What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellee, v. CHAMPLIN & WELLS, INC. and Northeastern Fire Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, Appellants.
No. 85-1209.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 18, 1985.
Decided Oct. 17, 1985.
Bert N. Darrow, Cabot, Ark., for appellants.
Michael G. Thompson, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
In this diversity suit Champlin & Wells, Inc. was adjudged liable in contribution under Arkansas law to Missouri Pacific Railroad Company in an amount equal to 95% of a settlement reached between Missouri Pacific and Clifford W. Clarke. The settlement was of an F.E.L.A. claim Clarke had brought against the railroad for personal injuries. Champlin & Wells and its liability insurer, Northeastern Fire Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, now appeal from the district court’s judgment, contending that tortfeasor Steven Conder was acting for Missouri Pacific as a “borrowed servant” at the time Clarke was injured, and that Champlin & Wells therefore should not have been held responsible for Conder’s negligence. We affirm.
By written contract dated August 20, 1975, Champlin & Wells agreed to furnish Missouri Pacific with “one (1) fork lift ... fully manned and maintained with all supplies, to unload and handle Carrier’s track material and secure track panels on Carrier’s cars at the Track Panel Facilities in North Little Rock, Arkansas.” The contract set hourly rates at which Champlin & Wells would be paid for labor and equipment. The contract also stated “[t]he Contractor shall at all times be and remain an independent contractor hereunder, and Carrier shall have no control over the employment, discharge, compensation, and services rendered by Contractor’s employees or agents.” Work under the contract was to be “prosecute[d] with diligence and completefd] in a substantial and workmanlike manner, and to the express satisfaction of Carrier’s Contracting Officer.”
Various individuals testified at trial about the manner in which the parties operated under this contract. Champlin & Wells hired and paid its own employees, but instructed them to do whatever railroad personnel told them to do. An assistant roadmaster for Missouri Pacific would tell the forklift operator what to move and where to move it; he did not give instructions regarding the operation of the forklift. Champlin & Wells typically did not supervise or monitor its forklift operators. If the railroad was unhappy with a particular operator, it would contact Champlin & Wells, and the latter would take appropriate action.
Steven Conder was the forklift operator furnished by Champlin & Wells on February 3,' 1978. Clifford Clarke, a Missouri Pacific employee, was helping Conder unload a railcar on that date when Conder negligently swung a heavy metal “raildog” attached to the forklift over Clarke’s head. When Clarke stood up suddenly from a crouching position, the raildog struck him.
Clarke, who suffered neck and back injuries, filed an F.E.L.A. claim against the railroad. Missouri Pacific settled the claim for $155,514.34. Missouri Pacific then brought this suit against Champlin & Wells for contribution; Champlin & Wells joined Northeastern as a third party defendant.
The case was tried before the district court, Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Champlin & Wells, Inc., 600 F.Supp. 182 (E.D.Ark. 1985). Conder was not available as a witness. The court found that Conder and Clarke were both negligent, but that 95% of the fault lay with Conder. The district court further found that at the time of the accident, Conder had been an “employee of Champlin & Wells acting within the scope of his employment” (emphasis added). The court accordingly concluded that Champlin & Wells was liable under Arkansas contribution statutes (Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 34-1001 — 1009) for 95% of the settlement Missouri Pacific had paid Clarke.
Champlin & Wells contends that in the circumstances of this case, Conder was a “loaned servant” of Missouri Pacific, and that the district court erred in holding Champlin & Wells responsible for Conder’s negligence. In support of this argument, Champlin & Wells cites a number of Arkansas cases in which the loaned servant doctrine has been applied. Barton-Mansfield Co. v. Bogey, 201 Ark. 860, 147 S.W.2d 977 (1941); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Morris, 183 Ark. 207, 35 S.W.2d 607 (1931); Arkansas Logging Co. v. Martin, 116 Ark. 318, 173 S.W. 184 (1915); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. Yates, 111 Ark. 486, 165 S.W. 282 (1914).
The applicability of the loaned servant defense here depended upon whether, at the time of Conder’s negligent act, he was under the direction and control of his employer, Champlin & Wells, or that of Missouri Pacific, the party to whom he had been lent or hired. See Barton-Mansfield Co., 201 Ark. at 867, 147 S.W.2d at 980. “Ordinarily the question whether the general or special employer had the right of control and thus was the employee’s master, presents an issue of fact____” Watland v. Walton, 410 F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir.1969). Accord Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Lee, 253 Ark. 151, 484 S.W.2d 874 (1972); Bell Transportation Co. v. Morehead, 246 Ark. 170, 437 S.W.2d 234 (1969).
After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the findings of the district court regarding the loaned servant issue were clearly erroneous. Conder was hired by Champlin & Wells to operate the forklift; and it was in the course of discharging that duty that he negligently injured Clarke. In addition, the parties’ written contract specified that Missouri Pacific would have “no control over ... the services rendered by Contractor’s employees or agents.” While it perhaps would have been open to Champ-lin & Wells to prove that the practices of the parties had varied the terms of the agreement, the evidence of such variance would have had to have been substantial to have raised a triable issue of fact. Ozan Lumber Co. v. McNeely, 214 Ark. 657, 661, 217 S.W.2d 341, 343 (1949). In this regard, it appears Missoúri Pacific registered any complaints it had about the forklift drivers with Champlin & Wells, rather than addressing the drivers directly. Missouri Pacific instructed the operators as to what work needed to be done, but did not tell them how to do it. Thus the evidence tended to reinforce, rather than modify, the allocation of authority as established by the written agreement. The fact that no Champlin & Wells agent was supervising Conder at the time of the accident is not controlling. It is the right to direct the manner in which work is done, rather than the actual exercise of that right, which determines whether a master-servant relationship is present. Wilson v. Davison, 197 Ark. 99, 103, 122 S.W.2d 539, 541 (1938).
Of the authorities cited by appellants, the closest on point — Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 183 Ark. 207, 35 S.W.2d 607 — is distinguishable. In that case, the party for whom the work was being done did not contractually disclaim responsibility for the acts of the workers, and in fact supervised the workers as they did their work. Id. In the other cases, the Arkansas court merely affirmed jury verdicts finding the loaned servant doctrine applicable; and the tor-tious acts occurred while the tortfeasors were performing special services that were clearly separate and distinct from the usual duties they performed for their regular employers. Barton-Mansfield Co., 201 Ark. 860, 147 S.W.2d 977; Arkansas Logging Co., 116 Ark. 318, 173 S.W. 184; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway, 111 Ark. 486, 165 S.W. 282.
Finding no error of law or fact, we affirm.
. The Honorable Henry Woods, United States District Judge, Eastern District of Arkansas.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2