What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Anthony L. MANNI, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 6956.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
March 28, 1968.
Joseph D. Steinfield, Boston, Mass., by appointment of the Court, with whom Hill & Barlow, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellant.
John M. Callahan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Paul F. Markham, U. S. Atty., and Albert F. Cullen, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, Mc-ENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction on three counts of an indictment charging violation of the Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 902(e). The only question raised is the propriety of the court’s denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of defendant’s motion to suppress the firearms in question, together with some admissions made by the defendant. 270 F.Supp. 103. The court warrantably found the following. Treasury agents, one Ho-ban and another, learned that a man by the name of Anthony Manni, living at a certain address in Massachusetts, had purchased eleven small arms in New Hampshire. Hoban obtained a description and the maker’s numbers of the arms, and a photograph of Manni. He also learned from the state crimihal 'records that an Anthony Manni of the same address had been convicted of a felony, a necessary element of the offense stated in section 902(e). Even if this was the same Manni, however, Hoban did not know whether Manni had brought the arms into Massachusetts, another element of the offense, or, if so, where they were.
On four occasions Hoban visited Manni’s house with another agent, but found only his wife. He told her that he was a Treasury Agent who wanted to talk to her husband, asked her (as he testified without contradiction) where Manni could be found, and tried without success to find him. On March 31, 1966 the agents called again, and Mrs. Manni informed them that Manni was out. They drove away and parked nearby. Ten minutes later they saw defendant Manni, recognizable from his photograph, enter the apartment building. They followed, and when they reached his door it was partly open. “Hoban knocked and the defendant turned toward him. Hoban held up his pocket commission and told the defendant he was from the Treasury Department and had been trying to get hold of him. Manni said: ‘Come in.’ ” 270 F.Supp. at 105. The agents entered, told defendant of their purpose, and stated that he need not answer questions and was entitled to the advice of a lawyer. In plain sight, in a cabinet with a glass door, Ho.ban could see a number of firearms, some of which, when asked, defendant admitted buying in New Hampshire, but added that he had brought them to Massachusetts disassembled. Hoban requested permission to inspect them, and on receiving it, discovered some on which the numbers coincided with his records. He then asked the defendant if he had done time in state prison, and upon receiving an affirmative answer arrested him, seizing the firearms in the cabinet. No other search was conducted.
The court found that before the agents’ entry, conversation, and observation, they did not have probable cause to obtain a warrant. It also found that the purpose of the entry was to engage in the conversation the agents had been seeking for some time, and that Manni knew of this purpose. On this record defendant’s case is even less tenable than was the defendant’s in Robbins v. MacKenzie, 1 Cir., 1966, 364 F.2d 45, cert. denied 385 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 215, 17 L.Ed.2d 140. While we do not say that the fact that the officers fail to explain to a householder that he need not admit them may not sometimes be relevant on the issue of voluntariness of the consent, the consent was clearly voluntary here unless such a warning must always be given. This entry took place before Miranda v. State of Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Cf. Stoval v. Denno, 1966, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199. Whether post-Mmmcto we would have to hold that the officer must not only inform the defendant that he need not talk, but must also inform him that he need not afford entry to talk although defendant has an apparent option to talk outside, we need not determine. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in Commonwealth v. Painten, 1968, 389 U.S. 560 at 566-567, 88 S.Ct. 660, 19 L.Ed.2d 770. Nor need we decide whether opening a glass door to reach a visible object, as distinguished from picking it up when lying loose, e. g., Harris v. United States, 1968, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067; Fagundes v. United States, 1 Cir., 1965, 340 F.2d 673, is a search. What the officers had already seen and heard justified the arrest, and the arrest, in turn, justified the seizure.
Affirmed.
. Hoban did not offer to supply a lawyer, but when defendant later realized he was in trouble, he asked permission to call his lawyer and put through a call, but found him away.
. This supported finding distinguishes our recent case of Niro v. United States, 1 Cir., 1968, 388 F.2d 535, even if we were to assume that the principle there enunciated applies when the agents were merely seeking to talk rather than to bypass the necessity of obtaining a warrant.
. The problems in Commonwealth of Mass, v. Painten, 1 Cir., 1966, 368 F.2d 142, cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 560, 88 S.Ct. 660, 19 L.Ed.2d 770 are not involved here.
. The defendant’s ready complaisance may be wondered at, but the answer is found in his mistaken (see section 901(3)) belief that carrying disassembled guns was not interdicted.
. We remain of the view that proving consent to a search after a voluntary entry requires a strong showing. See Robbins v. MacKenzie, supra, 364 F.2d at 49.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0