What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Lawrence L. SHULTS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harol L. WHITLEY, et al., Respondents-Appellees.
No. 91-16900.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 15, 1992.
Decided Dec. 23, 1992.
Lawrence L. Shults, pro se.
Robert E. Wieland, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, NV, for respondents-appellees.
Before: GOODWIN, O’SCANNLAIN and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App.P. 34(a); 9th Cir.R. 34-4.
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence L. Shults appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Shults was convicted in Nevada state court of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Shults argues that his habeas petition should be granted because the district court refused to give his requested instruction that no inference be drawn from his failure to testify.
A district court’s decision whether to grant a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir.1991). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Shults did not testify at trial. He proposed the following jury instruction:
The law does not compel a defendant in a criminal case to take the witness stand and testify, and no presumption of guilt may be raised, and no inference of any kind may be drawn, from the failure of a defendant to testify.
As stated before, the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.
The trial court refused this instruction.
Shults argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981), controls this case. In Carter, the Court held that a “no inference” instruction, when requested by a defendant, is required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. at 305, 101 S.Ct. at 1121. However, the rule of Carter does not apply retroactively on collateral review under the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).
In Teague, the Supreme Court held that “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 1075. In Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990), the Court reiterated that “a decision announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Butler, 494 U.S. at 412, 110 S.Ct. at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). A rule is not “dictated by precedent” if “reasonable jurists [might have] disagree[d]” that such a rule followed necessarily from prior decisions. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 2827, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990).
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Id. at 615, 85 S.Ct. at 1233. The rationale for this holding was that “comment on the refusal to testify ... cuts down on the privilege [against self-incrimination] by making its assertion costly.” Id. at 614, 85 S.Ct. at 1232-33. Shults argues that the holding in Griffin dictated the rule announced in Carter.
We believe, however, that “reasonable jurists” could well have concluded that adverse comment by the prosecutor or judge regarding a defendant’s failure to testify makes the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege “costly” to a defendant in a manner and to a degree that refusal to give a requested instruction forbidding adverse inference by the jury from an accused’s silence does not. Thus we do not think the Court’s decision in Griffin “dictated” the result in Carter. The Court might without self-contradiction have held that, although the Constitution requires that judge and prosecutor alike refrain from affirmative comment on a defendant’s silence, a jury may properly be left free to draw whatever inferences it wishes from that silence.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Court expressly reserved judgment in Griffin on the question it finally answered in Carter, suggesting that the Court did not view its holding in the latter case as in any sense foreordained by its holding in the former. See id. at 615 n. 6, 85 S.Ct. at 1233 n. 6; see also Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 337, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 1093-94, 55 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978) (same). We therefore hold that Carter announced a new rule.
Nor does the rule of Carter fall within either of the two exceptions set out in Teague. Carter does not “place[ ] ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,’ ” Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. at 1075 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1180, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), and does not mandate a procedure which is “ ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” id. (citing Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692, 91 S.Ct. at 1180, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937)).
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Shults’s conviction on direct appeal on September 5, 1980, 96 Nev. 742, 616 P.2d 388. Because Shults’s conviction was thus final before Carter was decided, Carter does not apply to his habeas petition. Furthermore, Shults does not show that failure to give the requested instruction otherwise violated due process. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312, 83 S.Ct. 745, 756, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) (“State prisoners are entitled to relief on federal habeas corpus only upon proving that their detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person, safeguarded against state action by the Federal Constitution.”) Therefore, the failure to give the requested instruction does not warrant habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.
. Shults's remaining claims are addressed in an unpublished memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99