What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America v. John “Ali” WILLIAMS, Appellant.
No. 90-5004.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) On Oct. 12, 1990.
Decided Oct. 24, 1990.
Peter V. Ryan, West Orange, N.J., for appellant.
Edna B. Axelrod, R. David Walk, Jr., Office of U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J., for appellee.
Before GREENBERG, HUTCHINSON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves the application of the federal sentencing guidelines to appellant John Williams. The facts are not complicated. On February 14, 1989, a federal grand jury indicted Williams as part of a large cocaine trafficking operation. The original indictment charged Williams and 19 others with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute in excess of five kilograms of cocaine. The grand jury returned a superseding indictment on March 23, 1989 adding another defendant to the conspiracy and 55 new counts, alleging various offenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Before trial, Williams entered into a plea agreement. Williams agreed to plead guilty to a lesser-included conspiracy charge; namely, a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute an amount of cocaine in excess of 500 grams but less than five kilograms. Both parties further agreed that the appropriate base offense level under the guidelines was 32 and that Williams should receive a two point reduction for accepting responsibility. In addition, Williams agreed that the total amount of cocaine “reasonably foreseeable” to be handled in connection with the conspiracy was between 5 and 14.9 kilograms. The parties did not stipulate to the amount of cocaine actually possessed by Williams.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court relied on the above information, setting an adjusted offense level of 30 and sentencing Williams within the guidelines range to 108 months. The court considered the amount of cocaine reasonably foreseeable by the defendant rather than the amount stated in the offense to which Williams pled guilty.
I.
We review the factual findings of the sentencing court for clear error, while issues of law raised by the court’s application of the sentencing guidelines are reviewed de novo. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Where the sentencing court includes illegal drugs not specified in the count of conviction as part of a common scheme or plan and calculates the offense level based on this greater amount, we review that determination only for clear error. United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989) (citation omitted).
II.
At the time of sentencing, the sentencing guideline for drug conspiracy convictions was section 2D1.4. Section 2D1.4 directs the sentencing court to the guideline for the object offense. In Williams’ case, the drug offense is 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. The corresponding guideline is Section 2D1.1. Under § 2D 1.1(a)(3), the base offense level for a drug offense not resulting in death or serious bodily injury is determined by reference to 2Dl.l(c) “Drug Quantity Table” which under subsection (6) rates possessing a quantity of cocaine between five and fifteen kilograms as Base Offense Level 32. The district court quantified the amount of drugs by turning to section 1B1.3 which defines relevant conduct.
In the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy, the conduct for which the defendant “would be otherwise accountable” also includes conduct of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointly-undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.
U.S.S.G., § 1B1.3, Application Note 1 (emphasis supplied).
Aside from the fact that Williams’ plea agreement stipulates the amount reasonably foreseen by Williams to be between 5 and 14.9 kilograms, every court of appeals ruling on this issue has held that a sentencing court may consider drug quantities outside the offense of conviction. United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907, 909-911 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1141-1142 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 805-806 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Woolford, 896 F.2d 99, 102-104 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 735, 737-738 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Guerrero, 894 F.2d 261, 265-266 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Allen, 886 F.2d 143, 145-146 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1560-62 (10th Cir.1990) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 88, 112 L.Ed.2d 60 (1990); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362, 1371-72 (11th Cir.1990). The rationale for including relevant conduct outside the offense of conviction is clear. Generally, the Guidelines limit conduct to acts embodied in the “charged” offense. However, in “ ‘fungible item’ crimes such as those involving drugs or money,” Blanco, 888 F.2d at 911, the court considers conduct of the “real” offense. “[T]he Commission has said that courts should punish convicted defendants by taking into account all the drugs or money that form part of the same conduct, scheme or plan.” Blanco, 888 F.2d at 911; see also U.S.S.G., § 1B1.3(a)(2). Furthermore, the commentary to the Guidelines clearly indicates that “in a drug distribution case, quantities and types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Background, p. 1.20; United States v. Woolford, 896 F.2d 99, 103 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting above language with approval in drug conspiracy case). We consider commentary critical to correctly interpreting the Guidelines. United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir.1989).
Williams urges us to limit the quantity taken into account to the lesser amount stated in the offense of conviction and adopt the rationale expressed in United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1989). Restrepo advocated the rule of lenity when considering drug quantities not embodied in the offense of conviction. This case goes against the rationale of the Guidelines, the force of logic, the weight of precedent in other Courts of Appeals, and remains uncertain even within the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1989), opinion withdrawn on rehearing by 903 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.1990), reh’g granted, 912 F.2d 1568 (9th Cir.1990). Hence, we reject that view and follow the reasoning set forth in Blanco and its progeny.
III.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court did not err when it added drug quantities that Williams admitted were associated with other counts to drug quantities for the offense covered by the conspiracy conviction. We will affirm the district court’s judgment of sentence.
. We have already rejected the contention that the relevant guidelines are those in effect at the time the offense was committed. See United States v. Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74, 77 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990).
. Section 2D1.4, Application Note 1, directs the sentencing court to section 1B1.3, Application Note 1 when the defendant is convicted of conspiracy.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1