What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
LOZADA v. DEEDS, WARDEN
No. 90-5393.
Decided February 19, 1991
Per Curiam.
Petitioner Jose M. Lozada was convicted in Nevada state court in 1987 of four crimes arising out of the possession and sale of a controlled substance in violation of the laws of that State. Lozada filed no direct appeal. After exhausting state postconviction remedies, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Lozada contended that ineffective assistance of counsel had deprived him of the opportunity to appeal his state-court convictions. In particular, he alleged that his attorney failed to inform him of his right to appeal, of the procedures and time limitations for an appeal, and of his right to appointed counsel. The habeas petition alleged further that the attorney had failed to file a notice of appeal or to ensure that Lozada received appointed counsel on appeal. It also implied that Lozada had been misled when the attorney told Lozada’s sister that his case had been forwarded to the public defender’s office.
Without holding a hearing on Lozada’s claims, a federal Magistrate recommended that the petition be dismissed. The District Court agreed and dismissed the petition, rejecting the ineffective-assistance claim on the ground that petitioner’s allegations failed to satisfy the standard set forth in our decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The court acknowledged that trial counsel’s alleged failure to inform petitioner of his right to appeal might constitute conduct below constitutional standards. It reasoned, however, that Lozada had not indicated what issues he would have raised on appeal and had not demonstrated that the appeal might have succeeded. As a result, the court concluded that petitioner had not shown prejudice under the Strickland test. The District Court later denied Lozada a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of habeas relief, see 28 U. S. C. § 2253, again stating that Lozada had failed to show any prejudice from counsel’s alleged errors. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also denied a certificate of probable cause in a one-sentence order. Lo-zada filed the instant petition for a writ of certiorari, which we now grant along with his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 892-893 (1983), we delineated the standards for issuance of a certificate of probable cause. We agreed with the Courts of Appeals that had ruled that “a certificate of probable cause requires petitioner to make a ‘substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right.’” Id., at 893 (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F. 2d 268, 270, n. 2 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 925 (1972)). We also quoted with approval Gordon v. Willis, 516 F. Supp. 911, 913 (ND Ga. 1980) (citing United States ex rel. Jones v. Richmond, 245 F. 2d 234 (CA2), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 846 (1957)), which explained that in order to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right a petitioner who has been denied relief in a district court “ ‘must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are “adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”” 463 U. S., at 893, n. 4.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in denying Lozada a certificate of probable cause because, under the standards set forth in Barefoot, Lozada made a substantial showing that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel. The District Court rested its analysis on the prejudice prong of the Strickland inquiry, and that was presumably the basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision to deny a certificate of probable cause. We believe the issue of prejudice caused by the alleged denial of the right to appeal could be resolved in a different manner from the one followed by the District Court. Since Strickland, at least two Courts of Appeals have presumed prejudice in this situation. See Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F. 2d 821, 823 (CA10 1990); Estes v. United States, 883 F. 2d 645, 649 (CA8 1989); see also Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U. S. 327, 330 (1969). The order of the Court of Appeals did not cite or analyze this line of authority as reflected in Estes, which had been decided before the Ninth Circuit issued its ruling.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2