What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Gerald LYSIAK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee. Gerald LYSIAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER, District Director and Regional Director of the INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 86-1371, 86-2454.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 26, 1987.
Decided April 6, 1987.
Gerald Lysiak, pro se.
Michael L. Paup, Chief Appellate Section, Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Roger M. Olsen and Jean Owens, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tax Div., I.R.S., Richard Farber, Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, and Michael J. Roach, Washington, D.C., John Daniel Tinder, U.S. Atty., Gerald A. Coraz, Asst. U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY and MANION, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
On February 6, 1987, this Court in Case No. 86-1371, 812 F.2d 1410, affirmed by unpublished order a decision of the Tax Court dismissing pro se appellant Gerald Lysiak’s petition for redetermination of deficiencies. In that order we imposed a $1500.00 penalty against Lysiak under Rule 38, Fed.R.App.P., because his appeal was frivolous. We have not been advised that any payment has been received to date, but Lysiak has moved for leave to file a late petition for rehearing, claiming in part that he was unaware of the 14-day deadline set by Rule 40(a), Fed.R.App.P.
This is hardly Lysiak’s first contact with this Court, or even the first time he has been sanctioned for making frivolous arguments in appeals related to the federal tax laws. In Lysiak v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 774 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir.1985), we imposed sanctions against Lysiak and his attorney for frivolous arguments made in support of Lysiak’s claim that he was exempt from taxation as a member of a certain religious order. We also note that on May 1, 1986 we denied Lysiak’s petition for a writ of mandamus in Lysiak v. U.S. Tax Court, Case No. 86-1404, in which he sought an order directing the Tax Court to reinstate a petition that had been dismissed for lack of prosecution. Although the arguments Lysiak made in support of his petition for mandamus were entirely without foundation, we imposed no sanction in that proceeding.
Lysiak has yet another appeal pending in this Court, and this one is frivolous as well. In Lysiak v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al, Case No. 86-2454, Lysiak appeals an order of the district court dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief against officials of the Internal Revenue Service and the United States Tax Court. In this lawsuit Lysiak seeks no less than to restrain those officials from enforcing the federal tax laws. In this Court and in the court below, Lysiak claims that the government is without power to tax him because the 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution was never properly ratified, an argument that this court has repeatedly rejected. See United States v. Ferguson, 793 F.2d 828, 831 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250, 1253-1254 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 462-463 (7th Cir.1986). Although we suggested in Foster that this claim might be cognizable if “an exceptionally strong showing of unconstitutional ratification” were made, 789 F.2d at 463, Lysiak, like Foster and Thomas and Ferguson before him, has not even approached such a showing. Lysiak has now filed his brief in No. 86-2454, and it provides no reason to disturb the district court’s decision. We will therefore affirm that judgment.
Because we find the arguments raised in No. 86-2454 to be frivolous, we are tempted to impose an additional penalty under Rule 38. We are concerned, however, that the pattern of baseless litigation generated by Lysiak, even after prior sanction, demonstrates that it would be fruitless simply to impose an additional monetary penalty. (In fact, the rehearing petition he has tendered in No. 86-1371 is primarily a rehash of prior frivolous arguments and offers no new assertions of any significance.) We know nothing of Lysiak’s financial status, but he has not indicated that he is financially unable to pay the penalty we assessed. We are convinced that the mere imposition of further financial penalties will not adequately protect this Court or Lysiak’s opponents from his abusive litigating. See Coleman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir.1986) (discussing purposes behind sanctions for frivolous litigation). Additional action on our part is warranted.
A court faced with a litigant engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on that litigant’s access to the court. See generally In Re Urban, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (D.C.Cir.1985); Green v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.1983). In fashioning such a remedy in Lysiak’s case we act on our “obligation to protect and preserve the sound and orderly administration of justice,” In Re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1262 (2d Cir.1984). At the same time we must take care to protect Lysiak’s undeniable right of access to the court’s processes, see In Re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir.1979) {en banc).
We also wish to observe that we have not yet given up on the efficacy of monetary sanctions, and will continue to impose them on Lysiak where circumstances warrant. Obviously monetary penalties are bound to be more effective if they are paid; accordingly the injunctive order entered below will remain in effect until Lysiak demonstrates that he has paid the penalty assessed against him in No. 86-1371. We are confident that the orders set forth below will allow us to avoid additional waste of the Court’s and opposing lawyers’ time and resources while allowing Lysiak access to this Court in the event that he presents a colorable claim.
Accordingly Lysiak’s motion for leave to file a late petition for rehearing in No. 86-1371 is Denied on grounds that the tendered petition lacks arguable merit. The district court’s judgment in No. 86-2454 is Affirmed. The mandate in both those appeals shall issue forthwith. The clerk of this Court shall accept no further filings from Lysiak in either of these appeals.
It Is Further Ordered that the following procedures shall, until such time as the Court may order otherwise, govern any appeals in this Court filed by Gerald Lysiak:
1. Upon receipt of the short record from a lower court clerk in any appeal filed by Gerald Lysiak, the clerk of this Court shall immediately issue an order holding all briefing in abeyance and directing that Lysiak file a petition for leave to appeal within 14 days of the date thereof.
2. In seeking leave to proceed on appeal Lysiak shall certify that his appeal is taken in good faith and that the claims he raises are not frivolous, and that they have not been raised and disposed of on the merits by this Court in previous appeals. He shall also attach a list of the issues he seeks to raise in the appeal. Failure to file this petition in complete form or within the 14-day deadline will be sufficient ground for denial of leave to appeal.
3. Upon timely receipt of a complete petition for leave to appeal, the Court shall direct the clerk of the appropriate lower court to transmit the full record of the underlying case. No further proceedings shall take place in this Court, nor shall any other filings be accepted, until a panel of three judges has reviewed the petition and the record to determine whether Lysiak’s appeal presents a colorable claim.
It Is So Ordered.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1