What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Bryon E. CURTNER, Appellant, v. Joseph A. CALIFANO, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Appellee.
No. 78-1408.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 19, 1978.
Decided Oct. 25, 1978.
Phillip J. Barkett, Jr. of Dempster, Fuchs & Barkett, Sikeston, Mo., filed brief for appellant.
Robert D. Kingsland, U. S. Atty. and Bruce D. White, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., filed brief for appellee.
Before HEANEY, STEPHENSON and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Byron E. Curtner was denied social security disability benefits by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. He asked the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to review the determination. On review the District Court affirmed the determination of the Secretary. Curtner appeals the decision of the District Court. We affirm.
Curtner raises two issues on this appeal. The first is whether the underlined portions of the following statement by an examining physician in a letter-report to the Secretary constitutes substantial evidence under Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971).
NEUROLOGIC EXAMINATION: The patient was a ruddy faced, neatly groomed, graying haired WM who in my consultation room was observed to walk slowly, hesitantly and with slow measured painful steps. As the patient was observed leaving the office and walking: down the walk I noted him to have a normal stride with a brisk gait, no hesitancy of movement and normal arm movement while walking. The patient was acyanotic and nonicteric. The carotid pulses were present bilaterally without bruit and no bruit could be heard over the subclavians. Blood pressure, RA sitting, was 140/90. The pedal pulses were present. The patient was right handed. Gait during the examination was characterized by a limping and listing from side to side. He walked slowly hesitantly and painfully. He could do tandem walking adequately and Romberg’s sign was absent. His gait outside mv office, however. was as noted above and was characterized by a normal brisk stride with no hesitation. Cranial nerves 2 through 12 were intact. There was no nystagmus. Muscle tone was good and there was no evidence of weakness, atrophy, spasticity, flaccidity, or fasciculations. There were no tremors. There were no pathologic reflexes. Proprioception, vibration, pain, touch and stereognosis were all intact. Finger to finger, finger to nose and heel to shin were done rapidly and well. There was good flexion of the hips on the heel to shin maneuver bilaterally. There was no drift. The deep tendon reflexes were slightly hypoactive (1 + ) but symmetrical. The plantars were flexor. (Emphasis added.)
In Richardson the Supreme Court held that:
[A] written report by a licensed physician who has examined the claimant and who sets forth in his report his medical findings in his area of competence may be received as evidence in a disability hearing and, despite its hearsay character and an absence of cross-examination, and despite the presence of opposing direct medical testimony and testimony by the claimant himself, may constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding by the hearing examiner adverse to the claimant, when the claimant has not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of the physician.
Richardson v. Perales, supra, at 402, 91 S.Ct. at 1428.
Curtner recognizes that we are bound by Richardson, but contends that that part of the physician’s report which involves the doctor’s observation that Curtner walked with a “normal stride with a brisk gait, no hesitancy of movement and normal arm movement” does not constitute substantial evidence under Richardson because it was not part of the examination in the doctor’s office. While we would be reluctant to extend Richardson beyond the perimeters set by the Supreme Court, we do not find such an extension here. The doctor’s comments were closely and intimately related to the examination in the office and were based on observations made by the doctor with respect to Curtner’s movements in the office and as he left the office. We would also emphasize, as did the Supreme Court, that the claimant had an opportunity under 20 C.F.R. § 404.926 to request sub-poenaes for the examining physician and to cross-examine the physician when he was subpoenaed.
The second issue raised by Curtner is that the vocational expert’s testimony with respect to job opportunities for persons of Mr. Curtner’s age, experience, education, training and general physical condition was based exclusively on double hearsay in that it was based upon publications of the State Employment Office, the United States Government and various business publications. The record belies this contention. The vocational expert specifically testified that he also relied on personal visits to job sites and on conversations with people doing various types of work at the job sites in reaching his conclusion. Under these circumstances, we need not decide the question posed by Curtner.
We affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1