What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
GOVERNMENT OF the CANAL ZONE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Alfonso GREEN C., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 75-2301
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 17, 1975.
Nathan Greenberg, Gretna, La. (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.
Lester Engler, Wallace D. Baldwin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Balboa, Canal Zone, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.
Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
A bill of information filed by the United States Attorney for the Canal Zone charged appellant Jose Green with the daytime entry of a specified building on Howard Air Force Base, Canal Zone, with the intent to commit the crime of larceny, all in violation of 6 C.Z.C. §§ 502 and 504. Green was convicted on that charge in a trial in the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone. This appeal from the conviction is based mainly on the contention that, before trial, a photograph of Green was made available to an eyewitness in circumstances so suggestive as to lead to a strong probability of misidenti-fication, and thus to a denial of due process. The trial judge, sitting without jury, considered this defense but concluded that the possibility of misidentifi-cation was small and that other factors supported the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
On December 7, 1974, Sgt. Carol Cesar entered her room in the barracks of Howard Air Force base and encountered an unknown male. The intruder struggled with her, then fled. Over twenty dollars had been stolen from the room. Seven weeks later, Sgt. Cesar was invited to the police station. While waiting for the interviewing detective, she noticed a clear plastic bag on his desk which contained, among several other visible items, a photograph of the defendant. She spontaneously identified the photograph as that of the man with whom she had struggled. Sgt. Cesar then identified Green from a lineup, and later identified him at trial.
In Simmons v. United States, 1968, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253, the Supreme Court held
that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissi-bly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
See Kelley v. Estelle, 5 Cir. 1975, 521 F.2d 238; United States v. Cooper, 5 Cir. 1973, 472 F.2d 64, cert. denied, 1973, 414 U.S. 840, 94 S.Ct. 96, 38 L.Ed.2d 77; Powell v. Wainwright, 5 Cir. 1972, 460 F.2d 1056.
As the trial court noted, “[Ejvery step on the part of the police should be taken to prevent” situations in which eyewitness access to photographs of a suspect might taint later identification. This admonition is particularly appropriate in this case — a lineup including the suspect was available for immediate viewing by the eyewitness, and the witness saw photographs of none of the other individuals who were to be in the lineup. Despite the gratuitous risk of taint which the police thus allowed, however, the trial court found that several other factors indicated that this photographic identification did not deny the defendant a fair trial. Most importantly, another witness, Sgt. Martin, identified the defendant from a lineup and at trial, without any prior photographic identification, as a man who was in the women’s barracks at the time of the incident. Also, Sgt. Cesar had a good opportunity to view the intruder in her well-lighted room, and was quite positive in both her unsolicited identification from the photograph and her later identifications of the defendant in the lineup and at trial. We cannot find that the trial court’s conclusions, drawn from all the facts, were in error. Green’s conviction was based only in part on Cesar’s identification of him at trial, and we cannot say that the circumstances of Cesar’s pretrial photographic identification of Green were “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”
Appellant also challenges his conviction on the ground that the information charging him with larceny cited the date of the incident as December 7, 1975, when in fact it occurred on December 7, 1974. The correct date, however, was specified in the arraignment, at the preliminary hearing, and in the testimony given at trial, including that of the defendant and his two alibi witnesses. We find no prejudice to the defendant in this typographical error in the information. See Russell v. United States, 5 Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 237, 238.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0