What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
ARIZONA v. CALIFORNIA et al.
No. 10,
Original.
Argued December 8, 1955.
Decided December 12, 1955.
George I. Haight served as Special Master by appointment of the Court, 347 U. S. 986, and filed the report on which this ruling was made. After his death, Simon H. Rifkind was appointed Special Master, 350 U. S. 812.
John P. Frank and Ernest W. McFarland argued the cause for the State of Arizona, complainant. On the brief were Robert Morrison, Attorney General, John H. Moeur, Mr. Frank, John Geoffrey Will, Burr Sutter, Perry Ling and Theodore Kiendl.
Northcutt Ely, Assistant Attorney General of California, argued the cause for defendants. On the brief were Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Mr. Ely, Robert L. McCarty, Prentiss Moore and Gilbert F. Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, and Charles E. Corker, Howard I. Friedman, Burton J. Gindler, James B. Mc-Kenney, John R. Alexander and George Brody, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California, Francis E. Jenney for the Palo Verde Irrigation District, Harry W. Horton and R. L. Knox, Jr. for the Imperial Irrigation District, Earl Redwine for the Coachella Valley County Water District, James H. Howard, Charles C. Cooper, Jr., Donald M. Keith, Alan Patten and Frank P. Doherty for the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, Roger Arnebergh for the City of Los Angeles, and T. B. Cosgrove for the City of San Diego, defendants.
W. T. Mathews, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Nevada, Intervener. With him on the brief were Harvey Dickerson, Attorney General, and Wm. J. Kane, Special Assistant Attorney General.
Hatfield Chilson, Special Assistant Attorney General of Colorado, argued the cause for the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. On the brief were Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, and Mr. Chilson for the State of Colorado, Richard Robinson, Attorney General, and Fred E. Wilson for the State of New Mexico, E. R. Callister, Attorney General, and Dennis McCarthy, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Utah, and George F. Guy, Attorney General, for the State of Wyoming.
Per Curiam.
The motion of California to join the States of Colorado and Wyoming as parties to this cause is denied. The motion to join Utah and New Mexico as parties is granted only to the extent of their interest in Lower Basin waters.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Burton, and Mr. Justice Harlan would grant the motion.
The Chief Justice did not participate in this proceeding.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 2