What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine the gender of this litigant. Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity (e.g., the sex of "Chris" should be coded as "not ascertained").

Opinion:
MARTIN et al. v. RUTLAND COURT OWNERS, Inc.
No. 9644.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 14, 1948.
Decided Oct. 18, 1948.
Mr. Arthur G. Lambert, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. George L. Hart, Jr., of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. Howard Boyd, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Edward B. Williams, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, PROCTOR, and GRONER, Circuit Judges.
WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge.
Mrs. Clotilde White leased to Chester Martin her individually owned unit in a cooperative apartment building in the District of Columbia. Martin and his family moved in on Saturday, August 18, 1945. When he came home from work the following Monday afternoon, he could not open the front door of his apartment. The janitor, whom he called, succeeded in opening it after a few minutes of effort. Binding or sticking at the bottom had caused the difficulty and Martin told the janitor the condition should be corrected.
As Mrs. Martin left the apartment Tuesday morning, she twice tried unsuccessfully to close the door from the outside. When she pulled a third time, the knob came off and she fell in the outer hall and broke her hip.
The Martins sued in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia to recover $60,000 from Mrs. White and from Rutland Court Owners, Inc., the corporation which held legal title to the building, issued certificates of ownership and right of occupancy to purchasers of apartments, and generally managed and operated the property. Mrs. White, being out of the country, was not served with process, so the litigation proceeded against the corporation alone.
It was alleged in the complaint that the front door of the apartment “was defective in that it could not be closed or opened without applying undue pressure and that there was difficulty in locking and unlocking the door and in turning the latch.” Negligence was charged -in two forms: first, in failing to repair after notice of a defective condition; second, in undertaking to repair but doing it so negligently as to cause the injury. The court declined to submit the first issue, holding it was not the defendant’s duty to make the repair. On the second issue the jury found for the defendant.
The plaintiff is here as appellant, seeking a reversal on the sole ground that the court erred in ruling the defendant had no duty to make the repair.
Appellee was not the landlord of the appellant, Mártin, and had no contraer tual relation with him. Assuming, without deciding, that the corporation owed him, as Mrs. White’s tenant, the same, duty it owed to her, we find no obligation upon the appellee to make repairs such as that involved here. In the contract between the appellee and Mrs. White, she agreed to “properly maintain, care for and improve” her own apartment. Appellee agreed only “to maintain and operate” the building for the use and benefit of all the cooperative owners. The District Court’s ruling was correct.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the second listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". What is the gender of this litigant?Use names to classify the party's sex only if there is little ambiguity.

Choices:
not ascertained
male - indication in opinion (e.g., use of masculine pronoun)
male - assumed because of name
female - indication in opinion of gender
female - assumed because of name

Answer: 3