What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In the Matter of TENNESSEE CENTRAL RAILWAY CO., Debtor. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, and Eleven Other Interline Freight Balance Claimants, Petitioners-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America and A. Battle Rodes, Trustee, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 73-2040.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 4, 1974.
Decided June 14, 1974.
David M. Keeble and Gareth S. Aden, Nashville, Tenn., for petitioners-appellants; Hooker, Keeble, Dodson & Harris, Nashville, Tenn., William F. Bunn, Chicago, 111., Duncan B. Phillips, Washington, D. C., Philip M. Lanier, Louisville, Ky., on brief.
James F. Dausch, Dept, of Justice, for respondents-appellees; Irving Jaffe, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles H. Anderson, U. S. Atty., Morton Hollander, David J. Anderson, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., on brief.
Before WEICK, EDWARDS and PECK, Circuit Judges.
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
This case really represents a belated motion for reconsideration of this court’s decision entitled In re Tennessee Central Railway Co., 463 F.2d 73 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Rodes, 409 U.S. 893, 93 S.Ct. 119, 34 L.Ed.2d 150, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 1029, 93 S.Ct. 459, 34 L.Ed.2d 323 (1972). There, on the theory of an equitable priority as to operating costs involved in the six months prior to bankruptcy, the railroads, who are appellants in this instance, sought priority over the claims of the United States Government which originated with a long unpaid RFC loan and mortgage. This court upheld the government priority under 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1970), and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, as shown in the citation above.
Subsequent thereto the railroads petitioned the United States District Court, to whom the matter had been remanded for distribution of the proceeds, seeking delay in the distribution of the assets and propounding a theory upon which they had not previously relied, namely, that the interline freight balances (totaling approximately $900,-000) were “trust funds.” The District Judge, on grounds of res judicata, and the principles of judicial economy, rejected the petition in a well-reasoned memorandum.
On appeal appellants point out to us that between the time of the District Court decision and the argument of this case on appeal, the Third Circuit, sitting in banc, has reversed a preceding ruling in a case called In re Penn Central Transportation Co., 486 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1974), and has held that railroad interline balances are trust funds. Since the District Court decision in this case, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the Penn Central case, sub nom. Baker v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 415 U.S. 990, 94 S.Ct. 1588, 39 L.Ed.2d 886 (1974). Appellants also argue that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bankruptcy proceedings when the proceeds have not been distributed.
We note that the trust fund theory was presented to the United States Supreme Court in the railroad’s petition for certiorari in the instant case. The Supreme Court denied that petition without opinion, as shown in the citation above.
The Third Circuit’s in banc opinion in the Penn Central case is, of course, entitled to our respect. It would not be binding upon us, however, even if this case were still properly before this court on the merits. In our instant case there has been no decision by the Supreme Court which conflicts in any way with this court’s original decision.
Clearly the trust fund theory on which appellants now seek to rely could have been, but was not, presented in the original appeal. See IB J. Moore, Federal Practice fí 0.405, at 628 (2d ed. 1974).
When a disputed claim in a bankruptcy proceeding has been litigated to final judgment, it is subject to the principle of res judicata. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 66 S.Ct. 853, 90 L.Ed. 970 (1946); IB J. Moore, Federal Practice fí 0.419 [3.-1], at 2964. We have read In re Inland Gas Corp., 187 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1951), and consider it completely inapposite.
We agree with the District Judge that litigation must end somewhere. The principles of res judicata would govern disposition of this case, even if there had been (as there is not here) a change in controlling case law. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940); Clouatre v. Houston Fire & Casualty Co., 229 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1956); 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice f[ 0.415, at 2051-58.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
. The instant action -was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, and styled “Petition of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, Illinois Central Railroad Company, Southern Railroad Company, et al., to Delay the Distribution of Assets to Claimants in Above Proceedings.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 12