What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK.
No. 59.
Argued November 16, 1964.
Decided January 18, 1965.
Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox and' Harold C. Wilkenfeld.
Henry Harfield argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William Harvey Beeves and John E. Hoffman, Jr.
Boy C. Haberkern, Jr., and Edward J. Boss filed a brief for the Chase. Manhattan Bank et al., as amici curiae, urging affirmance.
Theodore Tannenwald and A. 'Chauncey Newlin filed a memorandum for Omar, S. A.
Me.. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a collateral phase of litigation involving jeopardy assessments of some $19,000,000 made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against Omar; S. A., a Uruguayan corporation. The assessments charged that income had been realized within the United States on which a tax was due. On the same day respondent was served with notice, of levy and notice of'the federal tax lien. At the same time petitioner commenced ¡an action in the New York District Court naming Omar, as well as respondent and others, as defendants. Personal jurisdiction over respondent was acquired; but as of the date of argument of the case here, Omar had not yet been served. That action requested, inter alia, foreclosure of the tax lien upon all of Omar’s property, including sums held for the account or credit of Omar in foreign branch offices of respondent. It also requested that, pending determination of the action, respondent be enjoined from transferring any property or rights to property held for the account of Omar; and affidavits filed with the complaint averred that Omar was removing its assets from the United States.
The District Court, on the basis of the affidavits, issued a temporary injunction enjoining respondent from transferring any property or rights to property of Omar now held by it or by any branch offices within or without the United States, indicating it would modify the order should compliance be shown to violate foreign law. 210 F. Supp. 773. The Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote both by a panel of three, 321 F. 2d 14, and en banc, 325 F. 2d 1020. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 377 U. S. 951.
Title 26 U. S. C. § 7402 (a) gives the District Court power to grant injunctions “necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” Since it has personal jurisdiction over respondent, has it power to grant the interim relief requested? We are advised that respondent’s only debt to Omar is payable at respondent’s branch in Montevideo. It is said that the United States, the creditor, can assert against respondent in New York only those rights that Omar, the debtor, has against respondent in New York and that under New York law a depositor in a foreign branch has an action against the head office only where there has been a demand and wrongful refusal at the foreign branch. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917, 250 N. Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745. The point is emphasized by the argument that any obligation of respondent to Omar is due only in Montevideo — an obligation apparently dis-chargeable in Uruguayan currency, not in dollars. Therefore, the argument runs, there is no claim of the debtor (Omar) in New York which the creditor can reach.
We need not consider at this juncture all the refinements of that reasoning. For the narrow issue for us is whether the creditor (the United States) may by injunction pendente lite protect whatever rights the debtor (Omar) may have against respondent who is before the court on personal service. If it were clear that the debtor (Omar) were beyond reach of the District Court so far as personal service is concerned, we would have quite a different case — one on which we intimate no opinion. But under § 302 (a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, 7B McKinney’s Consol. Laws Ann., § 302, personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a “non-domiciliary” who “transacts-any business within the state” as to a cause of action arising out of such transaction, in which event out-of-state personal service may be made as provided in § 313. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Rule 4 (e) and Rule 4 (f) allow a party not an inhabitant of the State or found therein to be served with a summons in a federal court in the manner and under the circumstances prescribed by a state statute. See United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F. R. D. 216.
To be sure, this cause of action arose, the complaint was filed, and the temporary injunction was issued before the New York statute became effective. The New York Court of Appeals has, however,'indicated that where the suit is instituted after the effective date of the statute, the statute will normally apply to transactions occurring before the effective date. Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N. Y. 2d 281, 290, 200 N. E. 2d 427, 432. That court has further indicated that where, as in the instant case, the suit based on the prior transaction was pending on the effective date of the statute, “the new act shall— except where it ‘would not be feasible or would work injustice’ — apply ‘to all further proceedings’ in such actions . ...” Ibid. It seems obvious that a future attempt by the Government to serve process on Omar would be considered a “further proceeding” in the instant litigation. Accordingly, we judge the temporary injunction, which has only a prospective application, as of now and in light of the present remedy which § 302 (a) affords. And our review of the injunction as an exercise of the equity power granted by 26 U. S. C. § 7402 (a) must be in light of the public interest involved: “Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to. go when only private interests are involved.” Virginian R. Co. v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 552. And see United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 194; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 330.
If personal jurisdiction over Omar is acquired, the creditor (the United States) will be able to collect from respondent what the debtor (Omar) could collect. The opportunity to make that collection should not be lost in limine merely because the debtor (Omar) has not made the agreed-upon demand on respondent at the time and place and in the manner provided in their contract.
Whether the Montevideo branch is a “separate entity,” as the Court of Appeals thought, is not germane to the present narrow issue. It is not a separate entity in the sense that it is insulated from respondent’s managerial prerogatives. Respondent has actual, practical control over its branches; it is organized under a federal statute, 12 U. S. C. § 24, which authorizes it “To sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law and equity, as fully as natural persons” — as one entity, not branch by bratich. The branch bank’s affairs are, therefore, as much within the reach of the in personam order entered by the District Court as are those of the home office. Once personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to “freeze” property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United States. See New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U. S. 473, 482.
That is not to say that a federal court in this country should treat all the affairs of a branch bank the same as it would those of the home office. For overseas transactions are often caught in a web of extraterritorial activities and foreign law beyond the ken of our federal courts or their competence. We have, however, no such involvement here, for there is no showing that the mere “freezing”' of the Montevideo accounts, pending service on Omar, would violate foreign law, cf. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U. S. 197, 211, or place respondent under any risk of double liability. Cf. Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U. S. 71. The District Court reserved power-to enter any protective order of that character. 210 F. Supp. 773, 775. And if, as'is argúed in dissent, the litigation might in time be embarrassing to United States diplomacy, the District Court remains open to the Executive Branch, which, it must be remembered, is the moving party in the present proceeding.
The’temporary injunction issued by the District Court seems to us to be eminently appropriate to prevent further dissipation of assets. See United States v. Morris & Essex R. Co., 135 F. 2d 711, 713-714. If such relief were beyond the authority of the District Court, foreign taxpayers facing jeopardy assessments might either transfer assets abroad or dissipate those in foreign accounts under control of American institutions before personal service on the foreign taxpayer could be made. Such a scheme was underfoot here, the affidavits aver. Unlike De Beers Mines v. United States, 325 U. S. 212, there is here property which would be “the subject of the provisions of any final decree in the cause.” Id., 220. We conclude that this temporary injunction is “a reasonable measure to preserve the status quo” (Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 282, 290) pending service of process on Omar and an adjudication of the merits.
Reversed.
These branches are not separate corporations but parts of respondent’s single, federally chartered corporation. See 12 U. S. C. §§ 601-604; First National City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F. 2d 616.
There is also of course the possibility that Omar might enter a-general appearance as it apparently did in the Tax Court when it filed its petition of May 20, 1963, for a redetermination of the deficiencies on the basis of which the present jeopardy assessments were made.
Rule 4 (e), effective July 1, 1963, reads in relevant part:
“Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to Kim to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.”
Rule 4 (f), also effective-July 1, 1963, reads in relevant part:
“All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of'that state.”
The Court of Appeals reached these conclusions on the basis of Civil Practice Law and Rules, § 10003, 7B McKinney’s Consol. Laws Aim., § 10003: “This act shall apply to all actions hereafter commenced. This act shall also apply to all further proceedings in pending actions, except to the extent that the court determines that application in a particular pending action would not be féasibje or would work injustice,-in which event the former procedure applies. Proceedings pursuant to law in an action taken prior to the time this act takes effect shall not be rendered'ineffectual or impaired by this act.”
That the Government has not yet attempted to obtain personal jurisdiction over Omar is not significant in light of the fact that until now the Government’s primary contention has been that the ■District Court’s personal jurisdiction over the respondent bank was by itself an adequate basis for the issuance of the temporary injunction. As the Government said in its petition for rehearing before the Court of Appeals: “The jurisdictional basis, then, for the injunction issued by the District Court was personal jurisdiction over the Bank. Certainly, at this stage of the proceeding, it is inconsequential whether the District Court has jurisdiction over a res of over the taxpayer.” The Government went on to say that if this contention was rejected, then it wished tó argue that the tax lien had attached to Omar’s deposits and that these deposits “constitute rights to property which were within the jurisdiction of the District, Court.” Finally the Government stated: “It is only in the event that the Court concludes that the lien does not attach to such deposits that personal jurisdiction over Omar becomes relevant. In such event'the Government should be afforded an opportunity to obtain personal jurisdiction over Omar and the injunction should stand pending such efforts.” Even before this Court the Government argues alternatively that “the District Court had authority to enter the temporary injunction to preserve funds over which it had jurisdiction quad in rem,” a contention upon which, as noted previously, we do not pass.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 68