What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond H. COMER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14332.
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.
March 6, 1961.
N. Mitchell Meade, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky. (Jean L. Auxier, U. S. Atty., John W. Morgan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lexington Ky., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Harry B. Miller, Lexington, Ky. (Miller, Griffin, Marks & Stephens, Lexington, Ky., on the brief), for defendantappellant.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Judge, and MILLER, Circuit Judge, and THORNTON, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Raymond H. Comer, was found guilty by a jury in the District Court of conspiring during April, May, and June 1959 with John J. Lang to wilfully attempt to evade and defeat the special tax of $50.00 per year imposed by Section 4411, Title 26, U.S.Code, to be paid by each person engaged in the business of receiving wagers, and of wilfully attempting to evade and defeat the 10% excise tax imposed by Section 4401, Title 26 U.S.Code, on wagers placed with him while engaged in such business during the period of April 4, 1959, through April 30, 1959.
Appellant owned a building in Lexington, Kentucky, in which he operated a restaurant and bar. He used a room on the second floor as his living quarters. On or about January 15, 1959, he rented another upstairs room to Lang who admittedly operated a handbook therein until raided by Internal Revenue Agents on May 14, 1959. It is conceded that the special tax of $50.00 per year had not been paid, and necessarily no stamp indicating payment was displayed. Both appellant and Lang testified that appellant had no proprietary interest in the bookmaking operation and that appellant was merely the landlord of Lang.
It is appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to take the case to the jury as against the appellant. In particular, he contends that the evidence failed to prove under the first count knowledge on the part of appellant that the $50.00 gambling tax had not been paid, which was necessary in order to sustain the charge of conspiring to evade the tax, and also failed to prove under the second count that the 10% excise tax had not been paid for the period specified in the indictment, namely, April 4, 1959, through April 30, 1959, although Lang admitted in his testimony that it had not been paid for the period of January 15, 1959, through March 31, 1959.
The evidence showed that it was necessary for appellant to go through the betting room to reach his living quarters; that an Internal Revenue Agent secured admittance to the betting room on nine different occasions between April 4, 1959, through May 14, 1959, the day of the raid, and placed bets with Lang; that appellant was seen in the betting room on at least three of these occasions; that on one occasion he produced, at the request of Lang, some papers which were needed by Lang to determine whether the agent had made a winning or losing bet on a prior day; that most of the equipment in the gaming room, including the television set and the radio, was owned by appellant; that a Western Union clock, which is usually essential in the operation of such a business, was in the gaming room, listed as “Merry-Go-Round” at the time it was taken out, the rental for which was being paid by appellant; that appellant had a key to the cabinet under the counter over which Lang accepted bets and made payments; and that there was a metal box in appellant’s living quarters at the time of the raid containing $1,180„00, while there was only $3.91 in the cash drawer underneath the gaming counter. There were other activities by appellant, which, though minor when considered alone, reasonably supported the inference of appellant’s participation in the handbook operation.
The evidence against appellant was circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence, if strong enough to convince a jury of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to sustain a verdict. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150; Blalack v. United States, 6 Cir., 154 F.2d 591, 594, certiorari denied 329 U.S. 738, 67 S.Ct. 67, 91 L.Ed. 637, rehearing denied 329 U.S. 828, 67 S.Ct. 184, 91 L.Ed. 703; White v. United States, 4 Cir., 279 F.2d 740, 748.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in its entirety, with all the reasonable inferences permitted to be drawn therefrom by the jury, Henderson v. United States, 6 Cir., 218 F.2d 14, 19, 50 A.L.R.2d 754, certiorari denied 349 U.S. 920, 75 S.Ct. 660, 99 L.Ed. 1253, rehearing denied 349 U.S. 969, 75 S.Ct. 879, 99 L.Ed. 1290; United States v. Masiello, 2 Cir., 235 F.2d 279, 284-285, certiorari denied Stickel v. United States, 352 U.S. 882, 77 S.Ct. 100, 1 L.Ed.2d 79, was sufficient to take the case to the jury under both counts of the indictment and to sustain the verdicts thereunder.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1