What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Horst VON HENNIG, Ancillary Executor of the Estate of Carlo von Wedekind, Deceased, Appellant, v. Robert F. KENNEDY, Attorney General of the United States, as Successor to the Alien Property Custodian, Appellee. Robert F. KENNEDY, Attorney General of the United States, as Successor to the Alien Property Custodian, Appellant, v. Horst VON HENNIG, Ancillary Executor of the Estate of Carlo von Wedekind, Deceased, Appellee.
Nos. 16199, 16201.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 15, 1961.
Decided Oct. 19, 1961.
Petition for Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1961.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Denied En Banc Dec. 11, 1961.
Mr. James H. Mann, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. John W. Pehle, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant in No. 16,199 and appellee in No. 16,201.
- Mr. Irving Jaffe, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with whom Mrs. Mary P. Clark, Atty., Dept, of Justice, was on the brief, for appellee in No. 16,199 and appellant in No. 16 201
Before EDGERTON, WASHINGTON, and BASTIAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff executor of Carlo von Wedekind has appealed from a judgment of the District Court dismissing on the merits an action to recover certain property vested by the Alien Property Custodian on the ground that plaintiff’s decedent was not authorized by Section 9 (a) of the Trading with' the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 419, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 9(a), to claim the vested property because he was resident outside the United States (in Switzerland) and doing business in Italy during the war years, and was an “enemy” as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 2(a). The District Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are reported at 1960, 187 F.Supp. 914.
We bave viewed with care the record and aPPebant s contentions. We are unabIe to sa^that the District Court clearly erred in its findings or was wrong in its conclusions.
There is abundant evidence that planitiff’s decedent, the original plaintiff, exercised exclusive supervision for himself and the other owner over the firm of Carlo Wedekind & Company, a societa, in name collettivo doing business in Italy, though he may not have followed in detail the operations of the business. In addition to the matters referred to by the District Court, the record shows that he fixed the remuneration of Mueller, the firm’s manager in Italy, and insofar as ? “volved a monthly bonus of 200 Swiss francs’ Paid jt himself (apparently all d”mg tbe war years? through Fides a °W1SS firm which he dominated and controlled. As late as 1940 he advanced needed funds to the Italian firm; Mueller received instructions pr direetives for running the firm only from him; prior to the outbreak of the war in Europe, he made frequent visits to Italy to confer with Mueller about the firm’s business. It seems also that he must bave retained continuing power to revoke the authority delegated to Mueller and to aPPoint a new manager. The original Plaintiff s active supervision of the business Pperi to the war was dearly sbown exdst> and although during the war period his visits to Italy ceased and his correspondence with Mueller was perhaps more limited, he did not show that his powers of supervision over the business were materially changed. And he admittedly had unlimited personal liability for the firm’s debts, malting his identity with its business even clearer. We think that under all the circumstances the original plaintiff could properly be found to be doing business in Italy during wartime, and hence to be an “enemy” under the Act. Cf. The William Bagaley, 1866, 5 Wal. 377, 72 U.S. 377, 18 L.Ed. 583.
The judgment ia
Affirmed.
. The Government filed a protective cross-appeal with respect to the District Court’s bolding that the original plaintiff was not doing business in Germany during the war years. In view of our conelusion on the principal appeal, it is unnecessary to decide the questions raised in tbe cross-appeal No. 16,201.
. The record contains two letters from Mueller to plaintiff written in 1940, one written in 1941, one written in 1942, and one written in 1943. It also contains a letter from plaintiff to Mueller written in 1941. These letters refer to others which are not in evidence.
. Compare Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, D.C.D.C.1955, 133 F.Supp. 615, 620, affirmed sub nom. von Opel v. Brownell, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 341, 244 F.2d 789, certiorari denied, 1957, 355 U.S. 878, 78 S.Ct. 141, 2 L.Ed.2d 108.
. A societa 'in name collettivo■ — such 'as the firm here involved — is neither a partnership nor a corporation under Italian-law, according to the testimony of the ' expert witnesses; in addition to provi- . sion for it, Italian law provides for gen- . eral partnerships, corporations limited in shares (or closely held corporations), and general stock' corporations. As the District Court pointed out, the societa has some characteristics of corporations under American law concepts, but because of its unlimited personal liability feature, it- is 'far more analogous to a partnership. "• ' ■

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1