What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Clarence E. WOODS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 71-2228
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 25, 1971.
Clarence E. Woods, pro se.
John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., E. Ray Taylor, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.
Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.
[1] Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying the petition of Woods, a federal prisoner, for the writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Woods is serving a six year sentence imposed on February 25, 1966, for interstate transportation of forged securities in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314. On February 18, 1970, he was released from his sentence on mandatory release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 4163, with 736 days remaining to be served. On October 27, 1970, a mandatory release violator’s warrant was issued after Woods was arrested by Georgia state police and charged with auto theft. The warrant application also charged that Woods had failed to comply with other conditions of his release by failing to submit a monthly report and failing to report a change in residence. The warrant was executed on December 26, 1970, and a revocation hearing was held on February 24, 1971.
As grounds for habeas corpus relief Woods contends that he was returned to federal custody on a warrant application, not on a warrant; he was not informed of the parole board’s decision; there was no probable cause for the warrant; the parole board was biased against him; and the revocation hearing was unreasonably delayed. Woods also contends that he is entitled to credit on his sentence for the time spent on mandatory release, that his accumulated good time cannot be revoked, and his release under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4163 was absolute and irrevocable.
The district court found from the record that a warrant was in fact issued and executed, but that even if Woods was served only a copy of the warrant application, it was adequate notice of the violations charged to enable him to prepare a defense. The court below also found that Woods never denied the truth of the charges on which the warrant was based; that he offered no factual allegations to support his contention of bias; and that the two month delay in holding the hearing was not unreasonable. A review of the record reveals no clear error in these findings.
It is well settled that Woods is not entitled to credit on his sentence for time spent on mandatory release. Blanchard v. United States, 5 Cir. 1970, 433 F.2d 13; Garnett v. Blackwell, 5 Cir. 1970, 423 F.2d 1211; Clark v. Blackwell, 5 Cir. 1967, 374 F.2d 952. The contention that his earned good time could not be revoked is equally without merit. Smith v. Attorney General, 5 Cir. 1969, 420 F.2d 488; Smith v. Blackwell, 5 Cir. 1966, 367 F.2d 539. Finally, Wood’s contention that mandatory release is irrevocable is untenable. Tippit v. Clark, 5 Cir. 1971, 444 F.2d 534; Garnett v. Blackwell, supra; Buchanan v. Blackwell, 5 Cir. 1967, 372 F.2d 451.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0