What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam GATES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 73-1923.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 10, 1974.
Decided Feb. 8, 1974.
Jay A. Charon, Gary, Ind., for defendant-appellant.
John R. Wilks, U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., Andrew B. Baker, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Hammond, Ind., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge, KILEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and SPRECHER, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant-appellant,. Sam Gates, was indicted and convicted for possession of a firearm, which was not registered, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). He has appealed contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. We agree and reverse.
According to the evidence most favorable to the Government, the pertinent facts are as follows. On the evening of September 13, 1972 Officers Lewis DeLuna and Robert Nix of the Gary Police Department went to the Skyline Motel in response to a radio dispatch from headquarters in reference to a suspicious light-colored car. As the officers entered the parking lot of the Skyline Motel a light-colored car was departing and the officers proceeded to follow it for a short distance. After observing the occupants of the car look back at them the officers stopped the vehicle.
Melvin Jones, the driver of the car got out, walked to the rear, and met Officer DeLuna who questioned him about the vehicle registration and his driver’s license. At the same time Officer Nix walked over to the passenger side of the automobile. As he approached the vehicle Officer Nix testified that the passenger, Sam Gates, “appeared to be nervous and looked over his shoulder a couple of times and then again looked to the front towards the floor of the car. It looked like he was doing something with his hands, I can’t tell what, because I was approaching from the rear.” Officer Nix then requested that defendant step out of the vehicle. When the defendant left the vehicle Officer Nix saw a weapon laying on the floor of the vehicle and protruding from under the seat which defendant had been occupying. Defendant’s indictment, conviction, and this appeal followed.
We must ascertain whether the evidence together with all reasonable inferences and viewed in a light most favorable to the Government was sufficient to prove that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). In so doing, we are guided in our determination by United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971). In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Brennan enunciated the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d):
“To convict appellees of possession of unregistered hand grenades, the Government must prove three material elements: (1) that appellees possessed certain items; (2) that the items possessed were hand grenades; and (3) that the hand grenades were not registered. The Government and the Court agree that the prosecutor must prove knowing possession of the items and also knowledge that the items possessed were hand grenades. Thus while the Court does hold that no intent at all need be proved in regard to one element of the offense—the unregistered status of the grenades— knowledge must still be proved as to the other two elements. Consequently, the National Firearms Act does not create a crime of strict liability as to all its elements.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Using this criterion we find, upon a review of the record, that the Government failed to prove by sufficient evidence that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).
The record reveals that the only evidence submitted by the Government connecting defendant with the firearm was: he appeared nervous; he looked over his shoulder; he looked to the front after looking over his shoulder; and, he appeared to be doing something with his hands. We think that the foregoing evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. There was no evidence to establish that defendant in any way exercised dominion or control over the firearm. Defendant was merely a passenger and nothing can be inferred from that that he had control over the firearm. Additionally, there was nothing to indicate that during the time defendant was a passenger he had any connection with the gun. The only relationship between the defendant and the firearm was mere proximity which, standing alone, was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
To find guilt under the charge the Government was required to produce more proof than it offered. The thrust of the Government’s evidence rested on suspicion and conjecture arising from defendant’s proximity to the firearm. This was not enough.
The judgment of conviction is reversed with directions that the district court enter judgment of acquittal for defendant.
. Section 5861. Prohibited acts
It shall be unlawful for any person—
(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record;
. Melvin Jones was indicted with defendant, but was acquitted in a bench trial after electing to waive a jury trial.
. The Government’s brief makes reference to testimony that defendant “bent forward.” There is, however, no testimony to this effect in the transcript.
. There were no fingerprints found on the gun.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1