell Rogovin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Hu S. Vandervort, Jr., Atty., I. R. S., Richard M. Roberts, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Meyer Rothwacks, Jonathan S. Cohen, Harry Baum, Lee A. Jackson, Attys. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and JONES and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.
TUTTLE, Chief Judge:
This petition for review of a decision of the Tax Court attacks the decision of that court denying as a deduction under Section 165(c) (2), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as a loss incurred in a transaction that was entered into for profit, a substantial sum paid by the taxpayer pursuant to an indemnity agreement which he gave as part of a merger of his corporation with another corporation. The Tax Court held that this expenditure was of a capital nature and was to be added to the cost basis of the stock received on the merger exchange. The term “taxpayer” or “McGlothlin” used in this opinion will refer to Ray McGlothlin, and the personal representative of his deceased wife. The MeGlothins filed a joint federal income tax return on the cash method of accounting for the tax year in question.
The issue arose in the following manner. Prior to November 4, 1955, taxpayer owned something more than 94 percent of all of the capital stock of Petroleum Products Refining and Producing Company. This company owned mineral lands in Texas and it also owned three ranches and an oil refinery. During the year 1955, taxpayer was approached by Walter Seligman, a founder and president of Texas Calgary Company, which company owned oil properties in other states. Texas Calgary stock was held by approximately 3,000 shareholders and it was publicly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The proposal was that Petroleum Products would be merged into Texas Calgary and the resulting stock would be listed on the American Stock Exchange. The exchange of stock would, of course, depend upon the agreed values to be assigned to the assets of the two companies.
The three ranches belonging to Petroleum Products were carried on the books of that company at $898,014.08. During negotiations the fair value of these ranches was questioned, but taxpayer undertook to guarantee that these ranches were worth at least $200,000 in excess of the book value, or $1,098,014.08.
The directors of Texas Calgary also objected to the inclusion of the oil refinery in the assets to be included upon the merger. Thereupon, taxpayer caused Petroleum Products to sell the oil refinery to him, thus eliminating it from the assets to be included at the time of the exchange. Subject to the approval of the stockholders, a contract was entered into on November 4, 1955, between the two corporations under the terms of which 6,215,928 shares of Texas Calgary stock (this represented 62 percent of the outstanding stock) was to be given to Petroleum Products stockholders in return for their surrendering their stock in that company.
The assets of Petroleum Products at the time of the exchange excluded the oil refinery, as indicated above, but included the three ranches and McGlothlin’s personal guaranty that they would produce to the company within two years a minimum of $1,098,414,14.
On January 25, 1956, the stockholders of Texas Calgary approved the increase of its authorized stock to ten million shares, and the exchange of 6,215,928 for all of the stock of Petroleum Products. This exchange was then consummated shortly thereafter. There is a further agreement that after the merger, Ray Mc-Glothlin would be elected president of the merged companies, at a salary of $25,000 a year. Upon the merger, in 1956, he assumed this office which he held until April 10, 1959.
The company sought unsuccessfully for a couple of years to sell the ranches at what it considered to be a fair price, but these efforts were unsuccessful and, on June 1, 1958, the directors called on McGlothlin to satisfy his obligation on the ranch guaranty. McGlothlin worked out a transaction whereby he would acquire the remaining ranch properties at a sum which, when supplemented by a payment of $261,968.74 by McGlothlin, fully
satisfied the guaranty. McGlothlin made this payment on or about December 18, 1958. On or about April 10, 1959, taxpayer sold all of his Texas Calgary stock and resigned from his position of president and director of Texas Calgary. Upon the sale, taxpayer reported no cost basis in the Texas Calgary stock.
On his income tax return for the taxable year ended May 31, 1959, taxpayer claimed a deduction in the amount of $261,968.74 for “loss on ranch guaranty.” The Commissioner disallowed this deduction and the proceedings in'the Tax Court followed.
In that proceeding, the taxpayer contended that the $261,968.74 payment was a deductible loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit within the purview of Section 165(c) (2) of the 1954 Code.
The Tax Court held that this agreement could not have produced a personal profit for the taxpayer, although recognizing that he had entered into the transaction in order to end up by holding stock that was listed on the American Stock Exchange. The Court held that the payment was more nearly like a capital cost, and that it should result in increasing taxpayer’s basis for his Texas Calgary stock.
From the decision of the Tax Court, taxpayer then took this review to this court.
On this appeal, the Commissioner does not fully support the Tax Court’s conclusion that the transaction was not one entered into for profit, but does strongly contend that the transaction truly represented a payment of this amount as part of the cost of acquisition of the Texas Calgary stock. Moreover, the respondent urges that even though the transaction be considered to have created a loss within the contemplation of the income tax statutes, the loss was not one that could be recognized because it was a part of the tax-free reorganization involving Petroleum Products and Texas Calgary.
Petitioner here relies heavily on his argument that the scope of the “transaction” contemplated by Section 165(c) (2) means the “total transaction” and that it is not limited by the bounds of the particular payment obligation which gives rise to the loss. Appellant quotes from Mertens as follows:
“If the original transaction, consisting of several integral components was entered into for profit, all the components making up the one indivisible transaction are a part of a profit transaction.”
Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Sec. 28.34.
Petitioner cites Majorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, 40 B.T.A. 214, aff’d 116 F. 2d 642 (2 Cir.), cert. denied 313 U.S. 558, 61 S.Ct. 1111, 85 L.Ed. 1543, as authority for the proposition that the discharge of a guaranty in connection with a stock transaction brings it within the contemplation of the statute as a transaction entered into for profit.
The difficulty with this, it seems to us, is that the guaranty entered into by Mc-Glothlin was required by the other party to the merger as a condition for completing the exchange of stock of Texas Calgary for Petroleum Products. Thus, it was part of the “purchase price” of the Texas Calgary stock. As such, it was part of the cost of acquisition of a capital asset. This represents a capital expenditure which must be added to the cost basis of the investment and is to be reflected in the gain or loss realized upon ultimate disposition of the investment. See United States v. St. Joe Paper Co., 5 Cir., 284 F.2d 430, where we repeated what we had earlier said to the effect that “all sums expended toward the acquisition, protection, or preservation of title to property from or by means of which income is intended to be produced are capital expenditures.” Jones Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 127 F.2d 231, 232.
Conceptually, it would seem that if the taxpayer’s argument here were correct, then a loss sustained by any person upon buying a capital asset, if the loss resulted from the transfer of property at less than the basis in the hands of the taxpayer, would constitute a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit. No such construction can possibly be supported.
Furthermore, there is much logic in the Government’s contention that, even though there be what under normal tax concepts would amount to a loss here, the taxpayer would not be entitled to claim it as an ordinary loss for the year 1959 because of the tax free reorganization provision of Section 368(a) (1) of the 1954 Code. Taxpayer asserts, and we agree, that the guaranty was given as an integral part of the contract for exchange of stock between the two merging companies. As such, “no loss from the exchange * * * shall be recognized.” Section 354(a) (1). See W. D. Haden & Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 588. We agree that even though the indemnity was paid at a later year, the payment was in discharge of an obligation made as a part of the tax free reorganization. See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 344 U.S. 6, 73 S.Ct. 71, 97 L.Ed. 6.
The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.
. Paragraph 10 of the Agreement provided as follows:
“Ray McGlothlin individually and personally guarantees that in the event that the three (3) ranch properties included in the assets of Petroleum Products Refining and Producing Company, with a present fair value of one million ninety-eight thousand four hundred fourteen ($1,098,414.14) dollars and fourteen cents, are not sold by January 15, 1958, for an amount not less than the present fair value, that the said Ray McGlothlin will personally guarantee that upon six (6) months’ notice by the Board of Directors of Texas Calgary, Texas Calgary shall receive full payment for such ranches or such ranch properties as remain, said payment to be no less than the present fair value of the ranch properties. If the Board of Directors of Texas Calgary rejects a bona fide offer to purchase the aforesaid ranch properties for an amount not less than the present fair value of said properties, or in the event that the Board of Directors of Texas Calgary rejects a bona fide offer to purchase the aforesaid ranch properties for an amount less than the present fair value of the said properties, said Ray McGlothlin, having agreed to pay the difference between the present fair value and the offering price, then, and in either event, the said Ray McGlothlin is fully discharged from the obligation arising from the guarantee contained in this Paragraph.”
. Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
“Sec. 165, LOSSES.
(c) Limitation on Losses of Individuals. — In the case of an individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to—
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or business; and * * * * *»
(26 U.S.C.1958 ed., Sec. 165.)

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0