What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Curtis Wood ALLEN, Appellant, v. Dr. P. J. CICCONE, Director, United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Appellee.
No. 20066.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
May 1, 1970.
Curtis Wood Allen, pro se.
Brief of appellee was filed by Bert C. Hurn, U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., and Frederick O. Griffin, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty.
Before BLACKMUN, MEHAFFY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
BLACKMUN, Circuit Judge.
Curtis Wood Allen, an inmate of the United States Medical Center at Springfield, Missouri, appeals from Judge Hunter’s denial of his application for federal habeas relief. The district court, after observing that “it seems clearly apparent from the record that petitioner’s contentions are without merit * * nevertheless refrained from certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith and granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Allen does not claim that his federal sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the sentencing court was without jurisdiction'to impose the sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, which are the usual grounds and those mentioned in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He claims instead that, despite the validity of his federal sentence, the time for service of that sentence has not yet arrived and that, as a consequence, his federal incarceration is premature and unlawful.
The facts on which Allen bases his claim were not controverted. Thus there was no necessity for a hearing in the district court and none was held. Howard v. United States, 274 F.2d 100, 104 (8 Cir.1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 832, 80 S.Ct. 1604, 4 L.Ed.2d 1525.
In 1958, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Allen, upon his plea of not guilty, was convicted by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113. Judge Swinford on May 9, 1958, imposed a sentence of 15 years. Allen at that time, however, was in the midst of serving an indeterminate sentence in the Ohio state penitentiary. His attendance at his federal trial presumably was with the consent of the Ohio authorities or pursuant to an appropriate writ. Judge Swinford therefore provided in his judgment that the federal sentence was “to begin at the expiration of the present sentence now being served at the Ohio State Penitentiary”. Allen was returned to the Ohio prison.
On August 12, 1965, Allen was paroled by the Ohio authorities. Inasmuch as a federal detainer had been lodged, his Ohio release resulted in his transfer to federal supervision. He was placed in Atlanta and then in May 1967 was transferred to Springfield. His federal sentence expires on September 7, 1975, with good time, and on August 11, 1980, full term. He will become eligible for federal parole on August 11,1970.
Allen asserts that his Ohio sentence does not end until April 18, 1982, unless, prior to that date, he should be pardoned .or otherwise receive executive clemency. His argument is simply that the Ohio sentence has no “expiration”, within the meaning of his federal judgment, until April 1982; that until then he is in Ohio custody, citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed. 2d 285 (1963), and Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923); that the federal sentence by its very language was not to begin until the Ohio sentence expired; that, accordingly, the present service of his federal sentence is improper and illegal, citing In re Wright, 51 F.Supp. 639 (N. D.Cal.1942); and that he is entitled to his freedom in the interim.
The argument Allen advances is not a new one. His case is completely controlled by the decision in Hunter v. Martin, 334 U.S. 302, 68 S.Ct. 1030, 92 L.Ed. 1401 (1948), which the Supreme Court took on certiorari to resolve a theretofore existing conflict among federal circuits. On facts essentially identical to those which Allen presents to us here, Mr. Justice Jackson rejected the argument and, in speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
“We think it clear that the purpose of the clause deferring commencement of service of the federal sentence was to prevent conflict between the State and Federal Governments. The present federal imprisonment avoids such conflict and achieves- that purpose. Missouri authorities have released petitioner from their custody and surrendered him for the apparent purpose of serving his federal sentence and have reserved control over him as a parolee only in event he is not kept in prison during the period of the federal sentence. For all practical purposes contemplated by the judgment, the State sentence has expired — at least insofar as it was an obstacle to service of the federal sentence.
“To hold otherwise would mean that a man already finally adjudged guilty of a serious federal crime and sentenced to ten years imprisonment would be left at large and free of all restraint for an interlude between release from the state prison and commencement of the federal term. We do not think such a result is required or intended under the statute, 18 U.S. C. § 709a, or under the terms of the sentence as imposed.” 334 U.S. at 303-304, 68 S.Ct. at 1030. (footnote omitted).
The statute cited, namely § 709a, was reformulated, without change of significance here, by the Act of June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 838, and is now 18 U.S.C. § 3568. It provides in part:
“The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary * * * for service of such sentence.”
This statute, of course, governs Allen’s situation. In the light of Hunter v. Martin, which was decided prior to the imposition of Allen’s sentence, the meaning and application of the sentencing words are clear and no room remains for argument. But even if the statute and the sentence, in combination, were somewhat less than clear, the statute controls and the specification in the sentence is mere surplusage. United States v. Ayscue, 187 F.Supp. 946, 948 (E.D.N.C. 1960), aff’d 287 F.2d 887 (4 Cir.1961).
Hunter v. Martin, of course, nullified In re Wright upon which Allen relies. There is other authority precisely in point and adverse to Allen’s contentions. Domer v. Smith, 412 F.2d 199 (7 Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Mulroy v. Sloan, 83 F.Supp. 869 (W.D.Pa.1949).
We regard Jones v. Cunningham, supra, and Anderson v. Corall, supra, with their implications as to the continuance of custody during parole as in no way lessening the authority of Hunter v. Martin. The principle of Jones and the principle of Hunter are not the same. On the authority of Hunter v. Martin and in the light of the other precedents cited, the district court’s denial of relief to Allen must be and is
Affirmed.
Compare United States ex rel. Lombardo v. McDonnell, 153 F.2d 919 (7 Cir. 1946), cert. denied, U. S. ex rel. Durkin v. McDonnell, 328 U.S. 872, 66 S.Ct. 1365, 90 L.Ed. 1641, with Johnston v. Wright, 137 F.2d 914 (9 Cir. 1943), amending and aff’g In re Wright, supra, and Martin v. Hunter, 165 F.2d 215 (10 Cir. 1948). See Kirk v. Squier, 150 F.2d 3 (9 Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775, 66 S.Ct. 265, 90 L.Ed. 469.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0