What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
DORSEY v. OLD SURETY LIFE INS. CO.
No. 1644.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Sept. 6, 1938.
H. L. Stuart, of Oklahoma City, Okl. (R. R. Bell and E. P. Ledbetter, both of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellant.
Charles Swindall, of Oklahoma City, Okl. (Russell M. Chase, of Ava, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
Dorsey brought this suit against Old Surety Life Insurance Company, hereinafter called Insurance Company, for alleged infringement of copyrights on three forms of life insurance policies, seeking an injunction against future infringements and damages for alleged past infringements.
In his hill Dorsey alleged that he is the originator and author of three types of insurance policies, denominated “Family Group Life Insurance Policy,” “Family Group Policy,” and “Reserve Loan Life Insurance Co. Policy Family Group”; that copyrights covering such policies were duly granted to him in October, 1927, November, 1928, and September, 1930, respectively, and that he is now the owner of such copyrights; that such policies were composed, edited, prepared, arranged, and compiled by him at great expense after extended research and as a result of more than thirty years of actuarial and sales experience in the life insurance field; that such publications are of the value of $100,000; that commencing on a date unknown to him and continuing until on or about July'28, 1936, the Insurance Company had without license, leave, right, or authority knowingly published, issued, and sold certain insurance policies denominated “Family Group Policy” which infringed vital portions of Dorsey’s copyrighted publications.
The bill sets out the parts of the copyrighted forms alleged to be infringed and the parts of the Insurance Company’s policies alleged to infringe them.
The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the bill and entered its decree dismissing the suit. Dorsey has appealed.
The right secured by a copyright is not the right to the use of certain words, nor the right to employ ideas expressed thereby. Rather it is the right to that arrangement of words which the author has selected to express his ideas.
In Kaeser & Blair, Inc., v. Merchants’ Ass’n, Inc., 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 575, 577, the court said:
“It has been frequently held that the copyright law does not afford protection' against the use of an idea, but only as to the means by which the idea is expressed.”
It follows that Dorsey’s copyrights in nowise restricted the right of the Insurance Company to use the plans of insurance embraced in the copyrighted policies. They only restricted the use or copying of the means of expression selected by Dorsey to the extent that such means were original with Dorsey.
To be copyrightable a work must be original in that the author has created it by his own skill, labor, and judgment. If he takes matter which has been dedicated to the public by publication without copyright and adds thereto materials which are the result of. his own efforts a copyright thereon is not void, but is valid as to the new and original matter. However, the degree of protection afforded by the copyright is measured by what is actually, copyrightable in the publication and not by the entire publication.
Insurance policies were old at the time Dorsey’s copyrights were granted. Standard provisions had been worked out through long'study and experience. Many of such standard provisions are now inserted in life insurance policies pursuant to statutory requirement. Oklahoma requires that certain provisions be included in each policy of life insurance issued or delivered in Oklahoma or issued by a life insurance company organized under the laws of Oklahoma. See Section 10524, O.S.1931, 36 Okl.St.Ann. § 218.
The copyrighted forms here involved in the main are an aggregation of these standard provisions including those required by statute. As to those provisions it is clear that there is no infringement. One work does not violate the copyright in another simply because there is a similarity between the two if the similarity results from the fact that both works deal with the same subject or have the same common source. Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Gruber, 1 Cir., 86 F.2d 958, 961. The provisions dealing specifically with the family group are alleged to be new and original. The copyrights if valid at all must be limited to those particular provisions and to the particular means employed by Dorsey to express the contractual terms thereof.. The provisions in the policies of the Insurance Company dealing particularly with; the. family group are neither an exact nor a substantial copy of the family group provisions in the copyrighted policies. There is no more similarity than might naturally be expected in policies embracing the same plan of insurance and incorporating like contractual provisions. There can be no doubt, that the Insurance Company is free to make contracts embracing like contractual provisions as those included in the copyrighted policies and to use suitable words to express the provisions of such contracts so long as it does not copy the particular means of expression originated by Dorsey.
A copyright upon a form of contractual. provision should not be construed so, as to impinge upon the natural right of persons to make contracts containing the same, contractual provisions and creating like contractual .rights and obligations, and similarity of expression should not be held to constitute infringement in such cases. Necessarily, where the same contractual .provision is to be expressed there will be similarity of language. To constitute infringement in such cases a showing of appropriation in the exact form or substantially so of the copyrighted materia} should be required. See Brightley v. Littleton, C.C.Pa., 37 F. 103, 104.
Hence, we think the trial court was fully warranted in holding upon the face of the bill that the policies of.the Insurance Company did not infringe Dorsey’s copyrighted forms.
The decree- is affirmed.
Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86, 19 S.Ct. 606, 43 L.Ed. 904; Hartfield v. Peterson, 2 Cir., 91 F.2d 998, 999; Guthrie v. Curlett, 2 Cir., 36 F.2d 694, 696; Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 8 Cir., 61 F.2d 131, 137, 138; Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 9 Cir., 65 F.2d 1, 25; Kaeser & Blair, Inc., v. Merchants’ Ass’n, Inc., 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 575, 577; Dymow v. Bolton, 2 Cir., 11 F.2d 690, 691. See, also, Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Gantz, 10 Cir., 86 F.2d 597, 598, and Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Gruber, 1 Cir., 86 F.2d 958, 961.
American Code Co., Inc., v. Bensinger, 2 Cir., 282 F. 829, 834; Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 9 Cir., 65 F.2d 1, 23.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 5