What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
PATENTS PROCESS, Inc., et al. v. DURST et al.
No. 7053.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Feb. 23, 1934.
Hiram E. Casey, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.
Henry E. Bianchi, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.
Before WILBUR and GARRECHT, Circuit Judges, and NORCROSS, District Judge.
WILBUR, Circuit Judge.
Patents Process, Inc., a corporation, is the alter ego of Frank D. Williams. Bankruptcy proceedings were filed against both and the proceedings were consolidated. The adjudication of bankruptcy was made on November 14,1929. Prior thereto an action had been brought by Mildred E. Williams against Frank D. Williams and Patents Process, Inc. Harry Schenck was appointed receiver for the Patents Process, Inc. After the election and qualification of appellee Walter C. Durst as trustee in bankruptcy for the appellants, a turnover order was procured by the said trustee, in pursuance of which all the assets of the Patents Process, Inc., were turned over by Harry Sehenck, the receiver, to the trustee. Thereafter Harry Schenck filed his report and account of his receivership which came on regularly for hearing before the referee. The report requested an allowance for the receiver and the referee for services performed in the receivership matter before the bankruptcy proceedings were ' instituted. The appellant objected to the report and account and to the allowance of fees claimed by the receiver.
The hearing was had, evidence introduced, and on February 18, 1931, the referee made an order approving the report of the receiver and allowing certain claims for fees as follows:
To Harry Schenck, the sum of......$2,500.
To Harry Schenck, as compensation for the services of his attorneys Joseph Fainer and Phil Dodson,...... 3,500.
To Harry Schenck for the use of his automobile...................... 225.
No petition for review or appeal was taken from this order.
The rule of the District Court wherein the matter was pending provided that a petition for review under General Order 27 (11 USCA § 53) of the general orders in bankruptcy must be filed with the referee within ten days from the date of notice of such order. Such a rule limiting the right of ap peal to ten days is held valid in Re David (C. C. A.) 33 F. (2d) 748; Roberts Auto & Radio Supply Co. v. Dattle (C. C. A.) 44 F. (2d) 159. And in the absence of such a rule petition for review must be made within a reasonable time. In re Octave Mining Co. (D. C.) 212 F. 457; In re Faerstein (C. C. A.) 58 F.(2d) 942. Thereafter, in January, 1932, the appellee, as trustee in bankruptcy, filed his report and account. The appellant filed objections to the allowances therein reported made by the order of February 18, 1931. On this hearing Harry Sehenck, the receiver in the equity suit above mentioned, Phil Dodson and Joseph Fainer, his attorneys, and Lillian M. Sehenck were made parties to the proceeding. A hearing was had on such objections and on March 28, 1932, the referee approved the account and report of the receiver. From this order Frank D. Williams petitioned the District Court for a review. This petition came on for hearing before the district judge and on December 17, 1932, the order of the referee was approved. On January 16th the district judge allowed an appeal from the order of December 17, 1932, approving the report of the referee as above stated. The appellee’s affidavit in support of this motion states that the bankrupt estate totaled approximately $68,000; that from that amount he has paid the claims for receiver’s fees and attorneys’ fees allowed by the orders of February 18, 1931, and March 28, 1932, and that all the creditors of the bankrupt have been paid in full. It should be repeated that the claims here involved are not those of the receiver and attorneys in the bankruptcy proceeding, as in the case of Goodman v. Street (C. C. A.) 65 F.(2d) 686, but are amounts allowed as proper claims against the bankrupt estate for services rendered before the bankruptcy, the power to make such allowances having been transferred by the bankruptcy proceedings from the Superior Court in which the receivership was pending, to the bankruptcy court. Moore v. Scott (C. C. A.) 55 F.(2d) 863. The order of February 18, 1931, allowing these claims has become final. The referee himself could not set it aside. In re Faerstein (C. C. A.) 58 F.(2d) 942. See, also, In re Marks (D. C.) 171 F. 281; In re Greek Mfg. Co. (D. C.) 164 F. 211. In order to attack this allowance it was necessary that a petition for review he filed, in the District Court within ten days. This was not done and no appeal to this court lies from the order of the referee except by way of petition to review and an appeal from the order of the District Court on the petition. In re Home Discount Co. (D. C.) 147 F. 538; Knapp & Spencer Co. v. Drew (C. C. A.) 160 F. 413. We think this conclusion also logically results from the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit in Re Gelino’s, Inc., 51 F.(2d) 875, where it was held that there was no appeal from an order denying a petition to set aside an order disallowing a part of the creditors’ claim. The court held that the appeal should have been taken from the original order disallowing the claim and could not be taken from the order refusing to reconsider the former order.
In view of this situation the order of the referee of March 28, 1932, approving the account of the trustee and the order of the District Court approving the referee’s order do not constitute the allowance of the claim within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act whieh provides for an appeal from an order of the District Court allowing a claim (11USCA § 48). The order of the District Court of December 17, 1932, appealed from, in so far as it directed the payment of the claims already allowed, was a proceeding in bankruptcy as to which it was necessary to have the appeal allowed by this court (11 USCA § 47, Bankruptcy Act, § 24).
Appeal dismissed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1