What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
COOK et al. v. HUDSON et al.
No. 75-503.
Argued November 1, 1976
Decided December 7, 1976
George Colvin Cochran argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Will A. Hickman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was S. T. Rayburn
Stephen J. Poliak, John Townsend Rich, Franklin D. Kramer, and David Rubin filed a brief for the National Education Assn. as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Per Curiam.
Certiorari was granted to consider the question presented: whether, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a Mississippi public school board may terminate the employment of teachers sending their children not to public schools, but to a private racially segregated school. However, since the grant of certiorari, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 (1976), held that 42 U. S. C. § 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonseetarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes. Moreover, a Mississippi statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-59 (Supp., 1976), enacted in 1974 after the school board action here complained of, prohibits school boards “from denying employment or reemployment to any person . . . for the single reason that any eligible child of such person does not attend the school system in which such [person] is employed.” Though § 37-9-59 was cited in the record at the time of granting the writ, examination of the merits on oral argument in light of Runyon v. McCrary and § 37-9-59 satisfies us that the grant was improvident. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. Cf. Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70 (1955).

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 1