What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PARK et ux. v. AMERICAN FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO., Inc.
No. 8250.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 23, 1937.
Samuel H. Peak, of Houston, Tex., for appellants.
Frank G. Dyer, of Houston, Tex., for appellee.
Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment entered on a directed verdict against appellee as the insurer of the B. C. and G. C. Emerson Truck Line, a partnership, against whom appellants had recovered a judgment for the wrongful death of their son.
In their action against the assured truck line, appellants recovered judgment upon special findings of a jury that their son was killed in an accident caused by the negligent operation of one of the trucks of said line, while the same was being operated by a person who was under the direction and control of the assured. Appellee defended that suit according to the provisions of the policy. On the trial of this cause, appellee offered as its sole defense that the driver of the truck was a "person other than the assured or his paid employee,” and that for this reason the loss was not within the terms of the policy, which provided that it did “not cover any loss arising or resulting from an accident occurring while any of said automobiles were * * * being driven or operated by any person other than the assured or his paid employee.”
Appellant relies upon an indorsement affixed to the policy to bring it within the requirements of the Motor Carriers Act (article 911b, section 13, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. St.Tex.), giving a right of action on the policy to any person who has recovered a judgment against the assured, and further providing that: “No defense which is available to the insurer as against the assured under the provisions of this policy, as originally written, shall be available to the insurer as against a judgment creditor of the said assured after judgment shall have been rendered to such assured for any claims of personal injury or property loss growing out of the actual operation of the motor vehicles or trucks and/or trailers covered hereby.”
It is not disputed that the defense asserted by appellee would be available in an action by' the assured. It is equally clear that the loss, occasioned by the death of appellants’ son, and the subsequent judgment against assured, is within the coverage of the policy, subject to the paid employee clause above mentioned. The sole question here is whether or not the no defense clause, quoted above, applies in case of an action for wrongful death, in view of the fact that it only mentions personal injury and property loss.
Viewing the contract as a whole, we find that the assured purchased protection described therein under three heads: (1) To persons; (2) damage to property; (3) defense and payment of costs and expenses. Under the first of these, the protection afforded is described as being against loss from the liability imposed by law upon the assured on account of:
“Injury to Persons”
“(1) Bodily injury or death suffered by any person or persons, other than the assured or his employees excluded herein, as the result of an accident occurring while this policy is in force. * * * ”
We think the expression used in the no defense clause, contained in the indorsement, was intended to cover the protection given by the policy upon which a right of action against appellee would accrue on the rendition of a judgment against the assured. No special significance attaches to, the" fact that the exact language of the policy was not used in the indorsement. In one phrase of six words, the indorsement referred to what was described in the policy in two paragraphs with separate headings. The draftsman of the indorsement was primarily concerned with so modifying the contract as to bring it within the requirements of the Motor Carriers Act and the Railroad Commission, and in describing the risk there was no need for the precision of expression that existed in the original document where the protection was granted. The language used was not exclusive or restrictive, and does not evidence any intention to carve out of the protection granted in the policy a class of cases where rights of action might exist against the assured, but would be excluded from the protection given in the no defense clause.
Appellee insists that, since the indorsement was made to enable the assured to comply with the Motor Carriers Act, we are bound by the case of Bilbo v. Lewis (Tex.Civ.App.) 45 S.W.(2d) 653 (writ of error denied by the Supreme Court of Texas), in which it is held that wrongful death is not included within the expression “personal injury,” and that such recovery against the insurer is not contemplated by the act. While this may be true, it does not follow that an assured procuring insurance under the act may not also obtain protection which the act does not require, and may extend this protection to the public in the same manner as that required by the act. In the Bilbo Case, supra, an effort was made to hold the insurer on an allegation of wrongful death, .under a policy indemnifying against personal injury. Here, the policy indemnifies against death and personal, in jury, and the insurer seeks to avoid liability by interposing a defense which, admittedly, it would not have in an action for personal injury, but which it asserts was excluded from the protection of the no defense clause by the omission of the words “wrongful death,” or words of similar import. It is not clear that an exclusion was intended, and we think the natural import of the words used was to cover the insurance protection afforded to assured within the field in which a judgment could be recovered against it. Ætna Insurance Co. v. Houston Oil & Transport Co. (C.C.A.) 49 F.(2d) 121, certiorari denied 284 U.S. 628, 52 S.Ct. 12, 76 L.Ed. 535; Carson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (C.C.A.) 39 F.(2d) 50; Shelby County Trust & Banking Co. v. Security Insurance Co. (C.C.A.) 66 F.(2d) 120; Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Lane (C.C.A.) 67 F.(2d) 433; Nieman v. Ætna Life Insurance Co. (C.C.A.) 83 F.(2d) 753.
This view renders the consideration of other questions raised by the assignments of error unnecessary. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0