What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, and Carol O. Morey, Special Agent, Internal Revenue Service, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Lowell E. MORIARTY, as Vice-President and Secretary of Moriarty Manufacturing Company, Inc., Respondent-Appellant.
No. 18446.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Dec. 22, 1970.
Cahill, Fox & Smith, S. C., Milwaukee, Wis., for respondent-appellant; John D. Cahill, William Fitzhugh Fox, Daniel O. Ryan, Jr., Bruce C. O’Neill, Milwaukee, Wis., of counsel.
Johnnie M. Walters, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tax Division, John P. Burke, Meyer Rothwacks, Joseph M. Howard, Attys., Tax Division, Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for petitioners-appellees; David J. Cannon, U. S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., of counsel.
Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge, CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and PELL, Circuit Judge.
CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
The respondent-appellant Lowell E. Moriarty, vice-president and secretary of Moriarty Manufacturing Company, Inc., prosecutes this appeal from the, judgment order of the District Court enforcing an Internal Revenue summons issued by Special Agent Carol O. Morey. The summons requires the appellant to appear and to produce certain designated books and records of the corporation. The enforcement order was entered on the government’s motion for summary judgment based on the pleadings, depositions and affidavits on file in the enforcement proceeding. The appellant had filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment in which he asserted that he was entitled to a trial on the merits on the issue of whether the Special Agent issued the summons solely for the purpose of securing evidence to convict appellant of a crime.
The record discloses that early in 1966 the Internal Revenue Service was conducting an audit of the corporate income tax returns of Moriarty Manufacturing Company, Inc. for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965. Sometime in June 1966 the Revenue Agents involved in the audit discovered a badge of fraud (missing invoices) and the matter was referred to the Service's Intelligence Division. In July 1966 Special Agent Morey was assigned to investigate the case jointly with the Revenue Agent then assigned to the matter. From September 1, 1966 until November 9, 1966, the agents visited the offices of the corporation and examined some of the company’s records. Thereafter they were refused access to the records.
From the depositions appellant took of the agents it appears that some of the corporation’s records had not been seen by the agents and that normal auditing practices would require continued access to the various corporate books and records. Special Agent Morey testified in his deposition that a joint investigation is one participated in by a Special Agent of the Intelligence Division and a Revenue Agent from the Audit Division; in the joint investigation he was in charge and was responsible for investigating the possibility of the existence of criminal fraud; that the Special Agent has authority to recommend that the investigation be closed, that it be transferred back to the Audit Division, that a criminal prosecution be instituted, or that civil penalties for fraud be imposed without criminal prosecution, as the facts warrant; that the cooperating Revenue Agent is bound by the recommendations of the Special Agent with respect to civil fraud penalties; and that when the Special Agent enters the ease the civil part of the audit procedure does not stop completely, but the agents responsible for the civil aspect work right along with the Special Agent, although, generally, no actual tax assessment is made until there has been a disposition of the criminal aspect of the case.
The appellant filed no counter-affidavits. Consequently, the government’s affidavit filed in support of the motion for summary judgment and the deposition testimony of the agents stand uncontroverted. There is no genuine material issue of fact to be determined. And the record establishes that the summons was issued by the Special Agent in the course of an investigation to which he was assigned for the purpose of investigating possible fraud and of making recommendations on the assertion of civil penalties with or without criminal prosecution. The Revenue Agent previously in the case is still assigned to the investigation under the supervision of the Special Agent in a joint investigation. This joint investigaton embraces a continuation of the tax audit of the corporation’s federal tax affairs for the purpose of determination of civil tax liability.
This being so, the District Court applied correct legal criteria in granting the government’s motion for summary judgment and entering the judgment order enforcing the summons. The fact that the summons was issued by the Special Agent does not preclude its enforcement. As long as the determination of civil tax liability is genuinely a purpose of the summons, it will be enforced, as the summons, or its enforcement, does not become improper because it may also produce evidence warranting criminal prosecution. United States v. Hayes, 7 Cir., 408 F.2d 932, 936; United States v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company, 6 Cir., 415 F.2d 1284. Here the civil tax audit has not been completed, the inspection of the additional records is needed, and continued access to the corporation’s records is essential to a proper completion of the audit. There is no basis for a conclusion that the sole purpose of the investigation, or of the summons, is to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution.
We perceive nothing in our recent decision in United States v. Monsey, 7 Cir., 429 F.2d 1348, which makes enforcement of the instant summons improper. Monsey dealt only with the necessity for discovery, not with the ultimate issue of enforcement.
The fact that tax evasion indictments were returned against the appellant a few days prior to the entry of the enforcement order, which indictments charge him with attempting to evade his own and the corporation’s income taxes for the years 1963, 1964 and 1965, does not require a holding that enforcement of the summons is improper. The audit of the corporation’s records need not await final disposition of the criminal proceedings against the appellant. We do not read Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459, as so dictating. Reisman in referring to the right of the witness to challenge the use of the administrative summons “for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution” cites Boren v. Tucker, 9 Cir., 239 F.2d 767, 772-773, but only to the pages in Boren where United States v. O’Connor (D.C.Mass.1953) 118 F.Supp. 248, is discussed and distinguished. In O’Connor the Special Agent when he issued the summons was not engaged in any specific inquiry into the taxpayer’s affairs and the summons was admittedly issued to aid the Department of Justice in preparing for trial of a pending tax evasion indictment. Such is not the case here.
We conclude that on the record before it the District Court did not err in granting enforcement of the summons. The judgment order appealed from is, therefore, affirmed.
Affirmed.
. The summons was issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. §, 7602.
. The order of enforcement was entered on February 25, 1970. The petition for enforcement was filed August 3, 1967.
. Cf. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1