What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. PEET.
No. 1440.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 4, 1937.
Thomas E. Walsh, Atty., Dept, of Justice, of Washington, D. C. (Summerfield S. Alexander, U. S. Atty., and R. T. Mc-Cluggage, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Topeka, Kan., Julius C. Martin, Director, Bureau of War Risk Litigation, of Washington, D. C., Wilbur C. Pickett, Sp. Asst, to the Atty. Gen., and Keith L. Seegmiller, Atty., Dept. of Justice, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for the United States.
T. W. Bell, of Leavenworth, Kan., for appellee. .
Before LEWIS, PHILLIPS, and BRATTON, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
Peet brought this action against the United States on a policy of war risk insurance. The policy lapsed on March 1, 1919, for nonpayment of premiums unless on or prior to that date Peet became totally and permanently disabled.
On a former appeal we held the evidence failed to establish total disability and reversed a judgment in favor of Peet and remanded the cause for a new trial-United States v. Peet (C.C.A.10) 59 F.(2d) 728. On a second trial the lower court again found the issues of fact in favor of Peet and awarded judgment accordingly. The United States has appealed.
Prior to his service in the United States Army, which covered the period from September 17, 1917, to February 4, 1919, Peet worked in the coal mines as a mule driver. While in the service he was wounded in the right foot and was confined in army hospitals from October 19, 1918, until his discharge. After his discharge Peet continued to receive treatment for the wourjd for a period of about three months. The wound healed, but a portion of the scar tissue adhered to the bone and this causes him inconvenience and annoyance and interferes with the normal movement of the foot. The injured foot is not as strong as a normal foot, and at times the muscles thereof involuntarily contract and cause pain.
Peet testified that since his discharge from the Army, he has suffered at times from a digestive disturbance. He colloquially referred to it as “stomach trouble,” but there was no definite proof of any functional disorder of any abdominal organ except the gall bladder. He also testified he had to adhere to a restricted diet- At the first trial Doctor Smith, a witness for Peet, testified that Peet suffered a gall bladder attack in the early twenties. At the second trial Doctor Smith fixed the time of the gall bladder attack as 1923 or 1924. He further testified that the gall bladder trouble was caused by a stoppage of the common duct which carries the gall bladder secretions into the intestines; that the gall bladder condition caused the so-called stomach trouble; and that the attack above referred to yielded to treatment and after about ten days the gall bladder resumed its normal functions.
Peet worked in the coal mines from September, 1919, up to June 7, 1931, the day before the first trial. During the first four and one-half -years he worked as a mule driver and thereafter as a coal miner. He stated that when the car got off the track he had to have the help of other employees to replace it, and that he was only able to mine one-third as much coal as the average miner. He further stated that he was not able to work regularly because of his physical infirmities. He earned $7.70 per day as a mule driver and about $1.65 per day as a coal miner during the days he worked as such. He earned $1,272.00 in 1920, $729.00 in 1921, $1,195.-00 in 1922, $1,196.00 in 1923, and $230.00 in January and February, 1924- Peet’s father testified that Peet worked practically every day the mine operated during the years 1920 to 1923, inclusive, and the months of January and February, 1924.
It seems clear to us that the foot injury while permanent did not constitute total disability and that the gall bladder ailment did not develop until long after March 1, 1919.
Furthermore, gall bladder ailments are frequently curable, either by treatment and diet, or surgery, and there is no proof in this record that the gall bladder condition is one that Would not have yielded to treatment or surgery at its inception. In fact .the proof indicates the contrary. See United States v. Ivey (C.C.A.10) 64 F.(2d) 653; United States v. Rentfrow (C.C.A.10) 60 F.(2d) 488; United States v. Harrell (C.C.A.10) 66 F.(2d) 231; United States v. McShane (C.C.A.10) 70 F.(2d) 991; United States v. Frost (C.C.A.9) 82 F.(2d) 152; Falbo v. United States (C.C.A.9) 64 F.(2d) 948.
Peet did not commence his action until January 29, 1929. He offered no evidence excusing or justifying this long delay. Such delay was, therefore, strong evidence that he was not totally and permanently disabled before the policy lapsed arid cast a heavy burden upon him. Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551, 560, 561, 54 S.Ct. 272, 276, 78 L.Ed. 492; United States v. Mathis (C.C.A.10) 84 F.(2d) 451; United States v. Derrick (C.C.A.10) 70 F.(2d) 162, 164; Carey v. United States (C.C.A.10) 69 F.(2d) 766, 767. We are of the opinion that Peet failed to carry the burden of proof and that his evidence did not establish total and permanent disability on or before March 1, 1919.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to grant the United States a new trial.
Reversed And remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1