What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WELLS FARGO BANK & UNION TRUST CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 10662.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Oct. 11, 1944.
F. M. McAuliffe, L. C. Baker, and Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, all of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner.
Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sewall Key, Helen R. Carloss, Joseph S. Platt, and Melva Graney, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before WILBUR, MATHEWS, and STEPHENS, Circuit Judges.
STEPHENS, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner, as executor of the estate of Ben F. Sternheim, deceased, seeks the re-determination of a deficiency in federal estate taxes held payable by the Tax Court.
Decedent created a revocable inter vivos trust, knows as the Ben F. Sternheim trust, of which Wells Fargo Bank was named trustee. The income from the trust property was to be paid to his sister, Blanche Sternheim, from the date of decedent’s death until the sister’s death at which time the corpus was to be distributed to certain charitable institutions. For the duration of the life estate the trustee was authorized to use the principal, up to ten per cent of its valu’e each year, in the event of sickness, accident, want, or other emergency to the life beneficiary.
When her brother died in 1940, Blanche Sternheim was receiving $7000 a year as life beneficiary of a trust which she herself had previously established and as to which Ben F. Sternheim was trustee. At the time of Ben F. Sternheim’s death (1940) Blanche Sternheim was sixty years old, in good health, and thrifty in habit; her living expenses amounted to $250 or $300 a month, and she saved to her own account about an equal sum each month.
After the death of Ben F. Sternheim the Ben F. Sternheim trust was invaded for the benefit of the income beneficiary. Several payments were made from the Ben F. Sternheim trust to relieve a temporary cessation of income to Blanche Sternheim from her own trust caused by the commingling of assets belonging to Ben F. Sternheim’s estate and to Blanche Sternheim’s trust. Upon partition of the properties, repayment to the Ben F. Sternheim trust was made in full. On another occasion income distributions from both trusts were suspended pending the settlement of a tax controversy. Again Blanche Sternheim received payments from the corpu's of the Ben F. Sternheim trust over a period of several months. In final settlement of the matter, $8,999.16 was paid to the collector of internal revenue out of the Ben F. Sternheim trust.
The Tax Court intimated in its written opinion that, but for the evidence of these payments out of the Ben F. Sternheim trust corpus, it would have found resort to the corpus for payment to Blanche Sternheim so unlikely that the full sum of the trust corpus would be allowable as a charitable deduction for tax purposes. But with this evidence before it the court found that the corpus was liable to be invaded to the extent of the 10% permissible under the trust terms and entered its decision accordingly.
The Tax Court was wrong when it permitted evidence of such actual invasion of the trust corpus to influence its decision. In Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 1929, 279 U.S. 151, 155, 49 S.Ct. 291, 73 L.Ed. 647, the court says: “The estate so far as may be is settled as of the date of the testator’s death. [Citing cases.] The tax is on the act of the testator not on the receipt of property by the legatees. [Citing cases.] Therefore the value of the thing to be taxed must be estimated as of the time when the act is done.” Similarly, the court commented in United States v. Provident Trust Co., 1934, 291 U.S. 272, 281, 54 S.Ct. 389, 390, 78 L.Ed. 793, that in making a deduction for a charitable remainder “the valu'e thereof must be determined from data available at the time of the death of decedent.” See oitr opinion in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 9 Cir., 145 F. 2d 130.
Reversed and remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0