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Opinion:
HUTCHESON v. UNITED STATES.
No. 46.
Argued November 6, 1961.
Decided May 14, 1962.
Frederick Bernays Wiener argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Charles H. Tuttle and Joseph P. Tumulty, Jr.
Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Miller, Philip B. Monahan, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit.
MR. Justice Harlan
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Stewart join.
After a trial without a jury, petitioner was found guilty on all 18 counts of an indictment charging him with having violated 2 U. S. C. § 192 by refusing to answer pertinent questions put to him on June 27,1958, by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, commonly known as the McClellan Committee. He was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and fined $500. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, without opinion. We granted certio-rari to consider petitioner's constitutional challenges to his conviction. 365 U. S. 866.
The McClellan Committee was established by the Senate in 1957
“to conduct an investigation and study of the extent to which criminal or other improper practices or activities are, or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations or in groups or organizations of employees or employers to the detriment of the interests of the public, employers or employees, and to determine whether any changes are required in the laws of the United States in order to protect such interests against the occurrence of such practices or activities.” S. Res. 74, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
Pursuing an investigative pattern which in 1957 and the the forepart of 1958 had disclosed misuse of union funds for the personal benefit of various union officials, the Committee on June 4, 1958, began hearings at Washington, D. C., into the affairs of various organizations, including the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America of which the petitioner was president. Initially, the Committee sought to inquire into the personal financial interests of petitioner and other officials of the Carpenters Union in the World Wide Press, a New York publishing house owned by one Maxwell Raddock, which was publisher of the “Trade Union Courier.” More especially the Committee wished to learn whether union funds had been misused in the publication by the Press of a biography of petitioner’s father, entitled “The Portrait of an American Labor Leader, William L. Hutche-son.” Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Committee, announced that the petitioner and Raddock would both be called to testify.
On June 25 Raddock testified as to the affairs of the “Trade Union Courier” and the publication of the Hutcheson book. On the following day, however, he claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect to another matter to which the Committee had turned. That matter related to the possible use of union funds or influence to “fix” a 1957 criminal investigation, conducted in Lake County, Indiana, by a state grand jury, into an alleged scheme to defraud the State of Indiana, in which petitioner and two other officials of the Carpenters Union, 0. William Blaier and Frank M. Chapman, were allegedly implicated.
The alleged scheme to defraud had been revealed in testimony given before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Works during May and June 1957. That testimony had disclosed that in June 1956 the petitioner, Blaier, and Chapman had together bought, in their individual capacities, certain real property in Lake County for $20,000, and had shortly thereafter sold it, at a profit of $78,000, to the State of Indiana for highway construction purposes, pursuant to an agreement whereby a deputy in the Indiana Right-of-Way Department was paid one-fifth of that profit. The ensuing grand jury proceeding had been terminated in August 1957 without any indictment having been found, with an announcement by the county prosecutor, Metro Holovachka, that “jurisdiction” over the matter was lacking in Lake County, and that the entire $78,000 profit had been returned to the State. Thereafter, in February 1958, the petitioner, Blaier, and Chapman were indicted in adjoining Marion County on this transaction.
It is apparent from the questioning of Raddock by the chief counsel for the McClellan Committee that the Committee had information indicating that Raddock, the petitioner, Blaier, and several officials of the Teamsters Union had been involved in a plan whereby Holovachka had been induced to drop the Lake County grand jury investigation, and Committee counsel explained to Rad-dock that the Committee was interested to learn whether union funds or influence had been used for that purpose.
In addition to Raddock, whose self-incrimination plea with respect to all questions relating to that episode was respected by the Committee, Blaier, and two witnesses connected with an Indiana Local of the Teamsters Union, Michael Sawochka its secretary-treasurer and Joseph P. Sullivan its attorney, were also examined before the Committee on June 26. Sawochka and Sullivan each refused to answer any questions relating to the termination of the Lake County grand jury proceedings, Sawochka basing his refusal on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and Sullivan iftvoking the attorney-client privilege insofar as the questions related to any discussions with Sawochka. Both claims were honored by the Committee.
Blaier, who was asked no questions regarding the Lake County real estate transaction itself, refused to answer the question whether he had made “any arrangements for Mr. Max Raddock to fix any case for you in Indiana.” He asserted that the question “relates solely to a personal matter, not pertinent to any activity which this committee is authorized to investigate and ... it might aid the prosecution in the case in which I am under indictment.” The Committee Chairman, without ruling on the objection, stated that the witness might claim the privilege against self-incrimination. Although Blaier did not thereafter do so, he was never directed by the Committee to answer this question.
The last witness who was examined by the Committee on this phase of its investigation was the petitioner, who was called on June 27. He answered questions concerning the publication by Raddock of the biography of petitioner’s father, commissioned by the Carpenters Union at a total expense of $310,000. When the inquiry turned to the subject of the Lake County grand jury investigation, however, petitioner refused to answer any questions. Being under the same indictment as Blaier and represented by the same counsel, petitioner’s grounds for refusal were the same as those which had been advanced the day before by Blaier: “it [the question] relates solely to a personal matter, not pertinent to any activity which this committee is authorized to investigate, and also it relates or might be claimed to relate to or aid the prosecution in the case in which I am under indictment and thus be in denial of due process of law.” No claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was made at any stage. This objection, upon which the petitioner stood throughout this phase of his interrogation, was overruled by the Committee, and petitioner was directed, and refused to answer, each of the 18 questions constituting the subject matter of the indictment upon which he has been convicted.
The many arguments now made to us in support of reversal are reducible to two constitutional challenges. First, it is contended that questioning petitioner on any matters germane to the state criminal charges then pending against him was offensive to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, it is argued that the Committee invaded domains constitutionally reserved to the Executive and the Judiciary, in that its inquiry was simply aimed at petitioner’s “exposure” and served no legislative purpose. For reasons now to be discussed we decide that neither challenge is availing.
I.
Due Process.
The Committee’s interrogation is said to have been fundamentally unfair in two respects: (1) it placed the petitioner in a position where, save for silence, his only choice lay between prejudicing his defense to the state indictment, and committing perjury; and (2) it was a “pretrial” of the state charges before the Committee. The first of these propositions rests on two premises respecting Indiana law, which we accept for the purposes of the ensuing discussion: admissions of p,n attempt to “fix” the grand jury investigation could have been used against petitioner in the state trial as evidence of consciousness of guilt (see, e. g., Davidson v. State, 205 Ind. 564, 569, 187 N. E. 376, 378); a claim of the federal self-incrimination privilege before that Committee could also have been so used, at least to impeach petitioner’s testimony had he taken the stand at the state trial (see Crickmore v. State, 213 Ind. 586, 592-593, 12 N. E. 2d 266, 269).
The contention respecting Indiana’s future use of incriminatory answers at once encounters an obstacle in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, and United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141. Those cases establish that possible self-incrimination under state law is not a ground for refusing to answer questions in a federal inquiry; accordingly, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination will not avail one so circumstanced. Manifestly, this constitutional doctrine is no less relevant here either because the petitioner was actually under, and not merely threatened with, state indictment at the time of his appearance before the Committee, or because of the likelihood that the Committee would have respected, even though not required to do so under existing law, a privilege claim had one been made.
Recognizing this obstacle, petitioner asks us to overrule Hale and Murdock, asserting that both decisions rested on misapprehensions as to earlier American and English law. But we need not consider those contentions, for petitioner never having claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege before the Committee, this aspect of his due process challenge is not open to him now. This is not a case like Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, or Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190, where there is doubt whether that privilege was invoked by the witness. “If,” as was noted in Emspak, at 195, “the witness intelligently and unequivocally waives any objection based on the Self-Incrimination Clause, or if the witness refuses a committee request to state whether he relies on the Self-Incrimination Clause, he cannot later invoke its protection in a prosecution for contempt for refusing to answer that question.” In this instance, the petitioner, with counsel at his side, unequivocally and repeatedly disclaimed any reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Petitioner cannot escape the effect of his waiver by arguing, as he does, that his refusals to answer were based on “due process” grounds, and not upon a claim of “privilege.” We agree, of course, that a congressional committee’s right to inquire is “subject to” all relevant “limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,” including “the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights,” Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 112; that such limitations go beyond the protection of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, id., Ill— 112, and that nonreliance on one such limitation does not preclude reliance on another. But it is surely equally clear that where, as here, the validity of a particular constitutional objection depends in part on the availability of another, both must be adequately raised before the inquiring committee if the former is to be fully preserved for review in this Court.
To hold otherwise would enable a witness to toy with a congressional committee in a manner obnoxious to the rule that such committees are entitled to be clearly apprised of the grounds on which a witness asserts a right of refusal to answer. Emspak v. United States, supra, at 195; cf. Barenblatt v. United States, supra, at 123-124. The present case indeed furnishes an apt illustration of this. Pursuant to its policy of respecting Fifth Amendment privilege claims with respect to “state” self-incrimination (even though with Hale and Murdock still on the books it need not have done so), the Committee was at pains to discover whether petitioner’s due process objection included a privilege claim. Had he made such a claim, there is little doubt but that the Committee would have honored it. It was only after petitioner’s express disclaimer of the privilege that the Committee proceeded to disallow his due process objection. Now to consider that the self-incrimination aspect of petitioner’s due process claim is still open to him would in effect require us to say that, despite petitioner’s unequivocal disclaimer, the Committee should nonetheless have taken his due process objection as subsuming also a privilege claim. We cannot so consider the situation.
We also find untenable the contention that possible use in the state trial of a claim of the federal privilege against self-incrimination either excused petitioner from asserting it before the Committee or furnishes independent support for his due process challenge. Whether or not, as is intimated by the Government, but, for obvious reasons, not by the petitioner, the State’s use of such a claim directly or for impeachment purposes might be preventable, need not now be considered. For if such a proposition is arguable in the face of Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, and Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 51, let alone Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U. S. 371; Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487; Hale v. Henkel, supra, and United States v. Murdock, supra, its consideration should in any event await another day. The appropriate time for that, had the petitioner in this instance claimed the privilege before the Committee, would have been upon review of his state conviction, when we would have known exactly what use, if any, the State had made of the federal claim. To thwart the exercise of legitimate congressional power, on the basis of conjecture that a State may later abuse an individual’s reliance upon federally assured rights, would require of us a constitutional adjudication contrary to well-established principles of ripeness and justiciability. Cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89-90.
There remains for discussion on the due process challenge, the contention that the Committee’s inquiry was a “pretrial” of the state indictment. Insofar as this proposition suggests that the congressional inquiry infected the later state proceedings, the answer to it is found in what we have just said respecting the contention that a claim of self-incrimination before the Committee could have been used in the state proceedings. If the Committee’s public hearings rendered petitioner’s state trial unfair, such a challenge should not be dealt with at this juncture. The proper time for its consideration would be on review of the state conviction. To determine it now would require us to pass upon the claim in the dark, since we are entirely ignorant of what transpired at the state trial.
Nor can it be argued that the mere pendency of the state indictment ipso facto constitutionally closed this avenue of interrogation to the Committee. “It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through its committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits.” Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 295. It would be absurd to suggest that in establishing this committee the Congress was actuated by a purpose to aid state prosecutions, still less that of this particular individual. The pertinency of the observation in Sinclair is not lessened by the circumstance that in this instance the state proceeding involved was criminal, rather than civil. Cf. Delaney v. United States, 199 F. 2d 107, 114.
II.
Exposure.
There is also no merit to petitioner’s contention that the Committee undertook simply “to expose” petitioner “for the sake of exposure,” Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 200. The origins of the McClellan Committee, and the products of its endeavors, both belie that challenge, and nothing in the record of the present hearings points to a contrary conclusion.
It cannot be gainsaid that legislation, whether civil or criminal, in the labor-management field is within the competence of Congress under its power to regulate interstate commerce. The Committee’s general legislative recommendations, made at the conclusion of its First Interim Report, S. Rep. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 450-453 (1958), were embodied in two remedial statutes enacted by Congress: the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 997, and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519. The enactment of the first of these statutes is attributable primarily to the findings and recommendations of several Subcommittees of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S. Rep. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958). But passage of the bill was stimulated by the information then being gathered at hearings of the McClellan Committee. See 104 Cong. Rec. 7054, 7197-7198, 7233, 7337-7338, 7483, 7509-7510, 7521 (1958).
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was a direct response to the need for remedial federal legislation disclosed by the testimony before the McClellan Committee. This is made clear not by imprecise inferences drawn from legislative history; the proof is in the statute itself. Section 2 (b) of the Act declares it to be a finding of Congress “from recent investigations in the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and supplementary legislation.” 73 Stat. 519. The Senate and House Reports lean heavily on findings made by the McClellan Committee to justify particular provisions in the proposed bills. See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 6, 9, 10, 13-17 (1959); H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2, 6, 9, 11-13, 76, 83 (1959).
The resolution which gave birth to this Committee, when considered in light of the fruits of its labors, proves beyond any doubt “that the committee members . . . [were] serving as the representatives of the parent assembly in collecting information for a legislative purpose.” Watkins v. United States, supra, at 200. This is not a case involving an indefinite and fluctuating delegation which permits a legislative committee “in essence, to define its own authority, to choose the direction and focus of its activities.” Id., at 205. This Committee was directed to investigate “criminal or other improper practices ... in the field of labor-management relations.” Deciding whether acts that are made criminal by state law ought also to be brought within a federal prohibition, if, as here, the subject is a permissible one for federal regulation, turns entirely on legislative inquiry. And it is this inquiry in which the Senate was engaged when it assigned the fact-finding duty to the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field.
Moreover, this record is barren of evidence indicating that the Committee, for reasons of its own, undertook to “expose” this petitioner.
First: The transcript discloses a most scrupulous adherence to the announced Committee policy of not asking a witness under state indictment any questions “on the subject matter involved in the indictment.” Note 9, supra. This particular indictment related solely to activity in which petitioner and others had been engaged in their individual capacities, not on behalf of any labor organization. The Committee’s concern was not whether petitioner had in fact defrauded the State of Indiana of $78,000 in concluding a dishonest sale or whether he had personally corrupted a state employee. Its interest, which was entirely within the province entrusted to it by the Senate, was to discover whether and how funds of the Brotherhood of Carpenters or of the Teamsters Union had been used in a conspiracy to bribe a state prosecutor to drop charges made against individuals who were also officers of the Brotherhood of Carpenters, and whether the influence of union officials had been exerted to that end. If these suspicions were founded, they would have supported remedial federal legislation for the future, even though they might at the same time have warranted a separate state prosecution for obstruction of justice, or been usable at the trial of the Marion County indictment as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Supra, pp. 607-608. But surely a congressional committee which is engaged in a legitimate legislative investigation need not grind to a halt whenever responses to its inquiries might potentially be harmful to a witness in some distinct proceeding, Sinclair v. United States, supra, at 295, or when crime or wrongdoing is disclosed, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 179-180.
Second: The information sought to be elicited by the Committee was pertinent to the legislative inquiry. The Committee was investigating whether and how union funds had been misused, in the interest of devising a legislative scheme to deal with irregular practices. Because of petitioner’s refusal to answer questions, and because of the similar refusal by other witnesses to testify with regard to the Lake County grand jury proceedings, the Committee was not able to learn whether union funds or influence had been used to persuade Holovachka to drop those proceedings.
Petitioner contends that the Committee’s finding in its Second Interim Report that Raddock had been “used by Hutcheson as a fixer in an attempt to head-off the indictment of Hutcheson [and others] . . .” shows that his testimony was not needed for any purpose other than to prejudice or embarrass him. But this overlooks the fact that the Committee had been able to obtain no information whatever on the Lake County grand jury proceedings from any of the other witnesses by reason of their refusals to testify on the subject. Moreover, it does not lie with this Court to say when a congressional committee should be deemed to have acquired sufficient information for its legislative purposes.
Third: The Committee’s interrogation was within the express terms of its authorizing resolution. If the Committee was to be at all effective in bringing to Congress’ attention certain practices in the labor-management field which should be subject to federal prohibitions, it necessarily had to ask some witnesses questions which, if truthfully answered, might place them in jeopardy of state prosecution. Unless interrogation is met with a valid constitutional objection “the scope of the power of [congressional] inquiry ... is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” Barenblatt v. United States, supra, at 111. And it is not until the question is asked that the interrogator can know whether it will be answered or will be met with some constitutional objection. To deny the Committee the right to ask the question would be to turn an “option of refusal” into a “prohibition of inquiry,” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) § 2268, and to limit congressional inquiry to those areas in which there is not the slightest possibility of state prosecution for information that may be divulged. Such a restriction upon congressional investigatory powers should not be countenanced.
The three episodes upon which the petitioner relies as evidencing a Committee departure from these legitimate congressional concerns fall far short of sustaining what is sought to be made of them. The first of these is the Committee counsel’s statement at the outset of the hearings explaining “the subject matter being inquired into,” in the course of which he referred to the real estate transaction involved in the Marion County indictment, and explained the Committee’s interest in finding out whether union funds or influence had been used in bringing to an end the Lake County grand jury investigation of the matter. The propriety of such an inquiry has already been discussed. Pp. 617-618, supra.
The second episode is the Chairman’s statement to the effect that all the facts as to the Lake County proceedings had “not been developed by the committee”; that further “exposure” of them “should be made”; and that the Committee stood ready to “assist and help” Indiana if it chose to interest itself in the matter. We can see nothing in this statement, which was made after the Committee’s inquiry had ended, beyond a perfectly normal offer on the part of the Chairman to put the Committee transcript at the disposal of the Indiana law enforcement authorities if they wished to avail themselves of it.
The final occurrence is the so-called Committee “finding” as to petitioner’s alleged use of Raddock as a “fixer” to “head-off” an indictment by the Lake County grand jury. Whatever the basis for that “finding” (cf. note 18, supra), we must say that its mere inclusion in an official report to the Senate of the Committee’s activities furnishes a slender reed indeed for a charge that that Committee was engaged in unconstitutional “exposure.”
In conclusion, it is appropriate to observe that just as the Constitution forbids the Congress to enter fields reserved to the''Executive and Judiciary, it imposes on the Judiciary the reciprocal duty of not lightly interfering with Congress’ exercise of its legitimate powers. Having scrutinized this case with care, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of this case.
Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“§ 192. ’ Refusal of witness to testify or produce papers.
“Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months.”
The original resolution provided that the Committee was to exist until January 31, 1958. Its term was thereafter extended for an additional 26 months by several Senate Resolutions. S. Res. 221, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. Res. 44, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. Res. 249, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
See S. Rep. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See also S. Rep. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. Rep. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). The reports covered 2,032 pages and summarized 46,150 pages of testimony taken during 270 days of hearings at which 1,526 witnesses appeared. S. Rep. No. 1139, pt. 4, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 868 (1960).
The Chairman’s full opening statement, which appears at pp. 11785-11786 of the Hearings before the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, pt. 31, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (hereinafter Hearings), is as follows:
“The committee will hear witnesses today on the operations of Mr. Maxwell Haddock, owner of the World Wide Press, a large New York printing plant, and publisher of the Trade Union Courier.
“Witnesses will be called to testify as to financial interests and investments in the World Wide Press by labor organizations and certain labor officials and the unorthodox manner in which bonds of the company were issued and handled.
“The committee will also inquire into the propriety of labor officials’ having financial interests in Maxwell Haddock’s company at the same time that they invested considerable sums of their union’s funds in the plant that prints the Trade Union Courier and in subscriptions to that paper.
“The manner in which advertisements were solicited by the Trade Union Courier has been the subject of investigation by the committee staff. The committee is particularly interested in whether solicitors employed by the Trade Union Courier represented it as the organ of the AFL-CIO as well as making other false representations.
“Preliminary investigation by the staff has disclosed certain financial transactions of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters which require explanation.
“One of these transactions involves very large expenditures in the publication of a book entitled, ‘The Portrait of an American Labor Leader, William L. Hutcheson.’
"Maurice Hutcheson, who is now president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, and Mr. Raddock will be questioned about this matter.
“The Chair may say that during the existence of this committee we have had much information and a great deal of testimony regarding the misuse of union funds, regarding personal financial gain and benefit and profit and expenditure of such funds by union officials, and we are still pursuing that aspect of labor-management relations.
“We have also had considerable evidence of collusion between management and union officials where they both profit at the expense of the men who work and pay the dues.
“In this particular instance, there is indication that the union membership have again been imposed upon by transactions that have occurred that we will look into as the evidence unfolds before us.”
Hearings, 11932-11995, 12000-12006.
Investigation of Highway Right-of-Way Acquisition — State of Indiana, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works, U. S. Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
The Government’s brief informs us that petitioner and his two codefendants, Blaier and Chapman, were convicted on the Marion County indictment in November 1960, and that the conviction is now pending on appeal in the Supreme Court of Indiana.
Note 17, infra.
A copy of the state indictment was accepted for reference, and the Chairman announced that it was a "rule or policy” of the Committee not to interrogate about matters for which the witness was under pending state indictment. Hearings, 12060.
The Committee’s chief counsel stated that the question did not relate to the subject matter of the state indictment but “to steps taken in a later conspiracy to present [prevent?] an indictment in Lake County, Ind.” Hearings, 12074. Blaier’s attorney argued that the answer could be used by the prosecution in the Indiana case to prove the continuation of the conspiracy. Whether the question involved the state indictment or not, the Committee’s counsel conceded that Blaier might “not want to answer the questions on the grounds it may tend to incriminate him, but not because he is under indictment or that I am asking questions dealing with the indictment.” The chairman ruled, “It may be a borderline ease. I am unable to determine it at this time. The witness can exercise his privilege.” Hearings, 12074.
Hearings, 12115.
Count 1: “Has he [Mr. Raddock] received from the union payment for acts performed in your behalf and for you as an individual?” Count 2: “Have you, unrelated to this offense charged in the indictment now against you, engaged the services of Mr. Raddock, and have you paid him out of union funds for the performance of those services, to aid and assist you in avoiding or preventing an indictment from being found against you or for being criminally prosecuted for any other offense other than that mentioned in this indictment?” Count 8: “Did you engage the services of Mr. Raddock and pay him for those services out of union funds, to contact, either directly or indirectly, the county prosecuting attorney, Mr. Holovachka, given name Metro, in Lake County, Gary, Ind.?” Count 4- “Have you paid Max C. Raddock out of union funds for personal services rendered to you at any time within the past 5 years?” Count 5: “Have you used union funds to pay Max C. Raddock for any services rendered to you personally, wholly disassociated from any matters out of which the pending criminal charge arose?” Count 6: “Was he there [in Chicago] on union business for which the union had the responsibility for payment?” Count 7: “Was Mr. Raddock paid on that trip, the expenses of his paid by union funds while he was on union business?” Count 8: “You were out in Chicago at the same time?” Count 9: “Were your expenses on that Chicago trip paid by the union?” Count 10: “Were you out in Chicago at that time on union business?” Count 11: “Do you know Mr. James Hoffa?” Count 12: “Did you make an arrangement with Mr. Hoffa that he was to perform tasks for you in return for your support on the question of his being ousted from the A. F. L.-CIO?” Count 13: “Isn’t it a fact that you telephoned Mr. Hoffa from your hotel in Chicago on August 12, 1957?” Count 14: “And wasn’t that telephone call in fact paid out of union funds, the telephone call that you made to him on August 12?” Count 15: “Do you also know Mr. Sawoehka of the Brotherhood of Teamsters?” Count 16: “Isn’t it a fact that you had Mr. Plymate who is a representative of the brotherhood, telephone, and your secretary telephone, Mr. Sawoehka from your room on August 13, 1957?” Count 17: “And isn’t it a fact that that telephone bill and that telephone call was paid out of union funds?” Count 18: “Did you have any business with local 142 of the Teamsters in Gary, Ind.?”
Among other things, petitioner contends that both Hale v. Henkel and United States v. Murdock were founded on a misreading of an earlier decision of this Court, United States v. Saline Bank, 1 Pet. 100, which was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. It is argued that Saline Bank stands for the proposition that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in a federal court if the information divulged may aid a state prosecution. It is abundantly clear, however, that Saline Bank stands for no constitutional principle whatever. It was merely a reassertion of the ancient equity rule that a court of equity will not order discovery that may subject a party to criminal prosecution. In fact, the decision was cited in support of that proposition by an esteemed member of the very Court that decided the case. 2 Story, Commentaries on Equity, § 1494, n. 1 (1836).
Typical of such disclaimers are the following:
“The Chairman. I understand, it very clear now, that you are not invoking the fifth amendment privilege?
“Mr. Hutcheson. That is right, sir, I am not invoking it.
“The ChairmaN. You are not exercising that privilege?
“Mr. Hutcheson. No, sir.
“The Chairman. You are challenging the question and the jurisdiction of the committee for the reasons you have stated and for those reasons only?
“Mr. Hutcheson. Yes, sir.
“The Chairman. All right. We have a clear understanding about that.” Hearings, 12116.
“The Chairman. And, again, not invoking the privilege of the fifth amendment, you stand only and solely upon the statement you have read?” [See pp. 605-606, supra.']
“Mr. Hutcheson. Yes, sir.
“The Chairman. And you are not exercising the privilege that, by answering, a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you?
“(Witness conferred with counsel.)
“Mr. Hutcheson. No, sir.” Hearings, 12117.
Further disclaimers of the same tenor will be found at Hearings, 12119, 12121-12122, and 12124. Petitioner did not explain at the hearings why he went to such pains to avoid any appearance of invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. However, the following colloquy between petitioner and a member of the Committee sheds some light on his motivation:
“Senator ErviN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one or two questions along that line and then I will subside ?
“Mr. Hutcheson, you are familiar with the provisions of the AFL-CIO ethical code concerning officers of affiliated unions who invoke the fifth amendment; aren’t you?
“Mr. HutchesoN. Yes, sir.
“Senator Erven. In that connection I would like to state that this is my opinion of the law, though it may not be your counsel’s. The only reason for recognizing the right that a man may not testify concerning matters involved in an indictment against him arises out of the fact that the indictment is probably the strongest kind of evidence that anything he may say in reference to it may be construed to incriminate him, and that the only reason that a man has a right to refrain from answering matters about an indictment is the fact that what he may say about those matters may tend to incriminate him.
“Therefore, Mr. Hutcheson, don’t you realize that what you are doing is that you are seeking to avoid an expressed violation? In other words, you are seeking to get the benefit of the fifth amendment without invoking it so that you will not run the risk of committing an offense against the ethical code of the A. F. of L.-CIO?
“(The witness conferred with his counsel.)
“Mr. Hutcheson. Sir, I have been following the advice of counsel on the grounds outlined by me.
“Senator Ervin. Well, you are concerned that there shall be no actual or apparent violation on your part of the provisions of the A. F. of L.-CIO code of ethics concerning union officers who invoke the fifth amendment when asked about their official conduct, aren't you?
“Mr. Hutcheson. Yes, sir.” Hearings, 1212¿H2125.
While the Committee did not press Blaier to answer questions relating to the Lake County grand jury proceedings after he had refused to do so on the same grounds as those advanced by the petitioner, there is nothing to indicate that this resulted from the Committee’s understanding that those grounds included a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The suggestion made in dissent that the questions which petitioner refused to answer were “outside the power of a committee to ask” (post, p. 638) under the Due Process Clause because they touched on matters then pending in judicial proceedings cannot be accepted for several reasons. First: The reasoning underlying this proposition is that these inquiries constituted a legislative encroachment on the judicial function. But such reasoning can hardly be limited to inquiries that may be germane to existing judicial proceedings ; it would surely apply as well to inquiries calling for answers that might be used to the prejudice of the witness in any future judicial proceeding. If such were the reach of “due process” it would turn a witness’ privilege against self-incrimination into a self-operating restraint on congressional inquiry, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 2268; p. 20, infra, and would in effect pro tanto obliterate the need for that constitutional protection.
Second: The only decision relied on in support of this broad proposition is Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, which because of its “loose language” has been severely discredited, e. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 46, and which cannot well be taken to stand for the pervasive principles for which it is presently relied on. (Post, pp. 630, 632-636.) At most, Kilbourn is authority for the proposition that Congress cannot constitutionally inquire “into the private affairs of individuals who hold no office under the government” when the investigation “could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referred.” 103 U. S., at 195. The tangible fruits of the labors of the McClellan Committee (pp. 615-617, infra) show that such is not the case here.
Third: It hardly seems an impairment of “individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights” (post, p. 630) to limit a witness who makes such a “due process” objection to the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination granted by the Fifth Amendment. If neither the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from using the witness’ answer nor the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Federal Government from asking the question, it is difficult to understand how it can be said that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the inquiry because any answer may be used by a State.
Fourth: It should be noted that although this congressional inquiry was related to the subject matter of the state indictment, the questions that were asked of the petitioner did not bear directly on his guilt or innocence of the state charges. Indiana’s concern was not with whether union funds or influence had been misused; indeed there is no suggestion that the alleged bribery of the Indiana highway official was consummated with funds other than the personal profits reaped by the petitioner and others from their unlawful transactions. On the other hand, Congress’ concern was whether, on some later date, union funds had been used to stifle criminal proceedings that had been brought against the petitioner personally. How such payments were made, if they were in fact made, would certainly be a consideration in the establishment of a federal reporting and disclosure system for union funds.
Finally, “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed” phrase in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (post, pp. 632, 636, 638) scarcely bears upon the issue presented by this case. That expression was used in the Anderson case not in connection with anything having to do with the permissible scope of congressional inquiry, but solely with respect to “the extent of the punishing power” inherently possessed by the Congress. Id., at 230-231.
The Committee had information tending to show that the Teamsters Union, with whose officers petitioner was friendly, purchased for $40,000 some real estate in Gary, Indiana, worth approximately $3,800. The seller in this transaction was a corporation which then proceeded to purchase Holovaehka’s interest in another failing corporation for an amount substantially in excess of its value. See Second Interim Report of the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, S. Rep. No. 621, pt. 2, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 558-560 (1959).
The meagerness of the Committee’s finding on this subject stands in marked contrast to its findings on the Hutcheson biography, with respect to which the petitioner and the other witnesses had testified with comparative freedom. Whereas 17 pages of the Second Interim Report are devoted to summarizing the evidence regarding the publication of the biography, only six pages related to the Lake County proceedings. Second Interim Report of the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, S. Rep. No. 621, pt. 2, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 533-550, 554-560 (1959). It is relevant to observe in this regard that ten of the questions with respect to which the petitioner was subsequently indicted related to the possible use of union funds for the purpose of suppressing the Lake County grand jury proceeding. See note 12, Counts 1,2,3,4, 5, 6,7, 9,14,17.
In relevant part this statement was:
“We are inquiring into the situation in connection with the presentation before the grand jury in Lake County, Ind.; the intervention by certain union officials into that matter, and the part that was played by Mr. Hutcheson himself, Mr. Sawoehka, the secretary-treasurer of local 142 of the Teamsters, and Mr. James Hoff a, the international president of the Teamsters.
“The Chairman. Is there some information that either union funds were used in the course of these transactions or that the influence of official positions of high union officials was used in connection with this alleged illegal operation?
“Mr. Kennedy. We have information along both lines, Mr. Chairman, not only the influence but also in connection with the expenditure of union funds.
“The Chairman. That is the interest of this committee in a transaction of this kind or alleged transaction of this kind, to ascertain again whether the funds or dues money of union members is being misappropriated, improperly spent, or whether officials in unions are using their position to intimidate, coerce, or in any way illegally promote transactions where the public interest is involved.
“Mr. Raddock, you have heard a background statement. That is not evidence, but it is information, however, which the committee has, regarding this matter out there. The committee is undertaking to inquire into this in pursuit of the mandate given to it by the resolution creating the committee.” Hearings, 12021.
The full statement was :
“The testimony further indicates that certain high officials of both the Teamsters and the Carpenters Union, two of the largest unions in the country, with the help and assistance of Mr. Raddock were involved in a conspiracy to subvert justice in the State of Indiana.
“All the facts regarding this conspiracy undoubtedly have not been developed by the committee.
“Further exposure we believe can and should be made. We will be glad to assist and help law enforcement officials in the State of Indiana if they determine that they would interest themselves in the matter.” Hearings, 12132.
At the contempt trial Senator McClellan explained his statement as follows:
“Our legislative function had been performed in seeking information regarding crimes and improper activities. Some evidence had been presented indicating the possibility of a further crime involving this defendant possibly and officers of another large union. It has been our practice to cooperate with state and federal officials where any evidence is developed before us with respect to a crime having been committed. Our legislative purpose is to search out and find if crime has been committed.
“My statement here is to the effect that if the state officials desired to pursue any testimony that we had developed, we would cooperate with them and make the record available to them.”
Second Interim Report, S. Rep. No. 621, pt. 2, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 592 (1959).

Question: What is the court in which the case originated?

Choices:
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Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas
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Utah U.S. Circuit

Answer: 45