What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Joseph T. WATKINS, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Appellant, v. Walter E. WASHINGTON, Mayor for the District of Columbia, et al.
No. 74-1316.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Dec. 4, 1974.
Decided Feb. 6, 1975.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1975.
Donald V. Watkins, Montgomery, Ala., for appellant.
David P. Sutton, Asst. Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel were on the brief for appellees.
Before BASTIAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The appellant Watkins originally brought this action in the District Court alleging racial discrimination in the employment and personnel policies of the Housing Division of the Department of Licenses and Inspections, now the Department of Economic Development, of the District of Columbia, and seeking an award of back pay and declaratory and injunctive relief. The district judge entered judgment awarding back pay and denying all other requested relief. On appeal this court directed the District Court (1) to remand the case for further administrative proceedings on Watkins’ promotional status and (2) to enter an order enjoining further racial discrimination by the Housing Division and ordering that steps be taken to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. Watkins v. Washington, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 298, 472 F.2d 1373 (1972).
On remand the district judge on February 28, 1973 entered an order as directed. On August 24, 1973 a hearing committee appointed pursuant to the court’s order determined
that Mr. Watkins is entitled to a GS-12 position in the Housing Division at this time and should be considered for nothing less unless he personally is willing to accept a grade 11.
The panel respectfully requests that this offer of a GS-12 position be offered him, not only because he is qualified for such a position, but because had he not been the object of such discrimination which the court found to be practiced against him, he would have no doubt attained an even higher grade just on his initiative and merit.
Although the committee’s recommendation was subject to review by the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, the Director of the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, Department of Economic Development, voluntarily offered Watkins a GS-11 position on October 15, 1973, which Watkins declined.
On November 26, 1973 Watkins filed a pro se motion for enforcement of the order entered by the District Court on remand from this court. Ruling on the motion, the District Court enjoined the government from offering any position from GS-12 through GS — 15 to any person other than Watkins while the hearing committee’s recommendation was pending final action. However, the judge denied Watkins’ motions for enforcement and discovery in aid of enforcement. Watkins appealed.
During the pendency of the appeal in this court the Commissioner of the District of Columbia on June 13, 1974 issued his final decision approving the hearing committee recommendations and ordering that the Department of Economic Development
1. Promote Mr. Watkins to the position of GS — 11 Housing Improvement Specialist, now available in the Housing Division.
2. Offer Mr. Watkins the next available GS-12 position in the Housing Division.
On July 19, 1974 Watkins was appointed to the GS — 12 position of Supervisory Housing Improvement Specialist.
Watkins suggests that the government has delayed in complying with the District Court’s order remanding the case for further administrative proceedings regarding his promotional status. The government answers that Watkins is himself responsible for the delay. Our examination of the record indicates that the government is correct. The order entered February 28, 1973 required that a hearing panel be convened within thirty days. Such a panel was convened, the membership being designated jointly by the government and Watkins through his attorney. Watkins, however, was dissatisfied with the panel, and on April 4, 1973 informed the government counsel that he had dismissed his counsel and wished a new panel appointed. There is no indication that the government delayed in appointing a new panel suitable to Watkins, that the panel delayed in making its recommendations, or that the Commissioner delayed in issuing his final decision.
Watkins charges for the first time on this appeal that a GS — 12 position was vacant both at the time the hearing committee issued its recommendation and at the time he brought his motion for enforcement, and that the government did not disclose the existence of the vacancy. In support of this contention Watkins filed in this court an affidavit by one Victor Brown who was designated by Watkins to sit on the hearing committee. On the other hand the record contains an affidavit by George Stover, Personnel Officer for the Department of Economic Development, stating that no such position was vacant at the time the hearing committee issued its recommendations, or at any time since. This factual dispute cannot be resolved in this court.
Watkins argues that even if no positions higher than the GS — 11 position he refused were vacant at the time he brought his motion for enforcement, positions could have been made available by reclassification under 5 U.S.C. § 5107, by an ad hoc adjustment of pay and other benefits, or by a supplemental stipend to be paid out of funds received from philanthropic sources. We think none of these suggestions is feasible. In any case the argument has been mooted by Watkins’ appointment to a GS — 12 position.
Watkins argues that his promotion should be retroactive to the time he filed his original action and that he should be awarded back pay from that date. We think this is not required, either by our previous decision, or by the District Court’s order of February 28, 1973, or by the recommendations of the hearing committee as approved by the Commissioner. Under the District Court’s original judgment entered in this case Watkins has received back pay for the time during which the Housing Division discriminated against him. He has been promoted to the first vacant GS — 12 position, as recommended by the hearing committee and Commissioner. He has accordingly received all the relief to which he is entitled under his original action and the judgment entered therein which he now seeks to have enforced.
In summary, Watkins argues that the district judge abused his discretion by his ruling on the motion to enforce judgment. We do not agree.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1