What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, AEROSPACE DIVISION, Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO and CLC, Local Union No. 1805, Appellants.
No. 76-2268.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Heard April 4, 1977.
Decided Aug. 23, 1977.
Bernard W. Rubenstein, Baltimore, Md. (Edelman, Levy & Rubenstein, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellants.
Leonard E. Cohen, Baltimore, Md. (Jeffrey E. Rockman, Frank, Bernstein, Cona-way & Goldman, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.
Before WINTER, BUTZNER and HALL, Circuit Judges.
BUTZNER, Circuit Judge:
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.) appeals an order of the district court vacating an arbitrator’s award against Westinghouse Electric Corporation. We affirm because the arbitrator’s allowance of damages was improper.
The collective bargaining agreement permits Westinghouse to shut down for vacations, leaving the time of the shutdown to negotiations. The company is required to designate this time before January 1 of the year in which the shutdown is to occur.
On November 25,1974, Westinghouse formally notified the union that it was planning a vacation shutdown for Christmas week of 1975. This decision was based on sound business reasons, and at no time has the union questioned the company’s motives for choosing that week. After a slight delay attributable to the fault of neither party, a negotiating session was held on December 16, 1974. At that time, the union representative raised several questions which had been discussed at an earlier union meeting. Since the representative had to report to the full membership for a vote, he asked that a final decision be delayed until after the next union meeting, scheduled for January. However, because the collective bargaining agreement required that the shutdown be designated before January 1, and because other unions at the plant had already agreed to the Christmas week shutdown, Westinghouse advised the 1. B.E.W. on December 20, 1974, that the vacation shutdown would take place during Christmas week, 1975.
Dissatisfied with the company’s unilateral action, the union filed a grievance, and when the dispute remained unsettled, requested that it be submitted to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator found that the company had violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to provide sufficient time for negotiations in advance of the January 1 deadline, and he awarded each employee three additional paid vacation days.
Westinghouse then filed this action to set aside the arbitrator’s award. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the company’s request. It found that the arbitrator ignored the language of the bargaining agreement by viewing the shutdown itself, instead of just the time of the shutdown, as a matter for negotiation. It also found that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of the issues submitted to him for arbitration. Nevertheless, the court accepted his finding that the 37 days between the date of the company’s notice and the January 1 deadline was too short a period to allow for negotiations. Finally, the court concluded that since the union had failed to prove any monetary loss, the award of damages was impermissi-bly punitive.
We find no error in the district court’s acceptance of the arbitrator’s finding that the company allowed insufficient time for negotiations. Notwithstanding this violation, we agree with the district court that the arbitrator’s award of damages cannot be sustained.
In International Paper Co., Container Div., 76-1 ARB 18214 (1976), the arbitrator found that the company had violated a collective bargaining agreement by scheduling a vacation shutdown. Nonetheless, with respect to the appropriate remedy for the violation, he stated:
The Union has asked that the remedy for the breach be an award of additional vacation time with pay. I see no justification for such a remedy. Though the vacation shutdown interfered with certain valuable employee rights, no employee lost any vacation time because of the shutdown. Such an award would be punitive in nature, and there is nothing in the record to justify a punitive sanction. The Company acted in good faith, with advance notice and made a sincere effort to reach an understanding of its rights under the Agreement .... I can find no basis for calculating any monetary damages in this case or for devising an effective affirmative remedy.
Similarly, in another vacation shutdown case, Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 37 LA 134, 136 (1961), the arbitrator said:
[Tjhere is no established concept of which I am aware to the effect that contract violations involving no monetary loss to employees are to be remedied by payments based on inconvenience or designed as punitive damages. On the contrary, there are innumerable cases in which arbitrators have found violations of contract provisions without awarding any monetary compensation, when no monetary losses are shown.
As the district judge noted, these arbitration decisions embody principles that may be viewed as a part of the “industrial common law” which is incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). With respect to vacation shutdowns, compensatory damages may be awarded only when a breach of the bargaining agreement causes a monetary loss. In the absence of willful or wanton conduct, punitive damages should not be awarded. See also F. Elkouri and E. El-kouri, How Arbitration Works 356-57 (3d ed. 1973); 0. Fairweather, Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration 303-09 (1973).
In this case, the union makes no claim that the company’s conduct was willful or wanton, and the arbitrator characterized his award as “non-punitive.” With respect to the employees who took their vacation during the shutdown, the arbitrator ruled:
Employees who have reserved three days of vacation for this particular period should be granted three additional days of paid vacation in 1976.
It is clear, however, that none of these employees suffered any monetary loss. Each received the exact number of paid vacation days to which he was entitled without losing any days of work.
The entitlement to damages of the workers who chose to take their vacations before Christmas week presents a closer issue. As to them, the arbitrator ruled:
Employees who have not been deprived of vacation time because they have already taken their full vacations should not be compelled to take a three-day layoff without pay. They should therefore be paid for the three days.
At first blush this award seems plausible. However, examination of the arbitration record discloses that there is no evidence to support a finding of any compensable damage to these employees. The arbitrator ruled that the only breach of the agreement was the company’s failure to afford sufficient time for negotiations. The union did not introduce proof that this violation influenced any employee’s scheduling of his vacation. Thus, no causal relationship between the company’s violation of the agreement and the loss claimed by these employees has been shown.
The employees had about 12 months notice that the vacation shutdown was scheduled for Christmas week, 1975. Instead of insisting that all vacations coincide with the shutdown, the company accommodated its employees who desired to schedule their vacations at other times. No employee testified that he suffered any monetary loss, inconvenience or hardship. Moreover, the evidence fails to show, and it is unreasonable to assume, that even if the company had allowed sufficient time for negotiations, a shutdown could have been scheduled that would have suited the convenience of every employee.
Though nominally compensatory, the award was actually punitive. Because no provision of the contract warranted this punishment, the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
. Article XIV, section 1 of the agreement provides in part:
The Company will schedule vacation shutdowns for vacation purposes, and the time of year of the vacation shutdowns will be a matter for negotiations. The vacations will run concurrently with the vacation shutdown periods . .
The Company shall be required to designate the time of the vacation shutdown or shutdowns before January 1 of the vacation
year after such time has been made a matter for negotiations as above provided.
. The company proposed to schedule the vacation shutdown during Christmas week because the natural gas supply would be curtailed in winter; in the past, many employees had taken Christmas week off even when a shutdown was not scheduled; and the employees would use only three of their vacation days since the week already had two holidays.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0