What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ray PALMER, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America. Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ray PALMER and Maurice Robert Hettich, Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 71-1596, 71-1597.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
March 31, 1972.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 10,1972.
See 93 S.Ct. 119.
George J. Long, Louisville, Ky., for appellee.
Frank E. Haddad, Jr., Louisville, Ky., for appellants.
Before TOM C. CLARK, Associate Justice, and PECK and KENT, Circuit Judges.
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Retired, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM.
The Defendants Appellants, Palmer and Hettich, and others not involved here, were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which prohibits the operation of an illegal gambling business. To constitute an offense under this Section, the gambling business must violate a relevant state or local law, have five or more persons involved in its conduct and be in substantial, continuous operation for more than thirty days or have a gross revenue of $2,000 or more in one single day. Section 1955(c) further provides that for the purpose of securing warrants “probable cause that the business receives gross revenue in excess of $2,000 in any single day shall be deemed to have been established” if five or more persons conduct such business and it operates for two or more successive days. Appellants conducted their business at two separate locations in Louisville, Kentucky, and search warrants were issued covering both addresses. The affidavit supporting the search of the location on Fifteenth Street recited that five or more persons were involved in its conduct and that it had been in substantial, continuous operation exceeding thirty days. However, the affidavit supporting the Nineteenth Street search recited that five or more persons were engaged in its conduct but only on two successive days. The affidavit relied on the presumption of § 1955(c) aforesaid. Appellants’ primary position is that § 1955(c) is unconstitutional as violative of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and that the affidavit in question is not factually sufficient. Other contentions are that the five persons alleged in the affidavits as conducting the gambling business include employees; that § 1955 is hinged on state law, is an unlawful delegation of congressional power and denies equal protection of the law and that the admixture of § 1955 and the Kentucky gambling laws renders the latter unconstitutional in that the Kentucky Constitution provides that no law “shall be enacted to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General Assembly.” We find no substance in any of these contentions.
Appellants recognize that Congress has the power to provide in a criminal statute that proof of one fact shall constitute presumptive or prima facie evidence of another. The requirement of a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed was the crucial due process test established in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943). Also see Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971). The extensive hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 91 Congress, 1st Session, on S. 30 and other bills which culminated in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 clearly reveal that “in most or all” of the cases involving raids of gambling establishments, the records seized reflected revenues of these establishments to be “better than $2,000 a day.” Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary S. R. 91-617, page 400. From these and other available statistics indicating revenues received by such gambling businesses, the Congress could reasonably conclude that a gambling operation with five or more participants doing business for two consecutive days would reap at least $2,000 in revenues in a single day. See 116 Cong.Rec. 603-604. We conclude that this is a permissible inference.
Appellants also contend that § 1955(c) creates an irrebuttable presumption that if five or more persons are conducting the business condemned and such business operates for two or more successive days, probable cause is established. The Government answers that there is no irrebuttable presumption in the act and we find none. The Appellants were at liberty to rebut the presumption but elected not to do so. The claim therefore has no merit. Appellants’ other contentions are equally without merit. They urge that the five persons engaged in their business were employees and could not be included among those who “conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of such business ...” However the Senate Committee Report on the Act specifically states that the term “conduct” refers to both “high level bosses and street level employees.” Nor will the contention that the Federal crime hinges on state law and is therefore an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority stand scrutiny. It was directly rejected in United States v. Compton, 365 F.2d 1 (6 Cir. 1966), involving the phrase “unlawful activity” in 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which employs the same technique as used in § 1955. Also see United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969) which implicitly approved this procedure. Finally, we conclude that Appellants’ contention that § 1955 requires that Federal gambling laws enacted by the Kentucky Legislature take effect only upon the approval of the Congress is entirely frivolous. The relevant Kentucky laws were enacted long prior to § 1955 and insofar as Kentucky law is concerned, the latter has no effect whatever upon their enforcement in Kentucky courts.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1