What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Louise C. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELTA FAMILY-CARE DISABILITY and Survivorship Plan and Delta Family Care Medical Plan, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 83-8062.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 23, 1984.
John M. Comolli, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
D. Michael Keen, Helene Cohen, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.
Before TJOFLAT and HILL, Circuit Judges, and LYNNE, District Judge.
Honorable Seyboum H. Lynne, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
The district court order fully and accurately covers all of the issues presented by this appeal. Therefore, we AFFIRM on the basis of the district judge’s December 22, 1982 order, a copy of which is appended hereto.
AFFIRMED.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION
LOUISE C. GRIFFIS : C82-624A
vs. :
DELTA FAMILY-CARE DISABILITY :
AND SURVIVORSHIP PLAN and :
DELTA FAMILY-CARE MEDICAL :
PLAN :
ORDER
RICHARD C. FREEMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff commenced this action in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (hereinafter “ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., seeking to recover benefits allegedly due her and to clarify her rights to future benefits under the terms of both the Delta Family-Care Disability and Survivorship Plan and the Delta Family-Care Medical Plan (hereinafter “Delta Plans”). The action was timely removed by the defendants, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), and is currently before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment, Rule 56, Fed. R.Civ.P.
A party who moves for summary judgment bears the exacting burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact in the case. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). In determining whether a movant has met this burden, the court must view the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir.1981). If the record presents factual issues, the court must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Id. Furthermore, a court may discover questions of material fact even though both parties, in support of cross-motions for summary judgment, have asserted that no such questions exist. See Donovan v. District Lodge No. 100, International Ass’n of Machinists, 666 F.2d 883, 886-87 (5th Cir.1982); Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2720. Thus, before the court can consider the legal issues raised by the parties on cross-motions for summary judgment, it must have no doubt as to the relevant facts that are beyond dispute.
After consideration of the statements of fact submitted by each party, the court concludes that the relevant facts are beyond dispute and that a grant of summary judgment is warranted in this action.
I. Findings of Fact
Plaintiff is the widow of Hugh C. Griffis, Jr., who died on August 1, 1978, while an employee of Delta Airlines, Inc. (hereinafter “Delta”). As Griffis’ spouse, the plaintiff began receiving survivorship income benefits and medical and dental insurance coverage under the Delta Plans, which are employee benefit plans established and maintained by Delta under the provisions of ERISA. On August 20, 1980, the plaintiff married Collis R. Newell. Subsequently, on November 12,1980, the Delta Plans notified the plaintiff that her benefits would be terminated because of her remarriage. Termination was based on section 4.01 of the Delta Plans, which provides that an employee’s surviving spouse shall cease to be eligible for benefits from the time such spouse remarries. On April 1,1981, approximately six months after her benefits were terminated, the plaintiff’s marriage to Mr. Newell was annulled by the order of the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia, whose final decree stated
It is the judgment of the Court that the purported marriage between the parties is decreed to be as if said purported marriage had never been contracted and entered into by them.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. B.
On January 9, 1981, prior to the annulment of her marriage, the plaintiff requested that the defendants reinstate her benefits in the event that the marriage was annulled. The general manager of the Delta Plans informed the plaintiff on January 16, 1981, that the provisions of the Delta Plans did not provide for reinstatement of benefits after a beneficiary had remarried and denied her request for reinstatement. After the plaintiff’s marriage had been annulled, the general manager’s denial of reinstatement was reviewed and affirmed by both the Administrative Subcommittee and the Administrative Committee of the Delta Plans.
Under the terms of the Delta Plans, the Administrative Committee exercises, among other powers, the exclusive authority to “interpret the [Delta Plans] and determine questions of eligibility for participation and receipt of benefits.” Defendants’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of James W. Callison, dated August 6,1982, Attachment 9. On October 15, 1981, the Administrative Committee sent the plaintiff the following notice of its decision:
The Administrative Committee of Delta Air Lines, Inc. met on October 15, 1981 and considered your appeal from the decision of the Subcommittee that Mrs. Griffis ceased to be an Eligible Family Member under the Disability and Survivorship Plan by reason of her marriage to Collis R. Newell, despite the subsequent annulment of that marriage.
The Committee considered the file and the evidence and case law submitted by you and felt that such cases were distinguishable from Mrs. Griffis’ claim because they pertained to statutory benefit' programs and involved annulment statutes different from that in Georgia. Thus, the Committee determined that the Plan was not bound by these cases.
In addition, the Committee found that the intent of the Plan is to sever the right to monthly survivor benefits to a surviving spouse upon her remarriage, even if that marriage is later voided by annulment. The Committee felt that the loss of benefits was the responsibility of the second marriage, as that term is used in Georgia Statute 58-605 and that in accordance with that statute the annulment, although voiding the marriage from its inception, did not relieve the parties of responsibilities occasioned by the marriage. As a result, the Committee voted unanimously to reaffirm the Subcommittee’s decision.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. D. On March 25, 1982, the plaintiff filed this action.
II. Conclusions of Law
This court may disturb the decision of the Administrative Committee only if the plaintiff has established that the decision to deny her reinstatement was arbitrary or capricious. Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836, 102 S.Ct. 140, 70 L.Ed.2d 117 (1982). In reviewing the Administrative Committee’s interpretation of the remarriage provision of the Delta Plans, this court’s “judicial role is limited to determining whether the [committee’s] interpretation was made rationally and in good faith — not whether it was right.” Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir.1977). Thus, the Administrative Committee’s interpretation of the intent or meaning of the provisions of the Delta Plans need not be the best possible decision, only one with a rational justification. See Weisler v. Metal Polishers Union, 533 F.Supp. 209, 215 (S.D.N.Y.1982).
The court finds that there exists a rational basis for the Administrative Committee’s decision. Defendants contend that permitting reinstatement of a spouse’s benefits after annulment would threaten the efficient operation of the Delta Plans. Defendants argue that
[s]ince there is generally no statutory time limit for obtaining an annulment, the Plans could never be certain that a former beneficiary’s marriage would not be annulled and the Plans’ obligation to pay benefits reinstated. The Plans would be left dangling upon the uncertainties of the success or failure of that second marriage. Since Delta’s contributions to the Plans are made upon aetuarially determined requirements, there would be no adequate way of prefunding for such contingencies. Alsp, since the Plans would not be a party to the annulment proceedings, their future obligations would be determined by circumstances over which they had little or no knowledge or control. These uncertainties would affect both the operation and administration of the Plans as well as their ability to accurately project future funding needs. Statistical estimates of the number of annulments in the population as a whole would be of no assistance in alleviating these uncertainties since incentives to obtain annulments for purposes of reinstating plan benefits are not present in the ordinary annulment case.
Defendants’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 12-13. Attempts to prevent unanticipated costs that may limit the resources of an employee benefit plan are among the proper concerns of a plan’s administrator. Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d at 362. It is neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Administrative Committee to determine that permitting reinstatement of benefits for the plaintiff and other similarly situated spouses would threaten its ability to anticipate future funding needs.
Plaintiff argues that the decision of the Administrative Committee is unreasonable because the committee based its decision upon “an entirely erroneous interpretation of Georgia law.” Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 10. Under Georgia law, the plaintiff argues, her annulled marriage to Mr. Newell “could not (and did not) give rise to any responsibility or claim for support relieving [the defendants] of their obligations to provide support benefits to Plaintiff,” id., and therefore the committee’s contrary conclusion was an incorrect interpretation of Georgia Code Ann. § 56-605 (recodified as Official Code of Georgia Ann. § 33-5-52). However, the question of whether the Administrative Committee correctly interpreted section 56-605 is irrelevant to the present action. Even if one reason given by that committee would not alone justify the committee’s decision, the existence of a separate, reasonable ground for that decision, in this case the committee’s legitimate concern for correct anticipation of funding needs, requires this court to leave the defendants’ denial of reinstatement undisturbed.
The record discloses no evidence that either the Administrative Committee or any individual involved with administration of the Delta Plans has acted in bad faith in denying the plaintiff reinstatement of benefits. The court therefore will deny the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and will grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to enter final judgment for the defendant in this action.
SO ORDERED, this 22 day of December, 1982.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "private business and its executives"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0