What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re Steven Thomas HOLDER, Debtor. WACHOVIA BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kathryn L. BRINGLE, Standing Trustee, Defendant-Appellee, and Steven Thomas Holder, Rayford K. Adams, Standing Trustee, Defendants.
No. 88-2993.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Oct. 2, 1989.
Decided Dec. 15, 1989.
Thomas William Waldrep, Jr. (Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, Winston Salem, N.C., on brief) for plaintiff-appellant.
Rayford Kennedy Adams, III (Tuggle, Duggins Meschan & Elrod, P.A., Greensboro, N.C., on brief) for defendant-appellee.
Before POWELL, Associate Justice (Retired), United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, and HILTON, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
The question presented is whether § 547(c)(1) of the federal bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1), is applicable to protect purchase money security interests perfected more than 10 days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral. We find § 547(c)(1) inapplicable and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On July 24, 1987, Stephen Holder (“debtor”) purchased a Dodge truck. On that day, he signed a security agreement with appellant Wachovia Bank & Trust Company in exchange for a loan to buy the truck. The necessary registration and other paperwork were delivered to the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles 19 days later, on August 12, 1987. According to N.C.Gen. Stat. § 20-58.2, August 12, 1987, is the date on which appellant perfected its security interest.
On November 2, 1987, 82 days after the debtor received possession of the vehicle, the debtor filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the federal bankruptcy code. Respondent, the Chapter 13 trustee, filed a motion in bankruptcy court to avoid appellant’s lien. The bankruptcy court granted this motion, and the district court affirmed. 94 B.R. 394. See Joint Appendix at 23, 53.
II.
Both parties agree that the secured transaction at issue here constitutes a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and, hence, is avoidable by the trustee unless it is excepted from § 547(b) by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). See Brief of Appellee at 3. Section 547(c) states, in pertinent part:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer—
(1) to the extent that such transfer was—
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given the debt- or; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor—
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was—
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the security party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives possession of such property....
If appellant’s security interest had been perfected within 10 days after the debtor took possession of the truck, 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) would have prevented the trustee from avoiding the lien. Because perfection took 19 days, however, appellant seeks exception from avoidance pursuant to the “contemporaneous exchange” exception of § 547(c)(1). It argues that the plain meaning and legislative history of § 547(c)(1) allow the “contemporaneous exchange” exception to be applied to purchase money security transactions.
Four courts of appeals have addressed this question, and all have held that § 547(c)(1) does not apply to purchase money security transactions perfected more than 10 days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral. See In re: Tressler, 771 F.2d 791 (3d Cir.1985); In re: Davis, 734 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.1984); In re: Arnett, 731 F.2d 358 (6th Cir.1984); In re: Vance, 721 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.1983). There is a strong interest in uniform interpretations of federal bankruptcy laws. See U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”); LeBoeuf v. Austrian, 240 F.2d 546, 551 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965, 77 S.Ct. 1049, 1 L.Ed.2d 914 (1957) (“The Bankruptcy Act is intended to be uniform throughout the States except to the extent that its own provisions are to the contrary, as, for instance, where local State property rights are involved.”). For the reasons stated in the opinions of the Third, Sixth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits, and to maintain a uniform federal interpretation of § 547(c), we hold that § 547(c)(1) does not apply to purchase money security transactions perfected more than 10 days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
. Section 20-58.2 of the General Statutes of North Carolina states:
If the application for notation of security interest with the required fee is delivered to the Division within 10 days after the date of the security agreement, the security interest is perfected as of that date. Otherwise, the security interest is perfected as of the date of delivery of the application to the Division.
. The four courts held that § 547(c)(1) does not apply to purchase money security transactions perfected more than 10 days "after such security interest attaches.” All four cases were decided before Congress amended § 547(c)(3)(B) in 1986, changing "that is perfected before 10 days after such security interest attaches" to "that is perfected on or before 10 days after the debtor receives possession of such property.” This amendment has no relevance to the validity of the reasoning or holdings of any of these cases.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0