What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
The POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen H. SACHS, in his capacity as Attorney General of Maryland; Adele Wilzack, in her capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Defendants-Appellees, State of New York, et al., Amici Curiae. The POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stephen H. SACHS, in his capacity as Attorney General of Maryland; Adele Wilzack, in her capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Defendants-Appellants. State of New York, et al., Amici Curiae.
Nos. 86-1572, 86-1573.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
March 7, 1988.
Arnold M. Weiner (Michael Schatzow, Ethan L. Bauman, Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner & Smouse, Baltimore, Md., on brief), E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr. (Sherwin J. Markman, John C. Keeney, Jr., David J. Hayes, Hogan & Hartson, Kathleen B. DeWeese, Washington, D.C., Associate General Counsel, Potomac Elec. Power Co., on brief) for appellant/cross appellee.
Ralph S. Tyler, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen
H.Sachs, Atty. Gen., Richard M. Hall, Michael C. Powell, Kathie A. Stein, Charles R. Taylor, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Baltimore, Md., on brief) for appellees/cross appellants.
Karen L. Florini, U.S. Dept, of Justice (F. Henry Habicht, II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacques B. Gelin, Margaret A. Hill, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Francis S. Blake, General Counsel, Bruce M. Diamond, Regional Counsel, Terrell Hunt, Associate Enforcement Counsel, Alan H. Carpien, E.P.A., Washington, D.C., on brief) for amicus curiae U.S.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of N.Y., Lawrence A. Rappoport, Associate Atty., Nancy Stearns, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen. of State of Cal., Theodora Berger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., Timothy R. Patterson, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Diego, Cal., Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. of the State of Ala., Craig Kneisel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., Joseph I.Lieberman, Atty. Gen. of the State of Conn., Kenneth Tedford, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., on brief, for amici curiae State of N.Y., et al.
Ann Powers, Vice President and General Counsel, Catherine A. Cotter, Washington, D.C., on brief, for amicus curiae Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.
Jacqueline M. Warren, Donald S. Strait, Lawanda Still, Legal Asst., New York City, on brief, for amicus curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
William L. Kovacs, Henry W. Killeen, III, Donald S. Stefanski, Jaeckle, Fleisch-mann & Mugel, Buffalo, N.Y., Joseph F. Cleary, Asst. Secretary and Gen. Atty., Syracuse, N.Y., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., on brief, for amicus curiae Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
J.Thomas Wolfe, Lynne H. Church, on brief, for amicus curiae Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co.
Toni K. Allen, Mary F. Edgar, Piper & Marbury, Washington, D.C., on brief, for amici curiae Edison Elec. Institute, et al.
Before PHILLIPS, SPROUSE and CHAPMAN, Circuit Judges.
SPROUSE, Circuit Judge:
On January 19, 1988, the Supreme Court, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 743, 98 L.Ed.2d 756 granted the Potomac Electric Power Company’s (PEPCO) petition for certiorari in this cause, vacated our earlier judgment, Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Sachs, 802 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir.1986), and remanded “for further consideration in light of Deakins v. Monaghan, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) ], and to consider the question of mootness.” Both parties have since filed supplemental memoranda with this court agreeing that the case is moot. We have reviewed the parties’ contentions in light of subsequent developments in the case, and now agree with their position that there is no longer a controversy-
After the State of Maryland initiated grand jury proceedings to investigate whether PEPCO had violated Maryland’s criminal laws and regulations governing hazardous waste disposal, PEPCO commenced the instant action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the involved state laws were preempted by the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. The district court determined that TSCA does not preempt the challenged state laws. We reversed concluding that the court should have abstained from deciding the issue under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and its progeny. Sachs, 802 F.2d 1527 (4th Cir.1986). While PEPCO’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was pending, the State informed the Court that it had suspended its criminal investigation of PEPCO and, therefore, no remaining case or controversy existed between the parties. PEPCO subsequently concurred in the State’s position.
In light of the parties’ agreement and the absence of an enforcement action against PEPCO, we now agree that the case has become moot. Therefore, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s instructions, we remand the case to the district court with directions to dismiss the cause as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).
SO ORDERED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1