What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
John W. HANEY, Petitioner, v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent.
No. 11400.
United States Court ol Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Oct. 6, 1955.
Harvey W. Johnson, Spartanburg, S. C., for petitioner.
Myles F. Gibbons, Gen. Counsel, Chicago, 111., David B. Schreiber, Associate General Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board, Chicago, 111., Edward E. Reilly, William A. Eggert, Railroad Retirement Board, Chicago, 111., of counsel.
Before FINNEGAN, LINDLEY and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.
FINNEGAN, Circuit Judge.
Haney, petitioner here, seeks reversal of the respondent Railroad Retirement Board’s decision denying him sickness benefits under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act. After a hearing, in which Haney testified, the Board’s referee rejected his claim in a decision containing findings of fact and various relevant recitations. Thereafter, on Haney’s appeal, the referee’s decision was affirmed by the administrative agency in a written statement embodying its findings of fact, discussion and decision. The Board found that: (i) no day in the period November 1, 1953 through to January 8, 1954, for which Haney made claim, constituted a day of sickness because Haney’s “statement of sickness” was tardily filed and, (ii) none of the days January 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 1954 could be a “day of sickness” since vacation pay received by Haney for those five days constituted “remuneration” under the Act.
Our review is authorized by § 5(f), of the Act which provides, inter alia:
“It [the court] shall have power to enter upon the pleadings and transcript of the record a decree affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Board, with or without remanding the cause for rehearing. The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive. * * *” (Italics ours.)
We find that the Board’s findings of fact, here, meet that statutory test. Ellers v. Railroad Retirement Board, 2 Cir., 1943, 132 F.2d 636. However, Haney challenges the Board’s application of certain statutory terms to the facts found by that agency, and he questions its interpretation of some words appearing in the Act. His attack is launched from the platform of these two findings made by the Board:
“2. A statement of sickness dated January 14, 1954, received at the Board’s Atlantic regional office on January 18, 1954, was the first statement of sickness filed by, or in behalf of, appellant with respect to the period, November 1, 1953 to January 8, 1954, inclusive for which he claims sickness benefits. Accordingly, none of the days in the period, November 1, 1953 to January 8, 1954, inclusive, is a ‘day of sickness,’ within the meaning of the Act, with respect to appellant.
“3. Appellant is not entitled to benefits under the Act with respect to any of the days in the period, November 1, 1953 to January 8, 1954, inclusive.”
While we recognize our basic interpretive responsibility, it appears to us that the Board acted within the legislative framework, provided by Congress, and correctly ascertained if days of sickness, mentioned in the Act, were applicable to Haney’s claim. Gray v. Powell, 1941, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301.
Regulations, 20 Code Fed.Regs. § 335.-104(a) and (b), promulgated by the Board under its statutory rule-making power made it encumbent upon Haney to file a statement of sickness at the agency’s office within 10 days. He did so only tardily. The Act, itself, requires filing a “statement of sickness”; the Board sets the time limit. On the facts before us we perceive no sound reason for striking dawn the Board’s interpretation and ascertainment of reasonableness as used in its own regulations concerning when the requisite claim form could be considered as filed despite expiration of the time limit. There is no claim that these regulations are ultra vires, only that the Board erroneously applied them. Indeed by disputing the Board’s interpretation of its regulation, Haney recognizes it.
The judgment appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. 52 Stat. 1094 and 60 Stat. 722, 735 as amended; 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 351-367.
. 52 Stat. 1101, 45 U.S.C.A. § 355(f).
. 45 U.S.C.A. § 228j (b) (4) and § 362(2).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0