What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Gloria J. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Margaret M. WATKINS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 18124, 18125.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 11, 1964.
Decided April 16, 1964.
Petition for Rehearing en Banc Denied June 19, 1964.
Certiorari Denied Dec. 7, 1964.
See 85 S.Ct. 336.
Mr. M. Michael Cramer (appointed by the District Court), Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Thomas Sisk (appointed by this court), Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellant in No. 18124, argued for both appellants.
Miss Ruth E. Hankins (appointed by the District Court), Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellant in No. 18125.
Mr. Anthony A. Lapham, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Mr. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., and Messrs. Frank Q. Nebe-ker and Daniel Reznéck, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Prettyman, Senior Circuit Judge, and Washington and McGowan, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants (two women) met the complainant (a man) in a bar and had drinks with him. When he left they followed him, seized him, and took a roll of bills from his pocket. A police officer happened to witness the later stages of the affair and arrested them on the spot. They were indicted for robbery and convicted of assault with intent to commit robbery.
In defense appellants say they had given the complainant a dollar with which to buy whiskey and were seeking to recover their money. They submitted that version to the jury, but as the verdict indicates, that body declined to accept it.
Appellants also present a point under the so-called Jeneks statute. Inquiry was made into the matter at the trial. It was established that the officer had made an original pencil' draft of a report, that the draft had been given to a stenographer at police headquarters who made a typewritten version of it, and that the officer signed it. The typed report was produced at the trial and used to impeach the officer’s testimony as to the events he witnessed. As to the pencil draft the officer said: “ * * * it went in the trash after it was — * * * It. probably went in the trash after the clerk typed it.” All who heard this testimony appear to have taken it at face value as establishing that the notes had been destroyed in the usual course of business. The defense in particular seized upon the fact of the destruction of the notes, and urged upon the court that that fact alone necessitated the striking of the officer’s testimony. It did not suggest to the court, by motion or otherwise, that a hearing be held to inquire into either the fact or the circumstances of the destruction.
Appellants now say the trial judge should, upon his own initiative, have held a hearing to determine whether the original pencil draft of the policeman’s report had been destroyed. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Campbell v. United States, the inquiry conducted by the judge upon such a matter is not an adversary proceeding controlled by rules as to burden of proof or persuasion, but is simply a proceeding necessary to aid the judge to discharge the responsibility laid upon him to enforce the statute. The trial judge in the case at bar, having the officer before him and hearing his testimony, was satisfied there was no cause for a hearing. The record indicates that the defense was similarly satisfied. The only objective of a hearing would have been to determine whether the throwing of the pencil notes into the trash had been in bad faith or not in normal course. No suggestion to that effect was made at the time. We cannot say the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to initiate an inquiry which no one who heard the officer’s testimony thought necessary.
As to the argument that the destruction of the pencil notes after they had been typed and the typed copy signed made the officer’s testimony inadmissible, Killian is to the contrary.
Affirmed.
. 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
. In his interrogation of the officer, defense counsel himself referred to the handwritten statement as “The one in the trash.”
. 365 U.S. 85, 95, 81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961).
. Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 82 S.Ct. 302, 7 L.Ed.2d 256 (1961).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1