What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Alfred Joseph COLLINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WARDEN, NEVADA STATE PRISON, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 73-1927.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Nov. 7, 1973.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. Denied Dec. 20, 1973.
Robert J. Donovan (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner-appellant.
Robert A. Groves, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Robert List, Atty. Gen., Carson City, Nev., Robert Rose, Dist. Atty., Reno, Nev., for respondent-appellee.
Before DUNIWAY and WALLACE, Circuit Judges, and SCHNACKE, District Judge.
Tlie Honorable Robert H. Sclmacke, United States District Judge, Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
OPINION
DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge:
Collins appeals from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
In April of 1968, in Nevada State Court, Collins pled guilty to three charges, robbery, attempted robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon: He had also been charged with being an habitual criminal and, if convicted of that charge, he would have been subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. This Consequence Collins was most anxious to avoid, and as a result there was plea bargaining. In that bargaining, it was agreed that the habitual criminal charge would be dropped, and it was dropped.
During the plea bargaining, Collins’ counsel told him that he would be eligible for parole. When Collins was sentenced, the state judge told Collins that he would be eligible for parole. However, there was no bargain as to whether the sentences would be concurrent or consecutive. The sentences imposed were consecutive: ten years on the robbery charge, three years on the attempted robbery charge, and six years on the assault with a deadly weapon charge. The state judge told Collins that the fact that the sentences were consecutive would not affect his eligibility for parole.
When Collins’ pleas were accepted, Nev.R.S. § 213.110 appeared to make him ineligible for parole because he had been convicted of more than three felonies. Collins then sought post conviction relief in the Nevada courts. This relief was finally denied by the Nevada Supreme Court. Collins v. Warden, Nev., 1972, 493 P.2d 1335. There, the court held that § 213.110 did not preclude parole; that it only precluded parole “outside the prison’s buildings and enclosures,” and that he could be paroled from the first sentence to begin serving the second and from the second to begin serving the third, so long as he remained inside the prison. It also held that Nev.R.S. § 176.035 did not prevent such successive paroles. Relief was denied.
Collins then turned to the federal court for habeas corpus relief. After a hearing, relief was denied. This appeal followed. The federal trial court denied relief on two grounds. The first is that “the prime thrust of the plea negotiations had been to eliminate the habitual criminal charge so that Collins would not be subjected to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. The entire discussion before the change of pleas related to the elimination of the habitual criminal charges.” This finding is not clearly erroneous. See Albrecht v. Nelson, 9 Cir., 1972, 462 F.2d 623, 624. The federal trial court also found:
“Collins entered his pleas of guilty partly in reliance upon the representations by Erickson [Collins’ counsel] that he would be eligible for parole within three or four-years.”
In addition, the federal trial court held that insofar as parole eligibility may have been a part of the bargain, that bargain has, in substance, been fulfilled. This is because in 1971, Nev.R.S. § 213.110 was amended to eliminate the parole disqualification of a prisoner three times convicted of a felony. The federal trial court found, referring to the sentencing:
“At that time, the Court indicated that the Parole Board might put him out on parole in two and one-half or three years, ‘something like that, I don’t have it calculated but it is up to you.’ But this statement at the time sentence was imposed was not a representation which influenced the defendant in entering his pleas of guilty on April 22 and April 23, 1968.”
“There was understandably some confusion because of the recent change in the Nevada law, but the net result of what occurred is that the defendant actually received substantially what he bargained for.”
As to the decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada, the! federal trial court found:
“The effect of this decision applicable to Mr. Collins is that in view of the parole eligibility provisions of N.R.S. § 213.120, he would be eligible for parole under the ten year robbery sentence after serving two and one-half years, eligible for parole under the succeeding three year attempted robbery sentence after serving one year, and eligible for parole under the succeeding six year assault with a deadly weapon sentence after serving one and one-half years. Thus, taking all the consecutive sentences into consideration, the defendant would be eligible for parole outside the prison within five years ‘less good time credits.’ Under N.R.S. § 209.280, if total good time credits are earned, a ten year sentence becomes a sentence of six years and six months; a three year sentence becomes a sentence of two years and four months; and a six year sentence becomes a sentence of four years and two months. Taking these good time credits into consideration, it becomes evident that Mr. Erickson’s estimate and representation to the defendant that he could be paroled in three or four years was not far from the mark. ... If parole considerations are to be deemed important in this factual context as a consequence of the guilty pleas, it seems apparent that there was no substantial misinformation given to the defendant and that with the elimination of the habitual criminal charges, he would in fact receive from the plea bargaining negotiations substantially what he bargained for. This is particularly so in view of the fact that no one, before, during or after sentence, purported to assure the defendant that he would be eligible' for parole at any specific time or after serving any certain period of time.”
It concluded:
“In view of all the circumstances, it is the conclusion of the Court that the pleas of guilty by Collins were voluntary and understandingly tendered ft
These findings, too, are not clearly erroneous.
Before this court, the Warden asserts that eligibility for parole is not one of the consequences of a plea about which a defendant must be informed, citing Mathis v. Hocker, 9 Cir., 1972, 459 F.2d 988 and Bosley v. Hocker, 9 Cir., 1972, 460 F.2d 1064 (#1). Those cases, however, are not controlling here. So far as appears, in those cases parole eligibility was not mentioned, either in plea bargaining or when the pleas were accepted. Not so here; in our case parole eligibility was discussed, and, while it was not the primary motivation for the plea, it was .something that both counsel and the Nevada judge led Collins to believe that he would achieve. Collins argues that these facts bring into the picture the decision of the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 1971, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427. The essence of that decision is that:
“. . . [A] constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”
For the purpose of this case, we assume that the prosecutor, like defense counsel and the state judge, was a party to the representation about parole made to Collins in the course of the bargain. However, we expressly refrain from deciding whether these circumstances are equivalent to the kind of promise to which the Court referred in Santobello. Even if they are, it does not follow that Collins is entitled to relief. On the contrary, by the combined actions of the Nevada Supreme Court and the Nevada Legislature, the bargain has been kept. Collins has his parole eligibility. We can think of no good reason why action by the Nevada Legislature which fulfills the bargain should not be just as effective for the purposes of federal habeas corpus as action by a court or by the parole board.
Collins’ other arguments do not warrant discussion.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1