What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Melvyn I. WEISS, Custodian of Gary Michael Weiss, U/NY/UGMA, Appellant, v. TEMPORARY INVESTMENT FUND, INC., Provident Institutional Management Corporation, Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., Russell W. Richie, Robert R. Fortune, James Louis Robertson, Henry M. Watts, Jr., Dr. Ralph A. Young, Thomas S. Gates, G. Willing Pepper, Appellees.
No. 81-2688.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule 12(6) March 1, 1984.
Decided March 28, 1984.
Joseph A. Rosenthal, Morris & Rosenthal, P.A., Wilmington, Del., Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz, New York City, for appellant; Daniel W. Krasner, Jeffrey G. Smith, Wolf, Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz, New York City, of counsel.
Peter M. Mattoon, Richard Z. Freemann, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee, Provident Institutional Management Corp.; Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.
David L. Foster, Paula J. Mueller, New York City, for appellee, Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc.; Wilkie, Farr & Gallagher New York City, of counsel.
Morris R. Brooke, James M. Sweet, James C. Ingram, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees, Russell W. Richie, Robert R. Fortune, James Louis Robertson, Henry M. Watts, Jr., Dr. Ralph A. Young, Thomas S. Gates, G. Willing Pepper; Drinker, Biddle & Reach, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.
Before GIBBONS, SLOVITER and BECKER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION SUR REMAND FROM U.S. SUPREME COURT
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents the question whether a shareholder of an investment company must make a demand on directors pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1 prior to commencing suit under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1976), to challenge the company’s contracts with its investment advisers. The district court dismissed the action for failure to satisfy the demand requirement, Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 665 (D.Del.1981), and denied the appellant leave to replead after making a demand, Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 520 F.Supp. 1098 (D.Del.1981). We affirmed (Judge Gibbons, dissenting), reasoning that, because the demand requirement contributed to corporate governance, Rule 23.1 should apply to section 36(b) suits, 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir.1982). Appellant thereupon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Meanwhile, the Second Circuit had, in Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 692 F.2d 250 (2d Cir.1982), held that the demand requirement of Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions under section 36(b). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case to resolve the circuit conflict.
In an opinion filed January 18,1984, Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, — U.S.—, 104 S.Ct. 831, 78 L.Ed.2d 645 (1984), the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit and thereby rejected our holding as to the necessity of demand. On January 25, 1984, the court granted the writ of certiorari in this ease, vacated our prior mandate, and remanded the case to us for further consideration in light of the Daily Income Fund opinion. In view of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the judgment of the district court must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. An appropriate mandate will be entered.
. We also concluded that the circumstances alleged in the complaint did not warrant excusing such a demand as futile, and the district judge did not err in denying leave to replead.
. Our decision was filed prior to the action on the certiorari petition. It was congruent with the earlier holding of the First Circuit in Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838, 103 S.Ct. 85, 74 L.Ed.2d 80 (1982), so that there was a circuit conflict in any event.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0