What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
George H. HOFFMAN, Administrator of the Estate of Antoinette D. Drolles, Deceased, Appellant, v. George E. LENYO, M.D.
No. 18563.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Sept. 21,1970.
Decided Nov. 5, 1970.
David Kanner, Kanner, Stein, Feinberg & Barol, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Francis E. Shields, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, Pa. (Dolores B. Spina, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.
Before HASTIE, Chief Judge, and FREEDMAN and ADAMS., Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FREEDMAN, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, administrator of the estate of the decedent, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his action because diversity was manufactured and hence would not support the suit under our decision in McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3 Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Fritzinger v. Weist, 395 U.S. 903, 89 S.Ct. 1739, 23 L.Ed.2d 217 (1969).
I.
Plaintiff attacks the finding of the district court that “the sole purpose in selecting plaintiff as an administrator was to create diversity of citizenship.”
As we pointed out in McSparran and in subsequent cases, a plaintiff who invokes diversity jurisdiction has the burden of proving all the facts required to sustain it.
The record shows that the administrator is a citizen of New Jersey and a grand-uncle of the decedent. Plaintiff places strong reliance on this family relationship. However, decedent was survived by her parents who are citizens of Pennsylvania and who normally would be available as plaintiffs. She also was survived by three aunts who are citizens of Pennsylvania and more closely related to her than is plaintiff. Moreover, although plaintiff seeks to justify his entrance into the case on the ground that the parents were emotionally distraught by the death of their daughter, the record shows that his appointment as administrator was made at the request of the attorney for the decedent’s parents and was not accomplished until almost 10 months after decedent’s death.
Plaintiff has done nothing as administrator except file this action and is wholly inexperienced in such matters as the administration of an estate. He acknowledged that he knew nothing of the state court action then pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, for the same cause of action although it was brought in his name less than a week after his appointment as administrator.
The finding by the district court that plaintiff was selected as administrator for the sole purpose of creating diversity of citizenship is a finding of fact which may not be set aside on appeal unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Far from being clearly erroneous, the finding is amply supported by the record.
II.
Decedent’s death occurred and the cause of action arose prior to our decision in McSparran, We made it clear in McSparran and- our later cases that in the gradually shrinking class of cases where the cause of action arose prior to our decision in McSparran the new rule, which overruled Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3 Cir. 1959), was to be applied retrospectively “only where the [district] court finds that in the circumstances of the particular case there is ample time and opportunity for the plaintiff to institute a new action in the state court. * * * ”
The district judge dismissed this action for want of jurisdiction in express reliance on the fact that there was then pending an appropriate state court action which had been instituted within the period of the statute of limitations. Defendant, however, has attacked the state suit as barred by the statute of limitations, because the summons issued within the period of the statute of limitations was not served but was reissued after the statute had run, and the complaint was not filed until even later. This attack would impose on plaintiff the very hardship we were careful to guard against in McSparran and apparently was not brought to the attention of the district court. A defendant may not obtain the dismissal of a timely federal action on the ground that diversity was manufactured if he is also seeking to prevent relief in the state court by claiming the bar of the statute of limitations.
The order of the district court dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction will be vacated and the case remanded with direction to order dismissal only if, as a condition of such dismissal, defendant makes an effective waiver of any claim of laches or of the bar of the statute of limitations to the state court action, and with leave to plaintiff to move to vacate the order of dismissal if defendant should at any time raise the claim of laches or the bar of the statute of limitations in the state court action. Each party will bear his own costs.
. 402 F.2d at 876-877.
. Siegel v. Slaney, 419 F.2d 176 (3 Cir. 1969) ; Law v. Converse, 419 F.2d 38 (3 Cir. 1969) ; Groh v. Brooks, 421 F.2d 589 (3 Cir. 1970) ; Joyce v. Seigel, 429 F.2d 128 (3 Cir. 1970).
. See McSparran, 402 F.2d at 876-877.
. The complaint in the district court alleged that defendant’s negligence caused decedent’s death on February 21, 1968, seven and one-half months prior to our decision in McSparran, although the action was filed on February 24, 1969, four and one-half months after McSparran.
. 402 F.2d at 877.
. See supra, n. 2.
. The summons was issued on December 16, 1968. It was reissued on November 26, 1969. The complaint was filed on February 6, 1970. Defendant argued that the state action should be deemed to have been commenced no earlier than the service of the reissued summons on the filing of the complaint.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1