What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thermon McKNIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17335.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
May 21, 1970.
Rehearing Denied June 11, 1970.
Raymond J. Smith, Chicago, 111., for appellant.
Thomas A. Foran, U. S. Atty., Chicago, 111., John Peter Lulinski, Michael B. Nash, Robert J. Breakstone, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel, for appellee.
Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge, KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and GORDON, District Judge
Judge Gordon of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin is sitting by designation.
KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant, Thermon Me-Knight, was charged in a six-count indictment with three sales of heroin. in May and June 1966, in violation of Title 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) and of Title 21 U.S. C. § 174. The jury found defendant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to serve five years. This appeal followed.
Defendant sets out the issues for review as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
2. Whether the defendant’s conviction for failing to comply with the written order form provisions of Title 26, U.S.C., Section 4705(a) violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
3. Whether the defendant was denied due process by the application of the part of Title 26, U.S.C., Section 174, that provides that a defendant’s possession of heroin shall be deemed sufficient evidence that the heroin was illegally imported or brought into the United States and that the defendant knew of the illegal importation or bringing in, unless the defendant explains his possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
4. Whether the defendant was denied due process by application of that part of Title 21, U.S.C., Section 174, that provides that when a defendant is in possession of a narcotic drug such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
At the time this appeal was submitted for decision Issues numbered 2, 3 and 4 were the subject of cases under consideration by the United States Supreme Court. We held this cause under advisement pending decision of the two cases involved. Both have since been decided adversely to defendant’s position. Turner v. United States, 1970, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 and Minor v. United States, 1970, 396 U.S. 87, 90 S.Ct. 284, 24 L.Ed.2d 283.
In arguing that the Trial Court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, defendant relies on evidence of his physical disability. He had been addicted to drugs since 1943 when he was eighteen years old, an addiction which caused his discharge from the United States Navy. He testified that he had used drugs frequently since that time except for the years 1944 to 1949 and almost daily from 1956 until 1964. He said he had suffered a serious gunshot wound in February 1965 which caused substantial nerve damage and partial paralysis which left him in a state of constant excruciating pain, uncontrollable by the medication which had been made available to him by the hospital.
He testified further that in July 1965, when he was contemplating suicide, he met one Bo Carter who promised to give him the drugs he needed in return for securing customers for narcotics. It was under these conditions, he said, that he made the sales in question, acting as a middleman between the federal agent to whom he sold and Bo Carter from whom he obtained the drugs which he delivered. His landlady and another witness testified to seeing the defendant suffering from extreme and obvious pain. The then Chief Psychiatrist for the Illinois State Training School for Boys in St. Charles, Illinois, who had been staff psychiatrist at the Municipal Court of Chicago and for the Cook County Jail, answered a hypothetical question based on the testimony and some hospital records, that the acts on the dates of the sales were not voluntary on the part of the defendant, that he would not have been in sufficient control of his conduct to refrain from the acts charged in the indictment. Defendant stresses the fact that no counter psychiatric testimony was presented by the government.
Defendant would distinguish Castle v. United States, 1964, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 347 F.2d 492, 494, cert. den. 381 U.S. 929, 85 S.Ct. 1568, 14 L.Ed.2d 687 and 381 U.S. 953, 85 S.Ct. 1811, 14 L.Ed. 2d 726 and 388 U.S. 915, 87 S.Ct. 2129, 18 L.Ed.2d 1356 (where the Court held that the defense of compulsion presented an issue of fact for the jury) because there was no showing that the defendant in Castle was in physical pain as well as addicted to drugs. However, even if we accept that distinction, the existence of severe pain was itself in issue here. Defendant testified that he was in severe pain at the time of the sales and carried out the transactions only to secure medication to relieve the pain over which he had no control. Special Agent Frank J. Boyles of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, who had made the purchases in question, testified to his extensive experience in observing addicts suffering from immediate need of drugs and those suffering actual withdrawal symptoms, as well as those suffering extreme pain. He described the various different symptoms exhibited in such cases and stated that defendant had shown none of them during their dealings. At the first sale he had watched defendant run across the street in the rain. At the second sale, he thought defendant appeared “very slightly in need of a fix,” perspiring, for instance, but rational, and that he walked away showing no signs of pain. On the third occasion he found the defendant completely normal.
The jury were fully instructed on the theory of the defense. The Trial Judge properly allowed this issue of fact to go to the jury. United States v. Schwartz, 7 Cir., 1968, 398 F.2d 464, 468, cert. den. sub nom. Pyne v. United States, 393 U.S. 1062, 89 S.Ct. 714, 21 L.Ed.2d 705.
Careful consideration of all points and authorities cited by the defendant leads us nevertheless to the conclusion that the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed.
The Court wishes to express its appreciation of the able and conscientious representation of the defendant-appellant by Mr. Eaymond J. Smith of the Illinois bar as Court-appointed counsel.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1