What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CALCASIEU CHEMICAL CORPORATION, a corporation, and Sears, Roebuck & Company, a corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CANAL BARGE COMPANY, Inc., a corporation, the BARGE NBC 924, its tackle, apparel, etc., and the M/V REBAJANE, her engines, tackle, apparel, etc., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16899.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 3, 1969.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1969.
William K. Johnson, Warren C. Ingersoll, John E. Corkery, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants; Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Harvey Wienke, Robert D. Barnes, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees; McBride, Baker, Wienke & Schlosser, Chicago, Ill., of counsel.
Before CASTLE, Chief Judge, and SWYGERT and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges.
CASTLE, Chief Judge.
On July 6, 1966, plaintiff, Sears, Roebuck and Company (Sears), entered into a charter party or contract of affreightment with defendant, Canal Barge Company, Inc., (Canal), for the transportation by barge of a quantity of ethylene glycol (antifreeze) from Lake Charles, Louisiana, to Berwyn, Illinois. Canal picked up the cargo from plaintiff, Cal-casieu Chemical Corporation, which had sold it to Sears, and transported it to the prescribed destination. Upon arrival at Berwyn, the portion of the cargo carried in one compartment of the barge was found to have been contaminated by 16% water, allegedly due to a negligently leaky cement patch in the barge’s hull.
Plaintiffs brought this admiralty action to recover damages arising out of the cargo’s contamination. After answering, Canal moved for and was granted summary judgment on the ground that the charter had been breached by Sears, in that the latter had failed to obtain insurance for the joint account of itself and Canal on the cargo, as the charter required. In plaintiffs’ words, “This appeal is taken to reverse the court’s order granting that judgment on the ground, inter alia, that a genuine issue of material fact remain to be tried.”
One of the printed clauses in the charter provided:
“Neither the tug, tow, master nor owner shall be liable for any loss of, or damage to, or delay in the delivery thereof, however, arising or resulting, even if caused by negligence or unseaworthiness. Deviation by the owner shall not be a breach of this contract. Insurance against all risks shall be carried by the Charterer on the cargo, and on any craft of Charterer, for the Owner’s and Charterer’s joint account. No underwriter on cargo or on Charterer’s craft shall have any claim, by subrogation, loan receipt or otherwise, against the tug, tow, master or Owner, for any loss paid, regardless of the nature or circumstances thereof, and Charterer’s policies on cargo and on Charterer’s craft shall be claused accordingly.”
A further, typewritten clause appearing in the charter provides:
“Special Conditions
“Barge is to be tendered suitable to load ethylene glycol. Any cleaning at Owner’s expense. All inspection fees for account of the Charterer.”
Plaintiffs’ main contention is that the above clause constitutes an express warranty of seaworthiness, a condition precedent, which was not met. At least, plaintiffs claim, the meaning of the clause is ambiguous and requires for its interpretation a finding of the parties’ intent. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, a question of material fact is presented —namely, the intent of the parties — and summary judgment was improper.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the special condition was clearly intended by the parties to have the limited application of obligating Canal to tender barges whose tanks were sufficiently clean to be suitable to load the cargo, and to pay for all cleaning expenses. Moreover, defendants argue that regardless of the meaning of this provision, the clause requiring Sears to acquire insurance for the joint account of Sears and Canal was unquestionably breached by Sears’ obtaining insurance solely for its own account, and therefore as a matter of law, plaintiffs are precluded from recovery.
We believe the District Court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of Sears’ breach of the insurance clause. Since there is no doubt as to the intention of the parties in agreeing to that clause, there was no issue of material fact presented, the resolution of which could have changed the outcome of the litigation.
Regarding the “Special Conditions” clause relied upon by plaintiffs, we fail to see how the breach of that clause by Canal, if in fact such a breach occurred, would affect the holding rendered below. Even if there is an ambiguity which raised a question of fact, and even if that question could be resolved in favor of plaintiffs — i. e., that Canal breached an obligation to tender a seaworthy craft — plaintiffs are still precluded from recovery as a matter of law since it was Sears’ obligation to insure both itself and Canal against all loss and Sears failed to meet that obligation. As the lower court concluded, “It is clear that had Sears obtained insurance on behalf of itself and Canal covering any Cargo damage, as required by the Charter Party, none of the parties to the instant controversy would have borne the loss of the damaged cargo.” Thus, it was Sears’ own breach of the charter which occasioned its loss, and it is therefore precluded from recovering that loss from defendant. To hold defendants responsible would be manifestly unfair since Canal “might [itself] have insured against the loss, even though occasioned by [its] own negligence.” Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Co., 248 U.S. 189, 146, 39 S.Ct. 53, 54, 63 L.Ed. 170 (1918).
The case of T.N. No. 73, 1939 A.M.C. 673 (S.D.N.Y.1939), cited by defendants, is factually quite similar to the instant case. The shipper in that case also breached a contract requirement to insure the cargo for the account of the carrier, but contended that since the contract contained an express warranty of seaworthiness, the insurance clause was not intended to cover losses due to unseaworthiness. In holding that the carrier was not liable to the shipper for the value of the cargo, allegedly lost due to the unseaworthiness of the carrier’s craft, Judge Leibell issued a thorough, well-reasoned opinion. The following language of that opinion, of which we approve, is particularly appropriate to the instant case:
“In the case at bar * * * the claimant [shipper] was under an obligation to the petitioner [carrier] to take out insurance on the cargo. This was not a mere ‘benefit of insurance’ clause. Claimant was contractually obligated to effect insurance for the account of the petitioner. This was part of the consideration moving from the claimant and, in all likelihood, it had an effect on the freight rate.
******
“ * * * The contract provision as to insurance in this case is stronger and affords greater protection to the barge owner than the ordinary benefit of insurance clause.
“Claimant argues that the result of this interpretation of the insurance clause would be to nullify the express warranty of seaworthiness contained in the same contract of carriage. I do not see it that way. If the charterer, the claimant herein, had lived up to its obligations under the insurance clause, it would not thereby lose the benefit of the personal warranty of seaworthiness. That warranty would still be in effect and in the event of a loss to the cargo, resulting from the unseaworthiness of the barge, claimant could hold both the petitioner and the barge. See [Luckenbach v. (W. J.) McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U.S. 139 (39 S.Ct. 53) (1918); Pendleton v. Benner Line, 246 U.S. 353 (38 S.Ct. 330, 62 L.Ed. 770) (1918)].
******
“There is another aspect to this issue that should not be over-looked. To add by implication to the broad and general language of the insurance clause, an exception of losses resulting from the unseaworthiness of the barge, would leave the barge owner without insurance that he otherwise might have obtained, a result that would be manifestly unfair. The barge owner had the right to assume that the insurance clause in the contract of carriage meant just what it said, without any implied exceptions. The cargo owner (claimant) has only itself to blame if it failed in its obligation to effect insurance for the account of the barge owner (petitioner).
******
“As we have seen, the [carrier] could have taken out insurance on its own account which would cover cargo losses due to unseaworthiness. In fact, •having warranted the seaworthiness of the barges to the claimant, it would seem that insurance covering such a contingency would be the kind most desired by the petitioner. I am of the opinion the aforementioned insurance clause of the contract of carriage was intended to cover any losses the carrier (petitioner) could have insured against, including cargo losses due to unseaworthiness. Since claimant (or its predecessor) contracted to obtain such insurance and did not do so, I am of the opinion that petitioner should be granted exoneration from liability.” 1939 A.M.C. at 689-691.
While we are aware that a 1939 District Court decision from another circuit is not binding upon this Court, we believe the above holdings are a correct view of the law as applied to an almost identical factual situation as the instant case. Moreover, plaintiffs have cited no cases differing with T.N. No. 73, nor can we discover any.
Since the foregoing discussion disposes of the case, we find plaintiffs’ other contentions to be irrelevant. We therefore deem it unnecessary in this opinion to discuss the same. In addition, since the validity of the insurance clause was not challenged in the District Court, we will not consider this issue for the first time on appeal. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.R. Co. v. City of Fond Du Lac, 297 F.2d 583, 587, 93 A.L.R.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. County of Iowa, 295 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1961).
The judgment below is, therefore, affirmed.
Affirmed.
. T.N. No. 73 was affirmed on different grounds — burden of proof — by the Court of Appeals, sub nom., Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 114 F.2d 248 (2nd Cir. 1940), and by the Supreme Court, 314 U.S. 104, 62 S.Ct. 156, 86 L.Ed. 89 (1941). Neither reviewing court found it necessary to discuss the insurance clause and its effects. The District Court opinion in T.N. No. 73 was cited with approval in Hercules Powder Co. v. Commercial Transport Corp., 270 F.Supp. 676, 681 (N.D.Ill., E.D.1967).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2