What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the respondent is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
UNITED STATES ex rel. CRIST v. RAGEN.
No. 8933.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Oct. 29, 1946.
George F. Barrett and William C. Wines, both of Chicago, 111., for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
Before MAJOR and MINTON, Circuit Judges, and BRIGGLE, District Judge.
MAJOR, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order entered June -26, 1945, granting a discharge to petitioner Crist upon his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The required certificate of probable cause appears in the record and this court therefore has jurisdiction.
The following pertinent facts appear in the record: Petitioner Crist was convicted in March 1926, of grand larceny and sentenced by the Circuit Court of Iroquois County to serve a term of not less than one year or more than 10 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois. Petitioner was incarcerated in the Illinois Penitentiary until December 1929, when he was paroled, at his own request, to Detroit, Michigan. Petitioner admittedly violated his parole by failing to submit required reports and also by returning to Illinois. He was arrested on April 19, 1930, in Decatur, Illinois, on suspicion of having, with others, committed several robberies throughout central Illinois. A warrant for parole violation was issued on April 22, 1930, by the Warden of the Illinois Penitentiary and forwarded to the Sheriff at Decatur. Before the Sheriff received this parole violator’s warrant, he had surrendered petitioner to Indiana authorities upon presentation by them of papers signed by the Governor of Illinois permitting extradition. After this extradition, petitioner was convicted of bank robbery in the Indiana court and sentenced to life imprisonment. He started service of this sentence in May 1930, and was released by the Indiana authorities in October 1943. Upon his release by the Indiana officials, he was returned to Illinois, upon a parole violator’s warrant, declared a parole violator by the Illinois parole board and reincar-cerated in the Illinois Penitentiary to serve the remainder of his sentence.
After such incarceration, petitioner filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the Iroquois County Circuit Court (county of conviction), Will, County Circuit Court (county of incarceration) and the Illinois Supreme Court, which petitions were denied. He sought certiorari to review the action of the Illinois Supreme Court but did not petition for certiorari to review the action of the other two courts. It is pertinent to note that the record discloses that the petitions, which were denied in the Illinois courts, contained the same allegations as are herein present.
Upon the facts as stated, the District Court decided that it had jurisdiction, that the petitioner had exhausted his state court remedies, and that the State of Illinois waived jurisdiction of petitioner by extraditing him while he was on parole from its penal institution.
The respondent contends (1) that the federal court had no jurisdiction because (a) no federal question was presented by the petition, (b) there was no exhaustion of state court remedies, and (2) that even if the first contention be incorrect the lower court’s determination of the merits is erroneous.
The petition raises this question: Does the allowance by the Governor of Illinois of extradition of petitioner (admittedly a parole violator) while on parole amount to a pardon or commutation of the remainder of petitioner’s sentence as yet unserved and to a waiver of the right of the State of Illinois to reincarcerate petitioner for service of the remainder of his sentence?
We are of the opinion that the question stated presents a problem properly justiciable under the laws of Illinois. ■ The effect of the Governor’s action, in our opinion, presents a non-federal question. Therefore, the lower court should have refused to entertain the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 65 S.Ct. 978, 89 L.Ed. 1348; United States ex rel. Mazy v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 149 F. 2d 948, 950. We are-further of the view that “we cannot say that the refusal [of the Illinois courts] to entertain the petitions for habeas corpus * * * does not rest on an adequate non-federal ground,” and thé petition should have been dismissed. White v. Ragen, supra, 324 U.S. 760, 766, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1348. Furthermore, assuming that a federal question is presented, the petition still should have been dismissed because of the failure to exhaust state court remedies. White v. Ragen, supra; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572; United States ex rel. Mazy v. Ragen, supra; United States ex rel. Johnston v. Carey, 7 Cir., 141 F.2d 967, 968; Kelly v. Dowd, 7 Cir., 140 F.2d 81, 82; Herzog v. Colpoys, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 81, 143 F.2d 137, 138; Davis v. Smyth, 4 Cir., 155 F.2d 3, 5.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, with directions to dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
MINTON, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.

Question: What is the total number of respondents in the case that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 1