What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William Milton CARDEN, Appellant.
No. 78-5197.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued March 9, 1979.
Decided June 20, 1979.
H. Marshall Simpson, Greensboro, N.C. (Booth, Fish, Simpson, Harrison & Hall, Greensboro, N.C., on brief), for appellant.
David B. Smith, Asst. U.S. Atty. (H. M. Michaux, Jr., U.S. Atty., Durham, N.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before BUTZNER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges, and ROBERT R. MERHIGE, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Upon a plea of guilty, William Milton Carden was convicted of committing bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Carden’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
On October 25, 1977, Carden withdrew a prior plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty to the offense of bank robbery. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(c) and (d), he was tentatively sentenced to the maximum term of 20 years and was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of observation and study. On April 3, 1978, when Carden was returned to the court for resentencing, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 7, 1978, and subsequently denied the motion. Car-den’s sentence was reduced to a term of 15 years with credit given for time served.
A preliminary question arises whether the presentence “fair and just” standard or the post-sentence “manifest injustice” standard should apply to the withdrawal of a guilty plea in the context of § 4205(c) sentencing. Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea be made before sentence is imposed. We have held that before sentencing a trial court may allow withdrawal of a plea for any fair and just reason, and that ordinarily such a motion to withdraw should be allowed. United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574, 578 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tabory, 462 F.2d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 1972). When the government has been prejudiced by reliance on the defendant’s plea, however, the trial court must weigh the accused’s reasons for changing his plea against the prejudice the government will suffer. United States v. Strauss, 563 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1977). On appeal, denial of the motion will be overturned only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Strauss, 563 F.2d 127, 131 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ford, 363 F.2d 375, 377 (4th Cir. 1966). Withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing is permitted by Rule 32(d) only when necessary to correct manifest injustice.
Rule 32(d) does not address itself to the situation presented here where the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea after he had been provisionally sentenced under § 4205(c), but before he received a final sentence. The district court applied the “fair and just” standard to Carden’s motion to withdraw his plea. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carden’s motion even under the more lenient standard, this appeal presents no occasion to decide, as a general rule, which standard is proper in the context of a bifurcated sentencing proceeding such as that prescribed by § 4205(c).
The district court conducted a full eviden-tiary hearing on the motion. Carden asserted his reasons for seeking to withdraw his plea, and the government showed that it would be substantially prejudiced if the plea were allowed to be withdrawn. The district court properly weighed the defendant’s reasons for seeking withdrawal against the prejudice demonstrated by the government. In accordance with our decision in United States v. Strauss, 563 F.2d 127, 131 (4th Cir. 1977), the following factors were considered: (1) the court’s Rule 11 inquiry; (2) the quality of representation received by Carden; (3) his mental condition at the time the guilty plea was entered; and (4) whether he had asserted his innocence.
Our review of the transcript of the April 7th hearing, and that of the Rule 11 inquiry, satisfies us that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Car-den’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In contrast to the prejudice shown by the government, Carden has presented no satisfactory reason for allowing the withdrawal of his plea.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Two circuits have ruled that the “fair and just” standard should apply when a defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea after he has been tentatively sentenced under § 4205(c) (formerly § 4208(b)), but prior to final sentencing. See United States v. Barker, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 514 F.2d 208 (1975); United States v. Thomas, 415 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1969). Several other circuits have reserved judgment on this question. See, e. g., United States v. Bradin, 535 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973); Callaway v. United States, 367 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1966).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0