What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO. v. CHASE NAT. BANK OF CITY OF NEW YORK et al.
No. 13108.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Feb. 8, 1946.
Rehearing Denied March 6,1946.
William V. Hodges, of Denver, Colo. (Daniel Bartlett, of St. Louis, Mo., and Henry C. Vidal, James L. Goree, and Hodges, Vidal & Goree, all of Denver, Colo., on the brief), for appellant.
Harry W. Kroeger, of St. Louis, Mo. (Nagel, Kirby, Orrick & Shepley, of St. Louis, Mo., and Milbank, Tweed & Hope and Arthur A. Gammell, all of New York City, on the brief), for appellee Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York.
Before GARDNER, THOMAS and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.
GARDNER, Circuit Judge.
This case grew out of the reorganization proceedings of the St Louis-San Francisco Railway Company and is a companion to cases numbered 13,105, 13,106 and 13,107, in which we have just filed our opinion, Brooks v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 153 F.2d 312, and was submitted at the same time. At the inception of reorganization proceedings under Section 77, Bankr.Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 205, on May 17, 1933, the District Court entered an order enjoining bank creditors of the debtor from selling their pledged collateral. This order stood unchallenged during a period of some twelve years but after the court had approved a proposed plan of reorganization of the debtor, the Chase National Bank on January 22, 1945, filed a petition asking the vacation of all injunctional orders so far as they might restrain it from selling its pledged collateral. On April 17, 1945, the court entered an order vacating any and all injunctional orders restraining any of the bank creditors of the debtor from selling their pledged collateral. This appeal is from that order. On April 10, 1945, the court entered an order approving a plan of reorganization for the debtor and on appeal we affirmed that order.
Appellant debtor’s contention that the court erred in vacating the injunctional order is bottomed on the assumption that the equities of the stockholders have value and hence, it is interested in these pledged col-laterals. The bank was the holder of a-promissory note of the Railway Company in the original principal amount of $2,724,-722, dated September 1, 1932, which became due December 31, 1932. The note was secured by pledged securities consisting of $4,183,500 principal amount of consolidated 6 per cent bonds of the Railway Company. The amount owing on the promissory note, principal and interest, as of January 16, 1945, was $3,512,213. This amount was subject to adjustment in accordance with the final decision of the court as to whether these distributions should be credited to the principal or the interest on the note. The plan of reorganization approved by the court includes the claim of the Chase National Bank in the principal amount of $2,-492,592, with accrued interest to January 1, 1944, amounting in the aggregate to $3,-534,978, for which it is to receive $151,526 cash and $3,383,452 in bonds and preferred and common stock. As has already been observed, we affirmed the order approving the plan of reorganization and under that plan the debtor has no interest in the distribution of assets in reorganization. In view of this situation, the questions here sought to be presented have become purely academic.
The indebtedness owing the Chase National Bank and the indebtedness owing the other banks far exceeded the value of the pledged collateral held by them. The primary purpose of an injunction against the sale of collateral is to prevent interference with the consummation of a plan for reorganization. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 8 Cir., 86 F.2d 347, 108 A.L.R. 1020; In re New York,. N. H. & H. R. Co., 2 Cir., 102 F.2d 923. That purpose had been served before the entry of the order here complained of by the staying of such sale during a period of some twelve years. Continuing the injunction further would, in the circumstances here presented, certainly, serve no useful purpose. As the debtor has no equity in the collateral, sale of which was enjoined, and the plan of reorganization has in fact been perfected and approved the continuance of the injunctional order would be unreasonable and purposeless.
The or.der appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1