What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WHITLER. WHITLER v. WHITLER.
No. 9673.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 31, 1949.
James R. Hale, of Fayetteville, Ark., and Roy M. Seeley, of Springfield, 111., 'for. appellant.
Harold G. T-alley and Anthony W. Daly, both of Alton, 111., and Thomas F. Butt, of Fayetteville, Ark., for appellee.
Before MAJOR, Chief Judge/ KERNER, Circuit Judge, and LINDLEY, District Judge.
KERNER, Circuit Judge.
This' was an- interpleader suit. Plaintiffs, corporations. of the States of New Y-ork, Connecticut and Virginia, respectively, filed their complaint against Helen Marie Whitler, a citizen of the State of Illinois, -and Ruth L. Whitler, a citizen of the State of Arkansas, to have determined conflicting claims under k policy of ■insurance issued by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, w-hereby it agreed to pay to the beneficiary named therein, upon the death bf Isaac E.-Whitler, an employee of Shell Oil Company, the sum -of $4,500. The existence of the requisite jurisdictional amount, the diversity of citizenship of the adverse claimants, -and -the disinterestedness of plaintiffs made the remedy of the Interpleader Act .available to the insurer. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85; Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Tietsort, 7 Cir., 131 F.2d 448.
Isaac E. Whitler -died on February 26, 1947. Helen- is his. daughter and Ruth is his widow. Each defendant claimed to be the beneficiary. Helen based her claim to the fund on the ground that she was named as the beneficiary in the policy. Ruth claimed that she had been named as beneficiary in the application for the policy and -hence was entitled to the fund. The trial judge made special findings of fact, rendered his conclusions of law thereon, and entered a decree awarding Helen Marie Whitler the money deposited by Metropolitan in the court’s registry. To reverse the decree, Ruth L. Whitler appeals.
The facts -are undisputed. On March 21, 1944, Isaac, an employee of Shell, pursuant to the terms of Group Life Insurance Policy No. 9960-G, issued by Metropolitan to Shell, .filed with Shell a written application for a policy of insurance in which ■he designated appellant as the beneficiary. The record is silent -as to any later and different -application made and filed by -him. Under this group policy, Metropolitan, about April 1, 1944, issued and delivered to Isaac the policy involved herein. This policy Isaac retained in his possession until his decease. The policy named appellee as beneficiary. Isaac knew and was ■fully aware that appellee was named as beneficiary in the policy and accepted the policy with knowledge that appellee was so named as beneficiary. After Isaac’s death the -policy was found in his safety-deposit box, to which appellant had access. She had examined the policy during.Isaac’s lifetime and knew that appellee’s name appeared therein as beneficiary. The court concluded that even if Isaac did originally intend that- appellant should be the beneficiary, by his acceptance and retention of the policy it must be presumed that he changed his mind and concluded to accept-the contract tendered by the insurer.
Upon oral argument, counsel for appel-. lant stated that the only question in this appeal -is whether appellant is entitled -to. the fund because she was named as beneficiary in -the application under the provisions of the group -policy. She calls attention to the fact that section 3 of the group or master.policy provides that an employee may ¡become insured thereunder only by making written request to the employer on, a form furnished by the insurance company, and argues that the individual policy issued to Isaac was not a part of the contract of, or necessary to, the insurance, but that the master policy constitutes the contract of insurance. She cites cases where the certificate issued by an employer was merely evidence of the employee’s participation in a group plan, and not a policy issued by an insurance company. Such ca-ses are not in point and it would serve no useful purpose to discuss them. Here, Metropolitan issued its own insurance policy in which it certified that Isaac E. W'hitler was insured for $4,500 and agreed that if he died while in the employ of Shell and while insured under the group policy, the amount of insurance at the date of his death would be paid to Helen Marie Whitler.
In consideration of appellant’s contention it is well to remember that the same rules of construction apply to group insurance as to other forms -of insurance. Howard v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 329 Ill. App. 248, 255, 67 N.E.2d 878. Th-e law is well settled that an application f-or life insurance itself is not the -contract, but is a mere offer or proposal for a contract -of insurance. It is merely a -step in th-e creation of the insurance contract. 29 Am. Jur. p. 152. And wh-ere the insurance company tenders a policy at variance with the application, the tender constitutes a counter-offer, and upon acceptance of -the policy by the insured, there is a meeting of the minds a-nd -the policy becomes the contract between -the insured -and the -insurance company. 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 232, page 972. See also Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Newman, Tex.Civ.App., 157 S.W.2d 667, 671. While it is true that an individual certificate or -policy of -group life insurance issued an-d delivered to- an ■insured employee is an integral part of the master policy, yet the provisions of the individual policy govern in determining the beneficiary entitled to the -proceeds of -the policy upon the death of -th-e insured employee. Baker v. Prudential Ins. Co., 279 Ill. App. 5; Wing v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 314 Mass. 269, 49 N.E.2d 905, 906. The application -confers no right -on the beneficiary named therein, and it ha-s been held that even where -an application is made a part of th-e policy -and there is an irreconcilable conflict between the application and th-e policy .issued, the provisions of the policy control. Burt v. Burt, 218 Pa. 198, 67 A. 210, 211; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 10 Cir., 69 F.2d 901, 904. Moreover, receipt and retention of -a policy with knowledge as to whom it :i-s payable -constitutes ratification and it is accepted -as written. McFadden v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 351 Pa. 570, 41 A.2d 624; Woehr v. Travelers Ins. Co., 134 N.J.Eq. 38, 34 A.2d 136.
We -conclude -that the District Court -did not -err in -awarding the proceeds -of the policy .to -appellee. Accordingly the decree is affirmed.
28 U.S.C.A. § 41(26) [now §§ 1335, 1397, 2361].

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1