What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. TUCKER.
No. 3888.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
June 21, 1935.
Charles M. Love, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., of Charleston, W. Va., and Young M. Smith, Atty., Department of Justice, of Washington, D. C. (George I. Neal, U. S. Atty., of Huntington, W. Va., Will G. Beardslee, Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, and Armistead L. Boothe, Atty., Department of Justice, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
J. D. Jones, of Glenville, W. Va., and R. E. O’Connor, of Charleston, W. Va., for appellee.
Before SOPER, Circuit Judge, and WATKINS and CHESNUT, District Judges.
PER CURIAM.
This suit is based on a policy of war risk insurance issued to James O.- Tucker while in the military service of the United States. The policy lapsed on October 31, 1919, unless on or before that date, the insured was permanently and totally disabled. It was admitted that at the time of the trial, the insured was permanently and totally disabled by reason of insanity. His trouble was diagnosed as paranoia in 1928 when he was first treated for the disease at a government hospital for a period of forty-six days. He returned to the hospital in 1930, and at the time of trial was still undergoing treatment.
At the conclusion of the evidence offered by the plaintiff at the trial, the government moved for a directed verdict in its favor, on the ground that there was no substantial evidence tending to show permanent and total disability on or before October 31, 1919, but this motion was overruled and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. We are of the opinion, after an examination of the evidence, that the motion should have been granted. There is evidence that for periods ■ of substantial length during the interval from the soldier’s discharge from the army on September 3, 1919, to June 30, 1928, when he was admitted to a hospital for mental treatment, the insured was engaged in various gainful occupations in which he was able to make substantial sums of money. It is true that there is some evidence of nervousness during this period, but it cannot be said that he was permanently and totally disabled. Beginning in December, 1919, he worked ten hours a day in a saw mill for several months and was paid $4.25 a day. He was married in 1920. He was engaged in vocational training as a watch repairer for two years beginning in August, 1921. He attended to this occupation very regularly, and impressed his trainer as a splendid workman. At the end of this period, the trainer recommended him for employment to his son-in-law, by whom the insured was employed for a few months. The insured then set up a store of his own which he conducted for about six months, but it was not a business success.
In the year 1923, the insured applied for reinstatement of his policy, and was examined by a physician who estimated that he was a fair risk and recommended the acceptance of the risk.
Subsequently, the insured learned the business of shoe repairing, being his own teacher, and he followed this occupation for two years before he was first taken to the hospital for mental treatment. Evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiff tends to show that during this period -he made as much as $200 per month. After his return from the hospital in 1928, he resumed the same occupation until his breakdown in 1930.
It is obvious from this recital of the testimony that there was no substantial evidence tending to show permanent and total disability in 1919, and that a verdict for the government should have been directed. See Lumbra v. United States, 290 U. S. 551, 54 S. Ct. 272, 78 L. Ed. 492; Miller v. United States, 55 S. Ct. 440, 79 L. Ed. 977; Poole v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 65 F.(2d) 795; Werth v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 75 F.(2d) 192.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0