What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 
Your task is to determine the nature of the first listed respondent.

Opinion:
DUGAN DRUG STORES, INC., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 20493.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 21, 1964.
Harman Parrott, T. H. Riggs, Houston, Tex., McGregor, Sewell, Junell & Riggs, Houston, Tex., of counsel, for appellant.
Scott T. Cook, James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Attys., Houston, Tex., Stuart R. Poliak, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Woodrow Seals, U. S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, BREITENSTEIN, and BELL, Circuit Judges.
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Dugan Drug Stores, Inc., along with its president and four employees, was charged in a 10-count information with violations of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act by refilling prescriptions for a potentially harmful drug without authorization by the prescribing physician. A jury trial resulted in the acquittal of the president and all employees except one who plead guilty, and the conviction of the company on all counts.
The first claim is that the information is defective and the proof insufficient because the prescriptions were not bona fide prescriptions issued by a doctor in the course of treatment of a patient but instead were obtained by federal agents for the purpose of investigating the defendants. The record shows no physician-patient relationship in the issuance of the prescriptions.
The validity of the original prescriptions is not material. The charge is that the prescriptions required authorization for a refill and were refilled without such authorization. The government has proceeded against the dispensers rather than the prescribers. The prescriptions were valid on their faces. Authorization for a refill would have been a complete defense. Cases relating to the liability of doctors are not in point. The effect of the appellant’s argument is that the government would be precluded from investigations such as were made unless it had some unhealthy agents in need of the prescribed drugs. The record shows that the agents did no more than present an opportunity for the violation of the Act by the sale of a prescribed drug without the necessary refill authorization. The issue relates to the unauthorized refill — not to the existence of any physician-patient relationship. The information is sufficient and the evidence is ample to sustain the conviction.
Inconsistency in the verdicts is claimed because the jury acquitted the individuals and convicted the company. This has no bearing on the counts to which one of the individuals plead guilty. In any event the rule is that consistency in verdicts is not necessary.
Appellant urges that the trial court erred in overruling various objections and in not granting various motions for mistrial based on the improper conduct of the prosecuting attorney. Without detailing the charges of misconduct, it is enough to say that they relate to the accosting of witnesses, implied threats to witnesses, remarks in the presence of the jury relating to matters which oceurred out of the presence of the jury, prejudicial statements in colloquies between counsel and between court and counsel, and improper closing argument which went outside the record and made groundless charges and unreasonable inferences. The justification of the conduct is that it was instigated by defense tactics and that it was not prejudicial because the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.
It should be unnecessary to say again that in a criminal prosecution a United States attorney has a double burden — the obligation to conduct the government’s case zealously and the obligation to try that case fairly and with due regard to the rights of the accused. In the case at bar zeal overcame fairness.
We are not impressed with the argument that the conduct of the prosecutor was caused by the conduct of defense counsel. A prosecutor should be immune to improper tactics. If he feels that his opponent has overstepped, the remedy is an appeal to the trial court — not in the adoption of unfair procedures. The sufficiency of the evidence to establish guilt does not cure the misconduct. It was aggravated and persistent with such a probable cumulative effect on the jury that it may not be disregarded as unpre judicial.
This disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the other assigned errors.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392.
. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1) (B). Such acts are a misbranding within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 331 (k).
. E. g., Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 39 S.Ct. 217, 63 L.Ed. 497; De Freese v. United States, 5 Cir., 270 F.2d 730, certiorari denied 362 U.S. 944, 80 S.Ct. 810, 4 L.Ed.2d 772; Brown v. United States, 5 Cir., 250 F.2d 745, certiorari denied 356 U.S. 938, 78 S.Ct. 779, 2 L.Ed.2d 812; Nigro v. United States, 8 Cir., 117 F.2d 624.
. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-394, 52 S.Ct. 189. 76 L.Ed. 356: see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48.
. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314; Dunn v. United States, 5 Cir., 307 F.2d 883, 885-886; Handford v. United States, 5 Cir., 249 F.2d 295, 296.
. See Berger v. United States, supra, 295 U.S. p. 89, 55 S.Ct. p. 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314.

Question: What is the nature of the first listed respondent?

Choices:
private business (including criminal enterprises)
private organization or association
federal government (including DC)
sub-state government (e.g., county, local, special district)
state government (includes territories & commonwealths)
government - level not ascertained
natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)
miscellaneous
not ascertained

Answer: 2