What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MacFARLAND v. UNITED STATES.
No. 6372.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 17, 1952.
Decided Sept. 11, 1952.
William J. Cocke, Asheville (W. M. Styles, Asheville, on the brief), for appellant.
Thomas A. Uzzell, Jr., U. S. Atty., Ashe-ville, for appellee.
Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SO-PER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
PARKER, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the United States in .an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, to recover damages on account of wrongful death. Plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Robert L. MacFarland, who was killed as the result of the collision of a motor bicycle which he was riding with a chain blocking a road which served as a private driveway on the grounds of the United States Veterans Facilities at Oteen, North Carolina. Plaintiff claimed that there was negligence on the part of officers of the government in the maintenance of this road block which caused the death of decedent. The trial judge held against plaintiff on this contention and found that the death of decedent resulted from his negligent operation of the motor bicycle.
The fatal accident occurred around 7 o’clock P.M., January 26, 1950, while decedent, a young man twenty-one years of age, was riding his motor bicycle to a Boy Scout meeting which he was to attend on the Oteen reservation or to the home of a friend who lived near the meeting place. The chain into which he ran was stretched across a paved driveway which ran parallel with the Riceville Road on the reservation and to the rear of residences fronting on that road. The driveway was an open public road for a short distance after leaving the Riceville Road near a building maintained as nurses’ quarters, but south of this building was used as a private or service driveway for the residences fronting on the Riceville Road. The part used as a service driveway was blocked off by a chain stretched between posts, with stop signs to the right and left. To the right was a large white sign 2 by 3% feet bearing the words in large black letters, “Stop — Do Not Enter”. To the left was a standard highway stop sign painted yellow with black lettering. . Suspended from the chain was an additional sign 8 by 18 or 20 inches in size, painted white and with the word “Stop” in black lettering. Plaintiff contends that this sign had become detached from the chain;, but the judge found to the contrary and his finding is supported by positive evidence that it was in proper place on the morning of the accident. The fact that it was detached after the accident may well have been due to the accident itself. The judge found that the driveway was adequately lighted and that the road block could be easily seen; and there is evidence to support this finding, although there is evidence that the lights were painted in such way as to prevent annoyance to occupants of the nurses’ quarters and nearby residences.
There is evidence that the public was forbidden to use the driveway south of the road block, that tradesmen were allowed to use it only when they had express permission and that those using it were supposed to take down the chain for passage and replace it after they had passed. There is evidence also that decedent was thoroughly familiar with the situation and that he and others attending prior Boy Scout meetings on the reservation had been notified that facilities for the meetings were being furnished them on certain conditions, one of which was that they should not use the service driveway in connection therewith.
There is evidence to the effect that at the time of the accident decedent was operating the bicycle without lights and at a high rate of speed, and the judge so found. The speed in the service driveway was limited to twelve miles per hour and a sign near the southern end thereof bore a legend to that effect. Decedent was evidently going at an excessive rate of speed, as is shown by t.he fact that, although weighing around 160 pounds, he was thrown a distance of 55 feet beyond the point of collision. The trial judge found that “the plaintiff’s intestate, twenty-one years of age, should not have been operating his motor bicycle in the night time without lights and at a speed or in a manner which would likely endanger his safety and which seemingly resulted in his running into the stretched chain across the roadway, the existence of which he was well aware and' of the restrictions with which he was familiar.”
The questions in the case are pure questions of fact and we cannot say that the trial judge was clearly wrong in his conclusions either as to negligence or contributory negligence. On the question of negligence, there is room for argument that a light should have been placed upon the road block, in view of the fact that the public was allowed to use the northern end of the road and there was danger of running into the block unless it was marked in such way as to call attention sharply to its existence. There was evidence, however, that the road block was clearly marked, that the stop sign was hanging from the chain, that the driveway was lighted so that the block and signs could be seen and that it was well known to decedent as well as others that the road was blocked off and was not to be used by the public. We cannot say that, on this evidence, the judge’s finding exonerating the defendant of negligence was clearly wrong; but even if we should do so, it is perfectly clear that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his motor bicycle at an excessive rate of speed and without lights into the road block with which he was thoroughly familiar and that this would bar recovery by his administrator.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0