What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re Norman STUMES, Petitioner.
No. 82-1609.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 11, 1982.
Decided June 22, 1982.
Timothy J. McGreevy, Dana, Golden, Moore & Rasmussen, Sioux Falls, S. D., for petitioner.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and HARRIS, Senior District Judge.
The Hon. Oren Harris, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to review an order of the District Court staying the execution of this Court’s mandate pending action by the Supreme Court of the United States on a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by respondent Herman Solem. The District Court’s order entered on May 10, 1982, relies on 28 U.S.C. Section 2101(f) as authority for its ruling. We are not persuaded that Section 2101(f) grants the District Court this authority. The statute provides that in any case in which the final judgment of any court is subject to review by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, the execution and enforcement of such judgment may be stayed for a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to obtain a writ of certiorari. The statute further provides that the stay “may be granted by a judge of the court rendering the judgment or decree or by a justice of the Supreme Court . . . . ” It appears, therefore, that only a judge of this Court, or a justice of the Supreme Court, is empowered by 28 U.S.C. Section 2101(f) to stay the execution or enforcement of this Court’s judgment. Respondent Solem could have applied to this Court for a stay of its mandate, but he did not do so, and this Court’s mandate issued on April 23, 1982.
We are nevertheless of the opinion that relief by mandamus would be inappropriate in the circumstances of this case. This Court’s opinion, filed on March 1,1982, did not direct the District Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus unconditionally. Our order was that the writ be issued “discharging Stumes from custody unless the State commences proceedings to try him again within such reasonable time as the District Court may fix.” Stumes v. Solem, 671 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1982). The District Court’s stay order of May 10, 1982, in effect does no more than hold that the reasonable time within which Stumes should be retried should be determined with the fact in mind that the State has applied for review in the Supreme Court. The District Court, in other words, seems to have taken the view that it would be unreasonable to release petitioner, or to require that the State begin to try him again, before the Supreme Court has acted on the State’s petition. Certainly this is not an unreasonable view, and we are not prepared to say that the District Court abused its discretion, though, as indicated above, we cannot agree with its reliance upon 28 U.S.C. Section 2101(f).
The State’s petition for certiorari was filed on April 30, 1982. In the ordinary course, the Supreme Court can be expected to grant or deny the petition before the Court rises at the end of its present term, some time around the end of this month.
The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1