What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GEORG JENSEN HANDMADE SILVER, Inc., v. GEORG JENSENS SØLVSMEDIE A/S et al.
No. 6392.
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Argued April 9, 1935.
Decided June 24, 1935.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1935.
Axel V. Beeken, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Walter C. Clephane, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.
PER CURIAM.
Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District quashing service of a subpcena and the .return thereon, and dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction.
A brief statement showing the relation'ship of the parties will be helpful. The defendant Georg Jensens S{!>lvsmedie A/S (which we shall refer to as the Silver-smithy) is a Danish corporation engaged in Denmark in the manufacture of gold and silverware and jewelry. The defendant Pedersen is a Danish subject, a resident of Denmark, and an officer of the Silver-smithy. The defendant Georg Jensen & Wendel A/S (the Jensen & Wendel corporation) is also a Danish corporation located in that country and engaged in the sale of the products manufactured by the Silversmithy. The defendant Miller is also a subject and resident of Denmark and an officer of the Jensen & Wendel corporation.
In August, 1923, a contract (an exhibit to plaintiff’s bill) was entered into between the Silversmithy, Pedersen, Miller, Georg Jensen (designer of Silversmithy’s products), and Frederik Lunning. Lunning thereby secured for a definite term of years for himself and his assigns the exclusive right to sell in the United States articles manufactured by the Silversmithy. from designs made by the artist, Jensen. Lunning was to make a specified minimum volume of sales yearly, and he was to be allowed the use of all patents, trade-names, and trade-marks in connection with the business. As protection to Lunning the other parties undertook for a period of twenty years to refrain from selling the same wares in the United States, Lunning’s exclusive territory. Lunning was to sell only the products of the Silversmithy.
In January, 1925, and April, 1926, supplementary agreements were entered into whereby the 20-year term was extended and Lunning’s obligation was modified as to the volume of sales required of him. The 1926 supplementary contract also modified Lunning’s prior obligation to purchase solely from the Silversmithy.
The Jensen & Wendel corporation was not a party to any of these contracts.
In June, 1928, Lunning assigned his entire business in the United States, including his contract rights, to Georg Jensen Handmade Silver, Inc., a New York corporation, and plaintiff below (appellant here), which is engaged in the sale in the United States of the Silversmithy’s products.
Thereafter, in 1934, the present suit was initiated, the object of which, broadly-stated, is to establish the validity of the contracts above referred to as well as the assignment by Lunning to appellant, and to secure equitable relief against their alleged violation.
Since all the defendants were, as above stated, subjects and residents of Denmark and not doing business within the District, jurisdiction was sought to be obtained by, service of subpcena upon Herbert R. Kerslake (a resident of the District of Columbia), who had been designated in three trade-mark registrations as a special process agent of the Silversmithy and the Jensen & Wendel corporation under the provisions of section 3 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 (15 U. S. C. § 83, 15 USCA § 83). That section provides that every applicant for the registration of a trade-mark, or its renewal, who is not domiciled within the United States, “'shall, before the issuance of the certificate of registration * * * designate, by a notice in writing, filed in the Patent Office, some person residing within the United States on whom process or notice of proceedings affecting the right of ownership of the trade-mark of zvhich such applicant may claim to be the ozrner, brought under the provisions of this act or under other laws of the United States, may be served, with the same force and effect as if served upon the applicant or registrant in person.” (Italics ours.)
The court below, after stating that neither of the defendants, Pedersen and Miller, was designated as process agent under the Trade-Mark Act, and that while the bill claims that the corporate defendants represent the individual defendants, being as the bill expresses it each an “alter ego” of the individual defendants, held that a suit against an agent is- not a suit against , the principal; that the service provided by statute brings before the court the person who appoints the process agent, and not any third person whose agent the appointing party may be; that an agent cannot be sued upon a cause of action arising from the acts of the principal; and that it is not necessary to determine whether the “proceedings” referred to in the Trade-Mark Act were limited to proceedings in the Patent Office, because the court was without jurisdiction in the case even if the provisions of the statute were not so limited; that the agency of Kerslake is limited in its scope to proceedings “affecting the right of ownership of the trade-mark of which such applicant may claim to be the owner”; that the only matters in the bill which could be considered as coming within this provision is that part of the bill which seeks to cancel the .Silversmithy Registration No. 148928, “and the bill on its face shows that the trade-mark is no longer in force”; and that under this pretext the defendants cannot be brought before the court for purposes not within the statute.
Section 3 of the Trade-Mark Act 1905 is of limited application. Maya Corporation v. Smith (D. C. Del.) 32 F.(2d) 350; Erickson v. Macy, 231 N. Y. 86, 90, 131 N. E. 744, 16 A. L. R. 1322. The provision requiring a nonresident applicant to designate some person residing within the United States on whom process may be served is restricted to “proceedings affecting the right of ownership of the trade-mark of which such applicant may claim to be the owner.” In the present case an examination of the bill and exhibits fails to disclose that any one of the defendants claims to be the owner of any registered mark claimed by appellant, or which so nearly resembles such mark as to be likely to be mistaken therefor by the public. Section 7, Trade-Mark Act 1905, 15 U. S. C. § 87, 15 USCA § 87. There is, therefore, no basis for the contention that the defendants had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court below.
Appellant further contends that the attempted special appearance was in fact a general appearance by which the defendants submitted themselves to the jurisdictions of the court. There is no merit in this contention. In Jones v. Gould (C. C. A. 6) 149 F. 153, 156, the claim was that the defendants invoked the exercise of jurisdiction upon the merits by requiring the court to pass upon the facts of the case in order to determine the nature of the relief prayed. The court answered the contention as follows: “But we think this is a forced construction of the language employed. It was indeed necessary for the court to look into the bill and ascertain from its allegations and the prayer for relief whether the nature of the case was such as to authorize it under the provisions of section 738, Rev. St., and of section 8, Act March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 472 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 513 [see 28 USCA § 118]), to obtain jurisdiction of the defendants by publication of notice or service of process outside of its territory, for service could not be had within it. * * * The defendants, therefore, properly referred to the nature of the relief sought by the bill as a reason for denying the jurisdiction of the court over their persons, for as they were neither citizens of the state nor residents therein, personal service could not be had, and the question for the court would then be whether the nature of the case was such that the substituted service- authorized by the statute could be resorted to.” In Gage v. Riverside Trust Co. (C. C.)' 156 F. 1002, 1003, the court said: “There is no question but that, on a motion ■to vacate an -order for ■ substituted service .made under said section [section 8, act of March' 3, 1875, IS Stat. 472], the court must examine the bill in order to ascertain whether or not the case is within the statute. ' * * * Facts, which would otherwise be heard only on the merits, must necessarily ■ be considered in determining the legality of the service.”
The decree was right, and is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1