What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re PATE et al. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA v. PATE et al.
Nos. 6335, 6362.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Nov. 9, 1938.
George E. Drach and Wallace T. Filson, both of Springfield, 111., for appellant.
Colfax T. Martin, of Danville, 111., for appellees.
Before SPARKS, MAJOR, and TREANOR, Circuit Judges.
SPARKS, Circuit Judge.
The holder of a master’s deed to premises sold under foreclosure proceedings appeals from an order of the District Court permitting the farmer-debtors to remain in possession of the premises for a period ending three years after the filing of his original petition for relief under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203.
The farmer and his wife filed their petition for relief March 15, 1935, three days before the date fixed for a sale of his mortgaged premises under foreclosure proceedings. The District Court restrained the sale, but on June 15, 1935, vacated its restraining order, and the sale was thereupon had on July 15, 1935. On September 9, 1935, the District Court dismissed the bankruptcy proceeding and entered a judgment for costs against each debtor. On June 23, 1936, the court reinstated the proceeding and granted .the debtors leave to file their amended petition praying adjudication in bankruptcy, but on July 2, granted leave to appellant to proceed with its foreclosure in the state court, and authorized the receiver theretofore appointed by the state court to act as such. The order provided, however, that the appellant was not to transfer or assign its master’s certificate, nor was the master to issue his deed until further order of the District Court, which was given November 25, 1936. On May 27, 1937, the debtors filed their petition praying that the master’s deed be set aside and returned to the conciliation commissioner; for an accounting; and that their term of bankruptcy be extended to March 15, 1938. Acting on this petition, the court on June 25^ 1937, ordered that the debtors be allowed to remain in possession until March 15, 1938, under a lease to be entered into between appellant and the debtors, and that appellant was to hold its deed in the meantime without transfer or incumbrance until further order of the court. It is from this order that appellant appeals. Determination of the issue presented depends upon the validity and construction of subsection (n) of section 75, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203 (n), conferring jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy court over all property of a farmer-debtor as to which he has an unexpired period of redemption at the time he files a petition for relief under section 75. The cause was. held in- abeyance by this court pending decision by the Supreme Court of the case of Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance Company, 58 S.Ct. 1025, 82 L. Ed. 1490. That case, decided May 31, 1938, held section 75 (n) constitutional.
It is to be noted here that the sale of the property under the foreclosure proceeding had not even been held when on March 15, 1935, the debtors filed their petition for relief under section 75, nor had the period of redemption expired when on June 23, 1936, the court granted them leave to file their amended petition to pray adjudication in bankruptcy. They thereupon became entitled to an opportunity to comply with the provisions of section 75, subsection (s), 11 U.S.C.A. § 203(s), and to apply for the moratorium provided for by that section. See In re Price, 7 Cir., 99 F.2d 691, decided by this„court, November 9, 1938. The action of the court on November 25, 1936, in permitting the appellant to obtain the master’s deed rendered the relief to which appellees might he entitled nugatory as long as the master’s deed remained outstanding. There is no indication that the court tdok such action because it considered appellees not in -a position to avail themselves of the relief afforded by section 75 (s), but it merely stated that it appeared that the period of redemption had expired. In reconsidering its order, on petition of appellees, the court stated that the proceedings under section 75 (s) were still pending, and it apparently felt that there was a possibility of rehabilitation although it did not enter & finding to that effect, hence that its action in permitting the deed to issue was contrary to the intent and purpose of Congress. It then corrected its former action as it had power to do under the rilling in Wayne Gas Company v. Owens Company, 300 U.S. 131, 57 S.Ct. 382, 81 L.Ed. 557. There was no error, in this, and the decree is
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1