What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
JONES v. GEORGIA.
No. 174,
Misc.
Decided October 16, 1967.
Wilbur D. Owens, Jr., for petitioner.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, G. Ernest Tidwell, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Marion 0. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted.
Petitioner appealed his conviction for murder to the Georgia Supreme Court where he sought reversal on the ground, among others, that the evidence relevant to his claim of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand and petit juries drawn in the county established a prima facie case of the denial of equal protection within our decision in Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction stating that Whitus was distinguishable because “public officers are presumed to have discharged their sworn official duties. . . . Under the testimony in this case we can not assume that the jury commissioners did not eliminate prospective jurors on the basis of their competency to serve, rather than because of racial discrimination.” 223 Ga. 157, 162, 154 S. E. 2d 228, 232.
We hold that the burden upon the State to explain “the disparity between the percentage of Negroes on the tax digest and those on the venires,” Whitus, supra, at 552, was not met by the Georgia Supreme Court’s reliance on the stated presumptions. See Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584; Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion.
It is so ordered.
The record supports the following comparison of the salient facts in Whitus and in petitioner’s case:
Over 21 population Whitus 42.6% Negro men Petitioner’s case 30.7% Negro
Jury Commissioners White (apparently) White
Source of juror names Tax Digests separated and identified as to race 3 Tax Digests, two of which separated and identified as to race
Taxpayers 27.1% Negro 19.7% Negro
Negro jurors 9.1% grand jury venire 7.8% petit jury venire 5.0% of jury list and box (1 Negro was on the grand jury which in-dieted petitioner)
Rebuttal evidence by State None None

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 1