What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES v. BAKER.
No. 4249.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 9, 1951.
Russell Chapin, Washington, D. C. (Holmes Baldridge, Asst. Atty. Gen., D. Vance Swann, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Scott M. Matheson, U. S. Atty., O. K. Clay, Ass(. U. S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for appellant.
Franklin Riter, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and HUXMAN and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
PICKETT, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment of the court below in favor of Sara Ann Baker against the United States for the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy isstted on the life of Ansel F. Baker.
The insured, while in the military service of the United States, was issued a $10,000 policy of National Service Life Insurance effective October 10, 1944, and his mother, the plaintiff in this action, was designated as the principal beneficiary. The policy was in effect from the date of issuance to April 9, 1946. No premiums were paid thereafter and the policy lapsed on that date. The insured died on'December 12, 1947, without having filed an application for waiver of premiums.
The plaintiff filed a claim for waiver of premiums with the Veterans’ Administration on January 22, 1948. The Disability Insurance Claims Division and 'the Boa.rd of Veterans’ Appeals of the Veterans’ Administration denied the plaintiff's claim. The decision was based on findings that the insured had not made claim for waiver of premiums for total disability within one year after the discontinuance of the payment of premiums, and under the provisions of the Act the Administrator could “not grant waiver of any premiums be'coming due more than one year prior to the receipt * * * of the application.” No claim was made to the Veterans’ Administration nor is it made here 'that the insured’s failure to timely file a -claim for waiver of, premiums was due to circumstances beyond his control. It is conceded that at the time of his death, the insured had lost his right to apply for and obtain a waiver of premiums.
The plaintiff alleged in her amended complaint that the insured was totally and permanently disabled from before April 9, 1946, until the -date of his death because of his affliction with Hodgkin’s disease. This question was submitted to the jury whose verdict was in favor of the plaintiff. The sole question presented is whether a beneficiary has the right to claim' a waiver of premiums which right was not available to the insured at the time of his death. The right to such waiver is provided for in Title 38 U.S.C.A. § 802(n). The last proviso of this section states that in case of death of the insured without having filed an application for waiver, the beneficiary may file the application “with evidence of the insured’s right to waiver under this section.” The application by the beneficiary must be made within one year after August 1, 1946, or the date of death of the insured, whichever is the later. The plaintiff contends that the 4th proviso should be construed without reference to the waiver provisions of the first three provisos, or in other words that the statute gives a beneficiary the right to file an application for premium waiver within one year after the death of the insured re-? gardless of the time the policy lapsed. We do not believe that this is a reasonable construction and such a construction would be in direct conflict with express words in the proviso. The precise question was before the Fifth Circuit in Scott v. United States, 189 F.2d 863, 864, where it was said: “While the purpose of the 1946 Insurance Act was to liberalize the former Act, it was not intended to give the beneficiary greater rights than the insured had with respect to the waiver of premiums. The intention was merely to give the beneficiary more time within which to assert the rights which the insured had.” We agree with this interpretation. See also, Hendricks v. United States, D.C.E.D.Tenn., 94 F.Supp. 142.
Judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the United States.
. 38 U.S.C.A. § S02(n) : “Upon application by the insured and under such regulations as the Administrator may promulgate, payment of premiums on such insurance may be waived during the continuous total disability of the insured, which continues or has continued for six or more consecutivo months, if such disability commenced (1) subsequent to the date of his application for insurance, (2) while the insurance was in force under premium-paying conditions, and (3) prior to the insured’s sixtieth birthday: Provided, That upon application made within one year after August 1, 1946 the Administrator shall grant waiver of any premium becoming due not more than five years prior to August 1, 1946 which may be waived under the foregoing provisions of this subsection: Provided further, That the Administrator, upon any application made subsequent to one year after August 1, 1946, shall not grant waiver of any premium becoming due more than one year prior to the receipt in the Veterans’ Administration of application for the same, except as hereinafter provided. Any premiums paid for months during which waiver is effective shall be refunded. The Administrator shall provide by regulations for examination or re-examination of an insured claiming benefits under this subsection, and may deny benefits for failure to cooperate. In the event that it is found that an insured is no longer totally disabled, the waiver of premiums shall cease as of the date of such finding and the policy of insurance may be continued by payment of premiums as provided in said policy: Provided further, That in any case in which the Administrator finds that the insured’s failure to make timely application for waiver of premiums or his failure to submit satisfactory evidence of the existence or continuance of total disability was due to circumstances beyond his control, the Administrator may grant waiver or continuanee of waiver of premiums: And provided further, That in the event of death of the insured Without filing application for waiver, the beneficiary, within one year after the death of the insured or August 1, 1946, whichever be the later, or, if tile beneficiary be insane or a minor, within one year after removal of such legal disability, may file application for waiver with evidence of the insured’s right to waiver under this section Premium rates shall be calculated without charge for the cost of the waiver of premiums herein provided and no deduction from benefits otherwise payable shall be made on account thereof.”

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officialss"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1