What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
James P. TAYLOR, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 17623.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
April 16, 1964.
James P. Taylor, pro se.
No appearance for appellee.
Before JOHNSEN, Chief Judge, and MATTHES, Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM.
The denial of a previous motion by appellant to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 was reversed by us in Taylor v. United States, 8 Cir., 282 F.2d 16, with directions to hold a hearing upon appellant’s claim that he was mentally incompetent during the proceedings leading to his conviction and sentence.
A full-scale hearing was engaged in by the District Court, with appellant being present and duly represented by counsel, and with a large amount of evidence being adduced. Upon careful consideration of all of this oral and documentary evidence, the Court found that appellant had been mentally competent to understand the proceedings against him and to effectively assist in his defense; that this competency obtained in all of the proceedings involved; and that his conviction and sentence were accordingly valid. Detailed findings were made by the Court, which are reported in Taylor v. United States, D.C.Minn., 199 F.Supp. 734.
Upon application being made to us for leave to appeal in forma pauperis from this determination, after a certification by the District Court that the appeal would be one that was without merit and so not taken in good faith, we undertook to satisfy ourselves whether there was any basis to request us to review the evidence in relation to the Court’s findings, or whether the appeal would in the situation be frivolous. We made appointment of the counsel who had represented appellant on the hearing, and who thus was familiar with the proceedings and the evidence, to make indication for him of any possible appellate substance that could be involved in the situation. A detailed statement was prepared and filed as to the proceedings and the evidence, from which it was manifest that the situation was without basis for a contention that the evidence did not amply support the District Court’s findings.
We accordingly refused to permit the appeal to be proceeded with and dismissed it as frivolous. Taylor v. United States, 308 F.2d 776, 777. - Our opinion said (308 F.2d at 778 and 779): “That Taylor was given a full and fair hearing on his claim that he was mentally incompetent during the proceedings leading to his conviction, is unquestionable. .There was, obviously, ample evidence to support the determination of Judge Devitt that Taylor was during those proceedings mentally competent. The issue tried was an issue of fact for the trial court, and cannot be made a question of law for this Court. * * * There would be no justification for permitting Taylor to go further with his frivolous appeal or for requiring court-appointed counsel to waste further time and efforts on his behalf”.
Appellant thereafter filed another motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, seeking to have the District Court once more engage in a consideration of the question of his mental competency, under the guise of a charge that his appointed counsel had failed to render him effective assistance. He contends that counsel should have raised the question of his mental competency in his conviction and sentencing proceedings through a timely request to the Court for a mental examination and hearing under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244. But the plenary hearing and determination which appellant was given on his previous motion to vacate, 199 F.Supp. 734, have afforded him all the right and precaution which could have come to him through proceedings under § 4244. As has been indicated, the Court specifically found that appellant was at all times mentally competent to understand the proceedings against him and to effectively assist in his defense. His contention as to the failure of his counsel to have requested an examination under § 4244 would therefore not be entitled to any consideration as a question of due process in respect to his legal representation.
He further contends that his counsel should have raised the defense for him that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. The situation, however, is not one in which appellant stood trial, but one in which he pleaded guilty. On the determination of competency made in his previous § 2255 proceeding, that plea was one which appellant had the capacity to make.
Beyond this, his contention that, on the indications of mental incompetency which existed, his counsel failed to render effective assistance in not requiring him to stand trial on the criminal charge and setting up insanity as a defense, constituted in the circumstances of the situation an attempt to have the Court engage in another consideration of his mental condition upon the same basis and elements as it had previously done. The determination made had duly taken into account the background and history, as well as other material, upon which appellant sought to rest his present motion. The evaluation made as to all these aspects entitled the Court to treat the motion as not presenting any question of substance or merit sufficient to require hearing on the character of the assistance which had been rendered by his counsel, as a claim of want of due process. The appeal from the Court’s denial of appellant’s motion is entitled to be dismissed as frivolous.
It may be added that the charge of lack of effective assistance of counsel was also made in appellant’s previous motion, and that our opinion undertook to lay this charge at rest by stating consideredly that a detailed examination of the tremendous record involved “indicates conclusively a lack of substance to this charge”. 282 F.2d at 19.
Appeal dismissed.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2