What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Edward L. YOUNG, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 17268.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued Nov. 4, 1968.
Decided Dec. 30, 1968.
Joseph A. Steedle, Ryan & Bowser, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Stanley W. Greenfield, First Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee (Gustave Diamond, U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief).
Before KALODNER, FORMAN and STAHL, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from an Order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, denying without a hearing appellant Young’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate or set aside his sentence.
Young and a co-defendant, Charles Ptomey, entered pleas of guilty to a federal bank robbery indictment on October 1, 1964. Prior to sentence they made two attempts to withdraw their pleas. Both were denied by the District Court after hearing. In denying the second motion, the District Court found that the guilty pleas of Young and Ptomey were “entered understandingly and with the information and advice of counsel, and with full knowledge of the maximum penalty which could be imposed by the sentencing court,” and that they “acted voluntarily without any influences or inducements or promises and without any fear or coercion.” 244 F.Supp. 464, 468 (W.D.Pa.1965). In affirming at 366 F. 2d 759 (1966) we stated (p. 760):
“The trial judge painstakingly reviewed the testimony and searched the record before him to see whether there was anything which would indicate that the defendants were misled or coerced or that their pleas were not freely and understandingly entered and found nothing. We find nothing.” (emphasis supplied)
The instant motion raises no contentions as to the voluntariness of Young’s guilty plea that are not foreclosed by our prior opinion. Moreover, as we there stated, such a plea is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses. Therefore, since the voluntariness of Young’s plea remains unimpeached, his contentions as to the preplea conduct of his counsel and federal agents are of no consequence.
Young complains that the conduct of his counsel at the hearing of his first motion to withdraw his plea deprived him of his right to effective counsel. His complaint is two-fold: (1) his attorney also represented the co-defendant Ptomey without requesting or obtaining Young’s permission to do so; and (2) his attorney cross-examined him as to the voluntariness of his plea and made “self-serving” statements as to the advice he had given him. However, accepting as true all of Young’s allegations except those that are purely conclusory, he is not entitled to relief. Moreover, even assuming that Young was denied his right to effective counsel at the first hearing, any such error was cured when Young was represented by other counsel at the hearing on his second motion to withdraw his plea.
The Order of the District Court will be affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0