What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GAMBOA, RODRIGUEZ, RIVERA & CO., Inc., v. IMPERIAL SUGAR CO.
No. 9995.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 25, 1942.
L. S. Julian, of Miami, Fla., and Alfred C. B. McNevin, of New York City, for appellant.
John P. Bullington, of Houston, Tex., and James A. Dixon, of Miami, Fla., for appellee.
Before SIBLEY, HOLMES, and McCORD, Circuit Judges.
McCORD, Circuit Judge.
In September, 1938, Imperial Sugar Company, through Lamborn & Company, Inc., as broker, entered into a written contract for the purchase of 10,000 long tons of Philippine centrifugal sugar from Gamboa, Rodriguez, Rivera & Co., Inc. The contract was styled, “Raw Sugar Contract. Philippines — Cost, Insurance and Freight”, and provided for shipment of the sugar from the Philippine Islands in equal monthly installments of 1,000 tons each, commencing in January and ending in October, 1939, destination of the shipments to be Galveston, Texas.
In 1939 in accordance with its contract Gamboa shipped to Imperial 1,000 tons of sugar on board the S/S “Havelland” three parcels of 1,000 tons each on board the S/S “Friesland”, and 1,000 tons on board the S/S “Wasgenwald”. All three ships were owned and operated by the Hamburg-American Line — North German Lloyd. Insurance was procured and invoices were prepared by Gamboa on each of the shipments, and from the invoice price there was deducted the cost of freight which was to ,be paid by Imperial at destination. Gamboa then drew drafts against Imperial for the shipments, and attached to the drafts the invoices, the on-board bills of lading indorsed in blank, and the insurance policies. The drafts and accompanying papers were in due course presented to Imperial.
The voyages of the three vessels commenced, but with the outbreak of the war between England and Germany the “Havel-land” put in at the neutral port of Punta Arenas, Costa Rica, and later proceeded to Manzanillo, Mexico; the “Friesland” proceeded to Paita, Peru, and remained there; and the “Wasgenwald” ended its voyage at Sabang, Sumatra. Hamburg thereupon notified Gamboa and Imperial that the vessels would not complete the agreed voyage and offered to surrender the cargoes upon payment of the full freight to the agreed destination. Prior to receipt of notice of the frustration of the voyages Imperial had accepted the drafts and accompanying papers on the four 1,000 ton lots of sugar on the “Havelland” and “Friesland”, and it surrendered the bills of lading and under protest paid the freight on these shipments, amounting to $6,750.00 on the “Havelland” and $20,648.25 on the “Friesland”. Imperial refused to accept the draft and papers on the “Wasgenwald” shipment, and they were returned to Gamboa’s agent. Gamboa thereupon surrendered the bill of lading to Hamburg and paid the freight amounting to $5,143.50. Imperial thereafter agreed to accept the draft and accompanying documents on the “Wasgenwald” shipment, and it then paid Gamboa in accordance with an amended invoice which included the freight which Gamboa had paid to Hamburg. Imperial then at an expense of more than $65,000.00 made arrangements for and secured transshipment of the five 1,000 ton parcels of sugar which had been stranded in three foreign ports.
Imperial and Gamboa on the 20th and 30th days of December, 1939, respectively, filed libels against Hamburg in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida, in Admiralty, and by writs of foreign attachment levied upon Hamburg’s S/S “Auraca” which was found within the jurisdiction of the court. The libellants sought to recover, among other things, the freight paid for the agreed voyages which had not been completed. Hamburg filed answers to the libels and in September, 1940, paid different sums to Imperial and Gamboa in settlement of various claims asserted in their respective libels. It further conceded liability for the sum of $32,541.75, the total amount of freight received by it for the voyages which were not completed. Because of conflicting claims of Imperial and Gamboa respecting this sum, Hamburg paid the freight money into the registry of the district court, it “being agreed by separate stipulations in writing entered into by and between Gamboa, Imperial, and Hamburg filed in said District Court, that the respective rights of said Gamboa and Imperial to all or any part of said sum might be litigated and determined or otherwise adjusted as they might agree, as upon a petition for the disposition of remnants and surpluses in the possession of the District Court.” Thereafter by agreement of counsel and on approval of the court the libels of Imperial and Gamboa were consolidated and were treated as asserting their respective claims to the sum of $32,541.75 on deposit in the registry of the court. A trial was then had, and the court, after hearing evidence and argument of counsel made findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment awarding the full amount of the freight money to Imperial.
The parties agree that the sugar purchase contract was in substance and effect a “c. i. f. contract”, and that the price quoted in the contract included the cost of the sugar, the cost of insurance, and freight charges to the agreed destination. It is stipulated that as between Gamboa and Imperial the contract was fully performed by both parties.
Appellant contends that since the price under the contract included freight, it was entitled to the refunded freight charges even though these charges were paid by Imperial; and that in paying the freight on the shipments Imperial was merely acting as Gamboa’s agent. Alleging that it is entitled to all freight advantages, appellant further contends that frustration of the voyages resulted in carriage of the sugar “free of charge”; that this free carriage resulted in an unexpected windfall which its “shrewd freight contract has won from the ocean carrier”; and that the court below erred in awarding the freight money or any part of it to Imperial.
Appellant’s position will not be sustained. Gamboa has, in fact, realized every cent it expected to receive or to which it was entitled under the contract. It has been paid for the sugar and the insurance, and has been relieved of its freight obligations-When it shipped the sugar, and forwarded the proper documents to Imperial, its obligations under the contract were at an end. From that moment the buyer alone stood to lose on the ventures. Thé buyer, Imperial, was the one who was interested in receiving the sugar at its agreed destination, and when the voyages were broken up, it paid the freight charges, and it with the insurance carriers suffered the expense, risk, and inconvenience incident to the transshipment of the undelivered cargoes. No cases are cited, and we have found none dealing with a situation of this kind, but we think that the principles of fair play and justice sustain the judgment awarding the contested sum to Imperial.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0