What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
BROOKLYN TRUST CO. v. R. A. SECURITY HOLDINGS, INC.
No. 166.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 4, 1943.
Before SWAN, AUGUSTUS N. HAND and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Lynn G. Goodnough, of Brooklyn, N. Y. (Lynn G. Goodnough and William C. Hare, both of Brooklyn, N. Y., of counsel), for R. A. Security Holdings, Inc.
Walter F. O’Malley, of New York City (George O. Lehmann, of New York City, of counsel), for petitioners-appellees.
John F. Davis, of Philadelphia, Pa. and George Zolotar, of New York City (Theodore L. Thau, of Washington, D. C., and Earl J. Wofsey and Kiva Berke, both of New York City, of counsel), for Securities and Exchange Commission.
Arthur Block,'of Brooklyn, N. Y., for J. Read Smith, Trustee of the Estate of R. A. Security Holdings,. Inc., Debtor Corporation.
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.
The debtor, R. A. Security Holdings, Inc., owns a single parcel of real estate at 107 West 86th Street, New York City, subject to a mortgage in the principal sum of $825,000 and unpaid interest. It acquired the title subject to this mortgage but never assumed an obligation to pay the indebtedness which was that of the Prudence Bonds Corporation and was guaranteed by the Prudence Company Inc. The Brooklyn Trust Company held participation certificates in the mortgage as the trustee of three different estates. As such trustee it filed a petition in the bankruptcy court to obtain an involuntary reorganization of R. A. Security Holdings, Inc. under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et req. The debtor filed an answer denying insolvency and alleging that it never assumed or agreed to pay the mortgage, but the court held that it was insolvent and approved the petition. The balance sheet in srvidence showed a personal obligation of ihe debtor amounting to $1,840 which was represented by a loan to it by its holding company. The balance sheet also showed a mortgage of $825,000 covering premises No. 107 West 86th Street, which had been overdue for three years, and in addition there ■.vas a balance of unpaid interest that, with the unpaid principal, exceeded the value at which the premises, 107 West 86th Street, were carried on the books of the debtor.
The following provisions of Chapter X are applicable to the present proceeding;
§ 126. “A corporation, or three or more creditors who have claims against a corporation or its property amounting in the aggregate to $5,000 or over, liquidated as to amount and not contingent as to liability, or an indenture trustee where the securities outstanding under the indenture are liquidated as to amount and not contingent as to liability, may, if no other petition by or against such corporation is pending under this chapter, file a petition under this chapter.”
§ 106 (1). “‘claims’ shall include all claims of whatever character against a debtor or its property, except stock, whether or not such claims are provable under section 63 of this Act [section 103 of this title] and whether secured or unsecured, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent.”
§ 106(4). “ ‘creditor’ shall mean the holder of any claim.”
The question before us on this appeal-is whether the institution of an involuntary reorganization proceeding under Chapter X by persons holding claims only against the property of the debtor, and not claims against the debtor personally, deprived the latter of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
It is argued on behalf of the debtor, R. A. Security Holdings, Inc., that the proceeding violated the Fifth Amendment because it would interfere with the exercise of the debtor’s corporate franchises and the interference would be brought about by claimants who had no personal claims against it and to whom it owed no obligation. But the reports of the Committees of both the Senate and the House clearly show that Section 126 of the Chandler Act, which we have quoted, was intended to remove restrictions of Section 77B, 11 U.S.C.A. § 207, which had been held only to allow creditors holding personal obligations of the debtor, and not merely claims against its property, to file petitions for reorganization. The debtor’s contention that removal of the former restrictions was unconstitutional because it interfered with the exercise of the debtor’s corporate franchises is clearly without substance. It docs so, if at all, only temporarily and does no more than would the appointment of a chancery receiver which has long been a valid exercise of judicial power. Whatever reorganization may occur under the present proceedings would leave the corporate charter intact and permit the debtor to conduct any business that the charter may authorize, irrespective of whether or not the mortgage lien against its property may be modified.
The bankruptcy powers exercised in Congressional legislation have gradually been expanded from mere liquidation of the property of an insolvent debtor to rehabilitation through both voluntary and involuntary proceedings. Methods of rehabilitation have been extended from the old-fashioned composition applicable only to unsecured claims to an adjustment of the liens of secured claimants. The constitutionality of these later devices of rehabilitation in substitution for the old equity receivership was sustained by the Supreme Court in Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 671, 55 S.Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110. See, also, In re Central Funding Corporation, 2 Cir., 75 F.2d 256, 261. It is true that those decisions did not deal with claims which while secured were not also founded on personal obligations of the debt- or, but at least when the debtor is insolvent we can see nothing to prevent Congress from extending the application of the bankruptcy power in such a way as to protect the process of dealing with liens against its property in a reorganization proceeding like the one before us. The prime object in the case of either form of proceeding is to afford a convenient mode of adjusting the liens upon the property of a debtor under the safeguards of what amounts to a receivership. The question is entirely procedural and not constitutional.
The jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for corporate rehabilitation and to affect liens upon the property of the debtor where the latter has come under no personal obligation, has been recognized as permissible under Section 77B, when the proceedings have been instituted by voluntary petition. See Herbert V. Apartments v. Mortgage Guaranty Co., 3 Cir., 98 F.2d 662, 666, and In re Westover, Inc., 2 Cir., 82 F.2d 177, 181. The provision of Section 126 of the Chandler Act which permits such reorganizations, though the petition is involuntary, is in our opinion a valid application of the bankruptcy powers granted to Congress by the Constitution which in no way contravenes the Fifth Amendment.
Order affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1