What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
JUBAS v. SAMPSELL.
No. 12524.
„ , „ . . United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
Nov. 14, 1950.
Gendel & Raskoff, Los Angeles, Cal,, for appellant.
Craig, Weller & Laughan, Los Angeles, Cal. (Thomas S. Tobin, Los Angeles, Cal., . ... .. °f counsel), for aPPcllee-
_ATC _. . , STEPHENS, Circuit Judge, ’ J
The court’s Findings of Fact are to the following purport and are unquestioned:
A copartnership composed of Gene L J ‘ f FaíTan. and Leo G- 01son was conducting a retail shoe business under the fictitious name of Fashion Bootery. The copartnership was adjudged a bankrupt and plaintiff-appellee thereafter became Trustee jn Bankruptcy. While yet solvent, the COpartnership sold 1240 pairs of shoes « . , , , £ which were of broken sizes and out of , ^ _ stylc: Tbey had “st betwcen $5'25 and $^*25 per pair and defendant-appellant purchased them for their then value of $1.00 per pair. This purchase and sale constituted 25% of the number of pairs of shoes and 15% of the value of the then held stock in trade. Prior to the sale “all available attempts to sell said shoes in the ordinary retail method of separate Pairs of shocs t0 mdivldual ^tomers had bcen ^successful.” The firm “had been tmable t0 obtam any hl^her or bctter offcr for sald shoes tban ?L0° Per Palr’ which was offered by defendant bercm-”
The California Bulk Sales Law, § 3440 of the Civil Code of California, provides that a sale in bulk of a substantial part oí a stock in trade “otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the regular and usual practice and method of business of the vendor * * * will be conclusively presumed to> be fraudulent and void as against existing creditors * * * ” unless a seven days’ notice of intention is recorded with the county re-J corder. No such notice was recorded. Fagan and Olson were declared bankrupt and the Referee brought timely suit to recover on behalf of the bankrupt estate. The district court held that the goods sold constituted a substantial ■ part of the stock m trade and that it was conclusively fraudulent, and gave judgment for the value of the 1240 pairs of shoes at $1.00 per pair. Defendant appeals.
The sole question here is whether in the circumstances the court erred by holding that the sale was conclusively fraudulent because § 3440 of the Civil Code of California was not complied with.
Appellant claims that the sale was in „ , : j ™ it. j í regular and usual practice and method of , . r ,, , busmess of the vendor and that the merchandise which was the subject of the sale , , . , , was not a substantial part of the vendor s stock in trade. We are of the opinion that these claims cannot be sustained. The “regular and usual practice and method of business of the vendor” cannot be measured by a prevalent custom of merchants which the vendor followed. The vendors herein were retail shoe merchants whose regular and usual practice and method of business . e , , . was selling shoes to those who came into & , the store to buy from the stock m trade J for wear.
The plain meaning of the statute is that when a storekeeper disposes of a substantial part of his stock in trade in bulk, and selling in bulk sales is not the usual and ordinary way in which he conducts his business from day to day, the sale falls within the statute.
The Findings of Fact to the effect , v. . . .. . , , that the shoes m suit were m the stock in trade and constituted 25% in quantity and 15% in value of the whole stock supports the conclusion that the part sold was a substantial part of the whole. See Schainman v. Dean, 9 Cir., 1928, 24 F.2d 475 and Markwell & Co. v. Lynch, 9 Cir., 1940, 114 F.2d 373, 375.
Affirmed,

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1