What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Ronald D. VETETO, Appellant, v. H.G. MILLER and other named unidentified employees of the Bureau of Prisons.
No. 85-5553.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) May 8, 1986.
Decided June 19, 1986.
Ronald D. Veteto, pro se.
James J. West, U.S. Atty., Harrisburg, Pa., James W. Walker, Asst. U.S. Atty., Scranton, Pa., for appellees.
Before ADAMS, HIGGINBOTHAM and MARIS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
MARIS, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiff, Ronald D. Veteto, an inmate of the federal penitentiary at Lewis-burg, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint pro se in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Miller and other unnamed employees of the federal Bureau of Prisons alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The principal violation alleged was denial of access to the courts by depriving him of writing materials, stationery and stamps and of access to the prison law library. The complaint also alleged deprivation of meals, clean clothes, showers and recreation periods. Alleging that plaintiff had “repeatedly requested administrative remedies” from the defendants with no response or success, the complaint sought injunctive relief and also compensatory and punitive damages. Stating that it did not agree with the plaintiff’s assertion that he had exhausted his administrative remedy, the district court dismissed the complaint for his failure to do so. The present appeal followed.
Pursuant to authority conferred on him by the Attorney General, 28 CFR § 0.96(t), the Director of the Bureau of Prisons has promulgated regulations providing for a three-stage system for considering prisoners’ grievances and granting relief when justified. 44 FR 62250, 28 CFR § 542.10 et seq. In Waddell v. Alldredge, 480 F.2d 1078 (3d Cir.1973), this court held that it is incumbent upon a federal prisoner seeking mandatory relief from the actions of prison authorities alleged to violate his constitutional rights to exhaust this administrative remedy before seeking judicial relief. Because it concluded that the facts asserted in the complaint did not show an exhaustion of the administrative remedy, the district court dismissed the complaint in the present case under the authority of the Waddell case.
In Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 F.2d 122 (3d Cir.1984), we held that a federal prisoner suing only for money damages for the alleged violation by prison authorities of his constitutional rights is not bound by the exhaustion of remedy requirement since he can obtain no monetary relief from the Bureau of Prisons against individual defendants. The basic question with which we are here confronted is whether in a case such as the present one in which both in-junctive relief and damages are claimed, the rule of the Muhammad case should apply or whether the Waddell rule is applicable.
While this court has not heretofore expressly ruled on this question, at least two other circuits have held the exhaustion requirement applicable in such a case. Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 990-991 (5th Cir.1981); Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir.1979). Indeed, it was implicitly so ruled in our Waddell case since that case also involved a claim for damages as is indicated by footnote 1 to the opinion. 480 F.2d at 1078. Moreover, to hold that the exhaustion rule is not to be applied in a case seeking injunctive or mandatory relief if the complaint also claims damages would render the rule a virtual nullity. For all that a prisoner claiming injunctive or mandatory relief need do to avoid application of the exhaustion rule would be to add a claim for damages. We hold that the requirement for exhaustion of the administrative remedy provided by the regulations applies to a prisoner’s suit for injunctive or mandatory relief whether or not it carries an added claim for damages.
It remains to consider whether the district court erred in dismissing the complaint on nonexhaustion grounds based solely on the allegations of that pleading and without service, answer or preliminary hearing on the question. We think that the court did err in so doing and that in line with the settled policy to construe pro se complaints liberally, the case should be remanded to enable the plaintiff, if so minded, to amend his complaint so as to supply more specific facts on this subject and to enable the court to hold a preliminary hearing, if needed, to establish the background facts with respect to the plaintiff’s claim to have exhausted the remedy provided for him by the Bureau of Prison regulations. If it is found that the administrative remedy has not been exhausted, the complaint should be dismissed without prejudice to its reinstatement if, upon completion of the administrative procedure, the plaintiff has not received the relief to which he believes himself to be entitled. If, on the other hand, it is found that the plaintiff has exhausted his remedy in the Bureau of Prisons without obtaining the relief to which he believes himself to be entitled, the court should hear the case and accord the plaintiff such relief as the facts and the law warrant.
The judgment of the district court will be vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1