What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Tony FERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. Raymond W. MEIER, Appellee. Anthony FERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 23512, 23819.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Oct. 5, 1970.
Tony Fernandez (argued) pro. per.
■ Anthony Fernandez (argued), pro. per.
J. S. Obenour (argued), Asst. U. S. Atty., Stan Pitkin, U. S. Atty., Tacoma, Wash., for appellee.
Before HAMLEY and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges, SMITH, District Judge.
Honorable Russell E. Smith, Chief Judge, United States District Court, Missoula, Montana, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
This is a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking the sentence imposed on petitioner following conviction upon an indictment charging seven counts of interstate transportation of funds (18 U.S. C. § 2314) and one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States Government (18 U.S.C. § 371). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on all of the substantive fraud counts but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy count. Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. den., 379 U.S. 832, 85 S.Ct. 62, 13 L.Ed.2d 40.
Following his conviction, petitioner was sentenced to terms totaling eleven years and eleven months on the eight counts. At the time of sentencing, petitioner requested but was denied the right to inspect the presentence report made available to the District Court by the probation service. Petitioner bases his claim for relief upon the refusal of the District Court judge, at the time of sentencing, to grant petitioner the opportunity to examine the presentenee report. He asserts that the failure to afford him the opportunity to examine the presentence report, and thus the opportunity to refute any untrue or prejudicial material contained in it, amounted to deprivation of due process of law.
The rule in the federal courts is that the right to examine a presentence report is not one of constitutional magnitude and that the trial judge, in his discretion, may deny an accused an opportunity to inspect the report. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c) (2); Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492, 89 S.Ct. 1134, 1136, 22 L.Ed.2d 442, 446 (1969), reh. den., 395 U.S. 917, 89 S.Ct. 1738, 23 L.Ed.2d 232; Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 932-933 (4th Cir. 1968). Further, due process does not require that an accused be granted the right to confront witnesses who have made statements contained in a presentence report. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), reh. den., 337 U.S. 961, 69 S.Ct. 1529, 93 L.Ed. 1760 and 338 U.S. 841, 70 S.Ct. 34, 94 L.Ed. 514; United States v. Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir. 1967); cert. den., 390 U.S. 973, 88 S.Ct. 1064, 19 L.Ed.2d 1185.
We have examined the presentence report and find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to permit inspection of the report. We find no circumstances which suggest that petitioner might have received a shorter sentence than the one imposed if he had been afforded the opportunity to comment on the contents of the presentence report. The report contained information that was both favorable and unfavorable to the petitioner, and none of the latter could be considered unduly prejudicial to him. Finally, the length of the sentence petitioner received supports the conclusion that no prejudice resulted to petitioner from the act of the trial judge in refusing to allow petitioner to examine the report.
Petitioner also assigns as error the refusal of a district court judge to entertain his written application, dated February 16, 1968, for a writ of habeas corpus. The application was denied because petitioner, after notice, refused to make the application on the form required by the local rule of the district court. W.D.Wash. R. 34.
The use of the specific form required by Rule 34 and the purpose for the form in habeas corpus proceedings were approved in Hooker v. United States District Court, 380 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1967). Further, we note that petitioner raised the same points in a later “Motion to Discharge Petitioner” as he raised in the rejected application of February 16, 1968. The “Motion to Discharge Petitioner” was treated as a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by the District Court and constitutes petition #23819 disposed of above. Thus, no harm to petitioner resulted from the rejection of his written application.
The decision of the district court in each instance is affirmed.
. This rule of discretion is not uniformly followed by the States. See, e. g., State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 259 A.2d 895 (1969). A proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would make the disclosure of the material in a presentence report mandatory in most instances. Proposed Amendments to Criminal Rules, Rule 32.2(c) (1), 48 F.R.D. 553, 614-615 (1970).
. The maximum sentence possible was seventy-five years.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0