What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Charles P. NICHOLS, individually; as Trustee of the Charles P. Nichols Employee Pension and Profit Sharing Plan; and as Custodian for his children, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas E. STAPLETON, Jr.; E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc.; Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 88-5742.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 9, 1989.
Decided June 15, 1989.
Rehearing Denied June 15, 1989.
Michael A. Bertz, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Claire P. McGreal, Keesal, Young & Logan, Long Beach, Cal., for defendants-ap-pellees.
Before SNEED, FARRIS and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges.
The panel finds this case appropriate for submission without oral argument pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4 and Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).
ORDER
The panel in the above-captioned case has voted to withdraw its opinion filed May 15, 1989.
The petition for rehearing, filed May 30, 1989, is hereby denied.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Charles P. Nichols here attempts to appeal from an order of the district court compelling him to arbitrate some of his claims against Thomas Stapleton and Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. (Prudential-Bache), and staying the trial of his other claims against them. His appeal must be dismissed, but the district court should allow him an opportunity to apply for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Nichols sued Stapleton, Prudential-Bache, and E.F. Hutton, Inc., on November 11, 1986, claiming that they had defrauded him by using his investment accounts in risky and unsuitable trading activities. His complaint asked for more than $200,000 in damages and listed causes of action for securities and commodities fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, violation of RICO, and breach of contract.
On August 27, 1987, the district court dismissed Hutton pursuant to a settlement agreement. The remaining defendants moved to compel arbitration of the claims relating to one of Nichols’ accounts pursuant to an arbitration clause in their “Client Agreement.” At a hearing on the matter, Nichols argued that the arbitration clause was invalid because the defendants had breached a fiduciary duty requiring them to explain the clause to him. The court, however, concluded that Nichols was a sophisticated investor and stated:
There is no fiduciary duty.... I think you have to look at the interplay between the specific individual account executive —Mr. Stapleton in this case — and Dr. Nichols, and the type of accounts that were set up and the forms that were signed in order for a finding to be made that there was a fiduciary duty.
On February 2, 1988, the district court issued an order compelling Nichols to arbitrate the claims arising out of non-commodity transactions in the account under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Pending the arbitration, the court stayed all action on the claims relating to commodity transactions in the account and all claims relating to his six other accounts under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Nichols appealed to this court on February 17, 1988.
II.
1988 JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT
We must dismiss the appeal, however, because Congress recently removed our appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory arbitration orders. Section 1019 of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act (the “Judicial Improvements Act”), Pub.L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (to be codified at 9 U.S.C. § 15), which became effective on November 19, 1988, added a new section to the Federal Arbitration Act that reads in part:
§ 15. Appeals
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order—
(1) granting a stay of an action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
Although Nichols filed his notice of appeal before the Judicial Improvements Act’s effective date, the Act deprives us of jurisdiction. Our decisions have made clear that “[i]t is a rule of construction that statutes are ordinarily given prospective effect. But when a statute is addressed to remedies or procedures and does not otherwise alter substantive rights, it will be applied to pending cases.” Friel v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 751 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1985) (footnote and citations omitted) (addressing an amendment to the statute of limitations in 46 U.S.C. § 763a (1982)); see also United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir.1969) (discussing application of new procedure under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 to pending case). The Judicial Improvements Act, by denying interlocutory appeals of arbitration orders, addresses remedies and procedures. It thus applies retrospectively.
There has been no certification as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). Nichols, however, should have an opportunity to request such certification because, at the time he appealed, the law did not require it. If the new Act had been in effect at that time, Nichols’ conduct might have differed. See Friel, 751 F.2d at 1039. We therefore remand the case and instruct the district court to allow Nichols to apply for certification under § 1292(b) within such time limits as it may order.
APPEAL DISMISSED and CASE REMANDED.
. This court recently reversed an order compelling arbitration in Van Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus. Corp., 862 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir.1989). The decision did not address the effect of the Judicial Improvements Act on our jurisdiction over such orders.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1