What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Nels LARIVE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, Jerry Lindstrom, d/b/a Lindstrom Construction Company, Appellant.
No. 20731.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Oct. 14, 1971.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1971.
Albert T. Reddish, Alliance, Neb., for appellant.
Robert E. Kopp, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MATTHES, Chief Judge, and BRIGHT and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Neis Larive sustained severe electrical burns and related bodily injuries when he accidently came in contact with a live electrical conductor. The accident occurred when Larive, then employed by the contractor, Jerry Lind-strom, d/b/a Lindstrom Construction Company, was performing electrical construction work on behalf of his employer, for the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, at an electric power substation at Alliance, Nebraska. Larive, prior to the accident, thought that the electrical conductor with which he came in contact was de-energized.
Larive brought an action for damages against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b) and 2674, and joined his employer, Lindstrom, because of the latter’s interest in the claim arising from the payment of workmen’s compensation benefits to Larive under the Nebraska law. The United States cross-claimed for indemnity against contractor Lind-strom contending that Lindstrom should be held Hable for the accident and the consequent damages sustained by Larive in the event that the plaintiff should recover in the principal action.
During the trial, the United States settled with Larive for $301,000 and, in addition, paid Larive’s wife the further sum of $50,000 on her separate suit brought against the government for loss of consortium. Thereafter, the government pressed its cross-claim for indemnity to conclusion. The trial court awarded the United States a judgment of $175,000 plus interest on the cross-claim for indemnity, this figure representing fifty per cent of the amounts which the United States had paid to Larive and Larive’s wife. Lindstrom prosecutes this timely appeal from the judgment granting the government indemnity. The trial court’s opinion is reported at 318 F.Supp. 119 (D.S.D.1970).
The trial court found that the failure of Larive’s employer to notify Larive of the actual hazards on the job, as well as misrepresentations made to Larive by the Bureau of Reclamation representative, contributed to causing plaintiff’s injuries, and the court determined the relative fault of each to be fifty per cent. Upon our review, we find that substantial evidence supports these crucial findings. Appellant has failed to demonstrate them to be clearly erroneous.
The United States, however, concedes that the award should be reduced by $25,000 since the trial court took into consideration the settlement for $50,000 which the United States paid to Mrs. Larive on her separate action. This separate action was not involved in the cross-claim for indemnity and the trial court erred in awarding any indemnity in this proceeding on account of the government’s settlement with Larive’s wife.
Appellant takes further exception to the district court’s order that interest on the judgment be computed from June 26, 1968, the date of the settlement between the United States and Larive. This exception is not well taken. The government’s recovery here is ' based on indemnification by Lindstrom in proportion to his fault in causing Larive’s injuries. See United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 90 S.Ct. 880, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (1970). In the usual indemnity case the indemnitor becomes immediately liable, upon the expenditure by the indemnitee, for that portion of the expenditure covered by the indemnification agreement, even though a judicial determination is required to determine the amount of that liability. Because we have affirmed the finding that Lindstrom was liable at the time the government settled with Larive, for that portion of the settlement attributable to Lindstrom’s negligence, the government, in making settlement with Larive, expended funds on behalf of Lindstrom, its indemnitor. In this posture the district court was justified in awarding interest on the government’s recovery from June 26, 1968, the date of settlement with Larive. See Kincade v. C & L Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 299 S.W.2d 67, 73 (Ark.1957); cf. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Louis v. United States, 182 F.2d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1950). The appellants have failed to demonstrate any error of the trial court by citing appropriate authority suggesting a contrary result. We therefore affirm the district court view that interest should be allowed from the date of settlement with the claimant Larive.
The judgment is modified by reducing the same in the amount of $25,000. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. No costs shall be taxed by either party.
. The original settlement was for $306,000, which amount included $5,000 earmarked for an anticipated surgical operation. Following Larive’s decision not to undergo the operation, the amount of his final settlement was reduced to $301,000.
. Lindstrom agreed to be “responsible for all damages to persons or property that occur [red] as a result of his fault or negligence.” Under this contractual obligation, the extent of a contractor’s liability to indemnify the United States will be premised on the basis of comparative negligence “to the full extent that [his] negligence, if any, contributed to the injuries” sustained by the employee. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 90 S.Ct. 880, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (1970).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1