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4439812 | page content | {
"char_count": "4226",
"citations": "115 N.H. 1",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-01-06",
"docket_number": "No. 7112",
"first_page": 1,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7112\nLouis C. Wyman v. John A. Durkin Robert L. Stark, Secretary of State Carmen Chimento\nJanuary 6, 1975\nStanley M. Brown, Dart S. Bigg, Eugene M. Van Loan III and David R. DePuy (Mr. Brown orally) for the plaintiff.\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch and Matthias J. Reynolds and William S. Gannon (Mr. Joseph A. Millimet), by brief and orally, for John A. Durkin.\nThomas D. Rath, assistant attorney general, orally, for Robert L. Stark, Secretary of State.\nRichard W. Leonard, by brief and orally, for Carmen Chimento.",
"id": "4439812",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "3",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Louis C. Wyman v. John A. Durkin Robert L. Stark, Secretary of State Carmen Chimento",
"name_abbreviation": "Wyman v. Stark",
"parties": "Louis C. Wyman v. John A. Durkin Robert L. Stark, Secretary of State Carmen Chimento",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "683"
} |
4440959 | page content | {
"char_count": "7925",
"citations": "115 N.H. 508",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-09-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6958",
"first_page": 508,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 6958\nEngineering Associates of New England, Inc. v. B & L Liquidating Corporation\nSeptember 30, 1975\nMcLane, Graf, Greene & Brown and Grenville Clark III (Mr. Clark orally) for the plaintiff.\nWiggin, Nourie, Sundeen, Pingree & Bigg and W. Wright Danenbarger and Larry B. Pletcher (Mr. Pletcher orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440959",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "512",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Engineering Associates of New England, Inc. v. B & L Liquidating Corporation",
"name_abbreviation": "Engineering Associates of New England, Inc. v. B & L Liquidating Corp.",
"parties": "Engineering Associates of New England, Inc. v. B & L Liquidating Corporation",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1307"
} |
4439055 | page content | {
"char_count": "8794",
"citations": "115 N.H. 44",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-02-07",
"docket_number": "No. 7122",
"first_page": 44,
"head_matter": "Request of the Senate\nNo. 7122\nOpinion of the Justices\nFebruary 7, 1975\nThe following resolution was adopted by the senate on January 15, 1975, and filed with the supreme court on January 20, 1975:\n“Whereas, Part 2, Article 49 of the Constitution of New Hampshire provides that the president of the senate shall, during a vacancy in the chair of the governor, exercise all the powers and authorities vested in the governor and further provides ‘... but when the president of the senate shall exercise the office of governor, he shall not hold his office in the senate.’; and\n“Whereas, in the above-quoted portion of Article 49 the words ‘his office in the senate’ are ambiguous in that it is not clear whether they refer only to his office as president of the senate or whether they refer to the office of senator to which he has been elected; and\n“Whereas, a situation whereby the president of the senate could become acting governor may arise at any moment and without prior notice which would not permit timely consideration of this problem by the honorable court; now therefore, be it\n“Resolved by the Senate in General Court convened:\n“That the Justices of the New Hampshire supreme court be respectfully requested to give their opinion in answer to the following question:\n“When the president of the senate is acting governor pursuant to the provisions of Part 2, Article 49 of the New Hampshire Constitution, is he prohibited from holding his office as president of the senate only, or is he prohibited from acting in any manner as a member of the senate?\n“That copies of this resolution be submitted to the clerk of the New Hampshire supreme court by the clerk of the senate.”\nThe following answer was returned:",
"id": "4439055",
"judges": "Frank R. Kf.nison",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "47",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Opinion of the Justices",
"name_abbreviation": "Opinion of the Justices",
"parties": "Opinion of the Justices",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1508"
} |
4438975 | page content | {
"char_count": "9103",
"citations": "115 N.H. 499",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-09-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6862",
"first_page": 499,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 6862\nState of New Hampshire v. Russell E. Collins, Jr.\nSeptember 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Robert V. Johnson II, assistant attorney general (Mr. Johnson orally), for the State.\nLeonard J. Mershi (Mr. Merski orally), and Mark Donatelli, law student, for the defendant.",
"id": "4438975",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "504",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Russell E. Collins, Jr.",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Collins",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Russell E. Collins, Jr.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1547"
} |
4440114 | page content | {
"char_count": "7225",
"citations": "115 N.H. 22",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-01-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6960",
"first_page": 22,
"head_matter": "Cheshire\nNo. 6960\nPlastic Laminated Products, Inc. v. Arthur Seppala\nJanuary 31, 1975\nGoodnow, Arwe, Ayer fsf Prigge and Eric R. Gardner (Mr. Gardner orally) for the plaintiff.\nLeonard, Prunier & Mazerolle and William J. Groff (Mr. Groff orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440114",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "25",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Plastic Laminated Products, Inc. v. Arthur Seppala",
"name_abbreviation": "Plastic Laminated Products, Inc. v. Seppala",
"parties": "Plastic Laminated Products, Inc. v. Arthur Seppala",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1232"
} |
4438893 | page content | {
"char_count": "7033",
"citations": "115 N.H. 609",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-10-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7216",
"first_page": 609,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7216\nGeorge Disco & a. v. Board of Selectmen of Amherst & a.\nOctober 31, 1975\nProlman & Holland (Mr. Francis G. Holland orally) for the plaintiffs.\nEnright, Lizotte & Drescher (Mr. William R. Drescher orally) for the defendants Board of Selectmen, Town Moderator, and Building Inspector of Amherst.\nJohn A. Melrose, by brief and orally, for the defendants Bruce Reeves and Charles Vars.",
"id": "4438893",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "612",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "George Disco & a. v. Board of Selectmen of Amherst & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Disco v. Board of Selectmen",
"parties": "George Disco & a. v. Board of Selectmen of Amherst & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1225"
} |
4441147 | page content | {
"char_count": "1968",
"citations": "115 N.H. 366",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7047",
"first_page": 366,
"head_matter": "Personnel Commission\nNo. 7047\nJohn A. Colburn v. State of New Hampshire Personnel Commission\nJune 30, 1975\nCleveland, Waters & Bass and Michael C. Moyers ( Mr. Moyers orally) for the plaintiff and intervenors, The State Employees Association of New Hampshire, Inc.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Charles G. Cleaveland, assistant attorney general ( Mr. Cleaveland orally), for the State.",
"id": "4441147",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "367",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "John A. Colburn v. State of New Hampshire Personnel Commission",
"name_abbreviation": "Colburn v. State",
"parties": "John A. Colburn v. State of New Hampshire Personnel Commission",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "332"
} |
4438920 | page content | {
"char_count": "13546",
"citations": "115 N.H. 455",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7258",
"first_page": 455,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7258\nState of New Hampshire v. Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc., & a.\nJuly 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, Richard V. Wiebusch, assistant attorney general, and W. John Funk, attorney (Mr. Wiebusch orally), for the State.\nHamblett, Kerrigan, LaTourette & Lopez (Mr. Joseph M. Kerrigan orally) for the defendants.",
"id": "4438920",
"judges": "Grimes, J., and Griffith, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "461",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc., & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc.",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Credit Bureau of Nashua, Inc., & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "2190"
} |
4440054 | page content | {
"char_count": "13938",
"citations": "115 N.H. 287",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7108",
"first_page": 287,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7108\nJames M. Metzger & a. v. Town of Brentwood\nMay 30, 1975\nPerkins, Holland, Donovan &? Beckett and Arthur C. Randlett (Mr. Randlett orally) for the plaintiffs.\nShute, Engel & Frasier and Robert L. Steuk (Mr. Steuk orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440054",
"judges": "Duncan, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "294",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "James M. Metzger & a. v. Town of Brentwood",
"name_abbreviation": "Metzger v. Town of Brentwood",
"parties": "James M. Metzger & a. v. Town of Brentwood",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "2326"
} |
4441520 | page content | {
"char_count": "7372",
"citations": "115 N.H. 628",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-11-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7046",
"first_page": 628,
"head_matter": "Merrimack District Court\nNo. 7046\nState of New Hampshire v. John H. Handfield\nNovember 28, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Robert V. Johnson II, assistant attorney general (Mr. Johnson orally), for the State.\nCraig, Wenners, Craig McDowell (Mr. Joseph F. McDowell III orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4441520",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "631",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. John H. Handfield",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Handfield",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. John H. Handfield",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1258"
} |
4438931 | page content | {
"char_count": "3585",
"citations": "115 N.H. 245",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6800",
"first_page": 245,
"head_matter": "Carroll\nNo. 6800\nState of New Hampshire v. Richard W. Pheeney\nMay 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Thomas D. Rath, assistant attorney general (Mr. Rath orally), for the State.\nJames J. Railed, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4438931",
"judges": "Duncan, J., did not sit.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "246",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Richard W. Pheeney",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Pheeney",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Richard W. Pheeney",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "597"
} |
4440632 | page content | {
"char_count": "1496",
"citations": "115 N.H. 239",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6584",
"first_page": 239,
"head_matter": "Carroll\nNo. 6584\nState of New Hampshire v. Kenneth Craigue\nMay 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and James L. Kruse, attorney (Mr. Kruse orally), for the State.\nWilliam P. Shea, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4440632",
"judges": "Kenison, C.J., did not sit.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "240",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Kenneth Craigue",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Craigue",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Kenneth Craigue",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "266"
} |
4441078 | page content | {
"char_count": "8963",
"citations": "115 N.H. 591",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-10-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7135",
"first_page": 591,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7135\nDana A. Desrochers v. Real J. Desrochers\nOctober 31, 1975\nCraig, Wenners, Craig Si McDowell (Mr. Joseph F. McDowell III orally) for the plaintiff.\nClifford J. Ross, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4441078",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "595",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Dana A. Desrochers v. Real J. Desrochers",
"name_abbreviation": "Desrochers v. Desrochers",
"parties": "Dana A. Desrochers v. Real J. Desrochers",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1466"
} |
4440234 | page content | {
"char_count": "6166",
"citations": "115 N.H. 469",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-08-29",
"docket_number": "No. 6704",
"first_page": 469,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 6704\nWilliam T. Underhill & a. v. Robert J. Baker William J. Baker v. William T. Underhill & a.\nAugust 29, 1975\nPaul A. Rinden and Eleanor Krasnow (Mr. Rinden orally) for the plaintiffs.\nLouis P. Faustini, by brief and orally, for the defendants.",
"id": "4440234",
"judges": "Duncan, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "472",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "William T. Underhill & a. v. Robert J. Baker; William J. Baker v. William T. Underhill & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Underhill v. Baker",
"parties": "William T. Underhill & a. v. Robert J. Baker William J. Baker v. William T. Underhill & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1044"
} |
4441231 | page content | {
"char_count": "4125",
"citations": "115 N.H. 487",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-08-29",
"docket_number": "No. 7138",
"first_page": 487,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7138\nBerkshire Mutual Insurance Company v. Lorna G. LaChance & a.\nAugust 29, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch (Mr. Shane Devine orally) for the plaintiff.\nShaines, Madrigan ¿s’ McEachern and Gregory D. Robbins (Mr. Robbins orally) for the defendant Harry Nathanson.\nTaylor, Gray £j? Sullivan for the defendant Lorna G. LaChance, filed no brief.",
"id": "4441231",
"judges": "Kenison, C.J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "489",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Berkshire Mutual Insurance Company v. Lorna G. LaChance & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Berkshire Mutual Insurance v. LaChance",
"parties": "Berkshire Mutual Insurance Company v. Lorna G. LaChance & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "664"
} |
4438761 | page content | {
"char_count": "8397",
"citations": "115 N.H. 572",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-10-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6973",
"first_page": 572,
"head_matter": "Grafton\nNo. 6973\nNew England Fiber Company, New England Mica Company, Inc. v. Bath Fiber Company, Inc.; Paul W. Glover, Sr., and Paul W. Glover, Jr.\nOctober 31, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch, Robert A. Backus and James E. Townsend (Mr. Backus orally) for the plaintiffs.\nHamblett, Kerrigan, LaTourette Lopez and Martin J. McMahon, Jr. (Mr. McMahon orally) for the defendants.",
"id": "4438761",
"judges": "Griffith, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "575",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "New England Fiber Company, New England Mica Company, Inc. v. Bath Fiber Company, Inc.; Paul W. Glover, Sr., and Paul W. Glover, Jr",
"name_abbreviation": "New England Fiber Co. v. Bath Fiber Co.",
"parties": "New England Fiber Company, New England Mica Company, Inc. v. Bath Fiber Company, Inc.; Paul W. Glover, Sr., and Paul W. Glover, Jr.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1379"
} |
4441289 | page content | {
"char_count": "14436",
"citations": "115 N.H. 124",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6904",
"first_page": 124,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 6904\nHoward W. Sibson & a. v. State of New Hampshire\nMarch 31, 1975\nShaines, Madrigan £s? McEachern (Mr. Robert A. Shaines orally) for the plaintiffs.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Donald W. Stever, Jr., assistant attorney general (Mr. Stever orally), for the State.",
"id": "4441289",
"judges": "Grimes, J., concurred in the result in part and dissented in part; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "131",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Howard W. Sibson & a. v. State of New Hampshire",
"name_abbreviation": "Sibson v. State",
"parties": "Howard W. Sibson & a. v. State of New Hampshire",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "2462"
} |
4440334 | page content | {
"char_count": "7373",
"citations": "115 N.H. 40",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-01-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7001",
"first_page": 40,
"head_matter": "Belknap\nNo. 7001\nRobert J. Regan & a. v. Syren Hovanian & a.\nJanuary 31, 1975\nWescott, Millham &? Dyer (Mr. Peter V. Millham orally) for the plaintiffs.\nDecker & Hemeon and Philip T. McLaughlin (Mr. McLaughlin orally) for the defendants.",
"id": "4440334",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "48",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Robert J. Regan & a. v. Syren Hovanian & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Regan v. Hovanian",
"parties": "Robert J. Regan & a. v. Syren Hovanian & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1234"
} |
4440761 | page content | {
"char_count": "2355",
"citations": "115 N.H. 224",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-12",
"docket_number": "No. 7113",
"first_page": 224,
"head_matter": "Original\nNo. 7113\nState of New Hampshire v. Danny Slade\nMay 12, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Gregory H. Smith, assistant attorney general (Mr. Smith orally), for the State.\nSmith, Welts & Currier and Richard E. Boyer (Mr. Boyer orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440761",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "234",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Danny Slade",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Slade",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Danny Slade",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "402"
} |
4439406 | page content | {
"char_count": "4183",
"citations": "115 N.H. 655",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-11-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7160",
"first_page": 655,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 7160\nErnest Wiswell & a. v. Pembroke School District\nNovember 28, 1975\nPerkins & Brock and Kevin L. Tucker (Mr. Tucker orally) for the plaintiffs.\nSoule 6? Leslie (Mr. Lewis F. Soule orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439406",
"judges": "Kenison, C.J., and Grimes, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "657",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Ernest Wiswell & a. v. Pembroke School District",
"name_abbreviation": "Wiswell v. Pembroke School District",
"parties": "Ernest Wiswell & a. v. Pembroke School District",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "698"
} |
4440694 | page content | {
"char_count": "7748",
"citations": "115 N.H. 215",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-04-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7124",
"first_page": 215,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7124\nNew Hampshire Insurance Company & a. v. Robert M. Duvall, Commissioner of Labor\nApril 30, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch andF. Donald Dufresne and Michael G. Gfroerer (Mr. Dufresne orally) for the plaintiffs.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Charles G. Cleaveland, assistant attorney general (Mr. Cleaveland orally), for the State.\nCraig, Wenners, Craig & McDowell (Mr. Vincent A. Wenners, Jr. orally) for the intervenors Manchester Firefighters Association, &?",
"id": "4440694",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "221",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "New Hampshire Insurance Company & a. v. Robert M. Duvall, Commissioner of Labor",
"name_abbreviation": "New Hampshire Insurance v. Duvall",
"parties": "New Hampshire Insurance Company & a. v. Robert M. Duvall, Commissioner of Labor",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1213"
} |
4439781 | page content | {
"char_count": "17657",
"citations": "115 N.H. 414",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7003",
"first_page": 414,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 7003\nState of New Hampshire ex rel. Meldrim Thomson, Jr., Governor v. State Board of Parole\nJuly 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and David W. Hess, assistant attorney general (Mr. Hess orally), for the State.\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch and Silas Little III (Mr. Millimet orally) for the State board of parole.\nStanley M. Brown, by brief and orally, for Gerald R. Prunier.\nUpton, Sanders & Smith and Robert Upton II and John F. Teague (Mr. Robert Upton II orally) for Frederick J. Martineau.\nMaynard, Dunn & Phillips (Vincent P. Dunn orally) for Russell Nelson.",
"id": "4439781",
"judges": "Duncan, J., did not sit.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "423",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire ex rel. Meldrim Thomson, Jr., Governor v. State Board of Parole",
"name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Thomson v. State Board of Parole",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire ex rel. Meldrim Thomson, Jr., Governor v. State Board of Parole",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "2919"
} |
4441382 | page content | {
"char_count": "4272",
"citations": "115 N.H. 483",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-08-29",
"docket_number": "No. 7079",
"first_page": 483,
"head_matter": "Merrimack District Court\nNo. 7079\nState of New Hampshire v. Ghislain Beaulieu\nAugust 29, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Thomas D. Rath, assistant attorney general, and Edward N. Damon, attorney (Mr. Damon orally), for the State.\nJames A. Nadeau, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4441382",
"judges": "Duncan, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "485",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Ghislain Beaulieu",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Beaulieu",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Ghislain Beaulieu",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "715"
} |
4440373 | page content | {
"char_count": "1168",
"citations": "115 N.H. 672",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-11-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7221",
"first_page": 672,
"head_matter": "Original\nNo. 7221\nRonald Moses v. Raymond A. Helgemoe, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison\nNovember 28, 1975\nRonald Moses, pro se, by brief, for the plaintiff.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and James L. Kruse, attorney, by brief, for the defendant.",
"id": "4440373",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "672",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Ronald Moses v. Raymond A. Helgemoe, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison",
"name_abbreviation": "Moses v. Helgemoe",
"parties": "Ronald Moses v. Raymond A. Helgemoe, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "196"
} |
4439843 | page content | {
"char_count": "11962",
"citations": "115 N.H. 94",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-02-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7057",
"first_page": 94,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7057\nCambridge Trust Company v. P. Gerard Carney and A. E. Carney a.k.a. Ann E. Carney d.b.a. P. Gerard Carney & Company\nFebruary 28, 1975\nHarold Rosenwald, of Massachusetts, and Shaines, Madrigan & Mc-Eachern (Mr. Rosenwald orally) for the plaintiff.\nMcLane, Graf, Greene, Raulerson Middleton and James C. Hood (Mr. Hood orally) for the defendants.",
"id": "4439843",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "99",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Cambridge Trust Company v. P. Gerard Carney and A. E. Carney a.k.a. Ann E. Carney d.b.a. P. Gerard Carney & Company",
"name_abbreviation": "Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney",
"parties": "Cambridge Trust Company v. P. Gerard Carney and A. E. Carney a.k.a. Ann E. Carney d.b.a. P. Gerard Carney & Company",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "2006"
} |
4440468 | page content | {
"char_count": "6337",
"citations": "115 N.H. 60",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-02-28",
"docket_number": "No. 6884",
"first_page": 60,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 6884\nEdmond Cournoyer, father and next friend to Simone Cournoyer v. Allstate Insurance Company Royal Globe Insurance Company\nFebruary 28, 1975\nLemelin & Cloutier and Roger E. D’Amours (Mr. Raymond A. Cloutier orally) for the plaintiffs.\nAugustine J. McDonough and Susan B. Monson (Mr. McDonough orally) for Allstate Insurance Company.\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl Branch and Matthias J. Reynolds (Mr. Reynolds orally) for Royal Globe Insurance Company.",
"id": "4440468",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "63",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Edmond Cournoyer, father and next friend to Simone Cournoyer v. Allstate Insurance Company Royal Globe Insurance Company",
"name_abbreviation": "Cournoyer v. Allstate Insurance",
"parties": "Edmond Cournoyer, father and next friend to Simone Cournoyer v. Allstate Insurance Company Royal Globe Insurance Company",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1091"
} |
4439539 | page content | {
"char_count": "10500",
"citations": "115 N.H. 347",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6954",
"first_page": 347,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 6954\nClifford N. Wheeler v. State of New Hampshire & a.\nJune 30, 1975\nNew Hampshire Legal Assistance and Bruce E. Friedman (Mr. Friedman orally) for the plaintiff.\nEdward F. Smith, Joseph Stewart and Andre J. Barbean (Mr. Stewart orally) for the defendant New Hampshire Department of Employment Security.",
"id": "4439539",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "352",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Clifford N. Wheeler v. State of New Hampshire & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Wheeler v. State",
"parties": "Clifford N. Wheeler v. State of New Hampshire & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1720"
} |
4439766 | page content | {
"char_count": "2167",
"citations": "115 N.H. 678",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-11-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7277",
"first_page": 678,
"head_matter": "Strafford\nNo. 7277\nFrederick J. Barry, Adm’r w.w.a. of the Estate of Elsie M. Courser v. Bank of New Hampshire, National Association\nNovember 28, 1975\nFrederick J. Barry, by brief and orally, pro se for the plaintiff.\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch, Luke S. O’Neill, Jr., and Silas Little III (Mr. Little orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439766",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "679",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Frederick J. Barry, Adm'r w.w.a. of the Estate of Elsie M. Courser v. Bank of New Hampshire, National Association",
"name_abbreviation": "Barry v. Bank of New Hampshire, National Ass'n",
"parties": "Frederick J. Barry, Adm’r w.w.a. of the Estate of Elsie M. Courser v. Bank of New Hampshire, National Association",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "365"
} |
4439869 | page content | {
"char_count": "3285",
"citations": "115 N.H. 435",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7148",
"first_page": 435,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7148\nCharles J. Norton & a. v. Lucien C. Burleaud\nJuly 31, 1975\nTaylor, Gray Sullivan and William J. Hurley, Jr., (Mr. Hurley orally) for the plaintiff.\nCasassa, Mulherrin & Ryan (Mr. Joseph P. Mulherrin by brief and orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439869",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "437",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Charles J. Norton & a. v. Lucien C. Burleaud",
"name_abbreviation": "Norton v. Burleaud",
"parties": "Charles J. Norton & a. v. Lucien C. Burleaud",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "557"
} |
4439435 | page content | {
"char_count": "3338",
"citations": "115 N.H. 720",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-12-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7247",
"first_page": 720,
"head_matter": "Coos\nNo. 7247\nState of New Hampshire v. William G. Mitchell\nDecember 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Richard B. McNamara, attorney, by brief, for the State.\nWilliam G. Mitchell, pro se, by brief.",
"id": "4439435",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "721",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. William G. Mitchell",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Mitchell",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. William G. Mitchell",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "560"
} |
4440618 | page content | {
"char_count": "7134",
"citations": "115 N.H. 702",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-12-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7072",
"first_page": 702,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7072\nRaymond Remillard v. New England Telephone Company Pauline H. Remillard v. New England Telephone Company\nDecember 31, 1975\nSanders, McDermott & Kearns (Mr. Peter F. Kearns orally) for the plaintiffs.\nMcLane, Graf, Greene & Brown and Bruce W. Felmly (Mr. Felmly orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440618",
"judges": "Kenison, C.J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "705",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Raymond Remillard v. New England Telephone Company; Pauline H. Remillard v. New England Telephone Company",
"name_abbreviation": "Remillard v. New England Telephone Co.",
"parties": "Raymond Remillard v. New England Telephone Company Pauline H. Remillard v. New England Telephone Company",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1224"
} |
4441396 | page content | {
"char_count": "3844",
"citations": "115 N.H. 506",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-09-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6948",
"first_page": 506,
"head_matter": "Board of Taxation\nNo. 6948\nTown of Newport v. State of New Hampshire\nSeptember 30, 1975\nNolin, Spanos & Spanos and Gerald J. Carney (Mr. Carney orally) for the town of Newport.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Charles G. Cleaveland, assistant attorney general (Mr. Cleaveland orally), for the State.",
"id": "4441396",
"judges": "Duncan, J. did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "508",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Town of Newport v. State of New Hampshire",
"name_abbreviation": "Town of Newport v. State",
"parties": "Town of Newport v. State of New Hampshire",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "662"
} |
4439984 | page content | {
"char_count": "5560",
"citations": "115 N.H. 636",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-11-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7066",
"first_page": 636,
"head_matter": "Original\nNo. 7066\nIn re Ralph Brewster\nNovember 28, 1975\nAnthony A. McManus, by brief and orally, for Ralph Brewster.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Roger G. Burlingame, assistant attorney general (Mr. Burlingame orally), for the Merrimack County Superior Court.",
"id": "4439984",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "638",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "In re Ralph Brewster",
"name_abbreviation": "In re Brewster",
"parties": "In re Ralph Brewster",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "979"
} |
4440708 | page content | {
"char_count": "8171",
"citations": "115 N.H. 713",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-12-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7155",
"first_page": 713,
"head_matter": "Personnel Commission\nNo. 7155\nJames H. Hunt v. Personnel Commission\nDecember 31, 1975\nCleveland, Waters & Bass and Robert T. Clark (Mr. Clark orally) for the plaintiff.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Charles G. Cleaveland, assistant attorney general (Mr. Cleaveland orally), for the defendant.",
"id": "4440708",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "717",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "James H. Hunt v. Personnel Commission",
"name_abbreviation": "Hunt v. Personnel Commission",
"parties": "James H. Hunt v. Personnel Commission",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1325"
} |
4440170 | page content | {
"char_count": "2844",
"citations": "115 N.H. 381",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7182",
"first_page": 381,
"head_matter": "Carroll\nNo. 7182\nHorace L. Richardson & a. v. Curtis Schneider & a.\nJune 30, 1975\nNighswander, Lord, Martin & KillKelley (Mr. David J. KillKelley orally) for the plaintiffs.\nSheehan, Phinney, Bass Green and E. Paul Kelley (Mr. Kelly orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440170",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "383",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Horace L. Richardson & a. v. Curtis Schneider & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Richardson v. Schneider",
"parties": "Horace L. Richardson & a. v. Curtis Schneider & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "485"
} |
4440777 | page content | {
"char_count": "3052",
"citations": "115 N.H. 190",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-04-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6789",
"first_page": 190,
"head_matter": "Public Utilities Commission\nNo. 6789\nBrowning-Ferris Industries of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State of New Hampshire\nApril 30, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl 6? Branch and Silas Little III (Mr. Little orally) for the plaintiff.\nWarrenB. Rudman, attorney general, andJohnL. Ahlgren, attorney (Mr. Ahlgren orally), for the State of New Hampshire.",
"id": "4440777",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "191",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Browning-Ferris Industries of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State of New Hampshire",
"name_abbreviation": "Browning-Ferris Industries of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State",
"parties": "Browning-Ferris Industries of New Hampshire, Inc. v. State of New Hampshire",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "495"
} |
4439555 | page content | {
"char_count": "5554",
"citations": "115 N.H. 91",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-02-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7054",
"first_page": 91,
"head_matter": "Grafton\nNo. 7054\nJohn B. Eames, Grafton County Attorney v. Warren B. Rudman, Attorney General\nFebruary 28, 1975\nJohn B. Eames, by brief and orally, pro se.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Robert V. Johnson II, assistant attorney general (Mr. Johnson orally), for the defendant.",
"id": "4439555",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "93",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "John B. Eames, Grafton County Attorney v. Warren B. Rudman, Attorney General",
"name_abbreviation": "Eames v. Rudman",
"parties": "John B. Eames, Grafton County Attorney v. Warren B. Rudman, Attorney General",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "909"
} |
4438949 | page content | {
"char_count": "5972",
"citations": "115 N.H. 159",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7151",
"first_page": 159,
"head_matter": "Request of House of Representatives\nNo. 7151\nOpinion of the Justices\nMarch 31, 1975\nThe following resolution was adopted by the house of representatives on March 5, 1975, and filed with the supreme court on March 6, 1975:\n“Whereas there is pending in the House of Representatives House Bill No. 36, ‘An Act relative to the length of time in which the governor and council must approve a commissioner of health and welfare’; and\n“Whereas doubt has been expressed as to the constitutionality of certain provisions of said bill;\n“Now, therefore, Be It Resolved by the House of Representatives;\n“That the J ustices of the Supreme Court be respectfully requested to give their opinion upon the following important questions of law:\n“1. Would any provision of the Constitution be violated by the provision in said bill establishing a sixty day time limit within which the governor and council must make an appointment to the office of Commissioner of Health and Welfare from the list of nominees furnished by the Advisory Commission?\n“2. Would any provision of the Constitution be violated by the provision in said bill empowering the Advisory Commission to make an appointment to the office of Commissioner of Health and Welfare in the event that the governor and council shall fail to make an appointment within such sixty day period?\n“Further resolved that the clerk of the house be instructed to transmit to the clerk of the Supreme Court six copies of this resolution and six copies of House Bill No. 36.”\nThe following answers were returned:",
"id": "4438949",
"judges": "Frank R. Kenison",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "162",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Opinion of the Justices",
"name_abbreviation": "Opinion of the Justices",
"parties": "Opinion of the Justices",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "983"
} |
4439001 | page content | {
"char_count": "18808",
"citations": "115 N.H. 331",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6552",
"first_page": 331,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 6552\nState of New Hampshire v. Lawrence D. Conklin\nJune 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and David W. Hess, assistant attorney general (Mr. Hess orally), for the State.\nAlvin E. Taylor and Seth M. Junkins, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4439001",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "340",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Lawrence D. Conklin",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Conklin",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Lawrence D. Conklin",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "3102"
} |
4440988 | page content | {
"char_count": "5240",
"citations": "115 N.H. 242",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6775",
"first_page": 242,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 6775\nGeraldine Simon v. Wilbert Lambert Joseph Simon v. Same\nMay 30, 1975\nShute, Engel & Frasier and Robert L. Steuk (Mr. Steuk orally) for the plaintiffs.\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl Branch (Mr. Shane Devine orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440988",
"judges": "Duncan, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "244",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Geraldine Simon v. Wilbert Lambert; Joseph Simon v. Same",
"name_abbreviation": "Simon v. Same",
"parties": "Geraldine Simon v. Wilbert Lambert Joseph Simon v. Same",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "879"
} |
4440848 | page content | {
"char_count": "6822",
"citations": "115 N.H. 141",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7006",
"first_page": 141,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7006\nLumbermens Mutual Casualty Company v. Michael S. Oliver, by his father and next friend, Frederick G. Oliver, and Manchester Housing Authority\nMarch 31, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch (Mr. Bartram C. Branch orally) for the plaintiff.\nGreen, Sullivan Green (Mr. Leonard S. Green orally) for the defendant Manchester Housing Authority.",
"id": "4440848",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "145",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company v. Michael S. Oliver, by his father and next friend, Frederick G. Oliver, and Manchester Housing Authority",
"name_abbreviation": "Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Oliver",
"parties": "Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company v. Michael S. Oliver, by his father and next friend, Frederick G. Oliver, and Manchester Housing Authority",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1122"
} |
4441341 | page content | {
"char_count": "4125",
"citations": "115 N.H. 84",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-02-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7017",
"first_page": 84,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7017\nJohn Deem & a. v. Town of Newmarket\nFebruary 28, 1975\nShames, Madrigan S’ McEachern and Sanford Roberts (Mr. Robert A. Shaines orally) for the plaintiffs.\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch (Mr. Shane Devine orally) for the defendant; and Calderwood £s? Ouellette, filed no brief.",
"id": "4441341",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "85",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "John Deem & a. v. Town of Newmarket",
"name_abbreviation": "Deem v. Town of Newmarket",
"parties": "John Deem & a. v. Town of Newmarket",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "701"
} |
4441178 | page content | {
"char_count": "10388",
"citations": "115 N.H. 179",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-04-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6702",
"first_page": 179,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 6702\nHarold C. Welch v. Roland E. Bergeron\nApril 30, 1975\nWiner, Lynch, Pillsbury & Howorth (Mr. Robert W. Pillsbury orally) for the plaintiff.\nLeo R. Lesieur, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4441178",
"judges": "Duncan, J., and Griffith, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "184",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Harold C. Welch v. Roland E. Bergeron",
"name_abbreviation": "Welch v. Bergeron",
"parties": "Harold C. Welch v. Roland E. Bergeron",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1754"
} |
4441191 | page content | {
"char_count": "11755",
"citations": "115 N.H. 294",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7131",
"first_page": 294,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 7131\nKing Ridge, Inc. v. Town of Sutton\nMay 30, 1975\nCleveland, Waters & Bass and Robert T. Clark (Mr. Clark orally) for the plaintiff.\nUpton, Sanders & Smith ( Mr. Richard F. Upton orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4441191",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "299",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "King Ridge, Inc. v. Town of Sutton",
"name_abbreviation": "King Ridge, Inc. v. Town of Sutton",
"parties": "King Ridge, Inc. v. Town of Sutton",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1967"
} |
4440520 | page content | {
"char_count": "3712",
"citations": "115 N.H. 300",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7133",
"first_page": 300,
"head_matter": "Hanover District Court\nNo. 7133\nDenis S. Ransmeier v. Time Share Corporation & a. Peter B. Martin v. Time Share Corporation & a.\nMay 30, 1975\nSulloway, Hollis, Godfrey Esf Soden and John C. Ransmeier (Mr. Ransmeier orally) for the plaintiffs.\nLaurence F. Gardner and IT William Clauson (Mr. Clauson orally) for the defendants, Time Share Corporation and Interactive Learning Systems, Inc.",
"id": "4440520",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "301",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Denis S. Ransmeier v. Time Share Corporation & a.; Peter B. Martin v. Time Share Corporation & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Ransmeier v. Time Share Corp.",
"parties": "Denis S. Ransmeier v. Time Share Corporation & a. Peter B. Martin v. Time Share Corporation & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "585"
} |
4441022 | page content | {
"char_count": "5826",
"citations": "115 N.H. 306",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-20",
"docket_number": "No. 7228",
"first_page": 306,
"head_matter": "Request of House of Representatives\nNo. 7228\nOpinion of the Justices\nJune 20, 1975\nThe following resolution was adopted by the house of representatives on May 28, 1975, and filed with the supreme court on May 29, 1975:\n“Whereas, there is presently pending before the House of Representatives 1975 Senate Bill 138, relating to the definition of property within the state under the business profits tax; and\n“Whereas, the purpose of 1975 Senate Bill 138 is to relieve from taxation certain suppliers of the state liquor commission who would otherwise be subject to the business profits tax; and\n“Whereas, concern has been expressed that limiting this proposed legislation to spirits and wines may be in violation of the ‘proportional and reasonable’ requirements of Article 5 of Part Second of the Constitution of New Hampshire or may create an impermissible classification of property in violation of Article 6 of Part Second of the Constitution of New Hampshire, now therefore be it\n“Resolved by the House of Representatives:\n“That, the justices of the Supreme Court be respectfully requested to give their opinion upon the following important questions of law:\n“May the general court constitutionally limit the definition of ‘business organization’ under RSA 77-A: 1,1 when the consequence of such a limitation is to relieve from taxation otherwise taxable net income derived from a particular type of business activity as specified in 1975 Senate Bill 138? Would any other provision of the New Plampshire Constitution be violated if Senate Bill 138 were enacted into law?\n“That, the Clerk of the House transmit ten copies of this resolution and ten copies of Senate Bill 138 to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for consideration by said court.”\nThe following answer was returned:",
"id": "4441022",
"judges": "Frank R. Kenison",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "309",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Opinion of the Justices",
"name_abbreviation": "Opinion of the Justices",
"parties": "Opinion of the Justices",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "956"
} |
4439133 | page content | {
"char_count": "3492",
"citations": "115 N.H. 535",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-09-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7126",
"first_page": 535,
"head_matter": "Hampton District Court\nNo. 7126\nState of New Hampshire v. Philip G. Aberizk\nSeptember 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Edward N. Damon, attorney (Mr. Damon orally), for the State.\nNadeau, Nadeau, Cullimore & Gray (Mr. William B. Cullimore orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439133",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "536",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Philip G. Aberizk",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Aberizk",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Philip G. Aberizk",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "555"
} |
4441004 | page content | {
"char_count": "8973",
"citations": "115 N.H. 274",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7039",
"first_page": 274,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 7039\nArthur O. Frew, Jr. and Elizabeth H. Frew v. Eunice M. Dasch\nMay 30, 1975\nBranch & Tobin (Mr. Thomas J. Tobin orally) for the plaintiffs.\nSulloway, Hollis, Godfrey & Soden and Donald E. Gartrell (Mr. Gartrell orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4441004",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "278",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Arthur O. Frew, Jr. and Elizabeth H. Frew v. Eunice M. Dasch",
"name_abbreviation": "Frew v. Dasch",
"parties": "Arthur O. Frew, Jr. and Elizabeth H. Frew v. Eunice M. Dasch",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1517"
} |
4439950 | page content | {
"char_count": "8459",
"citations": "115 N.H. 80",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-02-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7016",
"first_page": 80,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7016\nFanny D. Sweetnam v. Paul S. Sweetnam\nFebruary 28, 1975\nAnthony McManus, by brief and orally, for the plaintiff.\nPerkins, Holland, Donovan & Beckett and Arthur C. Randlett (Mr. Randlett orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439950",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "83",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Fanny D. Sweetnam v. Paul S. Sweetnam",
"name_abbreviation": "Sweetnam v. Sweetnam",
"parties": "Fanny D. Sweetnam v. Paul S. Sweetnam",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1442"
} |
4438878 | page content | {
"char_count": "2616",
"citations": "115 N.H. 413",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6999",
"first_page": 413,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 6999\nState of New Hampshire Board of Registration for Land Surveyors v. Frank M. Emery, Jr.\nJuly 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and John L. Ahlgren, assistant attorney general (Mr. Ahlgren orally), for the plaintiff.\nJ. Christopher McGuirk (Mr. McGuirk orally) and Flynn, Powell, McGuirk & Blanchard and Stephen L. Tober for the defendant.",
"id": "4438878",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "414",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire Board of Registration for Land Surveyors v. Frank M. Emery, Jr.",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Emery",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire Board of Registration for Land Surveyors v. Frank M. Emery, Jr.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "430"
} |
4440720 | page content | {
"char_count": "4844",
"citations": "115 N.H. 282",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7085",
"first_page": 282,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7085\nIndian Head National Bank of Derry v. Edwin C. Simonsen Agnes Simonsen Joan D. Simonsen\nMay 30, 1975\nMcLane, Graf Greene, Raulerson & Middleton and Judith D. M. Ransmeier ( Mrs. Ransmeier orally) for the plaintiff.\nHamblett, Kerrigan, LaTourette & Lopez (Mr. Joseph Kerrigan orally) for the defendants Edwin C. Simonsen and Agnes Simonsen.\nRinden Professional Association (Mr. Paul A. Rinden orally) lor the defendant Joan D. Simonsen.",
"id": "4440720",
"judges": "Duncan, J., and Griffith, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "284",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Indian Head National Bank of Derry v. Edwin C. Simonsen Agnes Simonsen Joan D. Simonsen",
"name_abbreviation": "Indian Head National Bank v. Simonsen",
"parties": "Indian Head National Bank of Derry v. Edwin C. Simonsen Agnes Simonsen Joan D. Simonsen",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "801"
} |
4438821 | page content | {
"char_count": "4585",
"citations": "115 N.H. 405",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6955",
"first_page": 405,
"head_matter": "Carroll\nNo. 6955\nCarroll L. Shannon v. Roy W. Foster & a.\nJuly 31, 1975\nJames J. Railed, by brief and orally, for the plaintiff.\nWadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn &' Kohls and James C. Wheat (Mr. Wheat orally) for the defendants.",
"id": "4438821",
"judges": "Duncan, J., and Grimes, J., did not sit.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "407",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Carroll L. Shannon v. Roy W. Foster & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Shannon v. Foster",
"parties": "Carroll L. Shannon v. Roy W. Foster & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "757"
} |
4441062 | page content | {
"char_count": "3763",
"citations": "115 N.H. 722",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-12-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7252",
"first_page": 722,
"head_matter": "Laconia District Court\nNo. 7252\nState of New Hampshire v. John L. Kupetz\nDecember 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, Gregory H. Smith and Thomas D. Rath, assistant attorneys general (Mr. Rath orally), for the State.\nWescott, Millham & Dyer (Mr. Rodney N. Dyer orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4441062",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "723",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. John L. Kupetz",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Kupetz",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. John L. Kupetz",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "614"
} |
4440574 | page content | {
"char_count": "6710",
"citations": "115 N.H. 186",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-04-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6773",
"first_page": 186,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 6773\nBarbara C. Watts v. Milton W. Watts\nApril 30, 1975\nJames A. Connor, for the plaintiff, filed no brief.\nWilliam D. Tribble and Aaron A. Lipsky and Richard G. Smith (Mr. Smith orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440574",
"judges": "Duncan, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "189",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Barbara C. Watts v. Milton W. Watts",
"name_abbreviation": "Watts v. Watts",
"parties": "Barbara C. Watts v. Milton W. Watts",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1112"
} |
4440399 | page content | {
"char_count": "3521",
"citations": "115 N.H. 35",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-01-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6983",
"first_page": 35,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 6983\nState of New Hampshire v. Julia Anne Horan\nJanuary 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Edward N. Damon, attorney (Mr. Damon orally), for the State.\nNew Hampshire Civil Liberties Union, Inc. (Mr. Richard S. Kohn), by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4440399",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "36",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Julia Anne Horan",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Horan",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Julia Anne Horan",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "604"
} |
4438795 | page content | {
"char_count": "6301",
"citations": "115 N.H. 37",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-01-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6997",
"first_page": 37,
"head_matter": "New London District Court\nNo. 6997\nState of New Hampshire v. Robert Hill\nJanuary 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Edward N. Damon, attorney (Mr. Damon orally), for the State.\nMcSwiney & Jones (Mr. F. Graham McSwiney orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4438795",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "40",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Robert Hill",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Hill",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Robert Hill",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1070"
} |
4439677 | page content | {
"char_count": "6498",
"citations": "115 N.H. 513",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-09-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7075",
"first_page": 513,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 7075\nElise Patrick v. Maurice A. Morin, M.D.\nSeptember 30, 1975\nHamblett, Kerrigan, LaTourette & Lopez and Linda Stewart Dalianis (Ms. Dalianis orally) for the plaintiff.\nSulloway, Hollis, Godfrey & Soden and Kenneth L. Robinson, Jr. (Mr. Robinson orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439677",
"judges": "Duncan and Griffith, JJ., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "516",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Elise Patrick v. Maurice A. Morin, M.D.",
"name_abbreviation": "Patrick v. Morin",
"parties": "Elise Patrick v. Maurice A. Morin, M.D.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1082"
} |
4438962 | page content | {
"char_count": "6463",
"citations": "115 N.H. 428",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7048",
"first_page": 428,
"head_matter": "Board of Taxation\nNo. 7048\nJohns-Manville Products Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue Administration\nJuly 31, 1975\nOrr & Reno and Mary Susan Galway and Gary A. Collver of Colorado (Ms. Galway orally) for the plaintiff.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Charles G. Cleaveland, assistant attorney general (Mr. Cleaveland orally), for the defendant.",
"id": "4438962",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "431",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Johns-Manville Products Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue Administration",
"name_abbreviation": "Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Administration",
"parties": "Johns-Manville Products Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue Administration",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1073"
} |
4439082 | page content | {
"char_count": "6504",
"citations": "115 N.H. 4",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-01-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6230",
"first_page": 4,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 6230\nSolmica of New England, Inc. v. Marcel Verreault, d.b.a. New England Engineering Co., & a.\nJanuary 31, 1975\nSanders, McDermott & Kearns (Mr. Peter F. Kearns orally) for the plaintiff.\nCalderwood & Ouellette and Stephen J. Dibble (Mr. Dibble orally) for defendant Nicholas Karabelas.",
"id": "4439082",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "7",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Solmica of New England, Inc. v. Marcel Verreault, d.b.a. New England Engineering Co., & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Solmica of New England, Inc. v. Verreault",
"parties": "Solmica of New England, Inc. v. Marcel Verreault, d.b.a. New England Engineering Co., & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1088"
} |
1307220 | page content | {
"char_count": "7851",
"citations": "64 N.H. 500",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1888-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 500,
"head_matter": "DeRochemont & a. v. B. & M. Railroad.\nA land-owner cannot Lave a right of way over his land independent of his title to the land, and an existing way is a part of the realty and passes by a conveyance of the land.\nA grantor with covenants of warranty against incumbrances without reservation is estopped to maintain an action against his grantee for obstructing a way across the premises conveyed which he has covenanted does not exist.\nCase (1), for obstructing a navigable creek to the special damage of the plaintiffs; (2) for obstructing the plaintiffs’ private way; (3) for not maintaining farm-crossings in suitable repair. The plaintiffs own a farm in Newington, bounded easterly by the Piscataqua river, a navigable stream, in which there is a daily ebb and flow of the ocean tide, and there is a creek extending westerly from the river into the farm, in which there was a like ebb and flow of the tide, till obstructed by the defendants, to and from a wharf thereon, making it navigable for gondolas and other small craft, and in which the plaintiffs had an unobstructed passage from their farm to and from the river, and used the same in shipping farm products and in obtaining farm and family supplies. Prior to 1877 the Dover & Portsmouth Railroad was chartered, located, and built across said farm and creek, bridging the creek so as to leave it navigable, though obstructed to some extent, and was leased soon after its construction to the Eastern Railroad; and in 1888, under a lease of the Eastern Railroad and its leased lines to the defendants, the Portsmouth & Dover passed into the possession and management of the defendants, and has since remained so; and the defendants, in the summer and fall of 1885, removed the bridge over the creek, and made a fill or road-bed of gravel and rock across the creek, obstructing all navigation from the river to the farm wharf or farm through the creek, making a culvert in the fill sufficient only to allow water to pass. For fifty years or more before the fill the owners of the farm had a drive- or cart-way from the house to the bank of the river, through the brick-yard, on either side of the creek, at high water mark, to gather the rock-weed that grew on the place and the sea-weed that lodged there, and haul it to the house to be used as a fertilizer on the farm. The banks of the river aside from down the creek are abrupt, and so are the banks of the creek on the river side of the railroad, so that there was and is no other way to the shore, or so feasible a place to construct one. The creek is about one hundred feet wide, and extends into the plaintiffs’ land some four or five hundred feet, about two or three hundred feet of which are on the river side of the railroad. The plaintiffs conveyed to the railroad by deed of warranty, dated March 15, 1873, acknowledged and recorded, the land on which the railroad is constructed across their farm, a plan of which is on the deed, and the deed contains the following agreement, and no other reservation : “And it is hereby agreed that the grantee shall build and maintain two grade farm-crossings across the land hereby conveyed and no more.” Evidence was given that two farm-crossings were constructed, and that they have been insufficient and out of repair since the defendants came in possession of the railroad, and now are.\nJ. W. Emery, for the plaintiffs.\nFrink & Batchelder, for the defendants.",
"id": "1307220",
"judges": "Bingham, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "503",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "DeRochemont & a. v. B. & M. Railroad",
"name_abbreviation": "DeRochemont v. B. & M. Railroad",
"parties": "DeRochemont & a. v. B. & M. Railroad.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1398"
} |
1307311 | page content | {
"char_count": "8719",
"citations": "64 N.H. 402",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1887-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 402,
"head_matter": "State v. Campbell.\nIt is within the constitutional power of the legislature to prohibit the sale of milk which contains more than a specified per cent, of watery fluid, or less than a specified per cent, of milk solids.\nEvidence that pure milk frequently does not come up to the standard fixed by the' legislature is not admissible for the defendant, on the trial of an indictment under the statute for selling adulterated milk.",
"id": "1307311",
"judges": "Blodgett, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "405",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "State v. Campbell",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Campbell",
"parties": "State v. Campbell.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1495"
} |
1307156 | page content | {
"char_count": "7097",
"citations": "64 N.H. 146",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 146,
"head_matter": "Marston, Adm'r, Ap't, v. Marston & a.\nThe gift of a promissory note by the payee to the maker, perfected by delivery, is not rendered invalid by a subsequent arrangement whereby the note is restored to the custody of the donor with a right to collect thereon such amount as the donor may need for her support in case she should become poor.\nAppeal, from a proforma decree of the judge of probate, charging the appellant with the amount of two notes signed by Orissa J. Pillsbury, two notes signed by L. D. Kelly, and one note signed by Anson R. Marston, all payable to his intestate, Mercy Marston. Facts found by a referee.\nIn November, 1878, Mrs. Mercy Marston, with her son Anson, and her daughter Mrs. Pillsbury, called upon Samuel Herbert, Esq., attorney-at-law, and Mrs. Marston asked Mr. Herbert if she could give her property to a part of her children, and not to all. Upon being informed that she could, she said she wanted to give her son Anson, and her daughters Mrs. Pillsbury and Mrs. Kelly, notes that she held against them. She then took the notes here in question out of her satchel, and gave them to Mr. Herbert to ' give to the children. Mr. Herbert, by her request, handed Anson his note and Mrs. Pillsbury her notes. They took the notes and put them in their satchels or wallets. Mrs. Marston at the same time delivered to Mr. Herbert two notes signed by L. D. Kelly, the husband of her daughter Melissa, saying that she regarded them just the same as if signed by Mrs. Kelly, and that Mr. Herbert might keep those notes to Mrs. Kelly’s order, delivering them to Mrs. Kelly when she called for them.\nThe foregoing transaction was intended by the donor, and understood by the donees, to be a complete delivery of the notes, operating as an absolute extinguishment of all claim against the signers. There was no reservation or condition annexed to the delivery.\nFurther'talk occurred, and it was finally arranged that the notes should all be handed back to Mrs. Marston to be retained by her, and she signed and left in the hands of Mr. Herbert a writing, not under seal, in substance as follows:\n“For a valid consideration, 1 hereby give to my son, A. R. Mars-ton, a note I hold against him [describing it]. I also give to Mrs. Orissa Pillsbury two notes I hold against her [describing them]. I also give to Mrs. Melissa Kelly two notes signed by her husband, L. D. Kelly [describing them]. These notes are all given up into their hands and possession as their own property, I having no right whatever to them, to collect them, or to assign them, or give them away to anybody.\n“Excepting hereby after the notes are given up to each of them, by consent of said children I take the notes back as their property, to hold upon the condition that if I shall spend all the rest of my property and become poor and in want 1 shall have the right to draw upon each of my said children pro raía for such amount as I shall actually need for my support.”\nMrs. Marston died in July, 1881, at the house of Mrs. Kelly. Shortly after, Mrs. Kelly, Mrs. Pillsbury, and Anson came together to Mr. Herbert’s. Mrs. Kelly said that she had those notes that were given to the parties, and brought them down to be distributed. Mrs. Kelly then gave the notes to Mr. Herbert, and he gave them to the respective parties, Mrs. Kelly making no objection.\nMrs. Kelly, who is one of the appellees, has never returned to the administrator the two notes signed by L. D. Kelly. She alleges that she was divorced from L. 1). Kelly four or five years ago, that the notes are worthless, and that she cannot find them.\nSo far as it is a question of fact, the referee finds that the redelivery of the notes to Mrs. Marston was not intended or understood by the parties as revesting in Mrs. Marston the title to the notes, or the right to enforce the notes, except in the contingency of her needing support and the children refusing to furnish it. Upon the happening of such a state of tilings, Mrs. Marston was to be at liberty to treat the notes as hers, and to enforce them so far as necessary for her support. She had a right to retain the notes in her possession during life, but with the understanding that she should use them only in the contingency above specified. She never lacked for support, and never attempted to collect anything on the notes.\nAldrich & Remich, for the appellant.\nDrew & Jordan and R. Farnham, for the appellees.",
"id": "1307156",
"judges": "Allen and Bingham, JJ., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "148",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Marston, Adm'r, Ap't, v. Marston & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Marston v. Marston",
"parties": "Marston, Adm'r, Ap't, v. Marston & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1273"
} |
1307296 | page content | {
"char_count": "17782",
"citations": "64 N.H. 265",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 265,
"head_matter": "Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State.\nA telegraph company is liable for interest at ten per cent, on the amount of the tax finally levied upon them, from December 1 of the year in which it is assessed, although the amount of the original assessment has been reduced on appeal.\nAppeal from assessment of the plaintiffs’ tax for 1884, made by the board of equalization. At the June term, 1885, the amount of the original valuation, upon a further report of the board of equalization, was reduced from $250,000 to $150,000. The attorney-general moved that interest at the rate of ten per cent, from December 1, 1884, be added to the amount of the plaintiffs’ tax as finally fixed.\nThe Attorney-General, for the state.\nChase & Streeter, for the plaintiffs.\nI. The following facts are involved: 1. The valuation of the plaintiffs’ property, made by the boai-d of equalization from 1879 to 1883 inclusive, was from $51,442 to $61,579. The tax assessed during the same years was from $514.42 to $761.53. In September, 1884, the board fixed the valuation at $250,000, and assessed a tax of $3,090.75. This was done without notice to the company (except the general annual notice), and without suspicion by the company that such an act was contemplated. The plaintiffs immediately appealed to the court under the statute, and diligently prosecuted their appeal. The appeal was referred to the board of equalization. Long hearings were had, and the board once reported the valuation at $175,000. This was manifestly wrong, and at our suggestion the report was sent back for the correction of errors. In the meantime we had appealed from the board’s assessment for the year 1885, which appeal was also sent back to the board. In June, 1886, the board made a report fixing the valuation for each of the two years at $150,000, and assessed a tax for the year 1884 at $1,855.05, and for the year 1885 at $1,743.\n2. The plaintiffs were ready to pay their just tax for each year before November 1, as directed by statute, and held themselves in readiness to pay the same as soon thereafter as the amount should be determined by the state. They asked for and desired no delay in making such payment.\n3. The delay was not occasioned by the neglect or fault of the plaintiffs, but solely by the fact that the state, upon its own motion, hastily, and without giving the plaintiffs notice of a hearing (except the general notice), appraised the plaintiffs’ property $100,000 in excess of its actual value, thereby necessitating a hearing for the correction of errors.\n4. The practice of the state has been uniform in neither demanding nor receiving interest on overdue state taxes, except in cases where the statute demands interest as a penalty, and this, notwithstanding the default, may have arisen from the wilful neglect of the tax-payer. When extents have been issued for overdue state taxes, the amount called for by the extent has uniformly been the original assessment without interest. Since December 1, 1884 (when it is claimed that interest on the plaintiffs’ tax of 1884 began to run), delinquent taxes in considerable sums have been paid into the treasury, but no interest has been demanded or paid.\n5. No interest on taxes has ever been demanded by or paid to the state when the delay was occasioned by a pending appeal for the ascertainment of the true amount of the tax. This practice is ratified and confirmed by statute.\nThe form of the attorney-general’s motion gave us no opportunity of bringing the above facts regularly before the court. We are prepared to make proof thereof in such manner as the court may suggest.\nII. The statute (G. L., o. 62, s. 9) authorizes the court, in this case, “ to make such orders as justice may require.” Taking into account the letter and the sjsirit of the statute, we affirm that justice does not require, but forbids, the granting of the motion. Our reasons are,—\n1. To make such an order would be, in effect, the enactment of a penal statute by the court in relation to the collection of taxes.\n2. It would impose on the plaintiffs a penalty for not doing an act which by law and universal practice in this state they were not bound to do, and which it was impossible for them to do.\n3. It would impose on the plaintiffs, as tax-payers, more than their fair proportion of the public burden.\nUpon the first proposition, we suggest,—\nIII. Taxes do not bear interest except when expressly so provided by statute. 1 Desty Tax. 9. A tax is not a debt or contract, and does not bear interest. Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 318-350 ; Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281; Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 80. The state cannot recover interest on taxes, payment of which has been deferred, unless the statute authorizes interest on such taxes. W. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Texas 314. Where an action is given for taxes, interest is not recoverable unless the statute gives it. Danforth v. Williams, 9 Mass 324 “A tax never carries interest. No instance, it is believed, can be found, since the formation of the government, where a claim for interest on taxes has been made or enforced.” Green, C. J., in Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. 398; — see Shaw v. Peekett, 26 Vt. 485. Taxes are not debts so as to bear interest as liquidated demands. State v. R. B. Go.¿ 70 Ga. 11.\nIn an action against a corporation for a failure (to pay taxes), no interest should be allowed as damages : the statute prescribes the penalty for default in payment, and no other may be required. People v. Gold and Stock Tel. Co., 98 N. Y. 67. In the last case the court say,' — “ The state at pleasure created the charge or tax, and prescribed the penalty for default in payment. No other can be collected. . . . Interest is not given either by this act or by any general law of the state. The payment of it cannot be imposed by implication. What the state omitted to demand, the court cannot require.” To the sainé effect, see Hill. Law of Tax. 444, and cases cited. In Counties v. Railroad Co., 65 Ala. 391, the court say, — “ Without entering at this time into a discussion of the question, we decline to award interest on these back taxes. The uniform custom in this state, so far as our information extends, has been not to demand interest as interest on taxes in default, and we will not disturb that custom.” A judgment for taxes cannot include interest in the absence of statute or ordinance. Bdmonson v. City of Galveston, 53 Texas 157 ; People v. Thatcher, 95 111. 109.\nStatutes imposing interest on delinquent tax-payers (as our s. 9, c. 57, s. 6, c. 62, s. 8, c. 56, Gen. Laws, which impose a 10 per cent, penalty) are sustained on the ground that the interest imposed is in the nature of a penalty for non-payment of the tax within the time directed by statute. 2 Desty Tax. 764, and cases cited. And all the foregoing cases are authority to the effect that the imposition of such a penalty is exclusively within the province of the legislature, and not within the lawful power and authority of the court. The penalty of interest cannot be considered a part, of the tax (2 Desty Tax. 764), and an act which provides that a penalty (of 10 per cent, interest) shall attach to and become a part of a delinquent tax is void. Ryan v. State, 5 Neb. 276. In the last case the court say, — “ Now it is said that ‘ penalties may be prescribed [meaning by the legislature] for future delinquencies in the payment of taxes, as part of the machinery by which government is able to collect them; ’ but such penalty is not taxa tion, and cannot be sustained as a tax or any part of the revenues raised by taxation.”\nWhence does the court derive power to prescribe penalties and to punish the plaintiffs in this case ? Is it implied in the phrase “ to make such orders as justice may require ” ? We do not think the legislature intended such a construction. We do not believe the legislature intended to delegate their constitutional power of imposing “ fines, mulcts, imprisonments, and other punishments; ” or their other constitutional power of establishing “all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, ordinances, directions, and instructions, either with penalties or without,” to the judiciary, — nor that such a delegation of power, if intended, can be sustained. Delegatus non potest delegare is an apt maxim. But, if the court hold that under the statute they have power to impose the penalty called for by the motion, for what act of the plaintiffs, done or omitted, are they to be punished? What statute have the plaintiffs violated ? What ought the plaintiffs to have done (under the circumstances of this case) which they have not done ? We submit that these inquiries cannot be so answered as to lead to the conclusion that justice requires these plaintiffs to be set apart from other state tax-payers for judicial punishment. Justice does not require that the court, in disposing of this motion, should make an order which practically puts a new law upon the statute book, and which will overturn the uniform practice of the state since its organization.\nIV. Such an order would impose on the plaintiffs a penalty for not doing an act which by law and universal practice in this state they were not bound to do, and which it was impossible for them to do. The plaintiffs were not bound to pay their state taxes until the amount had been lawfully ascertained. A tax is a charge made by the .state upon persons resident and owning property therein. All the machinery for determining the amount of the tax properly chargeable to the plaintiffs was in the control of the state. The error in the original assessment was occasioned by the negligence of the state’s taxing agents. Acting hastily, without proper investigation and without notice (except as above stated), they more than quadrupled the appraisal of the plaintiffs’ property, and the tax as assessed the year before. The appraisal thus made was very greatly in excess of the “ actual value ” of the property, and the tax assessed was illegal because entirely disproportional. This ■error of the state cannot be charged to the fault of the plaintiffs, .and the plaintiffs ought not to be punished therefor. The statute upon which these assessments were based does not call for or contemplate payment until the tax is properly assessed.\nUnder the cirumstances, what was the plaintiffs’ duty in October, 1884? Was it to pay into the state treasury $8,090.75, a sum $1,200 more than their proportion of the public burden, upon the assumption that they might draw back$1,200 with interest after the state had corrected its manifest errors, and made a legal assessment on “actual values,” as by law it was bound to do in the first instance ? This, in effect, would compel the plaintiffs to loan the state $1,200 for nearly two years.\nThe board, without notice, multiplied the tax of 1883 by four. Suppose they had multiplied it by one hundred: it would have been more unreasonable than what they did do only in degree. The result then would have been an appraisal of about $6,100,000,. and an assessed tax of about $76,100; while the actual value would be 8150,000, and the assessment about $1,800. Is there any principle of justice that would require the plaintiffs to pay into the treasury the $76,100, thereby loaning a large sum to the state, pending the correction of its own errors by the state itself?\nWas it the plaintiffs’ duty to guess at the amount which the state, after two years, might fix as the “ actual value ” of the property, and pay the amount so guessed into the state treasury ?’ Obviously not, for the reason that it is exclusively the duty of the state to determine and fix said “ actual value; ” and no tax assessed upon other than the “actual value” is a legal charge upon any tax-payer. Taxes legally assessed are a proper charge against the tax-payer: taxes illegally assessed impose no obligation upon him. The tax assessed in September, 1884, was just as illegal, invalid, and unconstitutional as would have been a tax of two per cent, on the gross receipts of the plaintiffs, assessed arbitrarily at the pleasure of the board of equalization. The tax was unauthorized, and therefore not due or payable. Tax-payers ought not to be punished or mulcted in damages for declining to pay taxes of that character. “Justice” does not demand such a conclusion.\nY. The granting of the motion would impose upon the plaintiffs, as tax-payers, more than their fair share of the public burden. The facts stated at the beginning of this brief are conclusive upon this proposition.",
"id": "1307296",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "271",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State",
"name_abbreviation": "Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State",
"parties": "Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "3121"
} |
1307128 | page content | {
"char_count": "3634",
"citations": "64 N.H. 98",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 98,
"head_matter": "Evans v. Mason.\nTo constitute a conversion of chattels, there must he some exercise of dominion over the property in repudiation of, or inconsistent with, the owner’s rights.\nMere delay, by the bailee of a horse hired to drive to and from a place named without stopping, is not sufficient evidence of a conversion.\nTrover, for a horse and harness. The plaintiff’s evidence tended to prove that the defendant, a minor, hired the plaintiff’s horse, wagon, and harness to carry a woman from Swanzey to a certain house in Keene, and then to return directly back to Swanzey without stopping; that he carried tbe woman to the place named, drove thence on the direct route towards Swanzey to a stable, where he waited half an hour for a friend, upon whose arrival he ordered the horse to be fed, and went with his friend to the depot; that in a few minutes the stable took fire, and the horse and harness were burned. The defendant objected that there was no evidence of a conversion.\nD. H. Woodward, for the plaintiff.\nBatchelder & Faulkner, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307128",
"judges": "Bingham, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "99",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Evans v. Mason",
"name_abbreviation": "Evans v. Mason",
"parties": "Evans v. Mason.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "638"
} |
1307319 | page content | {
"char_count": "17810",
"citations": "64 N.H. 235",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 235,
"head_matter": "School-District No. 16 v. Concord.\nAbalance of a fund of an abolished school-district, remaining after the assessment and remission of the equalizing tax authorized by Laws of 1885, c. 43, s. 2, is applied by law, as nearly as may be, to the use of those who would have been entitled to the benefit of it if the district had not been abolished; and the school board of the town-district may be appointed trustees for the disposition of the money.\nBiel in Equity, by a district abolished by c. 43, Laws of 1885, for the disposition of $1,652.79 held by the defendants, belonging to the plaintiffs, and not included by the tax assessors in the equalization of the property of abolished districts. Facts agreed.”\nD. Cross, for the plaintiffs.\nThis proceeding is practically in the nature of a bill of interpleader to determine the title to the money in question, and the right to its possession and use. The city of Concord, as such, make no claim to this fund, and substantially admit their liability as a trustee or agent, but are uncertain as to the present purpose of the trust, or, if the trust has terminated or expired, as to the parties entitled to the money. It was originally collected and held by the city or their officers in trust to be applied for the benefit of the inhabitants of the plaintiff district in educating their children under the common-school system as then existing. School-District v. Sanborn, 25 N. H. 38; Fuller v. Heath, 89 111. 296 ; G. L., c. 85; Gen. Sts., c. 77. On demand it was paya ble to the prudential committee of the district, wbo would then hold it as a trustee or agent for the same purpose, and would be authorized to expend it for certain educational purposes in the district. Its use for any other object or in any other locality was unauthorized, and would have been illegal. It would have been a diversion and misappropriation of taxes, furnishing the tax-payers a ground for just complaint. If the money, though not wanted or needed by the district, had been applied to schooling purposes in other districts having a scanty appropriation, it could not be seriously denied that the diversion would be a gross breach of trust, and that the district or their tax-payers (and perhaps both) would be entitled to some remedy. School-District v. Morrill, 59 N. H. 867, 369; School-District v. Sherburne, 48 N. H. 52. If the money held by the city treasurer for the benefit of the district had been paid over to the prudential committee before c. 43, Laws of 1885, took effect, it could not be said that it would have become the “ property” of the district, which the district might “ lawfully sell and ■convey.” When delivered to the district’s authorized agent, it would not have become their money or property, nor his, but Would still be a trust fund for the benefit of the inhabitants of the district, created by their tax-payers in accordance with well understood provisions of law. The district could not use it to pay the expense ■of building a school-house or for liquidating their debts. It would belong to them in a qualified sense only, and for special purposes. Barrett v. School-District, 37 N. H. 445, 448. It is plain, therefore, that the money did not pass to the new town district, which succeeded, under Laws of 1885, c. 43, s. 2, to such property only ■of the old districts as they “might lawfully sell and convey.” Nor would it have been competent, on constitutional grounds, for the legislature to authorize, in express words even, such a diversion of money raised by taxation. To allow money paid and apportioned for the exclusive benefit of one district to be applied for the benefit of another, would be as unjust, inequitable, and unconstitutional as to authorize taxes raised in one town to be appropriated in another, or to make A liable for B’s debts. Hitchcock v. St. Louis, 49 Mo. 484, 488; Hdes v. Boardman, 58 N. H. 580, 589; Dillon Mun. Corp., s. 650.\nAs a coi’poration may exist for some purposes after their dissolution (G. L., c. 147, s 17, c. 86, s. 28), the plaintiff district, being technically entitled to the money by their prudential committee, may be held to exist, and may receive the money, if it is reasonably necessary and convenient for the final disposition of the fund; but if the fund can be legally, equitably, and conveniently disposed of without extending or continuing the powers of the defunct corporation, such a method should be adopted. School-District v. Greenfield, 64 N. H. 84. As the district have ceased “ to exist for general purposes” QSargent v. School-District, 63 N. H. 528), they could legally do nothing with the money except to hold it as trustee on a trust that has terminated. They own no school property, and have no care or supervision over the public schools. They can neither establish nor provide for the support of a public school. They are deprived of the powers they formerly had for maintaining a public common school, and are as incapable of exercising that privilege or franchise as though they had never had a corporate existence. If their inhabitants should form themselves into a private-school corporation to afford greater facilities for the education of their children, the body corporate thus brought into existence would not be entitled to use this money in paying for teachers, fuel, and incidental expenses (G. L., c. 85, s. 8) as the original district might have used it; for the appropriation was made, and the taxes were paid, not for a private but for a public school; and the diversion of the money in such a way would be as illegal as its use by the town district. Taxes cannot be raised or appropriated for merely private objects. Cooley Tax. 105; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94, 101; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, 353; Dillon Mun. Corp., s. 73(5.\nIf, then, the officers of the city and of the district, having money in their hands raised by taxation for school purposes, as this fund was raised, hold it as trustees, and if the object of the trust cannot legally be accomplished because the cestui que trust no longer exists or is no longer capable of receiving the benefit in any legal and practicable way, the fund must revert, by way of a resulting trust, to the tax-payers of the district by whose money it was established. 2 Story Eq. Jur., ss. 1156,1196 ; Perry Trusts, s. 160 ; JSasterbroolcs v. Tillinghast, 5 Gray 17. The money still subsists for legitimate uses ; it was not destroyed or rendered unavailable by the legislative act which annihilated the district’s corporate existence. And as the taxing power has voluntarily incapacitated itself from using it in the way and for the purpose it substantially promised the tax-payers it would use it, it has failed to perform its. duty or contract, and holds the money as the tax-payers’ bailee, discharged of any other trust in regard to it. The consideration for the payment of the money has wholly failed, and the payers, are now entitled to it. Perhaps the tax-payers of the district should be made parties to the bill, or be substituted in place of the plaintiffs; for no useful purpose would seem to be subserved by the payment of the money to the district or its agent. No reason exists why it may not conveniently be paid to the tax-payers at once. As a matter of fact, they are few in number. But as a matter of law, their number would not probably affect their legal rights. The Amoskeag Mfg. Co. of Manchester own the greater part of the taxable property in the district, and have paid more than nine tenths of the taxes in question. Their interest in the fund, therefore, is large, and they should receive their proportional share of the rebate, as well as the other tax-payers whose interests can be easily determined. As it will practically make little, if any, dif ference, so far as we are informed, whether the tax assessed against the persons and property of the district for 1886 is deducted from the unexpended taxes in question and the balance paid to the taxpayers of the district, or whether the set-off is made against each individual tax-payer’s part of the fund, we do not deem it necessary at this time to discuss that question.\nLeach & Stevens and H. G. Sargent, for the defendants.\nD. Cross, for the plaintiffs.\nIf the fund in question passed to the town district under s. 2, c. 43, Laws of 1885, notwithstanding the apparent exclusion of such property from the operation of that section, we insist that it could only pass as other school property passed, subject to the principle of compensation to the tax-payers. The legislature have undoubted authority to dispose of the general school property of the state in whatever way they may deem best in aid of the educational policy of the state. The entire school property, derived from taxátion, is in the nature of a public trust fund, as well as money raised for general school purposes. Towns and school-districts legally authorized to hold such jjroperty or money, and to dispose of it according to certain statutory provisions, require no title to it other than that of trustees or agents for the public. They are merely parts of the machinery established by the legislature for the convenient accomplishment of a public purpose; and they may be deemed no longer needful, and be dispensed with or abolished, at the will of the legislature, so far at least, as the use and enjoyment of the public fund is concerned. Child v. Colburn, 54 N. H. 71; Farnum’s Petition, 51 N. H. 376; Chicago v. People, 80 111. 384; Cooley Const. Lim. 240. A school-district, as such, have no vested rights of property in their schoolhouse ; and, when abolished, their corporate powers are at an end, unless their continued existence is necessary for some purpose of the trust. School-District v. Greenfield, 64 N. H. 84.\nThough the title to the property might pass to the town or to the town district without an express statutory provision to that effect (School-District v. Richardson, 23 Pick. 62, School-District v. Tapley, 1 Allen 49), it would pass charged with the trust for educational purposes imposed upon it by the legislature, and guaranteed to the tax-payers whose money created it. “ The money was raised by an assessment on all the polls and taxable estate of the town, and the statute contemplates that each district may receive back, as nearly as practicable, the amount they have contributed to the school fund.” School-District v. Morrill, 59 N. H. 367, 369. But if the district cannot receive it back, or, if they can, cannot use it, the tax-payers’ interest in the school property is not thereby abolished, because that interest was a vested interest. If, therefore, the money in question passed to the city the same as the district school-house, the same principle of equalization must apply to it. If the sum of money is $1,000, that sum, like the appraised value of the school-house, must be remitted to the taxpayers of the district in some convenient way. But an assessment •and collection of $1,000 to pay for the $1,000 received by the city would be a technical, unnecessary, and absurd proceeding, evidently not contemplated by the legislature. It would be like a trade by which two men agree to swap equal sums of money, and would present the absurdity of a law authorizing A to take $100 •of B’s money on condition that he at once return an equivalent in money. Nothing vrould be accomplished by the operation, and the formal change of title would be useless. A convenient and reasonable repayment or equalization can be effected by a return directly to the tax-payers of the money, which would be within the spirit and purpose of the law abolishing the old school-districts.\n“The general rule of equalization applied to abolished school-districts by s. 2, o. 43, Laws of 1885, is an affirmance of the rights of all parties concerned.” School-District v. Greenfield, 84 N. H. •84, 85. That statute did not create the tax-payers’ rights in the taxes paid years before, but it recognized them, and provided for their vindication. If no provision for an equalizing tax had been inserted in the act, their rights in school property would have been no less, nor would they have been less entitled to some method or remedy for an equitable adjustment of their various interests. The tax was raised, not for general municipal purposes, nor for general school purposes, but for the support of schools. G. L., c. 85, s. 3. It could not be used in the purchase of real estate for the district, or for the purpose of building school-houses. Lee v. School Trustees, 36 N. J. Eq. 581. Its object was special, and limited by statute. While it was legally raised, and might have been legally used under the old school system, it does not follow that its use under a new and different school system, without the consent of the tax-payers, is legally authorized; and we contend that it is not authorized. When taxes are legally assessed and paid for a special purpose which is afterwards abandoned or judicially declared to be illegal, the tax-payers are entitled to a remission or refunding of the taxes they were obliged to pay, although they paid them voluntarily. The municipality cannot retain the money, and omit to apply it to the purpose for which it was raised. Such a holding would legalize extortion and robbery. Dillon Mun. Corp., s. 945, n.; Bradford v. Chicago, 25 111. 411, 415 ; Greedup v. County, 30 Ark. 10Í; Worthen v. Badgett, 32 Ark. 496, 523; Jersey City v. O’ Callaghan, 41 N. J. Law 349; Peyser v. Mayor, 70 N. Y. 497.\nAssume that the legislature, if they had authority, should abolish the present school system, and declare that the public should no longer be taxed for educational purposes: what would become of the public school property, or the unexpended school money ? Evidently the tax-payers’ rights could not thus be divested, and a denial of their right to their just and equitable shares in the property would be an unauthorized exercise of judicial power. Q-rim v. School-District, 57 Pa. St. 433, 437. Having the right, they must in some convenient way have a corresponding remedy; and when the only convenient way is the refunding of the money, they are entitled to some remedy that will produce that result. But in this case it would be a diversion of the fund from its original purpose, whether it is used in the support of schools in other districts against the express purpose of its levy and collection, or whether it is applied in payment of the city debt, or for some other general municipal purpose. If the city cannot have the benefit of the money for their general purposes, it is difficult to understand how other parts of the city could use it for schooling, or how it can be used at all by the officers in whose hands it now is. Having been raised by a special tax for the support of schools — not for some other object — and having been apportioned to the plaintiff district, the money, like taxes raised for other special objects which are abandoned, belongs to the tax-payers who paid it. It is not easy to perceive the distinction, if any, between the case where taxes are raised for purposes which are afterwards declared to be illegal, and this case. In both, the money is properly raised and voluntarily paid, but its application is found to be legally impossible. The remedy by mandamus to compel its application ceases to exist ex necessitate, and the trust, having failed and become legally impossible, must terminate; and the money must revert to the donors. “Numerous cases might be named where the return of taxes collected would be the only just proceeding to be taken. Money raised for a special emergency may not be required by the emergency ceasing.” Oom’rs v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108, 115; Virden v. Needles, 98 111. 366, 372; Bass v. Fontleroy, 11 Tex. 698.",
"id": "1307319",
"judges": "Carpenter and Bingham, JJ., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "241",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "School-District No. 16 v. Concord",
"name_abbreviation": "School-District No. 16 v. Concord",
"parties": "School-District No. 16 v. Concord.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "3101"
} |
1307115 | page content | {
"char_count": "7030",
"citations": "64 N.H. 473",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1887-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 473,
"head_matter": "STATE ex rel. Wood & a. v. HADLEY & a.\nSelectmen cannot lawfully appoint supervisors in case of a failure to elect by the town. 3STo vacancy thereupon occurs, because the old board continue in office until others are chosen and sworn in their stead.\nInformation, in the nature of a quo warranto, filed by the attorney-general at the relation of Alonzo Wood and two others.\nD. A. Taggart, Briggs & Huse, and Jeremiah Smith, for the relators.\nChase & Streeter, J. P. Bartlett, and O. E. Branch, for the defendants.",
"id": "1307115",
"judges": "Allen, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "475",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "State ex rel. Wood & a. v. Hadley & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Wood v. Hadley",
"parties": "STATE ex rel. Wood & a. v. HADLEY & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1297"
} |
1307161 | page content | {
"char_count": "2566",
"citations": "64 N.H. 26",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 26,
"head_matter": "GIGNOUX, Assignee, v. DOWNS & a.\nAn assignee in insolvency, who by accident and mistake omits' within the time limited by the statute to file objections to claims against the estate, should apply to the probate court for relief. His remedy is not by bill in equity..\nBill in Equity, by tbe assignee in insolvency of William Downs & Sons and W. W. Downs, setting forth that by accident and mistake he was prevented from filing objections within seven months to certain unfounded and fraudulent claims filed by the several defendants against the insolvents’ estates, and praying that those claims be disallowed and expunged from the list of claims, or that he be now permitted to file his objections thereto in the probate court, and have the same considered there.' The defendants answered severally, denying the allegations of the bill, and also alleged, by way of demurrer, that the reasons assigned as cause of the plaintiff’s neglect seasonably to file objections to the claims are not sufficient in law to entitle him to the relief prayed for.\nCalvin Page and Frink & Batchelder, for the plaintiff.\nJohn Hatch, for the defendants.",
"id": "1307161",
"judges": "Clark, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "26",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "GIGNOUX, Assignee, v. DOWNS & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Gignoux v. Downs",
"parties": "GIGNOUX, Assignee, v. DOWNS & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "432"
} |
1307168 | page content | {
"char_count": "1572",
"citations": "64 N.H. 606",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1888-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 606,
"head_matter": "Jeraulds v. Brown.\nA sale of a quantity of oats to be weighed out of a bin containing a larger quantity, accompanied by payment of the price, does not, before the quantity sold is separated from the bulk, give the vendee title upon which he can maintain trover against the vendor for a conversion of the quantity sold.\nTrover, for 100 bushels of oats. Facts found by a referee. Tbe defendant, having a bin of oats containing more than 200 bushels, sold 200 bushels of them to the plaintiff, to be weighed out at thirty-two pounds to the bushel. About 100 bushels were weighed out and delivered according to the contract; and it is for failure to deliver the remainder of the 200 bushels on demand that this suit is brought.\nThe court gave the plaintiff leave to amend by filing a count in assumpsit, and to take judgment thereon for the sum paid for the undelivered oats, with interest, and, in default of such amendment, ordered judgment for the defendant; to which the plaintiff excepted.\nW. N. Armington, for the plaintiff.\nDrew & Jordan, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307168",
"judges": "CARPENTER, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "607",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Jeraulds v. Brown",
"name_abbreviation": "Jeraulds v. Brown",
"parties": "Jeraulds v. Brown.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "274"
} |
1307187 | page content | {
"char_count": "3460",
"citations": "64 N.H. 71",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 71,
"head_matter": "Morrill v. Merrill.\nAil insolvency assignee of a partnership has no possessory lien on a physician’s' sleigh for repairs made upon it by the firm, and paid for, in the execution of an agreement between the firm and the physician that his services, to bo rendered for one of the partners, should be applied in payment of the repairs to be made by them.\nReplevin, for the plaintiff’s sleigh. Facts found by the court. The Concord Carriage Company was a partnership consisting of Worthington and two others. The partners had an understanding, frequently acted upon, that each might contract for work to be done by the firm in payment of his separate debts. There was an agreement between the plaintiff and Worthington, assented to b.y the other partners, that medical services, to be rendered by the plaintiff for Worthington, should be applied in payment for carriage-work to be done by the firm- for the plaintiff. Under this agreement the plaintiff performed services for Worthington, and the firm did the plaintiff’s carriage-work. Under the same agreement the plaintiff sent his sleigh to the company to be repaired and painted, and the order for the work was entered on the company’s book. When the sleigh had been repaired, but not painted, the company made an insolvency assignment to the defendant; and he, finding the order on their book, painted the sleigh without the plaintiff’s knowledge. Worthington was then indebted to the plaintiff, under the agreement, more than the amount of the repairs and painting. All parties acted in good faith. The plaintiff demanded the sleigh, and the defendant refused to give it up, claiming a lien for the repairs and painting.\nR. E. Walker, for the plaintiff.\nS. C. Eastman, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307187",
"judges": "Bingham, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "73",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Morrill v. Merrill",
"name_abbreviation": "Morrill v. Merrill",
"parties": "Morrill v. Merrill.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "600"
} |
1307096 | page content | {
"char_count": "5313",
"citations": "64 N.H. 232",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 232,
"head_matter": "Gage v. School-District No. 7 in Boscawen.\nA condition in a deed making a gift of land to an academy, that when said land shall for the space of two years together cease to he used as a location for a school-house, teachers’ house, and the necessary buildings and other purposes of an academy or public school, said land shall revert to the grantor and his heirs, is not broken so as to work a forfeiture of the grant by a conveyance of the land by the grantees to a school-district and the establishment by the district of a public school in the school-house erected thereon ; nor by the failure for two years together to keep any school in such school-house.\nWrit oe Entry, for one undivided half of two acres of land. Pacts found by the court.\nFebruary 14, 1866, William H. Gage convoyed the land in question to Penacook Academy, as a gift, upon conditions as follows:\n“ Provided said,corporation and its assigns shall erect and forever maintain a good and sufficient fence between said land and other land now owned by said grantor; and provided further, that said corporation shall within two years build a school-house on said land, and said land, nor any part of the same, shall ever be devoted to any other use than a location for a school-house, teachers’ house, and the necessary buildings and other purposes of an academy or public school; and when said land shall for the space of two years together cease to be used for such purposes, said land shall revert to said grantor and his heirs, but said corporation shall have the right to remove their buildings from said land.”\nWithin two years the corporation built thereon a brick schoolhouse, in which, from the time of its completion until April, 1883, an academic or high school was kept and maintained. Prom April, 1883, to September, 1885, no school was kept in the building, but neither it nor the land was devoted during that time to any other use or purpose.\nFebruary 26, 1867, the corporation mortgaged the land to H. H. Brown and seven others, to secure notes for S10,500, for money loaned. All but one of the mortgagees were then trustees of the corporation. This mortgage was never foreclosed. In 1883 Isaac < K. Gage, John S. Brown, and David A. Brown, three of the mortgagees, acting for the mortgagees, offered the entire property for sale; and August 19, 1885, sold and conveyed it, with full covenants of warranty, to the defendants, who opened a school therein early in September. March 18, 1886, the corporation quitclaimed to the defendant all its right, title, and interest in the premises.\nWm. II. Gage died in 1872, leaving a will, in which he devised his right and interest in one undivided half of the land to the plaintiff, who in June, 1885, entered and took possession for a breach of the condition in the deed.\nChase & Streeter, for the plaintiff.\nW. G. Buxton and Albin & Martin, for the defendants.",
"id": "1307096",
"judges": "Carpenter, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "234",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Gage v. School-District No. 7 in Boscawen",
"name_abbreviation": "Gage v. School-District No. 7",
"parties": "Gage v. School-District No. 7 in Boscawen.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "926"
} |
1307160 | page content | {
"char_count": "1619",
"citations": "64 N.H. 1",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1885-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 1,
"head_matter": "GRAFTON.\nDECEMBER, 1885.\nLowd v. Bowers.\nA caption of depositions may be adjourned by the magistrate to a place other than that named in the notice, when the sickness of the witness renders such a course necessary in order to obtain the deposition.\nA caption of depositions by the plaintiff was notified for April 2, 1885, at the office of Burleigh & Adams. On that day the witness, who was the plaintiff herself, was unable by reason of sickness to attend at the place named, and the magistrate adjourned the caption to her residence a short distance away, and her deposition was there taken. The defendant did not appear either at the office of Burleigh & Adams, or at the plaintiff’s house. The deposition was admitted at the trial, and the defendant excepted.\nBurleigh & Adams, for the plaintiff.\nPage & Story, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307160",
"judges": "Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "2",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Lowd v. Bowers",
"name_abbreviation": "Lowd v. Bowers",
"parties": "Lowd v. Bowers.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "278"
} |
1307240 | page content | {
"char_count": "1606",
"citations": "64 N.H. 152",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 152,
"head_matter": "Simonds v. Hayden and Lucas.\nA motion to dismiss on the ground that the writ commands the officer to arrest the hody of the defendant, and' also to attach his goods, is properly denied when it appears that a motion to quash the writ for the same cause was made at the return term, and no bill of exceptions to the denial of that motion was filed within the time limited therefor.\nTrover, for eighty-five cords of wood. Facts found by the court, which need not be stated.\nThe writ commanded the officer to arrest the bodies of the defendants, or to attach their goods or estate; also to attach the money, &c., of Lucas in the hands and possession of Cyrus Taylor. Hayden was arrested, and gave bail. The funds of Lucas in the hands of Taylor were attached. At the return term of the writ the defendants appeared specially, and moved to quash the writ. The motion was denied, and an order made that the defendants’ bill of exceptions be filed in ten days. It did not appear that they complied with the order. At this term, and before the trial, the defendants moved to dismiss because the writ was served by arrest and by attachment of property. The motion was denied, and the defendants excepted.\nFling & Chase, for the plaintiff.\nDaniel Barnard and K. E. Dearborn, for the defendants.",
"id": "1307240",
"judges": "Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "153",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Simonds v. Hayden and Lucas",
"name_abbreviation": "Simonds v. Hayden",
"parties": "Simonds v. Hayden and Lucas.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "293"
} |
1307322 | page content | {
"char_count": "1099",
"citations": "64 N.H. 96",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 96,
"head_matter": "Watts v. Lynch.\nMoney paid upon a wager on the result of an election may be recovered ■ back, under Gen. Laws, c. 272, ss. 12, 13.\nAssumpsit, to recover 150 deposited by the plaintiff with a stakeholder, about November 1, 1884, upon a wager with the defendant as to the result of the coming presidential election. The defendant won the bet, and the stakeholder thereupon paid over the money to him. Facts agreed.\nOsgood & Prescott, for the plaintiff.\nSulloway, Topliff & O'Conner, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307322",
"judges": "Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "96",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Watts v. Lynch",
"name_abbreviation": "Watts v. Lynch",
"parties": "Watts v. Lynch.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "189"
} |
1307274 | page content | {
"char_count": "29224",
"citations": "64 N.H. 27",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 27,
"head_matter": "Bullard v. Boston & Maine Railroad.\nA verdict will be set aside for unwarranted remarks of counsel to the jury in closing, unless the presiding justice finds, as matter of fact, that the jury were not influenced thereby, or that the effect upon their minds was wholly removed by a retraction of counsel, the charge of the court, or in some other W'ay.\nEvidence that the custom of a railroad corporation was not to allow passengers to go forward from one car to another in getting out at stations ; that the rear car of a train was frequently stopped at a certain point; and that several witnesses had been jarred and shaken up in getting out of the car at that place, — is admissible on the question of due care by the corporation in providing for the safety of passengers in alighting from the car at that place.\nCase, for injury to the plaintiff in alighting from the defendants’ passenger car at Newton Junction.\nIt appeared that for some three weeks prior to the injury the plaintiff had been travelling over tbe defendants’ road from Newton Junction to Haverhill, Mass., and back daily; that on tbe occasion of tbe injury she was returning home from Haverhill in the afternoon train; that she was in the rear car by the conduct- or’s direction; that when the train stopped at the Junction this car was not opposite the depot platform; that the distance from the lower step of the car to the ground was about tliree feet; that tbe ground was level and the soil sandy; that the usual stopping time of the train at this station was from thirty to forty-five seconds; and that the plaintiff was injured in stepping or jumping from the bottom step of tbe car to the ground. She testified that she knew the rear car of the train did not ordinarily reach the platform, and that the place where she got out was a bad one. She also testified that the conductor assisted her in alighting at the same place shortly before tbe time of injury, and that he said it was a bad place. The accident occurred in the day-time.\nThe defendants claimed that the plaintiff could not recover, because of her knowledge that the place was a bad one for alighting, and of the situation generally, and her own carelessness in attempting to jump from the car; and moved for a nonsuit, which was denied.\nOne Rowell testified, subject to the defendants’ exception, that he had got out of the car several times at the same place, and when the situation was the same as when the plaintiff was injured, and that it shook him up in getting off there. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants’ custom was, not to allow passengers to go forward from one car to another in getting out at stations; and, subject to exception, Mrs. Tucker, a witness for tbe plaintiff, so testi fied. Subject to exception, the same witness was allowed to testify that passengers taking the train at Haverhill for upper stations were usually directed by the conductor to take the rear car; also, that she had jumped off the train several times at the place where the plaintiff did, and had felt the effects for half an hour or so.\nThe defendants’ counsel, in his argument to the jury, commented on the fact that one of the physicians consulted by the plaintiff had not been put on by her as a witness. The plaintiff’s counsel in reply said that the physician had not been called because he found from conversation with him that he had not examined the plaintiff, and could give no testimony as to hey condition. To this the defendants excepted. The court sustained the exception, and told the jury to disregard the statement of the plaintiff’s counsel; and thereupon counsel said he would take it all back.\nVerdict for the plaintiff, which the defendants moved to set aside. The motion was denied, and the defendants excepted.\nCopeland & Edgerly, for the defendants.\nThe rules of decision recognized by courts in granting or refusing new trials in cases of error or mistake on the part of the court do not apply to cases of misconduct of a party, his attorney, or agent. Many of the cases cited by the plaintiff raise no question of misconduct, and therefore do not apply to this case. The case raises no question of fact. The court at the trial term found and reported the fact of misconduct ; and the court at the law term has always decided cases of this sort, and set aside verdicts where it appears that the prevailing party, his agent, or attorney has been guilty of misconduct.\nThe rule recognized in Perkins v. Knight, 2 N. H. 474, was, that the jury “ should be preserved not only from all improper bias-in causes, but even from the suspicion of improper bias.” In State v. Kaseall, 6 N. H. 352, all of the jurors made oath that they had not read or heard read any papers such as were described in the affidavits offered by prisoner’s counsel, and that they were induced to agree to the, verdict from a consideration of the law and evidence given in at the trial, and from that only. Notwithstanding this the court set the verdict aside, saying, among other Ijhings, “We are not disposed to give any countenance to such a -procedure in this or any other case. It is sufficient for this case that the exhibition of those papers was highly improper, and that there is á possibility that some of the jury may have heard something of the statements contained in them before the trial. We should not hesitate a moment to set aside a verdict obtained by a party in a civil case under such circumstances.” In Mcllvaine v. Wilkins, lz N. H. 476, the court say, — “The verdict of a jury ought to be not only a true verdict upon the evidence, but it should be above suspicion.” “The safest rule is, that the verdict should always be set aside if there appear the least attempt by a party to influence a juror.” Underscoring portions of papers to attract special attention without the knowledge of the opposing party is sufficient reason for setting aside a verdict. Watson v. Walker, 2-3 N. H. 421. The doctrine of the above cases is affirmed in State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 159; Hilliard v. Beattie, 59' N. H, 466; Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; Cross v. Grant, 62 N. II.--\nIn none of the cases where misconduct was shown did the court require the innocent party to show affirmatively that the jury were influenced by the misconduct. In most cases it is impossible to ascertain. No one but members of the jury can tell what influences their minds; and as the evidence of a juror is not receivable to impeach the verdict, there is no way to establish by proof the fact that misconduct of a party influenced the verdict. It is sufficient that it is such misconduct as was calculated to have that effect, and might possibly have done so; and that is a question for the court here. The plaintiff contends that the instruction of the court was such an antidote as removed all effect of the poison. It may be, in cases of error or mistake: the correction of the error or mistake before the case closes obviates the effect of the error, but no such rule prevails in cases of misconduct. If it did, then counsel of skill and adroitness can make improper closing statements with impunity; if no objection is made, tlie misconduct will be waived; if objection is made, the court will instruct the jury to disregard it. In neither case does he run the least risk of injuring his case or imperilling his verdict.\nMarston & Eastman, for the plaintiff.\nThe presumption is, that the jury were not influenced by the language excepted to Burn-ham v. Butler, 58 N. H. 568; Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 104 Mass. 545-547; Hilliard v. Beattie, 59 N. H. 466.\nThe question whether the jury were influenced and the defendants’ rights prejudiced by the remarks of the plaintiff’s counsel, involves matters of fact, and should be determined by the court at the trial term. Wentworth v. Jefferson, 60 N. H. 158; Burnham v. Butler, 58 N H. 568; Hamblett v. Hambletl, 6 N II. 333 ; Rogers v. Kenrick, 63 N. II. 335; Osgood v. Katon, 63 N. H. 355; Gerrish v. Gerrish, 63 N H. 128; Dearborn v, Newhall, 63 N. H. 801; Pagev. Campion, 63 N. H. 197; Lefavor v. Smith, 58 N. H. 125; Puller v. Bailey, 58 N. H. 71; Austin v. Ricker, 61 N. II. 97; Goodwin v. Scott, 61 N. H. 112; Hovey v. Brown, 59 N. H. 114; Brown v. Wiggin, 59 N. IT. 327; Deerfield v.' Northwood, 10 N H. 269.\nThe question in all cases is, whether poison has been injected, and had an influence upon the jury. Matters of provocation; character and manner of the rejoinder; whether in the heat of debate, or in altercation; whether the rejoinder is sufficient to remove the poison, or more or less than reasonably necessary to do this; the apparent effect upon the jury, — are all elements to be considered in reaching a conclusion upon tbis question; and who is so well qualified to weigh all these elements as, the court who is present at the trial? The question decided in Wentworth y. Jefferson, 60 N. H. 158, cannot be distinguished from the one involved in this case. There the exception was to the conduct of counsel; and it was urged that the offer was flagrant (in view of the fact that the court had previously denied the motion), and well calculated to influence the jury; but the court held that the finding of the court at the trial term was conclusive. The exception in both cases is to what is claimed to be the unwarrantable conduct of counsel in the presence and hearing of the jury. Upon what legal principle can it be suggested that one case is to be decided by the trial court, and the other by the court at the law term upon exception?\nCounsel also cited and commented on Hamblett v. Hamblett, fl N. H. 333; Burnham v. Butler, 58 N. H. 568; Rogers v. Kenriek, 63 N. H. 341; Brown v. Wiggin, 59 N. H. 327; Osgood v. Eaton, 63 N. H. 355; Dearborn v. Newhall, 63 N. H. 301; Page v. Qampton, 63 N. H. 197; Kovey v. Brown, 59 N. 'H. 114; Kelley v. Woodward, 58'N. H. 153; Daniels v. Lebanon, 58 N. H. 284.",
"id": "1307274",
"judges": "Blodgett, J., did not sit; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "36",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Bullard v. Boston & Maine Railroad",
"name_abbreviation": "Bullard v. Boston & Maine Railroad",
"parties": "Bullard v. Boston & Maine Railroad.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "5246"
} |
1307215 | page content | {
"char_count": "6614",
"citations": "64 N.H. 577",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1888-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 577,
"head_matter": "SULLIVAN.\nState v. Brow.\nAn indictment upon Gen. Laws, c. 274, s. 10, is not sustained by proof that the defendant enticed away a female child under the age of eighteen years for the purpose of illicit intercourse with himself.\nIndictment, upon Gen. Laws, c. 274, s. 10, for wilfully and deceitfully enticing away a female child under the age of eighteen years, with the intent and for the purpose of prostitution.\nThe evidence for the government tended to show that the defendent enticed the person named in the indictment, a girl of the ago of sixteen years, from her home in Newport, in this county, and unlawfully cohabited with her, as his wife, under assumed names, at several places in Massachusetts, for five or six days.\nThe defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that if he only intended to obtain the girl for his own carnal enjoyment, the act did not amount to her prostitution in the sense of the law; that the term “ prostitution,” as used in the statute, means common, indiscriminate, illicit intercourse, and not sexual intercourse confined exclusively to one man.\nThe court declined to give the instructions requested, and instructed the jury that if the girl was enticed away by the defendant with the intent and for the purpose of maintaining and continuing unlawful sexual relations with her for an indefinite period, and living with her in a condition of concubinage or criminal cohabitation, she was enticed away for purposes of prostitution within the meaning of the statute.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant was sentenced to the state prison and committed. The defendant excepted to the refusal to give the instructions requested, and to the instructions given, and filed this bill of exceptions, which was allowed.\nH. W. Parker, and Davis & Enright (of Vermont), for the defendant.\nThe defendant was lawfully entitled to the instruction asked for. “ If any person shall wilfully and deceitfully entice or carry away any female child under the age of eighteen years, with the intent or for the purpose of prostitution, he shall be punished,” &c. Gf. L., e. 274, s. 10.\nProstitution is defined in Rapalje & Lawrence’s Law Diet. 1029, “ Harlotry; whoredom; permitting promiscuous sexual intercourse for the sake of gain.” Webster defines the word, “The act or practice of offering the body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men; common lewdness of a female.” “ Harlotry. The trade or practice of prostitution; habitual or customary lewdness; prostitution.” — Webster. “ Prostitution. The common lewdness of a woman for gain. The practice of a strumpet.” — Worcester. Concubinage, on the other hand, means “ Cohabitation of a man with a woman not his wife.” 1 Rapalje & Lawrence’s Law Diet. 255.\nStatutes identical in terms with this have been judicially construed in other states; and to show the force and application of those decisions to the case at bar, we submit copies of the statutes and the substance of the decisions under them.\nThe Maine statute is, — “ Whoever fraudulently and deceitfully entices or takes away an unmarried female from her father’s house, or wherever else she may be, for the purpose of prostitution at a house of ill-fame, assignation, or elsewhere, and whoever aids and assists in such abduction or secretes such female for such purpose, shall be punished,” &c. Acts of 1861, c. 4.\nIn State v. Stogell, 54 Me. 24, the court held that proof that the defendant, by false representations, persuaded an unmarried female to go'with him to a neighboring town, and there, having induced partial intoxication, had repeated sexual intercourse with her, will not support an indictment for enticing her away for the purpose of prostitution.\nThe Massachusetts statute (Gen. St., c. 165, s. 2) is identical in language* so far as these clauses are concerned, with the Maine statute above quoted. In Commonwealth v. Cook, 12 Met. 93, the court held that to bring a case within its provisions the woman must be taken away for the purpose of leading her to indiscriminate, meretricious commerce with men, to make a prostitute of her; and that such a statute did not apply to a case of a man’s enticing a woman to leave her place of abode for the purpose of illicit sexual intercourse with him.\nThe New York statute is, — “ Any person who shall inveigle, entice, or take away any unmarried female of previous chaste character, under the age of twenty-five, from her father’s house, or wherever she may be, for the purpose of prostitution at a house of ill-fame, assignation, or elsewhere, shall be punished,” &c. Laws of 1848, c. 105.\nIn Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603, the court held that the statute was not violated unless the inveigling, enticing, or taking away of the unmarried female, &c., be for the purpose of prostitution, — that is, for the purpose of her indiscriminate, meretricious commerce with men, to make a prostitute of her. See, also, People v. Parshall, 6 Park. Cr. Cas. 129, for the distinction between abduction for the purpose of prostitution, concubinage, or marriage.\nCounsel also quoted the statutes of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, and referred to Slocum v. People, 90 Ill. 274; Osborn v. State, 52 Ind. 526 ; State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447.\nS. L. Bowers, Solicitor, and The Attorney- General, for the state.\nWorcester gives as one of the definitions of the word to prostitute, \" to appropriate or devote to a bad use; ” “ to corrupt; ” “ to make vile.” In enticing away this girl for the purpose of illicit intercourse with himself for an indefinite period, the defendant prostituted her and corrupted her as effectually as though he had taken her to a house of ill-fame. A female is prostituted when her body is subjected to the use and intercourse of any man not her husband. Her chastity, her good name and reputation, are blasted. If the design of the defendant was to take this girl to some place for the purpose of living with her in a state of illicit intercourse, such conduct, we claim, was a clear violation of the statute. This is the usual and ordinary meaning of the word, and is sustained by judicial authority. See Walker v. Perkins, 1 W. Bl. 519, where this same phrase, “ for the purpose of prostitution,” was used in the sense of illicit intercourse for an indefinite period with one man. See, also, Walker v. Perkins, 3 Bur. 1569, and Shenk v. Mingle, 13 S. & R. 32.",
"id": "1307215",
"judges": "Clark, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "579",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "State v. Brow",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Brow",
"parties": "State v. Brow.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1117"
} |
1307294 | page content | {
"char_count": "4837",
"citations": "64 N.H. 70",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 70,
"head_matter": "Bartlett v. Sanborn.\nA mortgagee’s constructive possession during the year following his foreclosing entry is not actual, within the meaning of the statute of fore, closure, as against the mortgagor’s second grantee who has actual and exclusive possession, not subordinate in fact to any right of any other person, during the whole of the same year.\nTrover, for wood cut by the defendant on lot No. 2, which had been conditionally conveyed, with lots Nos. 1 and 8, by a single mortgage given by one Dearborn to a bank. Facts found by the court. The .mortgage had been foreclosed, in the second statutory mode, on No. 1, which was equal in value to the 'mortgage debt. If the mortgage was not foreclosed on No. 2 in the same manner and at the same time, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for $135.\nBarnard & Barnard, for the plaintiff.\nPike & Parsons and C. C. Rogers, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307294",
"judges": "Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "71",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Bartlett v. Sanborn",
"name_abbreviation": "Bartlett v. Sanborn",
"parties": "Bartlett v. Sanborn.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "826"
} |
1307216 | page content | {
"char_count": "4499",
"citations": "64 N.H. 410",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1887-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 410,
"head_matter": "Rochester Savings Bank v. Chick & a.\nA stipulation in a promissory note, that “All the signers agree tobe hólden should the time of payment he extended,” does not bind a surety to an indefinite extension of the time of payment made by agreement between the principal and payee, nor to more than one extension.\nA promise to pay a note, made by a surety who has no knowledge of extensions whereby he is discharged from liability, is without consideration, and cannot be enforced.\nAssumpsit, on the following promissory note:\n1900.00. Rochester, N. H., April 1, 1877.\nSix months after date, for value received, we jointly and severally promise to pay the Rochester Savings Bank nine hundred dollars. All the signers agree to be holden should the time of payment be extended.\nS. S. Chick & Co.\nJohn S. Haines.\nJohn B. Clark.\nClark only defends, pleading the general issue with a brief statement of the statute of limitations. He is a surety for Chick & Co., and was known to be such by the plaintiffs when they took the note. Without his knowledge, and without his consent except that expressed in the note, the plaintiffs, by agreement with Chick & Co., extended the .time of payment eleven different times for periods of from two to nine months each, the last of which expired April 1, 1886. The writ was made and bears date January 18, 1887. January 14, 1887, Clark, upon presentation of the note by the plaintiffs’ attorney, promised to pay it. The writ was served by attaching his property, January Í5, 1887, and upon him personally January 20.\nWorcester & Gafney, for the plaintiffs.\nG. E. Beacham and J. S. H. Frink, for the defendant Clark.",
"id": "1307216",
"judges": "Carpenter., J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "412",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Rochester Savings Bank v. Chick & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Rochester Savings Bank v. Chick",
"parties": "Rochester Savings Bank v. Chick & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "783"
} |
1307298 | page content | {
"char_count": "8413",
"citations": "64 N.H. 36",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 36,
"head_matter": "WIGGIN, Trustee, v. PERKINS & a.\nOrdinarily a testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the language of the whole will, rather than from particular words and phrases, especially when it is apparent that certain words are used in a sense different from their legal and technical meaning.\nIt is not the uncertainty of enjoyment in future, but the uncertainty of the right to that enjoyment, which makes the difference between a vested and a contingent interest.\nThe case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.\nWiggin & Fuller, for the plaintiff.\nLeavitt & Knight, for Adaline Perkins.\nFrink & Batchelder, for the children of W. O. Perkins.",
"id": "1307298",
"judges": "Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "39",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "WIGGIN, Trustee, v. PERKINS & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Wiggin v. Perkins",
"parties": "WIGGIN, Trustee, v. PERKINS & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1506"
} |
1307257 | page content | {
"char_count": "40223",
"citations": "64 N.H. 445",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1887-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 445,
"head_matter": "Cole & a. v. American Baptist Home Mission Society & a.\nAn ante-nuptial contract, which provides that the wife shall “ retain and' have under her control and management the whole of her property both real and personal during her natural life,” and limits a vested remainder in “ the same ” to the husband in fee, applies to and controls the disposition of her after acquired property.\nBill in Equity. Facts agreed. August 18, 1843, Jesse M. Sargent and Betsey Collins, in contemplation of marriage, made and executed the following deed, which was duly recorded: “ This indenture . . . witnesseth: That whereas the parties aforesaid have agreed to enter into the relation of marriage and to become man and wife and the said Betsey Collins agrees to become the wife of the said Jesse M. Sargent upon the conditions following, to wit: that she is to retain and have under her control and management the whole of her property both real and personal during her natural life and at her decease the same to descend to her heirs, meaning her children if she shall have any, otherwise to the said Jesse M. Sargent and his heirs.\n“ Provided however and it is further agreed by the parties aforesaid, that in case the said Betsey should decease before her parents, then they or either of them being the survivor shall have the full use and control of said property during their natural lives.\n“And the said Jesse M. Sargent hereby covenants and agrees that he will in no case intermeddle with, claim or demand any part or parcel of said estate during the lifetime of the said Betsey or of her father or mother but will permit her the said Betsey to have-,' hold, manage and control the same in as full and ample a manner as if such marriage had not taken place.\n“In witness whereof the parties aforesaid have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year above written and before entering into the bonds of matrimony.”\nImmediately after the execution of the deed the parties intermarried, and maintained the relation of husband and wife until July, 1856, when Mr. Sargent died. In April, 1863, Mrs. Sargent married Gilman Moore, who survived her a few weeks. In April, 1883, she died, testate, having borne no children, and having survived both her parents. By her will, dated July 22, 1874, which has been approved and allowed by the probate court, after the payment of six legacies, amounting to $125.00, — the rest, residue, and remainder of her estate was given, bequeathed, and devised to the American Baptist Home Mission Society of New York. At the time of the execution of the deed and of her marriage to Mr. Sargent, she was seized and possessed of certain real and personal property. She afterwards purchased other real and personal property, and died seized and possessed of all the real estate and of a large amount of the personal property. The plaintiffs are the children by a former wife, and the only heirs of Jesse M. Sargent, and pray that the estate may be decreed to them, and for such other relief as may be just.\nBurnham & Brown, for the plaintiffs.\nI. This is the case of a marriage settlement and not of marriage articles. The instrument is as formal, complete, and definite as it could well be made. Its terms are noticeable for their certainty. Everything is definitely settled, — the amount of the interest, the nature of the property, the persons who are to take, and the times at which they are to come into possession. All the statute requirements for the conveyance of real estate are carefully complied with. The instrument is a deed, an indenture, carefully pre¡Dared, signed, sealed, and acknowledged by both parties, attested by two witnesses, and recorded. The words used are sufficient to convey property. No future act was contemplated. If there is doubt of this, it is to be observed that the parties lived under this settlement for thirteen years, and until the death of the husband, and attempted to execute no other instrument in pursuance of it. They understood it to be a final and complete settlement, and so interpreted it by their acts. The court should put the same construction upon it to effectuate tlie intention of the parties. It is an executed trust, and as such must be “ obeyed and fulfilled by those standing in the relation of trustees for the benefit of the cestuis que trust, according to the provisions of the settlement.” And in this view of the case it would not matter at all were the cestuis que trust mere volunteers. There need not be an intervention of any trustees. Equity never wants a trustee. Neves v. Scott, 9 IIow. 196 — S. C., 18 How. 268 ; Eaton v. Tillinghast, 4 1L I. 276 ; Cray v. Humph, 2 Hill Eq 7; Barnes v. Hart, 1 Yeates 221; White v. Thomborough, 2 Vern. 702,705; Buhe of Newcastle v. Countess of Lincoln, 3 Ves., Jr., 887, 397; Buhner v. Jay, 3 Myl. & K. 197 — S. 0., 4 Sim. 48; Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 211; Jenkins v. Keymis, 1 Lev. 1.50, 237; New stead v. Searles, 1 Atk. 265; Edwards v. Countess of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 175; Jthell v. Beane, 1 Ves. 216; Coring v. Nash, 3 Atk. 188, n.; Ath. Mar. Set. 121-128.\nAt common law the husband became absolutely entitled to his wife’s personal property in possession. Sargent, who was married in 1843, before the modern legislation in favor of married women, took the personal property of his wife, but not absolutely. He took it subject to the trusts created by the deed aforesaid. He held as trustee. Upon Mrs. Sargent’s death, she having borne no children, he, or his representatives, held the property freed from the trust. The equitable estate merged in the legal. Ilopkinson v. Dumas, 42 N. H. 306; Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528; Per. Tr., **. 13, 345.\nAs to the real estate, why may not Mrs. Sargent’s deed “be considered as a covenant to stand seized of her real estate for the uses therein specially mentioned ” ? It is upon the consideration of marriage. It meets all the requirements of such a conveyance, though it does not contain, as it need not, the words “ covenant to stand seized.” Barnes v. Hart, 1 Yeates 221; Rollins v. Riley, 44 N. H. 9; French v. French, 3 N. H. 261.\nII. All the cases hold that even marriage articles will be enforced in favor of “ those who claim through one who is within the influence of the marriage consideration.” And the husband, as one of the contracting parties, is, by all the cases, within that influence. Now if a deed, as formal, definite, and explicit as the one in this case is, shall be held to be not a settlement, but mere articles, minutes, from which a settlement is to be made under the direction of the court, it is still valid, and should be enforced in favor of the plaintiff. For these plaintiffs claim, not as purchasers, but through Jesse M. Sargent, the husband, and as his heirs. Any limitation of property made, or to be made, in accordance with the terms of the instrument in question, which is the only guide to be followed, must be “ to the said Jesse M. Sargent and his heirs.” The word “ heirs ” here, as in other deeds, is a word of limitation and not of purchase. The manifest intention, as gath ered from the instrument, was to create in Sargent a remainder in fee, contingent upon the death of his wife without children. This contingency has happened, and if the plaintiffs, as heirs, take nothing under this deed directly, they are, as the representatives and heirs of their deceased father, and as persons claiming through him, at least entitled to a specific performance of the contract to which he was a party. Batchelder v. Lake, 11 N. H. 359 ; Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 197 — S. O., 13 How. 268 ; Baton v. Tillinghast, 4 B.. I. 276 ; Be Bar ante v. Grott, 6 Barb. 496 ; Tabb v. Archer, 3 Hen. & M. 399 — S. 0., 3 Am. Dec. 657; 2 Kent Com. 172, n. 1; 2 Story Eq. Jur., ss. 986, 987; Ath. Mar. Set. 126-128; Osgood v. Strode, 2 P. Wms. 255; Benson v. Bellasis, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 17; Vernon v.' Vernon, 2 P. Wms. 594; Trevor v. Trevor, 1 P. Wms. 631; G-oylmer v. Paddiston, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 17 ; Nolford v. Holford, 1 Ch. Cas. 216.\nIII. The result will be the same if “ heirs ” is considered to be a word of purchase, in which case there is a limitation in this deed to these plaintiffs.\nMarriage is said by Story, J., in Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348, to be “ a consideration of the highest value,” and all agree that a consideration of marriage will support every provision with regard to the husband, the wife, and the issue. The consideration extends to the children of the marriage, because they are the natural objects of the solicitude and care of their parents, and hence one of the great and immediate objects of a marriage agreement. But other relatives, especially, as in this case, the younger children of one of the contracting parties, may well be objects of the affection and care of both, and a limitation of property to them may be one of the great purposes of a marriage agreement, and without which it would not have been made. These relatives then, in such cases, come within the reason of the rule which extends the support of the marriage consideration to the issue of the marriage. The rule should be as extensive as the reason for it. To restrict it to the children of the marriage would be to defeat in very many cases the substantial intention of the parties apparent upon the face of the instrument, the one thing which equity considers in the interpretation of marriage contracts. And the best considered authorities, English and American, especially the latter, hold that an ante-nuptial agreement, though it be mere articles, and hence executory, will be enforced in cases where there is a proper limitation, even in favor of relatives who are mere volunteers. “The result of all the cases,” to use the language of Nelson, J., in Neves v. Scott, “ I think will show, that if, from the circumstances under which the marriage articles were entered into by the parties, or as collected from the face of the instrument itself, it appears to have been intended that the collateral relatives in a given event should take the estate, and a proper limitation to that effect is continued in them, a court of equity will enforce the trust for their benefit.” Indeed, Lord Hale held, in Jenkins v, Hemishe, Ilardres 895, at a time when such agreements were mostcominon, that “ the consideration of marriage and of the marriage portion will run to all the estates raised by the settlement.” In this view of the case, also, we think the plaintiffs should prevail. Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196 — S. C., 18 How. 268 ; Parsons v. Ely, 45 111. 282 ; Tabb v. Archer, 8 Hen. & M. 398 ; Michael v. Morey, 26 Md. 239; Jenkins v. Hemishe, supra; Edwards v. Couivless of Warwick, 2 P. Wms. 175 ; Sch. li. & W., s. 349 ; 3 Waite Act. & Def. 669. The following authorities support the above position, or at least go as far in that direction as was necessary under the circumstances of each particular case. And the marriage consideration was held sufficient to support provisions in favor of the issue of a'second wife, of the children of the wife of a former husband, of the grandchildren of the wife by a former husband, of the brother of the husband, of a nephew, and of a sister of the husband who was the daughter of the settlor. Jenkins v. Heymis, 1 Lev. 150 — S. 0., 237 ; Sale v. Sale, 6 Ch. L>iv. 148; Newstead v. Searles, 1 Atk. 265 ; Vernon v. Vernon, 2 P. Wms. 594; Lechmere v. Carlisle, 3 P. Wms. 211; Chapman v. Emery, Cowp. 278, 280 ; Soring v. Nash, 3 Atk. 186; LeNeve v. LeNeve, 3 Cruise Dig. 363. — S. C., 3 Atk. 646. It is immaterial, in any view of the case, that Mrs. Sargent made a will thirty years after the execution of her deed, as bearing upon the question of intention in the interpretation of the deed. Intention of the parties is the cardinal rule for the interpretation of marriage articles and settlements. But it is to be gathered, as in other contracts, from the face of the instrument itself if possible. Evidence aliunde will not be received to explain what is clear. This deed is plain and unequivocal ; it means what it says. It does not matter what Mrs. Sargent, in fact, may have thought it to mean. To give such a circumstance as the subsequent execution of a will any weight in a case like this would open a door to fraud, while to make it conclusive would enable every grantor to defeat his grant. The will operates only upon that property of which the testatrix has a legal power of disposition. The probate of the will settles no question as to the power of disposition. Hooks v. .Lee, 8 Ired. Eq. 157; Sause v. Hale, 2 Ired. Eq. 241; Ardis v. Printup, 39 Ga. 648 ; Trevor v. Trevor, 1 P. Wms. 631; Blandford v. Marlborough,2 Atk. 545; Sch. H. & W., s. 352; Simpson v. Currier, 60 N. H. 19; Fitzgerald v. Clark, 6 Gray 393 ; Sould v. Company, 9 Cush. 338 ; Rice v. Company, 2 Cush. 80 ; Black v. Bachelder, 120 Mass. 171; Winslow v. Briskell, 9 Gray 363; Bank v. Stone, 13 Pick. 424; Parker v. Parker, 11 Cush. 530; Holman v. Perry, 4 Met. 492.\nR. M. Wallace (and H. W. Chaplin, of Massachusetts), for the defendants, furnished no brief.",
"id": "1307257",
"judges": "Bingham, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "459",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Cole & a. v. American Baptist Home Mission Society & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Cole v. American Baptist Home Mission Society",
"parties": "Cole & a. v. American Baptist Home Mission Society & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "7123"
} |
1307268 | page content | {
"char_count": "2908",
"citations": "64 N.H. 2",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1885-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 2,
"head_matter": "Perham v. The Haverhill Fibre Co. & a.\nIt will be ascertained at the trial term whether there are persons not made plaintiffs in a bill in equity who will be affected by the decree, and if so such persons may be there joined.\nA bill in equity may'be Maintained by an attaching creditor to remove the cloud of a tax deed upon the title of real estate of the debtor which he has attached.\nBill in Equity, to remove a cloud upon the title of two parcels of land in Haverhill, created by tax deeds thereof dated February 6, 1885. Facts found by the court.\nApril 1, 1888, the premises in question were owned by a voluntary corporation called the Haverhill Fibre Co., which had- its principal place of business in Haverhill. Having knowledge of the above facts, the selectmen put the premises into the non-resident list, and they were afterwards sold and deeded by the collector to the defendant Pike for the tax of 1883 so assessed on them. The .interest of the plaintiff in. the premises is that of an attaching creditor of the Fibre Co. The plaintiff is described as trustee ©f the Haverhill Pulp Co. The defendants objected that the plaintiff’s eestuis que trust should have been joined as plaintiffs in -.the bill.\nChase & Streeter and S. T. Page, for the plaintiff.\nBingham, Mitchells & Batchellor and Geo. W. Chapman, for the defendants.",
"id": "1307268",
"judges": "Smith, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "3",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Perham v. The Haverhill Fibre Co. & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Perham v. Haverhill Fibre Co.",
"parties": "Perham v. The Haverhill Fibre Co. & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "522"
} |
1307181 | page content | {
"char_count": "5944",
"citations": "64 N.H. 149",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 149,
"head_matter": "Weeks v. Waldron.\nA tax sale of non-resident land cannot be sustained when the number of acres in the parcel is not inserted in the collector’s list as required by Gen. Laws, c. 59, s. 1.\nWrit oe Entry, to foreclose a mortgage upon land in Grafton. Facts found by the court. The defence was title in the defendant by collectors’ deeds of the land upon sales for the taxes of 1879 and 1880.\n1. D. Weeks and Gr. W. Murray, for the plaintiff.\nShirley £ Stone, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307181",
"judges": "Doe, C. J., and Allen, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "151",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Weeks v. Waldron",
"name_abbreviation": "Weeks v. Waldron",
"parties": "Weeks v. Waldron.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1105"
} |
1307158 | page content | {
"char_count": "2372",
"citations": "64 N.H. 294",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 294,
"head_matter": "Rindge v. Sargent.\nThe reasonableness of a use of land which obstructs the flow of surface-water over it is determined by its operation upon the interests of all parties affected by it.\nBill in Equity, to restrain the deféndant from obstructing the free and natural flow of surface-water from the plaintiff’s land over and across the defendant’s land. Facts found by a referee.\nLane & Dole and Batchelder & Faulkner, for the plaintiff.\nL. Wellington and C. B. Eddy, for the defendant.",
"id": "1307158",
"judges": "Bingham, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "295",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Rindge v. Sargent",
"name_abbreviation": "Rindge v. Sargent",
"parties": "Rindge v. Sargent.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "413"
} |
1307270 | page content | {
"char_count": "1459",
"citations": "64 N.H. 234",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-12",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 234,
"head_matter": "WiNNIPISEOGEE PAPER Co. v. EATON & a.\nA deed cannot be reformed in an action at law.\nCovenant, on the warranty of a deed made by the defendants to the plaintiffs July 28, 1875. The plaintiffs moved to reject a brief statement in which the defendants, after certain averments of fact, “ request the court to so reform the deed executed by the defendants on July 28, 1875, that it will in all respects fully accord with the agreement, undertaking, and intention of the parties to it as above set forth, and that such judgment or decree be made by the court as will protect the rights of the defendants.”\nD. Barnard, for the plaintiffs.\nBingham & Mitchell, for the defendants.",
"id": "1307270",
"judges": "Bingham, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "235",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "Winnipiseogee Paper Co. v. Eaton & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Winnipiseogee Paper Co. v. Eaton",
"parties": "WiNNIPISEOGEE PAPER Co. v. EATON & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "265"
} |
1307218 | page content | {
"char_count": "6222",
"citations": "64 N.H. 48",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1886-06",
"docket_number": "",
"first_page": 48,
"head_matter": "State v. White. State v. Priest.\nTo a complaint upon Gen. Laws, c. 269, s. 5, for beating a drum within the compact part of a town without the command of a military officer, •it is no defence to show that the act was done in the performance of religious worship in accordance with a sense of religious duty, and that no actual disturbance of the public peace or the religious worship of others resulted from it.\nThe statute prohibiting the beating’ of a drum in the compact part of a town (G. L., c. 269, s. 5) does not infringe the right of religious worship secured by the fifth article of the Bill of Bights.\nComplaints, upon Gen. Laws, e. 2G9. s. 5, for beating a drum within the compact part of the town of Somersworth, not by command of a military officer having authority therefor. The respondents admitted doing the acts charged, and offered to prove that they were done in accordance with their sense of religious duty, and in worshipping God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and that they were not disturbing the public peace or the religious worship of others. The court ruled that the evidence offered did not constitute a defence, and the respondents excepted.\nW. R. Burleigh, solicitor, and G. E. Beacham, for the state.\nW. S. Pierce, for the respondents.",
"id": "1307218",
"judges": "Bingham, J., did not sit: the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "50",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:29:37.953340+00:00",
"name": "State v. White; State v. Priest",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. White",
"parties": "State v. White. State v. Priest.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "64",
"word_count": "1047"
} |
4441356 | page content | {
"char_count": "6014",
"citations": "115 N.H. 271",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7031",
"first_page": 271,
"head_matter": "Carroll\nNo. 7031\nRobert A. Goldberg Dorothy H. Goldberg v. Al Tinson, Inc. Howard D. Johnson Co., a.k.a. Howard D. Johnson Company\nMay 30, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch ( Mr. Shane Devine orally) for the plaintiffs.\nHastings & Son, of Maine (Mr. Peter G. Hastings orally), for the defendants.",
"id": "4441356",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "274",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Robert A. Goldberg Dorothy H. Goldberg v. Al Tinson, Inc. Howard D. Johnson Co., a.k.a. Howard D. Johnson Company",
"name_abbreviation": "Goldberg v. Al Tinson, Inc.",
"parties": "Robert A. Goldberg Dorothy H. Goldberg v. Al Tinson, Inc. Howard D. Johnson Co., a.k.a. Howard D. Johnson Company",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1008"
} |
4440025 | page content | {
"char_count": "4731",
"citations": "115 N.H. 135",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6975",
"first_page": 135,
"head_matter": "Belknap\nNo. 6975\nPeter Makris v. Thomas W. Nolan\nMarch 31, 1975\nSnierson, Chandler & Copithorne (Mr. John P. Chandler orally) for the plaintiff.\nStein, Gormley U Morrill (Mr. Arthur O. Gormley, Jr., orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4440025",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "137",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Peter Makris v. Thomas W. Nolan",
"name_abbreviation": "Makris v. Nolan",
"parties": "Peter Makris v. Thomas W. Nolan",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "805"
} |
4440604 | page content | {
"char_count": "1040",
"citations": "115 N.H. 241",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6659",
"first_page": 241,
"head_matter": "Belknap\nNo. 6659\nState of New Hampshire v. Robert B. Green\nMay 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and James L. Kruse, attorney (Mr. Kruse orally), for the State.\nWilliam P. Shea, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4440604",
"judges": "Kenison, C.J., did not sit.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "241",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Robert B. Green",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Green",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Robert B. Green",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "177"
} |
4439885 | page content | {
"char_count": "5498",
"citations": "115 N.H. 12",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-01-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6779",
"first_page": 12,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 6779\nJohn J. Riesenberg, Sr. v. State of New Hampshire & a.\nJanuary 31, 1975\nGoodnow, Arwe, Ayer & Prigge and Eric R. Gardner (Mr. Gardner orally) for the plaintiff.\nEdward F. Smith, Andre J. Barbean and Joseph Stewart (Mr. Barbean orally) for the defendant Nfew Hampshire Department of Employment Security.",
"id": "4439885",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "14",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "John J. Riesenberg, Sr. v. State of New Hampshire & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Riesenberg v. State",
"parties": "John J. Riesenberg, Sr. v. State of New Hampshire & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "912"
} |
4441426 | page content | {
"char_count": "5588",
"citations": "115 N.H. 117",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6824",
"first_page": 117,
"head_matter": "Nashua District Court\nNo. 6824\nState of New Hampshire v. Charles W. Greenwood\nMarch 31, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Robert V. Johnson II, assistant attorney general (Mr. Johnson orally), for the State.\nProlman & Holland (Mr. Francis G. Holland orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4441426",
"judges": "Grimes, J., concurred in the result; the others concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "120",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Charles W. Greenwood",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Greenwood",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Charles W. Greenwood",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "941"
} |
4438839 | page content | {
"char_count": "5169",
"citations": "115 N.H. 88",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-02-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7037",
"first_page": 88,
"head_matter": "Merrimack\nNo. 7037\nJohn M. Hogan and Maurene G. Hogan v. Archer J. Leary, Individually and as Executor and Administrator of the Estate of Maude I. Putney\nFebruary 28, 1975\nJohn M. Hogan, by brief and orally, for the plaintiffs.\nMaynard, Dunn & Phillips (Mr. William Maynard orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4438839",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "90",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "John M. Hogan and Maurene G. Hogan v. Archer J. Leary, Individually and as Executor and Administrator of the Estate of Maude I. Putney",
"name_abbreviation": "Hogan v. Leary",
"parties": "John M. Hogan and Maurene G. Hogan v. Archer J. Leary, Individually and as Executor and Administrator of the Estate of Maude I. Putney",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "886"
} |
4441204 | page content | {
"char_count": "9403",
"citations": "115 N.H. 401",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-07-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6938",
"first_page": 401,
"head_matter": "Cheshire\nNo. 6938\nD. Latchis, Inc. & a. v. Borofsky Brothers, Inc. & a.\nJuly 31, 1975\nFaulkner, Plaut, Hanna Zimmerman (Mr. George R. Hanna orally) for the plaintiffs D. Latchis, Inc., and Keene Properties, Inc.\nBradley & Talbot (Mr. Homer S. Bradley, Jr. orally) for Borofsky Brothers, Inc.\nCharles H. Morang, city solicitor, filed no brief for the city of Keene.",
"id": "4441204",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "405",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "D. Latchis, Inc. & a. v. Borofsky Brothers, Inc. & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "D. Latchis, Inc. v. Borofsky Bros.",
"parties": "D. Latchis, Inc. & a. v. Borofsky Brothers, Inc. & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1647"
} |
4439569 | page content | {
"char_count": "6810",
"citations": "115 N.H. 192",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-04-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6897",
"first_page": 192,
"head_matter": "Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission\nNo. 6897\nSociety for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests Audubon Society of New Hampshire v. Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission\nApril 30, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl £sf Branch and Robert A. Backus (Mr. Backus orally) for the plaintiffs.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Edward A. Haffer, assistant attorney general (Mr. Haffer orally), for the State.",
"id": "4439569",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "195",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests Audubon Society of New Hampshire v. Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission",
"name_abbreviation": "Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Water Supply & Pollution Control Commission",
"parties": "Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests Audubon Society of New Hampshire v. Water Supply and Pollution Control Commission",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1060"
} |
4439475 | page content | {
"char_count": "8089",
"citations": "115 N.H. 261",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 6951",
"first_page": 261,
"head_matter": "Belknap\nNo. 6951\nGuarantee Mutual Assurance Company of America v. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Company\nMay 30, 1975\nDevine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch (Mr. Bartram C. Branch orally) for the plaintiff.\nWiggin, Nourie, Sundeen, Pingree & Bigg and William S. Orcutt and W. Wright Danenbarger (Mr. Danenbarger orally) for the defendant.",
"id": "4439475",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "265",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Guarantee Mutual Assurance Company of America v. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Company",
"name_abbreviation": "Guarantee Mutual Assurance Co. of America v. Middlesex Mutual Insurance",
"parties": "Guarantee Mutual Assurance Company of America v. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Company",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1326"
} |
4438988 | page content | {
"char_count": "7076",
"citations": "115 N.H. 212",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-04-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7091",
"first_page": 212,
"head_matter": "Insurance Commissioner\nNo. 7091\nUnited American Insurance Company v. Francis E. Whaland, Insurance Commissioner\nApril 30, 1975\nPerkins & Brock andKevin L. Tucker (Mr. Tucker orally) for United American Insurance Company.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and John S. Kitchen, attorney (Mr. Kitchen orally), for the insurance commissioner.",
"id": "4438988",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "215",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "United American Insurance Company v. Francis E. Whaland, Insurance Commissioner",
"name_abbreviation": "United American Insurance v. Whaland",
"parties": "United American Insurance Company v. Francis E. Whaland, Insurance Commissioner",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1201"
} |
4441108 | page content | {
"char_count": "6469",
"citations": "115 N.H. 131",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6905",
"first_page": 131,
"head_matter": "Board of Taxation\nNo. 6905\nTrustees of Lexington Realty Trust v. City of Concord\nMarch 31, 1975\nStanley, Tardiff & Shapiro (Mr. R. Peter Shapiro orally) for the plaintiff.\nPaulF. Cavanaugh, city solicitor, by brief and orally, for the defendant.",
"id": "4441108",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "134",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Trustees of Lexington Realty Trust v. City of Concord",
"name_abbreviation": "Trustees of Lexington Realty Trust v. City of Concord",
"parties": "Trustees of Lexington Realty Trust v. City of Concord",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1114"
} |
4439121 | page content | {
"char_count": "7010",
"citations": "115 N.H. 658",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-11-28",
"docket_number": "No. 7165",
"first_page": 658,
"head_matter": "Hillsborough\nNo. 7165\nJames Harkeem v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, Benjamin C. Adams, Commissioner, and Miller Shoe-Dover, Melville Shoe Corp.\nNovember 28, 1975\nWadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn & Kohls and James C. Wheat (Mr. Wheat orally) for the plaintiff.\nEdward F. Smith, Andre J. Barbean, and Michael M. Black (Mr. Barbean orally) for the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security.",
"id": "4439121",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "661",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "James Harkeem v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, Benjamin C. Adams, Commissioner, and Miller Shoe-Dover, Melville Shoe Corp",
"name_abbreviation": "Harkeem v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security",
"parties": "James Harkeem v. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security, Benjamin C. Adams, Commissioner, and Miller Shoe-Dover, Melville Shoe Corp.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1110"
} |
4439327 | page content | {
"char_count": "6591",
"citations": "115 N.H. 114",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 6655",
"first_page": 114,
"head_matter": "Rockingham\nNo. 6655\nNorth American Manufacturing, Inc. v. Crown International, Inc. & a. Village Forge, Inc. & a. v. Same\nMarch 31, 1975\nShute, Engel Frasier and Robert L. Steuk (Mr. Steuk orally) for the plaintiffs.\nTaylor, Gray & Sullivan and William J. Hurley, Jr. (Mr. Hurley orally), for the defendants.",
"id": "4439327",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "117",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "North American Manufacturing, Inc. v. Crown International, Inc. & a.; Village Forge, Inc. & a. v. Same",
"name_abbreviation": "North American Manufacturing, Inc. v. Crown International, Inc.",
"parties": "North American Manufacturing, Inc. v. Crown International, Inc. & a. Village Forge, Inc. & a. v. Same",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1052"
} |
4440292 | page content | {
"char_count": "10448",
"citations": "115 N.H. 151",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-03-31",
"docket_number": "No. 7067",
"first_page": 151,
"head_matter": "Board of Trust Company Incorporation\nNo. 7067\nThe Valley Bank v. State of New Hampshire & a.\nMarch 31, 1975\nDouglas S. Hatfield, Jr., by brief and orally, for the plaintiff.\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, andJohnS. Kitchen, attorney (Mr. Kitchen orally), for the State.\nBrighton, Fernald, Taft & Hampsey andJohnR. Falby,Jr. (Mr. Falby, orally) for Peterborough Savings Bank, intervenor.",
"id": "4440292",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "156",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "The Valley Bank v. State of New Hampshire & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Valley Bank v. State",
"parties": "The Valley Bank v. State of New Hampshire & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "1645"
} |
4440182 | page content | {
"char_count": "4968",
"citations": "115 N.H. 285",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-05-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7107",
"first_page": 285,
"head_matter": "Nashua District Court\nNo. 7107\nRonald J. Rogers & a. v. Cardinal Realty, Inc., & a.\nMay 30, 1975\nSullivan, Gregg Ü Horton andJ. Jefferson Davis (Mr. Davis orally) for the plaintiffs.\nJoseph L. Clough, by brief and orally, for the defendants.",
"id": "4440182",
"judges": "All concurred.",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "287",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "Ronald J. Rogers & a. v. Cardinal Realty, Inc., & a.",
"name_abbreviation": "Rogers v. Cardinal Realty, Inc.",
"parties": "Ronald J. Rogers & a. v. Cardinal Realty, Inc., & a.",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "849"
} |
4439636 | page content | {
"char_count": "4222",
"citations": "115 N.H. 363",
"court": "New Hampshire Supreme Court",
"decision_date": "1975-06-30",
"docket_number": "No. 7005",
"first_page": 363,
"head_matter": "Cheshire\nNo. 7005\nState of New Hampshire v. Walter L. Maxwell\nJune 30, 1975\nWarren B. Rudman, attorney general, and Edward N. Damon, attorney, by brief, for the State.\nCristiano & Kromphold, by brief, for the defendant.",
"id": "4439636",
"judges": "",
"jurisdiction": "New Hampshire",
"last_page": "365",
"last_updated": "2021-08-10T17:25:43.934256+00:00",
"name": "State of New Hampshire v. Walter L. Maxwell",
"name_abbreviation": "State v. Maxwell",
"parties": "State of New Hampshire v. Walter L. Maxwell",
"provenance": "CAP",
"reporter": "New Hampshire Reports",
"volume": "115",
"word_count": "727"
} |
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