What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
LOMBARD et al. v. LOUISIANA.
No. 58.
Argued November 5-7, 1962.
Decided May 20, 1963.
John P. Nelson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on.the brief were Carl Rachlin, Judith P. Vlad-eck, .Robert F. Collins, Nils R. Douglas and Janet M. Riley.
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael E. Culligan and William P. Schuler, Assistant Attorneys General.
Solicitor General Cox, by special leave of Court., argued the cause for the United States, as amicus cxiriae, urging reversál. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Ralph S'. Spritzer, Louis F. Claiborne, Harold H. Greene, Howard A. Glickstein and Richard K. Berg.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents for review trespass convictions result-, ing from an attempt by Negroes to be served in a privately owned restaurant customarily patronized only by whites. However, unlike a number of the cases this day decided, no state statute or city ordinance here forbids desegregation of the races in all restaurant facilities. Nevertheless, we conclude that this case is governed by the principles announced in Peterson v. City of Greenville, ante, p. 244, and that the convictions for this reason must be revérsed.
Petitioners are three Negro and one white college students. On September 17, 1960, at about 10:30 in the morning they entered the McCrory Five and Ten Cent Store in New Orleans, Louisiana. They sat down at a refreshment counter at the back of the store and requested service, which was refused. Although no sign so indicated, the management operated the counter on a segregated basis, serving only white patrons. The counter was designed to accommodate 24 persons. Negroes were welcome to shop in other areas of the store. The restaurant manager, believing that the “unusual circumstance” of Negroes sitting at the counter created an “emergency,” asked petitioners to leave and, when they did not do so, ordered that the counter be closed. The restaurant manager then contacted the store manager and called the police.' He frankly testified that the petitioners did not cause any disturbance, that they were orderly, and that he asked them to leave because they were Negroes. Presumably he asked the white petitioner to leave because he was in the company of Negroes.
A number of police officers, including a captain and major of police, arrived at the store shortly after they were called. Three of the officers had a conference with the store manager. The store manager then went behind the counter, faced petitioners, and in a loud voice asked them to leave.’ He also testified that the petitioners were merely sitting quietly at the counter throughout these happenings. When petitioners remained seated, the police major spoke to petitioner Goldfinch, and asked him what they were doing there. Mr. Goldfinch .replied that petitioners “were going to sit there until they were going to be served.” When petitioners still declined to leave, they were arrested by the police, led out of the store, and taken away in a patrol wagon. They were later tried and convicted for violation of the Louisiana criminal mischief statute. This statute, in its application to’ this case, has all the elements of the usual trespass statute. Each petitioner was sentenced to serve 60 days in the Parish Prison and to pay a fine of $350. In default of payment of the fine, each was to serve 60 additional days in prison. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana the judgments of conviction were affirmed. 241 La. 958, 132 So. 2d 860. Because qf the substantial federal questions presented, we granted certiorari. 370 U. S. 935.
Prior to this occurrence New Orleans city officials, characterizing conduct such as petitioners were arrested for as “sit-in demonstrations,” had determined that such attempts to secure desegregated service, though orderly and possibly inoffensive to local merchants, would not be permitted.
Exactly one week earlier, on September 10, 1960, a like occurrence had taken place in a Woolworth store in the same city. In immediate reaction thereto the Superintendent of Police issued a highly publicized statement which discussed the incident and stated that “We wish to urge the parents of both white and Negro students who participated in today’s sit-in demonstration to urge upon these young people that such actions are not in the community interest. . . . [W]e want everyone to fully understand that .the police department and its personnel is ready and able to enforce the laws of the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana.” On September 13, four days before petitioners’ arrest, the Mayor of New Orleans issued an unequivocal statement condemning such conduct and demanding its cessation. This statement was also widely publicized; it read in part:
“I have today directed the superintendent of police that no additional sit-in demonstrations . . . will be permitted . . . regardless of the avowed purpose or intent of the participants ....
“It is my determination that the community interest, the public safety, and the economic welfare of this city require that such demonstrations cease and that henceforth they be prohibited by the police department.”
Botñ statements were publicized in the New Orleans Times-Picayune. The Mayor and the Superintendent of Police both testified that, to their knowledge, no eating establishment in New Orleans operated desegregated eating facilities.
Both the restaurant manager and the store manager asked the petitioners to leave. Petitioners were charged with failing to leave at the request of the store manager. There wás evidence to indicate that the restaurant manager asked petitioners to leave in obedience to the directive of the city officials. He told them that “I am not allowed to serve you here. . . . We have to sell to you at the rear of the store where we have a colored counter.” (Emphasis supplied.) And he called the police “[a]s a matter;of routine procedure.” The petitioners testified that when they did not leave, the restaurant manager whistled and the employees removed the stools, turned off the lights, and put up a sign saying that the counter was closed. One petitioner stated that “it appeared to be a very efficient thing, everyone knew what to do.” The store manager conceded that his decision to operate a segregated facility “conform [ed] to state policy and practice” as well as local custom. When asked whether “in the last 30 days to 60 days [he had], entered into any conference with other department store managers here in New Orleans relative to sit-in problems,” the store manager stated: “[w]e have spoken of it.” The above evidence all tended to indicate that the store officials’ actions were coerced by the city. But the evidence of coercion was hot fully developed because the trial judge forbade petitioners to ask questions directed to that very issue.
But we need not'pursue this inquiry further. A State; or a city, may act as authoritatively through its executive as through its legislative body. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 347. As we interpret the New Orleans city officials’ statements, they here determined that the city Tyould not permit Negroes to seek desegregated service in restaurants. Consequently, the city must be treated exactly as if it had an ordinance prohibiting such conduct. We have just held in Peterson v. City of Greenville, ante, p. 244, that where an ordinance makes it unlawful for owners or managers of restaurants to seat whites and Negroes together, a conviction under the State’s criminal processes employed in a way which enforces the discrimination mandated by that ordinance cannot stand. Equally the State cannot achieve the same result by an official command which has at least as much coercive effect as an ordinance. The official command here was to direct continuance of segregated service in restaurants, and to prohibit any conduct directed toward its discontinuance; it was not restricted solely to preserve the public peace in .a nondiscriminatory fashion in a situation where violence was present or imminent by reason of public demonstrations. Therefore here, as in Peterson, these convictions, commanded as they were by the voice of the State directing segregated service at the restaurant, cannot stand. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350.
Reversed.
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante, p.-248.]
La. Rev. Stat., 1950 (Cum.'Supp. 1960), § 14:59 (6), provides in pertinent part:
“Criminal mischief is the intentional performance of any of the following acts:
“(6) Taking temporary possession of any part or parts óf. a place of business, or remaining in a place of business after the person in charge of such business or portion of such business has ordered such person to leave the premises and to desist from the temporary possession of any part or parts of such business.”
The full text of the statement reads:
“The regrettable sit-in activity today at the lunch counter of a Canal st. chain store by several young white and Negro persons causes me to issue .this statement to the citizens of New Orleans.
“We urge every adult and juvenile to read this statement carefully, completely and calmly.
“First, it is important that all citizens of our community understand that this sit-in demonstration was initiated by a very small group.
“We firmly believe that they do not reflect the sentiments of the great majority of responsible citizens, both white and Negro, who make up our population.
“We believe it is most important that the mature responsible citizens of both races in this city understand that and that they continue the exercise of sound, individual judgment, goodwill and a sense of personal and community responsibility.
“Members of both the white and Negro groups in New Orleans for the most part are aware of the individual’s obligation for good conduct — an obligation both to himself-and to his community. With the exercise of continued, responsible law-abiding conduct by all persons, we see no reason for any change whatever in the normal, good race-relations that have traditionally existed in New Orleans.
“At the same time we wish-to say-to every adult and juvenile in this city that the police department intends to maintain peace and order.
“No one should have any concern or question over either the intent or the ability of this department to keep and preserve peace and order.
“As part of its regular operating program, the New Orleans police department is prepared to take prompt and effective action against any person or group who disturbs the peace or creates disorder on public or private property.
“We wish to urge the parents of both white and Negro students who participated in today’s sit-in demonstration to urge upon these young people that such actions are not in the community interest.
“Finally, we want everyone to fully understand that the police department and its personnel is ready and able to enforce the laws of the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana.”
The full text of the Mayor’s statements reads:
“I have today directed the superintendent of police that no additional sit-in demonstrations or so-called peaceful picketing outside retail stores by sit-in demonstrators or their sympathizers will be permitted.
• “The police department, in my judgment, -has handled the initial sit-in demonstration Friday and the follow-up picketing-' activity Saturday in an efficient and creditable manner. This is in keeping with the oft-announced policy of the New Orleans city government that peace and order in our city will be preserved.
“I have carefully reviewed the reports of these two initial demonstrations by a small group of misguided white and Negro students, or former students. It is my considered opinion that regardless of the avowed purpose or intent of the participants, the effect of such demonstrations is not in the public interest of this community.
“Act 70 of the 1960 Legislative session redefines disturbing the peace to include ‘the commission of any act as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public.’
“Act 70 also provides that persons who seek to prevent prospective customers from entering private premises to transact business shall be guilty of disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace.
“Act 80 — obstructing, public passages — provides that ‘no person shall wilfully obstruct the free, convenient, and normal use of any public sidewalk, street, highway, road, bridge, alley or other passage way or the entrance, corridor or passage of any public building, structure, water craft or ferry by impeding, hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage thereon or therein.’
“It is my determination that the community interest, the public safety, and the economic welfare of this city require that such demonstrations cease and that henceforth they be prohibited by the police department.”

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 1