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038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_2.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | y) Content
APIR and APII
Mapping
Terrain features and key facilities
LLOCs, WLOCs, relief and vegetation | {"noise_level": 0.056131073438875245, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 228, "lighting_center_y": 753, "shadow_intensity": 0.07221962140929761, "max_perspective_angle": 3.154330573495718, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 9.578711221520365, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 7.953092542424955, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -62.93479878832733, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -13.365288744802328, "perspective_br_x_shift": -72.2137202885325, "perspective_br_y_shift": -0.6393085963818379, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -15.144658455591298, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -23.715730120571905, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.7692652613165201, "brightness_factor": 0.9640779099711749, "contrast_factor": 0.7727851222773334, "jpeg_quality": 21} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_1.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Lesson 3.50
Analysis of the Operating
Environment (AOE}
Operating Environment Evaluation;
Analysis of the Physical Terrain (PT) | {"noise_level": 0.09994368244676584, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1248, "lighting_center_y": 997, "shadow_intensity": 0.07574169515501068, "max_perspective_angle": 5.441338741441869, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -60.932484462757806, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 64.27572995488052, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -25.907998192680665, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 39.777114789756894, "perspective_br_x_shift": 15.26257245611751, "perspective_br_y_shift": -7.102121902533327, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -32.03968837622435, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -34.29656464592186, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 2, "spots": [{"x": 590, "y": 995, "size": 2, "is_dirt": true, "color": 34}, {"x": 1164, "y": 819, "size": 10, "is_dirt": false, "color": 200}], "blur_radius": 0.7728313034818053, "brightness_factor": 1.0483451664963783, "contrast_factor": 0.7056336237320633, "jpeg_quality": 24} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_8.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | FN
=
NSF
Physical Terrain
Living space for actors:
Live on land and off
Influenced by where, when they can live move and
work
How they use it
Focus on Area of Peacekeeping-Intelligence
Responsibility (APIR)
And wider Area of Peacekeeping-Intelligence Interest
(APII)
Helps visualization of OE | {"noise_level": 0.1670145066878322, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1494, "lighting_center_y": 1268, "shadow_intensity": 0.09371430568727088, "max_perspective_angle": 1.712929703383585, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 32.57057895903489, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -44.15168482937825, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 81.8227720400073, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 2.7871933059655873, "perspective_br_x_shift": -52.652992710034916, "perspective_br_y_shift": 24.470508724534014, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -88.286044531449, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 64.64680433978805, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.7779109526506125, "brightness_factor": 0.7852877012285281, "contrast_factor": 0.9561620018770567, "jpeg_quality": 10} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_4.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Relevance
bas
y
SY,
Movement is constrained and restrained by physical
terrain (PT)
Physical terrain is affected by climate and weather
¢ Human, information domains exist in physical terrain
¢ COAs can exploit the opportunities that Physical
Terrain provides
Terrain affects the COAs available to actors that
pose as a threat to the UN mandate | {"noise_level": 0.053040810024917874, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1972, "lighting_center_y": 582, "shadow_intensity": 0.1801351104708332, "max_perspective_angle": 2.836615733023495, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -39.373963780518274, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -61.56262703975047, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 37.497174753499905, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 54.09975199076689, "perspective_br_x_shift": 71.24253082659402, "perspective_br_y_shift": 47.96110021139327, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 88.16619905677106, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 34.531504920145196, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 345, "line_width": 2, "line_color": 63, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.4731830243237032, "brightness_factor": 0.6035165752008431, "contrast_factor": 0.974129969703925, "jpeg_quality": 20} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_3.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | bas
y
SY,
S% Learning Outcomes
¢ Explain Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Responsibility
(APIR)
¢ Explain Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Interest (API)
¢ Using a map conduct an analysis of PT, including
identifying terrain features and key facilities
¢ Identify key LLOCs, WLOCSs, relief and vegetation | {"noise_level": 0.17859972822739995, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1473, "lighting_center_y": 738, "shadow_intensity": 0.07889575045253439, "max_perspective_angle": 3.578782953396814, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -30.70003567908128, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -65.76447834395898, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 79.87873478048132, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -6.6568448447162325, "perspective_br_x_shift": -59.76068468620195, "perspective_br_y_shift": -36.736350129462444, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -42.98877349583658, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -58.452172964807716, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 0.8475198780265467, "brightness_factor": 0.7106137897523809, "contrast_factor": 1.0643555481969054, "jpeg_quality": 13} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_6.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | é
@) Where Is Analysis of Physical Terrain
in the ACE process?
¢ Analysis and conclusions of PT, plus
conclusions on Climate & Weather
¢ Analysis and conclusions on
Human Terrain (HT)
¢ Analysis and conclusions on
Information Terrain (IT)
©) AOE
Analyses of the ne eet Environment
n (systems)
_ beter fete devi weloptitents'a anda
ented in integrated predictive | {"noise_level": 0.09644208276378688, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 17, "lighting_center_y": 801, "shadow_intensity": 0.12100229336943193, "max_perspective_angle": 6.364483861046081, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -13.570102698624268, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -69.23699985805447, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 69.6274919338259, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 41.450300368094645, "perspective_br_x_shift": 65.59054082975499, "perspective_br_y_shift": -10.353170421059886, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -51.11317085456872, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -1.6573332374582748, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.2850878018127698, "brightness_factor": 0.9965431627699509, "contrast_factor": 1.0926846818708587, "jpeg_quality": 30} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_5.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Activity
Importance of Physical Terrain in military operations
Instructions:
¢ Discuss what is meant by the ”Physical Terrain” (PT)
¢ Discuss how the Physical Terrain is affected by climate and
weather and its impact on the conduct of military operations.
¢ Illustrate by using examples from military history or your own
experiences where a good analysis of the Physical Terrain
resulted in the success of a mission and/or where a poor
analysis of the Physical Terrain seriously hampered or even
prevented the accomplishment of a mission
Approximate Time: 15-20 minutes | {"noise_level": 0.13126695459075505, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1271, "lighting_center_y": 1276, "shadow_intensity": 0.16305402471082914, "max_perspective_angle": 4.945114130141513, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -21.47351777601712, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -67.07615747317696, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 37.564331985741376, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 70.2010663320516, "perspective_br_x_shift": -43.0790794653116, "perspective_br_y_shift": 39.00635438768198, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 31.750412617823002, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 19.068568018628966, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.6169082277062525, "brightness_factor": 0.6013269096159645, "contrast_factor": 0.7352983779760871, "jpeg_quality": 35} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_7.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Physical Terrain is one of 3
interconnected layers in OEE
Physical Terrain (FT)
incl. Climate, weather, flora and fauna. _ciimate-weatner
(Natural and man-made — infrastructures)
‘Threat
(Para)nititary Pooulation
actors
Human Terrain (HT)
(Actors and groups) 1€0 £ 8
en UNHCR
4:
®: ‘
Information Terrain (IT) 7 7 e Lf We
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(actors and relations} y emukimesio | bo eclarer)
©) AOE
af the Operating Environment
Nan factor orientated
Threat and Wyportunities are integrated
Emphasis on influencing
/ threatening actors
and opportunities
Emphasis on inter:
between factor de
presented in integrate
ms) on the ground
and actor behavior
scenario’s and ACOA’s
UN Operating Environment (OE)
(post) conflict ECO-system
Three ‘terrains’ are interrelated | {"noise_level": 0.18564980512706492, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 314, "lighting_center_y": 222, "shadow_intensity": 0.18082323335822315, "max_perspective_angle": 7.071208838372093, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -76.52286747676989, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -40.57513803348927, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 18.31323998907395, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 44.043104010578844, "perspective_br_x_shift": 8.001328670858172, "perspective_br_y_shift": 54.624022307502656, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 12.388626997550205, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -20.525841087126118, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.4068181821918533, "brightness_factor": 0.9390657921105025, "contrast_factor": 0.9579776788087087, "jpeg_quality": 30} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_9.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Aas
\ SZ
SS
APIR. area given to UN
Forces; has responsibility
for the production and
provision of peacekeeping-
intelligence /
understanding
s APIR and API
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|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_10.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | bas
NSF
ae
Learning Activity
How to analyze and evaluate the Physical Terrain (PT):
¢ Situation:
¢ Use the scenario to identify APIR and APII
* Task:
¢ Define the Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence
Responsibility (APIR) and the Area of Peacekeeping
Intelligence Interest (APII)
¢ Time: Approx. 10 min -group work and discussion | {"noise_level": 0.13556284137904429, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 5.730666210922553, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 1.535586560795707, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -32.344558156405874, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -36.82745761852746, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -5.348415464925225, "perspective_br_x_shift": -32.89863338766996, "perspective_br_y_shift": 25.983141551383966, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 7.75236790812211, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -45.1509894275205, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 586, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 180, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.8888120376297441, "brightness_factor": 0.9239810889671447, "contrast_factor": 0.6242262370101096, "jpeg_quality": 33} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_11.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | @) Terrain Features
e Physical Terrain consists of two distinct terrain
features:
— Natural
— Manmade | {"noise_level": 0.1358566697125562, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 87, "lighting_center_y": 651, "shadow_intensity": 0.17667353622850257, "max_perspective_angle": 2.6165664366952286, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 64.90522580480658, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -63.25681154313814, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 14.438969730417469, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -19.48358390237499, "perspective_br_x_shift": 59.35603716846467, "perspective_br_y_shift": 44.76420822163011, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 45.23267146381707, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 6.923679624914556, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.2818509378268284, "brightness_factor": 0.7184311823634622, "contrast_factor": 0.6597478080739759, "jpeg_quality": 34} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_12.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | bas
y
SY,
wae
Learning Activity
¢ Situation:
e Use the scenario to identify terrain features
* Task:
Use mapping and other assets to:
— Identify physical terrain features (Natural and man-
made)
— Mark on map
Key Question: How will this affect the actions of the
human terrain?
¢ Approx. Time: 10 Min | {"noise_level": 0.146203360542687, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 3.1762281808107784, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -7.865785710971096, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -30.776440698942167, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -13.017129860592135, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 73.54014299381925, "perspective_br_x_shift": 18.280408961124778, "perspective_br_y_shift": 56.337490525533156, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 51.103135462685486, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 17.54004332614207, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 7, "spots": [{"x": 1738, "y": 1191, "size": 7, "is_dirt": true, "color": 27}, {"x": 616, "y": 1471, "size": 6, "is_dirt": true, "color": 20}, {"x": 1486, "y": 21, "size": 2, "is_dirt": false, "color": 200}, {"x": 1577, "y": 270, "size": 4, "is_dirt": true, "color": 31}, {"x": 449, "y": 449, "size": 10, "is_dirt": false, "color": 251}, {"x": 345, "y": 1363, "size": 2, "is_dirt": false, "color": 215}, {"x": 1277, "y": 353, "size": 6, "is_dirt": true, "color": 5}], "blur_radius": 1.9509520229449508, "brightness_factor": 1.134510736811241, "contrast_factor": 0.9289828245482505, "jpeg_quality": 35} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_13.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | 20
19
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Example of a map showing key facilities
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SECTOR EAST
SCALE 1:50.000
INFRASTRUCTURE
FACILITIES
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10 EXERCISE | {"noise_level": 0.18484089602775766, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 885, "lighting_center_y": 656, "shadow_intensity": 0.1013688712364241, "max_perspective_angle": 7.048931343879519, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -60.13682488800121, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 36.57999224437576, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -29.738362272919545, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -67.7076317750481, "perspective_br_x_shift": 23.853481579931383, "perspective_br_y_shift": 30.558870878923045, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -23.478729615696793, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 31.565343686892533, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 1839, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 85, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 0.8322082177433012, "brightness_factor": 0.6206488005486884, "contrast_factor": 0.8088145441689056, "jpeg_quality": 29} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_16.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Types of Terrain Analysis and
Overlays fo Complete | {"noise_level": 0.17609528225879, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 56, "lighting_center_y": 39, "shadow_intensity": 0.14836096506848417, "max_perspective_angle": 5.9202828177764975, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 33.75296395125241, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -13.884881561035897, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 59.72048863505478, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 18.10060335879895, "perspective_br_x_shift": 84.18316607725103, "perspective_br_y_shift": -56.913299634231976, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -15.444984683495406, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 7.887136557958911, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.7658329749486363, "brightness_factor": 1.1463796861765831, "contrast_factor": 0.6692813537922399, "jpeg_quality": 18} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_14.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Learning Activity
N
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Z,
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LE
LEE
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SS
GZ
(N
Example of 3CF analysis of key facilities in
Sector EAST
DEDUCTION our
Physical terrain: 1.1 LL EAST-WEST 1.11R
1, LLOCin SCT EAST 1.1.1 Main LL is critical for both UN / UNHCR / LP / AG - What is the condition of the road?
2. Entrances to SCT EAST 2.1 Main entrance from ERIYA to GARIYA - What is the type of surface
3. Airfields in SCT EAST 2.1.1 LLOC through mountains 2.11R
4, Relief in SCT EAST 2.1.2 LLOC go's through tunnel - What are the characteristics of the tunnel surroundings
5. Bridges in SCT EAST 2.1.3 Tunnel is key entrance 5.1 IR
3.1 1x Airfield in SCT EAST - Condition of the bridges
4.1 Strong relief EAST of SCT EAST - Classification of the bridges
5.1 Bridges in SCT EAST RFI
5.1.1 3x bridges are critical for entrance from ERIYA | {"noise_level": 0.08255298810937278, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 630, "lighting_center_y": 476, "shadow_intensity": 0.14259152596425811, "max_perspective_angle": 6.651101158204138, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 95.44300777439895, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 56.14722567088495, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -13.947701141663487, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -34.79658413829061, "perspective_br_x_shift": 15.057669568524261, "perspective_br_y_shift": 11.392581641045524, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 98.76580390011736, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -46.37319180426768, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.9687448056824775, "brightness_factor": 0.807001189089075, "contrast_factor": 0.6878737042546081, "jpeg_quality": 24} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_15.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Learning Activity
Key Facilities
¢ Situation:
¢ Use the scenario to identify all key facilities in your AIR
* Task:
¢ Study your sector map and identify key facilities
¢ Mark on Map with a clear legend
¢ Insert factors into the 3-column format (3CF) and make
deductions
¢ Draw up alist of IRs
* Time: Approx. 20 minutes (group work and discussion)
FACTOR DEDUCTION OUTPUT
Bridges Are bridge classifications sufficient for UN RFI
convoys?
Dam at X
Electric power plant at Y | {"noise_level": 0.15654005571036644, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 421, "lighting_center_y": 1010, "shadow_intensity": 0.061588459636287195, "max_perspective_angle": 6.247104250252404, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -0.23891812493440057, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -39.80239989071715, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 54.81750587517857, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 2.66607783160714, "perspective_br_x_shift": -30.879747023998533, "perspective_br_y_shift": -38.64204341268398, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 81.95971511199272, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -35.43129111721727, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.8113397791156598, "brightness_factor": 0.7514058180472796, "contrast_factor": 0.7307331115779061, "jpeg_quality": 30} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_18.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Overlay Symbols
3)
G4
EES
>
STO? ~emagee
Key Terrain
Restricted Terrain
Severely Restricted Terrain
Built/up Areas
Rivers & Lakes
Land Lines of Communications (LLC)
Rail road
No go waterway
Slow go waterway*
Bridge
No go waterway**
* Outside Rainy season
** Already in Slow- or No go area | {"noise_level": 0.12162391501005565, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 2.6497522180207405, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 72.61769239175092, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 29.54402764625982, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 22.437738852078695, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -53.236262320982675, "perspective_br_x_shift": 3.1204017379702833, "perspective_br_y_shift": 63.07767941073311, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 96.03103890987691, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 72.59317060091217, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.8759156623764364, "brightness_factor": 1.0835989657000296, "contrast_factor": 1.02705304569152, "jpeg_quality": 20} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_17.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Use of mapping
bas
y
SY,
wae
=
Accurate up-to-date mapping is essential
¢ Digital and analogue
¢ Map scale: 1:50,000 or 1:100,000 for OE
¢ Details and clarity important
¢ Close-up imagery for conducting small-unit operations
e Use separate overlays or digital overlay layers
> Don’t reproduce map, highlight objects, elements for
making conclusions
* One overlay per specific topic/factor to focus information
and to combine single overlays as needed | {"noise_level": 0.12498195592825724, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 708, "lighting_center_y": 1098, "shadow_intensity": 0.19540398810611875, "max_perspective_angle": 3.899218820382008, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 75.89672342930697, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -72.45055634003538, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 86.70987712341244, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 30.794640936252193, "perspective_br_x_shift": 38.57779579186749, "perspective_br_y_shift": -45.95019995588294, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 48.72177860385858, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -21.79266986871496, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 8, "spots": [{"x": 1118, "y": 340, "size": 9, "is_dirt": false, "color": 239}, {"x": 1781, "y": 214, "size": 5, "is_dirt": false, "color": 250}, {"x": 1789, "y": 1113, "size": 10, "is_dirt": true, "color": 3}, {"x": 1118, "y": 959, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 50}, {"x": 343, "y": 1153, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 33}, {"x": 748, "y": 481, "size": 8, "is_dirt": false, "color": 233}, {"x": 931, "y": 843, "size": 9, "is_dirt": false, "color": 223}, {"x": 1262, "y": 1371, "size": 7, "is_dirt": false, "color": 228}], "blur_radius": 1.69838143023034, "brightness_factor": 1.1160967732112932, "contrast_factor": 0.9963644202736042, "jpeg_quality": 19} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_19.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Terrain Overlays
bas
y
SY,
The different Terrain Overlays that allow us to conduct the
analysis of military aspects of the terrain are:
- Land Lines of Communication (LLOC)
- Water Lines of Communication (WLOC)
- Relief
- Vegetation | {"noise_level": 0.06268645260548722, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 903, "lighting_center_y": 1185, "shadow_intensity": 0.14544118929398045, "max_perspective_angle": 6.832633146003133, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -20.60809584510676, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -38.35857292430857, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 60.22630599916707, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 39.45745227890647, "perspective_br_x_shift": -77.09741928287046, "perspective_br_y_shift": -4.3624896189873965, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 63.363023963188624, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -60.56528913870834, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 737, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 255, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.388321554458194, "brightness_factor": 0.6119966160852437, "contrast_factor": 0.886997577822176, "jpeg_quality": 26} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_20.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | © Key Terrain
@ Restricted Terrain
YP Severely Restricted Terrain
Se Built/up Areas
Jl! Norge Bivvers & Lakes
am Land Lines of Communications (LLC)
deer} Rail road
“#4 No go waterway
0 Slow go waterway*
—}f- Bridge
4-6 No go waterway**
* Outside Rainy season
** Already in Slow- or No go area
* \
\ x
se
+
MSRs and SSRs designated and named
after routes have been evaluated
a SS a i
as Te | {"noise_level": 0.17240229182678504, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 55, "lighting_center_y": 1444, "shadow_intensity": 0.1688244183425899, "max_perspective_angle": 6.080650123013134, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -62.19534800575865, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -35.0413511174419, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 27.99589251337389, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -3.189805981496079, "perspective_br_x_shift": -70.74782056403333, "perspective_br_y_shift": 5.523959736242773, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -20.433556979581184, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 43.334183853545, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 0.7284063033880503, "brightness_factor": 0.6094221104248178, "contrast_factor": 0.6184146325088404, "jpeg_quality": 12} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_21.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | (@) Key Terrain
@ Restricted Terrain
EY? Severely Restricted Terrain
© Built/up Areas
Jl! orga Biers & Lakes
St Land Lines of Communications (LLC)
deer Rail road
-— >No go waterway
0 Slow go waterway*
—}E Bridge
4-6 No go waterway**
* Outside Rainy season
** Already in Slow- or No go area | {"noise_level": 0.07541312474696854, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 1.5364458224562108, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 40.5860297878167, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -51.092546693853485, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 44.68416117857217, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 17.033168871608822, "perspective_br_x_shift": -51.14116265492279, "perspective_br_y_shift": -33.83881692693046, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 1.7201151893788449, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 43.367403532074476, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.6602857345754183, "brightness_factor": 0.8404689044396312, "contrast_factor": 0.7384290601546186, "jpeg_quality": 26} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_22.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Relief
a) UNIGAR — GARYA main map (PKMI pilot course 2019-1)
*~
\ FE
Up to 3200 meter
~
AS soso Upto 1750 meter | { mA (i
> Z
nee on Up to 3750 meter
f x » A)
{ D i (
j
Up to 750 meter
~
=
rel
EG
ABUSIR | {"noise_level": 0.15491906347576367, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1902, "lighting_center_y": 674, "shadow_intensity": 0.187187480132797, "max_perspective_angle": 3.999229271751995, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 43.24553342545286, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 18.751262660552626, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 52.15736289861292, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -49.75454631991283, "perspective_br_x_shift": 83.99826949770622, "perspective_br_y_shift": 32.198047105956704, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -26.76939302958597, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 57.143551813804464, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.646784515579766, "brightness_factor": 0.8061624602240622, "contrast_factor": 0.7394649650837286, "jpeg_quality": 11} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_23.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | i Lake
Vegetation
LEGEND
bl
i
Jungle / Rainforest / woodlands "
Grassland type Savannah
Savannah
Desert
Stone Desert
Mountainous area
FOREST
€ | {"noise_level": 0.0745898072016006, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 169, "lighting_center_y": 86, "shadow_intensity": 0.0990620190242433, "max_perspective_angle": 7.529128461822406, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 76.98507307049397, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 23.351935492244024, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 56.34561972923774, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -62.315718922498895, "perspective_br_x_shift": -97.82340361509623, "perspective_br_y_shift": -50.62150177145793, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -28.272246031001515, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 36.329580028326944, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": true, "line_pos": 1224, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 118, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.0339914035626074, "brightness_factor": 0.9814235535920535, "contrast_factor": 0.8491310842329175, "jpeg_quality": 40} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_26.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Questions | {"noise_level": 0.13141210498022993, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 418, "lighting_center_y": 393, "shadow_intensity": 0.1417406770258127, "max_perspective_angle": 1.8818461059330835, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -70.97614431374384, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 65.10601673537934, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 18.8950148350183, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -48.898525734195324, "perspective_br_x_shift": 58.26899098599242, "perspective_br_y_shift": -32.35305301597976, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -4.507189546215457, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -34.95192876209965, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.9935879156464615, "brightness_factor": 0.8427748364198069, "contrast_factor": 0.9033985193810623, "jpeg_quality": 38} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_25.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | bas
y
SY,
2) Take Away
=
¢ Understand Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence
Responsibility (APIR) and term Area of
Peacekeeping Intelligence Interest (APII)
¢ Be able to conduct a simple analysis of the PT of
an area of operations
Identify terrain features and key facilities
¢ Identify key LLOCs, WLOCs, relief and vegetation
¢ Integrate your analysis into the broader AOE/
MPKI products | {"noise_level": 0.181606686051681, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 6.080498209361842, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -37.53405580587583, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -53.69400941896463, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 54.037294497993884, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 56.25044442100585, "perspective_br_x_shift": -27.4620893847392, "perspective_br_y_shift": -35.18927771996053, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 95.68529766119309, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 72.59904304901428, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.7713964537818097, "brightness_factor": 1.012556263996541, "contrast_factor": 1.0603192668524113, "jpeg_quality": 31} |
|
038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain_page_24.jpg | 038-024 MIO RTP Lesson 3.5b Physical Terrain | Ge) e e e
(SS) Learning Activity
¢ Situation:
¢ Use the scenario identify LLOCs, WLOCs, Relief, Vegetation in the AIR
© Task:
¢ Study sector map; identify key LLOCs, WLOCs, Relief and Vegetation
¢ Mark on Map with a clear legend
¢ Insert factors into the 3-column format (3CF) and make deductions
¢ Draw up alist of Information Requirements
* Time: 30 minutes (group and discussion)
FACTOR DEDUCTION OUTPUT
MSR from Town A
to B
Threat Actor A needs to RFI. Where are
control for supplies. May
challenge UN FOM
UN need to control MSR.
Local population requires
security in this area.
vulnerable areas
for UN convoys | {"noise_level": 0.1500355488374093, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 6.778959161459363, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -94.3619546802961, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 34.81862877262992, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -76.8669309509288, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 70.08216339884055, "perspective_br_x_shift": 59.77224477075745, "perspective_br_y_shift": 63.4760117160904, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -62.23715913623009, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 33.33957486361764, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.6626298517125675, "brightness_factor": 1.0699892351560227, "contrast_factor": 1.14178049994997, "jpeg_quality": 21} |
|
McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_7.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | Sor
McKENZIE
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES
Analysis of the Russian Seizure
and Ongoing Occupation of the
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
September 2023
Proprietary:
Forbes McKenzie
McKenzie Intelligence Services
forbes @mckenzieintelligence.com
Commissioned by Greenpeace Germany
V4.3 dated 28 September 2023 | {"noise_level": 0.11565778603264006, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 187, "lighting_center_y": 512, "shadow_intensity": 0.13032854322697057, "max_perspective_angle": 2.0872182852086967, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 10.34010500559404, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 63.83467067343271, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 42.70453752879479, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -60.38313592167585, "perspective_br_x_shift": -18.11168941696549, "perspective_br_y_shift": 99.23649191982257, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 27.118697331770136, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 107.74155221736494, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.8725903471339664, "brightness_factor": 0.940637990152525, "contrast_factor": 0.7062249208314857, "jpeg_quality": 15} |
|
McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_2.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | A Nuclear Power Plant as Launch Pad
Analysis of the occupation of Zaporizhzhia NPP by Russian armed forces and Rosatom
and the role of the IAEA
Commissioned by
Greenpeace Germany
Shaun Burnie
E-Mail: sburnie@greenpeace.org
Hamburg, September 2023
Kein Geld von Industrie und Staat
Greenpeace arbeitet international und kampft mit gewaltfreien
Aktionen fiir den Schutz der Lebensgrundlagen. Unser Ziel ist es,
Umweltzerstérung zu verhindern, Verhaltensweisen zu andern und
Lésungen durchzusetzen. Greenpeace ist Uberparteilich und vollig
unabhangig von Politik und Wirtschaft. Mehr als 630.000
Férdermitglieder in Deutschland spenden an Greenpeace und
gewahrleisten damit unsere tagliche Arbeit zum Schutz der Umwelt,
der Vélkerverstandigung und des Friedens.
Impressum
Greenpeace e.V. Hongkongstrae 10, 20457 Hamburg, T 040 30618-0 Pressestelle T 040 30618-340,
presse @greenpeace.de, greenpeace.de Politische Vertretung Berlin MarienstraRe 19-20, 10117 Berlin, T 030 308899-0
V.i.S.d.P. Tobias Miinchmeyer Text McKenzie Intelligence Services Titelfoto (Ausschnitt) Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters/picture alliance
greenpeace.de | {"noise_level": 0.1620737009567221, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 901, "lighting_center_y": 2249, "shadow_intensity": 0.05484965562111744, "max_perspective_angle": 6.562204734573518, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 24.412027388528273, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -55.77876045387862, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -21.159965180144937, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -45.62946823665453, "perspective_br_x_shift": 77.86499643680222, "perspective_br_y_shift": -6.40321252213036, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 56.36635601866226, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -78.58569556915334, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.456166584311672, "brightness_factor": 0.8156345594997559, "contrast_factor": 0.8526404851410565, "jpeg_quality": 30} |
|
McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_1.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | “by Russian arme
the role o " ell
*
irc
i TS lie
_é | {"noise_level": 0.17979794299180013, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 5.222211451573405, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 37.194075383468416, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 81.54907635461954, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -65.46067487597898, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 61.122190076226005, "perspective_br_x_shift": -59.71045278804911, "perspective_br_y_shift": -10.330489219798423, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 23.34127351010079, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -42.088652756385315, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.6892181391794407, "brightness_factor": 0.8431442195214153, "contrast_factor": 1.1230084252714745, "jpeg_quality": 10} |
|
McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_6.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | The McKenzie report and the statements of the IAEA are at variance. For example, the IAEA
mission team in Zaporizhzhia are prevented to inspect inside Russian military vehicles at the
reactor turbine buildings, yet the IAEA reports that during their inspection walk downs they did
not see any heavy weapons or explosive. But as McKenzie reports, the Ural and KAMAZ military
vehicles are designed to carry essential equipment including weapons, ammunition, explosives.
The IAEA Director General’s reporting is incomplete and misleading, including the assessment of
compliance with the safety and security principles. While the nuclear crisis continues to
deteriorate however the IAEA is not providing the level of analysis of Russian military operations
at the site that is essential.
In conclusion, Greenpeace is calling on the IAEA Board member governments to review the
scale and scope of the IAEA mission, and to work with member states, and in particular the
government of Ukraine, to institute whatever measures that will bring maximum pressure to
bear on the Russian armed forces and Rosatom at the plant and to bring about an early end to
the current military occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant.
For further information:
Shaun Burnie, senior nuclear specialist, Greenpeace East Asia
shaun.burnie@greenpeace.org
Jan Vande Putte, radiation/nuclear expert, Greenpeace Belgium
jan.vande.putte@greenpeace.org | {"noise_level": 0.09684719885816892, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1444, "lighting_center_y": 2264, "shadow_intensity": 0.09858372207442734, "max_perspective_angle": 7.811756848968632, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -45.87478760131098, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -99.52875755623904, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -7.224299442721801, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 86.13345849914295, "perspective_br_x_shift": -22.433139313253186, "perspective_br_y_shift": 16.651996915666743, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -20.57751848091381, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -6.757231931300581, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": true, "line_pos": 917, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 60, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 7, "spots": [{"x": 455, "y": 1239, "size": 3, "is_dirt": true, "color": 9}, {"x": 742, "y": 69, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 22}, {"x": 1566, "y": 789, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 48}, {"x": 115, "y": 605, "size": 5, "is_dirt": false, "color": 242}, {"x": 305, "y": 1483, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 25}, {"x": 453, "y": 1318, "size": 2, "is_dirt": false, "color": 238}, {"x": 1342, "y": 1057, "size": 9, "is_dirt": false, "color": 229}], "blur_radius": 1.2717499428585055, "brightness_factor": 0.8478545355494342, "contrast_factor": 0.8255496322252747, "jpeg_quality": 11} |
|
McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_3.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | A Nuclear Power Plant as Launch Pad
Analysis of the occupation of Zaporizhzhia NPP
by Russian armed forces and Rosatom and the role of the IAEA
Executive Summary
Greenpeace Germany and Greenpeace Central and Eastern Europe
Berlin/Kyiv, 28 September 2023
Greenpeace Germany commissioned military analysts at McKenzie Intelligence Services to
assess Russian armed forces operations at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant which was attacked
and seized on 4 March 2022. Since 2022 we have been deeply concerned by the multiple
hazards and risks to the Zaporozhzhia nuclear plant posed by the Russian armed forces and the
Russian State Nuclear Corporation, Rosatom. The McKenzie report provides for the first time
publicly comprehensive details of the Russian military operations at Zaporizhzhia and equally
important, in the area around the nuclear plant.
Using satellite imagery, over a period of several months the former UK military remote sensing
specialists at McKenzie have identified Russian military activity that provides detailed evidence
that the Zaporizhizhia nuclear plant is being used strategically and tactically by Russian armed
forces in its illegal war against Ukraine. The military threat to the plant exists at the plant itself,
but also in the surrounding region and in particular to the off-site electrical grid.
The report, Analysis of the Russian Seizure and Ongoing Occupation of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear
Power Plant (ZNPP)’, has been sent to member governments of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in advance of the debate on Ukraine at the annual
General Conference, and before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 2"? October.
Greenpeace experts have used the McKenzie report to assess the reporting of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with major problems being identified on the how and what is
being reported to member Governments, and the failure of the IAEA to report on Russian
military operations and Rosatom at the nuclear plant and surrounding area. | {"noise_level": 0.16389322553714292, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 263, "lighting_center_y": 915, "shadow_intensity": 0.17922173502547423, "max_perspective_angle": 4.651779993655304, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 12.56826644033724, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -50.27385103444982, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 3.855335630430858, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 63.777803121915454, "perspective_br_x_shift": 18.47473051422638, "perspective_br_y_shift": -1.3427768347981015, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 44.16543158813327, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -85.28269531216685, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.5552813255491039, "brightness_factor": 0.9811740482099909, "contrast_factor": 0.7435996581267161, "jpeg_quality": 16} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_5.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | Greenpeace key findings
McKenzie’s analysis of the military operations and hardware at the Zaporizhzhia site, and
operations in the area of the nuclear plant, including the firing locations of Multiple Rocket
Launchers provides further damning evidence of the Russian armed forces occupation, with all
the inherent risks to nuclear plant safety including the off-site electrical grid.
Russian armed forces and State Nuclear Corporation, Rosatom at Zaporizhzhia nuclear
plant are in violation of the IAEA five principles announced at the UN Security Council in
May 2023;?
The IAEA mission in Zaporozhzhia is incapable of comprehensively assessing Russian
military operations due to restrictions placed on their access, movement and required
prior notification, as well as the small size of the team (four) and the large scale of the
nuclear plant — the largest in Europe;
Consequently the IAEA is unable to meet its mandate commitments on reporting on
Russian compliance with the five principals to the IAEA Board but has so far failed to
state as much;
The IAEA Director General report to the IAEA Board of Governors and regular
Communiques are limited in scope, lacks analysis, and gives too much credence to
Russian military claims;
The IAEA reporting risks normalizing what remains a dangerous nuclear crisis,
unprecedented in the history of nuclear power, while exaggerating its actual influence
on events on the ground;
The IAEA Board has taken a robust position on the Russian attack and occupation of the
Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, but their member governments have failed to apply effective
pressure on Russia, including the lack of sanctions against Rosatom and the continued
participation by Russia in IAEA nuclear programs.
2 UN News, IAEA chief outlines five principles to avert nuclear ‘catastrophe’ in Ukraine, 30 May 2023,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1137172#:~:text=Grossi's%20proposals%20to%20ensure%20the,the%20ter
ritory%200f%20the%20plant. On 30 May 2023 the IAEA Director General presented to the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) the proposal for both Russia and Ukraine to abide by five principles:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
no attack from or against the plant;
no use of the plant as storage nor as a base for heavy weapons or military personnel;
no placement of off-site power at risk;
the protection of all essential structures, systems and components from attacks or sabotage; and
no action which undermines these principles. | {"noise_level": 0.15005477594719083, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1270, "lighting_center_y": 2146, "shadow_intensity": 0.18007529974306408, "max_perspective_angle": 4.282865117487535, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 22.055101313067894, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -116.87433761884765, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 35.65891674255394, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 54.57544109550882, "perspective_br_x_shift": -44.89304179084469, "perspective_br_y_shift": -18.91435342733925, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 64.878239533626, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -59.81136057417149, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.6166398663255823, "brightness_factor": 0.8019254996931363, "contrast_factor": 0.8978749124808068, "jpeg_quality": 19} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_4.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | Key findings in McKenzie report?
The 500-600 military force occupying Zaporozhzhzia is the Russian National Guard, an
organisation that is separate to the Russian Ministry of Defence and is directly.
subordinate to the Russian presidency. They are equipped with vehicles such as the BTR-
70 and BTR-80 armored personnel carrier, heavy vehicles equipped with a turret..
mounted 30mm cannon, as well as other heavy armored urban patrol vehicles.
The Ural and KAMAZ military utility trucks located at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant are
versatile vehicle type used for the transportation of almost all essential equipment and
consumables including weapons, ammunition, explosives, and troops.
Identified GPS locations of Russian military firing positions within a range of 1-18km
from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. At these locations Multiple Rocket Launchers.
(MLRs), specifically BM-21 ‘Grad’ and BM-30 ‘Smerch’, have been fired since March
2022. McKenzie analysis reports that these military assets are likely based in nearby
settlements including the nearby town of Vodyanoye.
The Russian artillery units in the area are employing tactics whereby they deploy to
firing positions some distance from their lay-up positions, conduct their fire missions
then move on to prevent targeting by counter-battery fire. It also appears that they are
using the proximity of the nuclear power plant as a shield to also deter counter battery
fire on to their firing positions. It is expected that their operations will be conducted in
coordination with the armed forces occupying the Zaporizhzhia reactor site.
All activity observed over the reporting period does suggest a precarious environment
continues to exist at the plant.
In part based on the McKenzie analysis, Greenpeace has concluded that Russia armed forces
and Rosatom are in violation of the IAEA principles agreed at the UN Security Council in May
2023. In Greenpeace expert analysis of the IAEA inspections and reporting of the nuclear crisis
at Zaporozhzhia, the conclusion is that the IAEA is unable to fully report on the Russian armed
forces at the site.
1 All Planet Lab data from their SkySat constellation collected from March 2022 to July 2023 was used in McKenzie
study. The orbit pattern of the SkySat constellation allows for frequent collections of the plant, occasionally with
multiple collects in a single day. The dates and times of collection from the SkySat constellation used in the conduct
of this study are listed at Annex A to this report. Analysis was conducted by the McKenzie team of imagery analysts;
all of which are former military intelligence analysts and are graduates of the UK MoD and NATO-recognised
Imagery Analysis Course (UKIAC). This course includes in-depth study of industrial processes including power
generation. The course also develops the analyst’s expertise in military equipment and activity including ground
forces. The area of interest was studied in chronological order using all of the acquired imagery in order to develop
a timeline of activity. Using our analysts' experience and understanding of military activity, all relevant activity was
recorded and analysed to produce an assessment of activity on the ground. A north arrow is included to orientate
the reader. All measurements are approximate and are acquired using Geospatial Information Systems (GIS)
mensuration features. All times quoted in the report are local. | {"noise_level": 0.061066605707973405, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 87, "lighting_center_y": 2096, "shadow_intensity": 0.06012527495156682, "max_perspective_angle": 2.74380423945545, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -2.132933829661269, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -0.17666631231912788, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -21.27729086566093, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 43.634773287900444, "perspective_br_x_shift": -39.795729998586, "perspective_br_y_shift": 84.37690598584386, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -25.84895081418003, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -74.39910650283923, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 942, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 209, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 5, "spots": [{"x": 1091, "y": 313, "size": 9, "is_dirt": false, "color": 204}, {"x": 1629, "y": 1894, "size": 10, "is_dirt": true, "color": 35}, {"x": 1537, "y": 1788, "size": 4, "is_dirt": true, "color": 25}, {"x": 913, "y": 2017, "size": 5, "is_dirt": true, "color": 17}, {"x": 735, "y": 1036, "size": 10, "is_dirt": false, "color": 206}], "blur_radius": 1.8683160222776563, "brightness_factor": 0.7852119547419498, "contrast_factor": 0.8883020716600813, "jpeg_quality": 14} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_9.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | McKENZIE
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES
8.2.8 13 SEpteMber 2022... cccccccscesssesseseseeseseeseseeseseeecsenecseeecseecsesecsesesseseseeseeecseeeeaeeeeaeees 34
B.2.9 23 SepteMber 2022... ceccccsssssesesceseseeseeeseseeseseeeeseeecseeecsesecsesecseseesesecseseeecseeeeaeeeeaeees 35
8.2.10 3 OCtOb |r 2022.0... eeeeceeseseseseeeesesesesesessesesesesesueneseseaeseseeneseaeaeseseseeesaeeeseseseeaeaeateneeeeeees 36
8.2.11 8 OCtOb!|r 2022.0... eeeececeeseseseseesesesesesessesesesesesesseneseaesesneneseaeaesesseeseaeseseseseeaeaeateneeeeeneas
8.2.12 12 October 2022...
8.2.13 15 October 2022...
8.2.14 5 NOVEMDES 2022.00. ccceceeeeeteescseeseseeecsesecsececseeecseeecsesecsesessesesessesesseeesaeeeeaeeesaaees
8.2.15 7 NOVEMDED 2022.0. cccceeceteescseeseseeecsesecsececseeecsceecsesesseseeseseseesesseseeesseeeeaeeesagees 39
8.2.16 14 NOVEMbEr 2022... cesecseteesesececsesecsesecseeecseeecsesecsesessesessesesssseeesaseeeaeeetaeegs 40
8.2.17 4 DeCEMber 2022 oo. ccccceeeteescseesesesscsesscsececseeecseeecseeecsesessesesseseseeseeesaeeeeaaeesaaees 40
8.2.18 28 May 2028.00. ce ee eens ne nere eee nsneneeeesensneneeeseseneeeneeeesenenseeeeaseseneneaaeas 41
8.2.19 Video footage of MRL launch 2/3 September 2022 00... ee eeeeeteteteeeeeeeeeeeenenes 42
8.3 IMpPact POINKS 2... ee ec eceseesceeceeeeseeseeseeseeseeseeaeeseeaeeaeeaeeaecseeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaecaesaeeaeeaesaeeaeeate 43
8.3.1 12 AUQUSt 2022 ooo csetecsetetscseesesesecsesecseecseecseeecseessesessesesseseseeaseesaesessaeesaaees 44
8.3.2 28 AUGUSTE 2022 oo. ieee rene tence tenses neeseetenenenesessenenseeneseeseseneneeeseseneneneeanias 45
8.3.3 23 SepteMber 2022... ecccccccscessseeseseseeseeeseseescseeecseeecseecsesecsesecsesecsesecseseeeeseeeeaeeeeaeees 46
8.3.4 12 OCtObE!r 2022.0. ce eee nee eee ns ee nee eeeenseeneesseneneneneeeeseseneneeeseeenenenseaneas 47
9 CONCIUSIONS oo. ee eens ee reece ee rene neeeeenene ne ceseeseneneeeessesenenseeeeeeeeseneneeeeeaeeneneseeneeas 47
Annex A - List of Imagery Tiles Analysed in the Compilation of the Report... 49
Enclosure 1 — Illustration and Imagery Pack | {"noise_level": 0.11714417591492753, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 745, "lighting_center_y": 885, "shadow_intensity": 0.11761566708976467, "max_perspective_angle": 2.410917698866155, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 56.94482399017291, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 113.00820387032691, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -42.64445919704503, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 85.18440198257936, "perspective_br_x_shift": -81.43070930331105, "perspective_br_y_shift": 21.774066442168916, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -40.90757046574393, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 81.67388658993603, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.4064388989078966, "brightness_factor": 0.7863803901077631, "contrast_factor": 1.0862760309848953, "jpeg_quality": 12} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_8.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | McKENZIE
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES
Contents
TD INTPODUCTION oon. cece cece cece cs esenenecetenecscseseseseeesesesesscesseseseesesesesseseseseneeeseseseneseeseeenene 3
2 Data and Methodology oo... cece ceesceeeseeessenessesecsesesseessesececsecseseeecseeesseeessesesseesessesseeeseeeeees 3
3 Executive SUMMALY ...... cee eseseseseseeeeeseeseseseseseneseseeeescscscsceceeeeseeeseacaeaeeeueeeeeeessrseaeateneeeeseneas 4
4 Area and Installation Orientation ..
5 Assessed Russian Force......... 7
6 Analysis of Activity at Key Events of the OCCUPATION oo... eee eteteteeeeeeeeeeseseeeneeeeeeetetees 9
6.1 Night of 3/4 March 2022.00. eee eee eens neeee eens neseeeseneneneeeesenensneneeasenenenets 9
6.2. 1 SEpteMber 2022.0... ee ecccccccscseeceseeseseseeseseeseseeseseeseseeeeseeseseeeseeecsesesseseeseseeeeseeeeseseeseeeeaeees 14
6.3 30 May 2028 ooo. ere nner nesses neeeeeneneneeeenenensneeeasneneneeeeasenenete 15
7 Timeline of Other Activity Observed at ZNPP.............:cscssecseeseseseseseeeeeeeseeeseseseeeeeeeeeeeeees 15
7.1 18 March 2022 oe eee eee ne nese eens neeasseene ns neeesenenensneeeseenenenieeeasenenete 15
ACU WY At. 0-2 pEnUnEE UE SESESESEUESETENESESESEETOETESESESUSTSTNESESESUSTTOTTEVESESTSTSSETESESESESTSTSTESETESESESETNITETETESTSTTTITENE 15
7.3 3-24 JUIY 2022 ooo ee eerie nese tens neeeneneneneeeeeeenensneeesesnenenieeeasenenete 16
TA 31 JULY 20220 een nee einen nese neeeanenensneeesenensnsneeeaseneneneeeeaseneniee 18
7.5 7 AUQUSt 2022 ooo eeeccesceeecteesesecseeetseeescsessesecscsesecseeessesecseeesssesscessesesessesaeseseesesessaeesaaees 18
7.6 21 AUQUSE 2022 ool ccs eseteeseeeesetetseesseseescsessesececsececsesessesesscsessesesssseseesesaesesesaeeesaaegs 19
7.7 24 AUQUSE 2022 oo. ce eeeeeseseeseeeesesetscsesscseesesesecseeacseeecsesesscsesscsessesesesseseesesaesesesseeeeaaegs 20
7.8 21-23 SEPteMber 2022 oun. eecccccccsscecesesseseseeseseeseseeseseeseseeseseeeeseeecseesseseeseseeseseeecseeesseeeeaeees 20
7.9 4-15 October 2022 ooo. ener eens neeesene ne neeesseensnsneeeeesenenenineeasenenige 21
7.10 15 November — 14 December 2022.. +22
7.11 23 February 2028 oo ccseeeeseseescsesseesscsesscseeecsececsesesseeesscessesesesseseeseeessesesseeesaeees 22
7.12 4-8 JUNE 2028 oo eccccecceeecseteceteesenesseessesessssesecsecesseseeseessssesscsesseseessseseesesaeesesaeeesaaees 23
7.13 16 JUNE 2028 occ eetecsesecseeeesenesseessesesscsesscsececsecessesessseesscsessesesessesaesesaeseeesseeesaaees 24
8 Significant Activity Observed in the Wider Area Of ZNPP...........eceeeeeceseeeteeeeeeeeeeeees 25
B.1 CONTEXE cece eseseeneteteeeeseseseseneseeeseseseseaeseseseseecscaeseaeeeseseseasacseaeeeeeseseeeeseseaeaeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeaes 25
8.2 Indirect Firing POINtS oo ec eeeeeeteceeeetscsesscseeecseeecseeesscsesscsessesesessesesseeesseeesaeeesaaegs 26
8.2 IMPACt POINKS 2... ee ee eceseesceceeeeeseeseeseeseeseeseeaeeseeaeeseeaeesecaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaeeaecaecaesaesaeeaeeaeeats 29
8.2.1 22 JULY 2022. cece ene eee nen tenes eeeensneneessssensnenesessesenseeneeeeseneneeeceeeasesenensaeeas 29
8.2.2 7 AUQUSE 2022 woes ceetectetecsetetscseesesececsesecsececscecseecsesessesessesesseseseeaseesaesesaeeesaeees 30
8.2.3 12 AUGUSTE 2022 oo. cece ee nee etenseeneesestenenenesessenenseenesseeeneneneeeeesaneneneaneas 31
8.2.4 21 AUQUSt 2022 ooo. cee eres te nee tenses nesesestsnsneneeeseneneeenesseseseneneeesesaneneneaneas 31
B.2.5 2 SepteMber 2022 oo... eeccccscesssesseseeseseseeseseeseseescseeecseeecseeecsesecsesecsesesseseceeseeecseeeeseeeeaeees 32
8.2.6 3-7 SepteMber 2022 oo... cecccccscesssesseseseeseseescseescseeecseeecseeecsesecsesecsesessesecseseeecseeeeaeeeeaeees 33
8.2.7 6 SEPtEMbe!| 2022 oo... eecccccscessseeseseeeeseseeseseeseseescseeeeseecsesecsesecsesecsesessesecseseeeeseeeeseeeeaeees 33 | {"noise_level": 0.15962065394383507, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 627, "lighting_center_y": 1311, "shadow_intensity": 0.1400410381913178, "max_perspective_angle": 1.3187400648646634, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 18.865656041746732, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -44.23235878385785, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -8.592856888349772, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -2.3963227994355094, "perspective_br_x_shift": 34.45716059900674, "perspective_br_y_shift": -105.84878884507098, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -54.68392637496626, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 79.95114589869353, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 8, "spots": [{"x": 443, "y": 1206, "size": 2, "is_dirt": true, "color": 22}, {"x": 1485, "y": 1037, "size": 5, "is_dirt": true, "color": 40}, {"x": 1452, "y": 729, "size": 1, "is_dirt": true, "color": 45}, {"x": 726, "y": 731, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 28}, {"x": 1285, "y": 992, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 50}, {"x": 1436, "y": 1400, "size": 1, "is_dirt": false, "color": 236}, {"x": 1063, "y": 434, "size": 5, "is_dirt": false, "color": 238}, {"x": 547, "y": 1463, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 15}], "blur_radius": 1.1447137966527907, "brightness_factor": 1.0460116218732334, "contrast_factor": 0.936367543462397, "jpeg_quality": 29} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_12.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | fe
McKENZIE
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES
Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) which provides both electricity to the nuclear plant and, via water
canals, cooling water.
Nuclear Power Plant
Thermal PoWer Plant
Fig.1 - Area in General
Within the secure perimeter, the six reactor and turbine halls are located in the western half of
the installation (Fig. 2). The reactors are constructed in a line along the western edge of the
installation with a space of approximately 90m between each hall and are numbered from 1 to
6 south to north. Two large buildings, each with a tall smokestack to their rear are positioned
immediately to the east of reactor halls 2 & 3 and 6. These auxiliary buildings are believed to
have multiple functions including radioactive waste storage, liquid waste evaporation, fresh
fuel storage and water and other chemistry distillation. The eastern half of the installation is
dominated by an array of spray ponds for cooling. The array consists of 6 small and 6 large
ponds, each equipped with a number of fountains or water jets for cooling water. These ponds
have been numbered from 1-12 only for the purposes of reporting in this study and do not
reflect any identification system that may be in place at the facility. Administrative, industrial
and operational buildings including waste processing facilities are mainly situated to the south
of the secure area and a dry waste storage area is situated to the northeast corner of the
secure area. | {"noise_level": 0.07785900779236628, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 4.739421303701747, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -40.60559581753157, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 2.610726109832072, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -15.690902506414346, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -54.331081094872715, "perspective_br_x_shift": -50.0090823204869, "perspective_br_y_shift": -48.03181809227257, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -28.276214588868108, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -61.870583578028814, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": true, "line_pos": 2239, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 88, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.7974621463542872, "brightness_factor": 0.8269364713679062, "contrast_factor": 0.6313362156402008, "jpeg_quality": 21} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_10.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | Se
M | S McKENZIE
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES
1 Introduction
McKenzie Intelligence Services were instructed by Greenpeace Germany to conduct an
imagery and all source analysis study of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP)
between the initial assault on the plant during the night of 3/4 March 2022 and 30 June 2023.
The aim of the study is to gain an in-depth understanding of the Russian occupying force at
the plant and activity which may undermine the safety of the plant.
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Russian advance was
fast moving in the south and had reached the southern bank of the Dnipro River by the
beginning of March. During the night of 3/4 March, a full assault of the ZNPP was launched by
the Russian ground forces and was subsequently occupied. The Russians have continued to
occupy the ZNPP to the present day. The plant has been subject to military activity including
bombardment. Information from various sources also suggests that the plant is being used to
store military equipment with additional reports of the placement of mines around the plant.
2 Data and Methodology
Political restrictions over the releasability of imagery of Ukraine meant that MIS were only able
to analyse imagery from Planet Labs for the conduct of the study. All Planet Lab data from
their SkySat constellation collected from March 2022 to July 2023 was used in the study. The
orbit pattern of the SkySat constellation allows for frequent collections of the plant,
occasionally with multiple collects in a single day. The dates and times of collection from the
SkySat constellation used in the conduct of this study are listed at Annex A to this report.
Analysis was conducted by our team of imagery analysts; all of which are former military
intelligence analysts and are graduates of the UK MoD and NATO-recognised Imagery
Analysis Course (UKIAC). This course includes in-depth study of industrial processes
including power generation. The course also develops the analyst’s expertise in military
equipment and activity including ground forces. The area of interest was studied in
chronological order using all of the acquired imagery in order to develop a timeline of activity.
Using our analysts' experience and understanding of military activity, all relevant activity was
recorded and analysed to produce an assessment of activity on the ground. A north arrow is
included to orientate the reader. All measurements are approximate and are acquired using
Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) mensuration features. All times quoted in the report are
local. All imagery unless stated is Copyright 2023 Planet Labs Germany GmbH. The
probability yardstick language is used in this study — it is explained below.
Realistic
Possibility
Highly
Unlikely Likely
Unlikely Likely or Probably
(25-35%)
(10-20%) (40-50%) ae (80-90%) | {"noise_level": 0.1743244685905565, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1573, "lighting_center_y": 322, "shadow_intensity": 0.14920221129133854, "max_perspective_angle": 1.500859220468276, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -53.877276432690564, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -95.31139606724034, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 12.247629386347711, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -35.69508298189302, "perspective_br_x_shift": -53.8628036529157, "perspective_br_y_shift": 107.91053475368777, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 68.12934493337842, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -18.353722635631016, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 2, "spots": [{"x": 854, "y": 2165, "size": 7, "is_dirt": false, "color": 244}, {"x": 1440, "y": 823, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 20}], "blur_radius": 1.2677316242428593, "brightness_factor": 1.0654020861123024, "contrast_factor": 0.9927831524748978, "jpeg_quality": 17} |
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M | S McKENZIE
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES
3 Executive Summary
e Russian Forces forcibly seized control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
during the night of 3/4 March 2022, with use of heavy weapons including possible
use of main battle tanks.
e The plant is occupied by a force of approximately battalion strength of the National
Guard, an organisation that is separate to the Russian Ministry of Defence and is
directly subordinate to the Russian presidency.
e The force at ZNPP is equipped with utility trucks and armoured personnel carriers.
e Overt military activity observed at the plant has been minimal in that there has not
been full scale activity involving the use of heavy and armoured vehicles.
Nevertheless, there is a sizeable force in place at the plant of approximate battalion
strength (approx. 500-600 personnel). There have also been repeated instances of
detonations reported at the plant and multiple occasions when the grid lines
supplying power to the plant have been damaged or cut by shelling and other
kinetic activity. Emergency power supply has been required to keep the plant
cooling systems operating. Analysis of the reporting period also identified at least
one kinetic action against the occupying forces in the form of an unmanned aerial
vehicle and small munition strike.
e There is evidence of indirect fire targeting the plant which has resulted in damage
to buildings and safety infrastructure (cooling systems).
e Analysis of satellite imagery strongly indicates the area to the south of the industrial
area and within 1 to 18 km of the ZNPP has been used, and most likely continues
to be used, by Russian indirect fire assets such as artillery and multiple rocket
launchers. This practice would effectively deter Ukrainian counter-battery fire in
such close proximity to the plant. It was not possible from the imagery to identify
firing points or artillery assets from within the plant boundary although that does not
suggest that the use of mortar fire could not have occurred from within the plant.
No mortar assets were identified on imagery but the light nature of these weapon
systems makes them easy to move and conceal.
e While on the ground monitoring has confirmed the use of anti-personnel mines,
namely direction anti-personnel mines such as the MON-50/90/100 & 200, around
the secure perimeter of the plant, this cannot be confirmed through imagery.
4 Area and Installation Orientation
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is located on the southern bank of the Dnipro River in
southern Ukraine (Fig. 1), part of the industrial town of Enerhodar and close to the town of
Vodyanoye. The plant is approximately 440km southeast of Kyiv and 160km north of the
Crimean peninsula. The plant consists of six reactor and turbine halls which connect by way
of pylons to an associated transformer yard which subsequently connects to the Ukrainian
national grid. The plant is situated both within and outside of a secure, multi-layered
perimeter. Within the perimeter are the reactor and turbine halls, an array of 12 spray ponds
for cooling, likely auxiliary power generators and other essential industrial, operational and
administrative facilities. External to the perimeter, a large cooling pond and network of canals
provide the plant with water with which to cool the reactors. The transformer yard is also
external to the secure perimeter. The nuclear plant is also adjacent to the Zaporizhzhia
4 | {"noise_level": 0.07877902786548019, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 99, "lighting_center_y": 645, "shadow_intensity": 0.07545946093096362, "max_perspective_angle": 5.01323639576292, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -11.615933665912237, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 3.8831842933696663, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -47.82474327384645, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 12.915402485824202, "perspective_br_x_shift": 75.09459946394956, "perspective_br_y_shift": -25.61965536676226, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -49.07012542832185, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 39.916162182109204, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.7906427628065904, "brightness_factor": 1.1482210377669042, "contrast_factor": 0.9059408129718785, "jpeg_quality": 21} |
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‘Auxiliary ,ProcessingiHall
Reactor & Turbine Hall No. 5
Reactof & Turbine Hall No.4
i)
Regetor & Turbine Hall No, 3
/ >
Réaetor Y Tyrbine Hall No.2
/ j
9 24 ,
Redetof & Turbine Hall No, 1
?
Each reactor and turbine hall unit is constructed along similar lines (Fig. 3). The reactor hall
which is easily identifiable by the red roof of the containment building is located at the eastern
end of each unit. The turbine hall is directly connected to the western side of the reactor hall.
Switch gear connecting the turbine hall to the transformer yard is external to the hall and
positioned along the southern side of the turbine hall. A large access door is located at the
rear of the turbine hall on the northern side of the building. Each unit is also served by a pump
house to the rear of the turbine hall and alongside the canal leading from the large cooling
pond. Each unit also has an associated external building adjacent to the northern side of the
reactor hall. The precise purpose of this building cannot be ascertained by imagery but
research suggests it may house an emergency diesel generator to provide power to the unit.
An extensive network of pipes runs along the western edge of the units parallel with a service
road that separates the units from their associated pump house. An area of open ground
separates each unit with an approximate distance of 91m between each unit. The areas of
open ground between the units were often used for storage unidentified objects and vehicles
over the reporting period. It is not clear what the items may have been but the vehicles that
were parked in these areas were not armoured military vehicles or weapon systems. A local
rail network runs along the eastern end of the units with a line leading into the reactor halls.
The possible emergency generator halls to the east of the units are also connected to each of
the units via a raised structure, most likely containing pipes or power lines to the reactor halls. | {"noise_level": 0.07147643178552174, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 433, "lighting_center_y": 1395, "shadow_intensity": 0.07893742424683746, "max_perspective_angle": 5.701963029250702, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -29.838545927794016, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 54.793278128665676, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -23.083813478849223, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 3.9869984500502937, "perspective_br_x_shift": 23.82979524631915, "perspective_br_y_shift": -5.637027206007687, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -62.61947014404386, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 79.41256295965304, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.8095005731203384, "brightness_factor": 1.1241262776230205, "contrast_factor": 1.0085807884860487, "jpeg_quality": 21} |
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‘ '
Pump House
Access Door
ca
Turbine Hall
Y.
% ‘Switch Gear eins
-*, I 2 8
Le 7 3 Reactor Hal
.
4 .
J) o
‘tise
Fig. 3 — Reactor and Turbine Unit Layout
5 Assessed Russian Force
The Russian force arrived at the ZNPP during the night of 3/4 March 2022, approximately one
week after the invasion of Ukraine commenced. After a violent confrontation, the plant was
seized and the Russians have continuously occupied the plant since. Analysis of both ground
level (including CCTV) and aerial/satellite imagery does not reveal an overly sizeable force at
the plant. It has not been possible to conduct a consolidated vehicle count which would
indicate the size of force present at the plant due to apparent concealment of vehicles by the
Russian force at the plant. Open-source information indicates that vehicles have been parked
inside the turbine halls with footage of the vehicles being driven in (Fig. 4) and handheld
imagery of vehicles parked inside the turbine halls (Fig. 5). The footage confirms vehicles
entering the turbine hall of reactor 1 and possibly other halls too. Satellite imagery collected at
a lower angle off-nadir have also indicated vehicles have been parked directly underneath
raised platforms, most likely as a method of concealment. The imagery indicates that the unit
present at the plant are equipped with BTR-80 wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APC)
and a mixture of Ural and Kamaz utility trucks. Other open-source information’ suggest that a
force of approximately 500 personnel of the Russian National Guard have occupied the plant.
A force of 500 personnel indicates a battalion level of command at the plant which is a suitable
sized force to conduct security duties at an installation of this size. The Russian National
Guard is also an appropriate organisation for this purpose.
1 (The Insider dated 5 Aug 22 and TASS dated 11 Mar 22)
7 | {"noise_level": 0.10257683444359428, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 7.584231419804693, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -57.69972197243343, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -103.93986558255298, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -76.21524698843476, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 29.5509932178809, "perspective_br_x_shift": -8.365489978264605, "perspective_br_y_shift": 22.89470004629247, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 22.8916494935403, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 20.661618056301293, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.5233147848368727, "brightness_factor": 0.6805179140770495, "contrast_factor": 0.8312799578982245, "jpeg_quality": 18} |
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Fig. 5 — Utility Trucks Parked Inside Turbine Hall (CNN ‘Russian vehicles seen inside turbine hall at
Ukraine nuclear plant’ dated 19 August 2022)
The Russian National Guard is a separate force from the Ministry of Defence and do not come
under the command of the Chief of the Defence Staff or Defence Minister. As an agency it
reports directly to the President of Russia and has a stated mission of security of the national
border, counter terrorism and guarding of essential national facilities. The specific capabilities
and functioning of the Russian National Guard is consistent with their presence at the power
plant. The force is equipped with heavy vehicles such as the BTR-70 and 80 (Fig. 6) as well
as other heavy armoured urban patrol vehicles. These vehicles match those observed at the
plant but are not indicative of a specific type of unit; they are standard vehicles that can be
found in most units of the Russian ground forces and other security units. | {"noise_level": 0.16640236236408834, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 383, "lighting_center_y": 1761, "shadow_intensity": 0.0842942928863079, "max_perspective_angle": 6.635104136714669, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 68.09712465791286, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -42.83705881555835, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -77.63617743007414, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 82.16806377702618, "perspective_br_x_shift": 58.07549591546827, "perspective_br_y_shift": 113.39514598851865, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 25.730555741359325, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 41.87875450025395, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.5637694722282461, "brightness_factor": 0.6109676140691039, "contrast_factor": 0.6240538367432248, "jpeg_quality": 27} |
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Fig. 8 — Utility Trucks and Tents Erected within Plant Compound
A small number of vehicles were also observed in the northern part of the secure compound
adjacent to the northern entrance. Cross referencing with imagery on Google Earth dated
April 2022 confirms these vehicles as utility trucks and BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers
(Fig. 9).
ay.
LS
l~
Within the plant, spray ponds 1 & 2 were inactive and the water pressure on spray ponds 3-6
appeared to be lower than was observed at other occasions (Fig. 10).
11 | {"noise_level": 0.13658898492172622, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 4.449562522660717, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 1.1956415504987916, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 84.9192417535386, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -6.21176962124332, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 26.99745085113561, "perspective_br_x_shift": 35.69264078424848, "perspective_br_y_shift": -52.41154684344227, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -38.25076646929516, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -13.275624350174013, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 1117, "line_width": 3, "line_color": 89, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.7000891295396117, "brightness_factor": 1.1375627937969515, "contrast_factor": 1.1114864733808607, "jpeg_quality": 17} |
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Fig. 6 - BTR-80 Armoured Personnel Carrier (Wikimedia Commons)
6 Analysis of Activity at Key Events of the Occupation
This section provides a detailed analysis of activity observed at the plant at three key dates of
the Russian occupation of ZNPP, these being:
e 3/4 March 2022 — Initial assault on ZNPP and commencement of Russian Occupation.
e 1 September 2022 — Inspection of ZNPP by the IAEA.
e 30 May 2023 — Subsequent inspection of ZNPP by the IAEA.
6.1 Night of 3/4 March 2022
No cloud-free, very high resolution satellite imagery of the plant is available prior to 15 March.
CCTV footage has been released on YouTube which presents footage of the assault by the
Russian forces on the training building which is located to the immediate south of the plant and
external to the secure perimeter (Fig. 7). Directly behind the training building is the ZNPP
transformer yard. The footage is of sufficient quality to identify armoured vehicles, likely to be
BTR variants firing on the training building, most likely with their turret-mounted 14.5mm
machine guns. Tracer rounds can be seen being directed towards and striking the training
building. While the tracer fire appears to be sporadic, it must be considered that standard
practice is usually a ratio of 1:4 or 5 i.e. 1 tracer round per 4 or 5 standard rounds. A14.5mm
machine gun delivers a significant weight of fire and will have caused extreme damage to the
building. Muzzle flashes from the armoured vehicles also indicate fire was being directed onto
the building without tracer rounds, possibly from smaller calibre weapons such as 7.62mm.
The footage confirms some of the rounds overshot the building or ricocheted behind the
building and may have impacted the transformer yard behind the training building. | {"noise_level": 0.13876686736040816, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 983, "lighting_center_y": 1096, "shadow_intensity": 0.13402813918683515, "max_perspective_angle": 2.572093497072106, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -63.302773870871455, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -74.89930363846688, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 3.632850042387375, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 28.569872602753335, "perspective_br_x_shift": -38.109709254749, "perspective_br_y_shift": -52.50420750993585, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -61.68963246119169, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -12.760427794674243, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.0512374552781563, "brightness_factor": 0.6760564254476062, "contrast_factor": 0.6136535525841983, "jpeg_quality": 20} |
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Tracer Rounds Building on Fire
Fig. 7 —- CCTV Footage of Assault on Training Building (YouTube
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pelEvbcb7ec)
The footage does not indicate the use of heavier weapons such as from a main battle tank
(MBT) or indirect fire from mortar or artillery assets although this cannot be ruled out. No
return fire was observed from the training building although Russian personnel can be
observed taking cover behind the armoured vehicles that are firing on the building. As a result
of the assault on the plant, the training building sustained severe damage with a fire burning
for a substantial amount of time. A report from the Nuclear Engineering International industry
newsletter? dated 13 July 2022 quotes Olexiy Kovynyevis, an independent expert and former
reactor operator and shift supervisor, who highlighted the potential for catastrophic damage to
safety elements at the plant. Whilst the list of safety infrastructure was described as “almost”
impacted, they were not affected by the fighting during the assault.
The first available very high resolution imagery after the assault is dated 15 March 2022. The
staff car parks for the plant are empty, suggesting a low number of plant operating personnel
were present at the plant. A number of utility trucks were observed on an area of open ground
to the south of the spray ponds within the secure perimeter although not the amount of
vehicles that would be expected to be seen for a battalion sized unit (Fig. 8). A number of
tents had been erected in the same area.
2 https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurenuclear-safety-zaporizhzhia-and-military-conflict-9847710/
10 | {"noise_level": 0.1988949796734626, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1570, "lighting_center_y": 28, "shadow_intensity": 0.06704129388247429, "max_perspective_angle": 7.96592995497229, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 41.91277798772748, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 11.2589569251396, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 25.89518409021902, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 74.06522026800893, "perspective_br_x_shift": -2.483583926773818, "perspective_br_y_shift": 92.58896972464792, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -72.30109420452554, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 22.40090487422269, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.5182253040517406, "brightness_factor": 0.957165074876364, "contrast_factor": 1.0046695489714197, "jpeg_quality": 14} |
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Fig. 10 — Inactive Spray Ponds
External to the plant, an object was observed in the car park adjacent to the main entrance
and the training building (Fig. 11). An analysis of the precise position of this object and cross
referred to a hand held image published by the Wall Street Journal from 5 July 2022 indicates
the presence of a main battle tank (T-72 or T-80) under a rudimentary camouflage netting.
Research of the Russian National Guard does not suggest that they were equipped with MBT
at this time indicating likely assistance from the Russian ground forces during the initial
firefight. Reporting suggests that following the mutiny of the Wagner group in June 2023, the
Russian Duma has authorised the arming of the National Guard with heavy weapons including
MBT. The position and posture of the MBT in the photo does not suggest that it has been
positioned to guard the entrance to the plant. That the MBT has been camouflaged and its
barrel pointing inwards may suggest that the MBT was damaged during the fighting of the
initial assault and is unable to be moved to a more secure location and concealed from view of
surveillance from unmanned aerial vehicle or satellite.
12 | {"noise_level": 0.10624196154755247, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1028, "lighting_center_y": 1512, "shadow_intensity": 0.16972939010114935, "max_perspective_angle": 5.331357277093427, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 19.841548463413005, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 64.35500678583286, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -41.160233452617, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -103.60881694360168, "perspective_br_x_shift": 43.730214585106765, "perspective_br_y_shift": 90.99341927728996, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 18.07407587234478, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -105.55946797683414, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 3, "spots": [{"x": 1233, "y": 300, "size": 7, "is_dirt": true, "color": 29}, {"x": 1170, "y": 94, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 21}, {"x": 1511, "y": 243, "size": 2, "is_dirt": true, "color": 37}], "blur_radius": 1.7976617043022973, "brightness_factor": 1.0811347618073281, "contrast_factor": 0.8066418367199852, "jpeg_quality": 38} |
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Fig. 11 — Concealed MBT in Car Park (Inset image BBC ‘Zapoizhzhia: Russian rockets damaged part of
nuclear plant, Ukraine says’ dated 5 August 2022)
Elsewhere, external to the secure compound of the plant, a checkpoint and chicane have been
constructed on one of the tracks approaching the plant from the south and to the immediate
west of the transformer yard (Fig. 12) indicating the setting up of an outer cordon on the
approaches to the plant.
Chicane and Checkpoint
Fig. 12 — Chicane and Checkpoint on Southwestern Approach
13 | {"noise_level": 0.14044187219399684, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 170, "lighting_center_y": 51, "shadow_intensity": 0.11340676742222726, "max_perspective_angle": 6.305520745519465, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 56.115541152054774, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -96.13956725974893, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 29.42239515054051, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -70.60457717593405, "perspective_br_x_shift": -21.268936959705364, "perspective_br_y_shift": -96.94766180804933, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -32.988836278076896, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 85.85841845684418, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.7127162214944411, "brightness_factor": 0.9335977301509613, "contrast_factor": 0.9994200555205626, "jpeg_quality": 23} |
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6.2. 1 September 2022
No very high resolution imagery of the plant was available to cover 1 September 2022,
however there was imagery collected on 28 August 2022 which would indicate any
preparations for the IAEA inspection. There were two satellite imagery collections of the plant
on 28 August at 08:37hrs and 09:07hrs.
At 08:37hrs the large doors to the turbine halls of reactors 4 and 5 were partially opened (Fig.
13). The doors were not open sufficiently to allow vehicular ingress/egress but indicates that
some activity was ongoing which required access to the rear of the turbine halls. The door to
the turbine hall of reactor 1 was fully open although no vehicular activity was observed. No
other vehicular activity was observed around the plant on both imagery collections. Other
reporting from CNN and The Insider, both from August 2022 confirm the presence of vehicles
inside the turbine halls (Fig. 5). Footage from a UAV of the plant, published on 5 August 2022
identifies utility trucks and BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers entering the turbine hall of
reactor 1 (Fig. 4).
Partially Opened Access Door
Fig. 13 —- Open Access Doors, Turbine Halls 4 &5
The imagery of 28 August also indicated damage to the roof of the large building to the east of
reactors 2 and 3 (Fig. 14). Scarring suggesting impact from an unknown projectile was visible
at three different positions on the roof. The exact date of the apparent impact is unknown. It
cannot be determined from the imagery if the impacts had penetrated the roof structure. No
other impact points were identified in the vicinity of the building or elsewhere in the plant.
14 | {"noise_level": 0.1283777670574262, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 149, "lighting_center_y": 1328, "shadow_intensity": 0.15478953518872907, "max_perspective_angle": 4.42900373075072, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -2.03510154338602, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 7.878150968919968, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 38.89983194545451, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 28.409217034291473, "perspective_br_x_shift": -31.282423418482317, "perspective_br_y_shift": -100.2046396830243, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -33.13861348944199, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 33.10690049260931, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": true, "line_pos": 1484, "line_width": 2, "line_color": 204, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 0.6008587536362394, "brightness_factor": 0.9664282245091103, "contrast_factor": 0.919564554674621, "jpeg_quality": 15} |
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>
Reactor 2
Fig. 14 — Roof Damage and Impact points
6.3 30 May 2023
Only one cloud free image was collected around the time of 30 May with an image collected
on 26 April 2023. No significant activity was observed at the plant.
7 Timeline of Other Activity Observed at ZNPP
This section provides a chronological narrative of activity observed at the plant separate to the
activity observed during the key periods detailed at para 6. Activity reported includes both
Russian and Ukrainian military activity and other activity which may impact the operation and
subsequent safety of the plant. All activity will be reported in a chronological order but will
exclude any activity already covered in this report.
7.1 18 March 2022
The number of utility trucks in close proximity to the spray ponds had increased slightly but still
fell short of the expected number of trucks that would be expected of a battalion sized unit.
The tents that were previously observed in the same area (para 6.1 refers) were still present
but they had been moved to a different position. The camouflaged tank was still present in the
external car park. This tank had disappeared by 22 June 2022. Spray ponds 1 and 2
remained inactive.
7.2 3 July 2022
The tents remained in position to the immediate south of the spray ponds. The utility trucks
also remained in open storage on the open ground to the immediate west of the tents. The
vehicles appeared to be parked up and were not positioned as if to form a command post
complex. A vehicle measuring 8m in length was parked next to a pump housing between
15 | {"noise_level": 0.058620760972564995, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 83, "lighting_center_y": 868, "shadow_intensity": 0.12326298195382633, "max_perspective_angle": 2.203842672281893, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -73.13173782559845, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -30.75904275488294, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -32.72251278082241, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 83.38568886416972, "perspective_br_x_shift": 4.054398590982601, "perspective_br_y_shift": -18.43803384076105, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -76.40882359603677, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 75.25125819134398, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.402473219294182, "brightness_factor": 0.6408344927370911, "contrast_factor": 1.1224035440431765, "jpeg_quality": 32} |
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spray ponds 11 and 12 (Fig. 15). The vehicle appears to be a Kamaz utility truck, a slight
change in tone on the top of the vehicle is likely to be a painted ‘Z’, a symbol used by Russian
forces to mark their vehicles. All spray ponds were active.
Utility Trucks
. :
= = 'S
Fig. 15 — Activity in Vicinity of Spray Ponds
7.3 3-24 July 2022
Ukrainian Defence Ministry video footage published on 25 July shows an attack against the
Russian forces at the ZNPP and within the secure perimeter. The footage appears to show a
small UAV (drone) attack against at least two targets. In both instances the explosive device
is not substantial and is likely to be no larger than a grenade. The first attack claims to be
against a BM-21 ‘Grad’ Multiple Rocket Launcher (MRL). The video shows a small device
detonating on a vehicle which is parked in between two of the spray ponds but the vehicle that
is hit is not a BM-21 (Fig. 16). The device is not significant as there is little damage to the
vehicle after the device detonates.
16 | {"noise_level": 0.09849759899019456, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1609, "lighting_center_y": 1172, "shadow_intensity": 0.05708114765667861, "max_perspective_angle": 1.099819729389258, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -2.4641662276171132, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 99.6218339158254, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 29.569536926293466, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 51.01460501784469, "perspective_br_x_shift": -58.654876441645456, "perspective_br_y_shift": -20.487911046459516, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 29.736625596612583, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 52.12754894454376, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 4, "spots": [{"x": 216, "y": 180, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 2}, {"x": 951, "y": 1859, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 35}, {"x": 1091, "y": 509, "size": 3, "is_dirt": true, "color": 26}, {"x": 1647, "y": 2289, "size": 1, "is_dirt": true, "color": 21}], "blur_radius": 1.1322694043813273, "brightness_factor": 0.8404457372268224, "contrast_factor": 0.9032595669359893, "jpeg_quality": 20} |
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—
Unidentified Vehicle (Nota BM-21)
la ey
Fig. 16 — Vehicle Targeted for UAV Strike (YouTube -
https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=F9QmYORKx8M&t=22s)
In the same footage, the UAV captures what appears to also be a UAV dropping a small
device on the tented complex to the south of the spray ponds (Fig. 17). The device detonates
in a small patch of ground to the rear of the tents. While the detonation appears to be quite
significant, it does not appear to be a substantial munition. There is little initial damage and an
individual passing at the point of detonation does not appear to be significantly injured.
Point of Impact
Fig. 17 — UAV Strike on Tent Complex (YouTube -
https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=F9QmYORKx8M&t=22s)
Later in the footage, fire fighters are observed fighting a fire amongst the tents. Imagery from
24 July 22 identifies that the tent complex has mostly burnt down (Fig. 18). The utility trucks
previously observed parked on the open ground are no longer present.
17 | {"noise_level": 0.06696424474969032, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 227, "lighting_center_y": 1434, "shadow_intensity": 0.1281395701050198, "max_perspective_angle": 5.249951370454775, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -48.694999904191945, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -99.53792781851529, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 26.64001468329461, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 28.556393649545228, "perspective_br_x_shift": 80.81749814526133, "perspective_br_y_shift": -84.61533973466447, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -24.275059445908767, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 87.14177652363675, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 10, "spots": [{"x": 71, "y": 2315, "size": 1, "is_dirt": true, "color": 27}, {"x": 1171, "y": 2334, "size": 6, "is_dirt": true, "color": 40}, {"x": 584, "y": 2323, "size": 7, "is_dirt": true, "color": 0}, {"x": 1140, "y": 1508, "size": 7, "is_dirt": false, "color": 202}, {"x": 860, "y": 2321, "size": 10, "is_dirt": true, "color": 21}, {"x": 5, "y": 1634, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 28}, {"x": 381, "y": 504, "size": 1, "is_dirt": true, "color": 50}, {"x": 942, "y": 618, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 18}, {"x": 717, "y": 1742, "size": 1, "is_dirt": false, "color": 207}, {"x": 1504, "y": 2236, "size": 10, "is_dirt": true, "color": 41}], "blur_radius": 0.8266423294868014, "brightness_factor": 0.903021290914455, "contrast_factor": 0.9060367651929663, "jpeg_quality": 20} |
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Fig. 19 - Area of Graded Earth by Transformer Yard
7.6 21 August 2022
Imagery of 21 August 2022 was collected at a low angle off-nadir and identifies vehicles
parked under a raised structure between the supporting struts (Fig. 20). The vehicles
remained in this position until at least 21 September when they were also observed in the
same position. The vehicles are both utility trucks and likely heavy armoured vehicles such as
the BTR-80 APC which has been seen within the plant on previous imagery. The significance
of the parking of the vehicles under the raised structure is both concealment and protection
from overhead attack as previously sustained earlier in the occupation.
Li - La" aa
Fig. 20 — Concealed Utility and Armoured Vehicles
19 | {"noise_level": 0.14835230277465214, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 28, "lighting_center_y": 669, "shadow_intensity": 0.13667658089520096, "max_perspective_angle": 6.020007420545198, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -46.06431090967469, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -86.06570169537494, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -39.07251189246969, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 88.42776395289773, "perspective_br_x_shift": 21.570474343544632, "perspective_br_y_shift": -101.54973048724077, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 34.09808244287737, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 43.187031331990184, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.4909242174433985, "brightness_factor": 0.6500207344883702, "contrast_factor": 0.819684341783072, "jpeg_quality": 30} |
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Fig. 22 — Concealed Utility and Armoured Vehicles
7.9 4-15 October 2022
Imagery collected on 4 October identifies that only half of the jets remain operational on spray
ponds 4 and 5 although the repairs to the pipe on pond 4 appear to have been completed.
Two of the larger ponds, 7 and 10 are not operational at all. Ponds 7 and 10 remained non-
operational on 8 October and the water levels on pond 7 were significantly lower than usual
(Fig. 23). Pond 7 was filled to usual levels by 9 October but both ponds 7 and 10 were still not
working. All spray ponds were back to normal by 15 October although the pressure of the jets
was lower than usual in ponds 7 and 10.
21 | {"noise_level": 0.11825034693547218, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 6.91689220935693, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -77.19500104366686, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -75.07379530004225, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 72.97793118818159, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 14.620303020693072, "perspective_br_x_shift": -26.751792883195158, "perspective_br_y_shift": -51.33256115434969, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -72.38500796248587, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 31.745644054061174, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.0934467256356193, "brightness_factor": 0.7717533507289801, "contrast_factor": 0.6039421527118226, "jpeg_quality": 38} |
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a
i
Fig. 18 — Tents Damaged and Destroyed by Fire
Analyst Assessment: Following the relatively low complexity but successful attack, it is likely
that the Russian forces at the plant moved their equipment, vehicles and troop
accommodation into hard shelter, most likely the turbine halls associated with each reactor.
This not only provides cover from view from standoff surveillance but also provides hardened
protection. Assessment Ends.
7.4 31 July 2022
A truck, most likely a Kamaz utility truck, is parked on the grass verge to the immediate east of
spray pond 9. This truck remains at this location for at least 5 months and was last observed
on 14 December 2022 although subsequent imagery collected until 28 December 22 was
cloud covered. The role and purpose of the vehicle is unclear but it is not believed to be a
weapon system.
7.5 7 August 2022
The earth around the pylons to the immediate west of the transformer yard has been graded,
most likely by heavy plant equipment (Fig. 19). The reason behind the works is unclear. It is
highly unlikely that the area has been prepared for artillery or rocket firing positions as the area
has a large concentration of overhead power lines. Some of the graded areas have removed
vegetation but not all of them, also some vegetation remains so it is also unlikely that the
works were carried out to clear the area of vegetation. It is possible but unlikely that the area
may have been mined but cannot be confirmed from imagery. Other than creating a perimeter
security in depth, there is no logical, tactical or operational reason for mining this area of the
plant.
18 | {"noise_level": 0.17745534044514538, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1241, "lighting_center_y": 717, "shadow_intensity": 0.0639952186680564, "max_perspective_angle": 4.044302868763339, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -29.881869142505735, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 115.78132342080649, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -11.574755904224276, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -18.38881041856193, "perspective_br_x_shift": 57.46503468077803, "perspective_br_y_shift": 15.001286448583144, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -39.137597226599325, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 53.32255663524897, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 6, "spots": [{"x": 463, "y": 1629, "size": 3, "is_dirt": true, "color": 17}, {"x": 582, "y": 425, "size": 5, "is_dirt": true, "color": 14}, {"x": 741, "y": 1729, "size": 2, "is_dirt": false, "color": 210}, {"x": 1587, "y": 542, "size": 7, "is_dirt": true, "color": 37}, {"x": 622, "y": 1870, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 32}, {"x": 1072, "y": 282, "size": 4, "is_dirt": true, "color": 26}], "blur_radius": 1.638096463062417, "brightness_factor": 0.7480936345380732, "contrast_factor": 0.6223461312871275, "jpeg_quality": 32} |
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7.7 24 August 2022
Sentinel 2 Imagery of the plant indicated a large fire was burning in the area of undergrowth to
the immediate south of the plant and adjacent to the transformer yard. The fire was only
identified by a column of smoke on true colour imagery but the actual extent of the fire was
clearer when viewed utilising the shortwave infrared band of the Sentinel 2 platform (Fig . 21).
Fig. 21 — Fires Burning to South of ZNPP (Copernicus Sentinel data 2023)
7.8 21-23 September 2022
Open source reporting? reports that shelling of the plant occurred during the early hours of the
morning of 21 September 2022. The shelling reportedly damaged cables providing power to
one of the reactors and emergency power generators automatically powered up to provide
power to the reactor for approximately 40 mins until the power supply was reconnected. The
same article details a previous shelling in the area of the spray ponds on 20 September which
resulted in one of the ponds becoming non-operational. Imagery of 21 September confirms
that ponds 4 and 5 had only half of their jets operating. Imagery of 23 September 2022
appears to show damage and possible repairs being conducted to pond 4. A break in the
shadow confirms that a section of the pipe has been removed (Fig. 22). Spray ponds 4 and 5
remained only half functional until 15 October 2022 at the latest.
3 Nuclear Engineering International newsletter dated 22 September 2022
20 | {"noise_level": 0.06935641751445104, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 797, "lighting_center_y": 509, "shadow_intensity": 0.11697164598754972, "max_perspective_angle": 4.181058641693522, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 28.211499801117142, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 9.925423230663597, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 57.26000446695157, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 46.95923675631305, "perspective_br_x_shift": -48.73671424235341, "perspective_br_y_shift": -82.3286836233491, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 9.710049905473085, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -115.09096282642288, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": true, "line_pos": 1458, "line_width": 2, "line_color": 252, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 5, "spots": [{"x": 332, "y": 1740, "size": 2, "is_dirt": true, "color": 14}, {"x": 1345, "y": 1165, "size": 2, "is_dirt": false, "color": 217}, {"x": 1362, "y": 1231, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 33}, {"x": 698, "y": 1048, "size": 2, "is_dirt": true, "color": 16}, {"x": 241, "y": 251, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 47}], "blur_radius": 0.5192378689272795, "brightness_factor": 1.0298410532223177, "contrast_factor": 0.6925126994793467, "jpeg_quality": 31} |
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Fig. 24 — Construction of Positions on Reactor Hall Roofs.
7.12 4-8 June 2023
As at 4 June 2023, spray pond 11 was non-operational. Two white trucks, possibly
maintenance related, were parked next to the pond. By 6 June, pond 11 was almost dry. The
two white trucks remained next to the pond (Fig. 25). A network of hosepipes had been laid
out on the ground leading to other ponds. On imagery from 8 June, the pond was again
operational and the water level was returning to normal.
23 | {"noise_level": 0.06285228115969586, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 527, "lighting_center_y": 406, "shadow_intensity": 0.14551896363777847, "max_perspective_angle": 5.011179274681012, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 46.5533950008206, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -101.74179570486176, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 24.59308760614975, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 20.265186252721108, "perspective_br_x_shift": 46.76439419016238, "perspective_br_y_shift": -32.008840179069, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -54.13560829719601, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 10.147646397933755, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 1481, "line_width": 3, "line_color": 7, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 3, "spots": [{"x": 149, "y": 2154, "size": 5, "is_dirt": true, "color": 30}, {"x": 173, "y": 208, "size": 6, "is_dirt": true, "color": 44}, {"x": 740, "y": 1352, "size": 6, "is_dirt": true, "color": 31}], "blur_radius": 1.154247497625946, "brightness_factor": 0.897806840343772, "contrast_factor": 1.0376876480090154, "jpeg_quality": 30} |
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Gooling Pond
Fig. 27 — Drained Reservoir adjacent to ZNPP Cooling Pond
8 Significant Activity Observed in the Wider Area of ZNPP
8.1 Context
A wider study of the ground further out from the plants was conducted to identify any military
activity which could impact the safety of the plant or identify elements that may be using the
plant as a shield to prevent themselves from being targeted by indirect fire. A plan of the wider
area covered in this study is at Fig.28 below.
25 | {"noise_level": 0.06313598146971047, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 372, "lighting_center_y": 683, "shadow_intensity": 0.15307163754268413, "max_perspective_angle": 4.543139666447252, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -70.23762833656883, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -47.85161700677125, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -61.79113041625821, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 69.11087691729206, "perspective_br_x_shift": 60.25159868674221, "perspective_br_y_shift": -25.60157163233285, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 4.52414783199616, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 106.79738584815549, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.5524405721528702, "brightness_factor": 1.1088367539244928, "contrast_factor": 0.6886849802313438, "jpeg_quality": 25} |
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~~ p
Cow Water Levels
Pond7
Ki
Fig. 23 — Spray Ponds, 8 October 2022
7.10 15 November — 14 December 2022
All imagery collected between 15 November to 3 December was cloud covered. During that
period the water pressure of the jets on spray ponds 1-6 was reduced. Imagery of 3-6
December indicated very low pressure from the jets on these ponds. The water pressure has
returned to previously seen levels on ponds 3-6 by 14 December but was still low on ponds 1
and 2. Water pressure levels for ponds 1 and 2 was only observed to previous levels on
imagery dated 10 April 2023.
7.11 23 February 2023
Imagery dated 23 February 2023 identified small temporary constructions, possibly of
sandbags, on the roofs of some of the reactor halls, namely reactor halls 2 to 5 (Fig.24). The
constructions were built adjacent to the likely roof access buildings at the southeast corner of
the halls. The positions were relatively small in size, approximately 4x4m and are likely
defensive positions that will provide an overview of the power plant area. It is likely that the
positions will be manned by sentries armed with small arms weapons and up to heavy
machine gun (12.7mm) and could be for protection against UAV operations.
Analyst Comment: These positions have the appearance of a makeshift sangar. This is a
common military construction that is built from sandbags or other materials and provides a
sentry position with a degree of protection and affords wide arcs of view. It is of no surprise
that these will have been built on an elevated position to provide good observation around the
plant and approaches to the plant. Comment Ends.
The sangars were still present on imagery from September 2023.
22 | {"noise_level": 0.12595065896534752, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 217, "lighting_center_y": 1164, "shadow_intensity": 0.13273520960006574, "max_perspective_angle": 7.178928272957249, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 36.448007200225945, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 36.77987518665883, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -35.103509698917364, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -88.07354516566973, "perspective_br_x_shift": -75.40303279541554, "perspective_br_y_shift": -77.3316666777188, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -72.43884726950951, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 94.3692910144972, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": true, "line_pos": 1269, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 238, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 0.6840499072581555, "brightness_factor": 0.7290345661021908, "contrast_factor": 0.7108132936696372, "jpeg_quality": 21} |
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The roof of the turbine hall associated to reactor 4 displayed a number of unknown white
objects (Fig. 26). These objects were first identified on imagery dated 4 June 23. It cannot be
determined from imagery what the white objects are. The resolution of the imagery also
prevents accurate mensuration, but it is estimated that they are approximately 2m by 2m, this
is only an estimation however.
Unidentified Objects
Analyst Comment: Much media speculation was made over these objects in the international
media as they were linked to speculation over reported placing of explosives around the plant
and a possible ‘false flag’ operation to create a radiological event at the plant. The
international media picked up on the objects appearing on the roof on 5 July 2023. However,
these objects were in place from 4 June and remained visible until 5 July. While it cannot be
determined what the objects are, it is not believed that they were explosive devices. It must be
considered that the Russians have denied the IAEA inspectors access to the roof of the
turbine halls of both units 3 and 4. Comment Ends.
7.13 16 June 2023
Following the destruction of the Kakhovka dam on 6 June 2023, water levels began to drop in
the reservoir which formed the northern boundary of the nuclear power plant. Imagery of 16
June identified the catastrophic drop of the water level around the large cooling pond of the
plant (Fig. 27). The water levels had dropped to such a level that only the channel of the river
was evident with the majority of the bed of the reservoir now dry.
24 | {"noise_level": 0.10754491632786639, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 671, "lighting_center_y": 1559, "shadow_intensity": 0.17373458802764524, "max_perspective_angle": 6.66496127157453, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -58.99348475182745, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 61.78065178791398, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 81.4677024226374, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -60.14839285500003, "perspective_br_x_shift": 80.26503503838315, "perspective_br_y_shift": -97.95766857986952, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 54.02452658694561, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 36.10345159056247, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.5403362787264083, "brightness_factor": 0.757671702993315, "contrast_factor": 0.840329365983544, "jpeg_quality": 34} |
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Bare
Fig. 29 — BM-21 ‘Grad’ Multiple Rocket Launcher (Unattributed)
Track marks in fields which do not suggest logical agricultural practice were identified in
numerous places at different times over the reporting period (Fig.30). These tracks are likely
to be evidence of launchers moving to their firing positions and then departing afterwards.
Ground scarring was also identified which indicates firing of rockets had taken place.
Tracks
\
Fig. 30 — Tracks Indicating In-Direct Fire Firing Points
Measurement of some of the tracks indicated a vehicle which was approximately 3m wide; the
BM-21 is only 2.4m wide. The BM-30 ‘Smerch’ (Fig. 31) is a larger MRL in use by the Russian
ground forces which can fire up 12 x 300mm rockets per salvo. The launcher for this system is
27 | {"noise_level": 0.12023981513464664, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 74, "lighting_center_y": 738, "shadow_intensity": 0.11097768695432719, "max_perspective_angle": 5.978370848043683, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -20.128172812340544, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -19.6723522903757, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -46.34347107341427, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 16.237361032934942, "perspective_br_x_shift": -27.146049251487135, "perspective_br_y_shift": 0.987785603732803, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 6.0100337685675385, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -48.8299031787288, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": true, "line_pos": 1891, "line_width": 3, "line_color": 223, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 0.5769423999947021, "brightness_factor": 0.739762151696601, "contrast_factor": 0.8290688357018945, "jpeg_quality": 29} |
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aA
Chervonohryhorivka
Nikopol
10km
Vodyanoye
Dniprovka
Fig. 28 — Environs of ZNPP out to 20 Kilometres
8.2 Indirect Firing Points
Open source information* suggests that the Russian forces have positioned ‘Grad’ batteries in
the nearby town of Vodyanoye, approximate 6km west of the plant. Grad is the Russian
nomenclature for the BM-21 MRL (Fig. 29) which is a common piece of military equipment. It
is a truck mounted rocket launcher that fires salvos of up to 40 x 122mm rockets from each
launcher, with 4 to 6 launchers per battery. Throughout the course of the study, no BM-21
were identified within the plant or the wider area. That does not suggest that the launchers are
not present however. It would be common practice for the batteries to be concealed or
camouflaged when not firing. Batteries will typically deploy to pre-surveyed sites to fire their
salvos and will then immediately return to their concealed positions in order to prevent
targeting by counter-battery fire. Firing positions need to be surveyed in order to calculate the
accurate fall of rockets and shells. This takes into account ground elevation, atmospheric
conditions etc. the weapon systems can then move into position from their lay-up positions
and fire their salvos before quickly vacating their positions to alternate firing points or return to
their lay-up positions. In taking up their firing positions, there will be a certain amount of
manoeuvring of the systems in order to achieve the required firing position, such as orientation
and levelling of the platform, this will leave disturbance of the ground such as vehicle tracks
which appear to be nonsensical. In addition, self propelled artillery systems are designed to
be used across rough terrain so vehicle tracks will also be observed crossing fields and over
non-mettled surfaces. The study did identify ground marking which suggests that these
launchers are being used in close proximity to the plant.
4 The Insider dated 5 August 2022
26 | {"noise_level": 0.19436828380410037, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 4.45763893796519, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -9.570397509247115, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -72.73622053629944, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -44.88453908487185, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -98.70157741150796, "perspective_br_x_shift": 56.03953674800171, "perspective_br_y_shift": 63.72416045452165, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -20.965215575500864, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 25.078336895627203, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 1043, "line_width": 2, "line_color": 98, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 1, "spots": [{"x": 1324, "y": 825, "size": 4, "is_dirt": false, "color": 251}], "blur_radius": 1.3230437618613453, "brightness_factor": 0.9604057931273478, "contrast_factor": 0.8083532693323084, "jpeg_quality": 14} |
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the nuclear power plant is not under imminent threat of the Ukrainian counter-offensive and as
such there is no tactical or operational reason to maintain artillery units in this area.
Legend
Dates Identified on Imagery
22 Jul 22
07 Aug 22
12 Aug 22
21 Aug 22
02 Sep 22
05 Sep 22
06 Sep 22
13 Sep 22
> 23 Sep 22
» 03 Oct 22
» 15 Oct 22
05 Nov 22
07 Nov 22
14 Nov 22
04 Dec 22
28 May 23
Fig. 32 — Map of Potential Firing Points
8.2 Impact Points
The following paragraphs provide a detailed view of the identified potential firing points in the
wider area of the plant. Each location has an associated map and image of the ground signs
and a short description.
8.2.1 22 July 2022
Identified on imagery dated 22 July 2022 (fig.33), a series of tracks crossing a field may
indicate artillery systems moving across country to their firing positions. This location is nota
confirmed location but the tracks do not indicate normal agricultural activity.
Coordinates — 47.47989, 34.58579.
Distance from ZNPP — 3.2km south of plant.
29 | {"noise_level": 0.07701349844393014, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 371, "lighting_center_y": 244, "shadow_intensity": 0.1676135895914069, "max_perspective_angle": 5.409910209443678, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -14.759717730455108, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -36.755110686988374, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -74.62266976507073, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -111.06323806399308, "perspective_br_x_shift": -80.3373523204039, "perspective_br_y_shift": 44.93149159709678, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 8.928841117779939, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 71.52708050561013, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.317745677744579, "brightness_factor": 0.6184173361030766, "contrast_factor": 1.0301898501962925, "jpeg_quality": 22} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_37.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | fe
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Fig. 33 — Potential Firing Point — 22 July 2022
8.2.2 7 August 2022
Multiple tracks across and around the perimeter of a large field which appeared between 31
July and 7 August (Fig.34). While not indicative of artillery activity, the tracks do not suggest
normal agricultural activity. Coordinates — 47.48254, 34.58184.
Distance from ZNPP — 2.9km south of plant.
30 | {"noise_level": 0.12057634712748654, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 4.708309601418146, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -61.946659984498446, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -96.17266856272457, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 38.37814988627014, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -71.61885316310398, "perspective_br_x_shift": 45.89819153485807, "perspective_br_y_shift": -77.73927724562361, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 6.657705275566769, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -6.839308518428254, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 313, "line_width": 1, "line_color": 36, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 8, "spots": [{"x": 1237, "y": 2226, "size": 5, "is_dirt": true, "color": 22}, {"x": 1066, "y": 1592, "size": 6, "is_dirt": true, "color": 1}, {"x": 203, "y": 1768, "size": 7, "is_dirt": false, "color": 223}, {"x": 1150, "y": 1112, "size": 1, "is_dirt": true, "color": 23}, {"x": 425, "y": 315, "size": 1, "is_dirt": true, "color": 46}, {"x": 213, "y": 1994, "size": 9, "is_dirt": false, "color": 246}, {"x": 661, "y": 2090, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 6}, {"x": 578, "y": 1898, "size": 3, "is_dirt": false, "color": 210}], "blur_radius": 1.160958251472082, "brightness_factor": 1.149751698360041, "contrast_factor": 0.948157688412272, "jpeg_quality": 39} |
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3.05m wide. It Is not unusual for the term ‘Grad’ to be assigned to any truck mounted rocket
launcher; it is possible that either or both systems have been deployed in the wider area of the
plant. Eitherway, the launchers will be subordinate to the Russian ground forces and not the
National Guard so will not be under the operational command of the forces deployed to the
plant. Western Forces would be expected to have some form of liaison between different
organisations operating in the same area in order to deconflict and prevent instances of
fratricide, this could be in the form of an exchange of officers or through a dedicated
communication net. It is likely that there would be some form of liaison between the National
Guard elements and Armed Forces units to ensure that both elements’ operations do not
interfere with each other and prevent any accidental clashes, especially in close proximity to
the front line.
=
Fig. 31
— BM-30 ‘Smerch’ Multiple Rocket Launcher (WeaponSystems.net)
A number of potential firing points were identified in the wider area of the plant over the
reporting period. The map below (Fig. 32) and subsequent paragraphs detail the location of
the potential firing points and the date they were identified on imagery. There was a reduction
in ground signs of possible firing positions after December 2022 which would indicate a
significant drop in artillery activity in the wider area around the plant. An analysis of reporting
conducted by the Institute for the Study of War indicates that the Russians are having to
deviate from their doctrinal norms and evolving and adapting to the battlefield. A degradation
of artillery assets, barrel wear, critical problems with supplying frontline units and very low
stocks of ammunition have curtailed their use of this form of warfare. Ukrainian counter
battery fire has also improved significantly since the start of the war due to a number of factors
including the supply of superior western systems, training and experience. This has also
forced the Russians to adapt their employment of battlefield artillery and prioritize accuracy
over volume of fire; their default use of this type of weapon. The Russians are also now
fighting a defensive battle, particularly in the south along the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk
administrative borders. This, along with the degradation of their artillery assets and paucity of
ammunition, has likely forced them to redeploy their assets to those areas of the battlefield
where they are required the most. The Russians have likely assessed that the area around
28 | {"noise_level": 0.1411556772538748, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 272, "lighting_center_y": 1054, "shadow_intensity": 0.14449084755746627, "max_perspective_angle": 3.314453840489027, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 40.56788701456301, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 47.790816666072274, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -64.57091098918076, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -13.23865351016481, "perspective_br_x_shift": 63.236356093163025, "perspective_br_y_shift": -32.35172105790956, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -44.8270010159786, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -46.98258103604195, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.7164504591044034, "brightness_factor": 0.9645805405030207, "contrast_factor": 0.6674045580563711, "jpeg_quality": 26} |
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Fig. 36 — Potential Firing Point - 21 August 2022
8.2.5 2 September 2022
Track in a large field may indicate activity or possible firing point to the east of ZNPP (Fig.37).
The tracks do not suggest normal agricultural activity.
Coordinates — 47.47002, 34.75996.
Distance from ZNPP — 13.8km east-southeast of the plant.
Fig. 37 — Potential Firing Point — 2 September 2022
32 | {"noise_level": 0.08216411903284532, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1337, "lighting_center_y": 1338, "shadow_intensity": 0.17236886959690945, "max_perspective_angle": 2.6629823034874764, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 55.07933297972265, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 15.10939187961371, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 31.23710260116127, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -54.38139224449053, "perspective_br_x_shift": 37.030685480768724, "perspective_br_y_shift": 82.27820630997518, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 59.982699065508186, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 12.422451335981648, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.503141005236621, "brightness_factor": 0.9202657025034244, "contrast_factor": 0.6938262431822168, "jpeg_quality": 35} |
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8.2.3 12 August 2022
Tracks along the edge of the perimeter of a field are indicative of a launcher or launcher
deploying to firing point, manoeuvring into position and firing a salvo (Fig.35). There are at
least three separate positions that have appeared between 7 and 12 August 2022. The field
appears to have been ploughed or agriculturally prepared after the tracks were made.
Coordinates — 47.46458, 34.61114.
Distance from ZNPP — 4.8km south-southeast of plant.
Fig. 35 — Potential Firing Point — 12 August 2022
8.2.4 21 August 2022
Tracks evident along the edge of a field suggest the deployment of at least one vehicle
(Fig.36). The tracks indicate movement into the field along the hedgerow from the road to the
south and then breaking into the field. Where the tracks move into the field, it indicates an
amount of manoeuvring, most likely into a firing position.
Coordinates — 47.47864, 34.59788.
Distance from ZNPP — 3.2km south-southeast of the plant.
31 | {"noise_level": 0.09844075520169362, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 246, "lighting_center_y": 469, "shadow_intensity": 0.08281179493607, "max_perspective_angle": 5.440044032245034, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 38.970678116896494, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 79.20474790932236, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -49.56955504717582, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -66.0865053656158, "perspective_br_x_shift": 75.25620136925382, "perspective_br_y_shift": 113.69683308977393, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -50.20133984286335, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 52.11769115689428, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 995, "line_width": 3, "line_color": 238, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 2, "spots": [{"x": 113, "y": 347, "size": 7, "is_dirt": true, "color": 42}, {"x": 218, "y": 1643, "size": 9, "is_dirt": true, "color": 4}], "blur_radius": 0.6042787079326233, "brightness_factor": 0.7651805596526694, "contrast_factor": 0.6577560982380583, "jpeg_quality": 36} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_41.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | McKENZIE
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Tracks and Firing Point
Fig. 39 — Potential Firing Point —- 6 September 2022
8.2.8 13 September 2022
Fresh tracks were observed at the entrance to the field and evidence of vehicle manoeuvring
(Fig.40). There also appears to be possible ground scarring indicating launching of rockets
although the absence of vegetation cannot cerfermconfirm this as there is no burn scar. The
tracks also lead off in a north westerly direction indicating multiple vehicles.
Coordinates — 47.47628, 34.59693.
Distance from ZNPP — 3.5km south of the plant.
Analyst Comment: This collection of fields appears to be a well used firing position as it
regularly displays fresh tracks and firing positions. This makes perfect sense if there is an
artillery unit located in the town of Vodyanoye. The field is as short distance from the town
and provides easy access along the track that runs from the town to the field access point.
Launchers would be able to transit to the firing points, conduct the fire mission and quickly
return to their lay-up positions which will undoubtedly be well concealed. Comment Ends.
34 | {"noise_level": 0.1919714118270448, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 6.775884449677365, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -19.855267081912586, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 18.131720150552482, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -45.63021152401279, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -57.096688282279565, "perspective_br_x_shift": 38.06550155252397, "perspective_br_y_shift": 42.93505004944173, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -43.740465686193204, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 19.215698067853694, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 0.5083136588435417, "brightness_factor": 0.9533309493786679, "contrast_factor": 0.694587055969027, "jpeg_quality": 35} |
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8.2.6 3-7 September 2022
Fresh tracks were identified on an image from 7 September 2022 (Fig.38) which would have
been made between 2-7 September 2022. There are a number of tracks projecting into the
field after traversing along hedgerows to access the field, indicating tactical transit of the
vehicles. The tracks are indicative of the vehicles manoeuvring into position, most likely to fire
a salvo. The number of separate tracks indicates a battery level fire mission. It is possible
that this is the location of the salvo that was captured on CCTV footage discussed in
paragraph 8.2.19 of this report.
Coordinates — 47.48008, 34.59765.
Distance from ZNPP — 3.1km south-southeast of the plant.
Tracks and
Firing point
Fig. 38 — Potential Firing Point — 3-7 September 2022
8.2.7 6 September 2022
Tracks at the entrance to the field off the northern track of the settlement of Dniprovka could
indicate normal farm traffic (Fig.39). However, the tracks also reveal manoeuvring of a vehicle
which could indicate adopting a firing position. A single vehicle track also moves from the
entrance, northwest wards into the field.
Coordinates — 47.43973, 3462283.
Distance from ZNPP — 7.9km south-southeast of the plant.
33 | {"noise_level": 0.10604232738612102, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 847, "lighting_center_y": 1307, "shadow_intensity": 0.14740494461007644, "max_perspective_angle": 3.5345077196247487, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 23.783304046277763, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -53.24922979057718, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -73.93077893532985, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -73.06586040241737, "perspective_br_x_shift": -46.347981229617645, "perspective_br_y_shift": -114.5296755636201, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -46.30957126673138, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 18.31931501145938, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.351325514228566, "brightness_factor": 1.047089220939986, "contrast_factor": 0.6576304543365261, "jpeg_quality": 26} |
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Tracks
"Tracks and :
Firing Points ———_\
. oi
bs
Fig. 40 — Potential Firing Point — 13 September 2022
8.2.9 23 September 2022
Faint tracks were observed in the southern part of a field to the south of the plant (Fig.41).
The tracks were made between 7-18 September 2022 but were most clearly observed on
imagery from 23 September 2022. The tracks indicate vehicle moving into the field along
hedgerows before projecting into and manoeuvring in the field.
Coordinates — 47.45198, 34.67459.
Distance from ZNPP — 6.5km south-southeast of the plant.
0 4 2km
—
Fig. 41 - Potential Firing Point — 23 September 2022
35 | {"noise_level": 0.17175984348010703, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 867, "lighting_center_y": 271, "shadow_intensity": 0.19343342632709393, "max_perspective_angle": 3.9816425570191623, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 82.62456000754783, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 55.10282566293351, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -30.820957788801792, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 69.47028577448678, "perspective_br_x_shift": 51.24960080733747, "perspective_br_y_shift": 12.808165638941958, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 2.514916028444034, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -24.67808983434857, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.8916932795982409, "brightness_factor": 0.688145731034923, "contrast_factor": 0.8729446126224845, "jpeg_quality": 25} |
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0 1 2km f
A
Fig. 43 — Potential Firing Point — 8 October 2022
8.2.12 12 October 2022
Two likely firing positions were identified to the southwest of the plant in the vicinity of the
small settlement there (Fig.44). It appears that each location was used by one vehicle but this
cannot be confirmed. In each position, vehicle tracks are observed leading to the likely firing
point where the tracks indicate vehicle manoeuvring has taken place.
Coordinates — 47.43648, 34.44736 and 47.44077, 34.37496.
Distance from ZNPP — 13.2km and 17.5km southwest of the plant.
Tracks and
Firing Point
Fig. 44 - Potential Firing Point — 12 October 2022
37 | {"noise_level": 0.053084562769397506, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 5.553737532715772, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -41.33524930801067, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 56.17558731101384, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -25.94320993295387, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -34.07844210668408, "perspective_br_x_shift": -40.54546161712045, "perspective_br_y_shift": -22.22777161890778, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -66.29121213281532, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -45.67338796359277, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.8811519066676221, "brightness_factor": 0.6330433065032914, "contrast_factor": 0.7650486142338612, "jpeg_quality": 36} |
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8.2.10 3 October 2022
Fresh tracks were observed in a field indicating a vehicle entering the field along the hedgerow
before moving further out into the field (Fig.42). There is minimal vehicle manoeuvring tracks
but it appears the vehicle drove straight into the firing position, launched its fire mission before
driving away in a narrow loop and returning along the path it used to enter the field. The
activity is likely to have occurred between 23 September to 3 October 2022.
Coordinates — 47.46465, 34.61040.
Distance from ZNPP — 5.1km south-southeast of the plant.
Tracks and
——_ Firing Point
Fig. 42 — Potential Firing Point — 3 October 2022
8.2.11 8 October 2022
Vehicle tracks were observed in a freshly ploughed or prepared field (Fig.43). The tracks
move to the centre of the field after transiting along hedgerows. There is also evidence of
manoeuvring in the centre of the field.
Coordinates — 47.46625, 34.64436.
Distance from ZNPP — 6.5km southeast of the plant.
36 | {"noise_level": 0.08054303532416407, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1332, "lighting_center_y": 239, "shadow_intensity": 0.12127385270347071, "max_perspective_angle": 5.190973761542145, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -41.93920571838973, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 1.8028350635023997, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 30.688999470576675, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 20.769696227429662, "perspective_br_x_shift": 57.02805849852591, "perspective_br_y_shift": 54.898816694107396, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -41.63093695527129, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 57.62204322236981, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.4957998691493741, "brightness_factor": 0.6997806502664712, "contrast_factor": 0.712496606066578, "jpeg_quality": 40} |
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8.2.13 15 October 2022
Two likely firing positions were identified at two separate locations to the southeast of the plant
(Fig.45). The closest of the two positions was identified on imagery dated 15 October 2022
but will have been occupied between 19-15 October 2022. The tracks are very faint but are
discernible. But a large ground scarring suggests that a firing of a likely MRL occurred at this
location. The second location was further from the plant and indicates at least two vehicles
had entered a small field and performed significant manoeuvring, most likely to position for a
fire mission.
Coordinates — 47.47307, 34.60867 and 47.42467, 34.76314.
Distance from ZNPP —4.3km and 16.2km southeast of the plant.
‘Tracks and)
7 Firing Point
Fig. 45 — Potential Firing Point — 15 October 2022
8.2.14 5 November 2022
A possible firing position was identified on imagery dated 5 November 2022 to the east of the
plant indicating use by artillery assets between 8 October and 5 November 2022 (Fig.46). The
track observed suggests a vehicle or vehicles entering the field then cutting the corner before
manoeuvring into a position along the eastern edge of the field.
Coordinates — 47.46619, 34.70536.
Distance from ZNPP — 10km east of the plant.
38 | {"noise_level": 0.059314435090900196, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 732, "lighting_center_y": 1673, "shadow_intensity": 0.15955031390505237, "max_perspective_angle": 6.878268919444818, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 39.322932527580775, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 60.04821351728653, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -54.212354097767694, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -88.90841821834945, "perspective_br_x_shift": 40.529480627537254, "perspective_br_y_shift": 84.55463663020994, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -67.72984089850195, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 13.570763901437076, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.1255206292371902, "brightness_factor": 0.9469931629380506, "contrast_factor": 0.7162573031925483, "jpeg_quality": 30} |
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Tracks and
Firing Points
Tracks
Fig. 46 — Potential Firing Point - 5 November 2022
8.2.15 7 November 2022
A track was identified on imagery dated 7 November 2022 leading to a possible firing point
(Fig.47). The track enters the field at the southeastern corner then moves along the southern
edge before indicating vehicle manoeuvring. The tracks were made at some point between 1
and 7 November 2022.
Coordinates — 47.44635, 34.58071.
Distance from ZNPP — 6.8km south of the plant.
.
39 | {"noise_level": 0.17014717899296272, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1455, "lighting_center_y": 266, "shadow_intensity": 0.15498732320391265, "max_perspective_angle": 2.963522210855472, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 20.561807768797394, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -106.71289313455357, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 32.331823554969006, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 66.72692654997, "perspective_br_x_shift": 68.4745362267633, "perspective_br_y_shift": -90.39853540730473, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 68.07909626106947, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -16.418448978402964, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": true, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 158, "line_width": 3, "line_color": 229, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.4983205262179164, "brightness_factor": 0.8042090019505503, "contrast_factor": 0.7513664625180606, "jpeg_quality": 34} |
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8.2.16 14 November 2022
A number of tracks were identified on imagery dated 14 November 2022 (Fig.48). The tracks
were observed at two different positions within the field with evidence of vehicle manoeuvring
at both positions, at the western edge and northeastern corner. It was not possible to assess
a date range for the activity as no previous imagery of the position was available.
Coordinates — 47.45058, 34.70670.
Distance from ZNPP — 11km southeast of the plant.
0 1 2km 4
Fig. 48 — Potential Firing Point — 14 November 2022
8.2.17 4 December 2022
Two likely firing positions were identified on imagery dated 4 December 2022 at two separate
locations to the south of the plant (Fig.49). The closest of the two positions occurred at some
point between 15 November and 4 December 2022. The tracks are not very clear but two
scars on the ground suggest a recent firing of an MRL at that position. The furthest position
displays evidence of possible vehicle manoeuvring in a field adjacent to a road at a point
between 15 November and 4 December 2022.
Coordinates — 47.47829, 34.57613 and 47.45637, 34.55995.
Distance from ZNPP — 3.4km and 6km south of the plant.
40 | {"noise_level": 0.1852826790877708, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 942, "lighting_center_y": 1436, "shadow_intensity": 0.09973092896180222, "max_perspective_angle": 7.409292485933104, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -18.889993213095934, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -77.79414338698044, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -56.77471943225176, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 30.163493407458404, "perspective_br_x_shift": -75.18181728503478, "perspective_br_y_shift": -80.7301386400309, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -19.849643848127087, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 41.99445801550685, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": false, "num_spots": 0, "spots": [], "blur_radius": 1.5625215453814347, "brightness_factor": 0.9462942367331939, "contrast_factor": 0.6206352614305191, "jpeg_quality": 22} |
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Firing Points.
Fig. 49 — Potential Firing Point — 4 December 2022
8.2.18 28 May 2023
Prominent track marks across a field which do not suggest routine agricultural activity were
identified on imagery dated 28 May 2023. The tracks were not present on imagery dated 7
May 2023 indicating the activity between 7-28 May 2023. No ground scarring was identified to
suggest firing of rockets but firing of other artillery assets cannot be ruled out.
Coordinates — 47.45240, 34.69537.
Distance from ZNPP — 10.3km southeast of the plant.
Fig. 50 — Potential Firing Point — 28 May 2023
41 | {"noise_level": 0.1819406734071205, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1486, "lighting_center_y": 226, "shadow_intensity": 0.1257299811585934, "max_perspective_angle": 5.383102825380277, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 70.70939012751008, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 20.414515946169942, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 48.799204764502534, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 15.752274841956464, "perspective_br_x_shift": 36.25527600715607, "perspective_br_y_shift": -15.28234993104789, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 21.607359481016616, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 6.2618502627784665, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.5834180001349425, "brightness_factor": 1.0957928720063848, "contrast_factor": 1.1210095026475302, "jpeg_quality": 12} |
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Legend
Dates Identified on Imagery
S| HG 12 Aug 22
2M 28 Aug 22
Me 23 Sep 22
Me 12 06122
Fig. 53 — Map of Impact Points Identified on Imagery
8.3.1 12 August 2022
A number of craters were identified in the vicinity of electricity pylons heading south from the
plant (Fig. 54). Analysis of the craters indicated the round came from the northeast. The
rounds all fell in close proximity to the pylons and about 4km south west of the plant. The
trajectory of the rounds is likely to have gone over the plant. Although unconfirmed, the
possible reason for targeting the pylons may have been to cut power supply towards the
Crimean Peninsula from either the ZNPP or associated thermal power plant.
44 | {"noise_level": 0.08373182004556372, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 5.670440780003474, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 20.653382532185915, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 5.721158735049045, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 6.007964994323061, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -87.33231413811347, "perspective_br_x_shift": -43.226998993806035, "perspective_br_y_shift": 26.981440951209194, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 39.89945008922108, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 85.0961713507432, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.5663640228200639, "brightness_factor": 0.8025953989011522, "contrast_factor": 0.8938206929579433, "jpeg_quality": 20} |
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General Direction of
Firing point
Fig. 54 — Impact Craters 12 August 2023
8.3.2 28 August 2022
Impact points were identified in the vicinity of a heavily fortified area of the peninsula on the
northern bank of the Dnipro river (Fig. 55). This area has a substantial amount of trenches
and other fortifications and is occupied by Ukrainian forces. Crater analysis indicates the
trajectory was from the south and although fired in relatively close proximity to the nuclear
power plant, it does not appear that the rounds will have overflown the ZNPP but will have
gone over the thermal power plant.
45 | {"noise_level": 0.1230379865621427, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 703, "lighting_center_y": 2078, "shadow_intensity": 0.07898582752640826, "max_perspective_angle": 5.994127220497484, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 63.14295938540097, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 100.1203909806277, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -5.740326227815544, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 100.16399006418128, "perspective_br_x_shift": -53.057385873297285, "perspective_br_y_shift": 85.16271155143671, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -0.3377014818072439, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -44.50001493185117, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 0.7100084750664939, "brightness_factor": 0.7520414625560587, "contrast_factor": 1.0562544215999379, "jpeg_quality": 18} |
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190 200m \
—
|
General Direction of Firing point
General Direction of ZNPP
Fig. 55 — Impact Craters on Dnipro Peninsula 28 August 2023
8.3.3 23 September 2022
Impact points were identified in a field close to possible Russian trench positions (Fig 56).
Crater analysis suggests a trajectory from the north, most likely the Ukrainian held positions on
the northern bank of the Dnipro River. It does not suggest a flight path over the ZNPP but they
will have passed over the thermal power plant.
General Ditection of ZNPP»
General. Direction of Firing Point ‘
\
pact Craters 23 September 2023
Im
Fig. 56 -
46 | {"noise_level": 0.0848987348351598, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 873, "lighting_center_y": 724, "shadow_intensity": 0.1245064744919972, "max_perspective_angle": 3.186800065442055, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 42.53962630916547, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -44.391546934337214, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -6.476924909334912, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 91.92351747187188, "perspective_br_x_shift": -38.02678978077537, "perspective_br_y_shift": 47.706795334074386, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 79.38216186302914, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -35.21565316557776, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.6056092648811582, "brightness_factor": 0.6245630194126907, "contrast_factor": 1.0459611247195164, "jpeg_quality": 17} |
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8.2.19 Video footage of MRL launch 2/3 September 2022
Video captured from the northern bank of the Dnipro River indicates the firing of a salvo of
rockets from the south bank and from what appears to be in the vicinity of the nuclear power
plant. Analysis of the footage indicates 40 projectiles on a single trajectory which would
suggest a fire mission from a BM-21 ‘Grad’ launcher. The BM-21 is equipped with a launch
mechanism consisting of 40 tubes which it can fire in a single salvo. Further analysis of the
footage was conducted in order to identify the precise firing location.
The first stage was to locate the point where the video footage was captured. This was
achieved by correlating the position of the ZTPP stacks in relation to their respective generator
halls which were all clearly visible on the footage (Fig.51). Both stacks appeared to be to the
left of centre of the generator halls. From this, a line was drawn from each stack, through the
relative point of the respective generator hall and continue the line to the northern bank of the
Dnipro River. Where the lines intersect is the approximate location of the viewpoint of the
camera. The map at Fig.52 displays the assessed field of view of the camera from this
analysis.
Firing point
Zaporizhzhia Tharmal Powar Plant
Pos:
Pow
=! - : ™
— Se |
Fig. 51 — Video Footage of MRL Launch 2/3 September 2022 (The Insider ‘Russian MLRS firing from
Zapoizhzhia NPP site’ dated 4 September 2022)
42 | {"noise_level": 0.11218491254726577, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 5.351985721701624, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 59.36563176819321, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -10.034968810211282, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 27.4677949708622, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 41.92025887799325, "perspective_br_x_shift": -21.14053922520764, "perspective_br_y_shift": 81.6002531841197, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 52.83923168112172, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 37.663184986838715, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.5546251796573278, "brightness_factor": 1.0429740725273604, "contrast_factor": 0.8095028068640939, "jpeg_quality": 14} |
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Aproximate Location
of Firing Point
Fig. 52 — Field of View and Assessed Location of Firing Point
With the field of view calculated, the next step was to identify the likely location of the firing
point. From the field of view, using the ZTPP and ZNPP as reference points, the direction and
relative position of the firing point of the rockets observed in the video was assessed and an
approximate area of the firing point was calculated as illustrated by the area shaded red in
Fig.52. As there is only a single point of view, it was not possible to triangulate the position.
When compared to the analysis conducted to identify the firing points, there were a number of
firing points identified within this area from the beginning of September 2022. This area was
identified as a preferred firing position in the analysis and is easily accessible to any system
that has been reportedly based in the town of Vodyanoye.
8.3 Impact Points
The wider area study also identified instances of incoming fire around the plant with impact
points appearing on imagery (Fig. 53). Analysis of the impact point crater can identify the
general direction of flight of the rounds. The trajectory of falling artillery and mortar rounds are
rarely from directly above. The resulting crater from the impact tends to have a larger
displacement of earth on the opposite side from the firing point of the round and can identify
the likely direction of flight of the rounds.
43 | {"noise_level": 0.16901159618806932, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1281, "lighting_center_y": 1518, "shadow_intensity": 0.12075307251610608, "max_perspective_angle": 3.945229681177348, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -71.30698299709879, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -55.29379137020746, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 5.670631505811656, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 14.382174419899357, "perspective_br_x_shift": -25.258109323666517, "perspective_br_y_shift": -4.053162111621106, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 65.76788321273214, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 108.63187994924557, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 6, "spots": [{"x": 1331, "y": 215, "size": 1, "is_dirt": true, "color": 21}, {"x": 1118, "y": 1308, "size": 6, "is_dirt": true, "color": 9}, {"x": 1393, "y": 1613, "size": 8, "is_dirt": false, "color": 239}, {"x": 150, "y": 1926, "size": 4, "is_dirt": true, "color": 42}, {"x": 1158, "y": 58, "size": 8, "is_dirt": true, "color": 35}, {"x": 869, "y": 2134, "size": 5, "is_dirt": false, "color": 226}], "blur_radius": 0.9937169238574528, "brightness_factor": 0.8208065334817041, "contrast_factor": 0.6230828939170175, "jpeg_quality": 19} |
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McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia_page_57.jpg | McKenzie_Report_Zaporizhzhia | Planet Labs SkySat 29 Dec 22 | 61cm
Planet Labs SkySat 23 Feb 23 | 74cm
Planet Labs SkySat 26 Apr 23 73cm
Planet Labs SkySat 28 May 23 | 77cm
Planet Labs SkySat 4 Jun 23 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 6 Jun 23 71cm
Planet Labs SkySat 8 Jun 23 81cm
Planet Labs SkySat 9 Jun 23 81cm
Planet Labs SkySat 16 Jun 23 75cm
Planet Labs SkySat 22 Jun 23 74cm
Planet Labs SkySat 27 Jun 23 80cm
Planet Labs SkySat 5 Jul 23 74cm
50
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SERVICES | {"noise_level": 0.17717831116993432, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 1249, "lighting_center_y": 384, "shadow_intensity": 0.16545407578753185, "max_perspective_angle": 3.4030507663057605, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 74.31728060181437, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -96.47635604143878, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -41.49453874618243, "perspective_tr_y_shift": -44.64739904747883, "perspective_br_x_shift": 69.71283445769292, "perspective_br_y_shift": 16.239051856939042, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 62.37219366413696, "perspective_bl_y_shift": -92.77294182431015, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.3769474633922187, "brightness_factor": 1.1390228566829066, "contrast_factor": 0.7108749936369927, "jpeg_quality": 14} |
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mission to the plant confirmed the presence of the mines on 23 July 2023 in the buffer zone
between the multi-layered secure perimeter fence. It was not confirmed if any devices had
been placed within the reactor and turbine units. Should devices be set in these areas, it is
highly unlikely that any detonation would cause any damage to the structure of the buildings
but may cause some damage to any exposed and vulnerable machine parts. However, it
would not make any tactical sense to place the devices within the plant buildings. Due to the
size of the devices and the resolution of the satellite imagery used in the compilation of this
report, it is not possible to identify or confirm the presence of any mines.
All activity observed over the reporting period does suggest a precarious environment
continues to exist at the plant. It is clear that some indirect fire has been targeted towards the
plant and there was at least one direct attack on the Russian forces through use of small
UAVs. The initial assault on the plant in early March 2022 posed a huge threat to the safety of
the plant through apparent indiscriminate firing onto the plant infrastructure, namely the
transformer yard to the rear of the training building, which bore the brunt of the assault.
Insider information suggested that catastrophic damage to the equipment in the transformer
yard nearly occurred but was fortunately averted. Indiscriminate firing on the plant has had
potential catastrophic implications for the safety systems at the plant, namely provision of
power to the reactors and cooling systems for the reactors. Even though all six reactors at the
plant are in a state of shutdown, a continuous feed of power and cooling water is essential for
the management of the reactors.
48 | {"noise_level": 0.08917120829770223, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 5.871457999689911, "perspective_tl_x_shift": -73.55409318813959, "perspective_tl_y_shift": -46.645165398927645, "perspective_tr_x_shift": -47.957527137203, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 110.2886981250973, "perspective_br_x_shift": -58.53708352408769, "perspective_br_y_shift": 27.7617026391202, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 1.2129135788171652, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 12.121943235051404, "apply_artifacts": true, "has_line": false, "is_horizontal": false, "line_pos": 0, "line_width": 0, "line_color": 0, "has_spots": true, "num_spots": 1, "spots": [{"x": 631, "y": 77, "size": 7, "is_dirt": true, "color": 21}], "blur_radius": 1.0854667606963584, "brightness_factor": 1.037479229186081, "contrast_factor": 0.8385257206335394, "jpeg_quality": 17} |
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Annex A - List of Imagery Tiles Analysed in the Compilation of the
Report
Source Date Resolution
Planet Labs SkySat 15 Mar 22 75cm
Planet Labs SkySat 17 Mar 22 62cm
Planet Labs SkySat 18 Mar 22 69cm
Planet Labs SkySat 22 Jun 22 80cm
Planet Labs SkySat 25 Jun 22 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 3 Jul 22 69cm
Planet Labs SkySat 22 Jul 22 72cm
Planet Labs SkySat 24 Jul 22 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 28 Jul 22 82cm
Planet Labs SkySat 31 Jul 22 80cm
Planet Labs SkySat 7 Aug 22 81cm
Planet Labs SkySat 12 Aug 22 | 83cm
Planet Labs SkySat 13 Aug 22 | 58cm
Planet Labs SkySat 21 Aug 22 | 63cm
Planet Labs SkySat 23 Aug 22 | 7icm
ESA Sentinel 2 24 Aug 22 | 10m
Planet Labs SkySat 30 Aug 22 | 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 31 Aug 22 | 78cm
Planet Labs SkySat 2 Sep 22 56cm
Planet Labs SkySat 6 Sep 22 64cm
Planet Labs SkySat 7 Sep 22 69cm
Planet Labs SkySat 9 Sep 22 68cm
Planet Labs SkySat 13 Sep 22 | 69cm
Planet Labs SkySat 21 Sep 22 76cm
Planet Labs SkySat 23 Sep 22 | 66cm
Planet Labs SkySat 25 Sep 22 | 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 3 Oct 22 68cm
Planet Labs SkySat 4 Oct 22 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 6 Oct 22 73cm
Planet Labs SkySat 7 Oct 22 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 8 Oct 22 66cm
Planet Labs SkySat 9 Oct 22 71cm
Planet Labs SkySat 12 Oct 22 67cm
Planet Labs SkySat 15 Oct 22 69cm
Planet Labs SkySat 17 Oct 22 57cm
Planet Labs SkySat 18 Oct 22 72cm
Planet Labs SkySat 29 Oct 22 66cm
Planet Labs SkySat 5 Nov 22 77cm
Planet Labs SkySat 7 Nov 22 83cm
Planet Labs SkySat 14 Nov 22 74cm
Planet Labs SkySat 15 Nov22 | 66cm
Planet Labs SkySat 4 Dec 22 68cm
Planet Labs SkySat 5 Dec 22 69cm
Planet Labs SkySat 6 Dec 22 56cm
Planet Labs SkySat 14 Dec 22 66cm
Planet Labs SkySat 28 Dec 22 63cm
49 | {"noise_level": 0.09391667512628767, "apply_lighting": false, "max_perspective_angle": 4.528304113043349, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 32.8207448587909, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 110.09970930149679, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 7.563960864036602, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 88.46948515603826, "perspective_br_x_shift": 59.397623231527305, "perspective_br_y_shift": 89.28925217577815, "perspective_bl_x_shift": 58.57328881174483, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 4.117754134581759, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.5383979991426675, "brightness_factor": 0.988601279863188, "contrast_factor": 0.9597984215487847, "jpeg_quality": 38} |
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8.3.4 12 October 2022
Impact points were identified in close proximity to a small village approximately 12km to the
southwest of the nuclear power plant. Crater analysis was inconclusive as to the possible
direction of the firing point. The impact area, to the immediate south of the village, appears to
have a small trench system. There is no evidence of any other military activity in the area.
9 Conclusions
Throughout the reporting period, there has been limited military activity observed on imagery
to report, relative to other areas of Ukraine. With the exception of the initial assault on the
plant at the beginning of March, the forces deployed to the plant have carried out little activity
that was observed on satellite imagery. This does not suggest that the force is benign at the
plant and it is likely that much of the activity is conducted at low level and with vehicles and
any weapons stored within the turbine halls. Vehicles consistent with a sizeable military or
paramilitary presence were observed at the plant over the reporting period, including both Ural
and KAMAZ utility trucks, a versatile vehicle type used for the transportation of almost all
essential equipment and consumables including weapons, ammunition, explosives, rations,
furniture and troops. The force is also equipped with BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, a
heavy vehicle equipped with a turret mounted 30mm cannon. It does not appear that artillery
assets are stored within the plant; the National Guard are not believed to be equipped with
such systems. It must also be considered that the Russian forces will be aware of and
assume regular satellite imaging of the plant. Imaging satellites follow a sun synchronous
orbit; this is an orbit pattern that follows the progression of sun light as the Earth rotates on its
axis. Most imaging satellites pass over the point of imaging during the mid to late morning,
usually between 10 and 11 local time, although the Planet SkySat constellation is able to
deviate from this pattern due to the number of platforms in the constellation. Russian
awareness and understanding of this would most likely mean that any activity of substance
would take place outside of potential windows of coverage, such as the afternoon and would
not be detected by an imagery analysis study utilising satellite imagery.
External to the plant, there are multiple instances that would indicate firing of artillery assets,
most likely multiple rocket launchers including BM-21 ‘Grad’ and BM-30 ‘Smerch’. Reporting
has suggested that these assets are based in nearby settlements including the town of
Vodyanoye. It is clear that these artillery units are employing tactics whereby they deploy to
firing positions some distance from their lay-up positions, conduct their fire missions then move
on to prevent targeting by counter-battery fire. It also appears that they are using the
presence of the nuclear power plant as a shield to also deter counter battery fire on to their
firing positions.
A number of sources have reported the use of mines around the plant. The mines detailed in
the reports indicate anti-personnel mines rather than larger devices. While anti-personnel
mines still contain a significant amount of explosive, they are generally not enough to cause
any structural damage to a building. The mines mentioned in the reporting are directional
fragmentation devices which when detonated, send metal ball bearings or shards of metal at
high velocity in a horizontal path. These devices are commonly used by military forces for
perimeter security, especially in deployed situations. They are designed to be triggered by the
victim through proximity sensors or trip wires. Representatives from the IAEA monitoring
47 | {"noise_level": 0.11042424193895892, "apply_lighting": true, "lighting_center_x": 896, "lighting_center_y": 499, "shadow_intensity": 0.16509095619829295, "max_perspective_angle": 1.5647733850607377, "perspective_tl_x_shift": 40.52397577235607, "perspective_tl_y_shift": 90.28583438979426, "perspective_tr_x_shift": 68.60693681280726, "perspective_tr_y_shift": 72.58360822598918, "perspective_br_x_shift": -68.5019271289111, "perspective_br_y_shift": 114.73401324728108, "perspective_bl_x_shift": -77.02626703890259, "perspective_bl_y_shift": 99.71910249447303, "apply_artifacts": false, "blur_radius": 1.9566614137165432, "brightness_factor": 0.6724526743418556, "contrast_factor": 1.0408987219783683, "jpeg_quality": 32} |
OCR-PDF-Degraded Dataset
Overview
This dataset contains synthetically degraded document images paired with their ground truth OCR text. It addresses a critical gap in OCR model training by providing realistic document degradations that simulate real-world conditions encountered in production environments.
Purpose
Most OCR models are trained on relatively clean, perfectly scanned documents. However, in real-world applications, especially in the military/defense sector, documents may be poorly scanned, photographed in suboptimal lighting conditions, or degraded due to environmental factors. This dataset aims to:
- Enable the training of more robust OCR models that can handle imperfect document inputs
- Establish a standardized benchmark for evaluating OCR performance under various degradation conditions
- Bridge the gap between lab performance and real-world deployment for document processing systems
Domain Focus
This first iteration focuses specifically on military/defense sector documents. These documents:
- Contain specialized terminology and formatting
- Often include tables, diagrams, and structured information
- May include mission-critical information where accurate OCR is essential
- Represent a sector where document digitization processes may not always be ideal
Dataset Creation Process
The dataset was created through a systematic process of degrading clean PDF documents:
The process includes:
- Starting with clean military/defense PDF documents
- Extracting individual pages
- Performing OCR on the clean pages to establish ground truth text
- Applying various degradation effects to simulate real-world conditions
- Recording both the degraded images and the corresponding degradation parameters
Degradation Parameters
The dataset includes various degradation types:
- Noise: Random pixel noise at different intensities
- Lighting: Uneven illumination effects with varying intensities and positions
- Perspective: Distortions simulating non-flat document captures
- Artifacts: Lines, spots, and other common scanner/camera artifacts
- Image Quality: Variations in blur, brightness, contrast, and JPEG compression
Each image in the dataset includes specific parameter values, allowing for targeted evaluation and training.
Usage Examples
This dataset is ideal for:
# Example: Loading and using the dataset
from datasets import load_dataset
import json
dataset = load_dataset("racineai/ocr-pdf-degraded", split="train")
# Access a sample
sample = dataset[0]
# Get the degraded image
image = sample["image"]
# Get the ground truth OCR text
text = sample["ocr_text"]
# Access degradation parameters (for targeted training/evaluation)
params = json.loads(sample["params"])
noise_level = params["noise_level"]
print(noise_level)
Limitations and Future Work
- Current iteration focuses only on military/defense documents
- Further domain expansion planned for legal, medical, and financial sectors
- Future versions may include handwritten text degradations
- Working on expansion to include multi-page document context
Citation
If you use this dataset in your research, please cite:
@misc{racineai_ocr_pdf_degraded,
author = {RacineAI},
title = {OCR-PDF-Degraded: Synthetically Degraded Documents for Robust OCR},
year = {2025},
url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/racineai/ocr-pdf-degraded}
}
License
Apache 2.0
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