What follows is an opinion from a United States Court of Appeals.
Intervenors who participated as parties at the courts of appeals should be counted as either appellants or respondents when it can be determined whose position they supported. For example, if there were two plaintiffs who lost in district court, appealed, and were joined by four intervenors who also asked the court of appeals to reverse the district court, the number of appellants should be coded as six.
When coding the detailed nature of participants, use your personal knowledge about the participants, if you are completely confident of the accuracy of your knowledge, even if the specific information is not in the opinion. For example, if "IBM" is listed as the appellant it could be classified as "clearly national or international in scope" even if the opinion did not indicate the scope of the business. 

Your task concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Your task is to determine which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant. Consider the following categories: "not ascertained", "poor + wards of state" (e.g., patients at state mental hospital; not prisoner unless specific indication that poor), "presumed poor" (e.g., migrant farm worker), "presumed wealthy" (e.g., high status job - like medical doctors, executives of corporations that are national in scope, professional athletes in the NBA or NFL; upper 1/5 of income bracket), "clear indication of wealth in opinion", "other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy" (e.g., public school teachers, federal government employees)." Note that "poor" means below the federal poverty line; e.g., welfare or food stamp recipients. There must be some specific indication in the opinion that you can point to before anyone is classified anything other than "not ascertained". Prisoners filing "pro se" were classified as poor, but litigants in civil cases who proceed pro se were not presumed to be poor. Wealth obtained from the crime at issue in a criminal case was not counted when determining the wealth of the criminal defendant (e.g., drug dealers).

Opinion:
Asahel ABRAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 13172.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 15,1956.
Decided Sept. 13, 1956.
Petition for Rehearing Denied Oct. 30, 1956.
Mr. John A. Shorter, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. John D. Lane, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Lewis Carroll and Thomas Flannery, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee. Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., at the time record was filed, and Richard J. Snider, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered appearances for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, Chief Judge, and FAHY and BURGER, Circuit Judges.
EDGERTON, Chief Judge.
This appeal is from a conviction for assaulting a policeman. 67 Stat. 95, § 205, D.C.Code, Supp. IV (1955), § 22-505. The defendant contended that at the time of the alleged assault, which he denied making, the policeman was arresting him illegally. The policeman was badly injured. It was necessary to remove part of one rib; two ribs were broken; the collar bone was separated from the shoulder blade, and had to be fastened with a screw; and there were spinal injuries. If, as the jury found, the defendant struck the policeman, he inflicted these wounds. There is no contrary contention.
The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that if the police were attempting an illegal arrest the defendant “had full right to resist [the] officers and prevent them from placing him in unlawful custody, and for the purpose of said resistance, was at liberty to use such force as was at his command and necessary to prevent said arrest.” The court said this instruction was “inapplicable to the issues of this case” and refused to give it.
The requested instruction was too broad and in a sufficient sense inapplicable. “One has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest, and courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases.” United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594, 68 S.Ct. 222, 228, 92 L.Ed. 210. But the right to resist arrest does not extend to killing the officer, though it may reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 20 S.Ct. 729, 44 L.Ed. 874. Neither does it extend, in such circumstances as were shown here, to the infliction of the bodily harm proved. As the Second Circuit recently said, in approving refusal to give an instruction similar to the one the District Court refused in the present case, “the use of ‘reasonable force’ only would have been open to defendants.” United States v. Angelet, 231 F.2d 190, 193.
Affirmed.

Question: This question concerns the first listed appellant. The nature of this litigant falls into the category "natural person (excludes persons named in their official capacity or who appear because of a role in a private organization)". Which of these categories best describes the income of the litigant?

Choices:
not ascertained
poor + wards of state
presumed poor
presumed wealthy
clear indication of wealth in opinion
other - above poverty line but not clearly wealthy

Answer: 0