What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Henry C. WILSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 19675.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 14, 1966.
Decided Aug. 3, 1966.
Wilbur K. Miller, Senior Circuit Judge, dissented.
Mr. Norman M. Garland, Washington, D. C., (appointed by this court) for appellant.
Mr. Henry J. Monahan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., and Frank Q. Nebeker, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and Wilbur K. Miller, Senior Circuit Judge, and Danaher, Circuit Judge.
DANAHER, Circuit Judge:
In the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions this appellant was convicted of narcotics vagrancy under D.C. Code § 33-416a(b) (1) (B) (1961), which applies to any “vagrant” as defined in the Act who
“is found in any place, abode, house, shed, dwelling, building, structure, vehicle, conveyance, or boat, in which any illicit narcotic drugs are kept, found, used, or dispensed.”
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed after noting that Wilson’s “principal thesis here is that the Narcotic Vagrancy statute is unconstitutional.” We granted the appellant’s petition for allowance of an appeal.
The Government tells us:
“In the opinion of appellee, the following question is presented:
“Whether 33 D.C.C. § 416a (i), as construed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, denied appellant due process of law under the Fifth Amendment?”
Despite the Government’s submission of the question in that form, we need not reach the issue of constitutionality. Subsection 416a(i) provides:
“(i) In all prosecutions under the provisions of this section [33-416a], the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant to show that he has lawful employment or has lawful means of support realized from a lawful occupation or source.” (Emphasis added.)
Our study of the record discloses that there was no issue respecting Wilson’s “lawful employment.” There was no inquiry as to whether or not he “has lawful means of support realized from a lawful occupation or source.” Neither of these alternatives seems to have been involved in the information filed in the trial court. There the Government had charged and had offered evidence only to show that on October 19, 1964, this appellant had been “found” in a “vehicle” in which “illicit” narcotic drugs were “kept, found, used, or dispensed.” The language of the subsection in question, set forth above, unlike subsection (A) or subsection (C) of section 416a, for example, does not specify that conviction may follow if the vagrant defined in section 416a(b) (1) “fails to give a good account of himself.” We can not assume that the omission of such language was other than purposeful, and certainly the record here discloses no proper foundation for an application of subsection 416a(i), supra.
The evidence of record discloses that officers attached to the Narcotics Squad approached an automobile in the early afternoon of October 19, 1964. Three men were in the front seat while in the rear seat was the appellant with one Gar-nett (who was not arrested). Officers asked the driver for his permit, which was produced. They asked the owner of the car, also in the front seat, for the car registration, which according to the testimony, was thereupon removed from the glove compartment. An officer testified he then could see paraphernalia of a type utilized by narcotics users. The police next searched the car and found “in the space behind the rear seat” a needle, a bottle-cap cooker and an eyedropper syringe.
The appellant testified that he had left the Court of General Sessions on the morning of the 19th before or around noontime. He had been picked up by his friends who were to give him a ride back to his home in northeast Washington. They were waiting to have repairs made to the speedometer when the officers approached the car. Wilson admitted that he had twice been convicted of violations of the Harrison Narcotics Act but he testified that he knew nothing about and had not seen the various items said to have been narcotics paraphernalia.
We fail to perceive any issue deriving from this appellant’s mere presence as a passenger in the back seat of the car which gives rise to placing upon him a burden of proof within the meaning of D.C.Code § 33-416a(i), supra.
Reversed.
. Wilson v. United States, 212 A.2d 805, 806 (D.C.App.1965).
. In a prosecution under D.C.Code § 22-3302 (1961), the District of Columbia Vagrancy Act, we stated that the words not giving “a good account of himself” mean “not giving a good account when a question has been followed up by an order or demand. Since appellant was never confronted with an order or demand to explain her presence in the street, her conviction must be reversed.” Beail v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 111, 201 F.2d 176, 177 (1952). Cf. Freeman v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 213, 214, 322 F.2d 426, 427 (1963).

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 1