What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
John D. LAWTON, Petitioner, v. Jeremiah J. DACEY, Warden, Respondent.
Misc. No. 158.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Oct. 29, 1965.
Ronald J. Chisholm, Winchester, Mass., for petitioner.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, and McENTEE, Circuit Judge.
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.
Petitioner, having been convicted of a felony in the state court, and having lost his appeal based upon the court’s failure to suppress certain evidence seized at the time of his arrest, Commonwealth v. Lawton, Mass., 202 N.E.2d 824, brought a habeas corpus proceeding in the district court. His allegation that the seizure was unconstitutional because he was wrongfully arrested was rejected, the district court finding, as did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that although he was arrested without warrant, the officer had probable cause to make the arrest. The district court denied his application for a certificate of probable cause, without which he cannot appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. He accordingly renews his request in this court. Zimmer v. Langlois, 1 Cir., 1964, 331 F.2d 424.
Petitioner, so far as we can discover from the record presented to us, makes three claims. The first is that the Massachusetts statute relating to arrest of suspicious persons who, during the nighttime, give no satisfactory account of themselves, Mass.G.L. c. 41, § 98, is unconstitutional. His second is that there was no probable cause, apart from this statute, for his arrest. His third is that even if there •were probable cause, the officer did not rely- upon those circumstances, though known to him, but relied on the statute.
The district court found there was probable cause, known to the officer, apart from the statute, and held that this was enough even though in fact the officer, in his thinking process, relied on the statute. This was sufficient. An officer on the beat can hardly be expected to be that precise a lawyer. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 1965, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684. Appellate courts, as is well known, may affirm lower courts for reaching the correct result even though they gave the wrong reason. At least equal consideration should be given an arresting officer. If he was justified in doing what he did, in the absence of an affirmative showing of prejudice it should make no difference that his legal thinking may have been short of perfection. This is not a case where the state came up with a new justification on appeal. Cf. Giordenello v. United States, 1958, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503. The Commonwealth took this position from the outset, within the express procedure recognized in Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 488, 78 S.Ct. at 1251.
The constitutionality of the nighttime statute is not raised. We see no possible merit in the appeal. '
An order will be entered denying the application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0