What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Wayne K. PATTERSON, Warden of the Colorado State Reformatory, and Harry C. Tinsley, Warden of the Colorado State Penitentiary, Appellants, v. Ellsworth MEDBERRY, Appellee.
No. 6594.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
May 4, 1961.
Robert G. Pierce and J. F. Brauer, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellants.
Samuel D. Menin, Denver, Colo., for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, PICKETT, Circuit Judge, and SAVAGE, District Judge.
. The Federal District Court in this case made a finding supported by substantial evidence that Medberry was indigent at the time of his appeal in 1939 and in 1958. Medberry v. Patterson, D.C., 188 F.Supp. 557, 563.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The issue presented in this habeas corpus proceeding concerns the effect of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution when a state refuses to supply an indigent defendant a free transcript of the trial proceedings necessary for an adequate review of a conviction in a murder case.
Medberry was convicted of murder in the first degree in June, 1939. He filed a motion for a new trial alleging numerous errors in the trial of his case, an appellate review of which would require a transcript of the trial proceedings. The motion was overruled, and Medberry was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was represented in the trial of the case by attorneys of his own choice who withdrew shortly after the trial. A Wisconsin attorney then appeared for Medberry. There was a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court denied a request, premised upon a showing of indigency, that a transcript of the trial proceedings be furnished at public expense. The conviction was affirmed on a record which did not contain a reporter’s transcript of the trial proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the allowance of a free transcript in such cases was within the discretion of the trial court, which discretion had not been abused. Medberry v. People, 107 Colo. 15, 108 P.2d 243. In considering the appeal, the . Colorado court assumed that at the time of his conviction, Medberry did not have sufficient funds to purchase necessary transcript.
Since 1958 Medberry has been in and out of the state and federal courts in different habeas corpus proceedings in which he sought his release or a new appellate review with an adequate transcript of the trial evidence. He first brought habeas corpus proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The writ was denied on the ground that his state remedies had not been exhausted. An original petition for a writ was then filed in the Supreme Court of Colorado, and denied without opinion. Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was also denied. Medberry v. Patterson, 358 U.S. 932, 79 S.Ct. 320, 3 L.Ed.2d 304. A second application for a writ was denied by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on the ground that the state district court had jurisdiction of the merits of Medberry’s claims. Medberry v. Patterson, D.C., 174 F. Supp. 720. At the suggestion of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, further proceedings were instituted in the state district court where Medberry had been convicted. Relief was denied there, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal. Medberry v. Patterson, Colo., 350 P.2d 571. Medberry’s perseverance culminated with a judgment in the instant case, which provided that if he applied for an appellate review of his conviction within thirty days, then, within eight months, he should be given one of these alternatives: “(1) * * * a transcript (including the testimony adduced at the trial) or other adequate means of appeal and be granted an appeal based thereon, or (2) * * * a new trial, or (3) failing both of the above, he shall be discharged from custody by the respondents.” Medberry v. Patterson, D.C., 188 F.Supp. 557, 564.
It is now settled that if state statutes provide for appeals from convictions in criminal cases, the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment require that the right shall not be limited to those who are able to afford the expense of an appeal. Smith v. Bennett, 81 S.Ct. 895; Burns v. State of Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209. As applied to this case, this means that the state, upon a timely request, must furnish an indigent defendant in a criminal case with a record on appeal which is sufficient for an adequate appellate review of his conviction. Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891. If the state has refused to furnish the free transcript to which an indigent defendant is entitled, the taking of an appeal on a record which is not sufficient for adequate appellate review does not destroy that right. When a timely demand has been made, delay in seeking relief from the denial of the right to a transcript does not defeat that right. In Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269, the defendant was convicted of murder in a Washington State Court in 1935, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He gave timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, but was unable to obtain a review because of the state’s failure to furnish a free transcript. In 1956 Eskridge instituted habeas corpus proceedings in the Supreme Court of Washington, alleging as ground for the writ, that he had not been furnished a free transcript for the purpose of an appeal from his conviction. His petition was denied without opinion. The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court was reversed upon the principle that the failure to furnish Eskridge with a transcript for appeal purposes was a denial of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
We are of the opinion that Medberry’s case falls squarely within the rule of the Griffin, Eskridge and Burns cases, and that Medberry has exhausted his remedies in the state court. In his last appeal the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the relief he sought was not available in Colorado habeas corpus proceedings. No federal question having been considered, a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was not necessary in order to exhaust state remedies. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647; White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 765, 65 S.Ct. 978, 89 L.Ed. 1348. While it is unfortunate that at this late date the State of Colorado will be confronted with releasing one convicted of murder, or with the difficult but not insurmountable task of retrying him, yet, as said in the Griffin case, it is traditional in our system of government that “constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons.”
The judgment is affirmed and the time for compliance therewith is extended to six months from the date of the issuance of the mandate herein.
. In Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. 891, the court said:
“All of the States now provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions, recognizing the importance of appeDate review to a correct adjudication of guilt or innocence. Statistics show that a substantial portion of criminal convictions are reversed by state appellate courts. Thus to deny adequate review to the poor means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts would set aside. Many States have recognized this and provided aid for convicted defendants who have a right to appeal and need a transcript but are unable to pay for it. A few have not. Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial_ a naan gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.” (Footnotes omitted.)
. In Medberry v. Patterson, 350 P.2d 571, 574, the court quoted from McKenna v. Tinsley, 141 Colo. 63, 346 P.2d 584, as follows: “ ‘It is plain that the denial of a request for a free transcript, even if timely made, * * *, does not afford a basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner neither attacks the jurisdiction of the court nor the sentence imposed upon him * * :¡: ) if
. The record is clear that no transcript of the trial proceedings was made, and one is not now available.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0