What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony Ferguson KAISER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 78-1796.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Submitted May 17, 1979.
Decided June 4, 1979.
Joseph F. Dolan, U. S. Atty. and Nancy E. Rice, Asst. U. S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Robert Bruce Miller of Miller & Gray, P.C., Boulder, Colo., for defendant-appellant.
Before McWILLIAMS, McKAY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
Anthony Kaiser was convicted by a jury of distributing a controlled substance, namely amphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In the indictment, amphetamine was described as a Schedule III controlled substance. This was an error, be it typographical or otherwise, as amphetamine is a Schedule II controlled substance, rather than Schedule III.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the Government had failed to show that amphetamine was a Schedule III controlled substance, as stated in the indictment. This motion was denied. Thereafter, counsel sought, but was denied, an instruction to the effect that Kaiser should be found not guilty unless the Government proved that amphetamine was a Schedule III controlled substance.
On appeal the only matter urged as ground for reversal relates to the fact that the indictment mistakenly listed amphetamine as a Schedule III controlled substance, whereas in fact it is a Schedule II controlled substance. Such does not warrant a reversal.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(3) provides as follows: Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.
Describing amphetamine as a Schedule III controlled substance, when actually it is a Schedule II controlled substance, is a type of “error” contemplated by Rule 7(c)(3). Such error, under the rule, is not ground for reversal of a conviction on appeal unless the defendant was misled to his prejudice. There is nothing in the present record to indicate that Kaiser was misled to his prejudice. Kaiser, along with three others, was charged with unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally distributing amphetamine on or about August 24, 1977, in Denver, Colorado in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, Kaiser was clearly apprised of the transaction relied on by the Government. Had Kaiser been acquitted, he had adequate protection against being tried again on the same transaction. Of course, Kaiser was not acquitted, but was convicted, and now appeals that conviction.
In support of our disposition of the matter, see United States v. Walker, 557 F.2d 741, at 746 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Malicoate, 531 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1975); and Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973).
Judgment affirmed.
Amphetamine was by statute listed as a Schedule III controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 812. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 811, amphetamine was reclassified as a Schedule II controlled substance. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0