What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
In some cases there is some confusion over who should be listed as the appellant and who as the respondent. This confusion is primarily the result of the presence of multiple docket numbers consolidated into a single appeal that is disposed of by a single opinion. Most frequently, this occurs when there are cross appeals and/or when one litigant sued (or was sued by) multiple litigants that were originally filed in district court as separate actions. The coding rule followed in such cases should be to go strictly by the designation provided in the title of the case. The first person listed in the title as the appellant should be coded as the appellant even if they subsequently appeared in a second docket number as the respondent and regardless of who was characterized as the appellant in the opinion.
To clarify the coding conventions, consider the following hypothetical case in which the US Justice Department sues a labor union to strike down a racially discriminatory seniority system and the corporation (siding with the position of its union) simultaneously sues the government to get an injunction to block enforcement of the relevant civil rights law. From a district court decision that consolidated the two suits and declared the seniority system illegal but refused to impose financial penalties on the union, the corporation appeals and the government and union file cross appeals from the decision in the suit brought by the government. Assume the case was listed in the Federal Reporter as follows:
United States of America,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendant, Appellee.
International Brotherhood of Widget Workers,AFL-CIO
Defendants, Cross-appellants
v
United States of America.
Widgets, Inc. & Susan Kuersten Sheehan, President & Chairman
of the Board
Plaintiff, Appellants,
v
United States of America,
Defendant, Appellee.
This case should be coded as follows:Appellant = United States, Respondents = International Brotherhood of Widget Workers Widgets, Inc., Total number of appellants = 1, Number of appellants that fall into the category "the federal government, its agencies, and officials" = 1, Total number of respondents = 3, Number of respondents that fall into the category "private business and its executives" = 2, Number of respondents that fall into the category "groups and associations" = 1.
Note that if an individual is listed by name, but their appearance in the case is as a government official, then they should be counted as a government rather than as a private person. For example, in the case "Billy Jones & Alfredo Ruiz v Joe Smith" where Smith is a state prisoner who brought a civil rights suit against two of the wardens in the prison (Jones & Ruiz), the following values should be coded: number of appellants that fall into the category "natural persons" =0 and number that fall into the category "state governments, their agencies, and officials" =2. A similar logic should be applied to businesses and associations. Officers of a company or association whose role in the case is as a representative of their company or association should be coded as being a business or association rather than as a natural person. However, employees of a business or a government who are suing their employer should be coded as natural persons. Likewise, employees who are charged with criminal conduct for action that was contrary to the company policies should be considered natural persons.
If the title of a case listed a corporation by name and then listed the names of two individuals that the opinion indicated were top officers of the same corporation as the appellants, then the number of appellants should be coded as three and all three were coded as a business (with the identical detailed code). Similar logic should be applied when government officials or officers of an association were listed by name.
Your specific task is to determine the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries". If the total number cannot be determined (e.g., if the appellant is listed as "Smith, et. al." and the opinion does not specify who is included in the "et.al."), then answer 99.

Opinion:
Martin R. LONG, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 16779.
United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.
Nov. 8, 1961.
Martin R. Long, pro se.
F. Russell Millin, U. S. Atty., Kansas City,, Mo., and John S. Royer, Jr., Asst, U. S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., were on the brief for appellee.
Before VOGEL, VAN OOSTERHOUT and BLACKMUN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Martin R. Long appeals herein from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri overruling his motion to vacate sentence filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.
' On February 11, 1954, a two-count indictment was returned against the appellant. The first, count charged a violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312. Such count was dismissed. The second count charged a violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 752, m which it was alleged:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1953, one Martin Robert Lon^ did unlawfully, wilfully, know- and feloniously aid and assist m escape from the Greene Coun- & Jail< Springfield, Missouri, of Fred Paul Shannon and Jack Harold Richardson, who had been arrested upon a warrant issued under the law of the United States and committed to the custody of the Attorney General, and said custody and confinement was by virtue of an arrest 0n a charge of felony.”
Tried before a jury, the appellant was found Suilty and on April 20> 1954> was sentenced on said Count 2 to serve four years
“* * * Sentence to begin at the expiration of sentence or sen-fences now serving in any prison or institution.”
At £be yme 0£ indictment and prior to trial appellant had been serving a sen_ tence in the Arizona State Prison at Florence, Arizona. After trial herein be was returned to complete service of guch sentence. On July 5, 1960, being released therefrom, he was transferred to the United gtates Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, where he began serving the sentence under attack here.
_ m „ , ,,, , On February 10, 1961, appellant filed bjs fp-g-fc motion to vacate sentence under g 2255. This motion was overruled by the District C(mrt by order dated Febru_ ary 24, 1961. On March 21, 1961, appellant filed a second motion, supported by an affidavit, for vacation of sentence in forma pauperis. Such motion was overruled by the District Court on March 22, 1961. Appellant’s notice of appeal to this court covered both applications jointly. In an order dated May 26, 1961, this court denied Long’s application to appeal in forma pauperis from the District Court’s order of February 24, 1961, for the reason that the question sought to be raised represented on the face of the record a matter which would be cognizable only on an appeal from the conviction. Long’s application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis from the District Court’s order of March 22, 1961, was granted. It is that order which is on review here.
Appellant was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C.A. § 752, which provides:
“§ 752. Instigating or assisting escape
“Whoever rescues or attempts to rescue or instigates, aids or assists the escape of any person arrested upon a warrant or other process issued under any law of the United States, or committed to the custody of the Attorney General or to any institution by his direction, shall, if the custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; or, if the custody or confinement is for extradition or by virtue of an arrest or charge of or for a misdemeanor, and prior to conviction, be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” (Enacted June 25,1948.)
It is the appellant’s contention that the foregoing statute is applicable only to “prison officials and outsiders” and accordingly, he being an inmate confined in the Greene County Jail at Springfield, Missouri, at the time of the commission of the acts charged, could not be prosecuted thereunder. In support of his contention he cites Kahl v. United States, 10 Cir., 1953, 204 F.2d 864, 865. That case was concerned with a charge of conspiracy to commit the offense of causing or attempting to cause the escape of prisoners in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 252, which the court there does refer to as “(now § 752)”. It does contain dictum supportive of Long’s assertion here, in that the court there said:
“Upon the hearing of the motion to vacate, it was apparently conceded, and the trial court held, that the facts alleged in the indictment do not charge a valid conspiracy under § 252. This is so because § 252 applies only to prison officials and outsiders, and is inapplicable to inmates.”
It could be that the court in Kahl in referring to 18 U.S.C.A. § 252 (1940 edition) was misled by the first words of the opening sentence of that statute, which read
“Any person employed at any Federal penal or correctional institution as an officer or employee of the United States, or any other person who instigates, connives at, wilfully attempts to cause, * * * ” etc., (emphasis supplied)
and in so doing overlooked the words underlined above, “or any other person”. The point, however, is utterly immaterial. The statute which Long is charged with violating here was applicable to “Whoever rescues or attempts to rescue or instigates, aids or assists the escape of”, etc. (Emphasis supplied.) It is not confined to prison officials and outsiders. ■Its plain words encompassed anyone— “whoever” does the prohibited thing. It was applicable to the appellant even though he was an inmate of the jail at the time. His contention to the contrary may not be sustained.
Appellant also attempts to attack the validity of his indictment on the ground that it “failed to state mandatory essential ingredients of the crime charged”. A reading of the indictment indicates that it clearly and succinctly states the charge against the appellant with sufficient clarity to apprise him of the nature thereof, make it possible for him to intelligently defend against it, and also to plead it in bar to future prosecution. More may not be expected or required. Even if details had been necessary, a request for a bill of particulars at the time of trial should have been made. Any such attack on the indictment now comes too late.
Affirmed.

Question: What is the total number of appellants in the case that fall into the category "fiduciaries"? Answer with a number.

Choices:

Answer: 0