What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hardy JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 89-50379.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted June 4, 1990.
Decided July 12, 1990.
Jay L. Lichtman, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
Ellyn Lindsay, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los An-geles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BROWNING and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK, District Judge.
The Hon. William H. Orrick, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Hardy Jones appeals his sentence imposed under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) following his conviction by guilty plea for two counts of unarmed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The district court sentenced Jones to two concurrent terms of fifteen years imprisonment and five years probation.
Jones contends that the Guidelines as a whole violate due process on their face, and that the district court’s application of the Guidelines’ career offender provision in this case violated due process. Jones also contends that the district court erred by failing to make the fact findings required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D), and by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes.
Judgment was entered on July 24, 1989, and Jones timely filed his notice of appeal on the same day. The district court filed a sentencing order on July 28, 1989. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jones’s presentence report listed three prior convictions for purposes of Guidelines § 4B1.1: (1) assault with intent to commit murder and assault with a deadly weapon on January 31, 1979; (2) robbery on September 26, 1978; and (3) robbery on November 27, 1974. In his written objections to the presentence report, Jones acknowledged the 1978 robbery but contended the 1974 robbery and the 1979 assault should not be considered prior convictions under section 4B1.1. He argued: (1) that the 1979 assault conviction was not a prior conviction for a crime of violence because it was an act of self-defense in response to gang-related violence in prison; and (2) that his sentencing in 1974 was an erroneous resentencing for a 1971 conviction.
At the sentencing hearing on July 17, 1989, the district court stated: “With respect to the priors, the career offender priors, contained in paragraph 50, 56, and 58 of the presentence report, the Court finds that all priors are valid.” In its sentencing order, filed eleven days later, the district court found “the challenged information within the presentence report to be factually accurate.” With regard to the 1979 assault, the court stated: “The Court also rejects defendant’s self-defense challenge to the conviction listed in paragraph 58 of the presentence report. That conviction, for assault with intent to commit murder, is for a crime of violence which was properly considered in classifying defendant as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.” With regard to the 1974 robbery, the court stated: “Defendant’s incarceration for that conviction within fifteen years of the instant offense was not the result of a judicial mistake.”
DISCUSSION
I. Due Process Challenges
This court recently determined that the Guidelines do not unduly limit -the sentencing court’s discretion to individualize a defendant’s sentence, and thus do not violate substantive or procedural due process. United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.1990). We affirm the district court’s determination that the Guidelines do not violate due process either on their face or as applied in this case. See id. at 544.
II. Findings Under Rule 32(c)(3)(D)
Jones contends that the district court did not effectively make the findings required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D) because the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the sentencing order on July 28, 1989, after Jones had filed his notice of appeal on July 24, 1989. The government contends that the district court retained jurisdiction because Jones’s notice of appeal was premature. Because we hold that the findings made by the district court at the sentencing hearing satisfied Rule 32, we need not reach the question whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the July 28, 1989 sentencing order.
The Guidelines establish policy for resolving reasonable disputes over factors important to sentencing determinations. Guidelines § 6A1.3. Guidelines § 6A1.3(b) provides that the court “shall resolve disputed sentencing factors in accordance with Rule 32(a)(1), Fed.R.Crim.P.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D) “helps to ensure that due process is achieved at sentencing.” United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Messer, 785 F.2d 832, 834 (9th Cir.1986)). The Rule requires that if the defendant alleges any factual inaccuracy in the presentence report, the court shall “make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D); see Kerr, 876 F.2d at 1445-46. When a defendant challenges the factual accuracy of a presentence report, strict compliance with the Rule is required. United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d 1514, 1516 (9th Cir.1990) (en banc); United States v. Pettito, 767 F.2d 607, 609-10 (9th Cir.1985).
Here we determine whether the district court’s oral findings at the sentencing hearing complied with Rule 32. We hold that the district court did not violate the rule in this case.
At the hearing, the district court made findings that the 1979 assault conviction and the 1974 robbery conviction were “valid” prior convictions for purposes of section 4B1.1. Jones’ assertion that he had a defense to the 1979 assault to which he pled guilty was invalid as a matter of law; he pled guilty to assault, and may not now assert a defense to that assault charge. His challenge to the consideration of the 1979 conviction did not raise a reasonable factual dispute. The district judge, therefore, was not required to make a finding under Rule 32 other than the finding he did make that the conviction was validly considered in determining whether Jones was a career offended under the Guidelines. Further, and also because Jones did not raise a reasonable factual dispute, no evidentiary hearing was necessary under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(A).
Other contentions raised by Jones are equally without merit. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
. Under section 4B1.1,
[a] defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
For a defendant to be a career offender, each prior felony conviction must have resulted in a period of imprisonment that exceeded one year and one month. In addition, each prior felony conviction must have either been imposed within fifteen years of the defendant’s commission of the instant offense or resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any part of that fifteen-year period. Guidelines § 4A1.2(e); see United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 560-61 (9th Cir.1989) (even though the Guidelines apply only to conduct occurring after November 1, 1987, convictions obtained before that date are properly considered in determining a defendant’s career offender status).
A crime of violence is a crime that “has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or "is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
. Jones has made no argument against considering the 1978 robbery conviction in determining career offender status. Under section 4B1.1, a defendant is a career offender if, inter alia, "the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." Because we conclude that the district court properly considered the 1979 assault conviction in determining that Jones was a career offender, and because that felony and the 1978 robbery conviction are an adequate basis of the finding that Jones is a career offender, we need not consider Jones’ challenge to the district court’s consideration of the 1974 robbery conviction.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1