What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
LYON, SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS, v. SINGER.
NO. 512.
Argued April 18-19, 1950.
Decided June 5, 1950.
Edward Feldman argued the cause for Lyon, Superintendent of Banks. With him on the briefs was Daniel Gersen.
Albert R. Connelly argued the cause for Singer. With him on the brief was George S. Collins.
Allen T. Klots argued the cause for Banque Mellie Iran. With him on the brief were Peter H. Kaminer and Merrill E. Clark, Jr.
By special leave of Court, James L. Morrisson argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner in Nos. 512 and 513, urging reversal or modification of the judgment in No. 512, and affirmance in No. 527. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Perlman and Harold I. Baynton.
Per Curiam.
Certiorari was granted in these cases to review federal issues respecting the administration of frozen alien property. 339 U. S. 902.
The cases arose from suits brought by claimants Singer and Banque Mellie Iran to collect from a statutory bank liquidator claims allegedly entitled to a preference under New York Banking Law § 606, arising from transactions with a Japanese corporation, blocked under Executive Orders Nos. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400; 8832, 6 Fed. Reg. 3715. The New York Court of Appeals held that the transactions gave rise to a preferred claim in the liquidation but that payment by the liquidator must await specific licensing by the Alien Property Custodian of the transactions underlying the claims. Singer v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 293 N. Y. 542, 58 N. E. 2d 726, 299 N. Y. 113, 85 N. E. 2d 894; Banque Mellie Iran v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 299 N. Y. 139, 85 N. E. 2d 906.
Those opposed to the judgments urge that, as a matter of federal law, the freezing order prevented the creation of any claim recognizable under § 606 of the New York Banking Law.
Oral argument and study of the record have convinced us that the judgments of the New York Court of Appeals are not inconsistent with the First War Powers Act of 1941, § 301, 55 Stat. 839, or the above Executive Orders. We accept the New York court’s determination that under New York law these claims arose from transactions in New York and were entitled to a preference. Since the New York court conditioned enforcement of the claims upon licensing by the Alien Property Custodian, federal control over alien property remains undiminished. Our decision in Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, does not require a contrary conclusion. There the liquidator claimed title to frozen assets adversely to the Custodian, and sought to deny the Custodian’s paramount power to vest the alien property in the United States. No such result follows from the New York court’s judgments in the present cases.
Since we further agree that, at the time the New York judgments were entered, no licenses had been issued to these claimants, we affirm the judgments below.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter is of the opinion that since the federal question in Nos. 513 and 528 has been eliminated by the license granted by the Director, Office of Alien Property, no jurisdiction to review remains in this Court. Therefore, the writs of certiorari in these two cases should be dismissed.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0