What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WHITEHEAD et al. v. REPUBLIC GEAR CO.
No. 8880.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
March 1, 1939.
H. C. Belt and Shank, Belt, Rode & Cook, all of Seattle, Wash., for appellants.
Bogle, Bogle & Gates, Stanley B. Long, and Donald E. Leland, all of Seattle, Wash., for appellee.
Before DENMAN, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
The appeal is from an order sustaining a demurrer to appellants’ second amended complaint and dismissing the suit with prejudice. The question presented is whether the pleading states a cause of action. In their original complaint appellants named as defendants, in addition to appellee Republic Gear Company, the Morrison Mill Company and one of its employees. Recovery was sought for damages growing out of a collision between a coupe operated by appellant Whitehead, in which appellant Peck was a passenger, and a truck owned by the Mill company and operated by its employee. Appellee’s negligence contributing to the collision was alleged to have arisen from the manufacture and sale of a defective axle installed in the truck. The amended complaint, from the dismissal of which the appeal was taken, omitted previous specific allegations of negligence on the part of the Mill company and its employee, but retained in amplified form allegations of negligence attributed to appellee.
In substance it was alleged that appel-lee manufactured and sold to a distributor an axle which appeared to be suitable and safe for installation in a truck of the type owned by the Morrison Mill Company, and represented to the public that the axle was of such character. The axle, however, was constructed of defective material, had been subjected in its manufacture to improper heat treatment, had been shaped with improper fillets, and in consideration of its described defects was of inadequate size and shape. It was purchased from the distributor by the Mill company and installed by the latter in its truck. There was nothing in the appearance of the axle which would give notice to a purchaser of its latent defects, and the Mill company had no knowledge of such defects or opportunity to obtain knowledge. Because of the inherent defects described, a condition known to metallurgists as “fatigue structure” developed in the axle.
About midnight on the date of the collision the truck was being operated on the highway. As a proximate result of the structural defects the axle broke and the truck thereby became disabled on the highway and was unable to move under its own power, stopping in the lane of travel for cars proceeding in the direction in which the truck was headed. It was alleged “that while the said truck was so stopped as aforesaid on said highway as a proximate result of the negligence of said defendant Republic Gear Company, and before it could be removed from the said highway, the car which was being driven by the plaintiff Melvin Whitehead in a careful and prudent manner came into violent collision with the said truck, causing the damages hereinafter alleged.”
In support of their pleading appellants rely on the principle that “a manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing substantial bodily harm to those who lawfully use it for a purpose for which it is manufactured and to those whom the supplier should expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is manufactured.” Restatement, Torts, § 395; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F, 696, Ann.Cas,1916C, 440; 17 A.L.R. 672; 39 A.L.R. 992; 63 A.L.R. 340; 88 A. L.R. 527; 105 A.L.R. 1502; 111 A.L.R. 1239.
We believe it unnecessary to determine the extent to which the doctrine is applied in the state of Washington, where the collision occurred. For the purpose of the decision it will be assumed that the rule stated is accepted there in its full force. So assuming, we think the complaint discloses no sufficient causative relation between the negligence of the appellee and the occurrence resulting in appellants’ injury.
The truck, it is alleged, “became disabled” and “unable to move under its own power” in consequence of the breaking of the axle. It “thereupon stopped” on the highway. While so stopped, “and before it cculd be removed from the highway”, it was struck by appellants’ car. It thus appears that before the collision occurred the truck had become stationary and appellee’s negligence had spent its force. It is not indicated that appellants’ car was then in the vicinity. There is no allegation that the truck stopped suddenly or in such manner that the accident could not have been avoided, no allegation that it was properly lighted or that the collision took place before any warning could be given of the presence of this obstacle in the lane of travel. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts stated is that the accident resulted from the negligence of the truck driver in failing to give proper warning. 45 C.J. 1096, 1097. At best the complaint discloses that the subsequent collision was a remote consequence of appellee’s negligence.
Affirmed.
It was claimed on oral argument that the axle was a “floating” axle, functioning only as a propellant, and not in any way as a support for the truck.
A Washington statute then in force (§ 6362-47, Remington’s Revised Statutes) reads as follows: “No person shall park or leave standing any vehicle whether attended or unattended upon the paved or improved or main traveled portion of any public highway when it is practicable to park or leave such vehicle standing off of the road or improved or main traveled portion of such highway. * * * The provisions of this section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or improved or main traveled portion of the public highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such vehicle in such position.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0