What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
SWAN v. UNITED STATES.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
November 28, 1927.
Rehearing Denied January 13, 1928.
No. 3703.
Criminal law <§=>242(6) — In removal proceeding, indictment is only evidence and its validity may not be determined, except as evidence of probable cause (18 USCA § 591).
In proceeding for removal of a defendant to another district, under Rev. St. § 1014 (18 USCA § 591), probable cause may be proved by an indictment as evidence, or by other evidence, and when the indictment is introduced the commissioner or judge has authority to determine its validity only as evidence of probable cause.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Wm. N. Runyon, Judge.
Proceeding by the United States against Raymond D. Swan for his removal to another district. Erom an order of removal, made by the District Court, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Donohue & O’Brien, of Newark, N. J. (James E. X. O’Brien, of Newark, N. J., of counsel), for appellant.
Walter G. Winne, U. S. Atty., of Hackensack, N. J.
Before BUEEINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
WOOLLEY, Circuit Judge.
An indictment found in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia charges Raymond D. Swan and others with entering into a scheme to defraud and with use of the United States mails in executing the scheme in violation of section 215 of the Criminal Code, Comp. Stat. 10385 (18 USCA § 338). When Swan was apprehended in New Jersey he resisted removal to West Virginia for trial. Section 1014, R. S., Comp. Stat. 1674 (18 USCA § 591). Following an order of removal made by a commissioner he petitioned a judge of the District Court for the District of New Jersey for a writ of habeas corpus and also issued a writ of certiorari. At the same time the government renewed its application for an order of removal. The judge entered an order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dismissing the writ of certiorari and granting the government’s application. Erom that order Swan took this appeal and by thirty assignments has specified error and raised questions on many aspects of this sometimes perplexing proceeding.
At the hearing the government, as usual, introduced and relied on a certified copy of the indictment as evidence of probable cause. Admitting identity, Swan, the only witness in his behalf, denied any connection with the alleged scheme to defraud and the mailing of letters in a manner which amounted to a defense of not guilty. United States v. Mathues, 19 F.(2d) 22 (C. C. A. 3d). While we have read the testimony and considered all assignments of error, we feel — in fairness to Swan who stands accused but not yet tried— that we should not in this opinion review his testimony and possibly prejudice him by indicating our views as to its bearing on the crime charged against him. We shall therefore do little more than cite authorities for the law of the ease and state our conclusions.
In Ms main contention that the indictment does not “properly charge a crime” the appellant really attacks the indictment as defective. Clearly that instrument (as both the commissioner and district judge found) charges a crime against Mm by averring with sufficient particularity Ms participation -with others in the two essentials of the statutory offense: (1) A scheme to defraud; and (2) use of the Tinted States mails in executing it. Freeman v. United States, 20 F.(2d) 748 (C. C. A. 3d). Whether, later, the government can support these allegations by evidence is another matter to be determined in another conrt. The indictment was introduced in this proceeding under section 1014, R. S., not to establish the appellant’s guilt but only as evidence to show that there was cause to believe Ms guilt probable enough to justify Ms removal for trial. The requisite probable cause in removal cases may be proved by the indictment as evidence, or by other evidence without the production of the indictment, or, indeed, in advance of an indictment. Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249, 260, 22 S. Ct. 218, 46 L. Ed. 177; Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387, 403, 28 S. Ct. 714, 52 L. Ed. 1113; United States v. Greene (D. C.) 100 F. 941, 943. When it is sought to
bo proved by the indictment, the instrument is prima facie evidence which may be overcome by its own terms when they fail to set forth a crime. Yet no matter h®w inartificially it may be drafted, the commissioner or judge at a removal hearing has authority to pass upon its effect only in respect to its proof of probable cauge. Morse v. United States, 267 U. S. 80, 83, 45 S. Ct. 209, 69 L. Ed. 522; Pierce v. Creecy, supra, pages 401, 402 (28 S. Ct. 714). He has no authority to determine the validity of the indictment when offered only as evidence. That is the function of the trial conrt; and since it is the very foundation of the charge, the accused when arraigned may there take advantage of its insufficiency or other infirmity. Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, 10-12, 25 S. Ct. 569, 49 L. Ed. 919; Morse v. United States, 267 U. S. 80, 83, 84, 45 S. Ct. 209, 69 L. Ed. 522. The indictment in question may or may not be valid in that each of its ten counts charges the posting of a letter in the United States mail on a blank date of a named month; for instance, that the several persons accused “did on the- day of April, 1924,” mail a letter to a named person, quoting the letter, which bears date April 2, 1924. As the indictment was found on May 27, 1925, conceivably the trial court might, under a familiar rule of criminal law, allow proof of mailing on any date prior to the finding of the indictment, or it might allow amendment, or it might quash the indictment altogether. Plainly these are matters wholly apart from the use of the indictment as evidence of probable cause at a removal hearing where the sole duty of the commissioner or judge, or other magistrate, and similarly his sole power, is to find whether “probable cause is shown on the government’s side.” If so, he “is not to set it aside because on the other evidence he believes the defendant innocent.” Hughes v. Gault, 271 U. S. 142, 46 S. Ct. 459, 70 L. Ed. 875; Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, 10-12, 25 S. Ct. 569, 49 L. Ed. 919; United States v. Mathues, 19 F.(2d) 22, 23 (C. C. A. 3d).
We do not find that the commissioner and the district judge were guided to their judgment by erroneous interpretations of the law applicable to such cases, as the appellant urges, but on the contrary find they followed quite correctly the law of the cases we have cited.
The order of the District Court in effect dismissing the writ of certiorari and the petition for writ of habeas corpus and expressly directing the removal of the appellant from the District of New Jersey to the Southern District of West Virginia for trial is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1