What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GORTON-PEW FISHERIES CO. et al. v. MALLEY.
No. 3006.
Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
July 13, 1935.
Lawrence E. Green, of Boston, Mass., for appellants.
Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Louis Monarch and Arnold Raum, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen.
Before BINGHAM, WILSON, and MORTON, Circuit Judges.
BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
In this case the defendant has filed a petition for rehearing on the ground that the court erred in taking from income for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1918, the amortization deduction attributable to the whole calendar year 1918 instead of only that part attributable to the first three months of 1918. We believe we did err in this respect. This error arose from an endeavor to wi{ie out the discrimination between the taxes assessable against a fiscal year taxpayer and those against a calendar year taxpayer with the same income and entitled to the same deduction, believing that Congress never intended such discrimination.
The discrepancy is due to the way the Commissioner dealt with the $134,398.80. In dealing with the normal income tax only he took, as we understand it, the total income for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1918, deducted therefrom the agreed amount, got 12 per cent, of the remainder, which he multiplied by 3/12 to arrive at the tax for the first three months of 1918, or ($882,284.88 — $134,398.80) X -12 X 3/12 = $22,436.58. This is the same as taking 3/12 of the total income, deducting 3/12 of the amortization agreed upon and getting 12 per cent, of that result, as follows:
[$220,571.22 (3/12 of $882,284.88) — $33,599.72 (3/12 of $134,398.80)] X -12 = $22,436.98.
This shows that the plaintiffs received the benefit of but % of the agreed amortization deduction. But by section 234 (a) (8) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1078), they were entitled to have the whole $134,398.80 deducted and to be taxed only-on the remainder.
This could be accomplished by deducting the other % of $134,398.80 from the $882,284.88 in computing the tax for the nine months in 1917; but both parties agree that this may not be done. The only other method is to take % of the total income or $220,571.22 as the income from which to deduct the $134,398.80, leaving $86,172.42 as the net income on which to compute the tax attributable to the period from January 1 to March 31, 1918. These are the amounts the plaintiffs start with in their computation, and using them as above indicated, but eliminating their other figures and theories, which are misleading, it brings about the result contended for by them, which we now think is the correct one.
Unless the amortization deduction provided in section 234 (a) (8) may be considered as calling for special treatment, it would seem that the requirements of that section are inconsistent with those of section 205 (a), 40 Stat. 1061, as interpreted by the internal revenue officials and several court decisions. But as section 234 (a) (8) calls for the deduction of the whole $134,398.80 instead of % thereof, and as Congress could not have intended that the taxpayer operating on a fiscal year basis should, on account of this deduction, pay more than one operating on a calendar year basis, we think it should prevail over the other section, thus putting the plaintiffs on an equality with all other taxpayers entitled to amortization deductions.
Our order is:
The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the modifications above stated.
Rehearing denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0