What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
TURNER v. UNITED STATES.
No. 1055.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Nov. 21, 1934.
Frank Hickman, of Tulsa, Okl. (Irvine E. Ungerman, of Tulsa, Okl., on the brief), for appellant.
W. F. Rampendahl, U. S. Atty., of Muskogee, Okl. (C. L. McArthur, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Muskogee, Okl., on the brief), for the United States.
Before LEWIS and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
LEWIS, Circuit Judge.
Appellant was indicted, convicted and sentenced for possessing intoxicating liquor on September 29, 1933, at a certain point in Muskogee, Oklahoma, said place being in what was formerly the Indian country. Act of June 30, 1919 (25 USCA § 244).
We notice that said section was repealed March 5, 1934. 48 Stat. 396. The repeal of that section, however, does not extinguish penalties or liabilities theretofore incurred. Rev. St. § 13 (1 USCA § 29).
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was procured by certain officers of the United States by means of an illegal and unlawful search of appellant’s person and effects without a search warrant therefor. There was no search of his person. His automobile was searched. The court overruled said motion, and the sole question considered here is the correctness of that ruling.
Two federal prohibition investigators were witnesses. The evidence was that appellant was known as a liquor dealer who had served a term in the penitentiary for conspiracy to violate the liquor laws. About September 1, 1933, the witnesses were informed that appellant was back in the alcohol and bonded whiskey business. His movements were watched. On September 25, 1933, the witnesses received word from police officers in Tulsa that appellant was going to New Orleans for a load of liquor. They were informed he had left Tulsa, the kind of ear he was driving and its license number. They found out he was not at his home in Tulsa. On information the officers anticipated his return by Muskogee and they watched the highway. Shortly after noon on September 29, 1933, they saw appellant on the highway approaching from the south. He entered Muskogee, and at 24th Street and Okmulgee Avenue he changed his course and speeded up his ear. The officers followed and stopped him. When they came to his ear he said: “There is no use looking. It is full” — or something to that effect. A search of the car without protest or objection disclosed a-quantity of whiskey, wine and alcohol, also a revolver carried in the pocket of the ear. Later appellant told the1 officers he brought the liquor from New Orleans.
Under the facts the search was not unlawful and illegal, and no constitutional right of appellant was violated. See Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694, 51 S. Ct. 240, 75 L. Ed. 629, 74 A. L. R. 1407, Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 39 A. L. R. 790, and Underhill v. United States (C. C. A. 10) 47 F.(2d) 891.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0