What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Rudolph W. ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 5, ORANGEBURG COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA, a public body corporate, et al., Appellees. Cynthia D. GREEN et al., Appellants, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF the CITY OF ROANOKE, a body corporate, Roanoke, Virginia, et al., Appellees. Cynthia D. GREEN et al., Appellees, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF the CITY OF ROANOKE, VIRGINIA, et al., Appellants. Carlotta Mozelle BREWER et al., Appellants, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF the CITY OF NORFOLK et al., Appellees. David E. ALLGOOD, infant, etc., et al., Appellants, v. Carlotta Mozelle BREWER et al., Appellees. The SCHOOL BOARD OF the CITY OF NORFOLK et al., Appellants, v. Carlotta Mozelle BREWER et al., Appellees. Catherine SCOTT et al., Appellants, v. The WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees. Catherine SCOTT et al., Appellees, v. WINSTON-SALEM/FORSYTH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Appellants. Catherine SCOTT et al., Appellees, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF FORSYTH COUNTY, Appellant. Catherine SCOTT et al., Appellees, v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and A. Craig Phillips, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Appellants.
Nos. 14694, 15030, 15110, 15044-15046, 15185-15188.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 7, 1971.
Decided June 10, 1971.
Albert V. Bryan, Circuit Judge, concurred specially and filed opinion.
Matthew J. Perry, Columbia, S. C. (Lincoln C. Jenkins, Jr., Columbia, S. C., Zack E. Townsend, Orangeburg, S. C., Jack Greenberg and Michael Davidson, New York City, on the brief), for Rudolph W. Adams and others.
D. W. Robinson, Columbia, S. C. (C. Walker Limehouse, Orangeburg, S. C., on the brief), for School Dist. No. 5, Orangeburg County.
Kermit S. King, Columbia, S. C., on the brief for amicus curiae, H.O.P.E.
S. W. Tucker, Richmond, Va. (Henry L. Marsh, III, Hill, Tucker & Marsh, Richmond, Va., George W. Harris, Jr., Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, and Norman Chachkin, New York City, on the brief), for Cynthia D. Green and others.
James N. Kincanon, City Atty. and H. Ben Jones, Jr., Asst. City Atty., for School Board of the City of Roanoke.
Henry L. Marsh, III, Richmond, Va. (S. W. Tucker, Hill, Tucker & Marsh, Richmond, Va., Victor J. Ashe, Norfolk, Va., Louis R. Lucas, Memphis, Tenn., Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, and Norman Chachkin, New York City, on the brief) for Carlotta Mozelle Brewer and others.
Toy D. Savage, Jr., Norfolk, Va. (Leonard H. Davis, City Atty., Allan G. Donn, Willcox, Savage, Lawrence, Dickson & Spindle, Norfolk, Va., on the brief), for School Board of City of Norfolk and others.
M. T. Bohannon, Jr., Norfolk, Va., for David E. Allgood and others.
David L. Norman, Atty., Dept. of Justice (Jerris Leonard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Brian K. Landsberg and Walter W. Barnett, Attys., Dept. of Justice, on the brief), for the United States.
J. LeVonne Chambers, Charlotte, N. C. (Adam Stein, Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Lanning, Charlotte, N. C., Conrad O. Pearson, Durham, N. C., Jack Green-berg, James M. Nabrit, III, and Norman Chachkin, New York City, on the brief), for appellants Catherine Scott and others.
William F. Womble, Winston-Salem, N. C. (John L. W. Garrou and Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Winston-Salem, N. C., on the brief), for the Winston-Salem Forsyth County Board of Education.
Eugene Price, Jr., Winston-Salem, N. C., for Board of County Com’rs of For-syth County.
Ralph Moody, Deputy Atty. Gen. (Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen. of North Carolina, and Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for North Carolina State Board of Education.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BOREMAN, BRYAN, WINTER, CRAVEN, BUTZNER, and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
PER CURIAM:
On April 20, 1971, the Supreme Court released opinions in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 91 S.Ct. 1289, 28 L.Ed.2d 577 (1971) and companion cases. We immediately asked counsel in these cases to brief the questions presented in the light of Swann and Davis and set these appeals for argument before the full court on June 7, 1971. We are now convinced that all of these judgments must be vacated, except as noted, and we remand to the respective district courts with instructions to receive from the respective school boards new plans which will give effect to Swann and Davis.
It is now clear, we think, that in school systems that have previously been operated separately as to the races by reason of state action, “the district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation.” Davis, supra at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 1292. We remand these cases because the respective district judges did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court mandate that adequate consideration be given “to the possible use of bus transportation and split zoning.” Davis, supra at 38, 91 S.Ct. at 1292. Wherever schools are “all or predominately of one race in a district of mixed population [there will be required] close scrutiny to determine that school assignments are not part of state-enforced segregation.” Swann, supra at 25, 91 S.Ct. at 1281. Although the existence of “some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system which still practices segregation by law,” Swann, supra at 26, 91 S.Ct. at 1281, both the school authority and the district judge must nevertheless be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools.
We have previously noted that Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 90 S.Ct. 29, 24 L.Ed.2d 19 (1969), is a mandate for immediate action, and further delay in achieving desegregation in this circuit will not be tolerated. Nesbit v. Statesville City Board of Education, 418 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir., 1969). Accordingly, we are again compelled to impose upon the respective district courts a time schedule to permit compliance with Swann and Davis prior to the opening of the school year in September 1971.
Each school board shall submit a new plan to comply with Swann and Davis on or before July 1, 1971. Other parties may file responses on or before July 9, 1971.
Each district judge shall conduct a hearing on or before July 16, 1971, to enable him to determine the effectiveness of the proposed plan or its modification.
After a plan has been approved the district court may hear additional objections or proposed amendments provided, however, that the parties shall comply with the approved plan in all respects while the district judge considers suggested modifications.
If a district judge finds that a plan submitted by the school board does not comply with the directions set forth in this opinion, he may appoint an educational expert to develop a plan for implementation in September 1971. He may also direct the school board to cooperate with the expert by furnishing information and facilities for the prompt completion of his work. A reasonable fee for the expert and his expenses shall be assessed against the school board as costs.
The school authorities and the district court should consider the use of all techniques for desegregation, including pairing or grouping of schools, noncontiguous attendance zones, restructuring of grade levels, and the transportation of pupils.
If the district court approves a plan achieving less actual desegregation than would be achieved under an alternate proposed plan it shall find facts that are thought to make impracticable the achieving of a greater degree of integration, especially if there remain any schools all or predominately of one race.
In No. 15,110, the judgment of the district court retaining Addison School is affirmed.
In No. 15,186, the order of the district court disapproving the transfer plan is affirmed.
In No. 15,187 and. No. 15,188, the order of the district court joining the Board of County Commissioners, the North Carolina State Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction is affirmed.
The Orangeburg plan may be fashioned on the alternate HEW plan with modifications and refinements that are necessary for its implementation, or upon some other plan that will meet the requirements of Swann and Davis.
In Roanoke, the court may approve the present junior and senior high school assignment plan. In redrafting the plan for the elementary schools, the school authorities and the district court may proceed according to the plan outlined by Dr. Michael J. Stolee, or modifications, extensions and refinements of this plan.
The Norfolk plan may be based on a revision of the Stolee C plan with necessary modifications and refinements, or the board may adopt some other plan of its choice that will meet the requirements of Swann and Davis.
In Winston-Salem,/Forsyth County, the school board may fashion its plan on the Larsen plan with necessary modifications and refinements or adopt a plan of its choice which will meet the requirements of Swann and Davis.
In No. 14,694, No. 15,030, No. 15,044 and No. 15,185, the appellants shall recover their costs. In No. 15,110, No. 15,-045, No. 15,046, No. 15,186, No. 15,187 and No. 15,188, the appellees shall recover their costs.
Let the mandate issue forthwith.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0