What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL NUT CO. OF CALIFORNIA v. KELLING NUT CO. et al.
No. 8204.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
March 20, 1943.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1943.
Arthur D. Welton, Jr., Frank J. Foley, Guy A. Gladson, and Bryce L. Hamilton, all of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.
John J. McLaughlin, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before MAJOR, KERNER, and MIN-TON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
In a suit pending in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of California, Central Division, Judge O’Connor issued an order on September 17, 1942, authorizing the plaintiff to take depositions under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.
Sometime on or about October 9, 1942, the plaintiff filed a petition in the office of the Clerk of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, praying the court to authorize a subpoena duces tecum to .issue commanding Max J. Kelling, President, and Walter Halleman, Secretary of the defendant corporation, to appear and testify, and to produce and bring with them certain papers from the files of the defendant, The Kelling Nut Company, enumerating them.
From what we can learn from the short record filed in this matter, a subpoena duces tecum was issued for the witnesses above mentioned, requiring them to produce and bring with them the documents enumerated. On December 14, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois entered an order that the defendants deliver up for inspection of the plaintiff’s attorneys all documents produced in response to the subpoena duces tecum of December 11, 1942, directed to witnesses Kelling and Halleman ; that the defendants produce certain of their papers and files; and that defendants’ attorneys direct witnesses to submit to oral examination with respect thereto.
Defendants moved to vacate this order and in the alternative to modify it in certain respects and to quash the subpoena in part. The court on January 5, 1943, modified the order in one respect, refused to further modify it, and overruled the motion to vacate. From the order of December 14, 1942, as modified by the order of January 5, 1943, the defendants gave notice of appeal to this Court. The defendants have filed a short record here, and now ask for an extension of time in which to file the complete record. The plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order of December 14, 1942, as modified, is not a “final decision” within the meaning of Section 128 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 225.
If the order is not a final decision, we have no jurisdiction. Hatzenbuhler v. Talbot, 7 Cir., 132 F.2d 192. As this is a jurisdictional question, it is proper in raise it at any time.
We are of the opinion that the order is not a “final decision” within the meaning of the statute. It involves only a ruling of the court in the proceedings of a trial. The proceedings in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois were ancillary to and in aid of the main suit pending in California. The order in question was only a step in that proceeding. Nothing was decided finally that adjudicated the rights of the parties. We take it the deposition when concluded here or any part of it is subject to the action of the court in California, and if any error is committed, the defendants may yet be heard.
It is perfectly clear that a refusal to issue a subpoena duces tecum or a refusal to quash one already issued is not an appealable decision. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783. Here the order in question was only in aid of the subpoena and for the purpose of making^ it effective. This does not divest the proceeding of its ancillary character and make it an independent proceeding. It remains as it was in the beginning, a mere step in the trial. It settled nothing except to remove the impediment to further procedure. Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686; International Agricultural Corporation v. Pearce, 4 Cir., 113 F.2d 964; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., v. Jamaica Truck Tire Service Co., Inc., 7 Cir., 66 F.2d 91.
The motion to dismiss is sustained, and the appeal is dismissed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1