What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Gerard A. BAILEY, Petitioner, Appellant, v. U. S. COMMANDING OFFICER OF the OFFICE OF the PROVOST MARSHAL, U. S. ARMY, etc., Respondent, Appellee.
No. 74-1023.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Heard April 2, 1974.
Decided May 15, 1974.
Mel L. Greenberg, Worcester, Mass., with whom Teshoian, Greenberg & Drapos, Worcester, Mass., was on brief, for petitioner, appellant.
Robert B. Collings, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom James N. Gabriel, U. S. Atty., Boston, Mass., was on brief, for respondent, appellee.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
COFFIN, Chief Judge.
This petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from a specific Army regulation, the merits of which are irrelevant here, was filed the day after petitioner, who had been absent without authorization from the Army, entered military custody. While the present petition was pending in the district court, petitioner again absented himself without proper leave. The government filed a motion to dismiss, which was withdrawn when petitioner voluntarily returned to military custody. However, petitioner remained in custody for only one day, and thereafter again absented himself without leave. The government again filed a motion to dismiss. The district court, finding itself with . no jurisdiction, granted the government’s motion.
The game of hide-and-seek continues. The government contends that it has no military facilities within the jurisdiction for confining petitioner, if and when he again returns to' custody. Since he is not presently in custody, the government urges us to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the petition. Petitioner is unwilling to return to custody unless the government places him on excess leave status, which the government is not willing to do. Petitioner contends, however, that he is “in custody” for the purpose of invoking the writ of habeas corpus.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) provides that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless (3) [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Although “habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy” whose “use has been limited to a special urgency”, and whose custody requirement “is designed to preserve the writ . . . as a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty”, Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 1574, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973), the Supreme Court has found “custody” sufficient to invoke the use of the writ when a petitioner’s freedom of movement lay within the discretion of the government, as when a petitioner is on parole, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1962), awaiting trial on bail, Hensley, supra, or on military reserve status, Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 92 S.Ct. 1693, 32 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972). Moreover, jurisdiction will attach if the petitioner is “in custody” at the time of filing, Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968), although subsequently released from confinement before trial. See Marchand v. Director, U. S. Probation Office, 421 F.2d 331 (1st Cir. 1970) . Since the petition in the present case was filed when petitioner was in military custody to the extent that — although escape proved rather easy — his freedom of movement lay within the discretion of the government, it seems clear that jurisdiction attached. Meck v. Commanding Officer, Valley Forge Gen. Hosp., 452 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1971).
This does not exhaust the inquiry. It is possible that the case is moot. So held the court in Ragsdale v. Cameron, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 329 F.2d 233 (1963), when a habeas petitioner seeking release from a mental hospital escaped. So speculated the court in United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1969), when it said, “[I]t is doubtful whether a soldier who is absent without leave can be characterized as within the custody of any officer of the Armed Forces . . . .” It is true that in Carafas, supra, the Court held that the petition was not mooted by petitioner’s release from confinement, since petitioner still had to endure the “collateral consequences” stemming from his custody, such as its effect upon his career and reputation. See also Matthews v. State of Florida, 463 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1972). Similarly, in Bratcher v. McNamara, 448 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1971) , the court held that a potential recall to active duty presented an “adverse collateral consequence” sufficient to avoid mootness. It could be argued that the threat of arrest and return to custody might qualify as “adverse collateral consequences”. But we confess that we have conceptual difficulty in equating the consequences flowing from the illegal status which petitioner voluntarily entered with those of traditional custody where an individual is involuntarily but legally subject to restrictions on his liberty.
We need not, however, rule definitively on this issue for there is an equally compelling, if more rarely encountered, ground for affirmance. It is that petitioner has brought upon himself by his Janus-like conduct in seeking to invoke the processes of the law while flouting them a disentitlement “to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141, 17 S.Ct. 525, 41 L.Ed. 949 (1897); United States v. Shelton, 482 F.2d 848, 849 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Emma v. Armstrong, 473 F.2d 656, 658 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870, 94 S.Ct. 87, 38 L.Ed.2d 88, (1973); United States v. Tremont, 438 F.2d 1202 (1st Cir. 1971).
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1