What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Samuel COHEN et al., Defendants, Appellants, v. COLE NATIONAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, Appellee.
No. 6196.
United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.
Heard Nov. 6, 1963.
Decided Sept. 2, 1964.
Arthur M. Gilman, Boston, Mass., with whom Walter H. McLaughlin, Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellants.
Bertram H. Loewenberg, Boston, Mass., with whom Timothy H. Donohue, Stephen A. Hopkins and Sherburne, Powers & Needham, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee.
Before WOODBURY, Chief Judge, and HARTIGAN and ALDRICH, Circuit Judges.
WOODBURY, Chief Judge.
The so-called “golden car key” is a gold plated automobile key having a monogram on one side of its head and an emblem or advertising message on the other. The keys are sold by manufacturers as blanks, sometimes directly to users but for the most part in quantity to business concerns for them to use as gifts to customers for advertising or promotional purposes. The blank keys are cut by the purchasers on key filing machines, sometimes supplied by the manufacturer, to ■fit the car of the person to whom a key is presented.
The “golden car key”, hereinafter ■sometimes referred to as a key, was ■originally developed in 1952 or 1953 by an Ohio corporation in the advertising ¡specialty business which later merged with another Ohio corporation, the plaintiff, Cole National Corporation, and thereafter operated as Cole National’s Elnar Division. In January or February 1959 a principal officer of Elnar, one Kap-stein, entered into an agreement with the ■defendants, Cohen and Sulkin, citizens of Massachusetts, who a short time before had organized a partnership called Allied Associates. For convenience we shall hereinafter refer to the parties as Elnar and Allied. Under the terms of this agreement Allied was to be the sole representative for the sale of Elnar’s keys in New England with the exception of two existing distributors. Allied was free to sell keys outside New England but, in order to avoid conflicts with other distributors, only after clearing such sales with Elnar. Elnar sold keys to Allied for less than it sold its keys to others and allowed Allied to sell keys under its own name and to fix its own resale price. The evidence is conflicting as to whether Allied was to have the status of a “distributor” of Elnar’s keys and also as to whether it was to buy all its keys from Elnar. Allied forwarded its orders to Elnar and Elnar filled them by sending keys to Allied’s customers in envelopes marked with Allied’s name and mark. Beginning in March, 1959, Allied with Elnar’s advice and assistance devoted substantial efforts to selling keys to financial institutions at which it was gratifyingly successful.
On November 15, 1959, Elnar notified Allied by letter that effective a month later its price on orders of less than 2500 keys would be increased and that a separate charge would be made for “art work.” Allied objected and a conference was held at which it was agreed that the charge for “art work” would be cancelled but the price increase would go into effect. In spite of the price increase Allied was still paying less for keys than Elnar’s distributors. Early in 1960 Allied ordered dies for cutting key blanks from Hazelton Chain Co. of Roxbury, Massachusetts, and on June 7, 1960, ordered 45,000 key blanks from Hazelton which were shipped beginning in July of that year. These keys bore the same identifying letters, A, B, C, and D, in the same style of type that Elnar was using and were shipped to customers in the same kind of envelopes that Elnar used. There is a dispute as to whether in some instances Hazelton keys were cut by customers on key filing machines owned and supplied by Elnar.
In July or August, 1960, Kapstein noticed a sharp decline in Allied’s orders and at a conference arranged to discuss that matter was told by partner Sulkin that business was bad in the summer but that he expected improvement in the fall. Sulkin admitted that he did not at that time tell Kapstein of Allied’s order of keys from Hazelton, and apparently Kap-stein’s suspicions were not aroused. In November, when Allied’s orders had practically ceased, at another conference partner Cohen admitted to Kapstein that Allied had another source of supply, and friendly relations between Elnar and Allied came to an abrupt end. Elnar joined its distributors in battle with Allied, by that time incorporated in Massachusetts as Emblematics, Inc., for the golden car key business, and on December 21, 1960, brought suit against Cohen, Sulkin and Emblematics, whom for convenience we shall continue to refer to as Allied, for breach of contract, alleging that Allied had agreed to purchase keys exclusively from Elnar and charged Allied with unfair competition. Allied answered with a general denial and later filed an amended counterclaim in two counts. In the first count Allied sought triple damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 for violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, and in the second count sought damages for unfair competition. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff on its complaint and also a verdict for the plaintiff on the defendants’ counterclaim. The court entered judgment in accordance with the verdicts and the defendants appealed.
The gist of the plaintiff’s action was that it had entered into a manufacturer-distributor relationship with the defendants whereunder it sold keys to the defendants according to an agreement that the latter would purchase and sell the plaintiff’s keys exclusively. It sought and recovered damages on the basis that the defendants had broken their agreement by purchasing keys from another source. The defendants rested their defense on the proposition that the relationship created was not that of manufacturer-distributor but instead that of seller-customer and that, in any event, they had not agreed to buy keys exclusively from the plaintiff.
The verdicts of the jury settled the issues presented by the complaint and answer, for on this appeal the defendants do not challenge the verdict for the plaintiff on its complaint. The defendants’ appeal is limited to their counterclaim. It is based exclusively on asserted errors of the trial court in excluding certain evidence offered by them in support of their counterclaim and on asserted errors of the court in its instructions to the jury on the law applicable to their counterclaim. The plaintiff as appellee asserts that the court’s rulings on evidence and its instructions to the jury were correct. But it says that we need not concern ourselves with those matters because the trial court ought to have granted its motion for a directed verdict on the counterclaim on the ground that the evidence offered by the defendants was insufficient to warrant a finding for the defendants on either count. We agree with the appellee’s second proposition.
We are very doubtful indeed whether “golden car keys” constitute a “relevant market.” But however that may be, a careful analysis of the record fails to-show any contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy by Elnar in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states. Nor does the record show any monopoly or attempt to monopolize, or combination or conspiracy by Elnar with any other person to monopolize, any part of the trade- or commerce among the several states, if, indeed, golden car keys could possibly be monopolized. Witness Allied’s purchase of keys from Hazelton. The most that we can find in the record appendices-is evidence of vigorous, at times sharp,, competition between Elnar’s distributors-backed by Elnar and Allied. At times-the participants fought over the same customer, and on one occasion Kapstein-. wrote to one of Elnar’s distributors saying that the news of Sam Cohen in the-hospital “is not my desire as I just want, to put him out of business.” But evidence that Kapstein acting for Elnar put his wish into effect by unfair competitive means is lacking. It is true that, after the break in relations between El-nar and Allied in November, 1960, Elnar made available to its distributors a list of prospective customers submitted by Allied for clearance by Elnar to avoid conflicts with other distributors. But the evidence shows nothing more than the normal reaction of a former supplier forced to become a competitor by the wrongful breach of its distributor. The attempts by Elnar to compete for the customers who had previously purchased its keys through Allied, and whose business was by the jury’s verdict as much its property as that of Allied, do not strike us as improper. The most we can find is evidence of tough but not unfair competition. The motion to dismiss Allied’s counterclaim should have been granted. If there were errors in the exclusion of evidence or in the charge with respect to the counterclaim they are of no consequence.
Judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the District Court.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 99