What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Your task is to identify the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Willie Foster SELLERS, Appellant.
No. 74-1683.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 6, 1975.
Decided April 10, 1975.
Modified Sept. 2, 1976.
Certiorari Denied Jan. 25, 1977.
See 97 S.Ct. 815.
Robert B. Thompson [Court-appointed], for appellant.
Jimmie C. Proctor, Asst. U. S. Atty., Asheville, N. C. (Keith S. Snyder, U. S. Atty., Asheville, N. C., on brief), for appellee.
Before CLARK, Supreme Court Justice, HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER, Circuit Judge.
Sitting by Designation.
Mr. Justice CLARK:
Part III of our original opinion is hereby modified to read as follows: We turn then to appellant’s last contention— that the case was improperly submitted to the jury under instructions which allowed them to convict him of both possession of stolen bank funds under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) and theft of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (b), and (d). While we agree that this was error, we believe that it is harmless error under the recent Supreme Court decision of United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 96 S.Ct. 1023, 47 L.Ed.2d 222 (1976). Gaddis provides that instructions may be given on both the theft and the possession counts, but that convictions may not be sustained on both counts arising out of the same set of facts. The jury is to first consider the theft charges under § 2113(a), (b), and (d), and should consider the possession charge under § 2113(c) only if it finds insufficient evidence to support the theft charges.
In this case, the jury obviously found sufficient evidence to bring in a finding of guilt on the theft charges. Having done so, it was error to consider the possession charge. However, as we noted supra, it was harmless error in our view. Any prejudice resulting to Sellers may be quickly dispensed with by simply reversing the conviction on the possession count.
In view of the Gaddis decision and its effect upon our prior decision in this case, our prior order is modified as follows: The conviction on the possession of stolen money under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) is hereby reversed, and the remaining convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (b), and (d) are affirmed. This case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Question: What is the state of the first listed state or local government agency that is an appellant?

Choices:
not
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachussets
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New
New
New
New
North
North
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode
South
South
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Virgin
Puerto
District
Guam
not
Panama

Answer: 0