What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
DORSEY v. PEAK, Superintendent of the Washington Asylum and Jail.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted February 7, 1928.
Decided March 5, 1928.
No. 4650.
Automobiles <§=>359 — Sixty-day jail sentence on default in payment of fine for changing name on motor vehicle operator’s permit held authorized (Traffic Act 1925, §§ 4, 6 [b]; 43 St. 1119).
In prosecution for changing name of .licensee on motor vehicle operator’s permit, sentence to pay fine of $275 and in default to be committed to jail for 60 days held not in excess of court’s jurisdiction, under Traffic Act 1925, §§ 4, 6 (b), 43 Stat. 1119 notwithstanding regulation promulgated under statute limited imprisonment without fine, or in addition to fine, to 10 days, in view of sections 7, 7 (e), and 8.
Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Habeas corpus proceeding by Theodore R. Dorsey against William L. Peak, Superintendent of the Washington Asylum and Jail. Prom a judgment dismissing the petition, petitioner appeals.
Affirmed.
C. F. Johnson and J. S. Phelan, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
W. W. Bride and E. W. Thomas, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, ROBB, Associate Justice, and BLAND, Judge of United States Court of Customs Appeals.
ROBB, Associate Justice.
Appeal from a judgment in the Supreme Court of the District dismissing a petition for habeas corpus.
Dorsey, petitioner below, appellant here, pleaded guilty in the police court of the District to a charge of changing the name of a licensee appearing on a motor vehicle operator’s permit, whereupon he was adjudged guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $275, and in default to be committed to the Washington Asylum and Jail for 60 days. He failed to pay the fine, and was committed.
It is the contention of appellant that, under the provisions of the Traffic Act of 1925 (43 Stat. 1119), the sentence imposed was in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. That is the sole question involved in this appeal. See Posey v. Zinkham, 47 App. D. C. 293; Shore v. Splain, 49 App. D. C. 6, 258 F. 150.
Under section 6 (b) of the Traffic Act (43 Stat. 1121) there is a grant of authority “to make reasonable regulations with respect to * • * the issuance and revocation of operators’ permits, and such other regulations with respect to the control of traffic in the District not in conflict with any law of the United States as are deemed advisable, which regulations shall remain in force until revoked by the director with the approval of the commissioners,” and to prescribe “reasonable penalties of fine, or imprisonment not to exceed ten days in lieu of or in addition to any fine, for the violation of any such regulation.” In pursuance of this grant of authority, there was promulgated the following regulation:
“Article 6, Section 7, Operators’ Permits. (e) Any person who obtains or attempts to obtain a motor vehicle operator’s permit by misrepresentation, or who permits a motor vehicle operator’s permit to be used by any person other than the one to whom issued, or who changes the name of the licensee appearing on any such permit, or who makes any other alteration on such permit, shall be fined not less than $25, nor more than $300, or imprisonment not to exceed 10 days.”
Section 4 of the Traffic Act (43 Stat. 1120) provides, inter alia, that “in all eases' where the said court [police court] shall impose a fine it may, in default of the payment of the fine imposed, commit the defendant for such a term as the court thinks right and proper, not to exceed one year.”
It is appellant’s contention that his commitment was “in lieu of or in addition to” his fine, and therefore that xuxder the provisions of section 6 (b) the police court was without authority to sentence him to imprisonment in excess of 10 days.
We are unable to accept this view. Under the express provisions of section 4, already quoted, the court was granted authority to commit a defendant for a term not to exceed one year “in default of the payment of the fine imposed.” It is plain that the statute distinguishes between the,failure of a defendant to pay his fine (that is, a default in its payment) and a case where he has been sentenced “in lieu of or in addition to any fine.” In other wox-ds, whexe a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment without the option of paying a fine (that is, in lieu of the fine), he may not be sentenced in excess of 10 days, or, if fined and also sentenced to imprisonment, the additional sentence of imprisonment may not be in excess of ten days.
Other sections, of the Traffic Act add cogency to this view. Thus, under section 7 (43 Stat. 1121), relating to “Operators’ Permits,” each operator’s permit must state the name and address of the holder, contain his signature, and space for the notation of convictions for violations of the traffic laws. The holder of such a permit is required to have it in his immediate possession when operating a motor vehicle and exhibit the same to any police officer when demand is made therefor. Failure to comply with this particular provision is made an offense. Section 7 (e) reads as follows: “No individual shall operate a motor vehicle in the District, except as provided in section 8, without having first obtained an operator’s permit issued under the provisions of this act. Any individual violating any provision of this subdivision shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.” It is apparent that any one operating a motor vehicle in virtue of a fictitious permit would be liable to the penalties imposed by this subdivision; that is, to a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
The regulations in question, therefore, supplemented the express provisions of the statute and are reasonable. See Smallwood v. District of Columbia, 57 App. D. C. 58, 17 F.(2d) 210; District of Columbia v. Wheeler, 57 App. D. C. 106, 17 F.(2d) 953.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1