What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
WILLIS v. HUNTER.
No. 3600.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
March 10, 1948.
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1948.
John' J.. Gibbons, of Denver Colo., for appellant.
Eugene Davis, of Topeka, Kan. (Randolph Carpenter, of Topeka, Kan., U. S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
Before BRATTON, HUXMAN and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.
MURRAH, Circuit Judge.
By this habeas corpus proceedings petitioner seeks release from a three year sentence imposed in the United States District Court of Colorado for attempted escape, in violation of 46 Stat. 327, as amended 49 Stat. 513, 18 U.S.C.A. § 753h. See also Willis v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 164 F. 2d 694. The sole question presented by the petition for the writ is whether petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings, resulting in his sentence on a plea of guilty?
In denying the writ, the trial court found from the record evidence that on October 16, 1946, petitioner appeared in open court with Charles J. Moynihan, counsel of his “own choosing and employment”, and en-dered a plea of guilty to the charge against him; that upon request of counsel, im■position of sentence was deferred until October 23 to permit counsel to submit data in mitigation of punishment; that when asked by the court if he would be ■present on the sentencing date, counsel replied that he would not, but would “sub•mit written notes”; that he was advised -to send the “notes” to the Probation Offi•cer for submission to the court; that on the 23rd of October petitioner appeared before the court for sentence pursuant to -the previous order; that counsel, though -not present, had submitted to the Probation Officer for delivery to the court, a lengthy memorandum epitomizing the past life and background of the petitioner, -which had been briefed from his own "handwritten statement; that “the statement of counsel was submitted to the court for the purpose of aiding it while passing sentence upon the defendant,” and petitioner was therefore accorded the effective .assistance of counsel when sentence was imposed. The court was moreover of the opinion that petitioner being represented by employed counsel, and the cause being continued at his request to enable him to furnish written data and argument to -the court on the matter of sentence, and it being understood that counsel would not .be present when sentence was imposed, petitioner waived any right to have counsel physically present at that time.
On hearing, petitioner was permitted to .testify, in contravention of the record evidence, that he entered his plea of guilty before the sentencing court on September 12, 1946, at which time the court was informed by the Probation Officer that peti-tioner was represented by counsel who was -not present; that on October 16, he again .appeared before the court represented by •counsel, and stood silent while his attorney asked that sentence be deferred until lie could prepare a statement of the petitioner’s background for the court’s consideration; that when he appeared for -sentence on October 23 his attorney was not present; that he did not know of his -right to have counsel present and the court •did not so advise him.
The trial court’s findings on the record evidence is, of course, conclusively controlling here, and the narrow question then is, whether petitioner was entitled as of right to have counsel present when sentence was imposed on October 23, and if so, did he competently and intelligently waive that right?
In considering the question whether a petitioner has been accorded his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at every stage in the proceedings against him, we have never found it necessary to decide precisely whether absence of counsel when sentence is imposed in and of itself amounted to a denial of that constitutional guaranty. We have stated, however, that “an accused should have an opportunity to be heard by counsel on the sentence to be imposed and that a court should not impose sentence in the absence of counsel without expressly ascertaining that a defendant does not desire his presence. * * * ” This for the reason that “many considerations influence the length of a sentence which is to be imposed, and a defendant should have the opportunity to have his attorney present any mitigating circumstances to the court for its consideration in deter-, mining the weight of the sentence.” Batson v. United States, 10 Cir., 137 F.2d 288, 289. See also Thomas v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 153 F.2d 834. Cf. Kent v. Sanford, 5 Cir., 121 F.2d 216.
The constitutional mandate is not satisfied by legalistic formality, von Moltke v. Gillies, 68 S.Ct. 316. An accused may be denied effective assistance of counsel, although counsel be present at every stage in the proceedings. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680. Conversely, he may actually have the benefit of counsel, although he is absent at some stage of the proceedings. Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82, 66 S.Ct. 452, 90 L.Ed. 545. See also Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 67 S.Ct. 216; Amrine v. Tines, 10 Cir., 131 F.2d 827. Since the right to counsel is a matter of substance not form, it is the solemn duty of the trial judge to make sure that representation is not an empty gesture, but is the fulfullment of the spirit and purpose of the constitutional mandate. See von Moltke v. Gillies, supra; Glasser v. United States, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357.
We think that the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplates the guiding hand of an able and responsible lawyer, devoted solely to the interest of his client; who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the law and facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity to present them to a court or jury in their most favorable light If the accused does not have the assistance of counsel when entering a plea or when sentence is imposed, it must be manifestly clear to the court that he has competent and intelligently waived such right. Indeed, there are situations when justice cannot be administered unless one charged with a crime is represented by capable and responsible counsel. See Carter v. Illinois, supra.
Here the petitioner was represented by counsel of his own choice, who when the guilty plea was entered asked leave to reduce the argument in behalf of his client to writing and submit it to the court in order that he might have it when he came to consider punishment. When the court inquired whether he expected to be present when sentence was imposed, he stated in the presence of his client that he would not, but would submit his written notes for the court’s consideration. When the court came to pass judgment, he had before him the lawyer’s brief in his client’s behalf, and referred to it in the determination of punishment. Certainly, it cannot be said that the logic of a written argument to the court is not as effective as court room oratory. Furthermore, after imposition of sentence petitioner wrote to the sentencing court expressing the view that “In such a case as was my own, I am sure his honor was as merciful as could be expected and I am grateful for the undue kindness shown me under the then trying circumstances.”
While we should scrutinize very closely any sentence imposed upon an accused without the physical presence of counsel, we think the facts in this case deny any imputation that in' the constitutional sense petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at every stage in the proceedings.
The judgment is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1