What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Willie Ray BLANKENSHIP et al., National Bank of Washington, Appellant, v. W. A. (Tony) BOYLE et al.
No. 71-1430.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 10, 1971.
Decided June 25, 1971.
Mr. Jo V. Morgan, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. John J. Wilson and William E. Rollow, Washington, D. C., were on the motion for stay, for appellant.
Mr. Edgar H. Brenner, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Harry A. Huge, Armistead W. Gilliam, Jr., and Thomas J. McGrew, Washington, D. C., were on the objection to the motion for stay, for appellees Blankenship and various beneficiaries.
Before LEVENTHAL, MacKINNON and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We consider this case on the application by the National Bank of Washington (Bank) for a stay pending appeal. Although the applicant demonstrates irreparable injury if the stay is denied, we conclude that it fails to provide a sufficient showing of likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal to warrant the requested relief.
The District Judge did not base his ruling in the Decree of Equitable Relief on the premise that as a matter of law a trustee cannot make a deposit in a bank operated by such a trustee. Such a premise would have required careful consideration by this court in light of the pertinent doctrine on this subject. The District Judge rather proceeded on the premise that such a deposit relationship requires careful scrutiny by the court. After his consideration of the relationship during the month-long trial he found that the Bank acted with knowledge that the funds maintained by the trustees of the Fund in non-interest-bearing accounts were substantially in excess of the Fund’s need for cash. Although we need not now make a forecast whether the Bank is likely to be held liable in damages, there was enough possibility of taint to warrant the District Judge, in fashioning an equitable decree and in providing a prudent course of conduct for trustees of the Fund to follow in the future, to have ordered the trustees to place their deposits after September 6, 1971, in a bank in which they have no interest.
We interpret the decree to permit the new trustees to apply for relaxation of such provision if they be advised, after consultation with their newly-appointed investment adviser, that it is likely that the Fund’s retention of its deposit (s) in the Bank would be in the best interests of the Fund and of its beneficiaries. On that assumption the prayer for a stay is denied.
So ordered.
. We note, for example, that the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act provides, § 3(c) : “A trustee has the power * * * (6) to deposit trust funds in a bank, including a bank operated by the trustee.” This was approved in 1964 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association.
. We construe the decree as similarly requiring the trustees to reinvest elsewhere their funds from the certificates of deposits as they mature before September 6.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99