What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES ex rel. FLETCHER v. FAHEY et al.
No. 7568.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued Dec. 12, 1940.
Decided Feb. 24, 1941.
Petition for Rehearing Denied March 19, 1941.
Motion to Vacate Opinion and Judgment Denied April 10, 1941.
Edmond C. Fletcher, of Washington, D. C., pro se.
Harvey D. Jacob and E. K. Neumann, both of Washington, D. G, for appellees.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and LUHRING and O’DONOGHUE, United States District Judges sitting by assignment.
GRONER, C. J.
R.S. § 5438 made it a crime to present false claims against the United States, and by the terms of R.S. §§ 3490, 3491, and 3493, any person may institute an action in a District Court, on behalf of the United States, against the wrongdoer, to recover a penalty and double the damages sustained, one half of which the informer may keep for himself.
Appellant brought this action in the court below against John H. Fahey and others, who at the time in question were either members or executive officers of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, to recover 400 million dollars, plus a penalty of $34,-000, because of their acts in the following circumstances. § 4(a) of The Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, authorized and directed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board “to create a corporation to be known as the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, * * * which shall have authority to sue and to be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction, Federal or State”. The complaint charges that certain of the defendants, acting as members of the Board, “misconceiving themselves to be a Sovereign power, from which all corporate franchises flow, spread upon the records of said Board” a paper purporting to be a charter of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation; that their action in this respect was beyond any power committed to them by the Act or by any statute of the United States; that, having taken this illegal action, they then transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury a copy of the resolution, represented to him that the corporation was a bona fide and existing body corporate with a capital stock of 200 million dollars, called on him to subscribe on behalf of the United States for all of “such purported capital stock of said pretended corporation”, and demanded and received from the Treasury of the United States from time to time various sums of money aggregating 200 millions in payment for the stock.
This brief narrative is sufficient to show that the purpose of the suit is to recover on behalf of the United States double the amount of money paid for stock of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, on the theory that there is no such legal corporation and that the money had been secured by the false and fictitious claim of the defendants that the corporation had been properly and legally incorporated. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the authority of Fletcher v. Jones, 70 App.D.C. 179, 105 F.2d 58, certiorari denied 308 U.S. 555, 60 S.Ct. 116, 84 L.Ed. 467.
In this court appellant contends that it takes the act of a sovereign power to create a corporation, that the statute does not authorize the Board to issue a charter, and that the Board could create the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation only by obtaining a charter from the District of Columbia or some state.
We find no merit in the contention and think the lower court was quite correct in holding the case controlled hy the Jones decision. There the same plaintiff as here sought to recover possession of realty on a resulting trust, on the ground that the beneficiary in a deed of trust was the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which it was alleged did not exist. We examined the statute and held that Home Owners’ Loan Corporation had been properly organized according to law and had complete corporate existence. We now adhere to all that we said there.
Appellant also argues that the complaint could not be “dismissed” without the written consent of the judge and of the United States Attorney, required by R.S. § 3491 before actions of this nature, once filed, may be “withdrawn or discontinued”. This point, too, we think without merit. The action of the court was on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. This was a proper defense, and the prohibitions of the statute were intended to reach a wholly different situation.
Affirmed.
Now reproduced in amended form in 18 U.S.C.A. § 80, cf. United States ex rel. Kessler v. Mercur Corp., 2 Cir., 83 F.2d 178, certiorari denied 299 U.S. 576, 57 S.Ct. 40, 81 L.Ed. 424.
31 U.S.C.A. §§ 231, 232, 234.
48 Stat. 129, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1463(a).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0