What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BROWN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 5630.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
July 31, 1935.
Jesse I. Miller, of Washington, D. C, for petitioner.
Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Morton K. Rothschild and J. Louis Monarch, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., for defendant.
Before BUFFINGTON and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. In 1927, the Electro Construction Company, a corporation, had outstanding 1,000 shares of capital stock, of which the petitioner, William T. Brown, Jr., owned 550 shares, Joseph F. McCarthy 445 shares, and John A. McCarthy 5 shares. Joseph F. McCarthy died testate and under his will John A. McCarthy became the owner of his shares. The corporation declined John A. McCarthy’s request to redeem those shares at their book value of $205 per share, for, although at that time it had $154,000 cash on hand, it needed all of its available cash to execute a number of contracts then pending. The petitioner, however, agreed to and did in fact buy the 445 shares for $91,225 and paid for them out of his own personal funds. The petitioner thereupon sold 5 shares to his secretary and retained 990 shares. In 1927 and 1928, the corporation declared a 100 per cent, cash dividend, but in 1929, no dividend was declared, although the company’s earnings were high. The cash on hand had increased from $154,000 in 1927 to approximately $241,000 near the close of 1930. December 16, 1930, the corporation redeemed and canceled 440 of the shares which the petitioner had purchased from John A. McCarthy and paid the petitioner $280 per share or $123,200, using funds out of its surplus with which to pay for the difference between the par value and the hook value. One day later the corporation declared a 400 per cent, stock dividend on its capital stock, whereby the petitioner received 2,200 shares, his secretary 20 shares, and John A. McCarthy 20 shares. In his income tax return for 1930, the petitioner reported $31,-975 as profit' resulting from the sale of his stock to the corporation. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency and was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals.
The petitioner contends that the transaction was in partial liquidation of the corporation under section 115 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 26 USCA § 2115 (c) and that only the liquidated profit of $31,-975 was taxable. The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that the transaction was essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend under section 115 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 26 USCA § 2115 (g), and that the entire $123,200 should be reported in the petitioner's income tax return as dividend subject to tax.
The applicable statute is section 115 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2115) which provides:
“(a) The term ‘dividend’ when used in this title (except in section 2203 (a) (4) and section 2208 (c) (1), relating to insurance companies) means any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, whether in money ór in other property, out of its earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913. * * *
“(c) Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part or full payment in exchange for the stock. The gain or loss to the distributee resulting from such exchange shall be determined under section 2111, but shall be recognized only to the extent provided in section 2112. In the case of amounts distributed in partial liquidation (other than a distribution within the provisions of section 2112 (h) of stock or securities in connection with a reorganization) the part of such distribution which is properly chargeable to capital account shall not be considered a distribution of earnings or profits within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section for the purpose of determining the taxability of subsequent distributions by the corporation. * * *
“(g) If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was issued as a stock dividend) at such time and in such manner as to _ make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed - in redemption or cancellation of the stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings or profits accumulated aftéfi February 28, 1913,• shall be treated as a taxable dividend. In the case of the cancellation or redemption of stock not issued as a stock dividend this subsection shall apply only if the cancellation or redemption is made after January 1, 1926.
“(h) As used in this section the term ‘amounts distributed in partial liquidation’ means a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all or a portion of its stock.”
The question is whether the payment by the corporation for the redemption of the petitioner’s stock was essentially equivalent to the distribution to him of a taxable dividend. It is for the Board of Tax Appeals to determine from the facts before it whether the particular transaction is essentially equivalent to a taxable dividend. Commissioner v. Babson (C. C. A.) 70 F.(2d) 304, certiorari denied, 293 U. S. 571, 55 S. Ct. 107, 79 L. Ed. 669. We think the Board had sufficient evidence upon which to base its findings. The money with which the corporation paid the petitioner came from its profits and earnings. Prior to the sale to the corporation of 440 shares of capital stock, the petitioner held 99 per cent, of the stock. Notwithstanding the fact that the corporation paid him $123,200 for less than one-half of the stock which he held, the petitioner, after the sale, continued to hoM 98 per cent, of its stock. The reduction of the capital stock did not amount to a liquidation, for it is to be noted that the following day the capital stock was increased and the business of the corporation was continued at a profit.
In Hyman v. Commissioner, 63 App. D. C. 221, 71 F. (2d) 342, 344, certiorari denied, 293 U. S. 570, 55 S. Ct. 100, 79 L. Ed. 669, the court, speaking of section 115 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2115 (g), said: ■
“The purpose of Congress in the inclusion of (g) was to narrow the. distinction to the end that corporations might not by resort to the device of stock redemption or cancellation make a distribution to its shareholders essentially resulting in a division of profits. In both the House and Senate reports, and in the conference reports, an illustration is given showing the congressional purpose. The illustration supposes, under the tax laws prior to the amendment involved here, the case oí two men holding practically the entire stock of a corporation for which each paid S50,000. The corporation, having accumulated a surplus of $50,000 above its cash capital, buys from the stockholders for cash one-half of the stock held by them and cancels it, and the payment is nontaxable because it is a partial redemption of stock. To change this result and make it taxable (g) was written and incorporated into the law. Granted the illustration is an apt one and the object sought accomplished, it will be seen how nearly it fits the facts of this case, for here we have a corporation with large accumulated earnings, which, by means of a purchase of a part of its stock, it transfers to its single stockholder, leaving the corporation precisely in the condition in which it was prior to the transfer, except that its earnings have been distributed to its stockholder without having disturbed his ownership and control of the corporation.”
In the instant case, our conclusion is that the transaction, though in form a stock redemption, was, in fact, a distribution of earnings substantially equivalent to a cash dividend. We find no error in the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Board of Tax Appeals.
The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1