What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. WELLER
No. 77.
Argued December 10, 1970
Decided February 24, 1971
Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Black, HarlaN, BrenNAN, White, Marshall, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 261.
James van B. Springer argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Beatrice Rosenberg, Philip R. Monahan, and Roger A. Pauley.
Marvin M. Karpatkin argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Michael N. Pollet, Melvin L. Wulj, and Rhoda H. Karpatkin.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are called upon once again to construe the elusive provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731. Somewhat ironically, the argument that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal is made by the appellant, the United States. The appellee, on the other hand, insists the case is properly here.
A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California indicted the appellee for refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces, a violation of 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V). In the Selective Service proceedings leading up to his induction notice, the appellee sought conscientious objector status. He specifically requested that his lawyer be allowed to accompany him at the time of his personal appearance before his local board, but the board, relying on 32 CFR § 1624.1 (b), denied the request and conducted the personal appearance without the appel-lee’s counsel present. Subsequently, the board declined to reopen the appellee’s I-A classification, and the appel-lee unsuccessfully exhausted administrative review. His order to report for induction, his refusal to submit, and this prosecution followed.
The appellee moved before trial to dismiss his indictment on the ground, among others, that the denial of counsel at the time of his personal appearance before the board deprived him of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court did not squarely decide this constitutional claim, but granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the regulation prohibiting representation by counsel at a registrant’s personal appearance was not authorized by the Military Selective Service Act. 309 F. Supp. 50. The court relied primarily upon Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474, in which our opinion underscored “the Court’s concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation’s lawmakers, even in areas where it is possible that the Constitution presents no inhibition.” 360 U. S., at 508. Viewing the personal appearance as “a critical stage of an administrative process at which substantial rights are adjudicated,” 309 F. Supp., at 51, the District Court found the various provisions of the Selective Service Act conferring rulemaking power on the Executive insufficient to authorize a regulation denying counsel at local board hearings.
The United States filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Subsequently, the Government reconsidered its position and concluded that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, the Solicitor General filed a motion asking us to remand the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. We postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing of the case on the merits. 397 U. S. 985. We now conclude that this appeal is not properly here and, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act, remand the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellee urges that we have jurisdiction under either of two sections of the Act, one relating to dismissal of an indictment based on the construction of the statute on which the indictment is founded and the other to motions in bar. Considering first the “construction of the statute” provision, the controlling precedent is this Court’s decision in United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431. In that case, as in this one, there were in issue both a statute and a regulation promulgated pursuant to it. In finding jurisdiction in Mersky, however, the Court noted that “neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other.. .. When the statute and regulations are so inextricably intertwined, the dismissal must be held to involve the construction of the statute.” 361 U. S., at 438.
The relation between the Selective Service Act and the regulation forbidding representation by counsel before local boards is wholly different from the situation in Mersky. The regulation is not at all “called for by the statute itself,” 361 U. S., at 438. Indeed, so independent are the statute and the regulation that it would be entirely possible for a regulation covering the same subject matter to provide exactly the reverse of what the present regulation requires. It cannot be said here that “the construction of one necessarily involves the construction of the other.” Since this statute and this regulation fall so far short of being “inextricably intertwined,” we conclude that the dismissal of the appellee’s indictment was not “based upon the . . . construction of the statute.”
We turn, accordingly, to the “motion in bar” provision of the Criminal Appeals Act. Two preliminary observations are necessary. First, a “motion in bar” must be taken to mean whatever was meant by a “special plea in bar” in the Act as originally passed in 1907. Second, this Court has never settled on a definitive interpretation of what constitutes a “motion in bar.”
During its debates on the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907, Congress paid relatively little attention to the “special plea in bar” section of the Act. The clearest statement of its meaning was given by one of the bill’s cosponsors, Senator Patterson:
“A special plea in bar is that which is set up as a special defense notwithstanding the defendant may be guilty of the offenses with which he is charged; it is for some outside matter; yet it may have been connected with the case.”
The tenor of this definition accords with traditional usage, for at common law the most usual special plea in bar took the form of confession and avoidance. 1 J. Chitty, Treatise on Pleading and Parties to Actions *551-552 (16th Am. ed. 1883). In criminal cases the most common special pleas in bar presented claims of double jeopardy or pardon, 2 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 742 (2d ed. 1913), and sometimes the statute of limitations, id., at § 799 (5).
A characteristic common to all these definitions is that a special plea in bar did not deny that a defendant had committed the acts alleged and that the acts were a crime. Rather, it claimed that nevertheless he could not be prosecuted for his crime because of some extraneous factor. A situation in which the defendant claims that his act was simply not a crime would be beyond the scope of this test.
Our decisions are consistent with this reading of the “motion in bar” provision. In early cases under the section, the most familiar plea in bar interposed the statute of limitations. E. g., United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 236-237; United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 83-84. In other cases defendants have claimed immunity because of prior self-incriminatory testimony or a statutory grant of immunity. United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251; United States v. Hoffman, 335 U. S. 77, 78; United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424. See also United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 (speedy trial); United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531 (governing regulation revoked after violation but before indictment); United States v. Thompson, 251 U. S. 407 (first grand jury refused to indict; charges submitted to second grand jury without court approval); United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278 (challenge to federal jurisdiction).
Testing the appellee’s motion to dismiss by this standard, we think it plain that it cannot qualify as a “motion in bar.” The appellee did not deny that he refused to submit to induction, but he claimed that his conduct was not a crime because of the prior denial of counsel. He has not confessed to a crime and claimed immunity from prosecution; he argues that he has committed no crime.
We conclude, therefore, that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal under either the “construction of the statute” or “motion in bar” provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act. Accordingly, this case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings in that court.
It is so ordered.
The end of our problems with this Act is finally in sight. The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, § 14 (a), 84 Stat. 1890, amended the Criminal Appeals Act to read in pertinent part as follows:
“In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.”
This Court’s appellate jurisdiction of Government appeals in federal criminal cases has thus been eliminated. Pending cases, however, are not affected, since subsection (b) of the amending section provides:
“The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to any criminal case begun in any district court before the effective date of this section.”
The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 took effect on January 2, 1971. The appellee in this case was indicted on January 15, 1969.
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, §12 (a), 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), provides in pertinent part:
“[A]ny person . . . who . . . refuses . . . service in the armed forces ... or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title . . . shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment . . .
32 CFR § 1624.1 (b) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
“[N]o registrant may be represented before the local board by anyone acting as attorney or legal counsel.”
The District Court cited Military Selective Service Act § 10 (b) (3), 50 U. S. C. App. § 460 (b) (3) (1964 ed., Supp. V), and § 1 (c) of the Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §451 (c). See also Military Selective Service Act §§ 5 (a)(1), 10(b)(1), 50 U. S. C. App. §§455 (a)(1) (1964 ed., Supp. V), 460 (b)(1).
See 18 U. S. C. §3731:
“If an appeal shall be taken, pursuant to this section, to the Supreme Court of the United States which, in the opinion of that Court, should have been taken to a court of appeals, the Supreme Court shall remand the case to the court of appeals, which shall then have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same as if the appeal had been taken to that court in the first instance.”
Ibid.:
“An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances:
“From a decision or judgment . . . dismissing any indictment . . . where such decision or judgment is based upon the . . . construction of the statute upon which the indictment ... is founded.
“From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.”
The dissenting opinions would have found jurisdiction wanting in Mersky. 361 U. S., at 444, 453,
It is suggested in dissent that we have jurisdiction because of the language in 50 U. S. C. App. § 460 (b) (3) (1964 ed., Supp. V) conferring upon local boards the power “to hear and determine” claims for exemption and deferment from military service. The record does not indicate that this statutory language was mentioned by the appellee in the District Court, and the court did not rely upon the “hear and determine” clause in dismissing the indictment. The theory of the dissent was not urged before this Court, perhaps because the parties realized that it can hardly be said that a dismissal of an indictment was “based upon” a construction of a statutory provision that the District Court never even considered.
United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 292-293, n. 22; Note 4 of Advisory Committee to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 54 (c), reprinted following Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 54, 18 U. S. C. App.
United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S., at 300 and nn. 53-54.
41 Cong. Rec. 2753.
Only two eases appear difficult to reconcile with the test adopted in text, and these are of dubious parentage. In United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, and United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, defendants were being prosecuted for refusals to answer which they justified on grounds of Fifth Amendment privilege. Murdock itself, however, said that the plea was not appropriately presented as one in bar. 284 U. S., at 151. In Covington, we cited Murdock in assuming jurisdiction. 395 U. S., at 59 n. 2.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 106