What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Linda M. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD, BACON & DAVIS, UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation; and Ford, Bacon & Davis, Incorporated, a New Jersey Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 86-1842.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
June 27, 1988.
Elizabeth T. Dunning (Tracy H. Fowler, with her on the brief) of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff-appellant.
Randall S. Feil (Brent P. Lorimer with him on the brief) of Fox, Edwards, Gard-iner & Brown, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants-appellees.
Before MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BOHANON, District Judge.
Honorable Luther L. Bohanon, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Districts of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.
Linda Brown filed a complaint alleging her former employer discharged her from her position as an accountant because of her gender and her complaint of discriminatory treatment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She further claimed the defendants breached her contract of employment by failing to comply with termination procedures specified in their personnel manual. The trial court found defendants had not discharged plaintiff for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons but had breached the contract.
Plaintiff appeals on the grounds that the court’s findings on her civil rights claims are clearly erroneous and that damages for her contract claim were not properly calculated. We conclude plaintiff’s objections to the court’s factual findings merely go to the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence, which amply supports the court’s findings. We further conclude, in light of the peculiarities of this case, damages were improperly calculated. We therefore affirm in part but remand for further proceedings.
The unusual fabric of this case was first loomed by the defendants when plaintiff’s supervisors determined that Ms. Brown’s continued employment was not desirable. The trial court found that this decision was rooted in two separate circumstances. The first of these circumstances was plaintiff’s inability to function at a businesslike level, an inability reflected by her repeated tardiness, inattentiveness, and improper sociability. Plaintiff also made several mistakes in her work that proved detrimental to her employer. Although one of plaintiffs supervisors attempted to help her raise the level of her performance, these efforts met with no success.
The second, and equally important, factor leading to plaintiff’s dismissal arose from defendants’ acquisition of another company. This acquisition brought Amy Caputo, another accountant, into Ms. Brown’s department. Ms. Caputo ultimately proved herself more competent than plaintiff. Plaintiff’s supervisors determined there was insufficient work for both plaintiff and Ms. Caputo, and therefore decided to terminate Ms. Brown in a “reduction in force.” Plaintiff was given the three weeks’ severance pay her contract mandated for such a discharge.
This combination of circumstances led the trial court to conclude Ms. Brown was terminated both for cause and because of a lack of work. Plaintiff claims this finding is clearly erroneous, arguing that various inconsistencies in the evidence demonstrate these reasons are pretextual. We have examined the record and have concluded plaintiffs arguments do not satisfy her burden of demonstrating that a mistake was made by the trial court. Recognizing the arguability of plaintiff’s view of the evidence, we nonetheless conclude the district court’s findings are plausible when the record is viewed in its entirety. With this conclusion before us, we cannot find clear error. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir.1985). It is not the function of an appellate court to determine issues anew, nor will it disturb factual decisions supported by the evidence. State Distribs., Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 738 F.2d 405, 411-12 (10th Cir.1984).
While it is seemingly inconsistent that plaintiff was terminated both for cause and as a result of a reduction in force, the evidence supports this conclusion. We do not agree with plaintiff’s contention that defendants have taken inconsistent positions to justify their acts. It is a simple matter of fact that when the company decided it had insufficient work for two full-time accountants, it chose to release the one whose performance was below that of the other.
Although there are many other threads within this fabric which could be explored, and indeed have been in the briefs, we do not believe there would be profit in doing so. Suffice it to say that for each time plaintiff has asserted a “yin” argument, defendants have responded with a “yang,” leading us to the conclusion that plaintiff’s arguments go to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. These issues were resolved by the trial court, and we rely upon its resolution.
We are troubled, however, by the award of damages. By finding that plaintiff was discharged both for cause and as part of a reduction in force, the district court has created an unintended dilemma. If plaintiff was discharged as part of a reduction in force, there was no breach of contract and plaintiff is entitled to no damages whatsoever. If plaintiff was discharged for cause, however, defendants breached her contract by failing to afford her the “progressive discipline” procedures her contract required as a precondition to discharge for cause. Plaintiff would then be entitled to her accrued salary for the period between her procedurally defective discharge and the time when her employer “substantially complied” with the required procedures, subject to her duty to properly mitigate. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1067-69 (Utah 1981).
The district court’s resolution of this dilemma required some measure of judicial legerdemain. The court found that plaintiff was entitled to the “progressive discipline” procedures because defendants showed there was “just cause” for her discharge. With no apparent factual foundation, the court concluded that as a matter of law it would have taken only six weeks for plaintiff’s supervisors to give her the necessary “two warnings with related timetables.” It found plaintiff could then have been terminated “without cause” even if her job performance had improved during this period. Based upon these findings, the court restricted plaintiffs damages to six weeks’ salary plus interest.
The district court’s efforts to forge a just and equitable result have produced an unsupportable judgment. If plaintiff’s discharge was in fact based on her unsatisfactory job performance, she is entitled to back pay and reasonable front pay consistent with Piacitelli. If, however, the determinative factor in plaintiff’s discharge was the lack of work she was qualified to perform, defendants’ breach did not actually damage plaintiff. We therefore remand for a determination of whether plaintiff is entitled to damages consistent with our reading of Piacitelli, or whether her damages for breach of contract are curtailed by the absence of work she was qualified to perform.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
. The Utah Supreme Court has held that an employer substantially complies with "progressive discipline” procedures when "the purpose of the procedural requirements was fulfilled and the substantial interests of the parties were satisfied." Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah 1981).
. In the instant case, plaintiff seeks "reasonable” front pay in lieu of compliance with the contractually mandated procedures, which would require her reinstatement. Our reading of Pia-citelli persuades us that, in cases where actual compliance with contractually mandated procedures is impracticable, plaintiff is entitled to front pay for the period of time in which defendants could reasonably achieve “substantial compliance" with those procedures.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1