What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
NAYLOR v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 14246.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
April 3, 1953.
John E. Simpson and Alex P. Gaines, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Maryhelen Wigle, Carolyn R. Just, Robert N. Anderson, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., Charles S. Lyon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ellis N. Slack, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles W. Davis, Chief Counsel, Bur.Int. Rev., and W. Herman Schwatka, Sp. Atty., Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and HOLMES and RIVES, Circuit Judges.
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
This proceeding involves an alleged deficiency in petitioner’s income taxes for the year 1946. The question presented is whether a fee of $28,000 paid an attorney for his services in September, 1946, was deductible from gross income as a non-business expense under section 23 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., or was allowable to petitioner only as a selling expense in his computation of capital gain realized on the sale of his corporate stock.
The pertinent facts are undisputed and largely stipulated.- Briefly stated, they are as follows: In August, 1946, the taxpayer owned 2000 shares of stock of the Lane Drug Stores, Inc., which it had offered to sell to the Interstate Drugs, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Interstate. The offer to sell was in the form of an option given Interstate by petitioner in a contract between the parties, dated June 1, 1942. By letter of August 23, 1946, the Interstate Company advised petitioner that in view of its agreement to sell all the stock of Lane Drug Stores, Inc., it would be necessary for it to repurchase at “the book value as of July 31, 1946” the shares held by petitioner. Subsequently, by letter dated September 4, 1946, the Company gave petitioner formal notice of the exercise of its option. The option agreement provided that Interstate should pay for such shares so purchased the net asset value thereof as shown by the books of Lane Drug Stores, Inc., on the last day of the month preceding the date on which the purchase or sale was consummated.
The exercise on September 4, 1946, by the Company of its undisputed right to purchase petitioner’s stock effectively converted the agreement of June 1, 1942, into a binding contract of sale, since it constituted an acceptance of petitioner’s outstanding offer to sell; but a dispute arose between the parties as to the net asset value of the shares as shown by the books of Lane Drug Stores on the last day of the month preceding the date on which the purchase or sale was consummated. The ■option agreement repeatedly referred to the purchase or sale as being “consummated” when the party formally exercised its right to purchase said stock.
Since the sale was consummated except as to the delivery of the stock and the payment of the purchase price, the petitioner did not need and did not employ a broker to sell his stock, but employed a lawyer to negotiate, and if necessary to sue, for the purchase money due him under the contract. The Interstate Company had previously given notice to the petitioner that it was exercising its option to buy this stock for $440,000, the asserted option price. The amount paid his attorney by petitioner was for services leading to the petitioner receiving $580,000 for delivering his stock to the purchaser under the option. This was $140,000 above the price at which the Company had purported to exercise its option.
There was no dispute about the title to the stock or petitioner’s duty to deliver it. The controversy was over the amount due him upon delivery thereof. The situation called for the services of an attorney to collect the proceeds of a sale of a capital asset. Petitioner’s attorney was employed after an enforceable contract of sale existed. The gain realized by petitioner upon the disposition of his stock was income collected within the meaning of Section 23(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 64 S.Ct. 249, 88 L.Ed. 171; Redmond v. Sinclair Refining Co., 204 Ga. 699(7), 51 S.E.2d 409; Crawford v. Baker, 207 Ga. 56, 61, 60 S.E. 2d 146; Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed. (1936), Sec. 25; 49 Am.Jur., Specific Performance, Sec. 131; 22 A.L.R. 1032, 1041 (c); 13 A.L.R. 920, 926(c). Cf. Heller v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 147 F.2d 376, cer-tiorari denied, 325 U.S. 868, 65 S.Ct. 1405, 89 L.Ed. 1987.
Reversed, and remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0