What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
KINARD v. UNITED STATES.
No. 7153.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Decided Nov. 28, 1938.
Juan R. Quijano and Eugenio M. Fonbuena, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
David A. Pine, U. S. Atty., and Roger Robb and John W. Fihelly, Asst. U. S. Attys., all of Washington, D. C.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and VINSON, Associate Justices.
MILLER, Associate Justice.
Appellant has been twice convicted of murder in the first degree on account of the killing of his wife. Judgment upon the first verdict was reversed by this court on an earlier appeal. There is now presented to us, on appeal from the second judgment, the single question whether the court erred in charging the jury as follows:
“Now, some statements made by the defendant himself have been presented in this case. Some of these statements were not made in any judicial hearing, and they were offered on the theory of confession, those statements tending to show the defendant’s guilt of some form of criminal homicide. If you find they were freely and voluntarily made, then a confession is always a piece of evidence of great importance.”
No objection was made, or exception taken, to the charge as given and the question is raised for the first time on this appeal. In exceptional circumstances the court may, on its own motion and in the exercise of a sound discretion, “notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” But the purpose of such an exercise of discretion is to insure justice, not to thwart it. This is a criminal case in which the death penalty has been imposed and we have given careful consideration to the assignments of error.
Appellant contends that the charge as given was erroneous because the court improperly emphasized evidence unfavorable to him; because it failed to tell the jury that the “statement or confession” also tended to show that he killed his wife in self-defense; and because it failed to call to the attention of the jury other portions of the evidence and confession which tended to show self-defense. However, an examination of the entire charge reveals that the court instructed the jury properly. Its purpose in giving that portion of the charge to which objection is now made was to explain the effect of a confession, the conditions under which it may be considered, and the weight to be given to it. It could have served no useful purpose for the court to interject comments concerning self-defense at that point in its charge, and the effect of so doing would have been merely to confuse the jury. In other parts of its charge the court gave full and accurate instructions concerning self-defense, including all requests for instruction upon that subject offered by appellant.
The court, in its charge, told the members of the jury that it was not expressing any view concerning the evidence; that its references to the evidence were solely for the purpose of explaining legal principles; and repeatedly admonished them that they were the sole judges of the credibility and the weight of the evidence.
It is axiomatic that the charge to the jury must be considered as a whole. So considered, in the present case, appellant’s assignments of error are entirely lacking in merit. In our opinion he has had a fair and impartial trial.
• Affirmed.
Kinard v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 250, 96 F.2d 522.
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555. See also, Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 194, 29 S.Ct. 260, 53 L.Ed. 465, 15 Ann.Cas. 392; Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793, 19 Ann.Cas. 705; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 221-222, 25 S.Ct. 429, 49 L.Ed. 726; Kinard v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 250, 96 F.2d 522, 526. Cf. Bailey v. Block, 67 App. D.C. 57, 89 F.2d 801.
Morris v. United States, 61 App.D.C. 257, 258, 61 F.2d 520, 521, certiorari denied, 287 U.S. 597, 53 S.Ct. 22, 77 L.Ed. 520. See also, Webster y. United States, 8 Cir., 59 F.2d 583, 587, certiorari denied, 287 U.S. 629, 53 S.Ct. 81, 77 L.Ed. 545; Stassi v. United States, 8 Cir., 50 F.2d 526.
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 471, 40 S.Ct. 259, 64 L.Ed. 360; Sullivan v. District of Columbia, 20 App.D.C. 29, 37; Lehman v. District of Columbia, 19 App.D.C. 217, 232, 236.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0