What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Alice B. GIST, Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant.
No. 24709.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
March 30, 1970.
Stuart A. Smith (argued), Atty., Dept, of Justice, Johnnie M. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Charles H. Magnuson, Special Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., Harry D. Steward, U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for appellant.
Harrison & Watson, San Diego, Cal., for appellee.
Before BARNES and CARTER, Circuit Judges, and BYRNE, District Judge.
Honorable William M. Byrne, Senior United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge:
The facts of this case are reported at 296 F.Supp. 526 (S.D.Cal.1969). In summary, Mrs. Gist brought an action for refund of an overpayment of federal income taxes. Able use of pretrial procedures allowed counsel to present to the trial court the single issue in the case on cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted a partial refund to Mrs. Gist. The Government appeals from that decision. We affirm.
At issue is the tax consequences of Mrs. Gist’s election to take under her husband’s will rather than claim and retain all her property rights under California community property law. All of the property involved herein was community property under California law and had been acquired after July 29, 1927. California Civil Code, § 161a as amended that year provides that as to community property acquired thereafter, a wife has a “present, existing and equal interest.”
If a husband provides by will for the disposition of all the community property, and if his wife approves, her election to take under the terms of the will is an election which involves the retention or exchange of a property right which exists both before and after the death of her husband. Estate of Wyss, (1931) 112 Cal.App. 487, 297 P. 100. The legal effect of such election is determined by the law of the state where the parties reside and are domiciled. Morgan v. Commissioner, (1940) 309 U.S. 78, 60 S.Ct. 424, 84 L.Ed. 585.
Mr. Gist’s will placed all community property, both his share and his wife’s share, in a trust. The trust was to pay all income to Mrs. Gist for her life, then was to pay all income to two named daughters of the husband’s previous marriage for their lives, and then was to be divided among the issue of the daughters. The will further provided that if Mrs. Gist elected to take “the rights given her by law,” i.e. her half of the community property, the dispositive provisions of the will were to be carried into effect as though she had predeceased her husband.
After consultation with her attorney, Mrs. Gist determined to take under the trust provisions of the will. She then sought to amortize the value of her life estate under the provisions of § 167 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 167). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to allow any deduction for amortization. His decision was grounded on the language of § 273 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 273). That section provides:
“Amounts paid under the laws of a State, a Territory, the District of Columbia, a possession of the United States, or a foreign country as income to the holder of a life or terminable interest acquired by gift, bequest, or inheritance shall not be reduced or diminished by any deduction for shrinkage (by whatever name called) in the value of such interest due to the lapse of time.”
The Commissioner took the position that Mrs. Gist had acquired her interest by bequest from her husband’s testamentary disposition of his property. Mrs. Gist contended that she had purchased her interest by giving up fully vested rights in her half of the community property. Therefore, she had not acquired her interest by “gift, bequest, or inheritance” and was not within the coverage of § 273.
The question was well briefed by both parties in the trial court. The trial court found that Mrs. Gist: (1) gave up the remainder interest in her one half of the community property; (2) retained a life estate in her half of the community property; and (3) received a life estate in her husband’s one half of the property. Accordingly, amortization was allowed only for the cost of the life estate acquired in her husband’s share of the property. Only the Government has appealed. It continues to claim that the life estate acquired by Mrs. Gist from her husband’s one half of the community property was acquired by “gift, bequest, or inheritance” within the coverage of § 273.
It is admitted by both parties that the precise question is one of the first impression. The legislative history of § 273 and its antecedents is brief and unhelpful. No treasury regulations or revenue rulings provide definitive guidance. No case is precisely on point.
Our review convinces us that the district court correctly decided the issue. While it would serve no purpose to fully recapitulate the court’s reasoning, we note that the court found that Mrs. Gist’s election to take under the will was not based on tax avoidance motives. Further the court alluded to the particular nature of community property law. By Cal. Civil Code 161a Mrs. Gist had a “present, existing and equal interest” in the community property before the death of her husband. The court found that the election by Mrs. Gist fully relinquished her rights to the remainder interest in her one half share of the community property; and that she relinquished this interest as a condition to receiving a life estate in the husband’s one half interest in the community property, thus constituting in her a life estate in the entire property. We agree with the district court, that under these circumstances, Mrs. Gist’s acquisition of the life estate in her husband’s one half interest in the community property should be described as a purchase. The court correctly allowed an amortization deduction.
In reaching this result, we are conscious that different factual or legal situations from that present here may require different tax treatment. We, therefore, express no opinion as to the treatment to be given in related, but non-identical, situations.
The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.
. H.R.Rep.No.350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921); S.Rep.No.275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1921) ; 1954 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News pp. 4206, 4867.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0