What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FARRELL v. HALE, State Police Officer, et al.
No. 3238.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Nov. 9, 1937.
J. C. Johnston, of Boston, Mass., for 'appellant.
Sylvester E. Hevers, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Albany, N. Y. (Paul A. Dever, Atty. Gen., and James J. Bacigalupo, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
On January 11, 1937, the appellant brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for Massachusetts. The petition was dismissed and the writ denied. He then appealed.
It appears that the petitioner was arrested in Massachusetts . on January 11, , 1937, upon a warrant issued on the 6th day of January, 1937, by the then Governor of the state, James M. Curley, in response to a demand made upon him by the Acting Governor of the State of New York for the rendition of the petitioner to that state to answer to an indictment charging him with having committed there the crime of grand larceny and alleging that he was a fugitive from the justice of that state.
Two questions are presented for our consideration. The first is whether the petitioner, at the time of his arrest on the rendition warrant of the Governor of Massachusetts, was a fugitive from the justice of the State of New York. The second is whether the warrant of the Governor of Massachusetts, issued January 6, 1937, was functus officio on January 11, 1937, when it was served on the petitioner; Mr. Curley at that time having ceased to be the Governor of Massachusetts, as his term of office expired the day following the issuance of the warrant.
As to the first question the contention of the petitioner is that he did not leave the State of New York voluntarily, but against his will and under duress. As to this question it does not appear that the Governor of Massachusetts had made a demand on the Governor of New York for the' return of the petitioner to Massachusetts or that the Governor of New York had issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner and his return to Massachusetts. Neither does it appear how the petitioner came to be arrested by the officers of New York City; although it may be surmised that it was in the expectation that a demand was about to be made by the Governor of Massachusetts for his rendition. But, so far as the record shows, no demand was ever made upon the Governor of New York requesting the petitioner’s return to Massachusetts. All that appears is that the petitioner, while in New York City, was taken into custody by a police officer of that city; that upon the arrival in New York of Timothy Collins, a police officer of Massachusétts, the petitioner was taken by the officer in whose custody he was before a judge of the Court of General Sessions of the County of New York and informed “of his right to the issuance and service of a requisition and warrant and of his right to a hearing either on the return of a writ of habeas corpus or a summary hearing as provided for in section 827 of the Code of Criminal Procedure” of New York; and that, in the presence of the court, he thereupon, voluntarily, and not by reason of threats or undue influence on the part of any person or persons whatsoever, waived the issuance and service of a warrant of rendition and consented to return to the State of Massachusetts in the custody of Timothy Collins, the Massachusetts officer; • and that, thereafter, he returned to Massachusetts in the custody of Collins.
It thus appears that the petitioner was not removed to Massachusetts by virtue of any warrant of the Governor of New York, or by virtue of any authority of the State of Massachusetts, for Collins, certainly, as an officer of Massachusetts, possessed no official authority while in New York or on his way through Connecticut to Massachusetts, and the petitioner’s return, under the facts stated, must be regarded as voluntary and without compulsion of legal process, either on the part of the State of New York or the State of Massachusetts.
It, therefore, could be found that, at the time the demand of the Acting Governor of New York was made, the petitioner was a fugitive from the justice of the State of New York, he having been indictedún the County of Saratoga and State of New York in April, 1934, prior to his voluntary departure for Massachusetts as above stated.
Prior to his return to Massachusetts' he had not been taken into custody on the indictment found against him in the County of Saratoga, and there is no evidence in the case that the police officers of the City of New York knew or had ever heard of the existence of the Saratoga County indictment. Had he been held on the Saratoga indictment at the time he w.as permitted to return to the State of Massachusetts, a question would have been presented not now necessary for our consideration.
The remaining question is whether the requisition warrant of the Governor of Massachusetts was functus officio at the time of the petitioner’s arrest, the Governor who issued it having gone out of office the day following its issuance.
Governor Curley, at the time he issued the warrant for the arrest and return of the petitioner to New York, did not act as an individual but in his official character. As said in Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370, 21 L.Ed. 287: “In such cases the governor acts in his official character, and represents the sovereignty of the State in giving efficacy to the Constitution of the United States and the law of Congress.” As representative of the state he had jurisdiction and authority to issue the warrant, aqd its validity did not cease to exist from the mere fact that he later went out of office, for his act in issuing it was of an official character and in representation of the sovereignty of the state. In Restive v. Clark, 90 F.(2d) 847, we had a similar question under consideration. It there appeared that W. N. Doak, Secretary of Labor, through his Assistant Secretary, Snyder, on the 17th day of June, 1931, issued his official warrant for the deportation of an alien; that, thereafter, for some reason the execution of the warrant was stayed and the bail of the alien canceled; that, when the time for its execution arrived, the term of service of Mr. Doak, as Secretary of Labor, had expired (March 4, 1933) due to a change of administration. And this court held that “the fact that Mr. Doak ceased to be Secretary of Labor on March 4, 1933, did not affect the warrant and order of deportation” of June 17, 1931; the stay having been removed.
The judgment or order of the District Court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1