What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence.

Opinion:
SHUTTLESWORTH et al. v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM.
No. 67.
Argued November 6-7, 1962.
Decided May 20, 1963.
Constance Baker Motley argued the cause for .petitioners. With her on the brief were Jack Greenberg, Arthur D. Shores, Peter A. Hall, Orzell Billingsley, Jr., Oscar W. Adams, Jr. and Leroy D. Clark.
Watts E. ' Davis and ./. M. Breckenridge argued the cause for respondent. With Mr. Davis on the brief was Earl McBee.
Solicitor General Cox, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, .as amicus curiae, urging reversal. . With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Louis F. Claiborne, Harold H. Greene, Howard-A.'Glickstein and Richard K. Berg.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioners, both Negro ministers, were tried and convicted in the Birmingham, Alabama, Recorder’s Court for aiding and abetting a violation of the city criminal trespass ordinance. The complaint filed with respect to Shuttlesworth. charged:
“Comes the City of Birmingham, Alabama, a municipal corporation, and complains that F. L. Shuttlesworth, within twelve months before the beginning of this prosecution, and within the City of Birmingham or the police jurisdiction thereof, did incite or aid or abet in the violation of an ordinance of the. City, to-wit, Section 1436 of - the General City Code of Birmingham of 1944, in that F. L. Shuttlesworth did incite or aid or abet another person to go or remain on the premises of another after being warned not to do so, contrary to and in violation of Section 824 of the General City Code of Birmingham of 1944.” (Footnotes added.)
An identical complaint was filed charging Billups.
On appeal to the Circuit Court petitioners received a trial de novo and were again convicted. Petitioner Shut-tlesworth was sentenced to 180 days in jail at hard labor and a fine of $100. Petitioner Billups was sentenced to 30.days and a fine of $25. On-further appeal to the Alabama Court of Appeals the convictions were affirmed. 41 Ala. App. 318, 319, 134 So. 2d 213, 215. The Alabama Supreme Court denied writs of certiorari. 273 Ala. 704, 713, 134 So. 2d 214, 215. Because of the grave constitutional questions involved, we granted certiorari. 370 U. S. 934.
Though petitioners topk separate appeals, they were jointly tried in the Circuit Court. The evidence is sketchy in' character. Only one witness testified, a city detective who had listened to petitioners’ trial in the Recorder’s Court. . The detective testified to his recollection of the testimony of two college boys whom (among others) petitioners were alleged to have incited to commit the criminal trespass. ■
, These two boys were James E. Gober and James Albert Davis. They were convicted of criminal trespass in a separate proceeding subsequent to petitioners’ trial. In Gober v. City of Birmingham, post, p. 374, .decided this day, we hold on the authority of Peterson v. City of Greenville, ante, p. 244, that the convictions of Gober and Davis are constitutionally invalid. The detective stated that in the Recorder’s Court Gober and Davis had testified as follows:
' James' Gober and James Albert Davis, both Negro college students, went to the home, of petitioner, Rev. Shuttlesworth; on March 30, 1960, where there were other college students. Petitioner, Rev. Billups, drove Davis there, and Billups was present when Shuttlesworth asked for volunteers to participate in “sit-down demonstrations.” Gober “testified that in response to Rev. Shut-tlesworth asking for volunteers to participate in the sit down strikes that he volunteered to go to Pizitz at 10:30 and take part in the sit down demonstrations.” A list was made by someone; and Shuttlesworth announced he would get them out of jail. Gober and Davis participated in sit-down demonstrations on the following day as did others who were present.
This is the sole evidence upon which the petitioners were convicted. There was no evidence that any of the. demonstrations which resulted from the meeting were disorderly or otherwise in violation of law.
Petitioners contend that there is no evidence to show-guilt of the charged offense. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157; Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199. We need not reach that question sinqe there is a more compelling reason why these convictions cannot stand.
Petitioners were convicted for inciting, aiding,- and abetting a violation of the city trespass ordinance. The trespass “violation” was that committed by the petitioners in Gober v. City of Birmingham, post, p. 374. Since the convictions in Gober have been set aside, it follows that the present petitioners did not incite or aid and abet any crime, and that therefore their own convictions must be set aside.
It is generally recognized that there can be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act. See, e. g., Edwards v. United States, 286 F. 2d 681 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1960); Meredith v. United States, 238 F. 2d 535 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1956); Colosacco v. United States, 196 F. 2d 165, (C. A. 10th Cir. 1952); Karrell v. United States, 181 F. 2d 981, 985 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1950); Manning v. Biddle, 14 F. 2d 518 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1926); Kelley v. Florida, 79 Fla. 182, 83 So. 909 (1920); Commonwealth v. Long, 246 Ky. 809, 811-812, 56 S. W. 2d 524, 525 (1933) ; Cummings v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 301, 313, 298 S. W. 943, 948 (1927); State v. St. Philip, 169 La. 468, 471-472, 125 So. 451, 452 (1929); State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731, 25 So. 372 (1899); Wages v. State, 210 Miss. 187, 190, 49 So. 2d 246, 248 (1950); State v. Cushing, 61 Nev. 132, 146, 120 P. 2d 208, 215 (1941); State v. Hess, 233 Wis. 4, 8-9, 288 N. W. 275, 277 (1939); cf. Langham v. State, 243 Ala. 564, 571, 11 So. 2d 131, 137 (1942).
Reversed.
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante-, p. 248.]
Birmingham General CityCpde, 1944, § 1436, provides:
“After Warning — Any person who enters into the dwelling house, or goes or remains on the premises of another, after being warned not to do so, shall on conviction, be punished as provided in Section 4, provided, that this Section shall not apply to police officers in the discharge of official duties.”
Birmingham General City Code, 1944, §824, provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to incite, or aid or abet in, the violation of any law or ordinance of the city, or any provisipn of • state law, the violation of which is á misdemeanor.” ■
Petitioners objected to all of this testimony as hearsay and on constitutional grounds, but these objections were overruled.
The trial court stated, “[Y]ou have here the ten students and the Court thinks they were misused and misled into a violation of - a City Ordinance and has so ruled.” As we understand the record, these convictions were baséd upon the inciting of the 10 students who are the petitioners in Gober.

Question: What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision?

Choices:
judicial review (national level)
judicial review (state level)
Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction
statutory construction
interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order
diversity jurisdiction
federal common law

Answer: 1
6