What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jerry FASOLINO, Appellant.
No. 180, Docket 78-1225.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Sept. 15, 1978.
Decided Oct. 30, 1978.
Mark J. Mahoney, Doyle, Diebold, Bermingham, Gorman & Brown, Buffalo, N. Y., for appellant.
Michael J. Keane, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Richard J. Arcara, U. S. Atty., W.D.N.Y., Buffalo, N. Y., Jerome M. Feit, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Richard D. Endler, Sp. Atty., Buffalo Strike Force, Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for appellee.
Before OAKES, GURFEIN and MES-KILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant argues that the proof of the crime of which he was convicted, corruptly endeavoring to influence the court or affect the due administration of justice, was insufficient. We disagree and accordingly affirm the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, John T. Elfvin, Judge.
The three elements of the crime are (1) endeavoring, (2) corruptly, (3) to influence an officer of the court or the due administration of justice. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must, each of the elements was sufficiently proven.
Appellant did “endeavor” under the statute. Not once, but twice, he approached one Messina, an attorney and acquaintance of his who was also Commissioner of Jurors for Erie County, New York, and acquainted with United States District Judge Curtin, about a sentencing pending before the judge involving one Quaranta. Appellant, seeking to obtain for Quaranta probation on a mail fraud charge involving up to five years’ imprisonment, asked Messina whether he “[cjould . . . talk to the Judge, take him to lunch?,” and received the reply, “No, it’s out of the question.” At appellant’s request, however, Messina did find out from the probation office that the presentence report was favorable and reported this to appellant. Appellant then told Messina that he “should talk to the Judge and take him out to lunch”; Messina replied, “Look, I told you that’s out of the question the first time, forget it.” No one approached Judge Cur-tin in any way. Nevertheless, there was an endeavor within the statute, which is very similar to a criminal solicitation statute, see W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 58 (1972), and does not require proof that would support a charge of attempt. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966); United States v. Russell 255 U.S. 138, 41 S.Ct. 260, 65 L.Ed. 553 (1921); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 950, 94 S.Ct. 3080, 41 L.Ed.2d 672 (1974). Thus, it is no defense that the putative intermediary declined to approach the judge or that the endeavor was unsuccessful. United States v. Russell, supra, 255 U.S. at 143, 41 S.Ct. 260. The crime is one that can be committed merely by words, and words are sometimes misunderstood, LaFave & Scott, supra, at 416-17; but the likelihood of a misunderstanding here was substantially removed by appellant’s repetition of the solicitation albeit phrased first as a question and later as a declaration.
Appellant’s endeavor was also made “corruptly.” In response to the statement of a Government informer that he was concerned about a certain person in federal court, appellant said, “You need something in federal? What’s the guy’s name?” He then elaborated that he asked because he thought that it might be Quaranta and that as to him, “I got a guy going in to straighten that out. . . [T]his guy’s going up on the 13th for sentencing, we’re trying to get him maybe two or three years probation .... my man’s having lunch with Curtin tomorrow . . .” and that if the report were favorable his man could “[elaborate on the good.” In the course of a subsequent conversation with the informer appellant stated that he was charging only $1,000 and that the money would not be paid until sentencing because appellant had “guaranteed” two or three years’ probation. As appellant suggests in his brief, the jury could have taken this guarantee to be mere puffery, designed to impress the informant and set him up for a “sting,” because appellant’s “man” was not going to see the judge; but the jury could also have found in this statement an admission that appellant was in fact not only trying to do something for Quaranta, he was doing it for money. And Messina did go to the probation office and find out about the presentence report although what he said to the probation officer is in dispute. Whether the endeavor was “corrupt” was a question for the jury, Knight v. United States, 310 F.2d 305, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1962), under proper instructions emphasizing that the endeavor had to be “motivated by an improper purpose.” The court instructed the jury that it could find appellant’s intent to be corrupt if it determined that appellant knew that Messina had no personal knowledge about Quaranta or information relevant to his sentencing and that appellant “knew or thought that Mr. Messina had some friendship or special relationship or special association with Judge Curtin which [appellant] thought would, by itself, be persuasive with Judge Curtin” (emphasis added). We agree with the government that an endeavor to exploit such a relationship, actual or perceived, may be found to be corrupt.
The appellant argues, however, that the admissions to the Government informer were not competent evidence absent corroboration that the admissions were reliable or that the crime charged was in fact committed. United States v. Marcus, 401 F.2d 563, 565 (2d Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1023, 89 S.Ct. 633, 21 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969). Independent evidence is required because it tends to make the admission reliable while helping to establish independently the other necessary elements of the offense. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 151-59, 75 S.Ct. 194, 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S.Ct. 158, 164, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954). But such corroborative evidence need not be in and of itself sufficient to establish, independent of the admission, the corpus delicti; “[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth.” Id.; see also Smith v. United States, supra, 348 U.S. at 156, 75 S.Ct. 194. The corroborative evidence here meets, if by no great margin, that standard. At appellant’s request, and as appellant told the informer Messina would, Messina did in fact find out about Quaranta’s presentence report and report back to appellant on its favorability, even though Messina had no relationship whatsoever to the Quaranta case and, curiously, neither appellant nor Messina apparently ever approached Quaranta’s lawyer who probably could have given appellant the same information. In addition to being a lawyer, Messina did have an official position as a state jury commissioner which in appellant’s eyes gave Messina power; and he and appellant had a social relationship, which appellant conveyed to the informer by the phrase “my guy” or “my man.” Although Messina declined in fact to approach the judge, appellant’s repetition of his request, established by Messina’s testimony, indicated that appellant thought that Messina might do so.
Finally, the evidence of the corrupt endeavor clearly shows that it was made “to influence” the judge or the due administration of justice. Appellant solicited Messina to importune the judge to impose a lenient sentence.
Judgment affirmed.
. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 provides in pertinent part: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any . . officer in or of any court of the United States ... in the discharge of his duty, . . or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
. United States v. Fasolino, 449 F.Supp. 586 (W.D.N.Y.1978).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0