What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
CADICK MILLING CO. v. HAUCK MILLING CO.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Submitted March 16, 1927.
Decided April 4, 1927.
No. 1934.
Trade-marks and trade-names and unfair competition <©=>93(3) — Unsupported testimony, of two> men regarding events occurring more than 60 years previously held insufficient to establish priority in use of trade-mark.
Unsupported! testimony of two old men as to events occurring more than 60 years previously held insufficient to establish priority in use of word “Snowflake” as trade-mark for flour.
Appeal from Decision of Commissioner of Patents.
Trade-mark interference proceeding between the Cadick Milling Company and the Hauek Milling Company. From a decision of the Commissioner of Patents, awarding priority to the latter, the former appeals. Affirmed.
Jas. Atkins, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
H. A. Toulmin and H. A. Toulmin, Jr., both of Dayton, Ohio, for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
ROBB, Associate Justice.
Appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in a trade-mark interference proceeding, awarding priority of adoption and use of the word “Snowflake,” as a trade-mark for wheat flour, to the Hauek Milling Company, appellee here.
The Hauek Milling Company has conclusively established adoption and use of this mark since 1866. Supplementing the oral testimony, it produced contemporaneous documentary evidence of a convincing character. This documentary evidence, which includes a sales book kept when the business was founded by appellee’s predecessor in title, is not challenged.
Appellant relies solely upon the testimony of two witnesses to establish an earlier date of adoption and use of this mark. One of these witnesses, about 90 years of age when he testified, stated that he was bom and always lived at Grandview, Ind., and remembered the erection of a flour mill there by a Mr. Wilbem. Asked when that was, he replied : “I think it was in 1858; possibly about that time.” He had never worked in the mill. He then was asked what kinds of flour the mill sold, and stated: “Well, I used the flour. I bought what they called Snow Flake put up in cotton sacks, mostly in barrels. Before that they retailed in cotton sacks here in the country, 50 pounds to a sack.” He was also asked, “When did you begin to buy this flour?” and his answer was: “Soon as they made it. I couldn’t give any date. I think in the fall of ’58.' I couldn’t give the day of the month.” He subsequently stated that the mill was run by Mr. Wilbem until his death. Asked when that was, he replied: “That was in 1882 or ’83. I don’t remember the date.” On cross-examination, he again was asked whether the mill made any other brands of flour, and answered: “I think they did, but I can’t remember, for I didn’t use it.”
Appellant’s other witness, Henry Riley, was 70 years of age when he testified, and also a resident of Grandview, having moved there in 1860. He testified that he went to work in the Wilbem mill in 1864, and that the mill then was making several brands of flour, including . “Snow Flake.” He was connected with the mill until 1883, the date when he thought the sale to Cadick took place.
Appellant introduced documentary evidence of sales from 1900 to the date when the testimony was. taken, but there was no attempt either to introduce such evidence as to sales prior to that date or to account for the failure to do so. The evidence shows that the original mill was standing, and that, for aught that appeared, the original Wilbern books were in existence and available.
We agree with the Commissioner that the unsupported testimony of these two old men, as to events occurring more than 60 years previously, is not sufficient to establish priority. Gaines & Co. v. Rock Spring Distilling Co. (C. C. A.) 226 F. 531, 544; American Stove Co. v. Detroit Stove Works, 31 App. D. C. 304; Barbed Wire Patent Case, 143 U. S. 275, 12 S. Ct. 443, 450, 36 L. Ed. 154; Eibel Co. v. Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45, 60, 43 S. Ct. 322, 67 L. Ed. 523. In the Gaines Case,, the court said of the testimony of witnesses as to prior use of the mark involved:
“There is considerable volume of this testimony, but it consists almost wholly of unaided recollections of dates 40 years old, and it is that class of testimony which, by decisions familiar in patent cases, the Supreme Court has refused to accept. True, there is in a, trade-mark case no initial presumption of validity to be overcome; but the principles for determining the evidential value of testimony cannot differ according to the subject-matter of the case.”
The decision is right and is affirmed.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1