What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
HEINZ v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 7277.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 25, 1934.
Theodore B. Benson, of Washington, D. C. , and D. J. Gantt, of Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sewall Key and Helen R. Carloss, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and E. Barrett Prettyman, Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and George D. Brabson, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before BRYAN, FOSTER, and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
WALKER, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition for a review of the final redetermination by the Board of Tax-Appeals of a deficiency of income taxes against the petitioner for the year 1928. That redetermination, so far as it is now complained of, was the result of rulings by the Board mentioned below.
The Board of Tax Appeals made findings of fact, which findings, so far as mate* rial to the questions presented, were as follows : “The Petitioner <=> * » made his income tax return for the taxable year 1928 on the basis of cash receipts and disbursements. * * Early in 1928 the petitioner became a member of a syndicate or partnership organized primarily to deal • in Coca-Cola stock. The members shared in the losses or profits in the proportion of their respective holdings.
“The petitioner delivered to the syndicate 1,000 shares of Coca-Cola stock, indorsed in blank or otherwise transferred to the syndicate or a nominee, and authorized the syndicate to buy and sell said stock on his account to the best advantage, solely in its discretion.
“Included in the 1,000 shares of Coca-Cola stock which the petitioner delivered to the syndicate were 100 shares which petitioner purchased in 1920 at a cost of $2,100, and also 100 shares issued to the petitioner as a stock dividend. Petitioner placed no restrictions whatever in writing on the sale or disposition of this stock, which was indorsed in blank, but understood when he turned it over that the syndicate had the right to dispose of it as it saw fit. There was no earmarking or identification whereby any of the shares delivered by the petitioner to the syndicate could be differentiated or treated differently from any other shares.
“The syndicate continued its operations until November, 1928. Its last sale was made on November 16> 1928, after which date it proceeded to -wind up its affairs. On the last mentioned date the syndicate advised petitioner by letter that 800 shares of Coca-Cola stock had been sold for his account, check for the proceeds being enclosed therewith. The syndicate also advised the petitioner that 200 shares of said stock would be returned to1 him, and requested him to advise in whose name he wished the certificate for the 200 shares to be issued.
“On December 26, 1928, the syndicate again wrote to the petitioner, advising that it had been necessary to purchase 45 shares of Coca-Cola stock in order to deliver to him the 200 shares referred to in the prior letter, and enclosing cheek in settlement of those transactions. In the same letter the syndicate stated that it hoped to send petitioner a check in final settlement of ‘interest and dividend adjustment’ prior to January 1, 1929. Petitioner actually received a cheek from the syndicate on February 26, 1929, for $4,391.-6,0 in settlement of said ‘interest and dividend adjustments,’ which amount respondent included in the petitioner’s gross income for the taxable .year 1928.” The record does not contain the evidence adduced before the .loard of Tax Appeals.
The Board decided that the above-men;ioned amount of $4,391.60, for which petitioner received. a check on. February 26, 1929, and which represented “interest and dividend adjustments,” and was the final distribution of profits upon termination of the syndicate’s operations, constituted income to the petitioner for the year 1928. In support of his challenge of that ruling the petitioner invokes the decisions in the cases of Wild v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 777, and Glenmore Securities Corporation v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 62 F.(2d) 780. In the first cited case the court decided that earned, but undistributed, income of a member of an investment syndicate using contributions of its members to buy, hold, and sell securities and land was not taxable against the member. The facts of that case are materially different from those of the instant one. The syndicate which was under consideration in that case derived its funds from the contributions of its members, those funds being made subject to use by the syndicate manager, a corporation, to buy and “manage” specified securities, and for whatever else it thought “advisable,” and the syndicate was to last until the manager ended the venture at its pleasure, when it should distribute all the capital and profits, though it might make “partial distribution” earlier. The manager did not distribute all the profits made in the years in question, 1923 and 1925, and retained the undistributed profits for future investment, or eventual distribution. The facts of the other cited ease were similar. In the instant case the syndicate was organized in 1928, and its operations were discontinued in November of that year. What it, thereafter held was not held for future investment or trading, but was held for the purposes of settling the business of the syndicate and making distributions among its members. From the time the syndicate ceased to be a going concern, the undistributed profits were owned by the members of the syndicate, and were held by the syndicate head dr manager as agent for the members. Whether the syndicate was or was not a partnership, the relation of the members of the syndicate to its undistributed profits was quite similar to that of partners to profits of the partnership. If technically a partnership relation existed among the members of the syndicate, by express provision of the statute (section 182, Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 791, 840 [26 USCA § 2182]), such partner’s distributive share of the net income, whether distributed or not, was required to be included in his gross income. Even if, while the operations of the syndicate were in progress, property belonging to it was held in trust, and the head or mán-ager of the syndicate was a fiduciary, within the meaning of section 161 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (45 Stat. 838, 26 USCA § 2161). after the termination of the operations of the syndicate, the undistributed profits were not taxable against the syndicate or its head, because they were not, within the meaning of that section, “income which, in the discretion of the fiduciary, may be either distributed to the beneficiaries or accumulated.” Whether, while the syndicate was in operation, the existence of it did or did not stand in the way of the petitioner having title to a share of the undistributed profits, upon the termination of the syndicate’s operations during the year 1928, the petitioner was the beneficial owner of his share of the undistributed profits. Whether the syndicate was a partnership or another kind of joint venture prior to the end- of the year 1928, the petitioner, as to sharing in the undistributed profits, had the actual benefit for which the tax was assessed. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336, 74 L. Ed. 916. The petitioner’s beneficial ownership of his share of the undistributed profits having attached during the year 1928, the amount thereof was properly included in his gross income for that year, though that amount was not definitely ascertained until after the expiration of that year. Dickey v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 56 F.(2d) 917, certiorari denied, 287 U. S. 606, 53 S. Ct. 10, 77 L. Ed. 527. It was not open to the petitioner or his agent, the syndicate or its manager, to avoid the inclusion in his gross income for 1928 of his share of the syndicate’s undistributed profits by postponing beyond the end of that year the ascertainment of the exact amount of that share or the actual delivery to the petitioner, of the amount of profits to which he was entitled. Wright v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 50 F.(2d) 727; Newman v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 41 F.(2d) 743; Webb v. Commissioner (C. C. A.) 67 F.(2d) 859.
The petitioner contributed to the syndicate 1,000 shares of Coca-Cola stock. The syndicate sold 800 shares of that stock for petitioner’s account, and returned to petitioner 200 shares of that stock. The Board of Tax Appeals, after finding as a fact that the particular shares of stock which were sold for petitioner’s account could not be identified, approved the action of the respondent in determining the net. profit from j;hat sale by applying the following provision of Article 58 of Treasury Regulation 74, which is usually referred to as the “first-in, first-out” rule: “When shares of stock in a corporation are sold from lots purchased at different dates and at different prices and the identity of the lots cannot be determined, the stock sold shall be charged against the parliest purchases 'of such stock. * * * ” After the decision of the Board was promulgated, by a motion for a review by the Board of that decision, the petitioner challenged the findings of fact upon which was based the Board’s ruling as to the determination of the net profit on the sale of 800 shares of stock for petitioner’s account. The ground of that challenge stated in that motion was that those findings were not in accord with the evidence adduced in the hearing before the Board. That motion contained sundry statements as to testimony given in the hearing, and to that motion was attached an • exhibit which purported to be a written record of, or account book entries as to, Coca-Cola stocks purchased and sold by the petitioner in the year 1928. The transcript before us contains that motion and the exhibit thereto. Neither the statements in that motion as to evidence, nor what is contained in the mentioned exhibit, was in any way authenticated by the Board of Tax Appeals nor made a part of the record to be reviewed by this court. Papers or documents called to the attention of the tribunal below are not before this court for consideration unless they are made part of the record by bill of exceptions, statement of evidence, or in some other proper mode. Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 28 S. Ct. 392, 52 L. Ed. 540, 13 Ann. Cas. 905; 4 C. J. 59. The statements or showings of evidence contained in the above-mentioned motion and the exhibit thereto are not considered by this court, because they are wholly unauthenticated and in no proper way were made part of the record presented for review. As the record does not contain the evidence which was before the Board of Tax Appeals when it made its finding that the particular shares of stock sold by the syndicate for the account of the petitioner could not be identified, we must accept that finding as conclusive. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Continental Screen Co. (C. C. A.) 58 F.(2d) 625. The record furnishes no basis or support for the petitioner’s contention that that finding was not in accordance with the evidence. It is not controverted that on the state of facts found by the Board its determination of the gain derived from the sale of petitioner’s shares of stock was proper.
The petition for review is denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0