What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
William TOSTE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Raymond M. LOPES, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 285, Docket 88-2124.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Nov. 2, 1988.
Decided Nov. 17, 1988.
Robert E. Precht, New York City (The Legal Aid Soc., Federal Defender Services Unit), for petitioner-appellant.
Julia DiCocco Dewey, Asst. State’s Atty., Wallingford, Conn. (Appellate Unit, Office of the Chief State’s Atty., Div. of Criminal Justice), for respondent-appellee.
Before KAUFMAN, OAKES and NEWMAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Tosté appeals from Judge Ca-branes’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Tosté was convicted of murder by a jury in the Superior Court, Judicial District of Fairfield, Connecticut on May 8, 1981. He was sentenced to a term of no less than twenty-five years nor more than life. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 504 A.2d 1036 (1982). Tosté filed a petition under 28 U.S. C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus. He appeals from Judge Cabranes’s order of December 31, 1987 denying that petition.
We affirm the order for the reasons stated in Judge Cabranes’s thorough opinion. Toste v. Lopes, 701 F.Supp. 306 (D.Conn.1987). The validity of a waiver is a matter for independent federal determination. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-04, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1241-42, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (voluntariness of a confession a matter for independent federal review).
Despite his low intelligence level, Tosté validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He was advised of his Miranda rights immediately after his arrest. State v. Toste, 198 Conn. at 577, 504 A.2d 1036. After the warning, he orally indicated that he understood and signed a written form acknowledging that he comprehended his rights. Id. at 578, 504 A.2d 1036. At a second questioning session, Tosté was again warned of his rights in the same explicit fashion. He again indicated that he understood and signed a statement acknowledging this. Id. at 578-79, 504 A.2d 1036.
While the psychological testimony could support a conclusion that Tosté has a personality disorder, it does not indicate that he is unable to comprehend sufficiently the rights set forth in Miranda. A waiver of the right to remain silent is not invalid merely because a defendant is of limited mental capacity. See United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1979); see also Toliver v. Gathright, 501 F.Supp. 148, 150 (E.D.VA.1980) (waiver of right to remain silent not invalid solely because defendant has less than average intelligence). Nothing in the record seriously questions Captain Fabrizi’s testimony at trial that Tosté was “streetwise,” communicated relatively well and operated at about a sixth to seventh grade level. We agree with the district court that the preponderance of the facts in the instant case, as found by the Connecticut courts, demonstrate that Tosté knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0