What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF CALIFORNIA et al.
NO. 22.
Argued October 14, 1953.
Decided November 9, 1953.
Douglas F. Smith argued the cause for appellant in No. 22 and Burton Mason argued the cause for appellant in No. 43. With them on a joint brief were Jonathan C. Gibson, R. S. Outlaw, Robert W. Walker, Kenneth F. Burgess and Arthur R. Seder, Jr. for appellant in No. 22, and George L. Buland, B. J. Foulds and Randolph Karr for appellant in No. 43.
Roger Arnebergh argued the cause for appellees in No. 22. With him on the briefs were Bourke Jones for the City of Los Angeles, appellee in that case, and Henry McClernan and John H. Lauten for the City of Glendale in No. 43. Ray L. Chesebro was also with them on statements opposing jurisdiction and motions to dismiss or affirm.
Hal F. Wiggins argued the cause for appellees in No. 43. With him on the briefs was Everett C. McKeage for the Public Utilities Commission.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases present the same questions of law and will be disposed of together. The Public Utilities Commission of California entered orders authorizing the construction of certain grade separation improvements and allocating the costs therefor, pursuant to § 1202 of the Public Utilities Code of California. On petitions to the Supreme Court of California, that court denied review of the Commission’s orders, and these appeals followed. We postponed jurisdiction until a hearing on the merits.
We think the Commission’s orders must be treated as an act of the legislature for purposes of determining our jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2). Live Oak Water Users’ Assn. v. Railroad Commission, 269 U. S. 354, 356; Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 249 U. S. 422, 424. The Commission has construed § 1202 as authorizing these orders. The appellants presented squarely to the Supreme Court of California their contention that in the allocation of costs, these orders take their property without due process of law and are so arbitrary and burdensome as to constitute an interference with interstate commerce, in violation of the Constitution of the United States. In sustaining the Commission’s orders by denying writs of review, the Supreme Court of California upheld the statute as applied by the Commission, and the cases are properly here on appeal. Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Road Improvement District, 256 U. S. 658, 659-660.
The principal question presented by these appeals is whether the allocation of the reasonable cost of grade separation improvements is arbitrary as to the railroads unless imposed on the basis of benefits received, or, since the costs are incurred in the exercise of the police power in the interest of public safety, convenience and necessity, may they be allocated on the basis of fairness and reasonableness.
No. 22.
In this case, the Commission authorized the enlarging of two existing railroad underpasses where the Santa Fe tracks cross Washington Boulevard in Los Angeles. These underpasses were constructed in 1914 under an agreement between the railroad and the City providing that each party was to pay one-half of the cost. The Commission found the structures to be 75% depreciated. When constructed, their chief utility was to facilitate access to a garbage reduction plant. Washington Boulevard is now one of the main east and west thoroughfares of Los Angeles, and other streets and highways feed into it. It is not a part of the State highway system nor is it a freeway. The grade separations concerned here are in one of the principal industrial districts of the City and are a traffic bottleneck. For most of its length, Washington Boulevard is 60 feet wide, but at the site in question, the roadway narrows to 20 feet, with a vertical clearance of less than 14 feet. The City’s easement at this point is 90 feet. As improved, two 33-foot roadways and two 7-foot sidewalks will be provided, and the underpasses will be heightened. The improvement is being made to promote the safety and convenience of the public and to meet vastly increased local transportation needs, made necessary by the rapid growth of the City. In 1910 the City had a population of 102,000, in 1920 of 576,000, and in 1948 of 1,987,000. Los Angeles County’s population in 1910 was 504,000 and in 1948 was over four million. Vehicular traffic in the area has increased tremendously since construction of the present underpasses in 1914.
Considering all of these facts and evidence by the railroad that there were no benefits to be derived by the railroad from this improvement, the Commission decided that- there “is a need for widening and increasing the height of the existing underpasses,” and that the preferred plan submitted by the City of Los Angeles “sets out the construction which would be most practicable and best meet the public safety, convenience and necessity in this matter.” The Commission found that $569,355 of the cost was attributable to the presence of the railroad tracks and that the railroad should pay 50% of this amount and the City 50%.
No. 43.
This case does not differ materially from Case No. 22 except that here a grade crossing will be replaced by an underpass. Los Feliz Boulevard runs in a northeast-southwest direction, crossing at grade five Southern Pacific tracks approximately at the boundary of the cities of Los Angeles and Glendale. The street becomes known as Los Feliz Road in Glendale. Los Feliz is not a part of the State highway system nor is it a freeway, but, like Washington Boulevard, is an access street for adjacent properties and for other streets feeding into it in this congested area and as a through street has reached capacity. When the crossing is blocked by trains, 38 or more vehicles may back up in each of three lanes, causing a “backlash” on San Fernando Road, 820 feet distant. The crossing now has manually-operated crossing gates, and several relatively minor accidents have occurred there during the last 25 years. The plan approved by the Commission passes the street under the railroad tracks, with two 40-foot roadways, separated by a median strip and with 5-foot sidewalks on each side. The structure when completed will be 105 feet wide. The total cost necessitated by the presence of the tracks was estimated at $1,493,200. The Commission ordered that 50% be borne by the railroad, 25% by Los Angeles County, and 12%% each by the cities of Los Angeles and Glendale. Construction of the grade separation was found by the Commission to be “in the interest of public safety, convenience and necessity . ...”
In each of these cases, the railroads introduced evidence intended to show that their share of the costs should be based on benefits received and that they would receive little or no benefit from the construction. For the most part, this evidence related to the nature of the traffic on the boulevards, the fact that the improvements are required primarily to facilitate traffic flow on the streets, the “revolution” in transportation that has occurred since the early part of this century and its effect on the reasons for constructing grade separations and on the financial position of railroads, the competition afforded railroads by motor vehicles utilizing the public streets and highways, and the effect of the proposed construction on operation of the railroads. The appellants contended that the costs should be distributed on the basis of benefits, and since the railroads would receive little or no benefits, they should be required to pay only a small part of the costs or nothing, as the case may be. The cities contended in both cases that the railroads should bear all the costs attributable to the presence of the tracks. After lengthy hearings and after considering all the evidence and the arguments advanced, the Commission decided that it was not bound to follow any particular theory in apportioning the costs but may allocate the costs in the exercise of its sound discretion.
We do not understand the appellants to contest the right of the Commission to enter the orders or the reasonableness of the estimated costs. Their principal contention is that as to them the cost of the improvements may be distributed only on the basis of benefits which will accrue to their property. In this contention, we think the appellants are in error. These were not improvements whose purpose and end result is to enhance the value of the property involved by reason of the added facilities, such as street, sewer or drainage projects, where the costs assessed must bear some relationship to the benefits received. Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Dist., 306 U. S. 459; Valley Farms Co. v. Westchester, 261 U. S. 155; Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Road Improvement District, supra; Gast Realty & Investment Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55.
- Rather, in the cases at bar, the improvements were instituted by the State or its subdivisions to meet local transportation needs and further safety and convenience, made necessary by the rapid growth of the communities. In such circumstances, this Court has consistently held that in the exercise of the police power, the cost of such improvements may be allocated all to the railroads. Erie R. Co. v. Board, 254 U. S. 394, 409-411; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Omaha, 235 U. S. 121, 127; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 430, 441; Cincinnati, I. & W. R. Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336, 344. There is the proper limitation that such allocation of costs must be fair and reasonable. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 415, and the cases there cited. This was the standard applied by the Commission. It was not an arbitrary exercise of power by the Commission to refuse to allocate costs on the basis of benefits alone. The railroad tracks are in the streets not as a matter of right but by permission from the State or its subdivisions. The presence of these tracks in the streets creates the burden of constructing grade separations in the interest of public safety and convenience. Having brought about the problem, the railroads are in no position to complain because their share in the cost of alleviating it is not based solely on the special benefits accruing to them from the improvements.
The appellants rely heavily on the Nashville case, supra, but that decision is in accord with the long-established rule which we here follow and which the Commission applied. As this Court said in the Nashville case: “The claim of unconstitutionality rests wholly upon the special facts here shown.” P. 413. In that case, the railroad’s share of the cost was fixed at 50% by a Tennessee statute and no consideration was given by the Supreme Court of Tennessee as to whether the application of the statutory amount was unreasonable under the special facts advanced. The grade separation ordered in the Nashville case was located in the rural community of Lexington, Tennessee, which had a population in 1910 of 1,497, in 1920 of 1,792, and in 1930 of 1,823. The improvement was not required to meet the transportation needs of Lexington and was being constructed without regard to that community’s growth or to considerations of public safety and convenience resulting from such growth. The highway there under improvement was part of the State highway system and the grade was to be removed primarily as part of economic and engineering planning and to qualify the improvement of the highway for federal aid. Other facts offered pointed principally to the state and nation-wide nature of the highway system and the particular highway there involved, the competition afforded railroads by the users of such highways and the effect of such competition on the revenues of the railroads, and the increasing importance of grade separations as a means of assuring rapid movement of motor vehicles rather than as an exclusively safety measure.
As stated by this Court, “[t]he main contention is that to impose upon the Railway, under these circumstances, one-half of the cost is action so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive it of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” P. 413. Thus, the contention of the railroad and the rule recognized by this Court in the Nashville opinion was that there could be an allocation of costs subject to the limitation that they be allocated always with regard to the rule against unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee was reversed and the case remanded thereto because that court had refused to consider whether the special facts shown “were of such persuasiveness as to have required the state court to hold that the statute and order complained of are arbitrary and unreasonable. That determination should, in the first instance, be made by the Supreme Court of the State.” Pp. 432-433..
In our cases, not only are the facts distinguishable in many material particulars but unlike the Supreme Court of Tennessee which refused to consider the facts to determine whether the statute’s allocation of 50% was arbitrary or unreasonable, the California Commission considered all the evidence offered, including that going to the benefits received, and properly applied the rule of allocation sanctioned by this Court, and the California Supreme Court found no occasion to review the Commission’s orders. There is no showing on these records of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the Commission’s orders, and none is claimed except as the Commission refused to allocate costs on the basis of benefits received, which we hold it was not required to do.
It is next contended that the allocation of grade separation costs against the railroads in excess of benefits received constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce. We have decided that there is no showing that the orders here under attack were arbitrary or unreasonable. Certainly, if the Commission has the right to order these improvements and has not, in allocating the costs, acted so arbitrarily as to deprive the railroads of their property without due process of law, the fact that the improvements may interfere with interstate commerce is incidental. The construction and use of public streets is a matter peculiarly of local concern and great leeway is allowed local authorities where there is no conflicting federal regulation, even though interstate commerce be subject to material interference. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, 111; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 187. No conflict with federal regulation is involved here. See Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Board, 278 U. S. 24, 35.
When the appellants went on the streets in question, they assumed the burden of sharing on a fair and reasonable basis the costs of any changes for the reason of public safety and convenience made necessary by the growth of the communities.
“To engage in interstate commerce the railroad must get on to the land and to get on to it must comply with the conditions imposed by the State for the safety of its citizens.” Erie R. Co. v. Board, supra, p. 411.
The orders of the Commission are not arbitrary or unreasonable and do not deprive the appellants of their property without due process of law, nor do they interfere unreasonably with interstate commerce.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of California are
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
The final orders may be found at 51 Cal. P. U. C. 771 and 51 Cal. P. U. C. 788.
“§ 1202. Exclusive powers of commission. The commission has the exclusive power:
“(a) To determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use, and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a railroad, and of each crossing of a public or publicly used road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, subject to the provisions of Sections 1121 to 1127, inclusive, of the Streets and Highways Code so far as applicable.
“(b) To alter, relocate, or abolish by physical closing any such crossing heretofore or hereafter established.
“(c) To require, where in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such crossing heretofore or hereafter established and to prescribe the terms upon which such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the construction, alteration, relocation, or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected or between such corporations and the State, county, city, or other political subdivision affected.” Deering’s Cal. Pub. TJ. C. A., 1951.
40 Adv. Cal., No. 2, Minutes, 1; 40 Adv. Cal., No. 15, Minutes, 1.
51 Cal. P. U. C. 771, 779.
Ibid.
51 Cal. P. U. C. 788, 795.

Question: What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Choices:
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Atomic Energy Commission
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force
Department or Secretary of Agriculture
Alien Property Custodian
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army
Board of Immigration Appeals
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Prisons
Bonneville Power Administration
Benefits Review Board
Civil Aeronautics Board
Bureau of the Census
Central Intelligence Agency
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Department or Secretary of Commerce
Comptroller of Currency
Consumer Product Safety Commission
Civil Rights Commission
Civil Service Commission, U.S.
Customs Service or Commissioner or Collector of Customs
Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission
Drug Enforcement Agency
Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)
Department or Secretary of Energy
Department or Secretary of the Interior
Department of Justice or Attorney General
Department or Secretary of State
Department or Secretary of Transportation
Department or Secretary of Education
U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator
Federal Aviation Agency or Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)
Federal Credit Union Administration
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Election Commission
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Housing Administration
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Farmers Home Administration
Federal Parole Board
Federal Power Commission
Federal Railroad Administration
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Works Administration, or Administrator
General Accounting Office
Comptroller General
General Services Administration
Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services
Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Administrative agency established under an interstate compact (except for the MTC)
Interstate Commerce Commission
Indian Claims Commission
Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement
Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of
Information Security Oversight Office
Department or Secretary of Labor
Loyalty Review Board
Legal Services Corporation
Merit Systems Protection Board
Multistate Tax Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Navy
National Credit Union Administration
National Endowment for the Arts
National Enforcement Commission
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer
National Mediation Board
National Railroad Adjustment Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
Office of Economic Opportunity
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator
Office of Personnel Management
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of
Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
U.S. Public Health Service
Postal Rate Commission
Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Renegotiation Board
Railroad Adjustment Board
Railroad Retirement Board
Subversive Activities Control Board
Small Business Administration
Securities and Exchange Commission
Social Security Administration or Commissioner
Selective Service System
Department or Secretary of the Treasury
Tennessee Valley Authority
United States Forest Service
United States Parole Commission
Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster
United States Sentencing Commission
Veterans' Administration or Board of Veterans' Appeals
War Production Board
Wage Stabilization Board
State Agency
Unidentifiable
Office of Thrift Supervision
Department of Homeland Security
Board of General Appraisers
Board of Tax Appeals
General Land Office or Commissioners
NO Admin Action
Processing Tax Board of Review

Answer: 116