What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie Mae LYLES, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarence Edward RIDLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 17261, 17262.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
July 14, 1967.
Charles H. Warfield, Nashville, Tenn., (Court Appointed) for appellants.
Kent Sandidge, III, Nashville, Tenn., for appellee. Gilbert S. Merritt, Jr., U. S. Atty., Kent Sandidge, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., on the brief.
Before WEICK, Chief Judge, EDWARDS and McCREE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants were indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1708, 495, and 2, by possessing, forging and uttering a stolen check, or aiding and abetting in the same, with intent to defraud the United States. Appellant Ridley was convicted on three counts, while appellant Lyles was convicted only on an uttering count.
The basic question posed by this appeal is the sufficiency of evidence to support the convictions. The principal testimony relied upon by the United States was furnished by an accomplice. Appellants invite us to view his testimony with great skepticism because of a prior criminal record and some internal contradictions. Appellants would have us view the accomplice’s testimony as uncorroborated by other evidence in this record.
Appellant Ridley, however, admitted endorsing the words “Billy’s Garage” upon the check in question. He also admitted giving it to appellant Lyles, with whom he was then residing (albeit not in wedlock) and instructing her to cash it. Appellant Lyles in turn admitted cashing the check. Thus both appellants had a clear opportunity to handle and examine the check. The check was a United States Government check payable to M. W. Douglas and J. B. Douglas. Both appellants were aware that the parties who sought their aid in cashing the check were not the parties named on the check as payees. The accomplice testified that appellants received part of the proceeds of the cashing. In addition there were facts (apart from the accomplice’s testimony) from which the jury might properly have inferred the same thing.
Circumstantial evidence may be used to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony. Stanley v. United States, 245 F.2d 427 (C.A.6, 1957). So too may admissions which tend to incriminate the accused.
Further, testimony of an accomplice is admissible even if the accomplice’s reputation is unsavory, where a proper cautionary instruction is given to the jury. United States v. Deaton, 364 F.2d 820 (C.A.6, 1966). In this case the Judge gave a cautionary instruction to the jury as to which no objection was made at trial or on this appeal.
The convictions are affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0