What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
FRATES et al. v. EASTMAN et al.
No. 549.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 17, 1932.
COTTERAL, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
R. A. Kleinschmidt and Marvin T. Johnson, both of Tulsa, Okl., for appellants.
Samuel A. Boorstin and John F. Conway, both of Tulsa, Okl., for appellee.
Before LEWIS, COTTERAL, and Me-DERMOTT, Circuit Judges.
MeDERMOTT, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, a seven year old hoy, was injured when the Chevrolet car in which, he was riding with his mother collided at a street intersection with a bus operated by the defendants. He recovered judgment for $1,-000, and the defendants appeal.
1. Error is assigned because the court denied a motion for an instructed verdict. It is argued that one of plaintiff’s witnesses testified that the Chevrolet struck the bus, instead of the bus striking the Chevrolet; and that the bus stopped within a few feet from the point of impact. There was a dispute in the evidence on these points; but, were it otherwise, these facts alone are not conclusive on the question of fault. Where cars collide at an intersection, one of the drivers is generally at fault; which one it is does not depend upon the precise location of the cars at the moment of impact, nor upon the question of speed at that moment. One must look further back than the moment of impact to ascertain the fault. .If a ear races into an intersection, or enters upon tho wrong' side of the street, or fails fo yield the right of way to one entitled, it is no answer to say: “I was at fault, but I had almost stopped, and besides, I so nearly cleared the other car that the impact was between the rear end of my ear and the front end of the other.” While the evidence was conflicting, one disinterested witness testified that the bus was on the left side of the street; that it was traveling 30 miles an hour; that the Chevrolet was two-thirds of the way across the intersection when the collision occurred; others testified that the Chevrolet entered the intersection first. This is ample evidence to carry the case to the jury.
2. Error is assigned because the court admitted, over objection, city ordinances which limited the speed of automobiles at intersections to 15 miles per hour, and which required that vehicles shall be driven on the light side of the street at intersections. The record discloses tho following :
“Mr. Conway: We offer in evidence Section 7 of Article 3 of the Ordinances of the City of Tulsa; Section 8, subsection 3, of Section 8, and Sect ion. 9, and Section 80.
“Mr. Kleinschmidt: What is this you are reading from. I don’t know whether these are the ordinances in effect at that time or not.
“Mr. Conway: The statutes of this state say that any copy of ordinances purporting to be published by any city or municipality are admissible in evidence without further proof, and this one purports to be published by the City of Tulsa in November, 1929, and I have pleaded those in my petition.
“Mr. Kleinschmidt: I understand, but I don’t know whether they are the ordinances in force or not and I am not ready to admit it. Of course, there might be a lot of changes in the ordinance between the time those were published and the date of this accident, March 14,1930. * * *
“Mr. Kleinschmidt: To this offer and to each section of the purported ordinances the defendants object as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, no proper foundation having been laid, and no proper proof that such ordinances were in force and effect at the time of tho alleged accident.
“The Court: Overruled, they may be received.
“Mr. Kleinschmidt: Exception.
“The Court: I will give you the opportunity to offer in evidence if you wish on that proposition of what the ordinances may be.”
While the formal objection was comprehensive, the specific objection to which counsel emphatically directed the attention of tlie trial court was “there might bo a lot of changes in the ordinance between the time those were published and the date of this accident.” That objection is not renewed here, and it is not sound, for the burden is not upon one who introduces an official compilation to prove that a particular ordinance has not been amended or repealed. To prove such negative would require the introduction of all subsequent ordinances or statutes, or reliance upon opinion evidence. As a rule oP convenience, the burden is on the adversary to introduce proof of repeal or modification, and full opportunity was afforded the appellants to offer such proof. Cragg v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 154 Cal. 663, 98 P. 1063, 36 Ann. Cas. 1061; Bouver v. City of Bessemer, 17 Ala. App. 665, 88 So. 192.
Section 645 of tho Compiled Statutes of Oklahoma, 3921, provides: “Printed copies of any of the ordinances, resolutions, rules, orders, and by-laws of any city or incorporated town in this State purporting to be published by authority of‘ such city or incorporated town, or manuscript copies of the same, certified under the hand of the proper officer, and having corporate seal of such city or town affixed thereto, shall be received as evidence.”
The appellants now object tonthe ordinances on the ground that there was no proof that the compilation offered purported to be published by authority of the city. The objection is not well taken, for two reasons. In the first place, the appellants in the court below expressly waived the point. When tho compilation was offered, appellants’ counsel asked: “What is this you are reading from?” Appellee’s counsel replied by referring to the quoted statute, and said: “And this one purports to be published by tho City of Tulsa in November, 1929, and I have pleaded those in my petition.” Whereupon appellants’ counsel stated: “I understand, hut I don’t know whether they are the ordinances in force,” etc. There is no room here to quibble; there can be but one interpretation of this colloquy, and but one meaning to be ascribed to Ms statement, “I understand.” He brushed aside proof as to the purported publication, and centered his fire on the proposition that “there might be a lot of^ehanges” in the five months that elapsed between their publication and the accident. In the second place, the law is abundantly settled that counsel may not speeificallyeall the attention of the trial court to one ground of pbjeetion, and then, under a blanket objection, direct our attention to another. Frey & Son, Inc., v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208, 41 S. Ct. 451, 65 L. Ed. 892; Robinson & Co. v. Belt, 187 U. S. 41, 50, 23 S. Ct. 16, 47 L. Ed. 65; United States v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 512, 529, 35 S. Ct. 298, 59 L. Ed. 696; Guarantee Co. of North America v. Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn (C. C. A. 8) 124 F. 170; Ottumwa Box Car Loader Co. v. Christy Box Car Loader Co. (C. C. A. 8) 215 F. 362; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (C. C. A. 5) 233 F. 82; Arkansas Bridge Co. v. Kelly-Atkinson Const. Co. (C. C. A. 8) 282 F. 802; Monument Pottery Co. v. Imperial Coal Corporation (C. C. A. 3) 21 F.(2d). 683.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2