What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
O. Merlene KOVACS, and William Kovacs, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SUN VALLEY CO., INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 73-3079.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
June 24, 1974.
John K. Carmack of Roberts, Carmack & Johnson, Los Angeles, Cal., George A. Greenfield of McClenahan & Greenfield, Boise, Idaho, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Carl P. Burke of Elam, Burke, Jeppesen, Evans & Boyd, Boise, Idaho, for defendant-appellee.
Before ELY, HUFSTEDLER and CHOY, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Mrs. 0. Merlene Kovacs slipped on a piece of ice and fell while descending an exterior stairway of a restaurant in Sun Valley, Idaho, owned by Sun Valley Co., Inc. She sued Sun Valley Co., Inc. in the district court for the District of Idaho for injuries she sustained from the fall, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship.
She appeals from a judgment entered against her after a jury trial. We affirm.
Mrs. Kovacs alleges three errors requiring reversal. First, she contends the district court erred in refusing to allow her to introduce evidence that, subsequent to her accident, Sun Valley constructed handrails for the stairway in question. The district court correctly applied Idaho law in denying Mrs. Kovacs’ request for admission of this evidence. Generally, evidence of subsequent repairs is not admissible, reflecting a strong public policy against discouraging safety precautions. Carter Packing Co. v. Pioneer Irrigation District, 91 Idaho 701, 429 P.2d 433 (1967); Alsup v. Saratoga Hotel, 71 Idaho 229, 229 P.2d 985 (1951).
Idaho recognizés only one exception to this general rule: where the question of defendant’s duty to make the premises safe is at issue. Otts v. Grough, 90 Idaho 124, 409 P.2d 95 (1955); Zenier v. Spokane International Railroad Co., 78 Idaho 196, 300 P.2d 494 (1956) . Here, however, Sun Valley’s duty as an owner and occupier of land is not at issue.
Appellant urges this court to consider the law of states other than Idaho for the purpose of establishing an exception to the general exclusionary rule beyond the narrow exception recognized by the Idaho courts. This we refuse to do. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) required that the district court apply the rules of evidence of the courts of general jurisdiction of the State of Idaho. It is not the province of a federal court to look beyond the designated state for the purpose of predicting changes which may or may not occur in that state’s law. Furthermore, it is entirely appropriate to defer to the judgment of the Idaho District Court judge who is familiar with the local law. Klingebiel v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 494 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1974); Hurst v. Dare to Be Great, Inc., 474 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1973).
Appellant’s second contention is that there was no basis in fact for the instruction on contributory negligence given by the trial court. We disagree. The record reveals sufficient facts upon which the trial court could properly base that instruction. Lord Baltimore Filling Stations v. Miller, 71 App.D.C. 376, 110 F.2d 698 (1940); Schultz & Lindsay Construction Co. v. Erickson, 352 F.2d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 1965); Fowler v. Uezzell, 94 Idaho 951, 500 P.2d 852 (1972).
Finally, appellant contends Instruction 20 in using the terms “hidden dangers” and “pitfalls” created the feeling that the duty owed to invitees by the proprietor of a business is very thin and almost nonexistent. Instruction 20 is a correct statement of the applicable Idaho law. Alsup v. Saratoga Hotel, 71 Idaho 229, 236, 229 P.2d 985, 989-990 (1951).
Affirmed.
. The proprietor of a business is liable only for the injuries to his business invitees which result from his negligence, or the negligence of his employees which occurs within the scope of their employment. He has a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in reasonably safe condition for customers and others invited expressly or impliedly to enter.
The duty of a proprietor to keep the premises safe for invitees applies to defects or conditions which are in the nature of hidden dangers; pitfalls and the like, and which are not known to the invitee and would not be observed by the exercise of ordinary care. The invitee with the usual and ordinary human senses is expected by the law to observe and act upon all normal, obvious and ordinary risks attendant from the use of the premises.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 2