What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 114.64 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS situate IN the COUNTY OF CUSTER, STATE OF IDAHO, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 73-1453.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Oct. 18, 1974.
John Zimmerman, Atty., Dept, of Justice (argued), Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellant.
Louis F. Racine, Jr. (argued), of Racine, Huntley, Herzog & Olson, Pocatel-lo, Idaho, for defendants-appellees.
Before DUNIWAY and TRASK, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District Judge.
Honorable Russell E. Smith, United States E trict Judge from the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
This appeal was taken by the United States from a judgment of the District Court granting condemnation of a parcel of real property in Custer County, Idaho, and awarding just compensation therefor. The appeal challenges a ruling of the court which held that the United States by filing the complaint in condemnation waived any right it may have had to rely upon a Land Purchase Option and Contract in which the appellees, as owners, agreed upon the value of the land with the Government. The option price agreed upon was $20,000; the amount awarded upon condemnation at a jury-waived trial was $35,000.
On May 20, 1971, the Government filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho asking a taking of property under the power of eminent domain and requesting the ascertainment and award of just compensation to the owners. Paragraph nine of the complaint recited that the United States had entered into a Land Purchase Option and Contract with the appellee owners for the purchase of the land for the sum of $20,000. A copy of this agreement was attached. The prayer was for condemnation and an ascertainment and award of just compensation. On the same date the Government deposited the sum of $20,000 in the registry of the court under a Declaration of Taking stating that this sum was estimated by the Government as just compensation.
The appellee owners answered denying the allegations of paragraph nine and requesting an award in an amount not less than $35,000. Subsequently appel-lees filed a motion to strike paragraph nine. After hearing, the court entered a formal order granting the motion. In the course of its order it stated:
“In striking paragraph 9 from the complaint at this time, the court does not indicate or hold that the Option and Contract, as alleged in paragraph 9, may not be admissible or competent as evidence on the question of just compensation for the land taken by the plaintiff. If the Option and Contract is offered as evidence at the time of trial of this case, the admissibility of the same may then be determined.” C.T. at 52.
Upon trial before a different judge, the court held that the United States by filing its complaint “as duly authorized by the Acts of Congress” had waived any right it may or may not have had to proceed in a judicial proceeding to enforce the option contract regardless of its validity or enforceability, and was estopped by the condemnation proceeding to assert the value to be the sum of $20,000 as agreed upon in the contract. The Government stipulated with the landowners that the latter if called would testify that the value of the land was $35,000, and such was the award.
In the posture upon which the case comes before us we assume that the Government by its offer of proof of an executed Land Purchase Option and Contract for $20,000, which was timely accepted according to its terms, has made a prima facie showing of a valid and enforceable contract. It appears clear to us that such a contract represents a stipulation of value binding upon the parties in a condemnation action. United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. 328, 79 S.Ct. 1193, 3 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1959); Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599, 67 S.Ct. 606, 91 L.Ed. 532 (1947); Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939). The stipulation here specifically provided that it could be introduced in evidence in a judicial proceeding to acquire the land, and the amount of the payment stated therein to be made would be accepted “as full settlement for all damages” to vendor by reason of a taking.
The argument of appellees appears to be grounded upon the fact that the Government did not properly allege the theory of its case in order to render the stipulation admissible. We do not agree. The stipulation was pleaded in the original complaint but stricken over objection with the pointed observation that the order on the motion was not to be taken as holding that it might not “be admissible or competent” on the question of just compensation. At the trial an offer of proof was made of the option contract but was rejected upon the ground of waiver or estoppel because the Government had filed its action in statutory condemnation rather than on the contract. The offer should have been admitted subject to any defenses as to its validity or enforceability. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with the views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.
. Paragraph seven of the Option and Contract provided:
“It is agreed that, if the vendor cannot convey satisfactory title to the land herein described, or if the vendor does not promptly convey said land to the United States when requested to do so by an authorized representative of the Secretary, the land may be acquired by judicial proceedings, and, if so acquired, payment at the rate per acre hereinbefore set forth for so much of the acreage as is found to be vested in the vendor, will be accepted as full settlement for all damages caused to said vendor by reason of the taking of said lands. The vendor also agrees that this instrument may be introduced in such proceedings as the stipulation of the parties hereto with regard to all matters contained herein.” Brief of Appellant at 7.
. Even if invalid for lack of consideration or unenforceable because not properly exercised it would be admissible as an admission of a party on the issue of value. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 282, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84 L.Ed. 240 (1939) ; United States v 2,974.49 Acres of Land, 308 F.2d 641, 643-644 (4th Cir. 1962).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0