What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
HUTCHINGS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 9319.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 13, 1940.
Rupert R. Harkrider and Thomas W. Lain, both of Galveston, Tex., for petitioner.
Louise Foster, Sewall Key, and John J. Pringle, Jr., Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. P. Wenchel, Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, and Irving M. Tul-lar, Sp. Atty., Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before SIBLEY, HUTCHESON, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner, having a donative intent toward her seven children, transferred to two of them in trust for the seven, property valued at $144,970.34. The- Commissioner allowed a specific exemption of $50,000, and on the theory that the donation was one, to the trustees and not seven, one to each of the beneficiaries, allowed the donor one $5,000 exemption instead of the seven she claimed. The Board sustained the Commissioner’s determination. Petitioner’s appeal presents the single question whether, for the purpose of the $5,000 gift tax exclusion, allowed under Section 504(b), Revenue Act of 1932/26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, the gifts in trust should be treated as seven gifts, that is to each of the beneficiaries his proportionate part of the whole fund, or one gift, the whole of the fund to the trustees.
Petitioner is in the extremely fortunate position of being able to point out that every Circuit Court of Appeals and every District Court which has passed on the question, has held that the objects of the donative intent in such cases and therefore the recipients of the gifts, are the beneficiaries, not the trustees, who are the mere instruments for carrying out the intent, and that the Board itself has in later cases, taken this same view. She invites us to join the procession and to make it, except for respondent, unanimous. Respondent, standing his ground though deserted and alone, insists that all of the cited rulings and decisions are wrong, and appealing to our pride of opinion, invokes our independent judgment. We have examined and considered the question, both independently and in the light of the reasons advanced for and against respondent’s determination and the Board’s approval of it. We think it plain that wrongly based on the supposed but not the real purport and effect of Commissioner v. Wells, 7 Cir., 88 F.2d 339; Commissioner v. Krebs, 3 Cir., 90 F.2d 880, the conclusion of the Commissioner and the Board finds support neither in the language of the statute nor in the decisions the Board relies on.
Whatever of confusion and of apprehension as to its opening a loop hole for gift tax evasions, has arisen from a misconstruction of the effect of the holding in the Wells case, has been dissipated by the decisions cited in Note 1 and by Section 505 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, which a? to transfers in trust, takes away the exclusion entirely.
While not directly in point, these cases correctly construed, in effect support the view of petitioner that the gift is not to the trustees, but a present one to the beneficiaries, whether accomplished by the creation of one or more trusts. The case for petitioner’s view is well and strongly put in Welch v. Davidson and in Rhein-strom v. Commissioner, supra. We can add nothing. The decision of the Board is reversed and the cause is remanded for a determination of the deficiency in accordance herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
Davidson v. Welch, D.C., 22 F.Supp. 726; McBrier v. Com’r, 3 Cir., 108 F.2d 967; Rheinstrom v. Com’r, 8 Cir., 105 F.2d 642, 124 A.L.R. 861; Robertson v. Nee, 8 Cir., 105 F.2d 651; Ryerson v. United States, D.C., 28 F.Supp. 265; Welch v. Davidson, 1 Cir., 102 F.2d 100.
Rubinstein v. Com’r, 41 B.T.A., 220; Winterbotham v. Com’r, 41 B.T.A. —, decided Feb. 7, 1940.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 5