What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Eli BOLDEN, Appellant.
No. 71-1565.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted May 12, 1972.
Decided June 14, 1972.
Alfred I. Harris, and Morton L. Schwartz, St. Louis, Mo., on brief for appellant.
Daniel Bartlett, Jr., U. S. Atty., and David W. Harlan, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., on brief for appellee.
Before VOGEL, LAY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant-appellant, Eli Bolden, was found guilty by a jury of having in his possession certain mail matter and an article contained therein (a Master Charge credit card) knowing the same to have been stolen, in violation of 18 U.S. C.A. § 1708. He appeals from the judgment of conviction. We affirm.
On April 10, 1971, while at an E. J. Korvette Store located in Cool Valley, Missouri, Bolden presented a Master Charge credit card for payment of a suit which he wanted to purchase. The credit card in question had been issued and mailed to James Sayles of St. Louis, Missouri. Because of the amount of the purchase, the cashier called Master Charge for an authorization. As a result, Robert Earl Cope, who is a security detective at the E. J. Korvette Store in Cool Valley, received a call from Master Charge, stating that someone was attempting to use a stolen credit card in the store. Security Officer Cope then proceeded to the men’s check-out, took the Master Charge plate from the cashier and inquired as to whose card it was. Bolden responded that it was his. Cope thereupon asked appellant to accompany him to the store office in order to “straighten out the problem”.
When asked for personal identification, Bolden produced a card in his own name from the Missouri State Psychiatric Hospital. After seeing the card, Security Officer Cope immediately notified the Cool Valley Police, who then effected the arrest of appellant. Cope never placed appellant under arrest, nor did he restrain him in any way.
On appeal, appellant Bolden argues that he is entitled to a new trial because (1) he was not given the Miranda warnings by Security Officer Cope; (2) the United States Marshal’s office was unable to locate one Tony Gaskin, a potential defense witness; and (3) the trial court erred in the giving of certain instructions.
While it is true that Security Officer Cope did not give appellant the warnings required by Miranda, it is also true that such warnings are only required when there is a “custodial interrogation”, which is defined by the Supreme Court as “ * * * questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 1965, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
In view of the facts before us, we feel that Bolden was not under “custodial interrogation” because (1) Cope did not restrain appellant’s freedom in any significant way; (2) appellant voluntarily admitted that he had possessed the card in question; (3) appellant voluntarily gave evidence of his true identity; (4) appellant voluntarily accompanied Cope to the store office; and (5) Security Officer Cope was not a “law enforcement official” acting in a situation where the warnings would be necessary. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; United States v. Birnstihl, 9 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 368; United States v. Antonelli, 2 Cir., 1970, 434 F.2d 335. Cf. United States v. John R. Engle, 8 Cir., 1972, 458 F.2d 1017; Ping v. United States, 8 Cir., 1969, 407 F.2d 157, cert. denied, 1969, 395 U.S. 926, 89 S.Ct. 1784, 23 L.Ed.2d 244; Cohen v. United States, 8 Cir., 1968, 405 F.2d 34, cert. denied, 1968, 394 U.S. 943, 89 S.Ct. 1274, 22 L.Ed.2d 478.
Bolden next argues that he was prejudiced in that the subpoena issued for a defense witness was returned “Not Found”. Bolden argues that the witness, Tony Gaskin, would have corroborated other testimony to the effect that Gaskin gave the Master Charge card to appellant. Although the subpoena was returned “Not Found”, nineteen days elapsed between the return of the subpoena and the date of the trial. Appellant did not seek either an arrest warrant or a continuance. Additionally, members of appellant’s family admitted that they saw the witness during the time in question. Clearly the government cannot be required to be successful in its efforts to subpoena witnesses in every instance. All that is required is a good faith effort to secure the service of process. Maguire v. United States, 9 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 327, cert. denied, 1969, 393 U.S. 1099, 89 S.Ct. 897, 21 L.Ed.2d 792. The contention of appellant is without merit.
Finally, appellant submits that his trial was prejudiced by the instructions given by the trial court. We have reviewed the instructions in their entirety and find no error therein.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0