What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
SENKO v. LaCROSSE DREDGING CORP.
No. 62.
Argued December 12, 1956.
Decided February 25, 1957.
George J. Moran argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Stanley M. Rosenblum.
Stuart B. Bradley argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Henry Driemeyer and Robert Broderick.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was employed by respondent to assist with dredging operations being conducted by respondent in a slough dug to by-pass a rocky section of the Mississippi River. His work was that of a handyman; it included the carrying and storing of supplies, and the general maintenance of a dredge. He was injured by the explosion of a coal stove while placing signal lanterns from the dredge in a shed on the neighboring bank. He filed this suit under the Jones Act in the City Court of Granite City, Illinois, to recover damages for his injuries. The Act provides a cause of action for “any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment.” 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688. This Court, however, has held that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., restricts the benefits of the Jones Act to “members of a crew of a vessel.” Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1. To recover, therefore, petitioner had to be a member of a crew, as that term is used in the Longshoremen’s Act, at the time of his injury.
The jury returned a verdict for petitioner and judgment was entered in his favor. On appeal, the Fourth District Appellate Court of the State of Illinois held that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that petitioner was a member of a crew. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court and entered judgment for respondent. Senko v. LaCrosse Dredging Corp., 7 Ill. App. 2d 307, 129 N. E. 2d 454. The Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for an appeal. We granted certiorari. 351U. S.949.
In South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, we said that whether or not an employee is “ 'a member of a crew’ turns on questions of fact” and that, if a finding on this question has evidence to support it, the finding is con-elusive. Id., at 257-258. The sole question presented here, therefore, is whether there is an evidentiary basis for the jury’s finding that petitioner was a member of a crew at the time of his injury. This finding was made under specific instructions not objected to here.
The appellate court characterized petitioner as
“an employee whose principal duty is to load supplies on a vessel at anchor, and to perform incidental tasks of a common labor character . . . .” 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 313, 129 N. E. 2d, at 457.
They also noted that petitioner lived ashore and was not aboard except when the vessel was anchored. The court concluded that petitioner was not “naturally and primarily on board to aid in navigation” and could not “maintain an action under the Jones Act.” 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 313-314, 129 N. E. 2d, at 457.
It is true that the dredge was anchored to the shore at the time of petitioner’s injury and during all the time petitioner worked for respondent. It is also true that this dredge, like most dredges, was not frequently in transit. We believe, however, that there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to decide that petitioner was permanently attached to and employed by the dredge as a member of its crew.
Petitioner’s witnesses testified that he was known as a “deckhand” among rivermen. They said that he was hired to clean and take care of the deck, splice rope, stow supplies, and, in general, to keep the dredge “in shape.” This testimony indicated that substantially all of petitioner’s duties were performed on or for the dredge. A normal inference is that petitioner was responsible for its seaworthiness. If the dredge leaked, for example, the jury could suppose that his job would be to repair the leak. Furthermore, a witness testified that a usual duty of one holding petitioner’s job was to take soundings and clean navigation lights when the dredge was in transit. 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 310, 129 N. E. 2d, at 455-456. Here again, the jury could reasonably have believed that petitioner would have these responsibilities in the event that this dredge were moved. Whether petitioner would be a member of the dredge’s crew while taking soundings during a trip is certainly a jury question. If he were a member during travel, he would not necessarily lack that status during anchorage. Even a transoceanic liner may be confined to berth for lengthy periods, and while there the ship is kept in repair by its “crew.” There can be no doubt that a member of its crew would be covered by the Jones Act during this period, even though the ship was never in transit during his employment. In short, the duties of a man during a vessel’s travel are relevant in determining whether he is a “member of a crew” while the vessel is anchored. Thus, the fact that this dredge was connected to the shore cannot be controlling.
The fact that petitioner’s injury occurred on land is not material. Admiralty jurisdiction and the coverage of the Jones Act depends only on a finding that the injured was “an employee of the vessel, engaged in the course of his employment” at the time of his injury. Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S. 1, 4, citing O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36.
As we have said before, this Court does not normally sit to re-examine a finding of the type that was made below. We believe, however, that our decision in South Chicago Co. v. Bassett, supra, has not been fully understood. Our holding there that the determination of whether an injured person was a “member of a crew” is to be left to the finder of fact meant that juries have the same discretion they have in finding negligence or any other fact. The essence of this discretion is that a jury’s decision is final if it has a reasonable basis, whether or not the appellate court agrees with the jury’s estimate.
Because there was testimony introduced by petitioner tending to' show that he was employed almost solely on the dredge, that his duty was primarily to maintain the dredge during its anchorage and for its future trips, and that he would have a significant navigational function when the dredge was put in transit, we hold there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that petitioner was a member of the dredge’s crew. Cf. Gianfala v. Texas Co., 350 U. S. 879, reversing 222 F. 2d 382. Accordingly, we reverse the decision below.
Respondent, on its appeal from the trial court’s judgment, raised two questions which the appellate court did not reach because of its disposition of the case. So that these issues may be reviewed, we remand the case to that court.
It is so ordered.
Although two other grounds were advanced on appeal, only this one was considered. See n. 4, infra. No question has been raised at any time as to whether the dredge involved here had the status of a “vessel” at the time of petitioner’s injury.
The finder of fact in the Bassett case was a commissioner, but that holding applies with equal force to this case in which the finder was a jury.
“The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.” 62 Stat. 496, 46 U. S. C. § 740.
“2, the dredge was not operating in navigable waters; and 3, there was no evidence of negligence on its part and no basis to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” 7 Ill. App. 2d, at 309, 129 N. E. 2d, at 455.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 3