What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ralph A. RENFRO; Josephine Renfro, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 89-3007.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Aug. 10, 1989.
Decided Sept. 18, 1989.
Richard J. Marco (argued), Marco & Marco, Medina, Ohio, for Ralph A. Renfro and Josephine Diane Renfro, plaintiffs-appellants.
Colleen C. Cooney (argued), Office of the Pros. Atty., Cleveland, Ohio, for Cuyahoga County Dept, of Human Services, defendant-appellee.
Before KEITH and GUY, Circuit Judges, and HULL, Chief U.S. District Judge.
The Honorable Thomas G. Hull, Chief U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
KEITH, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, Ralph A. and Josephine Diane Renfro (“the Renfros”) appeal the district court’s order dismissing their § 1983 action and pendent state claims against the Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services (“DHS”). The district court dismissed the Renfros lawsuit pursuant to DHS’s motion. The district court held that the Renfros failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I.
The Renfros are foster parents licensed by DHS. In August, 1981 a fourteen-month old girl, Sonya Ellison, was placed with the Renfros. Sonya remained with the Renfros without mishap until September, 1987. In June of 1987, DHS arranged a visit between Sonya and her natural father. According to the Renfros, this visit and the anticipation of future visits caused Sonya to experience severe emotional problems. Sonya became anxious, had nightmares and wet herself daily. As a result of this change in Sonya’s behavior, the August visit was cancelled. DHS scheduled another visit with Sonya’s father for September 11, 1987. When Sonya was picked up for the September visit, a DHS social worker discovered a three inch bruise on Sonya’s bottom. DHS immediately investigated this suspected child abuse and refused to return Sonya to the Renfro home. The Renfros claim that Sonya received the bruise when she fell off her scooter.
DHS did not conduct a hearing on Sonya’s removal until March 25, 1988, despite repeated requests from the Renfros and the guidelines of the Foster Family Manual. Dissatisfied with the hearing and the failure of DHS to return Sonya to their home, the Renfros filed this action.
II.
The Renfros contend that DHS’s investigation was incomplete and not conducted in the best interest of the child. Moreover, the Renfros argue that the six month delay in holding the required hearing and DHS’s failure to provide them with a post-hearing report summarizing the reasons for Sonya’s removal, deprived them of their constitutionally protected liberty interest without due process of law. The Renfros allege that their six year relationship with Sonya is a liberty interest entitling them to the due process protections of the United States Constitution.
While this court recognizes the strong emotional bond that might evolve in a foster care situation, we hesitate to characterize this relationship as a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The nature of the foster care relationship is distinctly different from that of the natural family; namely, it is a temporary arrangement created by state and contractual agreements. See Sherrad v. Owens, 484 F.Supp. 728 (W.D.Mich.1980), aff'd., 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.1981).
Under Ohio law, the rights and limitations of the foster care relationship are clearly defined. Foster parents have no mechanism to challenge the removal of a foster child from their care; they have no statutory right to a hearing either before or after the child has been removed; nor are they entitled to a written explanation for the agency’s action or an appeal. Ohio Admin.Code § 5101:2-47 (Title IV-E Program, 1988) and § 5139,23-04 (Standards for For Foster Homes; Approval, Non-Approval, Revocation Process, 1988). The temporary nature of the foster care relationship provides sufficient notice to all participants that their rights are limited. Therefore, the Renfros argument that these rigid legal guidelines ignore the special relationship which developed during the six years Sonya was in their care is insufficient to support a § 1983 action. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the Renfros complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
. Since the district court properly dismissed the federal claim it was also appropriate to dismiss the pendent state claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0