What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
William S. RUTLEDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALUMINUM, BRICK AND CLAY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION; Lawrence A. Holley, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 82-7001
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 2, 1982.
George C. Longshore, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.
John C. Falkenberry, Birmingham, Ala., for defendants-appellees.
Before GODBOLD, Chief Judge, JOHNSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
GODBOLD, Chief Judge:
Appellant appeals from the district court’s denial of his request for injunctive relief. We affirm.
Rutledge was a regional director of the Southeastern states for the union. He attended a union convention in 1981 as a delegate from his local and during the convention campaigned actively for a presidential candidate who lost the election. The winner, appellee Holley, soon transferred Rutledge from his region to serve as regional director for the west coast. Rutledge alleges that Holley knew that his [Rutledge’s] life had been threatened by union members in Los Angeles previously. Rutledge refused the transfer and began picketing the union offices. Holley withdrew the transfer and fired him.
Appellant claimed that appellees violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1) and (2), which guarantee union members the right to freely participate in elections and to express their views about candidates and union business, by transferring and then firing him. He also alleged that the union violated 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) by discharging him without notice of the charges and a hearing. Finally, he contended that he was terminated without “just cause” as required by the union’s constitution. Rutledge asked for declaratory, equitable and injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. After a hearing, the district court denied the request for injunctive relief on the ground that he had not established a likelihood of success on the merits, relying in part upon Wambles v. Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974).
Denial of a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion of the district court and is reviewable on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Scoreboard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979). We find no abuse of discretion, particularly in light of Finnegan v. Leu, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982), which recently resolved a conflict among circuits in favor of the position taken by the former Fifth Circuit in Wambles, supra. The Court held in Finnegan that 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1) and (2) do not prohibit a union president from choosing a staff loyal to him as long as the union status of those fired remains unaffected. The Court also observed that § 411(a)(5) does not require the union to give notice and a hearing before removing a union officer from his position. The section only applies to the suspension of union membership. - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 1871, 72 L.Ed.2d at 245.
We agree with the district court that Rutledge is not likely to prevail on his claims after Finnegan. The district court’s finding that Rutledge’s membership in the union has not been revoked by his discharge is supported by the complaint and the evidence. See Record, Volume 1 and 2 and Volume 2 at 91-92. Also, the court’s preliminary conclusion that appellant’s picketing interfered with the union’s legal obligations to provide regional representation seriously enough to outweigh his right of free speech was within the court’s discretion.
The denial of injunctive relief is AFFIRMED.
. Finnegan v. Leu, supra, does not foreclose all claims of retaliatory discharge. See - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 1873, 72 L.Ed.2d at 247. However, the facts of this case so closely parallel those in Finnegan that Rutledge would have difficulty prevailing on his claims.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 1