What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. ALTEX MANUFACTURING CO., Inc., Artex Corp., and Metal Masters, Inc., Division of Arnold Altex Aluminum Co., Respondent.
No. 8579.
United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 5, 1962.
Decided Sept. 18, 1962.
Melvin Pollack, Atty., N. L. R. B. (Stuart Rothman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Allison W. Brown, Jr., Atty., N. L. R. B., on brief), for petitioner.
Daniel R. Coffman, Jr., Jacksonville, Fla. (Hamilton & Bowden, Jacksonville, Fla., on brief), for respondent.
Before BOREMAN, BRYAN and BELL, Circuit Judges.
ALBERT V. BRYAN, Circuit Judge.
Good faith bargaining was lacking, the National Labor Relations Board has found, on the part of Altex Manufacturing Co., Inc., Artex Corporation and Metal Masters, Inc., Division of Arnold Altex Aluminum Company — collectively designated Altex — in negotiating for a new contract with their employees at Summerville, South Carolina. International Association of Bridge, Structural and Iron Workers Union, AFL-CIO, represented the employees. An unfair labor practice was consequently adjudged against Altex under Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act and the companies were ordered to cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith on a new contract and to refrain from offending the Act in related particulars.
Enforcement of this order will be granted, as the Board now petitions, for we agree that Altex has unreasonably procrastinated and obstructed the bargaining. Only two witnesses were called, a company vice president Beauchene and Rutherford, a union representative. But there is evidence in plenty to establish the facts deduced by the Board and now recounted. They securely undergird the Board’s orders.
Collective bargaining contracts had existed between Altex and the union ever since 1955. The 1959 contract expired on November 30,1959, the union presumably giving prior notice of the termination. Toward a new contract Beauchene for the company and union’s Rutherford began negotiations on January 12, 1960, intending the new contract to retroact to December 1, 1959. The company was satisfied with the old contract and wanted it repeated without change for another year, from December 1, 1959 through November 30, 1960. But the union desired to improve wage and other stipulations of employment, concessions it did not wish postponed. At the conference the union rejected the proposal of the employer to rewrite the contract for one year “with a wage reopener on June 30, 1960” which would have allowed exploration of a wage increase after that date. Countering, the union suggested that the expired contract be renewed, but with a termination date of June 30, 1960.
Understanding the company had consented to the last proposal, Rutherford on January 27, 1960 sent Beauchene a draft of a corresponding agreement. Beauchene declined to execute it. On word of his refusal, Rutherford telephoned him January 28, inquiring why he would not sign. Beauchene replied that he had agreed simply to an extension of the old contract for a year. Thereupon Rutherford evidently convinced him that his recollection was in error, for Beauchene executed the agreement. According to Rutherford, however, Beau-chene said he would sign only on the condition that “come June 30th negotiations up to or thereafter, if we have to run over the expiration date, we will not have to negotiate anything but wages or monetary issues”. Beauchene stated further, Rutherford testified, “[Wjhen June 30, 1960, comes, we will not have to go through with anything else, because I like this agreement * *
Rutherford then prepared twelve copies of an agreement to run from July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961. This draft was in all respects like the expired agreement except it left the wage stipulation blank. None of the copies was at that time delivered to Beauchene. They were filed in the union office, Rutherford said, “to be used any time we reached an agreement on wages”.
Then began the series of meetings on which the Board bases the violation. On May 27, 1960, an hourly wage increase of 20 cents and a 5-cent advance in the health and welfare fund were asked by the union. These Beauchene declared unacceptable. Only monetary items were discussed, with the union ultimately stating its willingness to settle for what the company could afford. They met again on June 231'd. In answer to the reiterated request for the increases, the company responded that until its board of directors met — as shortly scheduled — it could not determine its ability to meet the demands. The compány refused to allow an accountant for the union.to inspect and report on its books.
July 8, 1960 saw the representatives again conferring and the company now consented to the examination of its books. September 22nd was the next meeting. Wages and the health and welfare fund were considered but nothing else. Beauchene stated that he expected his board of directors to convene on October 4 and after that maybe an offer could be made to the union. At a session on November 16 Beauchene reported that the directors had not yet met and he could make no offer. He did suggest an agreement effective December 1, 1960 for the ensuing year, containing the same terms as the former contract. Declining, Rutherford unsuccessfully proposed a 5-cent wage and 2-cent health and welfare increase. The Trial Examiner found there was a meeting on December 21, 1960 after requests by Rutherford and the union. The positions of company and union remained unchanged. Then in a letter of December 23, 1960 to the union, the attorney for Altex suggested a meeting date of January 10, 1961. That the negotiations were “to be conducted only on monetary items”, as the request of the union for further negotiations had recited, the letter denied. Rather, the attorney announced “our position [is] that the contract is open in all respects and we intend to present to you a complete proposal after receiving your proposal * * *”.
Meeting on January 10, 1961, Rutherford brought out the twelve-copy paper drawn in February 1960. The attorney termed it a proposal. Rutherford, telling of its history, replied it was not a proposal but a draft of an agreement incomplete only in regard to wages and health and welfare funds. Nothing was accomplished at this meeting.
On February 28, the company offered a proposal consisting of extensive changes in the expired contract, but left the union’s proposed wage increase untouched. Rutherford again stated the union’s understanding that everything except monetary issues had been settled previously, adding that nothing would be achieved through discussion of the company’s proposals. He reduced the union’s demand to a total increase of 3 cents per hour in the form of additional holiday pay, and health and welfare coverage. On March 1, this too was rejected in a meeting which brought the parties no closer together.
Thus chronicled, the findings of the Board are well underpinned by the evidence. They speak the company’s unwarranted procrastination. From January 1960 until the attorney’s letter in December of that year, the company mentioned no differences save the money items. Beauchene concededly knew in June 1960 that money was not the only subject in the previous agreement the company would urge for modification in the new pact. Yet no other differences were divulged to the union. Delay and delay of the directors’ meeting without explanation of itself illustrates the company’s dilatoriness and impeding of the bargaining process.
We have no hesitancy in upholding the conclusion of the Board that the company has been guilty of unfair labor practices as they are defined in Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act. The order passed by the Board is justified and appropriate. It will be enforced.
Order enforced.
. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (5) and (1).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0