Patent Document

This Application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/536,039, filed Sep. 18, 2011. 
    
    
     TECHNICAL FIELD 
     The present invention relates to secure communications with electronic access control systems comprising a controller and multiple authentication devices. The invention provides an authentication device identification methodology and a robust scheme for enabling the programming or reconfiguration of credentials and authorized identities. The present invention further provides an extension to the Wiegand communication protocol while remaining backward compatible with traditional Wiegand devices. 
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     There are numerous deployments and varieties of electronic locks that are utilized to provide secure access to buildings or other objects, for example, safes, automobiles, etc. Authentication is generally provided through a wide variety of means including keypads, cards, bio readers and other authentication input devices. In conjunction with the deployments, a need has developed for various types of functions or information relating to the secured door with which one needs to communicate. Improvements to the security, installation, maintenance, adding or removing users, and support of access control devices are also areas of growing need. For example, it is frequently desirable in a security system application project to enable the integration of components or devices from different manufacturers. This presents a number of challenges particularly when components may not communicate in the same manner or support the same signals, for example. To address this issue in the case of card reader based authentication devices, a de facto wiring standard was developed for card readers—the Wiegand interface. The interface is utilized to connect card readers to a controller and/or the rest of the access control system. Wiegand is also used as an interface in time and attendance systems. The Wiegand interface utilizes three wires. One wire is a common ground and the other two wires are used for data transmission (Gnd, DATA 0 , DATA 1 ). Zeros are impulses on the DATA 0  line and ones are impulses on the DATA 1  line. The communication protocol used on a Wiegand interface is referred to as the Wiegand protocol. In the Wiegand protocol, data bits are prefixed and postfixed with parity, and length/chunks of data bits can vary from 24 to 40 bits. The Wiegand protocol provides a level of compatibility and interoperability for readers and control panels that can be used by consultants, specifiers, and end users when setting product design or system installation criteria. 
     Numerous companies have developed their own custom variations of the Wiegand format. Typically, the alternatives are developed by those that require more codes. One such variation is the 39 bit Wiegand format, which contains 17 bits for the facility code and 20 bits for the ID number field. Consequently, this allows for a total of 131,072 facility codes, and the 20 ID number bits allow for a total of 1,048,576 individual IDs within each facility code. 
     Irrespective of the code variation however, the Wiegand based data communication between a controller and a card reader or other peripheral device has always been unidirectional. The peripheral device sends data to the controller but there is no data communication in the other direction. This presents several drawbacks and limits what can be done. For example, because the controller has no bi-directional data communication with the reader, reader device identification or reader device authentication is not possible. Newer access systems are thus unable to provide extended features if they want to remain compatible with the de facto communication standard. 
     Another issue that plagues the traditional access control systems that utilize a card reader and controller relates to the method for programming the controller, such as maintaining credentials or authorized identities. Such maintenance might include user card management, i.e., adding or deleting user cards to/from the system, or perhaps performing user identification code changes. 
     Heretofore, card readers require specialty cards that are encoded as programming cards (i.e., cards that will allow the end user to make maintenance changes such as user card management). For example, a particular programming card would be provided to the end user from the manufacturer to be used for placing the controller into ‘add mode’ and another card may be provided for placing the controller into ‘delete mode.’ When the controller is in add mode, it essentially learns a new credential that is presented to it, for example, a new badge for user Joe that will provide access to doors 1 and 4 only on the 10th floor of the building. In delete mode, it will delete the credential that is presented (i.e., remove the authorization access associated with the presented card). 
     These specialty program cards have to be provided by the manufacturer, and if a specialty program card is lost, a replacement card would have to be ordered from the manufacturer. This requirement and method is at best cumbersome and inefficient, it places the end user company at the mercy of the manufacturer and worse yet could pose a major security risk. For example, when there is an immediate need perhaps to delete a particular card user&#39;s credential from the system over a weekend or holiday period, the company would be vulnerable in the event of a lost program ‘delete card’ until the company can reach the manufacturer and ultimately have a new program delete card delivered on site. 
     Further, in the prior art, retrieval of a forgotten user code or password could be achieved by the user reciting the answer to a previously provided secret question. However, if the answer is unknown because the previous user has left the company, replacement of the old user code/password could not be accomplished without replacing an EEPROM hard-soldered to the circuit board. Once again, the company&#39;s security could be vulnerable during the down time to replace the EEPROM. 
     Yet another issue that affects the industry relates to the issue of communication between a personal computer (PC) and the controller of the access control system. Data in the form of configuration information, software updates, and report information is generally communicated between the PC and the controller via a Universal Serial Bus (USB) port. Such transmitted data needs to be encrypted for security reasons. However, a number of problems exist with traditional and currently available solutions. 
     One solution has been the use of a Private static cipher key that is hard coded into both the PC program and the controller. If the private key is ever discovered all controller units become compromised. 
     Another solution is a private static cipher key that pairs a particular controller to a particular PC. Having multiple private keys increases security as the compromise of one controller unit does not compromise all the other addresses and resolves the earlier problem. However, the problem in this case lies in the fact that the controller is now stuck or locked into a single PC. This means that only the particular PC can be used to communicate with that controller. This could be problematic to the customer should that PC get damaged or someone else needs to take over the task of managing the controller with their own PC. 
     Yet another solution is public key asymmetric cryptology. This option is widely used across the board and on the internet. It is proven and is secure but it requires more ‘horsepower’ than is vailable with the microcontroller typically found in most access control system controllers. As such this method is not technologically feasible to implement on the controller. 
     What is needed is a system and method that allows bi-directional data communication between a controller and peripheral devices, which is versatile enough to accommodate enhanced surveillance or security features, without the drawbacks described above. Further, a robust system that would enable for example, any standard Wiegand 2601 card to become the “Master Add” or “Master Delete” card for the controller, while providing ease of installation and avoiding the short comings of current systems, would be advantageous. Further still, providing for dynamically generated cryptographic keys in a PC and the controller of an access control system during each communication occurrence, without the use of standard public key algorithms, would also be advantageous. The present invention fills these as well as other needs. 
     SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     In order to overcome the above stated problems, in one aspect, the present invention provides a controller and authentication device having features and advantages in the physical components, design and configuration of the device. 
     According to another aspect of the present invention a protocol that conforms to the Wiegand protocol while providing added features and advantages in the circuits of the access control system devices is provided. The protocol provides for bi-directional data communication between the controller and peripheral authentication devices. 
     In a further aspect of the present invention, user controlled identity authorization/credentialing “Master Delete” and “Master Add” cards are provided. The identity authorization enables a user to securely assign and designate a conventional card reader compatible card as an appropriate programming card and thereby readily activate or deactivate users and/or cards. 
     In another aspect of the present invention, communication between the controller device and a PC, via the USB port, is encrypted in a manner that is secure and feasible within the processing constraints of the controller device&#39;s computing power. 
     Additional benefits of the above described system and method for providing power and data communication respecting a door and lock are set forth in the following discussion. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       The above-mentioned and other features and advantages of this invention, and the manner of attaining them, will become apparent and be better understood by reference to the following description of the invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein: 
         FIG. 1  is a component block diagram of an exemplary credential verification portion of an access control system in accordance with aspects of the present invention; 
         FIG. 2A  is an isometric view of a printed circuit board of a controller device according to an embodiment of the present invention; 
         FIG. 2B  is a listing of available modes for the controller device along with the corresponding display values; 
         FIG. 3  is a schematic diagram of the circuitry implemented in an exemplary embodiment of the controller device of the present invention; 
         FIGS. 3A-3J  are magnified segments of diagram  FIG. 3 , as designated in  FIG. 3 ; 
         FIG. 4  is a schematic diagram of the circuitry implemented in a first keypad according to an embodiment of the present invention; 
         FIG. 5  is a schematic diagram of the circuitry implemented in a second alternative keypad in the present invention; 
         FIG. 6  is an exemplary operational flow chart for the communication between the controller and card reader according to an aspect of the present invention; 
         FIG. 7  is an operational flow chart for the programming of the controller device of  FIGS. 2A ,  2 B and  3  to enable the authorization management aspect of the present invention; 
         FIG. 8  is a block diagram representation of a pseudo private/public seeds system according to an aspect of the present invention; 
         FIG. 9  is an exemplary operational flow chart for encrypted data transfer between the controller and PC according to an aspect of the present invention; 
         FIG. 10  is an illustration of several views of an authentication keypad; and 
         FIG. 11  is an exploded view of the authentication keypad of  FIG. 10 . 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT 
     Generally, the systems, components and methods described herein for providing and implementing communication, programming, encryption and associated features for an Access Control System (ACS) to provide secure entry to a door or closure may be implemented in a variety of hardware and component configurations, software or combinations thereof. 
     This document is organized as follows. First, an overview of the ACS in accordance with certain aspects of the present invention is described. Next the controller and keypad components of the ACS that achieve some aspects of the invention are described along with the details of their electronic circuitry. Next, the operational flow for establishing data communication between the controller and a card reader or keypad is described. Next the operating environment for programming and managing authentication identities using the controller and keypad is discussed. Following this, the logic and operational flow for providing the encryption of data in the communication between a personal computing device and the controller is presented. Thereafter, there is a discussion of the physical aspects of an exemplary keypad according to the present invention. 
     In the following discussion, whenever the term ACS is used, it is understood the card reader/keypad and controller disclosed are only part of of the entire access control system and that the ACS referred to herein is not an entire system, lacking for example, the electromechanical release component. 
     Referring to the drawings and initially to  FIG. 1 , an ACS is provided and is identified as reference number  100 . In general, ACS  100  is configured for providing selective access in medium/high security control of electric locks, electric strikes, or magnetic locking devices. The ACS  100  may include a PC  10  that is configured to communicate with a multi-access controller  12  via communication link  14 . The controller  12  communicates with keypads  18 A,  18 B and Wiegand  2601  card reader  20 , (collectively referred to as authentication devices  22 ) via communication medium  24 . The peripheral authentication devices referred to in the following description may be keypads, card readers, or a mixture of both. The terms card reader or keypad as used throughout are interchangeable unless specifically identified otherwise. The controller  12  includes a microcontroller  26  that provides communication, signaling, and processing. Similarly, although less robust and capable, the card reader  20 , and keypads  18 A,  18 B also include microcontrollers  28 ,  30  and  32 , respectively. While aspects of the present invention are described with reference to a card reader or keypad, it should be understood that the present invention is also applicable to biometric readers or any other authentication devices that may be utilized to provide identification for purposes of access to a secured location or object. 
     The components and details of the controller  12  will be described next with reference to  FIGS. 2A ,  2 B and  3 .  FIG. 2A  illustrates a pictorial view of a printed circuit board (PCB)  200  of an embodiment of the detailed schematic diagram of the controller circuit  300  shown in  FIG. 3 . 
     In one aspect of the invention and as best seen in  FIG. 2A , controller  12  of  FIG. 1  comprises the printed circuit board (PCB)  200  having thereon a number of electronic components including microcontroller  26 , a terminal strip  34 , a display DIS 1 , pushbutton SW 2 , and slide switch SW 3 . Adjacent to Display DIS 1  is a listing  202  (See also  FIG. 2B ) of operating modes/status of the controller  12  that correspond to the numeric values that may be displayed on display DIS 1 . In operation, pressing the pushbutton SW 2  places the controller  12  in one of the operating modes of the listing  202 .  FIG. 2B  illustrates the listing  202  including the available operation modes and corresponding display DIS 1  values. 
     Turning to  FIG. 3  and with reference thereto, the circuit  300  includes connector J 2  ( FIG. 3A ) for the connection of an AC or DC power supply for a voltage that is rectified, filtered then applied to a DC to DC converter U 1  ( FIG. 3A ) to provide 12 V DC and further applied to voltage regulators U 2 , U 3  ( FIG. 3A ) to provide 5 V DC and 3.3 V DC, respectively, for powering the other components of the circuit  300 . Connectors J 8  ( FIG. 3C ) and J 10  ( FIG. 3E ) provide means for connecting the microcontroller  26  ( FIG. 3B ) to two authentication devices  22 . The connectors J 8  ( FIG. 3C ), J 10  ( FIG. 3E ) each include terminals  1 - 9 , for each of a 12 V power supply, DATA 0 , DATA 1 , Green LED, Red LED, Yellow LED, Buzzer, Tamper Switch and Ground. The terminals of Green LED, Red LED, Yellow LED and Buzzer are connected to open collector transistors Q 7 , Q 8 , Q 9 , Q 10  ( FIG. 3C ) which are driven by ports RC  7 , RC  6 , RC  5 , RC 2  of the microcontroller  26  ( FIG. 3B ). These terminals  1 - 9  provide status signals to components housed in the authentication devices  22 . DATA 0  and DATA 1  are connected to ports RB 0  and RB 1  ( FIG. 3B ), respectively, and provide the means for receiving data communications from the authentication devices  22 . 
     Connectors J 9  ( FIG. 3D ) and J 11  ( FIG. 3F ) provide means for connecting and receiving signals at the microcontroller  26  ( FIG. 3B ) from the authentication devices  22 . Such signals include for example a Request to Exit (REX) signal or Door Position (DP). In an aspect of the present invention, connector J 9  ( FIG. 3D ) is utilized to connect keypad  18 A ( FIG. 1 ) and connector J 11  ( FIG. 3F ) is utilized to connect keypad  18 B ( FIG. 1 ). Connectors J 3  ( FIG. 3G ) and J 4  ( FIG. 3G ) provide connectivity for door relays/coils that can be controlled from the microcontroller  26  ( FIG. 1 ). For example, relay/coil for door 1  would be connected to J 3  ( FIG. 3G ) and be controlled by the Single Pole Double Throw (SPDT) relay K 1  ( FIG. 3G ). Relay K 1  is driven by common emitter transistor Q 2  ( FIG. 3G ), which is controlled by on/off signals to digital port RD 1  of the microcontroller  26  ( FIG. 3B ). Display DIS 1  ( FIG. 3H ) is connected to ports RJ 0 -RJ 7  of the microcontroller  26  ( FIG. 1 ). Push button SW 2  ( FIG. 3I ) is shown connected to port RA 2  and Switch SW 3  ( FIG. 3I ), which is a single pole double throw switch, is connected to port RA 1 . Connector J 12  ( FIG. 3J ) is the USB connector for communications between the microcontroller  26  and other external devices. Connector J 12  is coupled to ports RF 2 , RF 3 , RF 4  and ground GND of the microcontroller  26  ( FIG. 3B ). 
     Next, the components and details of the keypads  18 A,  18 B will be described with reference to  FIG. 4  and, in an alternate circuitry,  FIG. 5 . It should be understood that the discussions herein respecting the keypads  18 A,  18 B would be equally applicable to the card reader  20 , with the exception of the readily apparent distinctions, such as the fact that all data from the card reader is provided by means other than key presses. 
     The circuit  400  may be associated with keypad  18 A and comprises the microcontroller  30 , a  9 -position connector J 1 , Green LED D 2 , Red LED D 3 , Yellow LED D 5 , buzzer BZ 1  and a switch matrix  402 . The Connector J 1  provides terminals for each of a 12 V power supply, DATA 0 , DATA 1 , Green LED, Red LED, Yellow LED, Buzzer, Tamper Switch and Ground. When the keypad  18 A is connected to the controller  12 , terminal J 1  of keypad circuit  400  is wired to terminal J 8  ( FIG. 3C ) of controller circuit  300 . As would be appreciated by one skilled in the art, keypad  18 A and controller  12  could be connected entirely or in part by a wireless connection, alternate communication schemes, or other mediums and such variations are contemplated and within the scope of the present invention. 
     Connection of the terminal J 1  ( FIG. 4 ) of circuit  400  to terminal J 8  ( FIG. 3C ) of circuit  300  enables the controller  12  to receive data on DATA 0  and DATA 1  from the keypad  18 A. The controller  12  is able to turn on or off Green LED D 2 , Red LED D 3 , Yellow LED D 5 , and buzzer BZ 1 . As shown, buzzer BZ 1  is coupled to port RB  5  of the keyboard microcontroller  30  and therefore can also be activated by the keyboard  18 A. A connector  404  from the Yellow LED to port RC 7 /RX of the microcontroller  30  ties the synchronous communication port of the microcontroller  30  to the Yellow LED D 5  and to position  6  on the terminal J 1 . 
     Similar to circuit  400  of keypad  18 A, alternate circuit  500  may be associated with keypad  18 B and comprises the microcontroller  32 , a  9 -position connector J 1 , Green LED D 2 , Red LED D 3 , Yellow LED D 5 , buzzer BZ 1  and a switch matrix  502 . The Connector J 1  provides terminals for each of a 12 V power supply, DATA 0 , DATA 1 , Green LED, Red LED, Yellow LED, Buzzer, Tamper Switch and Ground. When the keypad  18 B is connected to the controller  12 , terminal J 1  of keypad circuit  500  is wired to terminal J 10  of controller circuit  300  ( FIG. 3E ). As would be appreciated by one skilled in the art, keypad  18 B and controller  12  could be connected entirely or in part by a wireless connection, alternate communication schemes, or other mediums and such variations are contemplated and within the scope of the present invention. 
     Connection of the terminal J 1  of circuit  500  to terminal J 10  ( FIG. 3E ) of circuit  300  enables the controller  12  to receive data on DATA 0  and DATA 1  from the keypad  18 B. The controller  12  is able to turn on or off Green LED D 2 , Red LED D 3 , Yellow LED D 5 , and buzzer BZ 1 . As shown, buzzer BZ 1  is coupled to port RB  5  of the keyboard microcontroller  32 . As such buzzer BZ 1  can also be activated by the keyboard  18 B. A connector  504  from the Yellow LED to port RC 7 /RX of the microcontroller  32  enables synchronous communication from the controller  12  to the microcontroller  32  of the keypad  18 B. 
     To reiterate and further clarify the functional effect of the described circuit couplings, the present invention provides means for controller  12  to engage in two-way data communication with Keypad  18 A and Keypad  18 B. As stated earlier, conventionally, because the controller  12  and keypads  18 A,  18 B conform to the Wiegand communications protocol there is only one-way data communication, i.e., from keypad  18 A,  18 B to controller  12  as provided on DATA 0  and DATA 1 . However, the controller  12  of the present invention is adapted to also transmit data to the keypad  18 A,  18 B, using a shared conductor between the two units, i.e., one of the open collector driver connections from terminals J 8  ( FIG. 3C ), J 10  ( FIG. 3E ) of controller  12  to terminal J 1  on each of the Keypads  18 A,  18 B. 
     Specifically, and as shown in the associated schematic diagrams, the conductor associated with a status mode indicator such as, for example Yellow LED D 5  on each of the Keypads  18 A,  18 B, is connected to the position  6  on terminal J 1 , corresponding to the open collector driver on position  6  of terminal J 8  ( FIG. 3C ) and also position  6  of terminal J 10  ( FIG. 3E ) of the controller  12 . The microcontroller  26  which is a PIC18F87J50 microcontroller includes an internal Universal Synchronous Receiver/Transmitter (USART) that can be accessed at ports RC 6 /TX and RC 7 /RX. Similarly, the Yellow LED D 5  on the schematics  400 ,  500  has a connection  404 ,  504 , to the internal USART of the respective microcontrollers  30 ,  32 . 
     In further operation, and as best described with reference to flow diagram  600  of  FIG. 6 , the present invention enables two way communication between the controller  12  and authenticating devices  22 , as shown in  FIG. 1 . At step  602 , when the controller  12  powers up, the controller  12  pings the connected keypads  18 A,  18 B through the shared conductor, i.e., the wire connected between the positions  6  of each device. The keypads  18 A,  18 B or any other Wiegand device  20  that is connected to the controller will receive the ping at step  604 . At step  606 , an inquiry is made regarding whether the device recognizes the ping as data from the controller  12 . If the recipient device is keypad  18 A,  18 B, or card reader  20  a response is sent to the controller  12  through the Wiegand interface (i.e., DATA 0 , DATA 1 ), at step  608 . The response thus identifies the Keypads  18 A,  18 B or card reader  20  to the controller  12  at step  610 . Conversely, at step  606  if the recipient device is any other Wiegand device, there would be no response to the controller  12  at step  612 . The device is thus identified as simply a traditional Wiegand device at step  614 . 
     The firmware of the keypad  18 A,  18 B or card reader  20  is set up to ignore long pulses that might normally be seen on the yellow LED, such as blinking or steady on, and only respond to data fitting an 8-bit  9600  baud signal. When not in use as a communication line, the yellow LED&#39;s purpose is to indicate that the controller  12  is in the programming mode. This purpose is not affected by the use of the line for data communications to the keypad. 
     As previously stated, the purpose of the ACS  100  is to provide secure access through one or more authenticating devices  22  that are connected to a controller  12 . The controller generally has, or is in communication with, a data store of credential identities that would be granted access. Credential identities are added or removed as desired by security personnel. In the case of the card reader  20 , it is ordinarily the case in the prior art that in order to either add or delete a card associated with a particular user, an appropriately encoded manufacturer designated card (Master Add or Master Delete) must first be swiped through the card reader in order to put the controller into a mode where it can either add or delete the card record, whichever is appropriate. In an aspect of the present invention, this requirement is eliminated. 
       FIG. 7  illustrates the operational flow  700  for the programming of a controller device to perform credential additions or deletions by enabling the controller device to accept a standard Wiegand  2601  card as the Master Add or Master Delete. It is assumed in the flow  700  that a Wiegand  2601  card reader is connected to the controller  12  for operation of door  1  or door  2 . 
     Referring to both  FIGS. 7 and 2A , at step  702 , a security officer or similarly authorized user with physical access to the controller  12 , moves the slide switch SW 3  into a position marked on the PCB  200  corresponding to the appropriate door connection of the card reader  20 . The user then presses the push button SW 2  repeatedly until the number ‘3’ is shown on the display DIS 1 , at step  704 . This places the controller  12  in program mode as specified by the mode listing  202  on PCB  200 . In this mode, the controller  12  is set to learn a new Master Add. At step  706 , a standard card is presented to the card reader  20 . The controller  12  learns the presented standard card as the Master Add, at step  708 . Next, the controller adds the credentials of the new Master Add to the data store and marks or otherwise identifies it as a programming card, at step  710 . The learning of the card causes the display DIS 1  to be turned off and program mode is exited at step  712 . A similar procedure would be followed to learn the Master Delete, with the exception being that the mode listing for that process is the number ‘4’ rather than ‘3’. Thereafter, the user may use the Master Add or Master Delete to place the controller in the programming mode for adding or deleting individual user cards to/from the credentialed identities in a conventional manner. 
     The controller  12  also communicates with PC  10 , as shown in  FIG. 1 , for a variety of reasons including the need to program or update the controller  12  or in some cases provide security related data on an ongoing basis. Communication may be performed through the USB port of the PC  10  and the USB connector J 12  ( FIG. 3J ) of the microcontroller  26 , effectively the USB port of the controller  12 , via communication link  14 . As would be appreciated by one skilled in the art, communication link  14  may be a hard-wired link or wireless link, also communication link  14  may run between USB port of the controller  12  and any other Input/Output (I/O) port of PC  10  including a wired or wireless port, Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN), Internet port, modem port or blue tooth. Such variations are contemplated and are within the scope of the present invention. For security reasons, the data transmitted via communication link  14  needs to be encrypted, thereby securing the link  14 . 
     In an aspect of the present invention, communication link  14  is encrypted by providing matching cipher keys in both the PC  10  and the controller  12 . In order to overcome the readily apparent problem presented by the limited processing capability of the controller  12  and the other limitations previously identified, the present invention provides in one aspect, a unique pseudo private/public seed system for dynamically generating the cipher keys in the PC  10  and controller  12 . 
     In operation, and as more readily understood with reference to  FIG. 8  and  FIG. 9 , the present invention encrypts data communicated via the link  14 . As shown, a pseudo private/public seed system  800  is defined by a single random number generator  802  in the PC  10  and two identical cipher generating algorithms  804 A,  804 B that individually produce identical cipher keys  806 A,  806 B in each of the PC  10  and controller  12 . Importantly, the random generator  802  is a cryptographically strong random number generator. As known in the art, a cryptographically strong random number generator is defined as a random number generator that passes all statistical tests that run in polynomial time asymptotically. Such a random number generator will pass any statistical test for randomness that does not require an exponentially increasing, to an infinite amount, of time to run. All such polynomial time statistical tests will be unable to distinguish the random number generator from a true random source. Each cipher generating algorithm  804 A,  804 B comprises pseudorandom function  808 , first private seed  810 , second private seed  812 , and third private seed  814 . 
     Turning to  FIG. 9 , and with reference thereto, the operational flow of the seed system  800  will be described. The communication program starts a communication session at step  902 . At step  904 , the random number generator  802  creates a 32-bit public key  816 . The public key  816  is communicated in plain text from the PC  10  to the controller  12  on the communication link  14 , at step  906 . At step  908 , the controller  12  receives the public seed. Following this, the PC  10  and the controller  12  each separately perform identical operational steps, utilizing generating algorithms  804 A and  804 B respectively. 
     On the PC  10 , processing continues at step  910  by combining the public key  816  with the three private seeds  810 ,  812  and  814 . At step  912 , the process utilizes the public key  816  to determine an iteration count. Next at step  914 , the combined public key  816  and private seeds are hashed through the pseudorandom function  804 A. A determination is made at step  916 , regarding whether or not the required number of iterations through the function  808 , as determined in the previous step, have been accomplished. If the result of that determination is in the negative, processing loops back to step  914  for hash iteration. If the result of the inquiry at step  916  is in the affirmative, processing proceeds to step  918  where 128-bit cipher key  806 A is available. 
     On the controller  12 , processing continues at step  920  by combining the public key  816  with the three private seeds  810 , 812  and  814 . At step  922 , the process utilizes the public key  816  to determine an iteration count. Next at step  924 , the combined public key  816  and private seeds are hashed through the pseudorandom function  804 B. A determination is made at step  926 , regarding whether or not the required number of iterations through the function  808 , as determined in the previous step, have been accomplished. If the result of that determination is in the negative processing loops back to step  924  for hash iteration. If the result of the inquiry at step  926  is in the affirmative, processing proceeds to step  928  where 128-bit cipher key  806 B is available. 
     With both the PC  10  and controller  12  having the same 128-bit cipher key  806 A,  806 B the communication link  14  goes secure. The cipher key  806 A,  806 B changes with every session thereby eliminating any drawbacks of utilizing static private seeds  810 ,  812  and  814 . Furthermore, the number of iterations is also random and is based on the public seed itself. Even further, the method used to generate the cipher key is complex enough so that it cannot be memorized but it is straightforward enough to be performed by the microcontroller  26  of the controller  12 . 
     Another aspect of the present invention relates to the physical attributes of keypads  18 A,  18 B, collectively referenced as keypad  18 . The physical positioning, profile, features, security and aesthetic issues are addressed by the keypad of the present invention, as best seen in  FIG. 10  and the exploded view of  FIG. 11 . As shown, the keypad may include a housing  1000 , an overlay  1002  for a keypad and PCB assembly  1008 , a logo overlay  1004  obscuring the housing installation screw  1006 , the keypad and PCB assembly  1008 , a pair of base mounting screws  1010 , an audio indicator  1012 , a mounting base  1014  and a tamper switch  1016  that is disposed such that it will activate if the housing  1000  is separated from mounting base  1014 . The housing  1000  may include recess  1017  and may be adapted to provide for a recessed placement of the keypad assembly  1008 , whereby the keys of overlay  1002  and the LEDs  1018  can only be seen within a narrow viewing angle. In other words, and as more clearly apparent in the side view  1020  ( FIG. 10 ) of the keypad, the keys  1022  and LEDs  1018  would not be readily visible for example to someone observing a user from down the hall or by someone standing to the side of the user because their visibility would be obscured by recess  1017 . 
     From the foregoing, it will be seen that this invention is one well adapted to attain all the ends and objects hereinabove set forth together with other advantages which are obvious and which are inherent to the method and apparatus. It will be understood that certain features and sub combinations are of utility and may be employed without reference to other features and sub combinations. This is contemplated by and is within the scope of the claims. Since many possible embodiments of the invention may be made without departing from the scope thereof, it is also to be understood that all matters herein set forth or shown in the accompanying drawings are to be interpreted as illustrative and not limiting. 
     The constructions described above and illustrated in the drawings are presented by way of example only and are not intended to limit the concepts and principles of the present invention. As used herein, the terms “having” and/or “including” and other terms of inclusion are terms indicative of inclusion rather than requirement. 
     While the invention has been described with reference to preferred embodiments, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes may be made and equivalents may be substituted for elements or components thereof to adapt to particular situations without departing from the scope of the invention. Therefore, it is intended that the invention not be limited to the particular embodiments disclosed as the best mode contemplated for carrying out this invention, but that the invention will include all embodiments falling within the scope and spirit of the appended claims.

Technology Category: 5