What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
In re COHEN et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
February 19, 1926.
Rehearing Denied March 20,1926.)
No. 3418.
Bankruptcy <s=>467 — Master’s failure to make findings held not reviewablo on appeal from valid order setting aside order granting discharge improperly obtained.
Failure of master, to whom, bankrupt’s offer of composition had been referred, to make findings of fact which creditor desired to use in opposition to discharge, held not reviewable on appeal from concededly valid order setting aside order improperly obtained granting discharge.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Joseph L. Bodine, Judge.
In the matter of the bankruptcy of Abraham S. Cohen and another, individually and as copartners doing business as the Army & Navy Salvage Company. From an order accompanying the disposition of contempt proceedings against H. H. Weinberger and others, attorneys for bankrupts, vacating an order granting discharge which had been improperly obtained, the Endicott-Johnson Corporation, a creditor, appeals.
Appeal dismissed.
Harold Remington, of New York City, for appellant.
Furst & Furst, of Newark, N. J., for appellee Van Cleve.
Collins & Corbin and Harry E. Walburg, all of Jersey City, N. J., for appellees Weinberger.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
WOOLLEY, Circuit Judge.
At the hearing, it was plain that this motion to dismiss the appeal could be allowed on formal defects in the appellate proceeding. We endeavored, however, to ascertain the bearing of the motion on the highly confused record. In doing this, we heard the entire case on the merits. Desiring to quiet the appellant’s concern, we shall so decide it.
A statement of the facts will, we think, dispose of the ease. Somewhat disentangled, they are these:
Cohen and Janes, bankrupts, made an offer of composition which the court referred to a special master for report on its allowance or disallowance. With an eye to future proceedings for discharge and with the purpose of developing in the composition proceedings evidence for use in the discharge proceedings — on the theory that what is a bar to composition is equally a bar to discharge — a creditor (the appellant) opposed the confirmation. The master reported in favor of confirmation but in doing so he did not make findings which the creditor desired for future use. Before the report was confirmed the creditor obtained from the court an order remanding the reference to the master with directions to complete his work by making findings. While the matter was pending, the court by order permitted the bankrupts to withdraw their offer of composition. Their estates were then settled and distribution made by final dividends. The controversy, however, went on. The court set aside its order permitting the withdrawal of the offer of composition but made an order confirming in part a later report of the master denying composition. Then the bankrupts filed a petition for discharge. This was opposed by the creditor who, still desiring fact findings on the evidence produced in the composition proceedings for use in the discharge proceedings, moved for an order to make the master find facts. The court made such an order, staying the discharge proceedings. Notwithstanding one judge of the court had ordered a stay of the discharge proceedings pending the completion of the composition proceedings, the master made a report recommending the .discharge, and counsel for the bankrupts — innocently, they say — went to another judge and obtained from him an order confirming the master’s report and granting the discharge. In contempt proceedings which followed, these counsel were first adjudged guilty and then exonerated. Accompanying the disposition of the contempt proceedings the court entered an order vacating the order of discharge which had been thus improperly en tered. From the last order this appeal was taken. .
. It should be noted that the appellant’s action, preliminary and final, was all the time in opposition to the bankrupts’ discharge. Yet by the order vacating the order allowing their discharge the proceeding for discharge was opened, and the appellant got what it wanted, and what it needed, in order effectively to oppose the discharge. We discover no error in this order appealed from —indeed, none is charged. Reversal is distinctly not wanted. The matter of which the appellant complains is not the order appealed from but the refusal of the master to finish the composition proceedings and furnish it' with the evidence it desires for use against the discharge. The order of reference to the master, which is truly interlocutory, and his action thereunder are matters which have not been brought before us by this appeal; nor can they be reached through appeal from a coneededly valid order. They are still in the bankruptcy court where they remain to be disposed of by that court — wholly without prejudice from the order we now make that the appeal be
Dismissed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1