What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Eugene CARTER, a/k/a Bimbo, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 86-1744.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
Argued Dec. 5, 1986.
Decided April 7, 1987.
John J. Loftus, Washington, D.C., for defendant, appellant.
F. Mark Terison, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Richard S. Cohen, U.S. Atty., Portland, Me., was on brief for appellee.
Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and SELYA, Circuit Judges.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.
This case is an appeal from a conviction entered after a guilty plea. Appellant raises three issues that we discuss in turn. We affirm the district court “without prejudice to the appellant’s right to apply for an immediate hearing in the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 450-51 (1st Cir.1983).
Background
Eugene Carter pled guilty to four counts in connection with a marijuana smuggle that took place in November 1982. At the hearing in which the court accepted his plea (the Rule 11 hearing), Carter testified that he had piloted his lobster boat out to meet a marijuana-laden mother ship, where he picked up the captain of that ship and left a pilot who would bring the ship to shore. He had plans to return the captain to the ship after the smuggle was completed, but the ship was seized. If the smuggle had succeeded, Carter testified that he would have received $10,000.
In the plea agreement with the government, Carter agreed to cooperate fully. He further agreed to take a lie detector test that would test his cooperation. If he failed, that failure would, under the agreement, be grounds for the government to abrogate the agreement. He took the test and, according to the government, failed to respond truthfully to questions about who arranged the landing site for the marijuana shipment. The government had three witnesses who would testify that Carter told them he had spoken to the owner of the landing site and had made arrangements for use of that site. Carter apparently denied this. The government then moved to abrogate the plea agreement and the court granted the motion after defense counsel conceded that abrogation was proper.
The court informed Carter that he could withdraw his plea, which he declined to do, and then held a second Rule 11 hearing. Carter admitted, once again, his involvement and the court explained the charges. After a sentencing hearing the judge sentenced him to three five year terms, to be served concurrently, and one three-year probation term.
I. ABROGATION OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT
Appellant claims that the prosecution’s “unilateral” abrogation of the plea agreement violated his right to due process. He argues that the court had a responsibility sua sponte to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government was correct in its noncooperation determination. His counsel below conceded that the abrogation was proper and requested no evidentiary hearing. Nor did he call into question the method or manner of administration of the polygraph test.
The district court did, however, hold an evidentiary hearing that focused on the noncooperation issue prior to sentencing. At the conclusion of the hearing the court stated:
... by a preponderance of the evidence as the Government has alleged, this defendant has not fully cooperated in that he has failed to inform the government of all that he knows about the criminal activities surrounding the charges of which he stands convicted.
Sentencing Transcript at 197-98. Thus, not only did appellant waive this challenge below, see United States v. Allen, 724 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir.1984), but he already received the evidentiary ruling he requests.
II. THE RULE 11 HEARING
Carter challenges the Rule 11 hearing on two grounds: insufficient factual basis for a guilty plea and failure to explain the charges. The first challenge is frivolous. By admitting that he knew there was marijuana on the mother ship and that he was aiding the smuggle by ferrying the captain and the pilot, Carter provided a sufficient basis for the conspiracy counts. Similarly, these admissions are sufficient to show liability as an aider or abetter on the substantive counts.
Appellant’s second claim, that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because he did not understand the nature of the charges against him, requires us to examine carefully the transcript of the Rule 11 hearing. We note, first, that Carter had two, substantially similar, Rule 11 hearings, one before and one after the abrogation of the plea agreement. Carter stated that he had gone over the charges with his attorney, that he understood the charges and that he was satisfied with his attorney. The judge read Carter the four counts he was charged with: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, possession with intent to distribute, conspiracy to import, and importation. Carter stated that he understood the charges. These charges are simple enough that a man with a high school education who says that he understands them should be believed. See Mack v. United States, 635 F.2d 20, 25 n. 2 (1st Cir.1980) (“there are indictments as to which a simple reading is the only explanation necessary”). The judge also told Carter the maximum penalties each charge carried and explained that the penalties could be strung out consecutively. Carter stated he understood.
Appellant makes much of the mens rea requirement of the possession counts (possession with “intent to distribute”) and the subtleties of “conspiracy.” First, it is not beyond common knowledge to assume that a group of men bringing in a freighter of marijuana are not planning to consume it themselves, but rather to distribute it. That intent needs no explanation. And second, while the subtleties of conspiracy law may be the bane of criminal law students, the basic principle is easily understood: a group of people agreeing to do something illegal. Carter testified that he knew what conspiracy meant. We see no reason why the judge should have disbelieved this totally plausible assertion. See Marquis v. United States, 698 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.1983) (upholding guilty plea in similar circumstances).
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not raised below. Ineffective assistance of counsel charges depend on evidentiary matters that are best considered by the district court in the first instance. We will not hear this claim until it has been raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding below. See United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 457 (1st Cir.1983); see also United States v. McClure, 786 F.2d 1286, 1291 (5th Cir.1986).
In summary, affirmed.
. He was charged with conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, conspiracy to import marijuana, and importation of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a) and 963.
. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 provides, in relevant part:
******
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law, including the effect of any special parole term and, when applicable, that the court may also order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense; ...
. Appellant’s claim, raised at oral argument, that the district court’s noncooperation determination was factually incorrect must be raised before the district court on a motion for reconsideration or for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On the record as it stands on appeal we cannot say that the district court’s decision was not supported by the evidence. The judge simply made a credibility determination that we cannot second guess.
. See footnote 2, ante.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1