What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
McNABB v. VIRGINIAN RY. CO.
No. 3226.
■ Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 12, 1932.
Affirmed.
A. A. Lilly, of Charleston, W. Va. (Lilly, Lilly & Warwick and It. G. Lilly, all of Charleston, W. Va., on the brief), for appellant.
John R. Pendleton, of Princeton, W. Va. (Harry C. Ellett, of Princeton, W. Va., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT and SOPER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Willie McNabb, appellant, brought this action of trespass on the ease against the Virginian Railway Company, a corporation, appellee, and against H. Clay Jacobs and R. C. Lambert, in the circuit court of Payette county, W. Va. The cause was subsequently removed to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia) and the defendants H. Clay Jacobs and R. C. Lambert were dismissed as defendants, and, the defendant, Virginian Railway Company, having pleaded not guilty, the issue was tried before a jury in May, 1931.
After the conclusion of the evidence for both the plaintiff and the defendant, the court, upon motion of the defendant, directed the jury to find for the defendant, which was accordingly done. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict of the jury, and to grant him a new'trial, which motion the court overruled. Prom that judgment this appeal is taken.
The appellant, who was plaintiff below, was struck by a locomotive of the railway company at a road crossing near Deep-water, Payette county, W. Va. There is evidence on behalf of the railway company that the headlight was burning on the locomotive and that the crossing signals were duly given. Plaintiff and a witness testified that the light was not burning. Assuming, that the evidence was sufficient do carry the ease to the jury on the issue of negligence, we think that plaintiff was unquestionably barred of recovery by his contributory negligence and that verdict was properly directed against him. We think it clear in the light of the evidence that, if plaintiff had looked before stepping in front of the approaching locomotive, he could unquestionably have seen it in timé to have avoided being struck, and his injury is therefore to be attributed to his own negligence in stepping in front of the locomotive without taking' proper precautions. A number of witnesseá on both sides) who had no better view than the plaintiff; testified that they saw the approaching locomotive. In view of the physical conditions disclosed by the other evidence, his testimony that he looked but failed to see>-the locomotive approaching is without probative force and entirely insufficient to form the basis of a verdict in his behalf.
Had the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, it would have been the duty of the trial judge in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to set it aside. It was therefore proper for him to direct a verdict for the defendant. South Carolina Asparagus Growers’ Association v. Southern Railway Co. (C. C. A.) 46 F.(2d) 452, 453, and cases there cited; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U. S. 472, 46 S. Ct. 564, 70 L. Ed. 1041; Hetzel v. Kemper, 102 W. Va. 567, 135 S. E. 667.
This rule applies not only in cases where the evidence is undisputed, but also in eases where the evidence is só conclusive in character that reasonable men would not reach different conclusions in regard thereto. In Ellerson v. Grove, 44 F.(2d) 493, 496, this court holds as follows:
“The general rule as to direction of verdicts is set out in the case of Marion County Commissioners v. Clark, 94 U. S. 284, 24 L. Ed. 59, as follows: ‘Decided cases may be found where it is held that, if there is a scintilla, of evidence in support of a ease, the judge is bound to leave it to the jury; but the modern decisions have established a more reasonable rule; to wit, that, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is or may be in every ease a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the burden of proof is imposed.’ * * *
“See also Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 307, 17 S. Ct. 117, 41 L. Ed. 442; Patton v. Southern Ry. Co. (C. C. A.) Ill P. 712; Woodward et al. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.) 145 P. 577. In the last-mentioned ease it is said that it is the duty of a court to direct a verdict at the close of the evidence in two classes of cases: (1) That class in which the evidence is' undisputed; and (2) that class in which the evidence is conflicting but is of so conclusive a character that the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion will set aside the verdict in opposition to it. See also numerous cases cited in that opinion.”
The judgment of the court below-is accordingly affirmed.- -

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0