What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FRANKLIN INVESTMENT CO., Inc., a corporation, Appellant, v. Walter N. TOBRINER, et al., constituting the Board of Commissioners for the District of Columbia, Appellees.
No. 16287.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 17, 1961.
Decided Dec. 7, 1961.
Mr. John T. Bonner, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. John R. Hess, Asst. . Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, with whom Messrs. Chester H. Gray, Corp. Counsel, Milton D. Korman, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Hubert B. Pair, Asst. Corp. Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Bazelon, Bastían and Burger, Circuit Judges.
BURGER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, a corporation engaged in the business of financing the purchase of automobiles, appeals from an adverse summary judgment rendered by the District Court in a suit for declaratory judgment. Appellant challenges the validity of portions of See. 304 of the .Regulations Governing the Businesses of Buying, Selling and Financing of Motor Vehicles in the District of Columbia, Order No. 60-2219 as being beyond the scope of authority granted by Congress.
This regulation was issued by the District Commissioners pursuant to Public Law 86-431 which authorized the Commissioners under § 2(e) (1) to make and enforce regulations “specifying the types and maximum amounts of insuranee which may be required, at the expense of the retail buyer [of automobiles], to protect from loss the seller in a retail installment transaction * 74 Stat. 69 (1960), 40 D.C. Code Ann. § 902 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
The important portions of the assailed regulation promulgated by the Commissioners under this authority read as follows:
“Section 304. Types and Amounts of Insurance
“(a) A buyer who executes a retail installment contract may be required to provide, at his own cost, insurance covering the motor vehicle for the protection of the holder. The insurance so required shall be limited to (1) collision insurance with a deductible of at least $50, (2) towing and labor costs, and (3) comprehensive or fire and theft, with or without combined additional coverage. * * *
“(b) With the agreement of the buyer, charges, not exceeding the premiums chargeable under applicable law, may be included in the retail installment contract for the cost of the following types of insurance: automobile bodily injury and property damage caused others, automobile medical payments and credit life. No costs shall be included in the retail installment contract for any type of insurance not authorized by this section. (Emphasis added.) Regulations Governing the Businesses of Buying, Selling and Financing of Motor Vehicles in the District of Columbia, Order No. 60-2219."
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that while Public Law 86-431, 74 Stat. 69 (1960), 40 D.C. Code Ann. § 902 (1961), authorized the District Commissioners to make regulations as to the types and amounts of insurance that might be required of a buyer by a seller, it did not authorize any regulation of the types and amounts of insurance which might be included in the contract. Since the language regarding what may be “included” is confined to part (b) of the regulation quoted above, it is to that section that appellant directs argument. In our view, however, the appellant has read the language of part (b) too literally and has misconceived its true effect.
Appellant’s argument overlooks the practical aspect of the congressional finding that the car dealer’s objectionable means of requiring, if not coercing, the purchase of the particular insurance was to include it in the conditional sales contract as part of a “package sale.” By the same token, the means selected by the Commissioners to implement the congressional intent was to preclude the objectionable conduct by prescribing what may lawfully be included in the conditional sales contract, and necessarily forbidding the inclusion of other elements.
The Commissioners were not compelled to use the precise language Congress used; they were free to use whatever language would reasonably give effect to the stated objectives of the statute. We hold they have not exceeded the authority vested in them by Public Law 86-431, 74 Stat. 69 (1960), 40 D.C. Code Ann. § 902 (1961).
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99