What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Leona WEINER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Donald Sommerset and John Doe, IRS Collection Agent, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 430, Docket 92-6152.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Jan. 7, 1993.
Decided Jan. 25, 1993.
Leona Weiner, pro se.
Steven C. Bennett and Thomas A. Zaceara, Asst. U.S. Attys., S.D.N.Y., New York City (Otto G. Obermaier, U.S. Atty., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Before: PRATT and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges, and DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal was originally heard on January 7, 1993, and decided by a detailed written order dated January 25, 1993, which affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Sprizzo’s Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 30, 1992. 789 F.Supp. 655. Upon further consideration, we conclude that our decision should be published, and we accordingly repeat the substance of our January 25th order in this opinion.
Plaintiff Weiner, appearing pro se, has chronicled her tale of frustrations suffered while seeking a prompt and courteous remedy from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for its three erroneous and improperly executed levies upon her pension fund at Long Island University and two bank accounts. Weiner alleged several negative consequences of the erroneous tax liens, including a denial of credit when a department store relied on a credit-reporting bureau’s notation of the liens on Weiner’s record, loss of monthly income, embarrassment, loss of reputation at the university where the pension fund was kept, loss of credit rating, and ill health.
Weiner’s efforts to resolve the situation resulted in repeated but unfulfilled verbal assurances from IRS staff that the errors would be corrected. Weiner’s correspondence to the IRS seemed to have been disregarded, and her personal visits to the office were similarly unhelpful. Weiner claims that one IRS letter was illustrative of her experience with the agency. The letter instructed her that writing the IRS within the next three months, while the agency underwent a computer-system conversion, would be futile and would, in fact, delay processing requests concerning her account.
The IRS does not dispute that the three levies were unauthorized, and that they were executed with lack of proper notice to Weiner. In fact, the IRS entered into a settlement agreement to return the funds that the IRS obtained from the wrongful levy against Weiner’s pension account. We note however that the IRS waited 2-and-V2 years after Weiner filed this lawsuit against it to do so.
The record is clear that Weiner’s bank accounts were improperly levied upon due to “computer error” at the IRS. In this suit, Weiner seeks damages flowing from the wrongful levies. Weiner’s principal concern however, is not money damages, but what seems like a reasonable request under the circumstances—that the IRS provide a letter acknowledging its multiple errors, and a “statement and or information” as to why Weiner’s tax return was handled in an unauthorized manner. Weiner further asks for the IRS collection division to operate with “courtesy in handling clients”, and that it acknowledge and respond to communications. Finally, in a plea that evokes almost Orwellian imagery, Weiner asks this court “[i]s there something in the IRS record that [I] should know about?”
Unfortunately, Weiner has no legal remedies for damages, to compel an apology from the IRS, or even to obtain an explanation of the errors that caused the improper levies. Congress has enacted a thicket of statutes that protect federal employees from liability for the improper execution of their duties, and has thereby blocked Weiner’s path to legal redress in this case. The relevant provision of the tort claims act bars tort claims against the federal government which “aris[e] in respect of the assessment * * * of any tax”. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). The anti-injunction act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), similarly states that, except in circumstances not relevant here, no suit shall be maintained in any court “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax”. Additionally, plaintiff may not sue for unlawful disclosure of her confidential tax information, because “computer error” by IRS employees does not amount to knowing or negligent disclosure by United States employees. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7431 and 6103. In short, although the IRS did wrong, congress has immunized it and its employees from liability for damages. While it is understandable that congress would want to protect federal collectors of revenue from harassment by taxpayer litigation, the result of that blanket protection impacts unfortunately upon a taxpayer like Weiner, who simply sought courteous and fair dealing from the IRS.
We are often expected to live with governmental actions that resist characterization as rational. And while modern urban life may bring to all its share of petty insults or injuries, we certainly sympathize with the plight of one like Weiner who, using all methods at her disposal, was still unable to secure a speedy resolution of such obvious governmental error. The reason she can not obtain the apology that she so clearly deserves is no doubt due, regrettably, to the fact that probably not one individual in the entire IRS bureaucracy believes that he or she did wrong. While this court cannot speak for the IRS, it may be some comfort to Weiner that she has convinced us that while she is entitled to no legal remedy, fair dealing and simple courtesy should have impelled the IRS to have corrected its error more expeditiously, to have apologized for having erred in the first place, and to have provided her with sufficient documentation of its error to enable her to undo some of the harm done to her.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0