What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Receiver for MBank Houston, N.A. and The Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, N.A., Intervenors-Appellees, v. Suzan E. TAYLOR, d/b/a Exploration Services, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 89-2328, 89-2373.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 28, 1989.
Hayden Burns, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Robert D. Daniel, Preston T. Towber, Hirsch & Westheimer, Houston, Tex., for FDIC & DIBB.
Paula C. Offenhauser, Asst. U.S. Atty., Henry K. Oncken, U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., Margaret Hewing, Anthony J. Stein-meyer, U.S.D.J., Civ. Div., Federal Programs, Washington, D.C., for U.S.
Blake Tartt, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Tex., for FDIC.
Jeff Joyce, Ann Ryan Robertson, Dallas, Tex., Blake Tartt, Tom Cunningham, Houston, Tex., for FDIC, Receiver and the Deposit Ins. Bridge Bank.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, JOHNSON and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
CLARK, Chief Judge:
The United States of America filed this action on behalf of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The United States brought the action to enjoin Susan E. Taylor d/b/a Exploration Services (Taylor) from filing an abstract of a state court judgment which would create a lien on property owned by MBank Houston, N.A. (MBank). The district court granted a preliminary injunction and ordered Taylor to release an abstract of judgment previously filed. We affirm.
I.
On February 27, 1989 Taylor obtained a $9.6 million judgment against MBank in a Texas state district court. The state court denied MBank’s requests for an order prohibiting Taylor from filing an abstract of the judgment. On March 1, 1989, prior to exhaustion of the appellate process, Taylor filed an abstract of the judgment with the Harris County Clerk. Under Texas law, the recorded abstract of judgment created a lien on all the real property of MBank located in Harris County, Texas. Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 52.001 (Vernon 1984).
Also on March 1, 1989, the United States, on behalf of the OCC, filed this action in federal district court seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Taylor from filing an abstract of judgment. The action was based on 12 U.S.C. § 91, which prohibits the issuance of an attachment, injunction, or execution against a national bank or its property prior to a final judgment. The district court signed a temporary restraining order, but not until nine minutes after Taylor had filed the abstract of her state court judgment.
On March 21, 1989, the district court granted a preliminary injunction and ordered Taylor to withdraw the abstract of judgment previously filed. In response to the order, Taylor filed a notice in the Harris County property records announcing involuntary withdrawal of the abstract of judgment subject to appeal. On April 18, 1989, the district court ordered Taylor to completely release the abstract of judgment or be held in contempt. Taylor appeals the preliminary injunction and the order requiring release of the abstract of judgment.
II.
Taylor initially argues that the United States lacks standing to bring this action because it has not pled a sufficient governmental interest at stake. However, by pleading and affidavit, the United States has asserted that the OCC has a supervisory and regulatory interest in enforcing the safeguards mandated by 12 U.S.C. § 91. This interest stems from the OCC’s obligation to ensure the safety and soundness of the national banking system for the benefit of depositors and the general public. See 12 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The OCC’s interest provides sufficient standing for the United States to bring this action. United States v. Lemaire, 826 F.2d 387, 388 n. 1, 390 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1223, 99 L.Ed.2d 423 (1988).
Taylor next argues that 12 U.S.C. § 91 does not prohibit the filing of an abstract of judgment. Section 91 reads as follows:
All transfers of the notes, bonds, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt owing to any national banking association, or of deposits to its credit; all assignments of mortgages, sureties on real estate, or of judgments or decrees in its favor; all deposits of money, bullion, or other valuable thing for its use, or for the use of any of its shareholders or creditors; and all payments of money to either, made after the commission of an act of insolvency, or in contemplation thereof, made with a view to prevent the application of its assets in the manner prescribed by this chapter, or with a view to the preference of one creditor to another, except in payment of its circulating notes, shall be utterly null and void; and no attachment, injunction, or execution, shall be issued against such association or its property before final judgment in any suit, action, or proceeding, in any State, county, or municipal court.
12 U.S.C. § 91.
Taylor does not argue that her judgment is final. Prior to conclusion of the appellate process it is not. Lemaire, 826 F.2d at 390. Rather, Taylor asserts that section 91 applies only to seizures of assets and not to the perfection of a judgment lien by recording an abstract of judgment. Taylor relies on the fact that the last clause of section 91 expressly prohibits only attachments, injunctions, or executions, but does not mention abstracts of judgment. However, under Texas law an abstract of judgment is functionally equivalent to an attachment in that “[e]ach fixes a lien upon the title of the debtor subject to execution; which lien, in either event, is foreclosed through sale under execution.” Stewart v. Rockdale State Bank, 52 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tex.Civ.App.1932), aff'd, 124 Tex. 431, 79 S.W.2d 116 (1935). See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 61.061 (Vernon 1986) (attachment); Tex.Prop.Code Ann. § 52.001 (Vernon 1984) (abstract of judgment). An abstract of judgment is also similar to an injunction in that the lien created by an abstract of judgment prohibits a national bank from freely transferring its property. Third National Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 2314 n. 18, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that section 91 is not to be given a completely literal meaning. See Impac Ltd., 97 S.Ct. at 2312. We have not limited section 91 to the prohibitions expressly mentioned and have construed the statute to prohibit garnishment of a national bank’s property prior to a final judgment. Lemaire, 826 F.2d 387. A non-restrictive reading of section 91 is necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose, which is to “prevent creditors from obtaining preferential treatment by court action, including the securing of a judgment at the trial court level.” Lemaire, 826 F.2d at 390. In this case, the district court correctly found that by filing an abstract of judgment and obtaining a lien on MBank’s property, Taylor would secure preferential treatment over the other general creditors of MBank. Such action prior to a final judgment would violate 12 U.S.C. § 91.
Taylor asserts that if she is not allowed to file an abstract of judgment, other creditors with liens against MBank’s property will obtain a preference over her claims. However, 12 U.S.C. § 91 does not prohibit all liens against the property of a national bank, only those obtained prior to a final judgment. Even if the other creditor’s liens acquire precedence, that would not justify Taylor’s attempt to obtain preferential treatment for her lien prior to a final judgment — a form of preference prohibited by section 91.
Taylor next argues that the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction without balancing the competing claims of injury and considering the public interest. Generally, in order to secure a preliminary injunction, the movant must prove 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued; 3) the threatened injury to the mov-ant outweighs any damage the injunction might cause to the opponent; and 4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Enterprise Int’l v. Corporación Estatal Petrolera, 762 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir.1985). However, if a statutory violation is involved and the statute by necessary and inescapable inference requires in-junctive relief, the movant is not required to prove the injury and public interest factors. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1402-03, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); United States v. Hayes International Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir.1969). In this case the district court correctly concluded that the purpose of section 91 — to prevent a creditor from obtaining preferential treatment prior to a final judgment — requires injunctive relief once a statutory violation is shown. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the preliminary injunction without requiring specific proof on the injury and public interest factors.
Finally, Taylor argues that the district court erred in requiring Taylor to release her abstract of judgment. Taylor acknowledges that the district court has the equitable power to return the'parties to their last uncontested status. See Canal Authority v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir.1974). Taylor argues, however, that the court erred in finding that the last uncontested status was the situation of the parties prior to the filing of Taylor’s abstract of judgment. The record shows that Taylor’s right to file an abstract of judgment was contested from the time the state court judgment was rendered. Taylor’s action in filing the abstract remains the core of the present controversy. The finding of the district court that the last uncontested status was prior to the act of filing is not clearly erroneous.
The district court’s judgment and order are
AFFIRMED.
. MBank was declared insolvent on March 28, 1989, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver for MBank, has intervened in this case in support of the United States.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0