What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

Opinion:
LIBBY, McNEILL & LIBBY v. UNITED STATES.
No. 37.
Argued October 13, 1950.
Decided November 27, 1950.
Stanley B. Long argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Edward G. Bobrin.
Samuel D. Slade argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman and Assistant Attorney General Morison.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 340 U. S. 54, decided this day. Here, as there, the Government insured petitioner’s ship against war risks including “all consequences of hostilities or warlike operations.” The ordinary marine risks were covered by a Lloyd’s policy. The vessel, United States Army Transport David W. Branch, stranded on January 13, 1942, when an inexperienced helmsman made a mistake in steering. The Government admits that the Branch was engaged in the warlike operation of transporting military supplies and personnel between war bases, but denies that the warlike phases of the operation caused the stranding. The Court of Claims found as a fact that there was no causal connection between the “warlike operation” and the stranding, and accordingly gave judgment for the United States. 115 Ct. Cl. 290, 87 F. Supp. 866. Petitioner’s contentions for reversal here are substantially the same as those advanced in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, supra. The reasons given for our holding there require affirmance in this case.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents for the reasons set forth in his dissent in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 340 U. S. 54, 70, decided this day.

Question: Did administrative action occur in the context of the case?

Choices:
No
Yes

Answer: 0