What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Vincent B. WELCH, Appellant, v. Robert W. SHERWIN et al., Appellees.
No. 16312.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 10, 1961.
Decided Feb. 8, 1962.
Mr. John A. Kendrick, Washington, D. C. , with whom Mr. E. Tillman Stirling, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for .appellant.
Mr. Mark P. Friedlander, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Mark P. Fried-lander, Jr., and Blaine P. Friedlander, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellees.
Before Edgerton, Bazelon and Fahy, Circuit Judges.
BAZELON, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit for an attorney’s fee of $12,718.41 based upon a written contract under which defendants, members of the Creditors’ Committee of an insolvent corporation, “assume[d] responsibility for payment of plaintiff’s fees * * * regardless of any arrangement the Creditors’ Committee may have or may obtain for reimbursement.” After trial, without .jury, the District Court found that a discussion between the parties which preceded execution of the contract led the defendants to understand “that in signing the agreement they would be technically liable for attorney’s fees and costs, but that * * * if the [debtor] corporation assumed [such] liability * * * the individual creditors would not be held responsible.” Finding that the corporation had assumed but had not paid the debt, the court denied recovery under the contract. Plaintiff appeals.
We think the District Court erred. There is no allegation or finding of fraud, mistake or overreaching. And the contemporaneous oral “understanding” upon which the trial court relied contradicts the plain language of the contract.
“[W]here parties enter into a written contract, their rights must be controlled thereby, and, in the absence of fraud or mistake, all evidence of any contemporaneous oral agreement on the same subject matter, contradicting, varying, modifying, or adding to the terms of the written agreement is inadmissible. Shankland v. Mayor, etc., 5 Pet. 390, 30 U.S. 390, 8 L.Ed. 166, affirming Shankland v. Corporation of Washington, Fed.Cas.No. 12,703, 3 Cranch C.C. 328; Selden v. Myers, 20 How. 506, 61 U.S. 506, 15 L.Ed. 976; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, 75 U. S. 557, 19 L.Ed. 501. The written contract merges all previous negotiations and is presumed, in law, to express the final understanding of the parties. Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168, 24 L.Ed. 622; Van Ness v. Mayor, etc., of City of Washington, 4 Pet. 232, 29 U.S. 232, 7 L.Ed. 842, affirming Van Ness v. United States, Fed.Cas.No. 16,868, 2 Cranch C.C. 376, 2 D.C. 376; Kinney v. Mc-Nabb, 44 App.D.C. 340” [Boomhower, Inc. v. Louis L. Lavine, 151 F.Supp. 563, 567 (D.D.C.1957).]
It follows that the instant contract must be enforced as written.
The question remaining is whether the defendants are jointly liable for the entire fee or severally liable for only a “pro rata” share. We are constrained to hold that they are jointly liable for the entire fee.
The contract provides that “the members of the Committee as such assume[d] responsibility for payment,” and contains no words of severance. The general rule is “that the obligation created by the promise of several persons is joint unless the contrary is made evident.” 2 Willis-ton, Contracts § 323 (1936). Cf. Restatement, Contracts § 112 (1932). Moreover, the contract identifies the promisors as “the members of the Committee” and discloses an undivided promise to pay the entire fee. This negates the view that each member made a separate promise to pay a pro rata share. See 4 Corbin, Contracts § 925 (1951). Compare Huff v. Doerr, 206 Mo.App. 563, 228 S.W. 849 (1921), with O’Connor v. Hooper, 102 Cal. 528, 36 P. 939 (1894). Cf. Olson v. Forster, 42 Cal.App.2d 493, 109 P.2d 388 (1941). Compare Adriatic Fire Ins. Co. v. Treadwell, 108 U.S. 361, 2 S.Ct. 772, 27 L.Ed. 754 (1883). Finally, the common object of the members of the Creditors’ Committee — to secure appellant’s legal services — suggests that their liability is joint. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 926 (1951).
Whether the members of the Creditors’ Committee are entitled to contribution inter se or from other creditors, or both, *s no^ before us.
Reversed and remanded.
. The court below awarded plaintiff $505.-83, presumably as third party beneficiary of another contract in which defendants as creditors promised to pay a portion of the Committee’s expenses based upon their share of the corporation’s debts.
. Fraud is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Fed.R.Civ.P. rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C.A.
Counsel admitted that defendants are experienced businessmen, well aware of the importance of written agreements. Compare Hill v. Marston, 65 App.D.C. 250, 82 F.2d 856 (1936).
. The terms joint, several, and joint and several have occasionally been confused. Co-promisors are liable (1) jointly if all of them have promised the entire performance; or (2) severally if they have promised separate performances. At common law joint promisors had to be joined in a single suit, but any one of them could be compelled to satisfy the entire judgment. 4 Corbin, Contracts §§ 920, 929 (1951). To obviate the necessity for joining all the promisors, and to avoid problems of survivorship, release of co-obligors, and the like, the promisee obtained the promisors’ agreement to be liable jointly and severally; i. e., collectively and individually liable for the whole performance.
In this jurisdiction, statutes authorize separate suits against joint promisors even if they have not agreed to be liable jointly and severally. D.C.Code §§ 13-401, 16-901 (1961). Those statutes do not determine, of course, whether each co-promisor has agreed to be liable for the entire performance or only for a part thereof. That determination is governed by the terms of the contract.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 3