What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Eugene LYNCH, Appellant, v. David R. LANDY, Deputy Commissioner and William K. Rogers, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, United States Department of Labor and Industrial Indemnity Co., et al., Appellees.
No. 21852.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 10, 1968.
Rehearing Denied July 9, 1968.
Eugene Lynch (argued), in pro. per.
William Kanter (argued), Lee H. Cliff (argued), Morton Hollander, Jack H. Weiner, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C.; Cecil F. Poole, U. S. Atty., John Meadows, Admiralty & Shipping Section, Hall, Henry, Oliver & McReavy, San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.
Before MADDEN, Judge of the United States Court of Claims, and JERTBERG and CARTER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eugene Lynch, appellant, appeals from an order entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissing his action to recover damages for personal injuries in the amount of $150,000.00, and for other relief, against Industrial Indemnity Co., the insurance carrier for appellant’s former employer, and David R. Landy and William K. Rogers of the “Department of Labor Bureau of Employees' Compensation for the Thirteenth Compensation District, Northern California,” appellees.
The action filed on November 21, 1966, was dismissed by the district court on the ground, inter alia,, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter set forth in the complaint. Jurisdiction of the district court was predicated under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.
It appears that on November 6, 1961, while employed by Martinolich Ship Repair Co., appellant was overcome by noxious fumes while cleaning tanks aboard a barge on San Francisco Bay, at Oakland, California. The employer had immediate notice of the claimed injury and appellant received medical attention on the date of the injury, and received compensation from November 6, 1961 to December 19, 1961.
On November 23, 1962, appellant filed a claim under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act with the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation. This claim was designated as Claim No. 294-83 and is still pending before the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation.
On July 15, 1964, appellant brought an action in the same district court against his former employer and its insurance carrier. The district court dismissed the action on the ground, inter alia, that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Appellant appealed and ultimately his petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court (Lynch v. Industrial Indem. Co., 382 U.S. 844, 86 S.Ct. 42, 15 L.Ed.2d 84), which likewise denied the petition for rehearing (382 U.S. 949, 86 S.Ct. 386, 15 L.Ed.2d 358).
After denial of the petition for certiorari, appellant contacted the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation, and insisted that his claim filed with the Bureau be heard and determined by a trial judge “at the United States Court of Appeals”, and not by the Deputy Commissioner assigned to hear the claim. Thereafter the appellant instituted the action which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, appeal from which order is now before us.
It is clear to us that the action filed in the district court was premature. Appellant’s claim under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is still pending before the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation. Appellant’s claim has not been rejected and no award has been made.
The Act establishes the procedure in respect to claims for compensation benefits under its provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 919 provides that the deputy commissioner shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions in respect to such claims.
33 U.S.C. § 921 provides that:
“If not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any party in interest against the deputy commissioner making the order, and instituted in the Federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury occurred * *
and that proceedings for suspending, setting aside, or enforcing an award shall not be instituted otherwise than as provided in section 921.
This court has clearly held that a decision of the deputy commissioner is a prerequisite to the consideration in the district court of the merits of a claim under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 95 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 305 U.S. 603, 59 S.Ct. 63, 83 L.Ed. 382 (1938); Thibodeaux v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 276 F.2d 42, 49 (5th Cir. 1960); Leonard v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 267 F.2d 421, 424-425 (3d Cir. 1959). See also Associated-Banning Co. v. Landy, 254 F.Supp. 275 (N.D.Cal.S.D.1965).
Appellant is advised to return to the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation and pursue his remedy there until the deputy commissioner issues a final decision on the pending claim.
The order of the district court is affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "natural persons"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1