What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
LAURENT v. UNITED STATES.
No. 10773.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
May 15, 1945.
Walter H. Duane, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
Frank J. Hennessy, U. S. Atty., and Reynold H. Colvin, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before GARRECHT, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.
On March 1, 1944, appellant and six others — Russell S. Youmans, Percy Newford, Arthur Grenier, Albert Norwitt, Charles E. Corsiglia and Bernard R. Kerns — were indicted for conspiring to acquire, use, permit the use of, transfer, possess and control “counterfeited and forged ration documents, to-wit, counterfeited and forged C-2 gasoline mileage ration coupons,” and to obtain and attempt to obtain “a rationed commodity, to-wit, gasoline, without presenting the prescribed ration coupons therefor.” Appellant’s codefendants pleaded guilty. Appellant pleaded not guilty, was tried, convicted and sentenced, and has appealed. The question is whether the evidence supports appellant’s conviction.
There is no evidence that appellant conspired with his codefendants, or any of them, to acquire, use, permit the use of, transfer, possess or control counterfeited or forged C-2 gasoline mileage ration coupons, or to obtain or attempt to obtain gasoline without presenting the prescribed ration coupons therefor.
There is no evidence that appellant knew, or had any dealings with, any of his codefendants except Newford. There is no evidence that appellant had any dealings with Newford except that appellant purchased from Newford 128 C-2 gasoline mileage ration coupons (two sheets of 64 coupons each) in November or December, 1943, and 2,560 C-2 gasoline mileage ration coupons (40 sheets of 64 coupons each) in January or February, 1944. There is no evidence that the coupons purchased from Newford were counterfeited or forged.
There is evidence that the coupons purchased from Newford had been obtained by Newford from Youmans, and that on February 16, 1944, Youmans had in his possession 80,612 C-2 gasoline mileage ration coupons (1,258 sheets of 64 coupons each), all of which were counterfeited. These, however, did not include any of the coupons purchased from Newford by appellant. Appellant, so far as the evidence shows, had nothing to do with any of the 80,612 counterfeited coupons.
There is evidence that on some undisclosed date or dates, appellant (a dealer) obtained gasoline by surrendering in exchange therefor 325 counterfeited C-2 gasoline mileage ration coupons, but there is no evidence that he conspired to do so. There is no evidence that any of the 325 counterfeited coupons was purchased from New-ford. Newford, so far as the evidence shows, had nothing to do with any of these coupons.
We conclude that the evidence does not support appellant’s conviction.
Judgment reversed.
Section 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 88, provides: “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any such act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than §10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”
Section 1394.8178 of Ration Order No. 5C, 7 F.R. 9135, provides: “No person shall transfer, receive a transfer of, possess or use any forged or counterfeited * * * coupon or other evidence.” Section 2.5 of General Ration Order No. 8, 8 F.R 3783, provides: “No person shall acquire, use, permit the use of, transfer, possess or control any counterfeited or forged ration document.” Ration Order No. 5C and General Ration Order No. 8 were issued under subsection (a) of § 2 of the Act of June 28, 1940, c. 440, 54 Stat. 676, as amended by § 301 of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, 50 U.S.O.A. Appendix, §§ 633, 1152. Paragiaph (5) of subsection (a), as amended, provides: “Any person who willfully performs any act prohibited, or willfully fails to perform any act required by, any provision of this subsection (a) or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, whether heretofore or hereafter issued, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than §10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”
Section 1394.8152 of Ration Order No. 50 provides that, with inapplicable exceptions, “a dealer or distributor may transfer gasoline to a consumer, and a consumer may accept such transfer of gasoline, only in exchange for valid coupons.” Section 1394.8207 of Ration Order No. 50 provides that, with inapplicable exceptions, “no dealer or distributor shall receive a transfer of gasoline, except in exchange for a quantity of coupons equal in gallonage value to the amount of the gasoline so transferred.”
Not later than February 10, 1944.
These coupons were taken from You-mans on February 16, 1944, and at the trial, were put in evidence as appellee’s Exhibit 1.
These and 62 genuine coupons — a total of 387, comprising seven so-called bingo sheets — were put in evidence as appellee’s Exhibit 3.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0