What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
GRANT v. HUNTER.
No. 3579.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 5, 1948.
James B. Radetsky, of Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Eugene W. Davis, of Topeka, Kan., Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, HUXMAN and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner, Cliff Grant, has appealed from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas discharging a writ of habeas corpus.
On' September 13, 1935, petitioner was sentenced by the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to a term of two years for violation of 18 U.S. C.A. § 88, and to a term of five years for violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 347. The two sentences were made to run consecutively. He was committed to the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. With the allowance for good time, he was conditionally released on April 8, 1940. On' June 11, 1940-, he committed an offense against federal law for which he was convicted by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, and was sentenced to a term of seven years. After the allowance for statutory good time under this sentence, he was discharged on September 24, 1945. On that day, he was recommitted to serve the good time allowed under the previous two-year and five-year sentences.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 710, petitioner was allowed 887 days of good time deduction from the two-year and five-year sentences imposed by the District Court sentencing him in those cases. This good time was computed on the basis of the aggregate of the twO' sentences.
Petitioner maintains that 225 days of the total accumulated good time of 887 days were allowed on the two-year sentence and the balance on the five-year sentence. His argument is that the two sentences were separate and distinct from each other and that, therefore, when he began serving the five-year sentence, the 225 days of the total accumulated good time had fully completed the two-year sentence and that when thereafter he was recommitted, he could be compelled to serve only what remained of the five-year sentence.
There is no merit to this contention. Aside from the statutory provision to that effect, defendant is entitled to no good time deduction. In the absence of such a statute, a prisoner would be compelled to serve the full period of the sentence. We must, therefore, look to the statute to ascertain the amount of good time deduction to which a prisoner is entitled, as well as to to the method and manner in which good time is computed and applied. 18 U.S.C.A. § 710 provides for the allowance of good time. Among other things, it provides for the method of computing and allowing good time where one is serving two or more sentences. That portion of the statute dealing with this question is as follows: “When a prisoner has two or more sentences, the aggregate of his several sentences shall be the basis upon which his deduction shall be estimated.”
It is well settled that the imprisonment of one serving consecutive sentences is considered a single term, consisting of the aggregate of such sentences for the purpose of computing good time allowance. Under this construction of the statute, the credit for good time for good conduct does not accrue until such credit has been completely earned. Any good time deduction is contingent upon good conduct for the entire period of imprisonment until its allowance will end imprisonment. It follows, therefore, that all possible deduction for good time accredited to a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is destroyed by bad conduct even though such conduct occurs after one or more of the successive sentences has been served.
Petitioner remained a ward of the court when he was conditionally released, and when he breached the terms of his conditional release, he was subject to return to the penitentiary to serve the full remaining portion of the term of his sentence without credit for the allowance of any good time.
Affirmed.
Ebeling v. Biddle, 10 Cir., 291 F. 567; Mills v. Aderhold, 10 Cir., 110 F.2d 765; Eori v. Aderhold, 5 Cir., 53 F.2d 840; United States v. Greenhaus, 2 Cir., 89 F.2d 634; Carroll v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 76 F.2d 961; Pagliaro v. Cox, 8 Cir., 143 F.2d 900.
Ebeling v. Biddle, 10 Cir., 291 F. 567; Carroll v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 76 F.2d 961; Pagliaro v. Cox, 8 Cir., 143 F.2d 900; Morgan v. Aderhold, 5 Cir., 73 F. 2d 171.
Ebeling v. Biddle, 10 Cir., 291 F. 567; Carroll v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 76 F.2d 961; Aderhold v. Hudson, 5 Cir., 84 F.2d 559; Aderhold v. Perry, 5 Cir., 59 F.2d 379; United States v. Nicholson, 4 Cir., 78 F.2d 468.
Gray v. Swope, D.C., 28 F.Supp. 822; Carroll v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 76 F.2d 961; Aderhold v. Hudson, 5 Cir., 84 F.2d 559; Aderhold v. Perry, 5 Cir., 59 F.2d 379; Ebeling v. Biddle, 10 Cir., 291 F. 567.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0