What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Eugene M. FUHRER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Malcolm W. FUHRER, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 13267.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
June 28, 1961.
Isidor Kahn, Milford M. Miller, Harry P. Dees, William C. Welborn, Evansville, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant, Kahn, Dees, Donovan & Kahn, Welborn & Miller, Evansville, Ind., of counsel.
Frederick P. Bamberger, Evansville, Ind., for appellee, Bamberger, Foreman, Oswald & Hahn, Evansville, Ind., of counsel.
Before DUFFY and KNOCH, Circuit Judges, and PLATT, District Judge.
DUFFY, Circuit Judge.
On July 10, 1959, this suit was commenced by filing a complaint in ten counts. It alleged a concealed fraud by defendant which led to and induced the execution of a written settlement agreement between the parties to this suit and a third person. On March 7, 1960, on motion by defendant, seven counts of the complaint were dismissed for failure to state a claim, and one count was ordered stricken from the file as scandalous; all, however, with leave to plaintiff to move to amend within fifteen days.
On March 21, 1960, plaintiff filed motions for leave to amend counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 by interlineation. On April 14, 1960, after a pretrial conference, the Court denied these motions. On this same date, plaintiff filed two additional motions, 1) to dismiss counts 8 and 10 of the original complaint without prejudice, and 2) for an extension of thirty days in which to prepare motions to amend the complaint. On May 17, 1960, the Court entered an order granting the first motion and denying the second.
On June 13, 1960, plaintiff appealed from the May 17, 1960 order, but this Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the May 17th order was not a final order or judgment. On October 12, 1960, plaintiff employed new counsel, and on October 31, 1960, an amended complaint in three counts was filed. On December 19,1960, the District Court sustained the defendant’s motion to strike the amended complaint and- dismissed the plaintiff’s action.
On January 11; 1961, the plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. moved the District Court for an order vacating and setting aside the December 19th judgment for the purpose of permitting the filing of an amended complaint. On January 18, 1961, the Court denied the motion and the plaintiff here appeals to this Court from both the December 19th and the January 18th orders.
The plaintiff contends that under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he has the absolute right to file an amended complaint. Rule 15(a) provides that, “A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served * * * ”. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading within the meaning of this rule. Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, 7 Cir., 188 F.2d 193.
A literal reading of Rule 15(a) might suggest that a plaintiff would be entitled as of right to one amendment to his complaint without any limit of time, despite the filing of a motion to dismiss. This has led some courts and commentators to interpret Rule 15(a) as subject to the qualification that the plaintiff may not amend after the court has dismissed the complaint except upon leave of the court. United States v. Newbury Mfg. Co., 1 Cir., 123 F.2d 453; Kelly v. Delaware River Joint Commission, 3 Cir., 187 F.2d 93; 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 15.07, page 826 (2d ed. 1948).
This Court has taken a more liberal view of Rule 15(a). In the Peterson Steels case, supra, the action was for breach of contract. The District Court sustained the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The District Court denied the motion saying the proposed complaint was essentially the same as the one originally filed. This Court said, at page 194 of 188 F.2d, “As defendants had not served a responsive pleading, plaintiff was entitled to file his amended complaint as a matter of course and was not required to ask leave of court; it was error, however, to deny such leave when the request was made.”
In Peckham v. Scanlon, 241 F.2d 761, 764, this Court approved a liberal interpretation of Rule 15(a), and at page 764 said, “This court in Peterson Steels, Inc. v. Seidmon, 7 Cir., 188 F.2d 193, 194, recognized the rqle as conferring an absolute right to amend.”
When plaintiff filed his motions on March 21,1960, they were for leave to amend certain counts of the complaint by interlineation. Plaintiff did not seek to amend as a matter of right, and the District Court refused to grant him permission to amend. No attempt was made to file an amendment as' of course and without asking permission of the court until October 31, 1960, when plaintiff’s new counsel filed the amended complaint containing three counts. No responsive pleading had been filed up to thát date. At least two of the grounds relied on by the Court to strike this complaint were that plaintiff had not sought' leave of the Court under Rule 15, and that he failed to obtain leave of the Court or written consent of the defendant for the filing of an amended complaint.
We think plaintiff was entitled to file the amended complaint containing three counts as of course... Leave of the Court was not necessary.
The District Court properly considered the amended complaint upon the merits.' This complaint did not refer to or adopt the original complaint or any part thereof. The counts were based on a theory of damages for concealed fraud in the violation of a confidential and trust relationship, both as to an express trust and a constructive trust in Führer Ford Milling Company stock, its earnings and dividends. Also, for misrepresentation by the defendant while acting in a fiduciary and trust relationship.
The motion to dismiss the counts of the original ten-count complaint were sustained primarily on three grounds, 1) failure to allege facts that the plaintiff had any interest in the property in question; 2) the original conveyance to the defendant was in violation of the Indiana criminal statute forbidding defrauding of creditors; and 3) the Indiana statute of limitations. The motion to amend by interlineation was denied on the ground that none of the proposed amendments cured the fatal defects in the original complaint.
Rule 15 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relied upon by the trial court explicitly provides that leave of court to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” The Federal Rules respecting amendments to pleadings should be given a liberal construction so that cases are decided on the merits rather than on bare pleadings. McHenry v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cir., 269 F.2d 18. Leave to amend should be freely given unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell, 7 Cir., 204 F.2d 8, 13. In Kingwood, we stated, at page 13, “No matter how likely it may seem that a plaintiff may be unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an opportunity to prove it.”
As hereinbefore stated, the District Court should have permitted the filing of the October 31 three-count complaint. It contained the clear and specific allegations that defendant had breached his fiduciary and confidential relationship to the plaintiff, and that by means of false and fraudulent representations, defendant had induced plaintiff to settle his interest in the trust res for a fraction of its actual worth.
Running through the several opinions and decisions of the District Court herein is the conclusion that the allegation in the original complaint that the transfer of property to the defendant by his father was a complete and absolute bar to the recovery in this suit by plaintiff, a nonresident of Indiana. After alleging that the father of plaintiff and defendant was a man of substantial means, holding important positions such as bank president and president of the Führer Ford Milling Company, the original complaint stated the father had endorsed notes of customers and conceived he might be required to make good thereon; that on May 4, 1925, the father transferred to defendant for safe keeping, 171% shares of the 271% shares owned by him of the milling company stock. Apparently, the father’s fears were unfounded as the record discloses he satisfied this liability by paying a nominal sum.
We hold that the allegation just described fails to show such fraud on the part of the father or such a violation of the Indiana criminal code which would, in itself, constitute a fatal admission against interest and which was incurable by amendment. The effect which the allegation may have as an admission against interest would depend on a number of factors including the financial condition of the father and his intent at the time of the transfer. Assuming, but not deciding, that a valid affirmative defense might be made on this ground, on a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
In any event, the amended complaint in no way refers to or adopts the allegations of the original complaint. The averment which the District Court found objectionable was not repeated in'the amended complaint.
In Nisbet v. Van Tuyl, 7 Cir., 224 F.2d 66, 71, the District Court sustained defendant’s motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs on an amended complaint. On appeal, in support of the District Court’s action, the defendant argued that the original complaint contained admissions which estop plaintiffs from maintaining their alleged action set forth in the amended complaint, and that it was proper for the Court to consider the unexplained admissions. This Court disagreed, and held at page 71:
“Upon a motion for summary judgment the court, in considering the pleadings upon which the motion is in part based, considers amended pleadings rather than prior pleadings superseded by the amended pleadings. An amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the prior pleading. The prior pleading is in effect withdrawn as to all matters not restated in the amended pleading, and becomes functus officio. 71 C.J.S., Pleading, § 321, p. 717. Therefore the argument of defendants in this regard is untenable. Upon a trial of the issues raised by the pleadings, including the amended complaint, a complaint superseded thereby might well be offered in evidence by the defense if it contains material admissions by the plaintiffs named in the amended complaint. Such evidence would be admissible in order to enable the court to determine the facts upon the issues being tried. Conversely, upon the trial, plaintiffs would be permitted to show by evidence the explanation, if any there be, as to why the facts relied on by defendants as admissions were stated in the amended complaint differently than the way in which they were stated in the original complaint.”
The relief asked for in the amended complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations. The complaint alleges a concealed fraud. The proof on this point at the trial may well establish the defense of the statute of limitations is not available.
Reversed and remanded.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "groups and associations"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0