What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
James Allen BLACK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Robert A. Butterworth, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 90-3878
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 5, 1991.
Alan B. Fields, Jr., Palatka, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.
Judy Taylor Rush, Dept, of Legal Affairs, Daytona Beach, Fla., for respondents-appellees.
Before JOHNSON, HATCHETT and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant James Allen Black received an enhanced felony sentence of three-and-one-half years in prison and one-and-one-half years on probation, due to his three previous convictions for drunken driving. Appellant pled guilty to the first conviction used to enhance his sentence without having counsel or being informed of his right to counsel. Appellant brought his claim of denial of the right to counsel before the state courts, which denied relief. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, which refused to grant relief. Appellant argues on appeal that he is due relief because he was denied counsel in the first drunken driving proceedings, under this circuit’s holding in Greene v. United States. Alternately, he argues that his case should be remanded to allow him to show the indigency required for relief under Baldasar v. Illinois. We will discuss these claims in reverse order.
I. Indigency
This court’s decision in Moore v. Jarvis precludes any relief to appellant on his claim that he was denied counsel because of his indigency. After conducting an analysis of the several concurring opinions in Baldasar, Moore held that Baldasar “forbid[s] only the sentencing of a defendant to an increased term of incarceration solely upon consideration of a prior conviction obtained in a proceeding for which, due to the indigence of the defendant or some misconduct of the State, counsel was unavailable to the defendant.” The court in Moore then denied relief because “Moore has not alleged — let alone proven— that she was indigent at the respective times of her prior convictions or that the state somehow prevented her from obtaining the services of retained counsel.” The district court found that appellant had not proven his indigency at the time of the prior conviction. In fact, the record shows that appellant was selling mobile homes at the time of the first conviction and that his parents quickly came up with the $165 fine. Appellant did not allege or show that the state prevented him from obtaining counsel. Due to Moore’s interpretation of Baldasar, no relief is appropriate.
II. The Holding in Greene
In a somewhat confusing argument, appellant seems to maintain that there is a conflict between this circuit’s opinion in Moore and our opinion in Greene, which states, “[T]he Sixth Amendment prohibits the use to enhance a sentence of a conviction obtained in a proceeding in which defendant lacked the assistance of counsel.” The district court did not discuss Greene.
Although the quoted language in Greene could be characterized as affording a basis for relief to appellant, it is apparent from our reading of other cases that it does not. Greene did not involve a situation where the sentence under attack was enhanced by a prior conviction for which there was no right to counsel. In the context of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, the Supreme Court in Scott v. Illinois held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is infringed only when a misdemeanor criminal defendant actually receives an uncoun-seled term of imprisonment. Thus, Greene should be read more properly as forbidding the enhancement of a sentence on the basis of an uncounseled prior conviction for which there was the right to counsel. Moreover, binding precedent of this circuit allows the consideration during sen-tenting of uncounseled prior misdemeanor convictions for which a term of imprisonment was not imposed.
Seen in this light, Moore and Greene are not at odds. Moore involved enhancement on the basis of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for which no imprisonment was imposed, while Greene involved enhancement on the basis of a prior, un-counseled felony conviction. Appellant received only a fine of $165 on his first drunken driving conviction, which was a misdemeanor.
Because the enhancement of appellant's conviction was based on a prior, uncoun-seled misdemeanor conviction for which he served no time in prison, no relief is appropriate here.
III. Conclusion
Finding no error, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of relief.
. 880 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1322, 108 L.Ed.2d 498 (1990).
. 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980).
. 885 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir.1989).
. Id. at 1573 (emphasis in original).
. Id.
. R1-23-3.
. R2-15, 17.
. Rl-23-4.
. 880 F.2d at 1302 (citations omitted).
. 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979).
. 440 U.S. at 373-74, 99 S.Ct. at 1162 (“We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”).
. See United States v. Peagler, 847 F.2d 756, 758 (11th Cir.1988) ("This Court has held that a sentencing court may consider in sentencing, uncounselled misdemeanor convictions where defendant was not imprisoned.” (citations omitted)); see abo United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir.1990) (discussing former fifth circuit precedent; "This Court’s earlier decisions establish that the district court may consider during sentencing a criminal defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for which the defendant did not receive a term of imprisonment."); Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158, 1159 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980) (permitting use in penalty phase of trial of uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that did not result in imprisonment), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 1985, 68 L.Ed.2d 302 (1981). But see United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 853 (9th Cir.1991) (noting circuit split; "We agree with the plurality in Baldasar v. Illinois that the constitutional rule enunciated in Scott also requires that an ‘uncounseled misdemeanor conviction [may] not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction.”’ (citations omitted)).

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1