What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
STAR MEAT COMPANY, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent.
No. 78-1438.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Aug. 19, 1980.
Decided Nov. 4, 1980.
Joseph P. Carey, Tarrytown, N. Y., Fred Elarbee, Jr., David M. Vaughan, Elarbee, Clark & Paul, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Elliott Moore, Carol A. DeDeo, Deputy Associate Gen. Counsel, Patricia Cornwell Matthews, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before WEICK and JONES, Circuit Judges, and DUNCAN, District Judge.
Robert M. Duncan, District Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
Star Meat Co. (Star Meat), appeals from an order that it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. by discharging an employee because of his picketing activities. 237 NLRB 132. The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has cross petitioned for enforcement of its order. For the reasons set forth below, we grant enforcement.
Zivko Dimovski participated in an economic strike with other employees at Star Meat’s Warren, Michigan plant. On May 11, 1977, the second day of the strike, Dimovski, who did not speak English well, attempted to prevent a non-striking replacement employee from going to work by grabbing him, asking him “where are you going,” and pushing him about four or five feet backward. Dimovski claims that he was not aware that he could not physically restrain non-striking employees until he was so informed by union counsel the day after this incident. On May 13, Star Meat discharged Dimovski. He was reinstated on July 9. After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge held that Star Meat’s discharge of Dimovski violated the Act. Star Meat was ordered to make Dimovski whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result of his discharge. On appeal, Star Meat argues that Dimovski’s violent activities justified his discharge. We disagree.
Physical violence on the part of striking employees is sufficient to remove such employees from the protection of the Act. NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978); Jerr-Dan Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 49, 98 L.R.R.M. 1569 (1978). However, not every violent or unlawful act committed in the course of activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, deprives the employee of the protective mantle of the Act. Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1976).
Neither the Board nor this Circuit has adopted a per se rule as to all violence by striking employees. Id. Employees who engage in unlawful activities against either fellow employees or an employer’s property may lose the protection of the Act. The determination of whether employees have exceeded acceptable limits must initially rest “with the Board, and its determination unless illogical or arbitrary, ought not be disturbed.” Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d at 578 (quoting NLRB v. Hartmann Luggage Co., 453 F.2d 178, 183-184 (6th Cir. 1971)). The Board’s determination that Dimovski’s actions were not egregious enough to remove him from the protection of the Act is supported by substantial evidence. The actions by the employee were limited in time and did not induce violent retaliation by other employees. Dimovski’s limited language ability of Dimovski and his stated ignorance of the Act’s provisions are additional factors supporting the Board’s conclusions. Though neither we nor the Board condone violence, when violent or unlawful acts are of a minor nature or are prompted by improper employer activity, will we enforce the Board’s orders reinstating discharged employees or granting back pay. NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978); Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 84 L.R.R.M. 1441 (1973).
Accordingly, the Board’s order is ENFORCED.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1