What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
John F. RAMEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 17774.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 3, 1964.
Decided June 25, 1964.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 12, 1984.
See 85 S.Ct. 79.
Mr. Rodolphe J. A. de Seife, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Robert Sheriffs Moss and Frank B. Tavenner, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. William C. Weitzel, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., Frank Q. Nebeker and Barry Sidman, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Fahy, Burgee and McGowan, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction on three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (22 D.C.Code, § 502). Appellant was charged with having made an unprovoked attack with a knife on three other young men. He asserted his innocence on the ground of self-defense, but a jury found him guilty. We are asked to reverse because of errors in (1) the admission of evidence and (2) the charging of the jury.
With respect to the former, it is claimed that appellant was prejudiced by the receipt in evidence of certain oral statements made by appellant while in the presence of two police officers shortly after his arrest and before he was taken before a magistrate for a preliminary hearing. These statements were that appellant had wounded the complaining witnesses with the knife but that the attack had been initiated out of fear! However, when asked whether the other young men had threatened him in any way, he is said to have answered “no.” The former part of this statement is consistent with, and indeed supports, a claim of self-defense. The latter part, however, would probably be of an injurious character vis-a-vis this defense. Thus, these statements appear to us as looking in both directions in respect of the self-defense issue. These oral statements, when offered, were objected to on Mallory grounds. After a hearing out of the presence of the jury, they were held admissible by the District Court, in the light of the showing made that they were forthcoming within a few minutes after appellant’s arrest and promptly in response to routine inquiries as to what had happened. We do not disturb the District Court’s ruling in this regard. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140 (1944).
Appellant urges for the first time on appeal that the statements should not have been admitted because they were not preceded by a warning to appellant that they might be used against him. There is nothing in the record, however, which establishes either the presence or the absence of such a warning; and, in the absence of an objection on this ground at the trial, we do not think that reversal is indicated under Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P.
The other errors asserted relate to the instruction given on self-defense. Appellant did not object to that instruction as such, but at most expressed a preference for an instruction he had submitted. But a party has no right to insist that instructions be always couched in his own language. Wheeler v. United States, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 165 F.2d 225 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 829, 68 S.Ct. 448, 92 L.Ed. 1115 (1948). The issue is whether the instruction as given was wrong. We find that it was not here. Appellant also seeks reversal because the self-defense instruction was, at the request of the jury after its deliberations had begun, reread to the jury by itself. There was neither objection nor request by appellant in this regard, and there is no occasion to treat this as a reason for reversal. See Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P.
Affirmed.
. We note that a police report embodying in written form substantially the same matters covered by the oral statements was not offered by the prosecution, but was introduced at the instance of defense counsel.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0