What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
GEBHART v. HUNTER.
No. 4091.
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 25, 1950.
Marvin Gebhart, pro se.
Lester Luther, U. S. Atty., Eugene W, Davi-s, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Malcolm Miller, Asst. U. S. Atty., all of Topeka, Kan., for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and MURRAH and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing an application for a writ of -habeas corpus.
An indictment containing three counts was returned against Gebhart in the United States District'-Court for the District of Nebraska, Lincoln Division. The first count charged that Gebhart, on August 25, Í934, in such Lincoln Division, with a pistol which he held, put in feár- Frank M. 'Farr and Mayme Erickson, and thereby took -from them $1535.40 in money belonging to the First National Bank in Aurora, Aurora, Nebraska, a banking institution organized under the laws of the United States. The second count charged that Gebhart at the same time and place, in committing the offense charged in count one, did make an assault by the use of a dangerous weapon, to wit, a ¡pistol, upon Farr and Erickson, ■by then and there pointing such pistol at Farr and Erickson. ¡Count three charged that Gebhart at the same time and place in committing the offense charged in count one, did put in jeopardy the lives of Farr and Erickson by the use of a dangerous weapon, to wit, a pistol, which pistol Gebhart pointed at Farr and Erickson.
Count one charged a violation of 12 U.S.C.A. § 588b(a), and counts two and three charged violations of 12 U.S.C.A. § 588t>(b)
Gebhart was found guilty on each of the three counts by a verdict of a jury, and was sentenced to a term of 20 years on count one, 25 years on count two and 25 years on count three, the sentence on the first count to run concurrently with the sentences on the second and third counts, and the sentences on the second and third counts to run concurrently with each other.
Prior to the effective date of 28 U.S. C.A. § 2255, September 1, 1948, and in February, 1947, Gebhart filed in the sentencing court a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence on the second and third counts on the ground that when the sentencing court imposed its sentence on count one it exhausted its power to sentence and therefore the sentences on counts two and three were void. On March 19, 1947, the sentencing court entered an order denying the motion. On appeal that order was affirmed. 4The sentencing court and the ■Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, followed the former decisions of the latter court in Holbrook v. United States, 8 Cir., 136 F.2d 649, and Holiday v. United States, 8 Cir., 130 F.2d 988,
In the instant case the trial court denied the motion primarily on the ground that Gebhart had not sought the remedy provided by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255
The grounds set up in the motion in the instant case were identical with the grounds set up for the motion filed in the Eighth Circuit in February, 1947. Since the precise issue here raised was ■adjudicated by the order of the sentencing court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, Gebhart is ¡barred from relitigating it in this court, under the doctrine of res judicata.
Moreover, we agree with the decision of the Eighth Circuit, that since counts two and three charged facts.’ Warranting the imposition of the greater punishment ¡provided for by 12 U.S.C.A. § 588b (b) and Gebhart Was found guilty on those counts, the concurrent sentences imposed on ¡counts two and three, although longer than the sentence imposed on count one, were valid. This court’s observation in the closing sentence of the opinion in Holbrook v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 149 F.2d 230, has no .application in the, instant case. There, each of the two counts of the indictment charged facts bringing the offense within 12 U.S.C.A. § 588‘b(b), and both sentences were imposed under that section. Here, the sentence on count one was imposed under 12 U.S.C.A. § 588b(a) and the sentences on counts two and three were imposed under 12 U.S.C.A. § 588b(b).
Affirmed.
. 1948 Revised Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113.
. United States v. Gebhart, D.C., 70 F. Supp. 824.
. Gebhart v. United States, 8 Cir., 163 F.2d 962.
. After the decision by the court below in the instant case,' Gebhart filed a motion in the sentencing court under § 2255, supra, seeking an order vacating the sentences imposed on counts two and three. That motion was denied. See United States v. Gebhart, D.C., 90 F.Supp. 509.
. Holbrook v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 149, F.2d 230, 231; Fowler v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 164 F 2d 668, 669; Garrison v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 149 F.2d 844, 845; Strewl v. Sanford, Warden, 5 Cir., 151 F.2d 648; Goldsmith v. Sanford, Warden, 5 Cir., 132 F.2d 126, 127; Spaulding v. Sanford et al., 5 Cir., 142 F.2d 444; Orencia v. Overholser, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 285, 163 F. 2d 763, 765.
. Ward v. United States, 10 Cir., 183 F.2d 270, 272.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0