What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
RAMAH NAVAJO SCHOOL BOARD, INC., et al. v. BUREAU OF REVENUE OF NEW MEXICO
No. 80-2162.
Argued April 28, 1982
Decided July 2, 1982
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 847.
Michael P. Gross argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Carl Bryant Rogers and Neal A. Jackson.
Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Dinkins, Elinor Hadley Stillman, Edward J. Shawaker, and Maria A. Iizuka.
Jan Unna, Special Assistant Attorney General of New Mexico, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeff Bingaman, Attorney General, and Gerald B. Richardson, Assistant Attorney General.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by George P. Vlassis and Katherine Ott for the Navajo Tribe of Indians; and by Richard W. Hughes for the Pueblo of Santa Ana.
Helena S. Maclay and Deirdre Boggs, Special Assistant Attorneys General of Montana, Leland T. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General of Washington, Warren Spannaus, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, and Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General of Nevada, filed a brief for the State of Montana et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by George Deukmejian, Attorney General, and Neal J. Gobar, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of California; and by Arthur Lazarus, Jr., for the Association of American Indian Affairs, Inc.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we address the question whether federal law pre-empts a state tax imposed on the gross receipts that a non-Indian construction company receives from a tribal school board for the construction of a school for Indian children on the reservation. The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the gross receipts tax imposed by the State of New Mexico was permissible. Because the decision below is inconsistent with White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136 (1980) (White Mountain), we reverse.
I
Approximately 2,000 members of the Ramah Navajo Chapter of the Navajo Indian Tribe live on tribal trust and allotment lands located in west central New Mexico. Ramah Navajo children attended a small public high school near the reservation until the State closed this facility in 1968. Because there were no other public high schools reasonably close to the reservation, the Ramah Navajo children were forced either to abandon their high school education or to attend federal Indian boarding schools far from the reservation. In 1970, the Ramah Navajo Chapter exercised its authority under Navajo Tribal Code, Title 10, §51 (1969), and established its own school board in order to remedy this situation. Appellant Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. (the Board), was organized as a nonprofit corporation to be operated exclusively by members of the Ramah Navajo Chapter. The Board is a Navajo “tribal organization” within the meaning of 25 U. S. C. §450b(c), 88 Stat. 2204. With funds provided by the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Navajo Indian Tribe, the Board operated a school in the abandoned public school facility, thus creating the first independent Indian school in modern times.
In 1972, the Board successfully solicited from Congress funds for the design of new school facilities. Pub. L. 92-369, 86 Stat. 510. The Board then contracted with the BIA for the design of the new school and hired an architect. In 1974, the Board contracted with the BIA for the actual construction of the new school to be built on reservation land. Funding for the construction of this facility was provided by a series of congressional appropriations specifically earmarked for this purpose. The contract specified that the Board was the design and building contractor for the project, but that the Board could subcontract the actual construction work to third parties. The contract further provided that any subcontracting agreement would have to include certain clauses governing pricing, wages, bonding, and the like, and that it must be approved by the BIA.
The Board then solicited bids from area building contractors for the construction of the school, and received bids from two non-Indian firms. Each firm included the state gross receipts tax as a cost of construction in their bids, although the tax was not itemized separately. Appellant Lembke Construction Co. (Lembke) was the low bidder and was awarded the contract. The contract between the Board and Lembke provides that Lembke is to pay all “taxes required by law.” Lembke began construction of the school facilities in 1974 and continued this work for over five years. During that time, Lembke paid the gross receipts tax and, pursuant to standard industry practice, was reimbursed by the Board for the full amount paid. Before the second contract between Lembke and the Board was executed in 1977, a clause was inserted into the contract recognizing that the Board could litigate the validity of this tax and was entitled to any refund.
Both Lembke and the Board protested the imposition of the gross receipts tax. In 1978, after exhausting administrative remedies, they filed this refund action against appellee New Mexico Bureau of Revenue in the New Mexico District Court. At the time of trial, the parties stipulated that the Board had reimbursed Lembke for tax payments of $232,264.38 and that the Board would receive any refund that might be awarded.
The trial court entered judgment for the State Bureau of Revenue. After noting that the “legal incidence” of the tax-fell on the non-Indian construction firm, the court rejected appellants’ arguments that the tax was pre-empted by comprehensive federal regulation and that it imposed an impermissible burden on tribal sovereignty. The Court of Appeals for the State of New Mexico affirmed. 95 N. M. 708, 625 P. 2d 1225 (1980). Although acknowledging that the economic burden of the tax fell on the Board, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax was not preempted by federal law and that it did not unlawfully burden tribal sovereignty. The Board filed a petition for rehearing in light of this Court’s intervening decisions in White Mountain, supra, and Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980). The Court of Appeals denied the petition, stating only that this case did not involve either “a comprehensive or pervasive scheme of federal regulation” or “federal regulation similar to the Indian trader statutes.” App. to Juris. Statement 36. After initially granting discretionary review, the New Mexico Supreme Court quashed the writ as improvidently granted. 96 N. M. 17, 627 P. 2d 412 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 1079 (1981).
II
In recent years, this Court has often confronted the difficult problem of reconciling “the plenary power of the States over residents within their borders with the semi-autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations.” McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 165 (1973). Although there is no definitive formula for resolving the question whether a State may exercise its authority over tribal members or reservation activities, we have recently identified the relevant federal, tribal, and state interests to be considered in determining whether a particular exercise of state authority violates federal law. See White Mountain, 448 U. S., at 141-145.
A
In White Mountain, we recognized that the federal and tribal interests arise from the broad power of Congress to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and from the semi-autonomous status of Indian tribes. 448 U. S., at 142. These interests tend to erect two “independent but related” barriers to the exercise of state authority over commercial activity on an Indian reservation: state authority may be pre-empted by federal law, or it may interfere with the tribe’s ability to exercise its sovereign functions. Ibid, (citing, inter alia, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, supra; and Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959)). As we explained in White Mountain:
“The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members. They are related, however, in two important ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an important ‘backdrop,’ . . . against which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured.” 448 U. S., at 143 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, supra, at 172).
The State’s interest in exercising its regulatory authority over the activity in question must be examined and given appropriate weight. Pre-emption analysis in this area is not controlled by “mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty”; it requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests. 448 U. S., at 145. The question whether federal law, which reflects the related federal and tribal interests, pre-empts the State’s exercise of its regulatory authority is not controlled by standards of pre-emption developed in other areas. Id., at 143-144. Instead, the traditional notions of tribal sovereignty, and the recognition and encouragement of this sovereignty in congressional Acts promoting tribal independence and economic development, inform the pre-emption analysis that governs this inquiry. See id., at 143, and n. 10. Relevant federal statutes and treaties must be examined in light of “the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal independence.” Id., at 144-145. As a result, ambiguities in federal law should be construed generously, and federal pre-emption is not limited to those situations where Congress has explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state activity. Id., at 143-144, 150-151.
In White Mountain, we applied these principles and held that federal law pre-empted application of the state motor carrier license and use fuel taxes to a non-Indian logging company’s activity on tribal land. We found the federal regulatory scheme for harvesting Indian timber to be so pervasive that it precluded the imposition of additional burdens by the relevant state taxes. Id., at 148. The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) had promulgated detailed regulations for developing “‘Indian forests by the Indian people for the purpose of promoting self-sustaining communities.’” Id., at 147 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)). Under these regulations, the BIA was involved in virtually every aspect of the production and marketing of Indian timber. 448 U. S., at 145-148. In particular, the Secretary and the BIA extensively regulated the contractual relationship between the Indians and the non-Indians working on the reservation: they established the bidding procedure, set mandatory terms to be included in every contract, and required that all contracts be approved by the Secretary. Id., at 147.
We found that the state taxes in question would “threaten the overriding federal objective of guaranteeing Indians that they will ‘receive . . . the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable of yielding. .. .’ ” Id., at 149 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)). We concluded that the imposition of state taxes would also undermine the Secretary’s ability to carry out his obligations to set fees and rates for the harvesting and sale of the timber, and it would impede the “Tribe’s ability to comply with the sustained-yield management policies imposed by federal law.” 448 U. S., at 149-150. Balanced against this intrusion into the federal scheme, the State asserted only “a general desire to raise revenue” as its justification for imposing the taxes. Id., at 150. In this context, this interest is insufficient to justify the State’s intrusion into a sphere so heavily regulated by the Federal Government. Ibid.
B
This case is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from White Mountain. Federal regulation of the construction and financing of Indian educational institutions is both comprehensive and pervasive. The Federal Government’s concern with the education of Indian children can be traced back to the first treaties between the United States and the Navajo Tribe. Since that time, Congress has enacted numerous statutes empowering the BIA to provide for Indian education both on and off the reservation. See, e. g., Snyder Act, 42 Stat. 208 (1921), 25 U. S. C. §13; Johnson-O’Malley Act, 48 Stat. 596 (1934), 25 U. S. C. §452 et seq.; Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, 64 Stat. 44 (1950), 25 U. S. C. §631 et seq.; Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975), 25 U. S. C. §450 et seq. (Self-Determination Act). Although the early focus of the federal efforts in this area concentrated on providing federal or state educational facilities for Indian children, in the early 1970’s the federal policy shifted toward encouraging the development of Indian-controlled institutions on the reservation. See 6 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 894, 899-900 (1970) (Message of President Nixon).
This federal policy has been codified in the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. §1451 et seq., and most notably in the Self-Determination Act. The Self-Determination Act declares that a “major national goal of the United States is to provide the quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities which will permit Indian children to compete and excel in the life areas of their choice, and to achieve the measure of self-determination essential to their social and economic well-being.” 88 Stat. 2203, as set forth in 25 U. S. C. § 450a(c). In achieving this goal, Congress expressly recognized that “parental and community control of the educational process is of crucial importance to the Indian people.” 88 Stat. 2203, as set forth in 25 U. S. C. § 450(b)(3).
Section 450k empowers the Secretary to promulgate regulations to accomplish the purposes of the Act. 88 Stat. 2212, 25 U. S. C. §450k. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has promulgated detailed and comprehensive regulations respecting “school construction for previously private schools now controlled and operated by tribes or tribally approved Indian organizations.” 25 CFR §274.1 (1981). Under these regulations, the BIA has wide-ranging authority to monitor and review the subcontracting agreements between the Indian organization, which is viewed as the ' general contractor, and the non-Indian firm that actually constructs the facilities. See 25 CFR §274.2 (1981). Specifically, the BIA must conduct preliminary on-site inspections, and prepare cost estimates for the project in cooperation with the tribal organization. 25 CFR § 274.22 (1981). The Board must approve any architectural or engineering agreements executed in connection with the project. 25 CFR § 274.32(c) (1981). In addition, the regulations empower the BIA to require that all subcontracting agreements contain certain terms, ranging from clauses relating to bonding and pay scales, 41 CFR §14H-70.632 (1981), to preferential treatment for Indian workers. 25 CFR §274.38 (1981). Finally, to ensure that the Tribe is fulfilling its statutory obligations, the regulations require the tribal organization to maintain records for the Secretary’s inspection. 25 CFR §274.41 (1981).
This detailed regulatory scheme governing the construction of autonomous Indian educational facilities is at least as comprehensive as the federal scheme found to be pre-emptive in White Mountain. The direction and supervision provided by the Federal Government for the construction of Indian schools leave no room for the additional burden sought to be imposed by the State through its taxation of the gross receipts paid to Lembke by the Board. This burden, although nominally falling on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily impedes the clearly expressed federal interest in promoting the “quality and quantity” of educational opportunities for Indians by depleting the funds available for the construction of Indian schools.
The Bureau of Revenue argues that imposition of the state tax is not pre-empted because the federal statutes and regulations do not specifically express the intention to pre-empt this exercise of state authority. This argument is clearly foreclosed by our precedents. In White Mountain we flatly rejected a similar argument. 448 U. S., at 150-151 (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959); and Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971)). There is nothing unique in the nature of a gross receipts tax or in the federal laws governing the development of tribal self-sufficiency in the area of education that requires a different analysis.
In this case, the State does not seek to assess its tax in return for the governmental functions it provides to those who must bear the burden of paying this tax. Having declined to take any responsibility for the education of these Indian children, the State is precluded from imposing an additional burden on the comprehensive federal scheme intended to provide this education — a scheme which has “left the State with no duties or responsibilities.” Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, supra, at 691. Nor has the State asserted any specific, legitimate regulatory interest to justify the imposition of its gross receipts tax. The only arguably specific interest advanced by the State is that it provides services to Lembke for its activities off the reservation. This interest, however, is not a legitimate justification for a tax whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal organization. Furthermore, although the State may confer substantial benefits on Lembke as a state contractor, we fail to see how these benefits can justify a tax imposed on the construction of school facilities on tribal lands pursuant to a contract between the tribal organization and the non-Indian contracting firm. The New Mexico gross receipts tax is intended to compensate the State for granting “the privilege of engaging in business.” N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7 — 9—3(F) and 7-9-4(A) (1980). New Mexico has not explained the source of its power to levy such a tax in this case where the “privilege of doing business” on an Indian reservation is exclusively bestowed by the Federal Government.
The State’s ultimate justification for imposing this tax amounts to nothing more than a general desire to increase revenues. This purpose, as we held in White Mountain, 448 U. S., at 150, is insufficient to justify the additional burdens imposed by the tax on the comprehensive federal scheme regulating the creation and maintenance of educational opportunities for Indian children and on the express federal policy of encouraging Indian self-sufficiency in the area of education. This regulatory scheme precludes any state tax that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).
C
The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the United States, suggests that we modify our pre-emption analysis and rely on the dormant Indian Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to hold that on-reservation activities involving a resident tribe are presumptively beyond the reach of state law even in the absence of comprehensive federal regulation, thus placing the burden on the State to demonstrate that its intrusion is either condoned by Congress or justified by a compelling need to protect legitimate, specified state interests other than the generalized desire to collect revenue. He argues that adopting this approach is preferable for several reasons: it would provide guidance to the state courts addressing these issues, thus reducing the need for our case-by-case review of these decisions; it would avoid the tension created by focusing on the pervasiveness of federal regulation as a principal barrier to state assertions of authority when the primary federal goal is to encourage tribal self-determination and self-government; and it would place a higher burden on the State to articulate clearly its particularized interests in taxing the transaction and to demonstrate the services it provides in assisting the taxed transaction.
We do not believe it necessary to adopt this new approach — the existing pre-emption analysis governing these cases is sufficiently sensitive to many of the concerns expressed by the Solicitor General. Although clearer rules and presumptions promote the interest in simplifying litigation, our precedents announcing the scope of pre-emption analysis in this area provide sufficient guidance to state courts and also allow for more flexible consideration of the federal, state, and tribal interests at issue. We have consistently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relating to tribes and tribal activities must be “construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of [Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.” White Mountain, supra, at 144; see also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S., at 174-175, and n. 13; Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S., at 690-691. This guiding principle helps relieve the tension between emphasizing the pervasiveness of federal regulation and the federal policy of encouraging Indian self-determination. Although we must admit our disappointment that the courts below apparently gave short shrift to this principle and to our precedents in this area, we cannot and do not presume that state courts will not follow both the letter and the spirit of our decisions in the future.
HH HH HH
In sum, the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme and the express federal policy of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency in the area of education preclude the imposition of the state gross receipts tax in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the New Mexico Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
On July 8, 1970, in his Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, President Nixon referred specifically to these efforts of the Board to assume responsibility for the education of tribal children abandoned by the State as a “notable exampl[e]” of Indian self-determination. 6 Weekly-Comp. of Pres. Doc. 894, 899 (1970).
See Pub. L. 93-245, 87 Stat. 1073 (1973) (amending Pub. L. 93-120, 87 Stat. 431 (1973) to specifically earmark funds appropriated there for the construction of the Ramah school facility); Pub. L. 93-404, 88 Stat. 810 (1974); Pub. L. 94-165, 89 Stat. 985 (1975); Pub. L. 95-74, 91 Stat. 293 (1977).
Article VI of the 1868 Treaty between the United States and the Navajo Tribe, 15 Stat. 669, provides that “[i]n order to insure the civilization of the Indians entering into this treaty, the necessity of education is admitted.”
Although these regulations did not become effective until several months after the BIA and the Board had executed the initial contracts, the Secretary and the BIA had applied similar requirements under the authority of the Johnson-O’Malley Act, 48 Stat. 596, 25 U. S. C. § 452 et seq. In any event, the two subsequent agreements between the BIA, the Board and Lembke, accounting for two-thirds of the total construction, were signed after the effective date of these regulations, which clearly authorize the BIA to monitor these construction agreements.
Justice Rehnquist asserts that the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme outlined above “do[es] not regulate school construction, which is the activity taxed.” Post, at 851. The dissent fails to explain, however, how this fact distinguishes this case from White Mountain. In that case, we struck down Arizona’s use fuel tax and motor carrier license tax, not because of any federal interest in gasoline, licenses, or highways, but because the imposition of these state taxes on a non-Indian contractor doing work on the reservation was pre-empted by the “comprehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal timber.” 448 U. S., at 151. We find that New Mexico is similarly precluded from impeding the federal interest in the construction of autonomous Indian educational institutions by imposing its gross receipts tax on Lembke. Justice Rehnquist’s contention that the New Mexico tax is somehow compatible with this federal interest because such taxes “are as much a normal cost of school construction as the cost of cement and labor,” post, at 855, is also foreclosed by White Mountain. Surely, state use fuel and motor carrier license taxes are considered part of the cost of harvesting and marketing timber. Yet in White Mountain, we concluded that these taxes impeded the federal interest in “guaranteeing Indians that they will ‘receive . . . the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable of yielding,’” 448 U. S., at 149, despite the dissent’s argument that the taxes amounted to less than 1% of the annual profits produced by the logging operation. Here, as in White Mountain, Justice Rehnquist continues to press this argument.
Appellee would have us impute congressional awareness and approval of the state gross receipts tax from appropriations bills which earmarked funds for the construction of these facilities, see n. 2, supra. Brief for Appellee 21-22. Appellee strains to find this awareness and approval by arguing that the same architects who prepared the cost estimates and requests that the Board submitted to Congress also prepared the bid specifications pursuant to which Lembke submitted its bid. However, as we have indicated, the bid specifications only required prospective bidders to include “all taxes required by law,” and the submitted bids did not specify the gross receipts tax as a separate line item. Supra, at 835. Therefore, it is by no means clear, and the Board disputes the contention, that the Board ever intended to have these state taxes included in the construction costs of its school facilities. Furthermore, there is absolutely no indication that Congress was even made aware of the existence of these taxes when it appropriated funds for the construction of the Ramah Navajo school. In any event, as we have noted in a related context, courts should be wary of inferring congressional intent to alter the force of existing law from an appropriations Act. Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 189-191 (1978).
Of course, these statutes and regulations do not prevent the States from providing for the education of Indian children within their boundaries. Indeed, the Self-Determination Act specifically authorizes the Secretary to enter into contracts with any State willing to construct educational institutions for Indian children on or near the reservation. 88 Stat. 2214, 25 U. S. C. § 458. This case would be different if the State were actively seeking tax revenues for the purpose of constructing, or assisting in the effort to provide, adequate educational facilities for Ramah Navajo children.
The Bureau of Revenue invites us to adopt the “legal incidence” test, under which the legal incidence and not the actual burden of the tax would control the pre-emption inquiry. Of course, in some contexts, the fact that the legal incidence of the tax falls on a non-Indian is significant. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 150-151 (1980); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976). However, in White Mountain, 448 U. S., at 151, we found it significant that the economic burden of the asserted taxes would ultimately fall on the Tribe, even though the legal incidence of the tax was on the non-Indian logging company. Given the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme at issue here, we decline to allow the State to impose additional burdens on the significant federal interest in fostering Indian-run educational institutions, even if those burdens are imposed indirectly through a tax on a non-Indian contractor for work done on the reservation.
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980), we held that the Indian trader statutes, 19 Stat. 200, 25 U. S. C. §261 et seq., pre-empted the State's jurisdiction to tax the sale of farm machinery to the Indian Tribe, notwithstanding the substantial services that the State undoubtedly provided to the off-reservation activities of the non-Indian seller. Presumably, the state tax revenues derived from Lembke’s off-reservation business activities are adequate to reimburse the State for the services it provides to Lembke.
We are similarly unpersuaded by the State’s argument that the significant services it provides to the Ramah Navajo Indians justify the imposition of this tax. The State does not suggest that these benefits are in any way related to the construction of schools on Indian land. Furthermore, the evidence introduced below by the State on this issue is far from clear. Although the State does provide services to the Ramah Navajo Indians, it receives federal funds for providing some of these services, and the State conceded at trial that it saves approximately $380,000 by not having to provide education for the Ramah Navajo children. App. 95, 105-106, 108.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 116