What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Theodore WAY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 6562.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 27, 1960.
See also 268 F.2d 785; 276 F.2d 912.
William E. Shade, Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Charles M. Stoddard, Asst. U. S. Atty., for the District of Colorado, Denver,, Colo. (Donald G. Brotzman, U. S. Atty., for the District of Colorado, Denver,, Colo., was with him on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRATTON, PICKETT and BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judges.
BRATTON, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was found guilty of conspiring with others to unlawfully and burglariously break and enter a named bank, the deposits of which were insured by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for the purpose of stealing money of the bank in excess of $100; for the purpose of carrying away money of the bank in excess of $100; and for the purpose of receiving, possessing, concealing, storing, bartering, selling, and disposing of money of the bank in excess of $100, knowing it to have been stolen. He was sentenced to imprisonment, and the cause came here on appeal.
The judgment is challenged on the ground that perjured evidence was adduced before the grand jury which returned the indictment. Two persons named in the indictment as co-conspirators but not named as defendants testified at the trial. Both testified that they were witnesses before the grand jury. One testified that he gave perjured testimony before the grand jury. The other did not testify that his testimony before the grand jury was untrue. It may be ■that an indictment is not open to challenge upon the ground that perjured testimony was adduced before the grand jury. And it may be that if an indictment is open to challenge on that ground, it must be raised by motion, plea in .abatement, or otherwise, in advance of trial. But it is unnecessary to explore those questions. It is enough to say that .since it affirmatively appears that the grand jury had before it other evidence ■on which it may have acted in returning the indictment without giving any weight or credence to the perjured evidence, the indictment is not open to challenge on the ground that perjured testimony was given before the grand jury. Anderson v. United States, 8 Cir., 273 F. 20, certiorari denied, 257 U.S. 647, 42 S.Ct. 56, 66 L.Ed. 415; Laska v. United States, 10 Cir., 82 F.2d 672, certiorari denied, 298 U.S. 689, 56 S.Ct. 957, 80 L.Ed. 1407.
Error is predicated upon the Action of the court in denying a motion to dismiss the jury panel for the reason that appellant was brought into court handcuffed. It is fairly apparent from the record that without any order from the court, appellant was at one juncture brought into court handcuffed. But it is further fairly apparent from the record that the handcuffs were removed promptly after he entered the court room. It is the general rule that under ordinary circumstances freedom from handcuffs, .shackles, or manacles of a defendant during the trial of a criminal case is an important component of a fair and impartial trial. In other words, such procedure should not be permitted except to prevent the escape of the accused, to prevent him from injuring others, and to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial. Odell v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 189 F.2d 300, certiorari denied, 342 U.S. 873, 72 S.Ct. 116, 96 L.Ed. 656. But there is no indication that the occurrence was prejudicial. And in the absence of an indication of prejudicial consequences, such an occurrence does not warrant the granting of a new trial. Blaine, v. United States, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 136 F.2d 284.
The judgment is challenged on the further ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Evidence was adduced which tended to show that sometime prior to the conspiracy appellant had rendered janitorial service for the bank; that he was familiar with the building and the location of the furnishings and equipment therein; that he discussed with others the matter of burglarizing and robbing the bank; that he drew a diagram of the building; that he explained how the building could be entered through the roof at a certain place; that he told others the best time to commit the offense would be over the weekend; that he went with others to the bank to burglarize it but they were prevented from doing so by the arrival of a janitor service vehicle; and that the burglary and robbery occurred later. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.
There was no evidence tending to show that appellant was present at the burglary and robbery or participated in it. But the evidence tended to show that he took part in forming the conspiracy; that he knew of its existence; and that with such knowledge, he and others did acts or things in furtherance of it. That was sufficient to warrant his conviction upon the charge of conspiring to commit the robbery and burglary. Duke v. United States, 5 Cir., 233 F.2d 897.
Other contentions are urged for reversal of the judgment, but they are without substance and do not merit discussion.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1