What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Maurice Mickey MANDEL, Appellant, v. David M. HERITAGE, Warden, United States Penitentiary, McNeil Island, Washington, Appellee.
No. 16376.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 5, 1959.
Maurice Mickey Mandel, in pro. per.
Charles P. Moriarty, U. S. Atty., David J. Dorsey, Asst. U. S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., Charles W. Billinghurst, Tacoma, Wash., for appellee.
Before POPE, CHAMBERS and HAMLEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Mandel has had trouble with “forged securities” in interstate commerce— some operation involving “bad checks.” 18 U.S.C. § 415. The record here begins in August, 1948, in the Northern District of Oklahoma. In a total of seven similar counts found in four indictments or in-formations he was sentenced on August 17,1948, to serve ten years on each count, all sentences to run concurrently. A week later, on August 24, on another similar count in another information or indictment he was sentenced to serve five years, the time to be concurrent with that of the sentences of August 17. He was received at Leavenworth penitentiary on August 26, 1948, where apparently the time of his sentence was established as having started to run as of the date of the first sentence: August 17, 1948. On September 8, 1954, he was released conditionally from the Federal Prison Camp at Tucson, Arizona, a notation being made on his record that there remained' 1438 days to be served.
On October 26, 1954, a member of the U. S. Board of Parole issued a warrant for Mandel’s arrest upon the ground that the latter had violated the conditions of his release. On January 5, 1955, pursuant to the warrant he was arrested in Omaha, Neb., and on January 14, 1955, he was returned to Leavenworth penitentiary. There he was given credit for having begun to serve time as of January 5, 1955. Apparently while incarcerated he is a good prisoner, and he was released on June 16, 1957, on a reconditional release, a notation then being made on the record that there were 544 days remaining to be served.
Out once again, Mandel was soon in trouble, and on February 7, 1958, a member of the U. S. Board of Parole issued a warrant for rearrest for violation of the terms of the reconditional release. Pursuant to the warrant, arrest was made at Oakland, Calif., on November 5, 1958, and he was returned this time to the federal penitentiary at McNeil Island, State of Washington. There his time was noted as having started to run again as of November 5, 1958.
It would appear that actual time served is as follows:
Aug. 17, 1948, to Sept. 8, 1954.
6 years and 22 days
Jan. 5, 1955, to June 16, 1957.
2 years, five months, 11 days
Nov. 5, 1958, to date.
Approximately 6 months.
November 4, 1959, has been set by the prison authorities as the prisoner’s prospective release date.
Upon a petition for habeas corpus, the district court on January 9, 1959, denied issuance of the writ, after having required the respondent warden to show cause in writing.
While the petition is lengthy, somehow Mandel seems to believe that he has not lost his credit for “good time” served during his first two periods of incarceration or that the prison authorities credited on his “time schedules” an excessive amount of “good time” and somehow this is to his advantage now.
We have considered carefully Sections 4161, 4168, 4164, 4165, 4205, and 4207 of Title 18 U.S.Code, which appear to have application here.
We are certain that the prisoner on rearrest is not entitled to take advantage of an erroneous calculation of time made previously (if such it is) and that on rearrest his “good time” theretofore earned or credited was properly and legally forfeited. This leads to the conclusion that the prisoner is now only entitled to such “good time” as he may earn on the period of time remaining unserved (without allowance for “good time” previously credited) at the time of his last rearrest. Yates v. Looney, 10 Cir., 250 F.2d 956; Morneau v. U. S. Board of Parole, 8 Cir., 231 F.2d 829.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Now 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0