What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CALLENDER v. BARRY et al.
No. 8278.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 10, 1937.
K. I. McKay and Maynard Ramsey, both of Tampa, Fla., for appellant.
S. Henry Harris, J. E. Kennedy, and J. Uhle Bethell, all of St. Petersburg, Fla., for appellees.
Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
FOSTER, Circuit Judge.
In this case it appears from the record that Wm. D. Callender was the owner of certain property in Mariners Harbor, Staten Island, N. Y., and on June 5, 1912, he conveyed it by a warranty deed to his unmarried sister, Elizabeth S. Callender. On May 20, 1915, she exchanged it for certain property in St. Petersburg, Fla., generally described as lots 8 and 9 in McClung’s subdivisión, owned by James T. MacLean and his wife. In perfecting the exchange warranty deeds were executed by said parties to each other. Wm. D. Callender died in 1931, bequeathing all his property then possessed to his widow, Irene H. Callender, appellant. Elizabeth S. Callender died in 1934, bequeathing the St. Petersburg property to appellee, the Rt. Rev. Patrick Barry, bishop of the diocese of St. Augustine, Fla., as trustee, for the use and benefit of St. Mary’s Roman Catholic Church in St. Petersburg, Fla. This suit was instituted in December, 1934, by appellant claiming title to the property in St. Petersburg under the last will of her husband and alleging that it was held in trust by Elizabeth Callender for the benefit of' herself, her father and her mother, who had died before her, during their lifetimes.
The District Court held there was no evidence to show that either the Staten Island or the St. Petersburg property was held in trust by Elizabeth Callender and denied the contention of appellant that, on the prima facie showing made, the burden of disproving the trust had shifted to appellees. Error is assigned to these rulings.
It appears from the record that Wm. D. Callender resided with his father, mother, and sister on the Staten Island property until his marriage, which occurred on June 8, 1912, three days after he had conveyed that property to his sister. He then moved to Chicago where he engaged in the business of publishing a trade paper. After the St. Petersburg property was acquired he paid for building a house on it and regularly paid the taxes until his death. His father had an income of $100 a month, pensions from the city of New York, of which he was a former employee, and from the United States, as a Civil War veteran. His mother had a small income, the exact amount of which is not shown. At her death she left an estate of approximately $1,000, which the sister invested in an annuity for the benefit of herself and a brother Thomas. William D. Callender gave his sister an income of about $40 a month until the death of the mother and then reduced it to $30 a month. She had never worked and had no other income. She was about 65 years old when she died. There was nothing to show that an express trust was ever created in either property in writing or by parol. Statements made by Wm. D. Callender during his lifetime, admitted without objection, tended to show that he intended to provide a home for his father, mother and maiden sister and to supplement their income so that they could live comfortably. His deeding of the property to his sister in full ownership is as consistent with that intention as would have been the establishing of a life trust for-them in it. He was about to remove to another home and he may well have thought it advisable to donate the property to his sister to avoid complications that might arise in the future from business reversals or'because of his marriage.
Fraud does not enter as an element in the case. The evidence was not sufficient to support a prima facie presumption that a trust was intended to be created. The burden of proof did not shift to appellees. We agree with the conclusions of the District Court. Rogero v. Rogero, 66 Fla. 6, 62 So. 899; McGill v. Chappelle, 71 Fla. 479, 71 So. 836; Brown v. Brown, 106 Fla. 423, 143 So. 737.
The record presents no reversible error.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0