What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Calvin L. RAMPTON, Appellant, v. Charles I. FOX, Director of Internal Revenue, Appellee.
No. 5313.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
July 24, 1956.
David K. Watkiss, Salt Lake City, Utah (Calvin L. Rampton, Salt Lake City, Utah, filed a brief per se), for appellant.
C. Guy Tadlock, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Charles K. Rice, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson and Harry Baum, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., and A. Pratt Kesler, U. S. Atty., for District of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for appellee.
Before HUXMAN, MURRAH and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, a practicing attorney in Salt Lake City, Utah, brought this action to restrain the Director of Internal Revenue for the District of Utah from collecting or attempting to collect a portion of his income taxes due for the years 1952 and 1953. This is an appeal from an order sustaining a motion to dismiss and dismissing the complaint.
In substance, the complaint alleged that during the year 1946, the plaintiff was employed by Joseph H. Lym, doing business as Lym Engineering Company, to prepare and present to the Department of the Interior a claim under the provisions of the War Contracts Hardship Act, 60 Stat. 902, as amended, 41 U.S.C.A. § 106 note; that Lym agreed to pay the plaintiff, as compensation for his services, 10 %■ of the amount recovered on the claim; that as a result of the efforts of plaintiff, the Department of the Interior, on October 17, 1951, made an award to Lym in the sum of $47,968.-32, of which the plaintiff was entitled to $4,796.83; that at the time of the award Lym was, and has been since, insolvent and unable to pay the fee earned by the plaintiff except from the proceeds of the claim. It was alleged that plaintiff filed a notice with the General Accounting Office of the United States of his lien against the proceeds of the claim for his services, and that Lym filed with the General Accounting Office an acknowledgment of plaintiff’s lien and an authorization and direction for the payment of plaintiff's claim from the proceeds due him.
The complaint discloses that the Bureau of Internal Revenue filed with the General Accounting Office an order directing the General Accounting Office to withhold the payment of any part of the proceeds due Lym because he owed taxes in excess of the amount of the award. The Bureau of Internal Revenue refused to recognize the plaintiff’s claim and continues to refuse to pay the amount due the plaintiff for representing Lym.
Stripped of legal verbiage, the plaintiff seeks by injunction to place his claim ahead of the tax claim of the United States in disposing of the award. He contends that he has an attorney’s lien on the proceeds of the award to the extent of his fee and there is no available remedy for the enforcement of his claim other than by injunction.
The plaintiff concedes that unless his complaint presents a case of exceptional, unusual and extraordinary circumstances, the action is barred by § 7421. Courts require that injunctive relief will be granted only in cases where such extraordinary and unusual conditions have been found to exist. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 52 S.Ct. 260, 76 L.Ed. 422; Allen v. Regents of University System of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439, 58 S.Ct. 980, 82 L.Ed. 1448; Sturgeon v. Schuster, 10 Cir., 158 F.2d 811, certiorari denied 331 U.S. 817, 67 S.Ct. 1306, 91 L.Ed. 1835; Burke v. Mingori, 10 Cir., 128 F.2d 996, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 662, 63 S.Ct. 64, 87 L.Ed. 533. In Voss v. Hinds, 10 Cir., 208 F.2d 912, 913, we said:
“It is now well settled that actions to enjoin the collection of taxes are prohibited by Section 3653, unless there are present extraordinary or unusual situations warranting the intervention of a court of equity. It has been held that neither the validity nor the constitutionality of the tax sought to be collected constitute such extraordinary circumstances as will support an injunction action to enjoin the collection thereof.” (Footnotes omitted.)
Generally, in cases granting injunctions, the extraordinary and unusual conditions warranting such relief have resulted from inequities arising out of the exaction of the tax itself. Maxwell v. Campbell, 5 Cir., 205 F.2d 461; Adler v. Nicholas, 10 Cir., 166 F.2d 674. Here plaintiff admits that the taxes, the collection of which he seeks to enjoin, are due from him. The sole purpose of his action is to enforce an offset against his taxes of the amount due from him for his services to a third person who owes the United States and to whom the United States is indebted. No cases have been cited, and we have found none, which would indicate that this was such an extraordinary and unusual circumstance as would remove the inhibition of § 7421.
Without considering the right of the United States to priority under 31 U.S.C.A. § 191, or to offset the award against the tax obligation of Lym without consideration of plaintiff’s claim, we are satisfied that the inability to dispose of a side issue such as presented here is not such an unusual and extraordinary situation as would warrant a court of equity in enjoining the collection of a tax admittedly due. Brasier v. United States, 10 Cir., 229 F.2d 176, appeal pending; Voss v. Hinds, supra; Sturgeon v. Schuster, 10 Cir., supra, certiorari denied 331 U.S. 817, 67 S.Ct. 1306, 91 L.Ed. 1835; Burke v. Mingori, supra, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 662, 63 S.Ct. 64, 87 L.Ed. 533.
Affirmed.
. The Motion to Dismiss was upon the grounds that the maintenance of the action was prohibited by § 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C.A. (formerly § 3653 of the 1939 Code), and that the complaint showed on its face that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. § 7421(a), 26 U.S.C.A., reads: “(a) Except as provided in sections 6212 (a) and (c), and 6213(a), no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0