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P095978
| Page 1
40113
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
Project Name
Nepal Village Micro Hydro Carbon Offset Project
Region
South Asia
Sector
SASSD
Project ID
P095978
Borrower(s)
Implementing Agency
Alternative Energy Promotion Center
Environment Category
[] A [X ] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD
Safeguard Classification
[]S
1
[X ] S
2
[
]
S
3
[
]
S
F
[
]
TBD
Date PID Revised
May 7, 2007
Date of Appraisal
Authorization
April 27, 2007
Estimated Date of ERPA
Signature
June 17, 2007
1\.
Country and Sector Background
Nepal has vast hydro resources, which represent a source of potential wealth\. Commercially
exploitable hydropower generating potential is estimated to be about 43,000 MW\. However,
despite this large potential, only about 600 MW has been developed so far\. Based on the 2001
census, 40 percent of Nepal's households have access to electricity, but disparity in access is
stark\. While over 90 percent of the urban population is connected to the grid, it is estimated that
only 27 percent of rural households have access to electricity\.
1
Nepals 10th National Plan aims to increase the electrification rate to 55 percent through both
grid extension and non-grid options including micro-hydro and solar\. This emphasis on power
development followed the adoption of the Hydropower Development Policy in the early 1990s
which, combined with changes in electricity legislation and the opening up of the power sector to
local and foreign private investments, was intended to make institutions operating in the power
sector efficient and creditworthy, as well as increase the participation of the private sector in the
provision of electricity services of the people\. Under this policy and regulatory framework,
Government of Nepal (GoN) has been able to attract some private (foreign) investments in power
generation, yet there is an increased recognition that more needed to be done to attract private
capital in the sector and to improve the efficiency and creditworthiness of Nepal Electricity
Authority (NEA), the central Government owned grid operator, generator and distributor\.
1
Nepal Country Strategy on Integration of Energy and Rural Development Policies and Programme -Water and
Energy Commission Secretariat of the Government of Nepal, December 2005\.
Page 2
The revised Hydropower Development Policy of 2001 was intended to address many of the
outstanding issues preventing achievement of the sector objectives\. It envisaged an increased
involvement of private investors in the production, distribution, and management of electricity
while recognizing the need for continued institutional and structural changes in the power
industry\. The revised Policy called for the creation of a more competitive environment for
private sector participation, including introduction of more transparent and investment friendly
procedures\. The development of small hydro projects and district level projects under
decentralized schemes in hilly and remote areas were also highlighted as areas to be developed
with support of a subsidy scheme implemented by the Alternative Energy Promotion Center
(AEPC)\. Finally, the Policy directed that increased attention be paid to the social and
environmental aspects of hydroelectric development to ensure that adverse effects on the
environment and communities are minimized\.
While progress has been made on several fronts during the initial years of policy
implementation, there was a growing realization that increasing access to remote areas though
decentralized schemes required additional specialized efforts\. Furthermore, implementation of
some elements of the hydropower policy, such as private sector participation, were hampered by
country economic and security risk, and the lack of adequate domestic capital market, issues
which were beyond the control of the power sector itself\.
To assist the GoN in meeting its sector objectives, the World Bank approved a Power
Development Project consisting of a $75\.6 million IDA credit in 2003\.
Discussions were initiated with the World Bank in late 2004 to prepare a complementary Carbon
Offset project whose revenues would provide additional financial support to AEPCs village
micro-hydro program, further increasing rural access to modern energy sources in Nepal\.
2\. Objectives
The proposed development objectives of the Carbon Offset Project are:
Reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide\.
Increase access to modern energy from renewable energy sources\.
The Carbon Offset project complements the ongoing World Bank Power Development Project
by providing additional support for the achievement of its development objectives, in particular
the objective of improving access of rural areas to electricity services\. The overall development
objectives of the Power Development Project are: (a) develop Nepal's hydropower potential in an
environmentally and socially sustainable manner so as to help meet electricity demand, (b)
improve access of rural areas to electricity services, and (c) promote private participation in the
power sector as a way to improve sector efficiency and to mobilize financing for the sector's
investment requirements\.
The objectives of this World Bank Carbon Offset Project are therefore consistent with the
developmental and poverty reduction objectives of GoN\.
3\.
Rationale for Bank Involvement
Page 3
This Carbon Offset project will facilitate greenhouse emission reductions and support the
development of the international market mechanism for trading Emission Reductions (ERs),
developed under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol\. The Nepal Village Micro Hydro project
consists of sale of ERs to the Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF) which provides
carbon finance to small-scale CDM projects in the least developed countries and poorer areas of
all developing countries\. The CDCF actively seeks to reach countries and communities that are
neither presently benefiting from development through carbon finance nor are likely to benefit
greatly from it in the future\. The CDCF also seeks to support projects which include, as a
measurable output, the provision of goods and services that will lead to improvement in the
social welfare of the communities involved in the projects\.
The sale of emission reduction credits to the CDCF will allow for full implementation of the
micro-hydro program by generating additional resources to allow for expanded coverage of the
program beyond the original target of 25 districts, and will improve program sustainability by
reducing reliance on donor assistance for implementation of future phases of the program\.
Higher level objectives to which the project contributes
The project is consistent with the CAS for Nepal and supports the PRSP, particularly through
providing support for the development of the rural economy and by increasing access to modern
energy sources\.
4\. Description
The Project will support the development of micro-hydropower mini-grids to meet the electricity
and motive power needs of the rural people of Nepal through provision of subsidy assistance and
program technical support\. The project will build on the successes achieved under the UNDP
Rural Energy Development Program (REDP) by extending electrification activities to 40
districts, including 15 that were not covered under the first phase of that program\. It will also
bring together the rural electrification activities supported through the micro-hydro component of
the World Bank Power Development Project and the donor-financed Energy Sector Assistance
Program (ESAP II) to expand the total target level of new micro-hydro installations by 15 MW
by utilizing the CDM revenues to help meet un-financed program implementation and subsidy
costs\.
The project seeks to develop a viable off-grid micro-hydropower market for villages which will
not be served by the national grid for at least 5 years\. It would offer support on both the demand
and supply sides by providing information and social mobilization support, technical training,
and investment subsidy (representing 40 to 70 percent of the initial investment) to communities,
and market information and business development support services to micro-hydro construction
and supply companies\. The micro-hydro plants will be installed by pre-qualified private sector
companies who will receive subsidy payments, technical assistance and credit support\. The
plants will be managed by the communities themselves or by the private sector providers\.
Meters will be installed on each unit, and operating costs will be recovered through tariffs based
upon installed demand for residential users and energy use for larger rural enterprises\.
Page 4
The program will scale-up the promotion of off-grid micro-hydropower plants less than 100 kW
utilizing Peltic systems (up to 3 kW) to supply power for domestic and institutional lighting and
larger micro-hydro systems which can power agro-processing mills, saw mills and other electric
machinery for small cottage industries\. It is anticipated that 15,000 kW from 750 micro-
hydropower plants will be installed between 2003 and 2010, providing access to electricity to an
estimated 142,000 households\. Thirty four schemes generating 589 kW have already been
commissioned under this program, although these schemes are not eligible for early start
crediting and will thus not claim early start emissions reductions under the carbon offset project\.
This project falls under the small-scale CDM project activity with total electricity generation
within the limit of 15 MW\. The project will lead to reduced GHG emissions by:
Replacement of kerosene for lighting;
Replacement of diesel fuel used for agro-processing and other productive use
applications\.
Average household electricity consumption post installation of the micro-hydro units is estimated
to be 27 kWh/month, of which 18 kWh will be used for lighting and 9 kWh will be used for
productive uses\.
The cost of the above investment projects
Project Cost
US$ Million
Project Component
Program Cost
28\.4
Program Development cost including project
appraisal costs, AEPC subsidy, technical
assistance, and program management\.
Installed costs
26\.9
Sponsors plant investment (loan, labor, other
contributions)
Other costs
3\.8
HRD, Goods, Incremental operating costs
TOTAL
59\.1
5\. Financing
Source: ($million)
GoN 2\.26
Domestic borrowings/Equity investment
26\.9
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT IDA GRANT
9\.4
UNDP 3\.57
DANIDA/NORAD 14\.3
Carbon Finance
1\.9
Financing gap
\.65
TOTAL 59\.08
Implementation
Page 5
The project will be implemented by the Alternative Energy Promotion Center (AEPC) with
technical assistance provided by UNDP REDP program\. Funding will be provided by the World
Bank, DANIDA/NORAD through the ESAP Phase II program, GoN, equity contributions and
in-kind contributions from the communities, and carbon finance revenues\.
AEPC will assume overall management of this project\. The REDP project support units will
provide project implementation support and technical assistance to the participating communities
and the private sector providers\. Actual implementation of the micro-hydro installations will be
managed by local governments, i\.e\., District Development Committees (DDC) and the Village
Development Committees (VDC), and will involve formation of a micro-hydro functional group
(MHFG) at each participating community to guide implementation and operation\.
AEPC will extend grants and other project support funds to a District Energy Fund (DEF)
managed by District Development Committees for financing approved micro-hydro project
proposals\. Funds are released from the DEF only after the acquisition of land for the power
house, securitization of the right of way for the canal and distribution lines, and the collection of
collateral for any required local loans\. Investment grants or subsidies are then released based on
output verification, while other costs such as for social mobilization, training, etc\. are paid on an
actual cost basis\. Expenditure statements submitted through the DDCs to AEPC, who confirms
eligibility of expenditures\.
Partnership arrangements
The Alternative Energy Promotion Center (AEPC), under the Ministry of Environment, Science
and Technology is devoted to the development and promotion of renewable and alternative
energy technologies in Nepal\. Established in 1996 by a Government Cabinet Order, the
objective of AEPC is to popularize and promote the use of renewable energy technology to raise
living standards of the rural people of Nepal, to protect the environment and to develop
commercially viable alternative energy industries in the country\. Acting as an intermediary
institution between the operational level NGOs/ private promoters of renewable energy and the
policy deciding levels in relevant ministries, AEPCs activities include renewable energy policy
formulation and planning and facilitating the implementation of the policies/ plans\. The REDP
shall provide continuing technical assistance support to AEPC in the implementation of the
village micro-hydro project\.
The Grant Agreement covering the Second Phase of the Energy Sector Assistance Program
(ESAP II) was signed in March 2007\. Joint funding for this program will be provided by the
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and Norway (NORAD)\.
5\. Monitoring and evaluation of outcomes/results
Monitoring and evaluation will be undertaken through two mechanisms, the World Bank
supervision of the ongoing Power Development project and through the specific monitoring plan
for Verification of Emissions Reductions that will be developed in the CDM Project Design
Document\. The monitoring parameters of the CDM program shall include the number of kWh
produced by each micro-hydro unit as measured by the individual meters, and the number of
households connected to the micro-hydro plant\. AEPC will be accountable for overall reporting
on implementation progress, preparation of financial monitoring reports, and preparation of
Page 6
audited project accounts\. REDP district stall shall conduct regular monitoring of the installed
plants\. AEPC shall also conduct enhanced verification and quality assurance activities\. A
monitoring and verification plan for the community benefits of the program will be developed as
required by the CDCF\. It will be built upon the existing M&E activities undertaken by AEPC
under the World Bank Power Development Project and the annual impact assessment reports\.
6\. Sustainability
Sustainability of the micro-hydro village electrification systems is primarily linked to the
sustainability of the MHFGs, the community mobilization process and the transparency of
operation throughout the life of each sub-project\. Previous experience with the first phase of the
REDP shows that the community mobilization program has been effective, and that system
failures have been few in number\.
However, there are a number of areas where processes (and therefore sustainability) would be
further enhanced, e\.g, (i) further strengthening of the community mobilization process, (ii)
improve the formalization of micro-hydro functional groups; (iii) improve procurement
practices; and (iv) improve the benefit monitoring and evaluation process\. Moreover, an
enhanced benefit monitoring and evaluation program is being implemented as part of the World
Bank Grant program, with the secondary aim of providing early feedback of system failure and
malfunction\.
Extensive training for the operation and maintenance (O&M) staff (two operators and one
manager selected from the local community) assigned to each system is being provided through
the World Bank project, in both technical aspects of system operation and in bill collection,
disconnection for non-payment, record keeping, accounting, etc\. O&M staff are engaged prior to
commencement of construction, are required to sign pledges that prevent them from leaving for
other opportunities once training is completed, and are required to assist with system
construction, plant installation and commissioning\.
7\. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector
The Carbon Finance Project will incorporate lessons learned from the initial implementation
results of the Power Development Project and the previous phases of the UNDP REDP project\.
Recent experience in Nepal has demonstrated that delivery of infrastructure services to rural
communities is more effective and sustainable when beneficiaries are able to actively participate
in project planning and design\. Accordingly, the village electrification component adopts a
community-driven approach, which involves the community through every stage of the
development process including,
inter alia,
organization development, woman's empowerment,
skills enhancement, capital formation, technology promotion and environmental management\.
8\.
Environmental Issues and Safeguard Policies
The environmental impacts of micro hydro projects are generally small, with the main impacts
being (i)
the partial de-watering of a section of riverbed from the intake until water is returned to
the river downstream of the powerhouse, and the consequent effect on aquatic life in the
Page 7
dewatered section; (ii) potential ground / soil erosion caused by flushing flows discharged from
sedimentation basins and by overflows at the forebay, (iii) potential ground instability caused by
canal/pipe construction and leakage from canals; (iv) cutting of forest cover to make way for
construction works, and (v) cutting of trees for use as power poles\. Considering the small size of
these sub-projects, it is not anticipated that there will be any road construction\. In the unlikely
event there are unanticipated impacts, the environmental mitigation plans developed for each
sub-project will address the problems with suitable mitigation measures\.
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project
Yes
No
Environmental Assessment
(
OP
/
BP
/
GP
4\.01)
[ X ]
[ ]
Natural Habitats (
OP
/
BP
4\.04)
[
X
]
[
]
Pest Management (
OP 4\.09
)
[
]
[
X
]
Cultural Property (
OPN 11\.03
,
being revised as OP 4\.11)
[
]
[
X
]
Involuntary Resettlement (
OP
/
BP
4\.12)
[
]
[
X
]
Indigenous Peoples (
OD 4\.20
,
being revised as OP 4\.10)
[
]
[
X
]
Forests (
OP
/
BP
4\.36)
[
X
]
[
]
Safety of Dams (
OP
/
BP
4\.37)
[
]
[
X
]
Projects in Disputed Areas (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.60)
[
]
[
X
]
Projects on International Waterways (
OP
/
BP
/
GP
7\.50)
[
]
[
X]
9
List of Factual Technical Documents
World Bank Nepal Power Development Project, Project Appraisal Document, 2003
Rural Energy Development Programme, Project NEP/02/001, Annual Progress Reports 2003/5
Energy Sector Assistance Program (ESAP I) Progress Reports, Ref\. No\. 104\.Nepal\.802, 2003/5
Nepal Micro-Hydro Carbon Finance Document, December 2005
Nepal Micro-Hydro Promotion by Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (AEPC), CDM-SSC-
PDD (Version 02), April 2007
10 Contact
point
Mudassar Imran
Jeremy Levin
11 For more information contact:
The Info Shop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
| APPROVAL
|
P009057
|  Second Small & Medium Scale Industry
Report No: ; Type: Report/Evaluation Memorandum ; Country: Turkey; Region: Europe And Central Asia; Sector: Small Scale Enterprise; Major Sector:
Industry; ProjectID: P009057
The Turkey Second Small and Medium Industry Project, supported by Loan 3067-TU for
US$204\.5 million equivalent, was approved in FY89\. The loan was closed in FY97, following a one year
extension, and US$2\.2 million was cancelled\. The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was
prepared by the Europe and Central Asia Regional Office\. The Borrowerâs contribution is included as
Part III\.
The project objectives were to assist further in the expansion of small and medium scale
industries (SMIs), improve their competitiveness, increase their export capacity, and strengthen the
financial intermediaries providing credit to the sector\. The loan resources were to finance lines of credit
to finance SMI investment, and a diversified technical assistance (TA) program\. The TA was to
strengthen the project appraisal and supervision capabilities of financial intermediaries\. Other TA
components that directly addressed the SMIs dealt with: (i) improvement of the quality of SMI products
for exports; (ii) promotion of industrial standards; and (iii) further development of the statistical
database on the SMI sector in Turkey\.
After a good start, loan disbursement decreased considerably in 1993 as a result of weak market
demand, high interest rates and competing Government subsidized credits\. In 1994, the loan was
restructured to allow financing of permanent working capital, preshipment export finance and leasing\. In
addition, loan proceeds could be onlent on a single currency basis in US dollars as well as DMs with an
adequate premium over their LIBOR rates\. Following the restructuring, loan utilization increased
substantially and the objectives of the credit component were reached\. The technical assistance program
was on balance successful, but the quality improvement and the statistics components will require further
financial and technical support to be sustainable\.
The ICR, which is of satisfactory quality, rates the project outcome as satisfactory, achievement of
institutional objectives as substantial, sustainability as likely, and Bank and Borrower performance as
satisfactory\. OED concurs with this evaluation\.
The lessons derived from this operation focus on project lending in an uncertain macroeconomic
environment\. Free standing permanent working capital loans with long term maturities can be vital for
enterprises in economies where banks are reluctant to provide term lending in an inflationary
environment\. A credit line can be satisfactory in an inflationary environment for export-oriented
enterprises if loans are made in foreign exchange\.
No audit is planned\.
| APPROVAL
|
P113117
| Page 1
INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS DATASHEET
APPRAISAL STAGE
I\. Basic Information
Date prepared/updated: 10/14/2008
Report No\.: AC3899
1\. Basic Project Data
Country: West Bank and Gaza
Project ID: P113117
Project Name: FOOD PRICE CRISIS RESPONSE PROGRAM - Additional Financing
to Social Safety Net Reform Project
Task Team Leader: Samira Ahmed Hillis
Estimated Appraisal Date: September 2,
2008
Estimated Board Date: November 14, 2008
Managing Unit: MNSHD
Lending Instrument: Emergency Recovery
Loan
Sector: Other social services (100%)
Theme: Global food crisis response (P)
IBRD Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
IDA Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
GEF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
PCF Amount (US$m\.):
0\.00
Other financing amounts by source:
Borrower
0\.00
Special
Financing
5\.00
5\.00
Environmental Category: C - Not Required
Simplified Processing
Simple [X]
Repeater []
Is this project processed under OP 8\.50 (Emergency Recovery)
or OP 8\.00 (Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies)
Yes [X]
No [ ]
2\. Project Objectives
To mitigate the impact of the continued socio-economic crisis on a subset of the poorest
and most vulnerable households\. An additional objective would be to strengthen
MOSAs institutional capacity to manage cash transfer programs\.
3\. Project Description
The proposed Additional Financing grant (out of the Food Price Crisis Response Trust
Fund - FPCR-AF) gives the Palestinian Authority (PA) the opportunity to scale up its
existing safety net instruments to demonstrate its commitment to the poorest and most
vulnerable population groups in the West Bank and Gaza\. The Grant would finance one
payment of $200 to about 25,000 of the poorest households that have been adversely
affected by the recent increase in food prices\. These households will be selected using
the SSNRP poverty targeting database using a proxy means test (PMT) to determine
household eligibility\.
The proceeds of the additional financing grant will finance only cash benefits to poor
households under component 1 of the SSNRP\.
Page 2
4\. Project Location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard
analysis
West Bank and Gaza\.
5\. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists
6\. Safeguard Policies Triggered
Yes No
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01)
X
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04)
X
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36)
X
Pest Management (OP 4\.09)
X
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11)
X
Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4\.10)
X
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12)
X
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37)
X
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP
7\.50)
X
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)
X
II\. Key Safeguard Policy Issues and Their Management
A\. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues
1\. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project\.
Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
N\.A\.
2\. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future
activities in the project area:
N\.A\.
3\. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize
adverse impacts\.
N\.A\.
4\. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues\. Provide
an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described\.
N\.A\.
5\. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and
disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people\.
N\.A\.
B\. Disclosure Requirements Date
Page 3
Environmental Assessment/Audit/Management Plan/Other:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
For category A projects, date of distributing the Executive
Summary of the EA to the Executive Directors
Resettlement Action Plan/Framework/Policy Process:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
Indigenous Peoples Plan/Planning Framework:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
Pest Management Plan:
Was the document disclosed
prior to appraisal?
Date of receipt by the Bank
Date of "in-country" disclosure
Date of submission to InfoShop
*
If the project triggers the Pest Management and/or Physical Cultural Resources,
the respective issues are to be addressed and disclosed as part of the Environmental
Assessment/Audit/or EMP\.
If in-country disclosure of any of the above documents is not expected, please
explain why:
N\.A\.
C\. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the
ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)
The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information
Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank's
Infoshop?
N/A
Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a
form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected
groups and local NGOs?
N/A
All Safeguard Policies
Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities
been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard
policies?
N/A
Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project
cost?
N/A
Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the
N/A
Page 4
monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the
borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal
documents?
N/A
D\. Approvals
Signed and submitted by:
Name
Date
Task Team Leader:
Ms Samira Ahmed Hillis
10/14/2008
Environmental Specialist:
Ms Banumathi Setlur
10/14/2008
Social Development Specialist
Ms Fatou Fall
10/14/2008
Additional Environmental and/or
Social Development Specialist(s):
Approved by:
Regional Safeguards Coordinator:
Mr Hocine Chalal
10/14/2008
Comments: The project has been transferred to the TTL on September 23, 2008\.
Sector Manager:
Ms Roberta V\. Gatti
10/14/2008
Comments:
| APPROVAL
|
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| APPROVAL
|
P119295
| 51759
PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Project Name Karnataka Wind Power Carbon Finance Project, India
Region South Asia
Sector SASDE
Project ID P119295
Borrower(s) NA
Implementing Agency Acciona Wind Energy Pvt\. Ltd\. (AWEPL), a 100% subsidiary of
the Spanish Acciona group of companies, i\.e\. Acciona Energia
Internacional, S\.A\. and Acciona, S\.A\.
Environment Category [ ] A [X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared 19 November 2009
Date of Appraisal 26 October 2009
Authorization
Estimated Date of ERPA 21 December 2009
Signing
I\. Country and Sector Background
The total installed power generation capacity in India at the end of the 10th Plan was
132329\.21MW which included 7760\.60MW from renewable sources of energy\. Keeping in view
the existing energy deficit of 11%, peak deficit of 12% and the envisaged growth of 9% in the
Eleventh Plan, the target of capacity addition in the Eleventh Plan period is an ambitious
78577MW, almost three and a half times the actual capacity addition during the Tenth Plan\.
India is also committed to achieving the desired growth in power sector in a clean, green and
sustainable manner\. Given this and the need to maximally develop domestic supply options as
well as the need to diversify energy sources, renewable energy sources remain important to
India's power sector\. The Eleventh Plan target for renewable power is addition of 14000MW
capacity which includes 10500MW wind based power\.
II\. Objective
The proposed development objectives of the Carbon Offset Project are:
Contribute to sustainable development by providing renewable power to the Karnataka
State electricity grid and reduce greenhouse gas emissions caused by reliance on fossil
fuels
Reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide\.
The objectives of this World Bank Carbon Offset Project are consistent with the developmental
and poverty reduction objectives of the Government of India\.
III\. Rationale for Bank involvement
This Carbon Offset project will facilitate greenhouse gas emission reductions and support the
development of the international market mechanism for trading Emission Reductions (ERs)
developed under the framework of the Kyoto Protocol\.
The final commissioned project cost is US$45\.11 million (1US$=Rs\.47\.86) which is financed
from a debt to equity ratio of 61:39\. The O&M costs are around 1% per annum\. As per Project
Design Document (prepared for CDM registration), the project IRR without considering CDM
revenues is 11\.93% and with CER revenue @9 per CER, is 13\.65%1\. This is stated to barely
meet the return criteria factoring the risk premium\. Acciona has executed a 10 year Power
Purchase Agreement with Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited (BESCOM) for sale
of electricity at a fixed rate (no escalation) of Rs\.3\.40 per unit (kWh)\. At present, this is the only
revenue stream available\. The sale of emission reduction credits to the World Bank-executed
Spanish Carbon Fund will make the implementation of the project more financially viable, by
providing an additional revenue stream\. This will provide increased financial comfort to the
project and lead to development of renewable energy based power in the region\.
This project is consistent with the India Country Assistance Strategy in that it augments the
generation of power while ensuring environmental sustainability and leads to reduction of
poverty by providing employment and economic opportunities to the local population\.
IV\. Description
The project consists of two 29\.7MW wind power plants located in Arasinagundi (13\.20MW) and
Anabaru (16\.50MW), in Davangere district of the Indian state of Karnataka, owned by Acciona
Wind Energy Private Limited (AWEPL), a 100% subsidiary of the Spanish Acciona group of
companies, i\.e\. Acciona Energia Internacional, S\.A\. and Acciona, S\.A\. The delivery of the power
plants was done by Vestas Wind Technology India Pvt\. Ltd, who are also the Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) contractors\. The plants are commissioned and under operation -
Arasinagundi since June'08 and Anabaru since Sept'08\. The electricity generated from the
project is supplied to the Karnataka Power Corporation Limited (KPTCL) sub-station at
Hiremallaholle, and from there to the state grid\. The project was registered as a Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) project with the CDM Executive Board on 20 November
20082\. The first verification of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) is under process3\. A Letter
of Intent (LoI) has been executed between the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) acting as the trustee of the Spanish Carbon Fund and AWEPL for the
transaction of 178,917 Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated from the Project from 1
January 2010 until 31 December 2012\.
1
As per the Project Design Document prepared for CDM registration
2
Project Reference no\. 1949
3
The final Monitoring Report was submitted to CDM Executive Board by BvQI with Request for Issuance on 9
October 2009 for the First Verification Report for CERs\. The completeness check is pending by UNFCCC after
which the documents will be hosted for the mandatory disclosure period of 15 days for review prior to CER
issuance\.
AWEPL has executed a 10 year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with Bangalore Electricity
Supply Company Limited (BESCOM) for sale of electricity at a fixed rate (no escalation) of
Rs\.3\.40 per unit (kWh)\. The tariff from 11th year onwards will be decided by Karnataka
Electricity Regulatory Commission (KERC), and BESCOM can exercise its option to procure
electricity at the KERC determined tariff, else AWEPL can enter into agreement with a third
party\.
Carbon revenues are necessary for improving financial viability of the project as they will
provide additional financial comfort to the project sponsor\. This in turn would provide
encouragement to other investors in the area and would be in line with the larger Government of
India objective of scaling up the share of renewable energy in Indian power sector\.
Monitoring and evaluation will be undertaken through the specific plan for Verification of
Emissions Reductions included in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Project Design
Document\. AWEPL will be responsible for periodic verification, certification, preparation and
submission of verification reports\.
V\. Financing
(US$ million4)
Source:
Equity 17\.59
Local Financial Institutions 27\.52
Total 45\.11
VI\. Implementation
AWEPL is responsible for overall implementation of the project including periodic verification
and certification of emission reductions, preparation and submission of verification reports\. The
Operation and Maintenance is presently contracted out to Vestas India Pvt\. Ltd\. who also
delivered the two projects\. The present O&M contracts are valid for 2 years and cover day to day
operations, scheduled/unscheduled plant/33kV transmission line maintenance\. AWEPL is
considering the continuation of the arrangement beyond this period\.
VII\. Sustainability
The project activity will achieve the objectives of sustainable development by
Substituting electricity generated using conventional fossil fuel with wind energy based
power
Mitigating the emission of GHG (CO2) as wind is a renewable source of energy
Conserving coal and other non-renewable natural resource
The project is in line with the policies of Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, India,
as it contributes its share towards achievement of the 11th Plan target of 10,500 MW of
renewable wind energy by 2012
4
1US$= Rs\.47\.86
Increasing the share of renewable energy in the regional grid
Reducing pollutants like SOX, NOX etc associated with other power plants
Contributing towards reducing power shortage in the state of Karnataka
Generate local employment and other economic activity in areas near the project
Help to bridge India's energy deficit
Contributing to the growth of Wind Energy sector in India
VIII\. Lessons Learned from past experiences in the country/sector
This project draws from previous World Bank operational experiences and analytic and advisory
work in renewable energy, especially wind energy\.
The project applies an approved small-scale CDM Methodology utilized by several CDM
projects registered with the UNFCCC\.
IX\. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation)
The project triggers the World Bank's Environmental Assessment Policy (OP/BP 4\.01) and was
designated a Category B as the potential negative environmental impacts of the project are site
specific and manageable with the proposed mitigation measures\. The table below lists the
applicable World Bank Safeguard Policies\.
Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No TBD
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4\.01) [X] []
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4\.04) [] [X]
Pest Management (OP 4\.09) [] [X]
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4\.11) [X] []
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4\.12) [] []
Indigenous Peoples ( OP/BP 4\.10) [X] []
Forests (OP/BP 4\.36) [X] []
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4\.37) [] [X]
Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7\.60)5 [] [X]
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7\.50) [] [X]
Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental
[] [X]
and Social Issues in Bank-Supported Projects (OP/BP 4\.00)
Overall, the project will have positive impact on the global environment due to reduction in the
Green House Gas emissions\. There may be some localized adverse impacts in the project area
which are being mitigated through the implementation of several mitigation and enhancement
measures by the project sponsors\. Key measures include: plantation in about 30ha of land in lieu
of plantation in the project site, provision of gully checks and on-site plantation, underground
cabling within site to minimize potential visual impacts and hazard to birds, and implementation
of a systematic waste management plan\. Consultations were held with the various stakeholders
during project preparation and PDD formulation\.
5
By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties' claims on the
disputed areas
The project activities are not expected to adversely impact the local communities\. However,
Acciona has proactively been adopting a strategy to help the local people, particularly the tribal
and other vulnerable communities, in accessing the project benefits including wage employment\.
An environmental and social assessment (ESA) report documenting the environmental and social
measures undertaken during project construction and addendum updating the current conditions
have been prepared\. The executive summary of the ESA has been translated into the local
language Kannada and is being locally disclosed in the Gram Panchayat offices of the two
villages where the two subprojects are located\. The project sponsor is also considering the
possibility of hosting the ESA report along with its executive summary on their website\.
X\. List of Factual Technical Documents
Project Design Document (PDD)
Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet (ISDS)
Environmental and Social Assessment (ESA) Report and Addendum to ESA for both sites
Letter of Intent between International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
Acciona Wind Energy Private Limited, India\.
XI\. Contact Point
Kavita Saraswat
ksaraswat@worldbank\.org
Fax: +91 11 41177849
70 Lodi Estate
New Delhi 110021
India\.
XII\. For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-5454
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
| APPROVAL
|
P000354
| Document de
La Banque Mondiale
A N'UTILISER QU'A DES FINS OFFICIELLES
Rapport No\. 3448-CM
RAPPORT D'EVALUATION
CAMEROUN
PROJET FORESTIER
22 decembre 1981
"
J
Region Afrique de l'Ouest
Agriculture 2
TRADUCTION NON-OFFICIELLE A TITRE D'INFORMATION
Le present document fait I'objet d'une diffusion restreinte, et ne peut etre utilise par ses
destinataires que dans I'exercice de leurs fonetions officielles\. Sa teneur ne peut etre
autrement dhulguee sans I'autorisation de la Banque Mondiale\.
CAMEROUN
PROJET FORESTIER
RAPPORT D'EVALUATION
Table des matieres
Pages
1\. INTRODUCTION \. 1
A\. Generali tes \. 1
B\. Le secteur forestier et l'economie 1
a) Contribution a l'economie \. 1
b) Ressources et industries forestieres \. 2
c) F inancement du secteur 4
d) Institutions et formation \. 5
e) Objectifs, strategies et politiques 7
f) Role de la Banque et des autres agences d'aide
exterieure 8
I I\. ZONE DU PRO JET 9
III\. LE PROJET \. 11
A\. Obj ecti fs \. 11
B\. Caracteristiques detaillees \. 12
a) Plantation d'Edea \. 12
b) Plantation de la SEMRY \. 14
c) Plantation de Ngaoundere \. 15
d) Services de production de graines \. 15
e) Renforcement du FNFP \. 16
f) Renforcement de la DEFC \. 16
g) Etudes et preparation d'un eventuel projet de suivi\. 17
IV\. ORGANISATION ET GESTION \. 18
A\. Generalites\. 18
B\. Dispositions en matiere de plantation 18
Le present document fait l'objet d'une diffusion restreinte\. 11 ne peut etre
utilise par ses destinataires que dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions officielles
et sa teneur ne peut etre divulguee sans l'autorisation de la Banque mondiale\.
Table des matieres (suite)
Pages
C\. Renforcement du FNFP \. 20
D\. Renforcement de la DEFC \. 20
E\. Formation \. \. 21
F\. Suivi et evaluation retrospective \. 22
G\. Production de graines et liaison avec les services de
recherche \. 22
V\. COUTS ET DISPOSITIONS FINANCIERES \. \. 24
A\. Estimations des coOts du projet 24
B\. Financement envisage \. \. 24
C\. Condi tions de retrocession \. 26
D\. Passation des marches \. 28
E\. Decaissement \. \. 28
VI\. PRODUCTION, DEBOUCHES ET RESULTATS FINANCIERS \. 31
A\. Production \. \. 31
B\. Debouches et commercialisation \. 31
C\. Resultats financiers \. 33
VII\. AVANTAGES, JUSTIFICATION ECONOMIQUE ET RISQUES \. 36
A\. Avantages \. 36
B\. Justification economique \. 36
C\. Risques \. 40
VIII\.ASSURANCES ET RECOMMANDATIONS \. 41
ANNEXES
Tableaux
Tableau 1 Estimations des coOts du projet
Tableau 2 Plan de financement envisage
INTRODUCTION
A\. Generalites
1\.01 Le Gouvernement camerounais a demande a la Banque de l'aider a
financer un projet forestier quinquennal dans les provinces du Centre-Sud
et du Nord, d'un cout estimatif de 35,5 millions de dollars\. Le projet
portera sur l'amenagement de trois plantations et d'une unite de produc
tion de semences ameliorees, et fournira une assistance technique au Fonds
national forestier et piscicole (FNfP), qui est responsable des programmes de
reboisement de l'Etat, ainsi qu'une aide logistique et technique a la Direction
des eaux et forets et des chasses (DEPC) qui est charg~e de la cote et de la
perception des impOts forestie~s\. Le projet sera Ie premier projet benefi
ciant d'une aide de la Banque a porter exclusivement sur Ie secteur forestier
au Cameroun\.
1\.02 Le projet a ete identifie en fevrier-mars 1979 par une mission sec
torielle du Programme de cooperation fAO/Banque mondiale et en novembre 1979
par une seconde mission d'identification; il a ete prepare par une mission du
Programme de cooperation qui s'est rendue au Cameroun en mai-juin 1980\. Le
present rapport a ete etabli a la suite du sejour effectue au Cameroun, en
janvier-fevrier 1981 par une mission d'evaluation de la Banque composee de
MM\. John Russell, Robert Fishwick, Robert Crown et Christopher Ward\. MM\. Sean
Magee et frank Dorward (CDC) ant participe a l'evaluation de la composante
plantation d'Edea\.
B\. Le secteur forestier et l'economie
a) Contribution a l'economie
1\.03 La Republique Unie du Cameroun s'etend sur 1 200 km, du golfe de
Guinee au sud-ouest au lac Tchad au nord; elle a une superficie de 475 000 km2\.
On y trouve un vaste eventail de conditions climatiques allant de la zone sahe
lienne a l'extreme nord a la foret tropicale humide au sud, qui rend pos
sible une agriculture diversifiee et lui permet presque, a l'heure actuelle, de
subvenir a ses besoins alimentaires\. Les forets couvrent environ 33 millions
d'hectares\. le pays doit exploiter de plus en plus ses reserves de petrole et
de bauxite mais son developpement industriel est encore dans une grande mesure
fonde sur l'agriculture et la foresterie, et repose sur Ie traitement des pro
duits de base, tels que Ie cacao et les palmistes, et de la transformation des
grumes en bois d'oeuvre, en bois deroule, en contreplaque, et en pate de bois\.
les industries alimentaires representent 45 % du chiffre d'affaires total du
secteur industriel\. D'un autre cOte, bien que les ressources forestisres
soient considerables et que des permis d'abattage aient ete accordes pour
7,7 millions d'hectares en 1977/78, on estimait que la valeur ajoutee dans ce
secteur n'etait que de 8 % de la production agricole nette et 4 % du PIB\.
- 2
1\.04 Les investissements d'infrastructure ant porte sur l'amelioration du
reseau routier, et en particulier des pistes rurales indispensables au mouve
ment des produits agricoles, sur la modernisation du reseau ferroviaire trans
camerounais, sur l'expansion des installations portuaires de Douala, et l'etude
des possibilites d'amenagement d'un nouveau port a Rocher du Loup entre Kribi
et Campo\. Ces investissements faciliteront Ie transport en vrac des produits
de base de gros volume, tels les produits forestiers qui a l'heure actuelle
sont surtout ex partes a l'etat brut\. D'un autre cOte, Ie developpement des
installations de transport dans Ie sud-est, au se trouvent un grand nombre des
for@ts les plus riches du pays, a pris du retard\.
1\.05 La population, estimee a 8,3 millions d'habitants en 1979, augmente
d'environ 2,3 % par an, et plus de 40 % des Camerounais sont ~ges de mains
de 15 ansa Sur une population adulte de 5 millions de personnes, 74 %, soit
3,7 millions, travaillent dans Ie secteur rural et environ 25 % ant des emplois
urbains\. La densite varie enormement entre les regions : dans la province de
l'Ouest et certaines parties de la province du Nord, elle atteint 200 habitants
au plus au km2 , alors quIa l'autre extreme dans la province de l'Est, elle
nlest que de 3 habitants au km2 Selon les projections, en llan 2000 la popu
lation atteindra 16 millions d'habitants, dont pres de la moitie vivront dans
des villes\. Cette croissance va creer une tres forte demande de materiaux de
construction et de bois de feu, surtout dans les regions de grande concentra
tion rurale au l'acces dlautres sources d'energie est limite et coOteux\.
1\.06 Le PNB etant estime aujourdlhui a 4,4 milliards de dollars, Ie revenu
par habitant est de 518 dollars\. Le PNB a progresse au rythme d'environ 4,5 %
par an entre 1970 et 1975 et 7,1 % par an entre 1975 et 1980\. Les revenus par
habitant ant augmente d' environ la moitie de ces taux\. Mais entre 1980 et 1981,
la croissance du PNB n'a ete que de 3,5 %\. Cette chute est due a la baisse du
cours des produits de base exportes, cafe et cacao notamment, et au ralentisse
ment des investissements\. Le taux d'inflation, qui etait en moyenne de 6,2 %
entre 1969 et 1973, est passe a 11,8 % entre 1974 et 1978 et est aujourd'hui
d'environ 12 %\. Le Gouvernement slest fixe pour objectif de retablir un taux
de croissance de 6 % dans Ie cadre du Quatrieme Plan national (1976/77-1980/81)
et, pendant la merne periode, a porte son budget d'investissements initiale
ment prevu pour 685 milliards de francs CFA (2,5 milliards de dollars) a
930 milliards de francs CFA (3,4 milliards de dollars)\. Au cours des quatre
premiers Plans, 14 % uniquement des investissements realises par l'Etat et le
secteur prive avaient ete consacres a l'agriculture et au developpement rural\.
Cette proportion est recemment passee a environ 16 % et lIon s'attend que
les credits budgetaires affectes a l'agriculture augmentent encore dans Ie
cadre du Cinquieme Plan, aujourd'hui en preparation\.
b) Ressources et industries forestieres
1\.07 On estime que la for@t couvre 33 millions d'hectares, soit les deux
tiers de la superficie du pays: 18 millions d'hectares de for@t dense, et
15 millions d'hectares de savane et ripisylves\. Cependant, on conna1t mal la
qualite et le volume du bois exploitable dans ces forets puisque 700 000 ha
seulement ont ete inventories\. La FAD a fait un inventaire de 176 000 ha dans
- 3
la for@t du Deng-Deng, ~ui montre que les volumes commercialement exploitables
peuvent atteindre 160 m a l'hectare; des etudes de la futaie tropicale humide
autour d'Edea et les resultats obtenus au moment du de mar rage de la scierie de
la Cellucam ont montre que le volume utilisable pour le projet de pate a bois
3
est d'environ 190 m a l'hectare\. Toutefois, a cause de la diversite des
essences, les petits echantillonnages sont des indicateurs peu fiables, et ac
tuellement la production moyenne des exploitations forestieres n'est que d'en
3
viron 10 m a l'hectare\.
1\.08 En 1978/79, des permis d'exploitation portant sur 7,7 millions d'hec
tares ont ete attribues a une centaine de concessionnaires travaillant dans
quelque 200 concessions concentrees dans les trois provinces du Centre-Sud
(3,3 millions d'hectares), de l'Est (2,8 millions d'hectares) et du Littoral
(1 million d'hectares); les 600 000 ha de concessions restants se trouvent dans
les provinces de l'Ouest et du Sud-Ouest\. Environ la moitie des concessions
ont moins de 50 000 ha, superficie inferieure a la moyenne de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest, et 10 % sont de grandes concessions entre 200 000 et 250 000 ha\.
Environ 10 % des societes forestieres sont des entreprises mixtes ou publiques\.
Malgre les encouragements de l'Etat aux entreprises locales, des compagnies
etrangeres detiennent des concessions sur 70 % de la superficie exploitee\. En
3
1978/79, la production de grumes a ete de 1,6 million de m , soit une augmen
tation importante par rapport au 1,3 million de m 3 de l'anneee precedente\.
3
La production annuelle pourrait passer a 2 millions de m pratiquement sans
nouvel investissement\.
1\.09 L'integration verticale tres poussee (abattage, traitement et commer
cialisation des grumes) est encouragee par des textes officiels qui exigent
que les concessionnaires exploitant plus de 10 000 ha fassent subir un premier
traitement aux grumes\. En 1977/78, quelque 75 scieries ont produit environ
3 3
250 000 m de bois scie, dont 75 000 m ont ete exportes\. 11 existe ac
tuellement deux usines produisant du bois de deroulage et deux autres sont en
construction\. En 1977/78, la production de bois deroule a ete de 40 000 m , 3
dont 90 % pour l'exQortation\. Le marche interieur a absorbe la plus grande
3
partie des 30 000 m de panneaux de particules et de contreplaque\.
1\.10 Dans le cadre de la politique officielle visant a accroitre la
valeur ajoutee interieure du secteur et, a long terme, a approvisionner en
papier 1e marche interieur, une usine de pate a papier a ete creee a Edea
(carte BIRD 15692) par la Societe cellulose du Cameroun SA (Cellucam) en 1980\.
La Cellucam est une entreprise d'investissement d'economie mixte dont l'Etat,
par l'intermediaire de la Societe nationale d'investissement (SNI) et de quatre
aut res organismes plus petits, est le principal actionnaire (67 % du capital
social)\. Les autres actionnaires sont la Banque islamique de developpement
(12 %), Voest-Alpine (6 %), la Societe luxembourgeoise de financement pour
l'Afrique (5 %), 1a Societe europeenne d'investissement industrie1 en Afrique
(3 ra) et deux particuliers (7 %)\. Voest-Alpine (Autriche) a installe l'usine
et fournit l'assistance technique necessaire a son exploitation\. Svenska
Cellulosa AB, le plus grand fabricant suedois de pate a papier et de papier,
fournit les debouches\. L'usine peut produire 122 000 tonnes de pate au
- 4
sulfate blanchie par an, et sa production provient a l'heure actuelle d'une
for~t naturelle de 160 000 ha de feuillus au nord d'Edea contenant environ
100\.000 ha de for~t exploitable\. Du point de vue technique, l'abattage des
arbres et la preparation de la pate sont d'excellente qualite et l'usine a
commence a produire de la pate blanchie en janvier 1981\. La pate produite
est d'une qualite acceptable sur les marches mondiaux pour les pates a fibre
courte, et il est probable que la Cellucam degagera des benefices d'exploita
tion en 1983 lorsqu'elle travaillera a 100 ~ de sa capacite reelle\. Cependant,
malgre ses atouts techniques et la qualite de sa production, la Cellucam fait
face a des difficultes financieres\. La hausse des coats a fait passer les
investissements d'environ 165 millions de dollars a 350 000 millions de
dollars a la fin de 1980; cette augmentation a ete financee par des credits
fournisseurs et des credits de banques commerciales a court terme\. Le rembour
sement de ces credits devant se faire au cours des cinq prochaines annees, la
Cellucam vient de negocier des accords de refinancement avec ses actionnaires
et les banques commerciales\. La participation de la Cellucam au projet envi
sage sera regie par un contrat d'execution, qui a ete discute au cours des
negociations (par\. 4\.02)\.
1\.11 Lorsque les plantations du projet seront arr1vees a maturite, la
Cellucam achetera Ie bois produit\. Elle en retirera certains avantages : au
lieu de preparer la pate a bois a partir de feuillus tropicaux d'essences
diverses, comme elle Ie fait aujourd'hui, elle sera approvisionnee en bois de
taille et de densite uniformes, situe a des distances raisonnables de l'usine,
et plante en rangs reguliers\. Le coat de l'abattage et du transport du bois
jusqu'a l'usine pourrait ~tre reduit d'environ 33 ~ par rapport au coat d'ex
ploitation des forets naturelles, et Ie coat de la transformation par tonne
de pate baisserait d'environ 20 ~ par suite de la reduction du temps de prepa
ration et du traitement chimique\. De plus, les plantations envisagees contien
dront des pins qui ne poussent pas naturellement dans la foret tropicale; or
Ie pin donne une pate a longue fibre, indispensable a la production de papier,
qui se vend sur les marches mondiaux a 8 % de plus que la pate a fibre courte,
du type actuellement produit par la Cellucam\. Ainsi, la politique de la
Cellucam d'utiliser du bois cultive en plantation au lieu de for~t naturelle
accroltra la valeur ajoutee interieure et ira dans Ie sens de la strategie
sectorielle de l'Etat (par\. 1\.19)\.
c) Financement du secteur
1\.12 D'une maniere generale, Ie secteur prive a pu facilement obtenir des
financements pour les entreprises forestieres et, jusqu'a present, l'exploita
tion a ete dominee par des compagnies etrangeres\. Cependant, outre les inves
tissements dans la Cellucam, la SNI a pris des participations au capital social
d'un certain nombre d'entreprises de transformation du bois\. Au cours du Plan
quinquennal 1976/77-1980/81, les investissements prevus pour Ie secteur fores
tier etaient de 21,7 milliards de francs CFA (80 millions de dollars), fournis
a 80 ~ par Ie secteur prive\. La contribution de l'Etat a en grande partie ete
affectee a des actions de reboisement et a des plantations d'enrichissement
executees par Ie FNFP\.
- 5
1\.13 L'Etat tire des recettes du secteur forestier par l'intermediaire :
i) de deux impots annuels payes par les concessionnaires (la redevance com
munale et la redevance de reforestation); ii) de charges codifiees pour l'oc
troi ou Ie renouvellement des concessions; et iii) des redevances per~ues sur
Ie cubage du bOis exporte ou traite dans Ie pays\. La loi specifie que la tota
lite de la redevance de reforestation et des charges codifiees et 55 % des
redevances per~ues sur Ie bois coupe sont affectees au programme de reboisement
de l'Etat\. Cependant, bien que Ie nombre des concessionnaires et la superficie
des concessions soient restees relativement stables depuis 1977, et que Ie vo
lume de grumes transformees et exportees ait augmente, les redevances per~ues ont
baisse : en effet, les redevances sur Ie bois coupe ont ete mal calculees
pres de la moitie de la recolte n'a pas ete comptee dans l'assiette de l'im
pot - et les reglements portant sur les redevances et les charges annuelles
et quinquennales ont ete mal appliques\. En consequence, au 30 juin 1980, envi
ron 1,5 milliard de francs CFA (5,6 millions de dollars) des charges et des
redevances mises en recouvrement n'avaient pas ete acquittes\. Cette somme est
presque egale aux recettes per~ues en 1979/80, et represente environ Ie double
des arrieres au 30 juin 1978\. De plus, plus de 64 % des impayes etaient dus
par Ie tiers des concessionnaires exploitant des superficies superieures a
100 000 ha\. Cela s'est produit parce que les sanctions legales dont dispose
Ie Gouvernement pour percevoir les arrieres n'ont pas ete rigoureusement appli
quees\. De plus, Ie manque de ressourCes materielles et financieres pour Ie
calcul et la perception des redevances et des charges, et la lourdeur de l'ap
pareil administratif ont reduit l'efficacite des organismes responsables\. Mais
depuis avril 1981, l'Etat fait un vigoureux effort pour encaisser ses arrieres
et, au moment des negociations, il avait recouvre environ 500 millions de
francs CFA (1,9 million de dollars)\. En outre, pour eviter qu'une telle situa
tion ne se reproduise, il a commence a mettre en place de nouvelles procedures
administratives et de nouvelles structures hieerarchiques\. Au cours des nego~
ciations, Ie Gouvernement a convenu de prendre toutes les mesures necessaires
pour percevoir d'ici au 31 decembre 1982 les redevances et charges qui etaient
exigibles au 31 juillet 1980\. II s'est engage a prendre a l'avenir les mesures
voulues pour que les redevances et charges forestieres soient correctement
calculees et per~ues dans les 12 mois suivant la date de calcul\. l 'Etat affec
tera des fonds pour renforcer la Direction des eaux et for@ts et des chasses
(DEFC), tant du point de vue logistique que materiel (par\. 3\.13)\. En cas de
besoin, il emploiera des consultants pour l'aider a appliquer strictement les
nouveaux reglements; il continuera a employer des cadres superieurs de la DEFC
exclusivement charges de calculer et de percevoir les charges et redevances
dans les cinq grandes provinces forestieres\.
d) Institutions et formation
1\.14 le Ministere de l'agriculture (MINAGRI) est charge d'elaborer la
politique forestiere et d'assurer la surveillance du secteur\. II exerce ses
responsabilites par l'intermediaire de deux organismes : Ie premier est la
DEFC, responsable de la planification du secteur, y compris de la direction
des programmes de replantation, de la gestion des for@ts domaniales, et de
- 6
la supervlslon de toutes les exploitations forestieres\. Bien que la DEFC soit
chargee de calculer et de percevoir les redevances et charges sectorielles,
ses depenses de fonctionnement sont financees par des credits budgetaires, et
son budget d'investissement par Ie FNFP\. Cela la laisse chroniquement a court
de fonds d'exploitation, et sans pratiquement aucune latitude pour renforcer
son soutien logistique\. Elle emploie 880 personnes\. Trois bureaux se trouvent
a son siege a Yaounde: Etudes et programmes (planification et statistiques),
Production et industries forestieres (supervision quotidienne et calcul et per
ception des charges et redevances) et Faune et environnement\. Compte tenu de
ses responsabilites, les locaux et Ie materiel dont dispose la DEFC sont insuf
fisants, ce qui explique en partie les carences de son contr61e financier\.
La DEFC va disposer de l'autorite necessaire pour imposer les penalites voulues
en cas de retard dans les paiements des redevances et charges\. La DEFC est
representee dans chaque province\. A l'echelon Ie plus bas de la hierarchie on
\.trouve Ie Poste forestier, tenu par un agent technique justifiant d'une annee
de formation : il est charge de mesurer et de marquer les grumes a la sortie
des concessions\. Il y a normalement un poste par arrondissement, ce qui n'est
pas suffisant pour couvrir convenablement les regions ou plusieurs concessions
sont exploitees\. Les postes sont groupes en sections dirigees par des tech
niciens justifiant de deux ans de formation; ces sections coincident en gros
avec les departements, qui comptent en moyenne huit concessions\. Le chef de
section est charge de recueillir et de presenter sous forme statistique les
renseignements des concessions sur Ie volume de bois recolte\. Mais les chefs
de section n'ont pas les moyens de transport necessaires pour aller verifier
sur Ie terrain les volumes de bois declares par Ie poste/le concessionnaire,
ce qui rend leur contr61e peu efficace\. Au niveau de la province, Ie bureau
de la DEFC - dirige par Ie Conservateur provincial - est charge de verifier Ie
travail des chefs de section, de calculer les redevances et charges dues sur
Ie bois recolte, et de verifier leur versement\. Cependant, les sieges provin
ciaux n'ont ni les moyens de transport ni les installations voulus pour tra
vailler d' une fa~on efficace\. Des mesures seront prises dans Ie cadre du pro
jet pour remedier a cette situation (par\. 3\.13)\.
1\.15 Le FNFP est un organisme public autonome responsable de l'execution
du programme de replantation\. Environ 90 % de ses fonds viennent directement
des redevances et charges versees par les concessionnaires a la DEFC\. Le FNFP
est dirige par un conseil d'administration ou siege Ie Directeur de la DEFC,
mais il dispose d'une autonomie considerable\. Les operations du FNFP, dirigees
par un petit bureau a Yaounde, sont tres decentralisees : Ie pays est divise \.
en chantiers qui correspondent, dans une grande mesure, aux provinces\. Dans
chaque chantier, un chef de chantier supervise un certain nombre de chefs de
base en fait charges de l'execution des programmes de plantation\. Jusqu'a
present, Ie programme de plantation du FNFP a ete modeste; environ 2 500 ha par
an, dont 60 % en plantations d'enrichissement dans les futaies tropicales, et
Ie reste en plantations dans la zone de la savane\. Du point de vue technique,
les resultats ont ete mediocres : les taux de perte enregistres dans les nou
velles plantations sont eleves, l'entretien y est faible et Ie travail generale
ment lent et coOteux\. La baisse des recettes provenant des redevances et
charges, qui sont tombees d'un maximum de 1,1 milliard de francs CFA
- 7
(4,1 millions de dollars) en 1978 a 700 millions de francs CFA (2,6 millions
de dollars) en 1980, a egalement cause de graves problemes budgetaires au FNFP\.
Cependant, gr~ce au renforcement envisage de ses capacites techniques, finan
cieres et administratives (par\. 3\.12), Ie FNFP devrait devenir un instrument
efficace d'execution de la politique officielle de regeneration des plantations\.
1\.16 La grave penurie de cadres et de techniciens justifiant d'une bonne
experience sur Ie terrain, dont souffrent la DEFC et Ie FNFP, nuit a la bonne
administration et au developpement du secteur\. L'Ecole nationale superieure
agronomique de Nkolbisson pourvoit aux besoins de formation des cadres\. Cette
ecole peut diplOmer 16 etudiants par an, ce qui est suffisant pour les besoins
futurs du Cameroun\. Le college de Mbalmayo forme actuellement 10 techniciens
par an, ce qui est egalement suffisant pour satisfaire les besoins previsibles\.
Cependant, ces diplomes - et Ie personnel deja en poste - ont, avant tout, be
soin de suivre des stages pratiques dans des exploitations techniquement bien
gerees Ie projet leur en donnera la possibilite\.
1\.17 Les stations de recherche et les plantations produisent aujourd'hui
a petite echelle des semences hybrides de pin et d'eucalyptus, mais aucun orga
nisme n'est charge d'importer, de certifier, de selectionner et de reproduire
des semences de bonne qualite\. II en resulte que les hybrides disponibles
actuellement commencent a perdre leur vigueur, parce que l'on ne s'efforce pas
de trouver ni de diffuser des semences de la meilleure origine possible pour
les essences exotiques\. Dans Ie cadre du projet cette tache serait confiee
au FNFP\.
1\.18 Les inter~ts des industries forestieres sont representes aupres du
Gouvernement par Ie Syndicat des exploitants forestiers, qui participe regulie
rement a des reunions d'information avec la DEFC et Ie MINAGRI\.
e) Objectifs, strategies et politigues
1\.19 les objectifs du Gouvernement dans Ie secteur forestier tela qu'ils
ont ete definis par des lois passees en 1973 et 1974 sont les suivants
etendre les superficies des for~ts domaniales classees;
assurer l'exploitation rationnel1e et planifiee des for~ts;
regenerer les for~ts par des plantations d'enrichissement dans la
for~t dense et par Ie reboisement dans les savanes; et
accroltre Ia valeur ajoutee interne gr~ce au traitement des
grumes\.
Etant donne l'etat actuel du secteur, ces buts sont juges raisonnables\. Cepen
dant, Ies resultat ont ete inegaux\. Le classement de nouveaux perimetres
avance lentement, la regeneration n'atteint m~me pas la moitie du rythme
prevu, et les taux de survie sont faibles\. Le pourcentage de la valeur ajoutee
interieure est de 20 % inferieur au niveau souhaite\. Ces resultats sont
- 8
d'autant plus decevants que les objectifs etaient modestes et des sommes consi
derables ont ete allouees a leur realisation\. Cette situation se perpetue sur
tout parce que les cadres du FNFP qui devraient organiser et suivre l'execution
des programmes n'ont pas les competences techniques requises sur Ie terrain\.
f) ROle de la Bangue et des autres agences d'aide exterieure
1\.20Ce sera la premiere fois que la Banque participera a un projet exclu
sivement consacre au secteur forestier au Cameroun\. Toutefois deux projets de
developpement rural - Ie Projet de developpement rural des plateaux de l'Ouest
(Cr\. 784-CM) et Ie Projet de developpement de la province du Nord (Cr\. l075-CM,
Prat 1919-CM) - comportent des volets forestiers visant a encourager Ie reboise
ment a petite echelle et la lutte contre l'erosion\. Las programmes des pla
teaux de l'Ouest avancent bien et Ie volet reboisement dans la province du Nord
vient de demarrer\. Le projet s'inscrit dans la logique du Document de politique
generale du secteur forestier, publie par la Banque, qui dit que les planta
tions forestieres industrielles, du genre de celles qui sont proposees ici, ont
une place dans la strategie forestiere globale du pays au meme titre que les
petits projets forestiers et qu'il est indispensable de renforcer les institu
tions travaillant dans ce secteur\.
1\.21 Le secteur forestier du Cameroun a egalement beneficie d'une assis
tance bilaterale pour la formation des techniciens forestiers a Nkolbisson,
et pour la recherche forestiere\. Le programme pilote de boisement actuellement
en cours dans la zone de la SEMRY (carte BIRD 15692) permet d'identifier des
essences et fournit des renseignements precieux qui seront utilises dans Ie
projet\. Dans Ie cadre d'un autre accord bilateral, Ie Cameroun re90it une
assistance technique dans les domaines de la politique sectorielle et de la
photographie aerienne pour l'etude, la classification et l'inventaire de la
Foret; tous ces elements completeront Ie projet\.
- 9
II\. ZONE DU PROJET
2\.01 Localisation: Le projet portera sur la plantation d'arbres dans
troia regions separees et differentes du point de vue ecologique, et renforcera
la production de semences ameliorees dans quatre perimetres\. Les plantations
couvriront 11 000 ha, dont 8 800 a Edea, dans Ie sud-ouest qui approvisionne
ront l'usine de pate a papier de la Cellucam en bois de pate cultive indus
triellement\. Mille hectares seront plantes pres de Ngaoundere sur Ie plateau
d'Adamaoua pour la production en bois d'oeuvre et en poteaux electriques qui
s'ajoutera a celIe d'une plantation de 600 ha existante; 1 200 ha plantes pres
de Maga, dans Ie nord, viendront s'ajouter a la plantation de 600 ha de bois
de feu que la SEMRY est en train d'etablir (par\. 1\.21)\. II existe dans ces
deux dernieres zones des terres disponibles pour Ie boisement, et etant donne
la rarete du bois dans la region, cette utilisation des sols est economiquement
souhaitable\. Tous les sites envisages, indiques sur la carte BIRD 15692, sont
desservis par de bonnes routes, par des liaisons aeriennes regulieres vers les
regions de Ngaoundere et Maga (Maroua) et par des communications regulieres\.
2\.02 Topographie et sols: La topographie et les sols de ces trois regions
sont differents\. A Edea, 75 % des terres peuvent etre plantees, Ie reste
consistant en collines rocailleuses, en marecages, ou en rives escarpees de
cours d'eau\. Les sols de la foret ont un bon ecoulement, ils sont profonds,
souvent tres lessives et acides\. A Ngaoundere, Ie haut plateau (1 500 m
d'altitude) a un relief legerement ondule coupe de vallees rocheuses; les sols
y sont generalement profonds, et lion y trouve des affleurements de granite
qui constitue la roche mere\. A Maga, Ie terrain est plat et avant que la
SEMRY ne construise une digue de retenue, la region etait souvent inondee pen
dant la saison des pluies, a l'exception de quelques lIes sur lesquelles les
villages sont construits\. Les sols sont des limons fortement tasses recouvrant
du sable ou du sable recouvrant des limons tasses\.
2\.03 Vegetation: Au sud de la region d'Edea se trouvent des forets tro
picales a feuillage persistant, qui ont ete exploitees d'une maniere selective\.
La vegetation de Ngaoundere est la savane boisee au sol couvert de canche gazon
nante perenne\. A Maga, on ne trouve que des graminees annuelles sur les
plaines alluviales et, sur les lIes, une savane arboree tres clairsemee\.
2\.04 Climat : A Edea, la pluviosite annuelle est en moyenne superieure a
2 500 mm, les taux d'humidite y sont tres eleves, et la saison seche ne dure
que deux mois\. Ngaoundere re~oit environ 1 600 mm de pluie par an et a une
saison seche de six mois\. Maga re~oit environ 750 mm de pluie par an, et la
saison seche dure six mois\. Les temperatures ne freinent pas la croissance
vegetale\. La temperature maximale moyenne annuelle oscille entre 40 0 C a
Maga et 24 0 a Ngaoundere\. Le taux Ie plus faible d'humidite relative (10 %
en pleine saison seche) a ete enregistre a Maga\.
- 10
2\.05 Infrastructure: Les trois plantations sont situees pres de peri
metres en exploitation\. A Edea, on utilisera les routes forestieres, les ate
liers, les bureaux, les services sociaux et autres de la Cellucam (par\. 4\.02)\.
A Ngaoundere, Ie projet permettra d'ameliorer la pepiniere, Ie magasin et les
bureaux du FNP\. A Maga, les ateliers et les services de la SEMRY sont de bonne
qualite, et la pepiniere qui y existe sera maintenue (par\. 4\.05)\.
2\.06 Population : Edea a une population d'environ 55 000 habitants, et a
la peripherie des 160 000 ha de la concession de la Cellucam, se trouvent de
nombreux villages\. La ville de Ngaoundere compte environ 45 000 habitants\.
Lorsque Ie Deuxieme projet SEMRY sera termine, on prevoit qu'environ
60 000 personnes vivront dans les nouveaux villages de la region\. A ce jour,
la Cellucam a ~te en mesure de recruter la main-d'oeuvre dont elle a besoin
dans la region d'Edea, en appliquant Ie SMIG\. On pourra trouver les 525 hommes
annees de main-d'oeuvre locale supplementaire necessaires aux plantations du
projet, ce qui representera environ 33 % de la main-d'oeuvre totale de la
'Cellucam pendant les periodes de pointe; les ouvriers seront egalement payes
au SMIG\. A Ngaoundere et a Maga, la main-d'oeuvre necessaire aux programmes
de plantation sera egalement disponible\.
- 11
III\. LE PROJET
A\. Objectifs
3\.01 Le projet aura pour principaux objectifs :
a) d'accrottre la contribution du secteur forestier a l'economie natio
nale grace a l'amenagement de 11 000 ha environ de plantations de
pins et d'eucalyptus, essences qui ne font pas partie de la flore du
pays; et
b) d'accroftre l'aptitude des organismes publics competents a pour
suivre la regeneration reguliere des for~ts en renfor~ant leurs
services techniques charges du reboisement et a accrottre leurs
recettes grace a l'application diligente de la reglementation en
vigueur en matiere de redevances et d'impOts forestiers\.
3\.02 II y aura deux types de plantations: d'une part, des plantations de
reboisement des zones de futaie naturelle exploitees par la Cellucam pour la
fabrication de pate, ce qui permettra a cette entreprise de tirer avantage,
en definitive, du bois de plantations (par\. 1\.11); d'autre part, de nouvelles
plantations (plantations en blocs et for~ts communales pilotes) dans les
regions de savane ou l'on manque de bois\.
3\.03 Le developpement des institutions sera etroitement lie a l'amenage
ment des plantations envisagees\. Les services techniques publics pourront \.
etre ameliores, d'une part, en faisant participer Ie personnel d'exploitation
du FNFP (par\. 1\.15) aux programmes de reboisement, ce qui leur procurera de
l'experience en cours d'emploi, et d'autre part en creant des vergers a varie
tes de graines ameliorees\. II sera egalement prevu de renforcer directement
les services d'exploitation, de planification et de suivi du siege du FNFP\.
L'Etat sera mieux a m~me de recouvrer les redevances et impOts forestiers
grace au renforcement direct des services operationnels de la DEFC (par\. 1\.13),
laquelle est chargee notamment de cette fonction\. II s'agira d'ameliorer imme
diatement l'aptitude de la DEFC a calculer et a percevoir les impOts et les
redevances\.
3\.04 En cinq ans, Ie Projet financera :
a) l'amenagement d'une plantation de 5 200 ha environ de pins et de
quelque 3 600 ha d'eucalyptus dans la zone du projet d'Edea\. Les
travaux seront effectues par la Cellucam sous la supervision du FNFP
et permettront de fournir a l'usine de cellulose du bois de qualite
superieure et uniforme;
b) l'amenagement d'une plantation de 1 000 ha environ d'eucalyptus en
blocs d'une superficie allant de 50 a 200\. ha et de 200 ha de bois de
forets communales pilotes pres de Maga (SEMRY)\. Cette operation
sera effectuee par la SEMRY et visera a produire du bois de feu pour
les menages et du perchis pour la construction;
- 12
c) l'amenagement par Ie FNFP d'une plantation de 750 ha de pins et de
250 ha d'eucalyptus a Ngaoundere qui produira des grumes pour Ie
sciage, et la construction de poteaux electriques;
d) la creation, au sein du FNFP, d'un service charge de l'amenagement de
vergers a graines ameliorees de 11 ha dans quatre sites;
e) la fourniture de services specialises (16 hommes-annees) qui ne sont
pas actuellement disponibles au Cameroun, pour la gestion des planta
tions et Ie contrOle financier du FNFP et de la SEMRY;
f) la fourniture du soutien logistique, materiel et operationnel neces
saire a la DEFC pour qu'elle soit mieux a meme de calculer et de
percevoir les impOts et les redevances; et
g) l'octroi de fonds pour la realisation d'etudes specialisees compre
nant la preparation d'un eventuel projet de suivi et pour contribuer
a financer la formation appropriee, a l'etranger, d'un personnel
selectionne\.
B\. Caracteristiques detail lees
a) Plantation d'Edea
3\.05 Le programme de plantation de 8 800 ha a Edea permettra de planter
des pins et des eucalyptus dans des zones de forets tropicales que la
Cellucam a deboisees pour fabriquer de la cellulose\. Par consequent, la
Cellucam finira Ie defrichement et construira des pistes qui seront par la
suite utilisees pour les travaux de plantation\. Le projet financera les
frais relatifs aux operations d'andainage et de brulage des residus qui ne
peuvent pas servir a la fabrication de cellulose\. Ces operations seront
effectuees avec les moyens mecaniques appropries et laisseront un site de
plantation couvrant 85 % environ de la superficie initialement exploitee\.
La preparation et Ie reboisement suivront des que possible afin de minimiser
les frais de desherbage\. Le programme quinquennal d'exploitation forestiere,
de defrichement et preparation de la terre et de plantation se deroulera
comme suit :
- 13 -
Annee 1 Annee 2 Annee 3 Annee 4 Annee 5 Total
------------------------(en ha)-----------------------
Exploitation forestiere
(non financee par le
projet) 2 200 3 000 3 000 3 000 3 000 14 200
Defrichement et
preparation 1 350 1 500 2 200 2 500 1 250 8 800
Plantation 000 1 100 1 900 2 500 2 500 8 800
Entretien (avec les
400 ha plantes
prealablement;
entretien cumule) 1 200 2 300 4 200 6 700 9 200 9 200
11 faudra pour effectuer un desherbage approprie etablir un programme d'entre
tien (les superficies cumulees figurent dans Ie tableau ci-dessus)\. Une pepi
niere sera creee pour fournir de jeunes plants\.
3\.06 Les pins choisis pour etre plantes sont l'essence Pinus caribaea,
variete hondurensis, qui dans le milieu d'Edea devrait enregistrer une crois
3
sance moyenne annuelle de 18 m sur ecorce par ha et atteindre en 14 ans la
taille appropriee pour etre abattue\. Les eucalyptus seront des Eucalyptus
urophylla qui se regenerent a partir de leurs propres racines apres l'abat
tage (rejets de taillis) et ont presente au cours de tests effectues a Edea
3
une croissance moyenne annuelle de 25 m sur ecorce par ha\. Pour cette
variete, l'abattage pourra avoir lieu a la dixieme annee\. Des variations de
croissance moyenne annuelle allant de 15 a 29 m3 par ha ont ete enregistrees
a Edea pour P\. Caribaea et la croissance moyenne annuelle a atteint jusqu'a 40
3
m par ha pour E\. urophylla selon la provenance\. On poursuivra les tests de
provenance dans le cadre du programme normal de plantation\.
3\.07 Le projet financera l'achat de gros materiel pour les travaux sup
plementaires de defrichement et de preparation de la terre, de materiel d'en
tretien de plantation et de vehicules; les travaux de construction de bureaux
supplementaires et l'achat de materiel pour les pepinieres; l'entretien des
routes d'exploitation forestiere et le coat de la main-d'oeuvre recrutee\.
Pour 8viter d'installer des infrastructures de soutien (garages, ateliers de
reparation et magasins pour les pieces detachees) faisant double emploi,
celles-ci seront louees a la Cellucam sur la base de leur coat reel\.
Les chefs de section de plantation et les contremaitres du FNFP seront
detaches a Edea OU ils travailleront sous la direction de la Cellucam\. lls
recevront une formation en cours d'emploi pour la direction d'une equipe de
travail et la gestion des sites des plantations dans le cadre d'un programme
organise par la Cellucam et elabore d'apres un programme deja utilise pour la
formation des directeurs de sites d'exploitation forestiere et des contre
maitres (par\. 4\.09)\. La Cellucam sera payee pour ce service et pour les
services de gestion comprenant notamment la gestion globale du programme de
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plantations et du personnel, la coordination des operations de plantation
et des activites d'exploitation forestiere et la passation des marches\. Le
Gouvernement et Ie FNFP concluront un contrat juge acceptable par la Banque,
et dont la Cellucam aura fixe les modalites\. Les points qui seront inclus
dans ce contrat ant ete examines avec les services officiels et la Cellucam
au cours de l'evaluation et un projet de contrat sera discute au cours des
negociations\. La signature de ce contrat sera une condition d'entree en
vigueur du pr~t (par\. 4\.02 et 4\.03)\.
b) Plantation de la SEMRY
3\.08 Dans Ie cadre du programme quinquennal de plantation du projet,
1 000 ha d'eucalyptus (E\. camaldulensis) seront amenages ainsi que des blocs
d'autres essences sur des terres non irriguees de la zone du projet Semry II,
ce qui sera la suite logique du programme pilote commence avec une assistance
bilaterale (par\. 1\.21) et qui a ete couronne de succes\. Dans Ie cadre du pro
jet, des fonds seront accordes en quantite suffisante pour financer Ie materiel
et les depenses supplementaires d'exploitation necessaires pour la construction
de pistes, la preparation des terres (labour du sous-sol) et l'amenagement de
pepinieres pour executer Ie programme\. Le personnel comprendra un fares tier
recrute au niveau international, ayant l'experience voulue de l'amenagement de
plantations en zone aride pour diriger les plantations en blocs et l'execution
d'un programme de bois de village pilotes (par\. 3\.09)\. Du personnel supplemen
taire de direction sera detache du FNFP\. Bien que la zone du projet SEMRY dis
pose de terres suffisantes pour les for@ts, les cultures vivrieres irriguees
et en sec, on financera une etude pedologique detail lee au 1:20 000 qui per
mettra a la SEMRY d'etablir un plan d'utilisation des terres et, a cette occa
sion, de determiner l'emplacement a reserver aux cultures forestieres
appropriees\.
3\.09 Un programme pilote visant a amenager des bois de village sur 200 ha
pour produire du bois de feu destine a l'usage domestique et a la vente, du
bois de service et du fourrage sera egalement entrepris dans Ie cadre du pro
jet\. Le programme interessera des groupes d'exploitants organises en previ
sion de la creation de cooperatives dans les zones de peuplement nouvellement
creees par la SEMRY\. Ces groupes recevront gratuitement des jeunes plants
(notamment des plants d'arbres fuitiers et fourragers) et 20 ha environ de
terres preparees qu'il subdiviseront en parcelles individuelles de 0,5 a 1 ha\.
Chaque famille d'exploitants plantera et entretiendra sa parcelle\. Les femmes
seront un groupe cible particulierement approprie pour cette activite\. Le
travail aux champs sera organise et supervise par Ie personnel du FNFP detache
a cette fin aupres de la SEMRY\. Un accord adapte au cas de chaque groupe sera
negocie entre la SEMRY/le FNFP et les exploitants; il definira les droits fan
ciers, les obligations des exploitants pour ce qui est de la plantation, de
l'entretien et de la lutte contre les incendies et les animaux et fixera la date
avant laquelle tout abattage sera interdit\. L'accord precisera egalement Ie
prix du bois sur pied qui sera per~u par Ie FNFP au moment de la coupe pour
couvrir les frais initiaux de preparation de la terre\. Le Cameroun ne dispose
pour ainsi dire d'aucun personnel experimente pour guider l'evolution d'un tel
programme bien que certains travaux soient actuellement effectues dans Ie cadre
- 15
du Projet de developpement agricole des hauts plateaux de l'Ouest (Cr\. 784-CM)
finance en partie par l'IDA\. Par consequent, Ie personnel du projet effectuera
des visites periodiques dans les hauts plateaux de l'Ouest dans Ie cadre de sa
formation en cours d'emploi\. En ce qui concerne Ie manque d'experience pour ce
type de projet, les autorites ont donne l'assurance au cours des negociations
que l'on n'effectuerait pas de travaux sur les forets communales avant qu'un
plan d'action relatif a leur execution comprenant des dispositions contrac
tuelles avec les exploitants n'ait ete approuve par la Banque (par\. 8\.01(a))\.
c) Plantation de Ngaoundere
3\.10 Le programme de plantation qui sera finance dans Ie cadre du projet
comprendra la plantation d'un bloc de 200 ha par an, pendant cinq ans, qui
viendra s'ajouter au programme normal de plantation du FNFP de 50 ha environ
dans cette region que Ie FNFP poursuivra apres Ie demarrage du projet\. Comme
les plantations actuellement en cours, les plantations du projet seront etab
lies sur des terres classees "terres forestieres" conformement aux procedures
administratives habituelles et appartiendront a l'Etat\. Les operations de
plantation qui seront effectuees dans Ie cadre du projet permettront d'ajouter
au patrimoine forestier 750 ha de pins (P\. kesiya et P\. caribaea) et 250 ha
d'eucalyptus (E\. grandis et E\. cloeziana)\. Le defrichement se fera mecanique
ment afin d'extraire completement les souches et de bien preparer Ie sol et Ie
FNFP vendra Ie bois de recuperation de la savane (environ 4 000 m3 par an) a
des acheteurs prives, en tant que bois de feu\. On agrandira les pepinieres
existantes pour produire les jeunes plants necessaires\. La plantation se fera
selon des plans de travail annuels approuves par Ie FNFP et la Banque
(par\. 8\.01 (c))\. Les fonds prevus dans Ie projet financeront l'achat du mate
riel supplementaire, des vehicules de service et les pepinieres necessaires\.
Comme les nouveaux sites seront de plus en plus eloignes de Ngaoundere, des
campements modestes seront construits sur les plantations pour Ie personnel
participant a l'entretien et a la protection des plantations\.
d) Services de production de graines
3\.11 Un service de production de graines sera cree au sein du FNFP; il
sera charge :
d'importer des graines d'arbres forestiers et d'en etablir l'inven
taire;
d'organiser et d'executer en collaboration etroite avec les services
de recherche forestiere une serie de tests de provenance portant sur
toutes'les essences de plantation importantes;
de mettre en place des stations de production de semences d'eucalyp
tus et de pins dans chaque region ecologique importante du pays\.
Onze hectares environ de P\. caribaea, P\. oocarpa, P\. kesiya,
- 16
E\. grandis, E\. urophylla, E\. deglupta et E\. cloeziana seront plantes
dans quatre stations;
d'effectuer un examen systematique de toutes les plantations amena
gees afin de selectionner des individus superieurs desquels des bou
tures seront prelevees pour creer des vergers a graines clonals\.
Comme exercice de formation pour les pepinieristes, des boutures
seront faites a partir de l'essence camerounaise Triplochiton et
cinq hectares supplementaires seront plantes avec cette essence
pour la production de clones destines aux futures plantations; et
d'utiliser toutes les techniques appropriees existantes en matiere de
genetique forestiere et de reproduction arboricole\.
La realisation de ce programme demandera du temps et a la fin des cinq ans
d'execution du projet, Ie service de production de graines commencera a
peine a fonctionner\. la formation du personnel local sera une fonction
importante de ce service; des consultants experts dans ce domaine aideront a
mettre en place ce service et a etablir son programme de travail\. les tech
niques habituelles de creation de plantations et de pepinieres seront utili
sees pour la production de plants a partir de graines\. les techniques connues
pour faire monter des boutures seront egalement employees\.
e) Renforcement du FNFP
3\.12 Dans le cadre du projet, le FNFP disposera de 12 hommes-annees envi
ron d'assistance technique ainsi que du materiel necessaire, ce qui lui permet
tra de renforcer ses activites dans les domaines suivants : planification
annuelle du travail et suivi des resultats, gestion financiere et gestion des
diverses plantations\. Des efforts dans ces trois domaines sont indispensables
a la reussite du projet mais l'amelioration de la gestion financiere du FNFP
est d'une importance vitale pour administrer les interets financiers de l'Etat
dans la plantation d'Edea\.
f) Renforcement de la DEFC
3\.13 On ameliorera l'efficacite de la DEFC en finan~ant : tout d'abord,
l'achat de vehicules et de materiel pour donner au personnel la mobilite
necessaire et lui permettre d'effectuer des inspections sur Ie terrain et de
verifier les operations d'exploitation forestiere et d'enregistrement du bois
abattu; en deuxieme lieu, l'achat de materiel de bureau et de calculateurs
pour etablir et contrOler de maniere plus efficace les avis d'imposition et
la perception des impOts et des redevances; et enfin, la remise en etat des
bureaux et des cases de passage sur Ie terrain pour Ie personnel charge de
la cote et du contrOle des impOts\. De plus, des fonds seront prevus pour fi
nancer 45 hommes-mois de services de consultants a recruter en fonction des be
soins (par\. 4\.08) et pour l'exploitation adequate des vehicules et des bureaux\.
- 17
g) Etudes et preparation d'un eventuel projet de suivi
3\.14 Dans Ie cadre du projet, il est prevu de recruter, en fonction des
besoins et apres accord entre Ie Gouvernement, la 8anque et la CDC, des con
sultants a concurrence de 43 hommes-mois; il s'agira d'experts en matiere de
croissance, protection et utilisation de la for~t\. Au dossier du projet
figurent des mandats qui pourraient servir de directives en la matiere\. De
plus, apres un examen a mi-course de l'etat d'avancement du projet, on pour
rait commencer la preparation d'un eventuel projet de su~v~ pour lequel Ie
financement des services de consultants a concurrence de 12 hommes-mois sera
prevu\.
- 18
IV\. ORGANISATION ET GESTION
A\. Generalites
4\.01 Les institutions du secteur de la foresterie, a savoir Ie FNFP et
la DEFC (par\. 1\.14 et 1\.15), seront chargees de l'organisation et de la ges
tion du projet\. Ces organismes recevront Ie soutien necessaire pour atre a
marne d'assumer les responsabilites supplementaires resultant de l'execution
du projet (par\. 3\.12 et 3\.13)\. Le FNFP conclura avec la Cellucam et la SEMRY
des accords speciaux pour la mise en place des plantations d'Edea et de la
SEMRY et s'occupera seul de la creation de la plantation de Ngaoundere et du
service de production de graines ameliorees\. Les specifications techniques
des facteurs de creation et d'entretien figurent dans Ie dossier du projet\.
B\. Dispositions en matiere de plantation
4\.02 L'element correspondant a la plantation d'Edea sera execute par la
Cellucam, qui assumera Ie r61e d'entrepreneur pour la plantation des arbres
pour Ie compte du FNFP\. Le FNFP retrocedera les fonds du projet et fournira
Ie personnel de terrain qui fera temporairement partie de celui de la Cellucam\.
La Cellucam organisera et executera les operations de plantation, et assurera
la coordination avec ses activites d'abattage de grumes a pate\. L'Etat sera
donc proprietaire des arbres plantes au cours du programme quinquennal et que
la Cellucam achetera a un prix de bois sur pied approprie (par\. 6\.03) lorsque
les arbres auront atteint liege optimal des grumes a pate\. Ces dispositions
formeront la base d'un contrat qui sera conclu entre Ie Gouvernement et Ie FNFP
d'une part et la Cellucam d'autre part\. Un projet de contrat a ete examine au
cours des negociations; la signature d'un contrat juge satisfaisant sera une
condition d'entree en vigueur du pret (par\. 8\.02(b))\.
4\.03 L'accord entre Ie Gouvernement, Ie FNFP et la Cellucam comprendra
egalement les dispositions detaillees relatives a l'execution du projet\. Les
plans de travail annuels et les budgets, Ie recrutement des consultants et la
nomination aux postes cles du service de reboisement de la Cellucam seront exa
mines et soumis a l'approbation d'un comite directeur compose de representants
de la Cellucam, du FNFP et du Gouvernement, qui etudiera toutes questions ou
problemes se posant au cours de l'execution de cet element et fera des recom
mandations a ce sujet\. La Cellucam preparera des plans de travail et des bud
gets detailles, recrutera Ie personnel de terrain, prendra les dispositions
voulues en matiere de passation des marches, detiendra et gerera les avoirs du
projet au nom du FNFP et etablira une comptabilite trimestrielle (non verifiee)
et annuelle (verifiee) et des rapports sur l'etat d'avancement du projet\. Le
FNFP detachera aupres de la Cellucam du personnel de direction sur Ie terrain
- 19
qui sera organise selon l'organigramme presente ci-apres et contrOlera la
comptabilite et l'avancement du projet avec Ie personnel sur Ie terrain\. Le
FNFP remboursera la Cellucam de ses frais effectifs enregistres pour les tra
vaux de reboisement qu'elle execute dans Ie cadre du projet\. De plus, Ie
FNFP verser a a la Cellucam pour les services de soutien des paiements perio
diques dont Ie montant sera determine conformement aux dispositions de l'ac
cord et proportionnel aux travaux de plantation realises\. Cette depense
couvrira Ie pourcentage des frais gene raux de la Cellucam et des frais de ges
tion de la Direction de la foresterie imputable au programme de plantation\.
Ce pourcentage sera determine d'apres une formule qui tiendra compte des aug
mentations des frais d'exploitation de la Cellucam et des effectifs par rap
port a ce qu'ils etaient avant Ie projet, a l'exclusion du travail de l'usine\.
Une estimation du montant des versements a effectuer a la Cellucam pour les
services de soutien sera incluse dans Ie budget annuel qui sera soumis a l'ap
probation des copr~teurs au plus tard Ie 31 mars precedant Ie debut de
l'exercice du projet (par\. a\.Ol(c»\. Le FNFP nommera un comptable pour Ie
contrOle des fonds du projet utilises par la Cellucam\.
4\.04 La Division de la forest erie de la SEMRY executera l'element de
reboisement SEMRY\. Un forestier recrute au niveau international, ayant des
qualifications jugees acceptables par la Banque, dirigera les travaux\. II
sera aide de deux adjoints detaches du FNFP dont l'un sera charge de l'element
de plantation en blocs et l'autre du programme pilote de bois de village\.
La Division de la foresterie sera administree conformement aux reglements de
la SEMRY selon lesquels des rapports sur l'etat d'avancement seront presentes
regulierement et des comptes seront etablis a l'intention du FNFP pour etre
inclus aux etats financiers consolides du projet\. Elle choisira les sites
devant etre reboises d'apres Ie plan d'utilisation des terres (par\. 3\.0a)\.
Elle etablira et suivra les plans de travail annuels et les budgets qui seront
approuves par Ie FNFP et la Banque (par\. a\.Ol(c» et fera en sorte que la SEMRY
entretienne les pistes et recrute de la main-d'oeuvre, maintienne et comptabi
lise les avoirs du projet\. Le FNFP detachera des contremattres de site et
des contrema1tres d'equipes aupres de la SEMRY pour effectuer des travaux
sur Ie terrain et mettra a la disposition du projet les conseils techniques du
Directeur de plantation charge de la supervision (par\. 4\.06)\. Un accord juge
acceptable par la aanque, precisant notamment Ie programme de plantation, ses
specifications techniques ainsi que les responsabilites administratives du
FNFP et de la SEMRY, sera conclu entre Ie FNFP et la SEMRY\. Sa signature sera
une condition prealable au decaissement des fonds afferents a cet element
(par\. 8\.03)\. Les avoirs residuels provenant du projet pilote en cours,
finance par l'aide bilaterale, pourront etre utilises pour Ie projet\.
4\.05 L'execution de l'element concernant Ie bois communal pilote de la
SEMRY sera souple et fera une large place aux principes de base qui ant ete
couronnes de succes dans d'autres projets de foresterie villageoise finances
par la Banque (par\. 3\.09)\. On assurera les services d'un consultant specia
liste en sociologie economique, recrute pour une courte periode pour analyser
la mise en oeuvre du programme et veiller a son expansion et a sa
reproduction\.
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C\. Renforcement du FNFP
4\.06 L'aptitude du FNFP a executer les programmes de regeneration des
for~ts du Gouvernement sera accrue, tout d'abord gr~ce a la formation en
cours d'emploi des ingenieurs et des techniciens du FNFP qui seront detaches
pour travailler a l'amenagement de plantations financees dans Ie cadre du pro
jet (par\. 4\.09), ensuite gr~ce au renforcement de la direction financiere
et technique du siege du FNFP\. Un directeur/ingenieur forestier recrute au
niveau international sera charge, en tant que directeur du programme, d'eta
blir des programmes de reboisement annuels detailles au sein du FNFP, dans Ie
cadre : i) des directives etablies pour Ie FNFP; ii) des limites imposees par
les ressources disponibles; et iii) des besoins renouvelables d'entretien et
de replantation\. D'autre part, il mettra sur pied un systeme de visites perio
diques, site par site, avec enregistrement des donnees pour verifier l'etat
d'avancement, identifier les goulets d'etranglement et etablir la base des
prochains programmes annuels de plantation\. Un comptable du projet recrute au
niveau international sera charge de mettre en place un contrale financier,
d'en superviser l'application, de rediger des rapports pour chaque element du
projet et d'ameliorer, gr~ce aux conseils qu'il pourra donner et a sa colla
boration avec la direction et les comptables du FNFP, Ie contrale financier et
l'etablissement des etats financiers du FNFP\. Enfin, un Directeur de planta
tion charge de la supervision, recrute au niveau international et residant a
Garoua, introduira site par site avec les directeurs des plantations exis
tantes du FNFP des techniques ameliorees et choisira les essences et les res
sources appropriees aux conditions microecologiques particulieres a la pro
vince du nord\. II supervisera l'application des nouvelles methodes\. II
assurera aussi la liaison avec Ie personnel de recherche forestiere de l'IRA
afin de donner des conseils sur les besoins en matiere de recheche et de
faire adopter les techniques ayant donne des resultats prometteurs\. Tout Ie
personnel recrute au niveau international, y compris Ie Directeur de la fores
terie de la SEMRY (par\. 4\.04), aura des qualifications et une experience
jugees acceptables par la Banque et fournira ses services pendant quatre ans,
dans Ie cadre d'un mandat detaille figurant dans Ie dossier du projet
(par\. 8\.01(b»\.
D\. Renforcement de la DEFC
4\.07 Le Directeur de la DEFC ameliorera, par l'intermediaire du Service de
l'exploitation et des industries forestieres, l'aptitude de la DEFC a calculer
les impats et les redevances du secteur forestier et a en assurer Ie recouvre
ment\. Dans chacun des sieges des cinq provinces ou des concessions forestieres
sont actuellement en exploitation (ouest, sud-ouest, littoral, centre-sud et
est), des cadres ont ete nommes pour calculer les impOts et redevances et
s'occuper de toutes les questions fiscales, dans la province, et les autorites
ont donne l'assurance que ces responsables seraient en poste pendant toute la
periode d'investissement du projet (par\. B\.Ol(d»\. Le responsable de chaque
bureau provincial de la DEFC (Ie Conservateur) sera charge d'organiser, au sein
- 21
de la province, des visites regulieres des chefs de section 8 leurs postes
respectifs et aux concessions faisant partie de leur section; des visites regu
lieres effectuees par des agents du siege permettront 8 leur tour d'exercer
un contrdle sur ces deplacements\. Des rapports trimestriels de ces activites
sur Ie terrain seront prepares et soumis au siege de la DEFC ou Ie Chef du
Service de l'exploitation et des industries forestieres sera charge du suivi
et du contrOle\.
4\.08 Les autorites ont considerablement ameliore Ie recouvrement des impOts
et mettent en oeuvre de nouvelles mesures pour renforcer cette tendance\. De
plus, elles ont donne l'assurance qu'un specialiste du calcul de l'assiette
des impOts forestiers et de leur mise en application, recrute au niveau in
ternational, serait employe pendant une periode de 24 hommes-mois environ pour
aider Ie Directeur de la DEFC 8 mettre en oeuvre les mesures\. Des services de
consultants en administration publique pour une duree de six mois environ seront
egalement finances\. Enfin, comme l'application de sanctions peut soulever des
problemes juridiques en ce qui concerne les concessionnaires, des fonds seront
disponibles pour assurer les services d'un conseiller juridique (8 concurrence'
de 15 mois) au cours de la periode d'investissement de cinq ans, en vue d'aider
selon les besoins la DEFC 8 traiter avec l'industrie forestiere\. Tous les con
sultants auront des qualifications et une experience jugees acceptables par la
Banque\.
E\. Formation
4\.09 Le personnel local sera essentiellement forme en cours d'emploi au
cours des operations de plantation en cours\. Un programme de detachement par
rotation de superviseurs de site et de contremaitres du FNFP aupres de la
Cellucam et de la SEMRY sera organise et suivi par Ie Directeur du FNFP avec
l'assistance du Directeur du programme d~nt les services seront finances dans
Ie cadre du projet (par\. 4\.06)\. Les detachements, qui porteront sur des perio
des de deux 8 trois ans selon les besoins des organismes beneficiaires et du
FNFP, auront pour objectif de donner aux 50 ingenieurs et techniciens supe
rieurs du FNFP la possibilite de travailler soit 8 la Cellucam, soit 8 la
SEMRY, pendant les cinq ans de la periode d'investissement du projet\. Au
FNFP, Ie comptable du projet sera charge d'ameliorer les services de comptabi
lite du FNFP et les techniques employees par Ie personnel du FNFP et de les
porter 8 des normes jugees acceptables pour l'execution du projet\. Ces normes
sont decrites dans Ie dossier du projet\. On prevoit egalement de financer la
participation (pour une duree de 12 hommes-mois environ) du personnel selec
tionne du FNFP et de la DEFC 8 des seminaires specialises 81'etranger\.
- 22
F\. Suivi et evaluation retrospective
4\.10 Au FNFP, Ie Directeur du programme (par\. 4\.06) etablira une proce
dur~ de suivi des operations de plantation qui servira de base a l'etablis
sement des plans de travail et des budgets annuels\. Pour ce faire, les contre
ma1tres devront presenter des rapports hebdomadaires d'activites et d'utilisa
tion des ressources aux directeurs de site, les directeurs de site des rapports
mensuels a l'intention des directeurs de zones et ces derniers des rapports
trimestriels consolides a l'intention du siege\. Chaque superviseur devra
periodiquement effectuer une visite de contrOle aux services relevant de sa
supervision\. Le Directeur de plantation charge de la supervision (par\. 4\.06)
examinera les rapports mensuels etablis sur les sites\. Le contrOle des flux
financiers sera place sous la responsabilite du service de comptabilite du
FNFP qui comprendra un comptable residant a Edea, charge de la comptabilite de
la plantation d'Edea\.
4\.11 La DEFC restera responsable du suivi des questions fiscales concer
nant Ie secteur de la foresterie\. Le Directeur, par l'intermediaire de chaque
Conservateur provincial, veillera desormais a ce que les techniciens en fores
terie, les chefs de section et les responsables designes du siege provincial,
par ordre hierarchique, effectuent des visites de contrOle periodiques des
exploitations forestieres\.
4\.12 Le personnel renforce du FNFP et de la DEFC aura notamment pour
tache d'evaluer periodiquement l'etat d'avancement du projet\. Pendant la
deuxieme partie de l'annee 3 du projet, une evaluation du projet ami-course
sera effectuee par des consultants dont les qualifications, l'experience et Ie
mandat auront ete juges acceptables par la Banque\. Les recommandations emises
dans cette etude seront examinees par les services officiels, Ie FNFP, la DEFC
et la Banque et serviront notamment de base a la preparation, a 1'annee 4,
d'un eventuel projet de suivi\.
G\. Production de graines et liaison avec les services de recherche
4\.13 Le service de production de graines qui sera cree au sein du FNFP
(par\. 3\.11) poursuivra les travaux d'apres les resultats des tests d'elimina
tion qui ont ete menes avec succes pendant de nombreuses annees par 1'IRA/CTFT
a Mangombe et ailleurs et qui ont permis d'identifier des essences pouvant
convenir au Cameroun\. Le service de production de graines continuera a coope
rer et a echanger des informations avec ces chercheurs\. Au debut du projet,
des consultants recrutes pour trois mois aideront a etablir Ie programme de
travail; celui-ci sera mis a jour chaque annee grace a un mois de services
de consultants\. Des terres et des services de plantation et d'entretien se
ront mis a la disposition du projet dans Ie cadre des programmes de plantation
prevus par Ie FNFP a proximite des quatre sites du projet\.
- 23
4\.14 Dans chaque plantation, des essais de rendement des arbres de dif
ferentes provenances seront egalement effectues dans le cadre des elements de
production\. Le Directeur de plantation charge de la supervision du FNFP et le
Directeur du programme prepareront ces essais en liaison avec les responsables
de l'IRA\. Le siege du FNFP entretiendra des contacts etroits avec les servi
ces de recherche de l'IRA, en particulier a propos de la province du nord ou
de nombreux sites du FNFP tres differents sur le plan ecologique sont plantes
simultanement\. Le FNFP consultera egalement l'IRA en ce qui concerne les
besoins en matiere de recherche appliquee\.
- 24
v\. COUTS ET DISPOSITIONS FINANCIERES
A\. Estimations des coOts du projet
5\.01 Le coOt total du projet pendant la periode d'investissement de
cinq ans est estime a 9 602 millions de francs CFA (35,5 millions de dollars),
dont 4 374 millions de francs CFA (16,2 millions de dollars) en devises\. Ce
devis comprend un mont ant estimatif de 632 millions de francs CFA (2,3 mil
lions de dollars) d'impOts identifiables\. Les droits d'importation identi
fiables des fournitures importees destinees a l'execution du projet ont ete
exclus, en prevision de la decision du Gouvernement d'exonerer de ces droits
lesdites fournitures\. Le coOt du projet netd'impots s'eleve donc a
8 970 millions de francs CFA (33,2 millions de dollars), dont 49 % en devises\.
5\.02 Les estimations de couts sont fondees sur les prix de janvier 1981
et comprennent : i) des provisions pour imprevus de 10 % sur les b~timents et
de 5 % sur tous les autres couts, a l'exception des frais de personnel, des
honoraires des consultants et des services de gestion a propos desquels aucune
provision pour imprevus n'a ete calculee; et ii) des provisions pour hausse
des prix calculees en fonction des previsions d'augmentation des prix
suivantes :
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
CoOts en monnaie 12 12 12 12
nationale
Couts en devises 9 8,5 8,5 7,5 7,0 6,0
Les provisions sont egales a 44 % des couts de base ou a 31 % du cout total\.
Les couts estimatifs du projet sont recapitules dans Ie Tableau 1 ci-dessous
et figurent de maniere detaillee dans Ie dossier du projet\.
B\. Financement envisage
5\.03 Le projet sera finance par la Banque (pret de 17 millions de dol
lars), la Commonwealth Development Corporation du Royaume-Uni (CDC) (pret de
7,4 millions de dollars) et par l'Etat (11,1 millions de dollars)\. La reparti
tion de ce financement figure au Tableau 2\. Le pret de la Banque financera
Ie cout en devises du projet (11,6 millions de dollars)\. II financera egale
ment 1,3 million de dollars de coOts marginaux relatifs au renforcement de
la DEFC et du FNFP que lion considere justifies compte tenu de l'importance du
bon fonctionnement de ces deux organismes\. Le financement total de la Banque
couvrira 51 % des coOts du projet nets d'impots\.
- 25 - Tabl\.
!\.timatlona daa eoGts du Projet
e" \. lIIIo"\. de lelA en lrJ1 ilion\. de dollan
1Ion"\.Le lIo"nd\. Dev1&
Nationale Devises Totd NaUo\.le Of:Yb Totd %
!U\.nu du I"IIFP
PlaotatioQ4 c'£4e\.
Vlhieule mat~rl\.1 et b;tl~"ea 68 864 932 0\.3 3\.2 3 \.5 91
III't\.ti\.e"t\. relauta \.u" pla"taUolIA \.ill! 1080 1!!l \.2\.:\.! ~ ~ 1!1\.
260\.5 1944 4549 9\.7 7\.2 16\.9 43
nneationa SEMI'!: II (Maaa)
Vfbie,,1\. mater lei at bit1ment\. 33 108 141 0\.1 0\.4 0 \.5 80
11:IY\.ti\."U relaut\. pla"t\.tio\.,\. \.ill -Y\. \.ill\. ~ 0\.3 1& 11
216 189 40\.5 0\.8 0\.7 1\.5 47
nant\.tions d\. tls_ndh/!
Vfbieulaa, materlel at batiment\.
lJrre\.U\."ts rel\.tib a \. plant\.tio"\. ill
7 S4
2i
61
ill hl
-* 0\.2
\.!!\.:\.!
0\.2
~
67
12\.
144 108 252 0\.5 0\.4 0\.9 44
S\.rvlc\. de !roductlon d\. sral~e\. amelioree\.
Vfbleul\., materlel et bidmenu 21 27 48 0\.1 0\.1 0\.2 SO
11:IYaaciaa\.anta r\.l\.Ub au" plantatio"\. 2! -1! -!l \.2\.:l\. hl hl 11
79
" 133 0\.3 0\.2 O\.S 40
AI"l"t\."\.e technlgu\.
Yihieul\.
Per\.annel\. cccs"ltallta et 1 9 10 -\.
-\. -\. -\. 90
exploit\.tloo de\. vehi¢ula\. -1
6
\.ill\.
630
ill
636 - \. 1:\.L
2\.3
Ll
I\.3
2!
q'l
total partie1 de \.nt\.nta J"IIFP 3050 2975 S966 11\.3 10\.1 22\.1 49
Soothn tochn19"e at "atlrld 1 1\. Due
Ytbieule", materlal at bitlmanta 98 210 368 0\.3 1\.0 1\.3 77
CoUu d' expl"tt\.Uon \.uppl\.ntal\. 139 \.ill\. \.ill\. !!\.:\.L 2\.J!\. b1\. !\.L
ec eOl\\.8ulCanta 237 486 723 0\.8 1\.8 2\.6 69
\.,\.
CoGt 4e loa\. tctal 3287 3402 6689 12\.1 12\.6 24\.7 Sl
Prov1don\.
Prov idon\. 1>0ur impdvua 49 108 157 0\.2
Provlda,," pour hau8\.e de prix 0 0\.6 61
1892 864 2756 1\.& 1\.:1\. 10\.2 11
1941 972 2UJ 7\.2 3\.6 10\.8 33
ceNt t!)tal du Proj\.c S228 4314 9602 19\.3 16\.2 3S\.5 46
1101\.- da 50,000 dollar
- 26
5\.04 Le pr~t de la Banque sera octroye au Gouvernement pour une duree
de 20 ans avec un differe d'amortissement de cinq ans, au taux d'interet en
vigueur au moment de la presentation du projet au Conseil des Administrateurs\.
Le pret de la Banque sera retrocede au FNFP et a la DEFC sous forme de dons\.
Le pret de la CDC devrait ~tre octroye aux m~es conditions que Ie pret
de la Banque et financera 30 % des coOts estimatifs de l'element representant
la plantation d'Edea\. Pour que Ie pret de la Banque prenne effet
(par\. 8\.02(a)), il faudra que les conditions auxquelles est subordonnee
l'entree en vigueur du pret de la CDC soient remplies\.
C\. Conditions de retrocession
5\.05 Comme il a ete convenu au cours des negociations, Ie Gouvernement
mettra a la disposition du FNFP et de la DEFC, sous forme de don, taus les
fonds necessaires (montants des prets de la Banque et de la CDC et la quote
part de l'Etat) pour executer Ie projet (par\. 8\.01(e))\. Bien que Ie FNFP soit
sur Ie plan juridique un organisme autonome, ses activitees se bornent a l'exe
cution des programmes de plantations du Gouvernement et il n'est donc pas
motive sur Ie plan commercial\. II s'ensuit que l'octroi de prets subsi
diaires au FNFP ne serait pas justifie\. En ce qui concerne la DEFC, les prets
subsidiaires sont inutiles puisqu'il s'agit d'un organisme public\. Pour que
Ie pret de la Banque entre en vigueur, Ie Gouvernement devra ouvrir pour
chacun des elements du projet des comptes separes qui serviront a financer
les frais de fonctionnement en monnaie nationale; d'autre part, l'execution
du projet ne pourra commencer qu'apres qu'il aura depose aces comptes un
montant d'au moins 400 millions de francs CFA pour la plantation d'Edea,
35 millions de francs CFA pour la plantation de la SEMRY, 25 millions de
francs CFA pour la plantation de Ngaoundere; 12 millions de francs CFA pour Ie
siege du FNfP et 33 millions de francs CFA pour la DEFC (par\. 8\.02(c))\. Le
compte de Ie plantation de Ngaoundere sera ouvert au siege du FNFP et les
fonds de la DEFC seront deposes a un compte subsidiaire du FNFP pour la DEFC\.
Ces comptes seront reapprovisionnes au cours de l'annee par les fonds prove
nant des prets de la Banque et de la CDC et au debut de l'exercice par la
contribution de l'Etat conformement a l'approbation des budgets pour les ele
ments du projet\. Le FNFP supervisera Ie flux des fonds du projet pour les
cinq elements\. En plus de la contribution supplementaire de l'Etat envisagee
pour l'element de Ngaoundere, Ie FNFP maintiendra les fonds de fonctionnement
destines au programme de plantation en cours de Ngaoundere a leur niveau de
1981 (40 millions de francs CFA; 148 000 dollars)\. Pour minimiser les frais
supplementaires de defrichement apres l'abattage, Ie programme de reboisement
envisage dans les plantations d'Edea commencera vers Ie milieu de 1981\. Un
financement retroactif pour ces activites sera accorde a concurrence de
1 million de dollars sur Ie pret de la Banque; des contributions de l'ordre
de 700 000 dollars pour la CDC et de 700 000 dollars pour l'Etat seront prevues
pour couvrir les depenses enregistrees apres Ie ler juillet 1981\.
-2'7 Tableau 2
Plan dL, financement envisage
(eu millions de dollars)
Bank CDC Etat Total
Plantations d'Edea
Vibicules, materiel et batiments 2\.9 2\.2 5\.1
lavestissements relatifs aux plantatioUJ 7\.1 S\.2 6\.9 19\.2
10\.0 7\.4 6\.9 24\.3
Plantations de Semry II (Maga)
Vebicules\. materiel et batiments 0\.4 0\.1 0\.5
Amenagement des plantations et couts 0\.7 0\.8 1\.5
d lexploitation
1\.1 0\.9 2\.0
Plantation de Ngaoundere
Vihlcules, materiel et batiments \ 0\.2 0\.1 0\.3
luveatfasements relatifs aux plantatlona 0\.4 0\.7 1\.1
0\.6 0\.8 1\.4
Service de production de semences amelior~es
Vebicules\. materiel et batiments 0\.1 0\.1 0\.2
lDvestissements relatifs aux plantations
0\.2 0\.3 0\.5
0\.3 0\.4 0\.7
Assistaneetechnique au FNFP
_ 1t
Vihlcules 0\.1 0\.1
Personnel, consultant et 2\.7 0\.5 3\.2
exploitation des vehicules
2\.8 0\.5 3\.3
SoutienTechnique et materiel a la DEFC
Vibicules, materiel et bitiments 1\.3' 0\.4 1\.7
Couts d'exploitation supplementaires 0\.9 1\.2 2\.1
et consultants
2\.2 1\.6 3\.8
Total 17\.0 7\.4 11\.1 35\.5
Pourcentage du total 48 21 31 100
Total du finsncement il\. I' exclusion des tax~s_\.::\.17::\.:\.;:\.o_ _ _ _-\.:\.7:\.,;\.4;:\._ _ _\.;8:::,\.:\.,:8::\.-_ _ _-\.:3:\.:3:\.:\.:,\.=2:\.-_
Pourcentage du total il\. l'exclusion des tax~ __~5_1________2_2 ____________7___________
_ 2 l_0_0___
\." Moina de 50\.000 dollars
- 28
D\. Passation des marches
5\.06 Les marches d'un montant egal a au moins 100 000 dollars, portant
principalement sur l'achat de gros materiel, seront passes dans Ie cadre d'un
appel a la concurrence internationale conformement aux directives de la Banque\.
Les fournitures achetees selon ces procedures devraient atteindre un montant
total de 5,2 millions de dollars environ (financement de la Banque : 3,3 mil
lions de dollars)\. Les achats seront groupes dans la mesure du possible pour
tirer Ie maximum d'avantages d'achats en grandes quantites\. Les marches d'un
montant inferieur a 100 000 dollars mais superieurs a 50 000 dollars seront
attribues sur appel d'offres dont la publicite est faite localement tandis que
les marches d'un montant egal ou inferieur a 50 000 dollars seront passes sur
la base d'offres de prix emanant de trois fournisseurs au moins ayant bonne
reputation\. Ces marches devraient atteindre un montant total de 1,1 million
de dollars (financement de la Banque : 700 000 dollars)\. Les travaux de prepa
ration de la terre et de construction de pistes forestieres qui doivent etre
etroitement coordonnes avec les operations de plantation ne se pretent pas a
une passation de marche par appel a la concurrence et seront donc effectues en
regie par les organismes de plantation respectifs du projet (2,9 millions
de dollars; financement de la Banque : 800 000 dollars)\. Les petits bati
ments 9values a 200 000 dollars (financement de la Banque : 100 000 dollars)
des plantations d'Edea, de la SEMRY et de Ngaoundere seront egalement cons
truits en regie\. Cependant, pour la construction des elements de la DEFC et
du service de production de graines, les marches d'une valeur de 700 000 dol
lars (financement de la 8anque : 500 000 dollars) seront attribues dans Ie
cadre d'adjudications avec publicite locale, conformement a des procedures
jugees acceptables par la Banque\. Les marches relatifs a l'assistance tech
nique (294 hommes-mois) dont Ie coat total se monte a 3,2 millions de dollars
environ (financement de la 8anque : 3,1 millions de dollars) seront attribues
conformement a des procedures portant sur Ie recrutement au niveau interna
tional\. Tous les mandats, qualifications et contrats des specialistes devant
etre recrutes conformement aux directives du Groupe de la 8anque, seront
juges satisfaisants par la 8anque\. Quelque 18,2 millions de dollars de de
penses pour Ie projet (principalement coats de fonctionnement et salaires du
personnel local) (financement de la 8anque : 7 millions de dollars) ne se pre
tent pas aux procedures d'appel d'offres et seront engages conformement a des
pratiques prudentes et bien etablies qui sont satisfaisantes\. Les versements
effectues par l'Etat a la Cellucam pour les services de gestion seront determi
nes selon les principes de finis dans Ie contrat de gestion envisage avec la
Cellucam (par\. 4\.02 et 4\.03) et se monteront a 4 millions de dollars environ
(financement de la 8anque : 1,5 million de dollars)\.
E\. Decaissement
5\.07 Le pret de la Banque sera decaisse sur une periode de sept ans
(voir Annexe Tableau 1)\. Ce calendrier de versement est fonde sur l'expe
rience de la Banque en matiere de decaissement de prets au Cameroun\. Le pret
de la Banque financera les depenses du projet comme suit :
- 29
Millions de dollars Decaissement (%)
1\. Plantations d'Edea
Vehicules, materiel et b§timents 2,3 60
Coats d'investissement des plan
tations, y compris Ie coat du
personnel local et les depenses
de la Cellucam 7,4 35
2\. Plantation de la SEMRY (Maga)
Vehicules, materiel et b§timents 0,4 75
coats d'investissement de la plan
tation, y compris Ie coat du
personnel local 0,6 50
3\. Elements du FNFP
a) Plantation de Ngaoundere
Vehicules, materiel, b§timents 0,2 75
Coats d'investissement de la plan
tation, y compris Ie coat du
personnel local 0,1 35
b) Production de graines
Vehicules, materiel, b§timents 0,2 75
Coats d'exploitation supplementaires 0,1 35
c) Assistance technique et services de
consultants
Vehicules et coats d'exploitation 0,1 60
Personnel expatrie 2,4 100
4\. Soutien technique et materiel a la DEFC
Vehicules, materiel et b§timents 1,2 75
Coats d'exploitation supplementaires 0,4 35
Services de consultants expatries 0,4 100
5\. Non affecte
TOTAL
- 30 -
Les decaissements relatifs aux travaux de genie civil, a l'achat de vehicules
et de materiel, aux versements effectues a la Cellucam pour les services de
soutien et aux services de consultants se feront sur presentation de pieces
justificatives\. Les decaissements relatifs aux coats de plantation pour Ie
projet, y compris les salaires du personnel local, seront effectues sur pre
sentation de releves de depenses certifies\. Les pieces justificatives qui ne
seront pas presentees avec les demandes de retrait seront mises en suspens et
tenues a la disposition des missions de supervision de la Banque pour examen\.
II faudrait prendre des dispositions appropriees pour verifier les depenses
financees sur presentation de factures\.
5\.08 Le comptable du projet, qui sera recrute pour Ie siege du FNFP
(par\. 4\.06), sera charge de la comptabilite et du contrOle financier des ele
ments du FNFP et coordonnera la preparation des demandes de retrait de fonds
emanant du pr~t de la Banque pour tous les elements du projet\.
5\.09 Comptabilite, audit et etablissement de rapports\. Le FNFP tiendra,
conformement a des pratiques comptables appropriees, les ecritures se rappor
tant aux elements du FNFP et necessaires pour enregistrer la situation finan
ciere de chaque element et leurs coats detailles d'exploitation\. La compta
bilite des elements des plantations d'Edea et de la SEMRY sera confiee aux ser
vices comptables de la Cellucam et de la SEMRY; cependant, des comptes separes
seront tenus pour ces elements et seront contrOles par Ie FNFP\. Les systemes
comptables actuellement utilises par la Cellucam et la SEMRY suivent les proce
dures de comptabilite analytique appropriees a l'etablissement de releves de
depenses et de balances d'inventaire mensuelles exigees par Ie FNFP, comme il
sera precise dans les accords d'execution qui seront signes pour ces elements
(par\. 4\.02 et 4\.05)\. Le comptable du projet au FNFP conseillera egalement la
DEFC sur les ameliorations a apporter a la comptabilite et a l'etablissement
de rapports\. Le FNFP tiendra pour l'ensemble du projet une comptabilite con
solidee qui recapitulera les balances d'inventaires mensuelles\.
5\.10 les comptes du projet tenus par Ie FNFP feront l'objet d'une veri
fication comptable effectuee chaque annee par un expert-comptable independant
dont les qualifications et Ie mandat seront juges acceptables par la Banque\.
le rapport de l'expert-comptable sera presente a la Banque dans les quatre
mois suivant la clOture de l'exercice du FNFP\. De plus, les experts
comptables de la Cellucam fourniront chaque annee un releve indiquant les couts
reels des services rendus par la Cellucam a la plantation d'Edea au cours de
l'exercice precedent\.
5\.11 Le FNFP et la DEFC soumettront chaque trimestre au Gouvernement et
a la Banque des rapports sur l'etat d'avancement presentant les depenses
reelles et celles prevues au budget et indiquant les travaux realises et les
objectifs pour Ie trimestre a venir pour chaque element du projet\.
- 31
VI\. PRODUCTION, DEBOUCHES ET RESULTATS FINANCIERS
A\. Production
6\.01 Apres la periode d'investissement du projet, les plantations commen
ceront a produire comme suit :
Abattage (nombre Production (en
d'hectares milliers de m3
Categorie Annee du pro,jet par an) par an)
Bois a papier
15-26 (pins) 520 136
Plantation d'Edea 15 et 23 1 800 588
(eucalyptus)
16 et 24 1 800 401
Bois de chauffage et
bois de construction
6 14 (pins et 19
400
Plantations de la SEMRY)
et de Ngaoundere ) 15 23 eucalyptus) 22
)
25 29 (pins) 150 47
B\. Debouches et commercialisation
6\.02 La Cellucam utilisera comme matiere premiere (par\. 1\.11) du bois de
plantation au lieu du bois en provenance de la foret naturelle; Ie debouche
pour Ie bois de la plantation d'Edea est donc assure\. L'abattage du bois a
papier sera contrOle de sorte que de l'annee 15 a l'annee 26 du projet (1995
a 2006), la Cellucam pourra compter sur Ie bois de plantation pour satisfaire
100 % de ses besoins annuels en bois a longues fibres (pin) et pres de 100 %
de ses besoins en bois a fibres courtes (eucalyptus)\. Pour passer completement
de l'utilisation de la futaie tropicale au bois de plantation, et pour atteindre
un objectif de production de 80 % de pate blanchie a courtes fibres et 20 % de
pate blanchie a longues fibres, Ie Gouvernement et la Cellucam continueront
de l'annee 6 a l'annee 11 du projet a planter un nombre suffisant d'eucalyptus
(2 500 ha environ par an)\.
6\.03 La Cellucam paiera Ie bois sur pied un prix negocie pour les arbres
de plantation venus a maturite, qui sera determine suivant les principes pre
cises dans Ie contrat d'execution passe entre la Cellucam et Ie Gouvernementl
FNFP (par\. 4\.02)\. Ces principes, examines au cours des negociations, permettront
- 32
a l'Etat, d'une part, de recouvrer la totalite du cout de plantation et
d'entretien et, d'autre part, d'obtenir un taux de rentabilite positif apres
ajustement pour inflation\. De plus, il a ete convenu que la Cellucam devrait
acheter Ie bois de plantation dans un certain lapse de temps suivant la venue
a maturite des arbres\. D'autre part, il a ete convenu que si Ie prix du bois
sur pied excedait la valeur du bois determinee sur la base du prix paritaire
a l'importation, la Cellucam pourrait ajourner ses achats d'un an\. Pour illus
trer Ie principe de recouvrement des coats si lion prend comme base les
coats estimatifs du projet aux prix de 1981 et si lion fixe arbitrairement a
2,5 % Ie taux de rentabilite reel des investissements, Ie prix du bois sur pied
3 3
devrait depasser 2 820 francs CFA la m (10,44 dollars Ie m ) d'ou un cout
du bois livre a la Cellucam de 6 120 francs CFA Ie m 3
3 (22,67 dollars Ie m )\.
Ce prix du bois livre se situe dans la fourchette des prix que paieRt actuelle
ment les producteurs de pate a papier dans de nombreux pays developpes (de
3
15 dollars a 30 dollars Ie m )\.
6\.04 La production de bois des plantations en blocs de la SEMRY sera ab
sorbee par Ie marche de Maga qui comprend la zone de la SEMRY, ou la demande
devrait s'accroitre de 5 % par an, et ou il y a penurie de bois par suite de
L'augmentation naturelle de la population et de la reinstallation recente de
25 000 personnes environ (quelque 4 000 familIes) dans la zone de la SEMRY\. La
production des plantations aidera a satisfaire la demande croissante de cette
region qui devrait augmenter de 30 000 m3 d'ici a l'annee 5 du projet\. Compte
tenu des possibilites d'ecoulement, la moitie environ du bois sera vendue sous
forme de bois de feu et l'autre moitie sous forme de bois de service\. La
SEMRY et Ie FNFP annonceront la vente de droits d'abattage sur des exploi
tations de tailles differentes et Ie bois sera vendu sur pied a des bacherons,
sous contrat\. Les prix planchers du marche acceptables seront superieurs a un
prix plancher du bois sur pied qui sera au moins suffisant pour couvrir les
frais de creation et d'entretien de la plantation estimes a 1 800 francs CFA
3 3
Ie m (6,67 dollars Ie m ) aux prix de 1981, ce qui represente actuellement
15 % environ de la valeur moyenne actuelle sur Ie marche des eucalyptus sur
pied dans la region\. A partir de l'annee 6 du projet, les villageois paieront
egalement pour Ie bois sur pied des bois communaux un prix payable au moment
de la coupe, ceci pour permettre au FNFP et a la SEMRY de recouvrer Ie coat
de preparation du sol (par\. 3\.09)\. D'apres les coats estimatifs du projet,
3 3
ce prix atteindra au moins 760 francs CFA Ie m (2,80 dollars Ie m ) au prix
de 1981 et Ie montant a verser correspondra a la recette provenant de la vente
d'une petite quantite de bois sur les marches locaux\.
6\.05 D'apres les possibilites de marche de la region de Ngaoundere, 5 %
de la production d'eucalyptus pourrait etre consacree a la construction
de poteaux electriques, 25 % au bois de construction et 70 % au bois de feu\.
Pour les pins, la moitie de la production provenant des eclaircies effec
tuees de l'annee 7 a l'annee 19 du projet pourrait servir de bois de feu
et l'autre moitie de bois de service\. Au moment de la coupe rase, la moitie
des pins pourrait fournir des grumes de sciage\. La consommation annuelle
3
de combustibles dans la region de Ngaoundere est estimee a 55 000 m et
la demande devrait augmenter de 4,5 % par an jusqu'en 1990\. Par consequent,
- 33
3
les 4 000 m supplementaires de bois de la savane arbustive qui seront
disponibles grace au defrichement effectue dans Ie cadre du projet et la
3
production annuelle supplementaire de 8 400 m disponible apras l'annee 6
du projet seront rapidement absorbes\. L'envergure du marche des poteaux de
ligne, lequel absorbe actuellement environ 700 m3 par an dont la majeure
partie est deja fournie par les plantations du FNFP a Ngaoundere, devrait
augmenter d'environ 15 ~ par an au fur et a mesure que d'autres lignes seront
installees dans la province du nord\. La production supplementaire de poteaux
prevue, qui est de 225 m par an, est inferieure a la demande supplementaire
3
de 850 m 3 par an qui sera enregistree chaque annee apras l'annee 6 du projet
et sera donc immediatement absorbee\. La production supplementaire de bois de
3
service, 1 125 m par an, sera egalement inferieure a la demande supplemen
3
taire prevue de 6 500 m par an apras l'annee 6 du projet\. Bien qu'il n'existe
pas actuellement de scierie a Ngaoundere, il ne devrait pas ~tre difficile de
3
commercialiser les 48 000 m de grumes de pins pour la construction disponibles
a l'annee 25 du projet si lIon considare que la demande actuelle de bois de
3
sciage dans la province du nord depasse 50 000 m par an\. Le FNFP commercia
lisera Ie bois de plantation par l'intermediaire des bOcherons locaux, sous
contrat, comme il Ie fait actuellement au nom du Gouvernement\. Les prix du
bois sur pied devraient continuer a ~tre superieurs aux niveaux moyens neces
saires pour permettre de recouvrer la totalite des coOts et inter~ts,estimes
3 3
a 1 700 francs CFA Ie m (6,30 dollars Ie m ) pour Ie pin et a 1 200 francs CFA
Ie m 3
3 (4,44 dollars Ie m ) pour l'eucalyptus (par\. 7\.06)\.
C\. Resultats financiers
6\.06 Les flux financiers de llEtat relatifs aux plantations et au projet
ont ete estimes de la maniare suivante :
\. i) les coOts des elements du projet ont ete estimes chaque annee
avec les provisions et les impots, comme dans Ie dossier du pro
jet, avec en plus les couts renouvelables afferents a la periode
suivant l'execution du projet;
ii) les recettes comprennent les impOts indirects, les revenus des
plantations de Ngaoundere et de la SEMRY estimes aux prix courants
du marche (par\. 7\.06), et les revenus de la plantation d'Edea
estimes aux prix minimums du bois sur pied permettant de recouvrer
la totalite des coOts et d'atteindre un taux de rentabilite nomi
nal (par\. 6\.03); tous ces montants sont ex primes en prix courants;
iii) l'estimation du montant du service de la dette est fondee sur Ilhy_
pothase selon laquelle Ie pret de la CDC serait accorde aux m~mes
conditions que celui de la Banque (par\. 5\.04); et
iv) les recettes supplementaires enregistrees par suite de l'amelioration
du calcul et de la perception des redevances et impots forestiers
due au renforcement de la DEFC ont ete exclues des calculs\.
»
- 34
D'apres ces hypotheses, les resultats financiers sont les suivants :
Projet, plus ser
vice de la dette
PlantationsL1 Projet/ 2 moins impOts
Annee ou les recettes
annuelles sont posi
tives pour la pre
miere fois annee 7 annee 7 annee 14
Periode d'amortissement
(annees jusqu'au pre
mier flux de tresore
rie cumule positif) 15 15 16
Investissement cumule
(en milliolls) $ 28,4 $ 34,0 $ 30,0
/1 Les trois elements de plantation\.
/2 Plantations plus la DEFC et le FNFP\.
Les resultats financiers sont presentes en detail dans Ie dossier du projet\.
l 'Etat devrait amortir son investissement en 16 ans au plus s'il reussit a
ameliorer Ie recouvrement des impOts et des redevances per~us aupres du
secteur forestier\. Avec l'amelioration des procedures administratives et de
la perception des impOts et des redevances leves sur la recoite connue de
bois, les recettes pourraient augmenter de 1 000 millions de francs CFA par an
(3,7 millions de dollars), ce qui permettra de disposer chaque annee de revenus
supplementaires (SOD millions de francs CFA environ, soit 1,9 million de dol
lars) suffisants pour financer Ie coat du reboisement pendant 7 des 13 annees
au cours desquelles le flux de tresorie cumule de l'Etat sera negatif\.
6\.07 les taux de rentabilite financiere du projet seront determines en
grande partie par le prix du bois sur pied qui sera negocie entre Ie Gouver
nement et la Cellucam pour Ie bois de la plantation d 'Edea\. Le tableau ci
apres presente les taux de rentabilite pour differents prix du bois sur pied
3
a Edea, allant de 12 dollars Ie m (prix approximatif qui permettrait a
3
l'Etat de recouvrer les coOts) a 57 dollars Ie m (prix paritaire a l'im
portation) (par\. 7\.05)\. Si lIon considere que Ie coat de la recolte et du
3
transport du bois de plantation a l'usine est de 13 dollars Ie m environ
(par\. 6\.03), Ie Gouvernement pourrait appliquer un prix allant jusqu'a 18 dol
3
lars Ie m de bois sur pied et enregistrer une rentabilite financiere allant
jusqu'a 9,8 % sur l'investissement total sans pour cela que Ie coOt du bois
de la Cellucam soit superieur au coat plafond habituellement enregistre
ailleurs par des entreprises de pate a papier efficaces\. Un accord sur les
prix, satisfaisant pour les deux parties, pourra probablement etre conclu
entre la Cellucam et Ie Gouvernement\.
- 35
TAUX DE RENTABILITE FINANCIERE/l
--------Taux de rentabilite financiere---------------------
Projet plus
service de
Prix du bois sur Elements de la dette
pied a Edea Edea SEMRY Nqaoundere plantation moins impots
(en dollars par m ) _____________________________ %
3 _____________________-------
12 5,2 18,0 18,1 8,1 7,1
18 7,9 II II
10,0 9,8
24 9,9 " " 11 ,3 11 ,8
30 11,5 " " 12,5 D,2
48 14,9 " " 15,3 17,2
57 16,1 " " 16,6 18,4
11 L\.es flux d'avantages nets ont ete calcules sur la meme base que le flux
de tresorerie de l'Etat (par\. 6\.06) mais aux prix de 1981\.
- 36
VII\. AVANTAGES, JUSTIFICATION ECONOMIQUE ET RISQUES
A\. Avantages
7\.01 Dans Ie cadre du projet, Ie programme de plantation de 11 000 ha don
nera des resultats immediatement quantifiables, a savoir : i) une production
3
supplementaire annuelle egale en moxenne a 19 000 m de bois de l'annee 6 a
l'annee 14 du projet, et a 26 000 m' de l'annee 15 a l'annee 29, essentielle
ment dans la grovince du nord qui conna1t une penurie de bois; et
ii) 330 000 m par an de bois abattu de l'annee 15 a l'annee 29 a Edea
3
(par\. 6\.01)\. Cela permettra a la Cellucam de n'utiliser en fin de compte que
du bois de plantation de qualite uniforme, d'ou une diminution d'environ 33 %
environ des coats de la recolte et de 20 % environ du coat de la fabrication
de pate et une augmentation de la valeur de la pate a fibres longues et
courtes par rapport a la valeur actuelle (par\. 1\.11)\. II s'ensuivra une ame
lioration des resultats financiers de la Cellucam d~nt l'Etat, principal
actionnaire, sera Ie beneficiaire\. ,De surcro1t, des graines ameliorees
d'eucalyptus provenant des vergers I graines finances par Ie projet seront
disponibles apres l'annee 6 et des graines ameliorees de pin apres l'annee 10\.
Cet element du projet fournira environ la moitie des graines necessaires pour
executer les futurs programmes de plantation du FNFP, ce qui est d'autant plus
avantageux que Ie desequilibre entre l'offre et la demande mondiales pourrait
limiter les futurs programmes de plantation\.
7\.02 Le principal avantage indirect du projet envisage sera Ie renforce
ment des deux principaux organismes du secteur forestier, Ie FNFP et la DEFC\.
Le projet mettra en place la base necessaire pour assurer un suivi et un
contrdle ameliore a terme de l'exploitation forestiere et pour l'etablisse
ment de programmes de regeneration bien fondes sur les plans economique et
technique\. Le renforcement de ces organismes sera avantageux dans l'immediat
sur Ie plan financier: d'une part, la perception des impdts et des redevan
ces s'ameliorera et, d'autre part, des economies seront realisees grace a la
mise en oeuvre de programmes de reboisement plus rentables, executes par Ie
personnel du FNFP forme dans Ie cadre du projet\. Enfin, Ie projet permettra
d'acquerir davantage d'experience dans Ie domaine de la foresterie villageoise
qui est l'un des elements cles grace auxquels il sera possible de freiner la
degradation des ressources forestieres en zone seche (par\. 3\.09)\.
B\. Justification economigue
a) Analyse et taux de rentabilite economigue
7\.03 L'analyse economique du projet est limitee a trois elements de plan
tations productives representant 81 % du coat total du projet, a savoir les
plantations d'Edea, de la SEMRY et Ngaoundere et a l'assistance technique
accordee au FNFP et representant 7 % des coats du projet \. L'Etat beneficiera
d'avantages importants decoulant du service de production de graines ameliorees,
- 37
mais qui sont de par leur nature similaires aux efforts de recherche a long
terme dont les avantages et les coats ne sont pas quantifies aux fins d'ana
lyse economique\. De plus, les avantages dont beneficiera l'Etat grace a
l'amelioration de la DEFC sont des avant ages financiers; il s'agit en effet
de paiements de transferts dont la valeur economique nlest pas calculee\. Deux
analyses ont ete faites sur la plantation d'Edea; la premiere porte sur la
plantation de 8 800 ha prevue dans Ie projet et la deuxieme, sur Ie programme
de reboisement de 24 000 ha qui permettra a la Cellucam d'utiliser du bois de
plantation\. La variation du taux de rentabilite economique de la plantation
dlEdea dans Ie cas ou lion exclurait la Cellucam comme debouche est analysee
dans Ie paragraphe consacre aux risques du projet (par\. 7\.11)\.
7\.04 Les coats et les vantages ont ete estimes aux prix constants de
1981\. Tousles coats sont ex primes nets d'impOts et tous les coats autres
queles coats de main-d'oeuvre comprennent des provisions pour imprevus ap
propriees (par\. 5\.02)\. La part des coats d'investissement et des coats de
fonctionnement autres que ceux dela main-d'oeuvre qui represente des services
et des biens non commercialises a ete multipliee par un facteur de conversion
standard de 0,77 pour obtenir des prix frnco frontiere et pouvoir ainsi Ie com
parer a des biens et services commercialises\. On a egalement ramene les trai
tements et salaires de la main-d' oeuvre qualifiee travaillant dans les planta
tions d'Eaea, qui sera payee selon Ie SMIC aux niveaux des prix franco frontiere,
en les multipliant par Ie facteur de conversion standard 0,77\. La main-d'oeuvre
saisonniere non qualifiee travaillant dans les plantations d 'Edea sera payee aux
niveaux de sal aires les plus bas permis par Ie SMIC\. Cependant, pour l'analyse
economique, Ie coat de la main-d'oeuvre est evalue selon des salaires compa
rabIes aux salaires payes pour un travail similaire, realise dans des condi
tions comparables dans Ie cadre de projets de plantations agricoles de la re
gion\. Le coat de la main-d'oeuvre saisonniere qualifiee et non qualifiee
travaillant dans les plantations de la SEMRY et de Ngaoundere est evalue au
taux salarial dumarche, net d'impOt, qui traduit actuellement la valeur de
rarete de la main-d'oeuvre en periode de pointe\.
7\.05 On a estime la valeur des pins sur pied a la plantation d'Edea d'apres
Ie prix des copeaux de bois de pin importes livres a l'usine de pate a papier
tout en tenant compte des couts d'abattage et de dechiquetage du bois de plan
3
tation au m Le resultat est une valeur economique du pin sur pied de 57 dol
3
lars Ie m aux prix de 1981\. En fonction des projections recentes de la si
tuation commerciale mondiale future, ce prix est majore de 0,5 % par an en
termes reeels\. La valeur economique des eucalyptus a ete calculee directement
comme etant egale au coat de la recolte d'eucalyptus, lequel est inferieur a
celui de la recolte de bois de feuillus de la for§t naturelle, auquel sont
venus s'ajouter les economies realiseees sur les coats de fabrication de la
pate par suite de l'utilisation de bois de plantation de qualite uniforme
(par\. 7\.02)\. Le resultat est une valeur economique estimative des eucalyptus
3
sur pied de 12 dollars Ie m
- 38
7\.06 La valeur des eucalyptus sur pied a la 5EMRY est estimee a 53,40 dol
3
lars Ie m C'est la valeur moyenne ponderee du bois de service (50 %) et
du bois de feu (50 %) calculee en soustrayant des prix du marche les coats
estimatifs de l'abattage et du transport\. 5i lIon considere que Ie bois de la
5EMRY est ecoule localement sur des marches qui ne sont pas, pour la plupart,
reglementes, les valeurs monetaires sur Ie marche local sont en fait les
valeurs economiques du bois\. Le bois abattu par les proprietaires de par
celles dans les bois communaux a egalement ete evalue a ce prix\. D'apres
les estimations, la valeur des eucalyptus sur pied a la plantation de
3
Ngaoundere est de 44 dollars Ie m , ce qui correspond a la valeur ponde
ree du bois de feu, de service, et des grumes pour poteaux de ligne sur
pied, calculee a partir des prix du marche dont on a deduit les couts
d'abattage et de transport\. La valeur des pins sur pied est estimee a
3
10 dollars Ie m de llannee 7 a l'annee 10 du projet, et a 15 dollars Ie
3
m de l'annee 11 a l'annee 20 du projet, ce qui represente les prix moyens
ponderes des bois de service, de feu et du petit bois de sciage\. Au moment
de la coupe rase des pins qui serviront de bois de sciage, entre l'annee 25 et
3
l'annee 29, leur valeur sera de 24,50 dollars Ie m Les marches locaux
de bois de feu, de service et de sciage ne sont soumis a aucune reglementa
tion de sorte que les valeurs monetaires sur Ie marche local correspondent
aux valeurs economiques du bois\. Les poteaux de ligne seront vend us a la
50NEL, societe nationale d'electricite, a 77 dollars environ la piece (aux
prix de 1981) pour ~tre utilises dans la province du nord\. Ce prix est une
approximation de la valeur paritaire a llimportation de poteaux de bois traite
qui ant ete vendus recemment au niveau international a des prix allant de 174
a 264 dollars la piece, deduction faite, d'une part, des frais de transport
qui se montent a environ 30 % de la valeur (pour Ie calcul du prix CFA Douala)
et, d'autre part, des frais de transport se montant a 50 % de la valeur (pour
fixer un prix local a Ngaoundere)\. Le calcul des prix economiques est
presente dans Ie dossier du projet\.
7\.07 D'apres les hypotheses susmentionnees, les taux de rentabilite eco
nomique des elements du pro jet sont les suivants
- 39 -
Taux de
rentabilite
economique Valeur de substitution a 12 %
% du coOt estimatif en l20urcentage en l20urcentage
du I2rojet en % des coOts des avantages
Elements
Plantation d'Edea (projet) 70 13,9 20,9 -17,3
Plantation d'Edea (programme) 13,7 15,7 -13,6
Plantation de la SEMRY 7 19,1 67,7 -40,4
Plantation de Ngaoundere 4 19,0 88,1 -46,8
Projet (3 plantations plus
Ie siege du FNFP) 88 13,9 19,0 -16,0
Les flux de couts et avantages detailles utilises figurent dans Ie dossier du
projet\.
b) Sensibilite
7\.08 Le taux de rentabilite du projet n'est dans l'ensemble que peu sen
sible aux modifications des coOts et avantages reels\. Comme il est indique au
paragraphe 7\.07, il faudrait une augmentation generale des coOts reels de 19 %
ou une baisse des avantages reels allant jusqu'a 16 % pour que Ie taux de renta
bilite economique tombe a 12 %, c'est-a-dire au niveau representant Ie coOt
estimatif d'opportunite du capital\. De surcroit, les deux plantations situees
dans la zone aride, celIe dela SEMRY et celIe de Ngaoundere, ne sont que tres
peu sensibles aux modifications des coOts et des avantages\. Les facteurs ci
apres, qui pourraient avoir une influence sur Ie taux de rentabilite econo
mique de la plantation d'Edea, sont particulierement importants :
a) l' augmentation du I2rix reel du l2in : \.si la valeur economique du pin
n'augmentait pas de 0,5 % par an comme prevu (par\. 7\.05), Ie taux de
rentabilite economique du projet tomberait de 13,4 % a 13,2 %;
b) un retard dans Ie I2rogramme des 121antations : des retards dans Ie
programme d'abattage de la futaie tropicale de la Cellucam ralenti
raient Ie rythme de plantation, d'ou un recul de la date a partir
de laquelle Ie projet commencera a produire des avantages\. Dans un
- 40
tel cas, de nombreux couts pourraient etre evites, mais un ajour
nement d'un an dans la realisation des avantages par rapport aux
couts du projet est une eventualite qui n'est pas a ecarter, et
un tel retard ferait tomber Ie taux de rentabilite economique de
13,4 % a 13 %; et
c) la variation des rendements : les estimations des rendements qui sont
a la base du projet envisage sont conformes aux rendements obtenus
au cours des tests de provenance effectues dans la region d'Edea\.
Neanmoins, si les conditions microecologiques changent, les rende
ments peuvent varier\. Si Ie rendement diminue de 10 %, Ie taux de
rentabilite economique tombera a 13 % et une diminution des rende
ments de 20 % pourrait se traduire par un taux de rentabilite econo
mique de 12,2 %\.
C\. Risgues
7\.09 La reussite du projet envisage n'est menacee par aucun risque _tech
nique majeur au inhabituel\. Les risque normaux d'incendie dans des planta
tions de zone aride et de maladies ant ete pris en compte, comme i l se doit
lars de la conception du projet et des fonds ont ete prevus pour assurer une
protection adequate\. Les techniques de plantation envisagees ant e~e utili
sees dans plusieurs pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest avec succes, dans des conditions
climatiques d'aridite et d'humidite similaires\. Des techniques mains eprou
vees visant a creer des bois individuels (par\. 3\.09) seront utilisees dans Ie
cadre d'un projet pilote et les risques qui peuvent exister sont d'ordre socio
economique plut6t que technique\.
7\.10 La Cellucam sera Ie principal debouche pour Ie bois des plantations
financees dans Ie cadre du projet et un participant important a l'execution du
projet, bien que l'Etat soit proprietaire du bois qui sera plante et soit
charge d'etablir les modalites appropriees pour Ie calcul des prix du bois sur
pied dans Ie contrat avec la Cellucam (par\. 8\.02(b»\. De plus, une analyse du
cash-flow projete de la Cellucam indique que la Cellucam sera a meme de payer
un prix du bois sur pied raisonnable lorsque Ie bois sera pret a etre abattu\.
Cependant, dans Ie cas au la Cellucam ne constituerait pas un debouche pour Ie
bois de plantation du projet, ce qui est peu probable, la production des plan
tations de pins et d'eucalyptus pourrait etre exportee sous forme de parti
cules de bois, de grumes de sciage pour la construction et de poteau x de ligne\.
Si 20 % du bois de pin etaient vendus sous forme de bois de construction et
80 % sous forme de particules de bois pour l'exportation, et si 5 % du bois
d'eucalyptus etaient vendus comme bois de service et poteaux de ligne et 95 %
sous forme de particules de bois, l'Etat pourrait vendre les arbres plantes
3
dans Ie cadre du projet a 12 dollars environ Ie m aux prix de 1981\. Ce prix
serait suffisant pour permettre a l'Etat de recouvrer la totalite des couts et
obtenir un taux de rentabilite de 2,5 % sur son investissement (par\. 6\.03)\.
- 41
VIII\. ASSURANCES ET RECOMMANDATIONS
8\.01\. Au cours des negociations, Ie Gouvernement a assure:
a) qu'aucune activite ne serait effectuee dans les bois communaux avant
qu'un plan d'action pour executer un tel programme n'ait ete soumis
a la Banque et approuve par cette derniere (par\. 3\.09);
b) que des responsables ayant des qualifications et un mandat juges accep
tables par la 8anque seraient recrutes suivant les procedures decrites
dans les "Directives pour l'emploi de consultants par des emprunteurs
de la 8anque mondiale et par la 8anque mondiale en tant qu'Agence d'exe
cution" pour les postes de directeur de programmes, de comptable du pro
jet, et de directeur de plantations charge de la supervision pour Ie
FNFP et de directeur de la foresterie pour la SEMRY (par\. 4\.06);
c) que les plantations d'Edea, de la SEMRY et de Ngaoundere seraient ef
fectuees conformement aux plans de travail et aux budgets annuels
presentes a la 8anque pour approbation Ie 31 mars de chaque annee
precedant la mise en oeuvre du programme (par\. 3\.10, 4\.03, 4\.04);
d) que des responsables nommes pour calculer les impots et redevances
et s'occuper du controle de leur perception dans chacune des cinq
provinces seraient en poste pendant toute la periode d'investissement
du projet (par\. 4\.07);
e) qu'il mettrait a la disposition de la DEFC et du FNFP suffisamment de
fonds pour executer Ie projet, les fonds etant octroyes sous forme de
dons a la DEFC et au FNFP qui tiendra des comptes separes pour chaque
element du projet et qui reapprovisionnera ces comptes au cours de
l'annee en utilisant pour cela des fonds provenant des pr~ts de la
Banque et de la CDC, et au debut de l'exercice a l'aide de sa
contribution, conformement au budget approuve pour les divers ele
ments (par\. 5\.05); et
f) qu'il prendrait toutes les mesures necessaires pour percevoir d'ici au
31 decembre 1982 tous les impots et redevances forestieres dus et en
souffrance depuis Ie 31 juillet 1980 et pour assurer que tous les
impots forestiers et redevances seront par la suite correctement
calcules et seront per~us dans les douze mois suivant leurs calculs
respectifs (par\. 1\.13)\.
8\.02 l'entree en vigueur du pr~t sera soumise aux conditions preala
bles suivantes :
- 42
a) toutes les conditions prealables a l'entree en vigueur du pret de
la CDC auront ete remplies (par\. 5\.04);
b) Ie contrat entre la Cellucam et l'Etat/FNFP, juge acceptable par la
Banque et precisant les modalites de mise en place de la plantation
d'Edea, aura ete signe (par\. 4\.02);
c) Ie Gouvernement aura etabli des comptes du projet separes pour
chacun des elements de plantation et depose aces comptes 400 mil
lions de francs CFA (1,5 million de dollars) pour la plantation
d'Edea; 35 millions de francs CFA (130 000 dollars) pour la SEMRY;
25 millions de francs CFA (90 000 dollars) pour la plantation
de Ngaoundere; 12 millions de francs CFA (40 000 dollars) pour Ie
siege du FNFP; et 33 millions de francs CFA (120 000 dollars) pour
la DEFC, montants qui representent les frais d'exploitation affe
rents a ces elements pendant une periode de six mois (par\. 5\.05)\.
8\.03 La signature d'un accord juge satisfaisant par la Banque, conclu
entre Ie FNFP et la SEMRY et precisant les dispositions a prendre pour mettre
en place Ie programme, sera la condition prealable au decaissement des montants
correspondant a des couts concernant l'element de la SEMRY et qui peuvent ~tre
finances dans Ie cadre du pret (par\. 4\.04)\.
8\.04 Sous reserve des conditions susmentionnees, Ie projet justifie
l'octroi par la Banque d'un pret de 17 millions de dollars\.
- 43
ANNEXE
Tableau 1
CAMEROUN - PROJET FORESTIER
Etat Estimatif des Decaissements
(en millions de dollars EU)
Annees Fisca1es Decaissements Pourcentage de
et Trimestres (BIRD) Decaissements cumu1es Decaissement
AF 83
Septemb re 1982 0\.2 0\.2 1
Decembre 1982 0\.4 0\.6 4
Mars 1983 0\.4 1\.0 6
Juin 1983 0\.5 1\.5 9
AF 84
Septembre 1983 0\.7 2\.2 13
Decembre 1983 0\.7 2\.9 17
Mars 1984 0\.8 3\.7 22
Juin 1984 0\.9 4\.6 27
AF\. 85
Septembre 1984 0\.9 5\.5 32
Decembre 1984 0\.9 6\.4 38
Mars 1985 0\.9 7\.3 43
Juin 1985 0\.9 8\.2 48
AF 86
Septemb re 1985 0\.9 9\.1 54
Deceml:J'e 1985 0\.8 9\.9 58
Mars 1986 0\.8 10\.7 63
Juin 1986 0\.8 11\.5 68
AF 87
Septemb re 1986 0\.7 12\.2 72
Decemb re 1986 0\.6 12\.8 75
Mars 1987 0\.6 13\.4 79
Juin 1987 0\.5 13\.9 82
AF 88
Septembre 1987 0\.5 14\.4 85
Decembre 1987 0\.5 14\.9 88
Mars 1988 0\.5 15\.4 91
JUin 1988 0\.5 15\.9 94
AF 89
Septembre 1988 0\.3 16\.2 95
Decembre 1988 0\.3 16\.5 97
Mars 1989 0\.3 16\.8 99
Juin 1989 0\.2 17\.0 100
~Y11 - PHQJID' FOflESTIm Annexe
Tableau 2
Cash Flov de 1 'Etatll
(en million de FCrA)
InTeat1!;sen:ellts
Recettes r6aultant du proJet SurElus ProJet \. l"!nance1llent du ProJet Cash Flow let de l'Etat
Colnposante Autres COlli- ColTlllosante SOIW- Taxes indi- Sous\. Service de
Plantation '$I ColllPosante ( financement
/IIlnEes f?slIIltea FNFP\. Dt~C \. \. total
PllllltationaY rectes !I Total reguia) ~!!I la dette ;V Net Annue! Ct:\.nru1 s ti t
1982 1398 223 400 2021 130 130 (1891) 243 76 168 (1,723) (1,732)
1983 1050 156 126 1332 90 90 (1242) 891 69 822 (420) (2,152)
1984 1605 168 81 1860 122 122 (1738) 1350 162 1,188 (550) (2,702)
1985 1922 240 239 2401 160 160 (2241) 1350 30'1 1,041 U,200) (3,902)
1986 1844 44 100 1988 130 130 (1858) 1134 457 1,591 (267) (4,169)
1981 252 252 21 21 (231 ) 810 1,169 (359) (590) 4,759)
1988 28 11 39 39 1i2T (492) (453)
1989 1,113 (5,212)
389 389 389 189 1;060 (811) (482) (5,694)
1990 452 452 452 (1,009) (557) (6,251)
1991 1,009
532 532 532 957 (957) (425) (6,676)
1992 539 539 539
1993 906 (906) (367) (7,043)
145 145 11\.5
855 (855) (710) (7,753)
1994 358 358 358 803 (803) ~445) (8,198)
1995 815 815 815
1996 752 (752) 63 (8,135)
6968 6968 6968 100 (700) 6,268 (1,867)
1991 5389 5389 5389
1998 649 (649) 4,740 2,873
1810 1810 18]0 598 (598) 1,212 4,085
1999 1356 1356 1356
2000 546 (546) 810 4,895
1591 1591 1591 495 (495) 1,096 5,991
2001 2011 2011 2011
2002 443 (443) 1,568 1,559
1924 1924 1924 1,924 9,483 +:
2003 1930 1930 1930 +:
2004 1,930 11,413
6629 6629 6629 6,629 18,043
2005 4601 4601 4601
2006 4,601 22,643
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2001 1000 1000 1000
2008 1,000 26,078
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2009 861 867 867
2010 861 21,807
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| APPROVAL
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P123783
| PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
APPRAISAL STAGE
Report No\.: AB6209
VN-VAHIP additional financing
Project Name
Region EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
Sector Health (50%);General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector
(20%);Solid waste management (10%);General public
administration sector (10%);Other social services (10%)
Project ID P123783
Borrower(s) THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Implementing Agency
Ministry of Health
138A Giang Vo Street
Vietnam
Tel: (84-4) 6273-2273 Fax: (84-4) 3846-4051
Environment Category [ ] A [X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined)
Date PID Prepared January 9, 2011
Date of Appraisal January 20, 2011
Authorization
Date of Board Approval June 30, 2011
1\. Country and Sector Background
The Vietnam Avian and Human Influenza Control and Preparedness Project is co-financed by an
IDA Credit (SDR 13\.5 million, US$20 million equivalent), an Avian and Human Influenza
Facility Grant (US$10 million), a Japan PHRD Grant (US$5 million), and the Vietnam
Government (US$3 million)\. The Credit and Grant were approved on March 13, 2007 and
became effective on August 23, 2007\. The Project was restructured once in June 2010 to re-
allocate funds among the Disbursement Categories\. The original Projectâs Closing Date was
December 31, 2010\. A second extension of six months from June 30, 2011 to December 31,
2011 was approved by the Bank management recently\.
The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to increase the effectiveness of Government
services in reducing the health risk to poultry and humans from avian influenza in eleven high
priority provinces and thus contribute to addressing highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) at
the national level by (i) controlling the disease at source in domestic poultry; (ii) early detection
and response to poultry and human cases; and (iii) preparing for the medical consequences of a
human pandemic\. This is in line with and supports the implementation of Vietnamâs plans for the
medium to long-term control of avian and human influenza as outlined in the Integrated National
Operational Program for the Avian and Human Influenza 2006 â 2010 (The Green Book), and is
fully consistent with the approach envisaged under the Global Program for Avian Influenza and
Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response (GPAI)\.
The Project is being implemented jointly by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
(MARD) and the Ministry of Health (MOH), with MARD as the lead ministry for the overall
management of the Project, MARD for Component A activities and MOH for Component B
activities\. Out of a total cost of US$38 million, US$21 million is under the management of
MARD and US$17 million is under the management of MOH\. It consists of three components:
(a) HPAI Control and Eradication in the Agricultural Sector; (b) Influenza Prevention and
Pandemic Preparedness in the Health Sector; and (c) Integration and Operational Program Plan
(OPI) Coordination, Results Monitoring and Evaluation, and Project Management\. Component
A, which is for animal health and managed by MARD, covers 11 selected Provinces\. Component
B, which is for human health and managed by MOH, covers 8 out of the same 11 Provinces\.
Component C is jointly managed by MARD and MOH\.
The Project is being implemented jointly by MARD and MOH, with MARD as the lead ministry
for the overall management of the Project and for Component A activities and MOH managing
Component B activities\. It consists of three components: (a) HPAI Control and Eradication in
the Agricultural Sector; (b) Influenza Prevention and Pandemic Preparedness in the Health
Sector; and (c) Integration and Operational Program Plan (OPI) Coordination, Results
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), and Project Management\. Component A is managed by
MARD and covers 11 selected Provinces\. Component B is managed by MOH and covers 8 out
of the same 11 Provinces\. Component C is jointly managed by MARD and MOH\.
2\. Objectives
The Project Development Objective is to assist the Recipient to increase the effectiveness of
public services in reducing the health risk to poultry and to humans from avian influenza in
selected provinces, through measures to control the disease at source in domestic poultry, to
detect early and respond to human cases of infections, and to prepare for the medical
consequences of a potential human pandemic\.
3\. Rationale for Bank Involvement
The VAHIP is due to close on December 31, 2011\. However, the threat from emerging infectious
diseases (EIDs), including influenza A (H5N1), has not been adequately reduced\. The on-going
threat justifies additional investment into measures to reduce the risk posed by poultry and to
improve the capacity of health services and pandemic preparedness\. A majority of high impact
infectious diseases that have recently affected humans have arisen at the animal-human-
environment interface and significantly impact animal and human health, livelihoods and
development\. More specifically, as predicted at the time VAHIP was prepared, HPAI viruses of
the H5N1 subtype are still entrenched in Vietnam, despite the improvements made\. Although
the frequency and scale of H5N1 outbreaks has been reduced, they could flare up if close
attention to control and prevention is not maintained\. The recent human influenza A (H1N1)
pandemic demonstrated the need for pandemic preparedness\. By June 30, 2011, the original
VAHIP would have invested in strengthening of animal health systems in 135 Districts in 11
Provinces, and strengthening human health systems in 28 overlapping Districts in 8 of the 11
Provinces\. The proposed AF is consistent with the draft National Strategic Plan for Avian and
Human Influenza for 2011- 2015\. An extension of VAHIP will support the updated National
Strategic Plan by strengthening the human health system (Component B) in a larger number of
Districts while keeping the same "one-health" approach that underpinned the original VAHIP\.
The AF also recognizes the importance of some key activities under Component A (HPAI
Control and Eradication in the Agricultural Sector) which will receive continued support in order
to consolidate and scale up the project impact on the ground\. On the basis of the foregoing, the
Government has requested AF from the Bank to narrow the financing gap in order to achieve
these goals\.
Description
The AF will keep the original components\. Component A â HPAI Control and Eradication in the
Agricultural Sector ($2 million) will be managed by MARD Department of Animal Health to
supplement government support to the program\. Component B Influenza Prevention and
Pandemic Preparedness in the Health Sector and Component C Project Management (total $18
million) will be managed by the CPMU of MOH\.
Component A â HPAI Control and Eradication in the Agricultural Sector
Sub-component A1: Strengthening of Veterinary Services: Under the existing VAHIP, good
progress has been made in: (a) improving the quality management of the nine national and
regional veterinary laboratories to ensure that they have the necessary capacity and capability to
perform all necessary testing for avian influenza to international quality standards and in
improving their biosafety facilities, and (b) improving the commune-based early warning and
disease reporting in 90 districts in 11 project provinces through the provision of training for
commune animal health workers (CAHW) and supporting monthly meetings between district
veterinary stations and CAHW\. To consolidate the impact on the ground, the AF will support the
operation of seven regional labs and two central labs, and costs associated with commune-based
early warning and disease reporting e\.g\. training, meetings between DVO and CAHWs\.
Sub-component A2: Enhanced Disease control\. Under the existing VAHIP, good progress has
been made in (a) upgrading Ha Vi live bird market in Hanoi and some selected live bird markets
and slaughterhouses in project provinces, (b) constructing a poultry destruction and disposal site
in Lang Son for smuggled poultry; and (c) developing bio security standards for smallholder- and
commercial farms\. The achievements under VAHIP have provided a foundation for future
control and prevention of avian influenza along the production and market chains\. The AF will
include continued support to strengthening operations of Ha Vi live bird market in Hanoi and
culling and disposal site in Lang Son for smuggled poultry for another 2 years (a testing period)
to ensure smooth operations of the facilities as they have just been completed\.
Sub-component A3: Disease surveillance and epidemiological investigations: Under the
existing VAHIP, good progress has been made in (a) introducing a market-based and risk-based
surveillance approach; and (b) improving the quality of surveillance activities, including
sampling, laboratory analysis, data analysis, and reporting\. As HPAI viruses are continuing to
circulate in the natural environment and poultry flocks, the AF will support risk-based disease
surveillance and epidemiological investigations at local levels\.
Sub-component A5: Emergency Outbreak Containment Plan: The current VAHIP has
provided disinfectants, supplies, and basic equipment for effective outbreak containment in- and
outside the 11 project provinces\. Provincial and district rapid response teams have been
established in all project provinces\. Joint simulation exercises prove to be very useful for
improving coordination between animal health sector and human health sector in responding to
epidemics\. These also helped improve responding capacity of commune, district, and provincial
levels to respond and control other emerging diseases such as H1N1, malaria, dengue fever, etc\.
To consolidate experience and lessons, and deepen the impacts, the AF will finance stockpiles of
emergency supplies and simulation exercises\.
Component B - Influenza Prevention and Pandemic Preparedness in the Health Sector
Sub-component B1: Improving Surveillance and Response System: Evidence in Vietnam
suggests that the weakest part of the response systems tend to be at the grass-root level, and
cross-sectoral collaboration at the district and commune levels is one of the critical factors to
strengthen the response systems\. Under the existing VAHIP, good progress has been made in (a)
developing and piloting an improved surveillance system in Project Provinces; (b) establishing
and operating rapid response mechanisms; and (c) improving surveillance capacity\. The AF will
focus on filling the gaps in human health sector in these areas while supporting the collaboration
of animal health and human health in surveillance and joint simulation\. The AF will support
improvement of the quality of disease surveillance and expand the coverage of the internet-based
(infectious) disease reporting system in 54 additional project districts in the eleven Project
provinces\. It will also support multi disciplinary Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) pilots in a few
selected districts to improve the linkage between the surveillance systems in animal and human
health sectors\.
Sub-component B2: Improving Technical Quality and Efficiency of Curative Care
Preparedness: Under the existing VAHIP, good progress has been made in (a) reviewing and
updating technical guidelines and training materials on influenza clinical management (diagnosis
and treatment), infection control, management of patients with respiratory failure, and operation
of mechanical ventilation systems; and (b) improving capacities to control infection in hospitals
at central, Provincial and District levels\. This component will scale up the pilot activities under
(a) and (b) in 54 additional project districts\. It will also support development and implementation
of health sector pandemic preparedness plans at District level, piloting establishment of human
influenza (HI) surveillance in two to three Provinces, and upgrading isolation wards in three
Provinces\. The new activities are aimed at improving hospital infection control and health sector
pandemic preparedness at District level\.
Sub-component B3: Strengthening BCC and Risk Communication for Emerging Infectious
Diseases: Under the existing VAHIP, good progress has been made in (a) training for Provincial,
District, commune and village health workers in BBC skills and provision of equipment for
Provincial and District communications units; and (b) conducting community awareness,
information, education and communication campaigns\. The AF will scale up training on BCC
and other campaigns at the community level in 54 additional districts\. In addition, it will finance
the development and piloting of risk communications models through: (i) developing national
Risk Communication Plan (RCP); (ii) developing a toolkit for risk communication on EIDs; (iii)
training of spokespersons within health sector; and (iv) impact evaluation skills for preventive
medicine staff\.
Sub-component B4: Strengthening the Preventive Health System at the Local Level:
Strengthening the capacity of District health systems would improve the countryâs overall
capacity in early detection and early response to HAPI or similar infectious diseases\.
Identification of a significant number of avian influenza outbreaks in Vietnam was promoted by
identification and reporting of human infection of HPAI (H5N1)\. Such a strategy is particularly
important when the country is running vaccination campaigns that may prevent large scale of
deaths among domestic poultry\. Investments under VAHIP in the 28 pilot Districts have
improved the District preventive medicine system in selected Provinces and demonstrated good
impact on helping control H5N1, H1N1 and other emerging epidemic diseases\. In the AF, the
pilot model developed under VAHIP will be replicated in 54 additional Districts in the eleven
Project Provinces to improve the emergency response capacity at District preventive medicine
centers, including provision of equipment and training of staff\.
Component 3 - Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Project Management: This
component will support Project management, monitoring and evaluation, and coordination
between agriculture sector, human health sector and other concerned agencies implementing the
Integrated and Operational Program Plan (OPI)\. At the central level, MOH will be the lead
Ministry for the overall management and implementation of AF project\. The Central Project
Management Unit (CPMU) in MARD will be replaced by the Department of Animal Health
(DAH) as implementer of AF funded activities under Component A\. A Designated Account
(DA) will be opened at DAH\. A Project Team including a Director, a Sr\. Technical Expert, and
an Accountant will be appointed to manage and implement project activities\. This team will also
provide technical guidance to project provinces through provincial animal health specialists
seconded to PPMUs to implement animal health related activities and coordinate with human
health sector\. Results Monitoring and Evaluation, and incremental operating costs of DAH for
the AF implementation will be covered by the AF\. The CPMU in MOH will be responsible for
the implementation of human health related activities and coordination with DAH in MARD\. It
will manage the Project Designated Account in the CPMU, procurement of goods and consulting
services, Project monitoring and evaluation, Project reporting, and Project audit\. At the
provincial level, the PPMUs under the on-going project will continue to implement the AF
project activities\. The directors of the PPMUs will be directors of the Department of Health in
respective provinces\. It will consist of project coordinator, procurement officer, accountant, and
project assistants\. One staff from the agricultural sector will be seconded to the PPMU\. This
arrangement is believed to be appropriate for better inter-sectoral cooperation\. The AF will
finance the costs associated with project implementation and management including coordination
and M&E\.
Financing
Source: ($m\.)
BORROWER/RECIPIENT 2
International Development Association (IDA) 10
AHI Facility (Grant) 13
Total 25
Implementation
The project management structure at central and provincial levels will also remain unchanged\.
The central Project Coordination Units (PCUs) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MARD) and the Ministry of Health (MOH) will be responsible for the
implementation of the activities in animal health sector and human health sector under the AF
project respectively\. The Ministry of Health will be the lead agency for implementation of the
AF project, instead of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development\. At the provincial
level, the joint Provincial Project Management Units (PPMUs) in 11 project provinces will be
responsible for implementation of the AF project\. Provincial Department of Health will be the
lead agency for implementation of the AF project in respective provinces\.
Safeguard Policies
Experiences from the Project show that the AF, with a continuation of existing activities, is not
expected to have any large-scale, significant and/or irreversible environmental and social impacts
as it is focused largely on capacity building and strengthening readiness for dealing with
outbreaks of avian influenza and preventing or reducing possible human infections by
strengthening emergency preparedness and response\. In addition, the AF Project continues to
incorporate in its design other beneficial measures such as upgrading the regional/central
laboratories, improving bio-security in farms and hygiene in live bird markets and strengthening
the culling and disposal sites\. With respect to the health sector, similar activities in additional
districts will continue to be supported, as well as equipment, and training to improve the
capacity, preparedness and readiness to respond, along with strengthening the curative care
systems in the Provinces and Districts\. These will have positive impacts on human health and
the environment\. Since the activities remain largely unchanged, the AF is still assigned an
Environmental Category of B\.
Among the Bankâs safeguards policies, only OP 4\.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4\.10
(Indigenous People) are triggered\. The Bankâs policy on Pest Management is not triggered since
the Project: (a) will not procure any pesticides; and (b) will not promote an increase in the use of
pesticides increase\. However, the chemicals to be used for the disinfection of farm
facilities/personal protection equipment will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for conformity
with OP 4\.09 for Pest Management\. Similar to the parent Project, the AF will not trigger the
policies of OP 4\.04, OP 4\. 36, OP 4\.11 on Natural Habitat, Forest and Physical Cultural
Resources respectively given that no activities affecting the natural habitat, forest and cultural
resources are proposed\.
Contact point
Contact: Lingzhi Xu
Title: Senior Operations Officer
Tel: (202) 473-2803
Fax:
Email: Lzxu@worldbank\.org
For more information contact:
The InfoShop
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Telephone: (202) 458-4500
Fax: (202) 522-1500
Email: pic@worldbank\.org
Web: http://www\.worldbank\.org/infoshop
| APPROVAL
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| APPROVAL
|
P154219
| Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review
Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
Report Number: ICRR0022182
1\. Project Data
Project ID Project Name
P154219 Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project
Country Practice Area(Lead)
Bulgaria Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation
L/C/TF Number(s) Closing Date (Original) Total Project Cost (USD)
IBRD-85960 31-Dec-2018 319,734,000\.00
Bank Approval Date Closing Date (Actual)
18-Mar-2016 31-Dec-2019
IBRD/IDA (USD) Grants (USD)
Original Commitment 327,465,000\.00 0\.00
Revised Commitment 327,465,000\.00 0\.00
Actual 319,734,000\.00 0\.00
Prepared by Reviewed by ICR Review Coordinator Group
Paul Holden John R\. Eriksson Christopher David Nelson IEGFP (Unit 3)
2\. Project Objectives and Components
DEVOBJ_TBL
a\. Objectives
The Objective of the project (PDO) was to strengthen the financial and institutional capacity of the Borrower
so as to enable it to meet its deposit insurance and bank resolution obligations\. (Financing Agreement, p\. 5)\.
The ICR (p\. 8) notes that âthe Borrowerâ refers to the Bulgarian Deposit Insurance Fund (BDIF)\.
Page 1 of 14
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review
Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
The objective can be parsed into two key outcomes:
ï Outcome 1: Strengthen the financial capacity of the BDIF
ï Outcome 2: Strengthen the institutional capacity of the BDIF
b\. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No
c\. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
No
d\. Components
Initially the project specified only one component, which was âstrengthening the financial and institutional
capacity of the BDIF, (estimated total cost at appraisal US$327\.47 million equivalent; actual financed cost
was US$319\.743 million)\. However, this was parsed into two components in the PAD to reflect the two
outcomes of the PDO, (ICR,pp\.8-9[JE1] ) although in the Loan Agreement (p\. 5) it is shown as one
component\.
The first component aimed to strengthen the financial capacity of the BDIF in order to be able to have
sufficient financial capability to meet disbursement requirements in the event of a further bank failure\. In
2014, a failure of the fourth largest bank in the country had drained the liquidity of the BDIF\. The failure
necessitated the payout of EUR1\.9 billion (ICR p\. 6), with the assistance of a government loan\. The payout
exceeded the EUR 1\.07 billion of accumulated reserves of the BDIF by a substantial margin, leaving it with
only EUR232 million in reserves by March 2015, which would have been insufficient to cover payouts in the
event of a further bank failure\.
The component was to be achieved through meeting ten Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs) on which
disbursements of the tranches of the loan were based\. The first group of these involved measures to
increase the reserves of the BDIF to the equivalent of one percent of covered deposits\. The second group
of DLIs involved the recovery of assets from the bankrupt bank in order to further augment reserves of the
BDIF\. The third set of DLIs involved securing a backstop loan to be drawn in the event of a bank failure
requiring additional disbursement of reserves\. This loan could not be from the World Bank since the
objective of this set of DLIs was to broaden the sources of funding\.
The second component aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the BDIF\. The measures to be
taken were based on the recommendations of the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI),
which focused on improving the ability of the BDIF to recognize and respond to potential banking sector
problems through sharing information between the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the BDIF\. In
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
addition, an Independent Asset Quality Review of the Commercial Banks in Bulgaria was being undertaken,
the results of which were to be shared with the BDIF\. An additional sub-component was the improvement of
the ability of the BDDIF to engage in deposit payouts and bank resolutions in the event of bank failure\.
[JE1]The ICR is clear that the PAD split the PDO in two\. This is important since if It was only the ICR that
did so, assessing the efficacy of achievement of each sub-PDO separately, rather than just the original
PDO, could be questioned\. It is not clear in what document and when only the one PDO was cited\. Perhaps
in the Financing Agreement (FA)?
e\. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
The total cost of the project at appraisal was estimated at EUR300 million ($327\.465 million equivalent)\. The actua
amount disbursed was $319\.734 million, with the difference being accounted for by exchange rate fluctuations\. The
was financed through World Bank Investment Project Financing\.
Disbursements were as follows:
ï A EUR100 million advance payment plus EUR150 million on the achievement of five DLIs;
ï A further disbursement of EUR50 million during project implementation\.
While there was no co-financing, the borrower also secured a loan of EUR300 million from the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)\.
The borrower did not contribute to the financing of the project because of the liquidity crisis\.
Dates: Relevant dates were; Approval, March 18, 2016; Loan effectiveness June 28, 2016; Original closing Decem
2018\. There was a level 2 restructuring on December 6, 2018 which extended the closing date to December 31, 20
when the actual closing occurred\. The restructuring also changed the results framework but did not change key ou
targets\.
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
3\. Relevance of Objectives
Rationale
PDOs were relevant for the World Bank Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2017-2022 under Area
One, Strengthening Institutions for Sustainable Growth (CPF p\. 16), one of the three objectives of which is
âimproved resilience and stability of the financial sectorâ\. It goes on to add (p\. 18) âA pivotal dimension of
the WBG support under this Objective is a financing instrument to the BDIF â
The PDOs remained relevant\. The 2019 Country Learning Review (p\. 1) states: âThe main program areas
of the CPF remain relevantâ¦in the financial sector, additional support for institutional strengthening of the
deposit insurance schemeâ\. The contribution of the project supported strongly the compliance of the BDIF
with the core principals of the IADI\. The relevance of objectives is rated âhighâ\. The banking system was in
crisis and there was a substantial risk of loss of confidence in financial institutions, which could have
resulted in a financial meltdown\.
Rating Relevance TBL
Rating
High
4\. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)
EFFICACY_TBL
OBJECTIVE 1
Objective
Strengthen the financial capacity of the BDIF
Rationale
The results chain for this objective involved strengthening the financial capacity of the BDIF through
rebuilding its reserves, which had been completely depleted by the payouts associated with the failure of the
KTB bank\. The rebuilding of reserves was to occur through:
i\. The collection of premiums in 2016 and 2017 from the remaining commercial banks\. This had been
the mechanism for funding the BDIF in the past, but premiums had not taken balance sheet risks of
the banks into account\.;
ii\. Going forward, premium payments would be adjusted for risk so that banks with riskier portfolios
would pay additional amounts;
iii\. The loan from the World Bank:
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
iv\. An additional loan of EUR300 million from the EBRD;
v\. Recovery of assets from KTB, the failed bank\.
Recovery of assets under item (v) was complicated by the fact that shareholders of KTB contested in court
the withdrawal of the banking license\. Since assets could only be sold by the BDIF once the banking license
was withdrawn, rebuilding reserves through this channel was delayed\. Initially, a requirement of the World
Bank loan had been that asset recovery would lead to the BDIF having a reserves to deposit ratio of 1\.5
percent\. This was changed in the restructuring to one percent on the basis that the court case was outside
the control of the BDIF\. This also changed the requirement of one of the DLIs regarding the recovery of
assets from the bankrupt KTB Bank\. However, the ICR (p\. 13) notes that the case had been ongoing for more
than two years and that the resources were âalready in a KTB bankruptcy account at the BNB and could not
be used for purposes other than the recovery of creditorsâ\. Furthermore, asset recovery from KTB was
assisted by amendments to the Bank Bankruptcy Law (BBL) that were undertaken specifically for this
purpose\.
The rebuilding of the financial capability of BDIF was in accordance with the findings by the IADI that the
âassessment recommends that the authorities should aim for expedited replenishment of the deposit
insurance fundâ (ICR p\. 9)\. The BDIF essentially had negative reserves since payouts had exceeded its
accumulated reserves\. The total payout amounted to EUR1\.9 billion, compared with the accumulated
reserves of the BDIF of EUR1\.07 billion, with the balance covered by the government loan\. This allowed for
the reimbursement of 95 percent of insured deposits and 102,250 of insured depositors by the end of
February 2015\.
There was no evidence of malfeasance in the payouts to depositors\. The ceiling on the amount of each
payout to KTB depositors was in accordance with the EU deposit insurance directive of EUR100,000\. There
were also exclusions on payouts to shareholders (shareholders with more than five percent voting power,
members of the bank management and supervisory board, directors, auditors, together with closely related
parties, and sophisticated investors such as government institutions, municipalities, pension funds and
insurers (Interview with the TTL)\.
The outcome indicator for this PDO was that BDIF reserves reach the equivalent of one percent of covered
deposits in the absence of bank failures compared with a baseline of 0\.75 at the end of December 2015 (ICR
p\. 26)\. The original target had been 1\.5 percent\. The target was formally revised to one percent on December
17, 2018\. However, by the completion of the project, actual reserves amounted to the equivalent of 2\.16
percent\. The target was exceeded\.
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
The rating for this objective is âhighâ on the basis that not only did the rebuilding of reserves go ahead in a
satisfactory manner in spite of the court case, but also that by completion of the project, reserves were double
the target amount\. In addition, all protocols for payouts were observed\.
Rating
High
OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
Strengthen the Institutional Capacity of the BDIF
Rationale
The causal chain for this objective involved the following measures that were designed to strengthen the
institutional capacity of the BDIF:
i\. An updated information sharing agreement between BDIF and BNB on the financial status of
commercial banks that would increase the amount of information available to the BDIF regarding the
financial health of the institutions whose deposits it insured;
ii\. BNB shared with BDIF the results of its Asset Quality Reviews of the commercial banks, which would
have a similar effect as the previous measure;
iii\. The BDIF conduct a survey of the public awareness of its role in order to build knowledge and
confidence in the banking system;
iv\. That the BDIF prepare a contingency plan that would be operationalized in the event of future bank
failures so that it could act expediently in a time of crisis\.
These measures were all put in place and plausibly relate to strengthening the institutional capacity of the
BDIF\.
Additional measures for institutional strengthening of the BDIF were put in place and monitored by the project
team as part of ensuring the DLI conditions were met\. These contributed to institutional strengthening and
included contingency planning, information sharing with the regulator and the collection of risk based premia
as contributions to the BDIF (ICR, p\. 12)\.
The outcome results indicator was that the BDIF perform âits legally mandated technical functions, including
in any future bank failures in which its resources are utilizedâ\. The technical functions of the BDIF were
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
achieved compared with these not being in place at the outset of the project\. They were based on the
recommendations of the IADI\.
However, this outcome indicator also partly refers to future actions that did not take place within the life of the
project\. The project team maintained (interview with the TTL) that âit is still possible to assess the
improvement in institutional capacity based on the progress achieved in specific areas that required
strengthening at the time of project preparation, according to the IADI assessmentâ\. The measures that were
put in place strengthened the institutional capacity of the BDIF\. However, the outcome indicator chosen did
not measure this\.
Given these minor shortcomings, the rating for this objective is Substantial\.
Rating
Substantial
OVERALL EFF TBL
OBJ_TBL
OVERALL EFFICACY
Rationale
The first outcome indicator was met and exceeded by the end of the project, so that in the event, the
reduction of the reserve to deposit ratio that occurred as part of the restructuring was not needed\. With regard
to the institutional strengthening of the BDIF, the measures required were all put in place by the end of the
project, though the evidence base for institutional transformation is limited\.
The second outcome indicator was achieved, except for that portion relating to future actions, which were
impossible to achieve since they related to future bank failures, the occurrence of which were not possible to
know\. Navigating these indicator issues makes it difficult to be certain of the institutions long term capacity to
deal with future bank failures\.
With a "High" rating for objective 1, strengthening the financial capacity of the BDIF and a "Substnatial" rating
for strengthening the institutional capacity of the BDIF, the overall efficacy rating is Substantial\.
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Overall Efficacy Rating
Substantial
5\. Efficiency
The ICR (p\. 17) indicates that economic rates of return (ERR) were not estimated as part of the analysis of
project efficiency, since the nature of the project did not lend itself to such calculations\. Nevertheless, efficiency
was based on a scenario analysis that compared what might have occurred if the BDIF had not received the
World Bank loan\. The analysis identified the positive âchain effectâ that consisted of:
ï Obtaining the EBRD loan that probably would not have been granted if the World Bank loan had not
occurred;
ï Being able to repay the government loan, that carried a significantly higher interest rate than the World
Bank loan\.
The rebuilding of reserves, the restoration of confidence in the financial system, and the improvement in the
regulatory structure occurred significantly faster as a result of the policy actions in the World Bank loan\.
Efficiency is therefore rated substantial\.
Efficiency Rating
Substantial
a\. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal
and the re-estimated value at evaluation:
Rate Available? Point value (%) *Coverage/Scope (%)
0
Appraisal 0
ï¨ Not Applicable
0
ICR Estimate 0
ï¨ Not Applicable
* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated\.
6\. Outcome
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With a high rating for relevance of objectives, a substantial rating for efficacy and a substantial rating for
efficiency, the overall outcome rating is Satisfactory
a\. Outcome Rating
Satisfactory
7\. Risk to Development Outcome
The greatest risk to the banking system of Bulgaria was that the project not go ahead\. With the fourth largest
bank in the country having failed and the confidence in other banks in the financial sector weakening, there
was a high degree of systemic risk that could have resulted in a more general banking collapse\.
Furthermore, the PAD (p\. 6) points out that the failure of KTB exposed weaknesses in the supervisory
framework of the BNB, further casting doubt on the ability of other banks to weather the storm that had
begun with KTBâs failure\.
The risk to achieving the development outcome was reduced not only by strengthening the BDIF but also by
improving the overall regulatory structure of the financial system, including the cooperation between the
BDIF and the BNB\. Nevertheless, increasing the equity portion of the balance sheets of the commercial
banks would further reduce the risks to the system\.
8\. Assessment of Bank Performance
a\. Quality-at-Entry
The design of the project was sound against a background of the severe pressure on the financial system
of Bulgaria\. There was ambiguity in some of the DLIs and the design of the project did not fully consider
the possibility of delays in the recovery of assets from KTB bank\. Since the shareholders of KTB opposed
the removal of the banking license, resolution was delayed\. Asset recovery could only occur once the
banking license had been withdrawn\. The process was complicated and necessitated the issue being
considered by a court system that was unfamiliar with bankruptcy issues\. This could possibly have been
foreseen when the project was being designed, but it is difficult to envisage any changes in the outcome\.
Apart from this issue, the project was well designed to assist the BDIF weather the storm through which it
was going\. The project was not without risks, in particular arising from the possibility that the Bulgarian
authorities would not have the ability and willingness to implement the necessary measures\. The
inclusion of the DLIs ensured that disbursements would only take place once certain conditions had been
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
met\. This reduced risks by incentivizing the BDIF and the BNB to expedite the necessary reforms and
upgrading of processes in order to ensure the timely disbursement of funds\.
The soundness of the project prepared against a background that included the possibility of systemic
meltdown as well as strong project design contributed to a satisfactory quality at entry
Quality-at-Entry Rating
Satisfactory
b\. Quality of supervision
The continuity of the World Bank team was a strength of the project\. It enhanced supervision and
strengthened the working relationship with the client institutions, thereby contributing to the success of the
project\. Although the BDIF had not had previous experience with similar projects (ICR p\. 23), this continuity
built up a level of trust that resulted in ongoing communication and discussions between the BDIF and the
project team\. The ICR points out (p\. 23) âThe achievement of each DLI was verified by the BDIF and
confirmed by the WB team and independent performance auditor\.â
The ICR also points out that although technical assistance was not part of the project, the World Bank team
worked closely with the BDIF to provide in-depth comments on documents prepared by this staff,
particularly those related to the DLIs\. The ICR notes (p\. 23) that the BDIF placed substantial value on this
support\.
The close working relationship that developed between the Bank team and the two key institutions as a
result of strong supervision contributed to the outcome\. All necessary steps were taken to ensure that the
policy actions were implemented and the support of the Bank team was highly valued\. The quality of
supervision is therefore rated highly satisfactory\.
Quality of Supervision Rating
Highly Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance Rating
Satisfactory
9\. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
a\. M&E Design
The design of the M&E framework for the financial strengthening of the BDIF was in the main, clear\. The
causal chain linking prior actions with outputs and the outcome was easily derived\. Since the project linked
to disbursements to the achievement of the DLI indicators, which were in general clearly specified and
unambiguous, the M&E framework provided a system of control that was relatively clear-cut and not open
to alternative interpretations that could have led to conflict\. Furthermore, a verification process was put in
place to independently certify that the DLI's had been achieved, which further reduced the potential for
disagreement over what had been achieved\.
With regard to the outcome indicator that measured the achievement of the institutional strengthening of
the BDIF, the indicator referred not only to actions that had been achieved (that the BDIF perform its
legally mandated technical functions) but also future actions (including in any future bank failures in which
its resources are utilized)\. Having an indicator that related to future bank failures outside the time frame of
the project essentially nullified its usefulness, especially since the policy actions were designed to limit
further failure of banks\. Nevertheless, with respect to institutional strengthening, the project linked the
recommendations of the IADI to the PDO, which again allowed for armâs length criteria to be utilized\.
b\. M&E Implementation
Since the M&E framework related closely to the achievement of the DLI's, it was not difficult to ascertain
the extent of progress against the PDO that related to the financial strengthening of the BDIF\. The ICR
notes (P\.22) that for each DLI achieved, a notification letter was submitted by the BDIF\. In addition,
progress reports were submitted that outlined achievements in the preceding period as well as plans for
the next period\. These were then discussed as part of the supervision missions\.
c\. M&E Utilization
The ICR (p\. 22) states âThe WB team had to confirm achievement of DLIs based on evidence provided
by the BDIF as per the verification protocol, and the discussions during missions allowed the team to
make the decision about extending the project closing date and revising one of the PDO indicators\.â
Apart from the selection of an indicator that was of little use, as described above, the M&E framework
made a substantial contribution to the success of the project\.
M&E Quality Rating
Substantial
10\. Other Issues
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
a\. Safeguards
No environmental or social safeguards were triggered by the project
b\. Fiduciary Compliance
The ICR (p\. 22) notes that financial records and audit reports were inspected by a Financial Management
Specialist on a regular basis and there were no findings of non-compliance\.
c\. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)
In order to speed up the recovery of assets from KTB, the BBL was amended, which strengthened the
institutional framework for the financial system\. An unintended positive impact of the project was an
improved bankruptcy framework\.
d\. Other
N/A
11\. Ratings
Reason for
Ratings ICR IEG
Disagreements/Comment
Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory
Bank Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory
Quality of M&E Substantial Substantial
Quality of ICR --- Substantial
12\. Lessons
The ICR offers the following lessons with some modification of language by IEG:
Results based financing, particularly when combined with an effective results framework that
involves unambiguous success criteria can be a powerful instrument to achieve PDOs\. In Bulgaria,
project design ensured that disbursements occurred upon achievement of clearly specified criteria
that were independently verified\. Although funds were used to bolster the financial position of the
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Deposit Insurance Strengthening Project (P154219)
BDIF, they also resulted in the financial strengthening of the institution as well as enhancing its
institutional capabilities\. This could be a valuable lesson for World Bank operations directed at
supporting deposit insurance schemes\.
In the design of projects in which disbursement depends on achieving DLIs, it is important to
consider the implications of indicators, the achievement of which are beyond the direct control of the
borrower\. In Bulgaria, the process of bankruptcy of KTB had to go through the courts, which led to
delays in its liquidation and recovery of assets\. This is an issue that needs to be considered at the
preparation stage of the project\.
IEG offers an additional lesson:
The importance of continuity in project teams is often overlooked\. Continuity ensures that confidence
is engendered and that unforeseen issues that inevitably arise during the course of a project can be
resolved in a timely manner\. In Bulgaria, continuity of the project team contributed substantially to
the successful completion of the project\.
13\. Assessment Recommended?
---
14\. Comments on Quality of ICR
The ICR is well written and describes the issues faced by the World Bank and the BDIF clearly\. It describes
well the challenges facing the BDIF as the implications of the failure of KTB Bank spread through the financial
system\. Its description of the DLIs is clear and notes how these contributed to the achievement of the PDOs\.
More discussion of the institutional issues would have been welcome, but overall it is a sound document\.
a\. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial
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Page 14 of 14
| APPROVAL
|
P000340
| Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 6808
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
CAMEROON
ZAPI INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(CREDIT 776-CM)
May 29, 1987
Western Africa Projects Department
Agriculture D
This document has a restricted disiribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of
their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization\.
CA}IEROON
ZAPI INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
US $1: At Initiation CFAF 245
At Completion CFAF 350
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric System
ABBREVIATIONS
AGRRD World Bank Rural Development Division
CFAF Westafrican Franc Zone Currency Unit
CODES Branch Committee
(Comite de Succursale)
CODEVI Village Development Committee
(Comitt6 de Dgveloppement Villageois)
COGEST Management Committee
(Comig de Gestion)
DEP Studies and Planning Department (MINAGRI)
EPL Local Progress Enterprise
(Entreprise de Progres Local)
ERAP Inputs Supply Center
(Entreprise Regionale d'Approvisionnement des Paysans)
FNFP National Fund for Forestry and Fisheries
(Fonds National Forestier et Piscicole)
FONADER National Fund for Rural Development
(Fonds National de Developpement Rural)
IITA International Institute for Tropical Agriculture
IPD Pan-African Institute for Development
(Institut Pan-Africain de Developpement)
MINAGRI Ministry of Agriculture
ONAREST National Research Organization
(Office National da la Recherche Scientifique et Technique)
PMB Produce Marketing Board (Office National pour la
Commercialisation ues Produits de Base - ONCPB)
PROVIV Commercial Food Crop '\.arketing Organization
SODECAO Cocoa Development Society
(Socigtg de Dgveloppement du Cacao)
USAID US Agency for International Development
ZAPI Integrated Priority Action Areas
(Zones d'Actions Prioritaires Integr6es)
Fiscal Year (Government and ZAPI): July 1 to June 30
MOR OMCIAL US ONLY
THE WORLD BANK
Washtngton\. D\.C\. 20433
U\.S\.A\.
Office of DiecIt\.ewtaI
Opetton t atuarnf
May 29, 1987
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Cameroon Zapi Integrated
Rural Development Pro1ect (Credit 776-CM)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled
"Project Completion Report on Cameroon Zapi Integrated Rural Development
Project (Credit 776-CM)" prepared by Western Africa Regional Office\.
Further evaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Department
has not been made\.
Attachment
Ram K\. Chopra
for Yves Rovani
This document has a rstricted distributon and may be usd by rcipients only in te performance
of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwe be diclsed without World ank autborutlon\.
CAMROON
ZAPI INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CREDIT 776-CM
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Table of Contents
Page No\.
BAsrc DATA SHEET
PREFACE ii
EVALUATION SUMMARY ±1±
I\. INTRODUCTION I
II\. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 3
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 5
IV\. PROJECT PERFORMANCE 13
V\. PROJECT IMPACT 21
VI\. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION 23
VII\. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 26
VIII\. BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE 29
IX\. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSITIONS 31
ANNEXS
HAP IBRD 12998R
CAMEROON
ZAPI INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CREDIT 776-CM
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
The following is a Project Completion Report (PCR) of one of
three rural development projects financed by the Bank in Cameroon in 1978\.
Two other projects were identified at the same time as this project:
(i) the Rural Development Fund Project (Credit 723-CM) which was audited in
1986 (Report No\. 6282 dated June 17, 1986); and (ii) the Western Highlands
Project (Credit 784-CM) which was completed in 1984\.
The ZAPI Integrated Rural Development Project (Credit 776-CM) was
appraised in March 1977 and was approved on March 7, 1978\. The credit
became effective on October 4* 1978 and amounted to US$8\.5 million compared
with an estimated overall project cost of US$12\.2 million equivalent, of
which the foreign exchange component amounted to US$4\.9 million\. The
project's closing date was extended from June 30 to December 31, 1984\. The
Government of Cameroon was the Borrower while the ultimate recipient of the
credit was the development company Integrated Priority Action Areas (East
ZAPI)\. Final disbursement reached 92% of the total credit amount and the
remaining US$0\.7 million was cancelled\.
The PCR was originally prepared by the Government with the
assistance of consultants\. The Western Africa Regional Office finalized
the attached PCR based on a review of the appraisal report (No\. 1737a-CM)
dated February 17, 1978, the President's Report (No\. P-2190-rC') dated
February 22, 1978, the Credit Agreement dated April 17, 1978, project
files, and interviews witb Bank staff\. A completion mission visited the
country in March 1986\.
A draft PCR was sent to the Borrower on April 1, 1987, for
comments\. Comments received from the Borrower are attached as Annex 10\.
This project has not been subjected to an audit by OED\.
- Ii -
ZAP1 nUERY RAL DREPT PROJ
CRD? 776-01
PROJECT COOKLRMTON REPORT
BASIC DATA SUIT
KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Actual as 2 of
Estimsta Estimated Actual App raI 3s1 1aapI/
Project Costs (US$ million) 12\.2 12\.8 1OO
Credit Amount (US$ million) 8\.5 7\.8 92 (US$0\.7 a cancelied
Date Board Approval 3/07/78 -
Date Effectiveness 10/04/78 -
Date Physical Components Completed: 12/31/83 06130/85
Proportion then completed 100S 302 30
Closing Date 06/30/84 12/31/84
Institutional Performance Good Poor
Agronomic Performance Good Poor
Nuober of Direct Beneficiaries 85,000
CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS
FY79 FY80 FY81 PY82 m3 PYSA FY85
Appraisal Estimate (USS million) 1\.0 4\.9 6\.1 7\.3 8\.3 8\.5 8\.5
Actual (US$ million) 0\.2 2\.9 4\.5 5\.9 6\.1 6\.1 7\.8
Actual as 2 of Esttiate 20 59 73 81 74 72 92
Date of Final Disbursement 12/16/85
MISSION DATA
41
No\. of fandays Specializatlons Perf\. 3/ Types of
mission Date Persons in Field Represented 1/ Ratina 2/ Treai Problems
(a-7fyr\.
Ident\./Prepart4on 4/76/
Pra-Appraisal I 11/76 - - - - - -
Pre-Apprala l II 2/77 - _ _ _ _ _
AppraieAl 3/77 8 25 - - - -
Post-Appraisal 9/77 3 18 ,f,c - - -
Supervision 1 1/79 4 15 a,o\.f,a 2 1 FH
Supervision 2 6/79 1 18 a 2 2 in
Supervision 3 6/80 4 15 a,a,a,f 2 1 tqt
Supervision 4 11/80 3 13 ps,af 2 2 FP
Supervision 5 4/81 4 17 p\.a\.a,Soeio 2 1 FM
Supervision 6 10/81 3 13 p\.a,Div\. Ch\. 2 1 FM
Supervision 7 5/82 2 18 poo 2 3 FKT
Supervision 8 2/83 1 15 a 3 3 FMK
Supervision 9 10/83 2 13 a 3 2 ENT
Supervision 10 6/84 3 9 *,eof 3 1 Pt
Supervision 11 t1/84 2 5 a,s 3 1 FT
Completion 5/85 1 4 f - - -
Completion 3/86 3 8 b - -
ena EPn Ela E- E3M Eau ESm ElM El ElM Elm mu
\.,#* _ 88\.1 88\.0 9\.1
Aepmi_i 7$\.6 29\.7 104\.5
Nesetlatia 5at18 18\.1
8\.7 \.e6 2Z\.6 61\.4 36\.5 12\.2 21\.C 7\.2 12\.5 20\.5
ouX 1~~ 9 1\. \. I \. t e\.
TOAl JS\.St 135\.8 2\.6 36\.6 28\.6 91\.4 U\.s 12\.8 21\.6 7\.2 12\.6 496\.5
OtMER PROJECT DATA
Borrower Government of Cameroon
Executing Agency Zapi East
Fiscal Year July 1 to June 30
Nate of Currency FCFA
Currency Excbange Rate:
Appraisal Year Average 245 FCFA * US$1\.0
Intervening Years Average 329 FPFA * US$L\.0
Completion Year Average 380 KCFA * US$1\.0
Preceding Project None
Pollow-on Project None
l/1 a * agrticulturist; b * agricultural economlst; c a financial analyst;
d - economist; e * rural enginaer; f - agronomist\.
2/ 1 - problem-free or minor problem\.; 2 m oderate problems and
3 - major problems\.
3/ 1 - improving; 2 * stationary; and 3 w deteriorating\.
/ P * financia,; M managerial; T - tachnical; P * political\.
- iii -
CAMEROON
ZAPI INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CREDIT 776-CM
PROJECT tOMPLETION REPORT
Evaluation Summary
Introduction
The project was designed to build upon an approach to rural
development in the less populated areas of Cameroon which had been
initiated on a pilot scale in the late 19609\. The "Zones d'Actions
Prioritaires Integrees" (ZAPIs) were planned as non-profit farmers
organizations responsible in specified zones for all activities necessary
to promote overall commercialized development including organizing credit,
inputs, training and marketing\. As such, the project was in line with two
major elements of the Cameroonian rural development strategy:_
(a) decentralization of development activities to incorporate local
self-governing organizations where feasible; and (b) the expansion of
export crops in harmony with improving food crop production\.
Objectives
The project was designed to extend ZAPI activities into five
priority zones of the Eastern Province with the objective of improving the
production and marketing of cocoa, robusta coffee and food crops, and of
diversifying its operations with the development of social services\. The
project was to reorganize and expand extension services, develop an applied
research program on food crops and a crop protection service, reorganize
ZAPI's management structure, expand staff training, upgrade and expand
coffee processing plants and transport infrastructure, improve commercial
management, and construct rural water points and health centers\. Project
operations involved coordinating the provincial services of three
ministries; feeder roads were to be constructed under a parallel project
(1494-CM)\. Total project costs were estimated at US$15\.0 million\. The IDA
credit was for US$8\.5 million\.
Implementation Experience
The project ran into problems from the outset\. An objective of
the project had been to maintain ZAPI as an independent entity and to
provide funds to expand its activities and improve its efficiency, and,
thereby, to enable it to eventually be able to support the expanded program
from its own cash flow\. However, the development of functions extraneous
to its primary responsibilities, and a rapid doubling of staff
overstretched the already rather weak management, and controls
- iv -
deteriorated\. The abilities of the different provincial services to support
project actions varied considerably\. Furthermore, ZAPI's financial
position had deteriorated before the start of the project, and the initial
infusion of Government funds was used to pay off debt already incurred\.
Because of the cash flow problem, the construction program was delayed and
subsequently a significant part, which was considered least essential, was
eliminated\. The program for modetnizing coffee processing, and
expenditures for strengthening ZAPI operations were un'ertaken as
programmed, although with delayed timing\. Actual disbursements against the
credit of US$8\.5 millon were US$7\.8 million covering 522 of project costs\.
The final disbursement was made in December 1985, and the balance of
US$700\.000 was cancelled\. Almost 75Z of the amount disbursed was for
vehicles, equipment, and operating costs\.
Results
A formal re-estimation of the economic rate of return was not
attempted because of lack of data, but it is clear that it would be
substantially lower than the 25% calculated at appraisal\. While coffee
production reached appraisal estimates, cocoa production has only increased
slightly and, because of delayed installation, the output of the coffee
factory and quality levels have been below projections\. Food crop _
production is uncertain\. At the same time, project costs were 25% above
appraisal estimates\. Long-term benefits from the project will, however, be
realized from (a) nurseries which supply improved planting material;
(b) coffee and coffee plantings which would have not been undertaken
without the project; (c) the improved food crop varieties which were
identified; and (d) the improvements in coffee quality and marketing
procedures which are slowly being realized\. However, ZAPI has not been
strengthened overall as an institution and, in fact, became unwieldy\. The
additional staff have not been moulded into an effective organization,
especially iu extension, and administration and financial controls
remain weak\.
Sustainability
ZAPI is not now financially self-sustaining and shows no prospect
of generating sufficient funds to support the organization developed under
the project\.
Findings and Lessons
In common with many other area-based projects, this was too
complex for the modest and young organization which was called upon to
implement it\. Consequently, it was overwhelmed\. The premises of the
project that firstly the major constraint to agricultural development in
the province was farmers' lack of knowledge of available techniques and
that, secondly, this deficiency could be made up by adding a field staff to
disseminate this knowledge onto a nascent commercially-oriented organiza-
tion dealing with farmers, were shown not to be valid\. An approach which
may have yielded better results would have been:
(a) to concentrate more directly on improving the efficiency of
commercial practices and operations of ZAPI which might have
ensured its viability; and
(b) to have concentrated on pilot agricultural productOon operations
and, thus, slowly expanded the organization on the basis of
proven activities\.
In retrospect, action to reduce the complexity of the project and
sharpen its focus during its early stages when the problems were
identified, might have had a major positive impact on the subsequent
performance\.
CAMEROON
ZAPI INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
(Credit 776-CM)
I\. INTRODUCTION
Bank Group Lending
1\.01 The project was the Bank Group's twelfth lending operation for
agriculture and the first area development project in Cameroon\. It fol-
lowed six tree crop projects (oil palm and rubber - totalling US$93\.6
million), specialiged projects, for: rice (two totalling US$5\.7 million),
livestock (US$29\.1 million), and cocoa (US$6\.5 million), and a rural
development fund project (US$7\.0 million)\.
The Agricultural Sector
1\.02 Agriculture provides a livelihood for about 75% of Cameroon's
population and, at appraisal in 1977, it contributed 35% to GDP and 70% of
the value of total exports, principally as cocoa, coffee and cotton\. About
90% of agricultural production originates from the traditional smallholder
sector (including coffee and cocoa production), and 10% from, mainly state
owned, oil palm and rubber plantations\.
1\.03 Cocoa and coffee are the principal smallholder cash crops in
Cameroon, each producing exports of about 100,000 tons per year from an
estimated total production area of 600,000 ha\. Low average yields of about
250 kg/ha from cocoa and 250 kg to 400 kg/ha from Arabica and Robusta
coffee reflect ageing plantations, inadequate cultivation and poor treat-
ment against pests and diseases (capsid attack and Black Pod disease on
cocoa and scolytes attack on Robusta coffee) set in a context of unattrac-
tive producer price incentives\.
1\.02 Until the mid 1970s actions for improving food crop production
were largely overshadowed by the emphasis on export crops\. Cameroon is
self-sufficient in food, relying on traditional staple crops of roots
(cassava, yams etc\.,), cereals (maize, sorghum and millet) and vegetables,
occasionally supplemented with livestock products\. In the mid 1970s,
however, the Government started actions to improve food crop production,
specifically to ensure adequate supplies for the growing urban population\.
1\.05 Production inputs, which were about 50% subsidised, were
generally supplied by the provincial Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI)
delegations but frequently poorly timed and inadequate in quantities\. The
MINAGRI delegation in Eastern Province also organized field extension and
crop protection services\. Primary marketing for cocoa and coffee was
generally the responsibility of farmer cooperatives while licenced traders
were mainly responsible for buying, bulking and transporting for
exportation by the Produce Marketing Board (PMB)\.
-2-
Project Origin
1\.06 The "Zones d'Actions Prioritaires Integrees" (ZAPIs) were initi-
ated in 1966 under the second five-year plan\. They were planned as
non-profit farmers' organizations responsible in specified areas (zones)
for all activities necessary to promote overall commercialized 4qvelopment,
including animating the population, as well as organizing credit, inputs
supply, training, and produce marketing\. The ZAPI movement commenced with
developments in five zones in the Center-South region in 1966\. "ZAPI de
l'Est" (ZAPI) is a development company which was created by Presidential
Dectee in 1972 under MINAGRI supervision, with the major objective of
progressively developing a peasant-directed cooperative type structure\. It
was, therefore, considered an appropriate institution for implementing a
development project for the Eastern Province\.
1\.07 The basic organizational focus of the ZAPIs was the village,
typically representing a group of about 100 farmers who nominated a leader
as their contact farmer and created their own representative committee
(CODEVI)\. Groups of about 12 villages (1000 farmers) coordinated them-
selves into "surccursales" (approximately sector level) which each elected
a committee (CODES)\. Some three surccursales combined to create a central
organizational unit (at zone/department level), called the "enterprise du
Progres Local-EPL" again with an elected management committee (COGEST)\.
The COGEST formed the main point of contact for ZAPI (and, therefore, the
project) management\. The ZAPI Director General organized and coordinated
the day to day operation of ZAPI services in line with plans and budgets
approved by the surccursales, provided the central focus for production
services, including inputs supply centers (Enterprise Regionale
d'Approvisionnement Paysans-ERAP), training and extension services\.
1\.08 The ZAPIs were attached to the MINAGRI from whom they contracted
production services through the provincial delegation and obtained subsidy
funds for inputs (at uniform levels with other farmers in the country)\.
Farmers paid an init\.ial subscription (CFAF 1,000) on joining ZAPI, thereby
creating a capital base\. This was complemented by annual receipts from
fees charged for inputs and marketing services; these were intended to
cover the administrative costs of the ZAPI\.
1\.09 The project represented a step in an evolutionary strategy from
central towards regionally controlled development of the agriculture
sector\. The project embodied two key strategies underlying the Cameroon
Government's national development plans: (i) the decentralization of
sectoral developments to rural areas, incorporating local self-governing
organizations and restricting the demand for fiscal support from Govern-
ment; and (ii) the expansion of export crops in harmony with improving food
crop production\. The project was one of a set of rural development efforts
in Africa analysed as part of a research project in the early 19709 which
led to the Bank publication "The Design of Rural Development" (Uma Lele
1975)\. It was designed to test new approaches to the productive
-3-
development of the poorest rural populations in line with the special focus
in Bank lending followinh the 1973 Annual Meeting\. This project was,
therefore, of particular interest for the Bank\.
II, PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
2\.01 Identification and Preparation\. In early 1976, an AGRRD/RMWA
reconnaissance mission identified Eastern Cameroon as a relatively
impoverished area of the country (per capita income estimated at US$85,
versus about US$250 per annum for the entire country)\. Eastern Province,
one of the most isolated area in Cameroon, had been seriously neglected in
previous development efforts and laeked most amenities (roads, schools,
hospitals and water supply)\. As a result, cor-munications were difficult,
the rate of illiteracy was high and health standards were poor\.
Agriculture had been neglected and the population was not dynamic\.
2\.02 An AGRRD mission in April 1976 identified ZAPI as an appropriate
development vehicle through which improved small farmer support services
could be delivered\. Preparation of the ZAPI Eat Integrated Rural
Development Project (the project) was coordinated by the ZAPI Est Director
General during 1976 under the auspices of the Planning Department of
MINAGRI (DEP) which organized a technical commission to decide on the
components\. The Bank closely supervised the preparation process, including
hiring specialist consultants (using PPF) to advise on coffee processing/
economics, fisheries, health, rural water supply, and feeder road aspects\.
An inter-ministerial orientation committee was esLablished to ensure
coordination between sectors\. The Bank also organized a socio-economic
study covering the proposed project area\. Two pre-appraisal missions by
the Bank (11/76 and 2/77) helped Government to finalize the preparation
report\.
2\.03 Appraisal and Negotiations\. A five-man mission completed field
appraisal work in March 1977 and a post appraisal mission visited Cameroon
in September 1977 to confirm the project's organizational and applied
research aspects and to prepare for negotiations\. Negotiations were held
in Washington at the end of January 1978 and finalized on Febritary 10, 1978
following agreement of a Government's request to increase t\.e total credit
by US$500,000 (to US$8\.5 million) to finance costs for additional technical
assistance personnel\. The credit was approved by the Board on March 28,
1978 and it became effective on October 10, 1978\.
2\.04 Bwnk Supervision\. The project was one of a series of integrated
rural development projects in all regions which were supported by IDA in
early/mid 1970s\. These projects had three common features; they were: (i)
targeted at the poorest and most neglected populations; (ii) involved a
range of productive and social investment choices for the target popula-
tion; and (iii) centred on self-help community management and autonomous
operation\. Because of the project's innovative objectives, responsibility
- 4 -
for its preparation and initiation was conferred on the Rural Development
Division (AGRRD) of the Central Projects Staff (CPS)\. This continued from
1976 until 1982 when supervision of the ongoing project was taken over by
WAP Department\.
Project Description
2\.05 The project was designed to consolidate and extend the ZAPI
activities in five priority zones of the Province with the objective of
improving the production and marketing of cocoa, Robusta coffee, and food
crops and diversifying its operations with the development of social
services\. The Project's objectives were centred on balanced crop
production, the organization, processing and marketing of cocoa and Robusta
coffee, and social developments\. It was expected to directly beunefit
13,200 farm families whose average net farm incomes were to increase from
US$490 to US$720 per year\. The social developments were expected to
benefit some 85,000 people\.
The Agrinultural Production objectives for existing crops involved
diffusing improved production technology through: reorganized agricultural
training, extension, and inputs services (including crop protection service
for caysid control in cocoa; and cocoa/coffee seedling nurseries)\. To help
counter the dominance of export crops production, specific provisions were
included for: (i) initiating bottomlands rice production; (ii) developing
applied research programs to improve production, storage and processing of
food crops grown under traditional systems; (iii) introducing fish culture;
and (iv) providing rural credit\.
(a) The Institution Development objectives involved: (i) reorganizing
ZAPI's management structure to manage an expanded action program;
(ii) enlarging ZAPI's subscribed capital and constructing offices
and other facilities; (iii) providing training opportunities for
ZAPI staff; (iv) strengthening and transforming peasant group
structures into farmer-run organizations and associations; and
(v) establishing a monitoring and evaluation system\.
(b) The Processing and Marketing provisions involved: (i) upgrading
and expanding the coffee processing plants; (ii) improving the
transportation and storage infrastructure; (iii) increasing the
efficiency of ZAPI's commercial management; (iv) stimulating
commercial operations for supply and distribution (farm inputs
consumer goods and pharmaceutical products)\.
(c) The Socio-Economic Developments included: (i) improving access to
primary health facilities; and (ii) constructing rural water
points\.
2\.06 Particular features concerning these services were: (i) the
signing of conventions with existing government agencies for implementing
components and providing services which were exogenous to ZAPI's normal
operations: (ii) the accent on actions for women and young farmers; and
(iii) the emphasis on detailed monitoring and evaluation to guide the ZAPI
management and analyse the project impact\.
2\.07 The added need to improve the feeder roads system was expected to
be met by the "Feeder Roads Project" (Loan 1494 CM)\. This project was
approved in November 1977, with the intention of enabling the Department of
Roads of the Ministry of Equipment (MINEQ) to build, develop, upgrade and
maintain some 540 km of roads in the project zone\. The project was expect-
ed to build and maintain about 280 km of roads serving the plantations
through a small roads unit which was to be set up with financing from the
Feeder Roads Project\.
III\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Effectiveness and Start-up
3\.01 The credit became effective or\. 10/04/78, seven months after
signature\. By July 1978, the initial developments were encouraging:
Government provided FCFA 470 millions for ZAPI Est's capital increase (75%
higher and 2 months earlier than stipulated in the credit agreement)\.
Conventions were promptly signed with ONAREST (research component),
Ministry of Health, and the FNFP (filsheries component) anri staff were
transferred to the project\. The Administrative Council was established
with the Governor of Eastern Province as president\. Consultants (Planning
Assistance) were hired to help initiate the work programs and budgets\.
3\.02 Conversely, unqualified personnel at field and office levels and
logistical problems for credit processing by ZAPI resulted in procurement
delays and a slow start-up for the extension and training components\. Lack
of collaboration within the Bank and between the Bank and the Government
agencies concerned delayed the procurement of road building machinery and
building of the training center\. Better training and closer attention by
Bank supervision missions could have reduced these delays\.
3\.03 Two fundamental problems became apparent at project start-up and
persisted throughout the implementation period\. The first concerned the
calibre and rapid expansion in numbers of ZAPI staff, where the incumbent
personnel, who were technically experienced but lacked formal training,
were superseded by younger graduates with limited practical experience and
less knowledge or commitment to the ZAPI philosophy and for whom status and
material gains predominated\. At field level, the number of (men and women)
extension workers was increased to meet project objectives\. As a result,
within a year of start-up the ZAPI staff increased from 200 to 483, in
principle with the approval of ZAPI management, the Government and IDA\.
The result was that a relatively small and united team was replaced by a
-6-
large "community" in which strains and rivalries surfaced between different
groups and many of the new recruits could not relate to the farmers or
their aspirations\.
3\.04 The second fundamental problem concerned ZAPI's cash flow\. At
appraisal it was expected to avoid financing problems by: (i) the capital
increase for ZAPI; (ii) the creation of a special account with an initial
deposit of FCFA 150 milliom$, which would be regularly replenished; and
(iii) the advance payment of subsidies\. Although Government respected its
initial obligations, both the capital increase and the initial deposit
served to pay-off outstanding debts\. Therefore, there was no operating
fund to meet the initial demands for project expenditures, a problem which
worsened over time and was exacerbated by inexperienced project management
(para 4\.04) and the start-up of ZAPI's marketing services\. Had ZAPI's
capital and financial situation been more thoroughly analysed at appraisal,
the impact of this problem could have been significantly lessened\.
Revision
3\.05 As early as the second supervision mission, the project manage-
ment proposed some modifications, including: abandoning of the planned
extension to other zones and shortening the duration of the project from
five to four years in order to take account of the depreciation of the
dollar and domestic inflation in Cameroon\. Although the former was
accepted, the shortening of the project implementation period was declined
by the Bank at that time, because it was considered too early in the
operations\. Subsequent progress showed that project forshortening could
not have been justified by lack of funds\. Nonetheless, fundamental changes
ma\.de were in the construction program in PYI, with the elimination of a
uumber of buildings that were considered nonessential in the light of the
financial crisis with which ZAPI was faced (the ZAPI headquarters in
Bertoua and the Training Center were not built, the number of storaga sheds
and pro-pharmacies and health centers was reduced and the planned buildings
were not provided for research nor for the 24 technical support centers)\.
3\.06 As far as the individual components are concerned, the swamp rice
program started late and was abandoned, ostensibly because of the lack of
farmer interest\. Fish culture was much reduced due to reorganization of
the Ministry of Livestock\. Although ZAPI was supposed to take over
responsibility for pest and disease control in the project area, it decided
to leave it in the hands of the crop protection service of the provincial
delegation of MINAGRI\.
3\.07 Accounting and financial control problems existed from the
outset\. Eventually, faced with project management's inability to submit
reliable accounting statements at the proper time, the Bank suspended
disbursements from May 1983\. This continued until restricted disbursements
resumed early in 1985 specifically for: (i) completing the audit of the
accounts up to 1983; (ii) hiring an expatriate Administrative and Financial
-7-
Director for ZAPI (9/1984 to 12/1985); and (iii) employing consultants for
preparation of the completion report and for reviewing technical
operations\. On termination of the project (final disbursement 12/16/85)
$700,000 of credit (audited) was cancelled\.
Implementation Schedule
3\.08 According to the initial supervision reports and annual reports
submitted by ZAPI, the development plan started well, despite some delays\.
However, the situation rapidly deteriorated mainly due to poor
coordination, cash flow problems, deficits on commercial operations and
excessively high expenditures, and this led to a state of crisis and a
change of general manager in September 1982\. The new General Manager
reduced the project objectives and made his top priority the improvement in
commercial operations\. To some extent, this objective has been achieved
and marketing operations now appear to be profitable, although it is not
possible to confirm this due to the present state of the accounts\.
3\.09 Regarding the project components directly administered by ZAPI,
the coffee processing program (construction of the Belabo plant and
modernization of the other plants) was implemented between 1980 and 1982\.
The expenditures for vehicles, equipment, technical assistance, training
and monitoring and evaluation were also completed, but without any lasting
impact on ZAPI\. The construction program was cu-rtailed as indicated
above\.
3\.10 With regard to the programs sub-contracted by ZAPI, it should be
noted that the applied research program (ONAREST/IITA) was carried out on
schedule and well done despite the decision against constructing the agreed
facilities\. Conversely, the health and family fish ponds programs en-
countered delays and were only partially completed\. The feeder roads
component, financed under Loan 1494 CM, only came into operation in mid-
1980\. However, there was insufficient specification in mvehinery
procurement, and the road construction equipment subsequently proved to be
too light for the tropical forest conditions in Eastern Province and,
therefore, the project was ineffective\.
3\.11 Although the major problems (especially the cash flow shortages,
poor accounting methods, the losses on commercial operations, ZAPI's
dependence on the Department of Agriculture for pest and disease control
measures, and the delays in the feeder roads program) had become evident by
1979, no effective remedial measures were implemented, despite: (i) the
presence of technical assistance (particularly on the accounting and
finance sides); (ii) the completion of additional marketing studies; (iii)
the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation studies; and (iv) the
fielding of regular and intensive IDA supervision missions and many
meetings with the Government\. By and large, the lack of follow-through
from these provisions resulted from the inexperience of the technical
assistance team, ZAPI management's inability to implement changes, and on
-8-
excess of "benefit of the doubt" in Bank and central Government\. The
deteriorating situation was evident and decisive reorganizational action
was needed\.
Reporting
3\.12 The monitoring and evaluation system provided for regular reports
at all levels (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, twice-yearly and yearly),
which was probably, unnecessarily ambitious\. Summaries of the various data
are presented in the annual project reports prepared by the monitoring and
evaluation unit\. This practice had already been followed by ZAPI Est for
several years prior to project initiation and, by and large, the project
adopted the same indicators and the same method of presentation (including
the hiring of specialists)\. The major shortcoming of these reports was
they included only technical indicators and no financial analysis\. The
latter (generally late and often of doubtful reliability) were provided by
the administrative and financial management\.
Procurement
3\.13 There are no detailed procurement records because of poor
accounting and financial controls and the dearth of associated progress
reports\. Supervision and disbursement records indicate that procurement
-s, generally in compliance with the credit agreement, although, bulking of
oiaers and ICB for contracts exceeding US$100,000 were not rigorously
respected\. However, acceptable deviations resulted from:
(a) Preference being given to local suppliers who could provide spare
parts and after-sales service (the cost of keeping a defective
piece of equipment idle usually exceeds any savings on the
purchase price); and
(b) preference was given to splitting between two or more suppliers
first to avoid creating a monopoly vis-a-vis the project, and
second so as not to overload the after-sales service capacity of
any one supplier\. If the cost of local purchases of imported
goods is included, foreign purchases ran slightly above the
appraisal estimates\.
3\.14 Project Management complained of financial problems and delays In
project implementation due to the reimbursement procedures\. However, this
would have been minimized by streamlining and by more extensive use of the
direct payment procedure\. Moreover, the financial problems raised seem to
be due more to the fact that the proposed revolving fund was diverted to
cover commercial losses rather than to provide working capital\.
Total Project Cost and Financing Resources
3\.15 The design of the accounting system used by ZAPI did not
differentiate between costs related to commercial operations (\.including
share of overhead), costs associated with activities envisaged under the
project, and other possible costs (other projects or specific subsidies)\.
Furthermore, the cost accounting system does not provide data in a usable
from, e\.g\. costs of commercial operations by reference to the PMB 1/ scale
and by activity center, project costs by reference to the classification
system used in the appraisal report\.
3\.16 An audit report on the ZAPI accounts up to June 30, 1983 did not
present detailed analyses of all annual costs and commercial receipts
(although this analysis is now being made)\. The analysis of project costs
given in the 1983 auditors' financial report refers only to the
reimbursement requests sent to IDA, which account for less than half of the
financing assistance received by ZAPI during the project implementation
period\. In addition, it was not possible to determine whether this analysis
was based on the total costs submitted for reimbursement or on the share
reimbursed by IDA\. Therefore, it has only been possible to estimate the
final cumulative cost and to compare it with the estimates given in the
appraisal report\. (Tables 1-3 in Annex 3 summarise the estimates of
project financial operations)\. The more detailed analyses will be made as
part of the final audit of project accounts for 1983/84 and 1984/85\. 3\.17
Project costs totaled US$15\.0 million equivalent, including the following
estimated relative contributions from Government and IDA sources up to
1984:
Original Actual
Allocation Disbursement
US$000 US$'o00
Government of Cameroon 3,730\.0 7,200\.0
IDA 8,500\.0 7,799\.3
Total 1230\.0 142
This summary, which excludes Government's contributions to ameliorate the
ZAPI Est debts accummulated prior to project initiation in 1978, indicates
1/ The PMB (Produce Marketing Board - Office Nationale pour la
Commercialisation des Produits de Base ONCPB) is responsible for
coordinating and organizing the purchase and exportation of most
export crops: coffee, cocoa, cotton, palm oil, and groundnuts\.
- 10 -
that between 1978 and 1984, the Government's contributions to ZAPI opera-
tions (US$7\.2 million equivalent) was nearly double the predictions at
appraisal\.
3\.18 The following table compares actual credit disbursements with
credit funds allocated in the appraisal budget:
Orghial Actal Actual to
Allocatitm x of Total D2xrmmt X of Total Alloatim
Cateoy/kI ptlqn M$'000 Allcation US$ 00( DdisWrs u UB$'000
1\. Civil 4Wbrks 1,400\.0 16 335\.1 4 (1,064\.9)
2\. Vedcles and RpAp\. 2,640\.0 31 2,868\.1 37 228\.1
3\. Technical Assist\.
and Trahn*g 1,610\.0 19 1,698\.1 21 88\.1
4\. Operating Costs 2,820\.0 33 2,868\.0 37 48\.0
5\. Refund of Proj\.
Facility 30\.0 1 30\.0 1 -
Total Disburs ent 8,500\.0 10D 7,799\.3 100 (700\.7)
Credit Fund
Cancelled (12/16/85) 700\.7
Total Credit Fund 8500\.0
This analysis indicates that: i) the severe cut-back on construction
proposals was unnecessary: ii) expenditures on vehicle/equipment purchase
and operating costs exceeded the appraisal budget by approximately
US$276,000; and iii) the technical assistance and training expenditures
also exceeded provisions\.
3\.19 The project cost was approximately 30% above the original esti-
mate\. The cost overrun was financed by Government's fiscal budget\.
However, lack of rigorous financial control on the part of the Government
and of monitoring of the use of its financial resources (either directly or
through audited annual accounts or status reports) boosted unproductive
costs\. To avoid this problem in future, it will be necessary to introduce
precise methods to ensure stricter monitoring of the use of financial
resources granted by MINAGRI to the projects and organizations under its
supervision\. This need is being tackled within the DEP as part of the
agriculture component of the Second Technical Cooperation Project(Cr\.
1168-CM) by the appointment of a financial analysis specialist\.
- 11 -
Performance of Consultants, Suppliers and the Borrower
A\. Consultants
3\.20 The Project Appraitsal provided for about seren man years of
technical assistance; including 36 months for an admiListrative and
financial director and 48 months designated for short-term consultancies on
technical and organization aspects\. The Government retained a group of
consultants (Planning Assistance from Utah) to coordinate this work\. Their
prime objective was to help improve the organization of ZAPI and to develop
a monitoring and evaluation scheme\. They also organized studies on tech-
nical aspects of the project and particularly, for coffee processing and
ZAPI's commercial operations\.
3\.21 The consultant group devised and installed a number of planning
and control devices but, by and large, these were too theoretical and
sophisticated for the calibre of project management\. Although they
operated partially and provided information for progress reports, they were
not self-sustaining and ceased with the consultants' departure in 1983\.
The consultants also made proposals for planning systems, job descriptions
and work monitoring for the ZAPI employees\. However, this was largely
unimplemented because the consultants proved incapable of providing a
guidance tool with simple technical indicators and financial performance
charts\.
3\.22 An expatriate financial director, assigned by the consultant
group for three years, endeavoured to improve the accounting system and
financial controls\. However, this was done without rectifying ZAPI's
inherent capital crisis, improving its financial controls, or deciding a
precise action plan with Government for resolving the considerable debt
problems which existed at project initiation\. Several efforts to rectify
this situation were attempted during project implementation with the
assistance of foreign auditors, but with little success\. The Bank should
have been far more decisive in requesting strong Government action on this
matter\.
3\.23 For monitoring and evaluation, although a credible baseline study
was made, the report was presented only in May 1981 after two years of
project operation, thereby negating the possible impact\. During this
period, project operations were being monitored and a follow-up study(in
1982) focussed on crop yields and raised many useful questions and revealed
a number of discrepancies between different sets of production data\. This
report, as with the periodic M & E analyses (para 4\.21) were neither
assimilated by project management nor applied to subsequent (re)planning
exercises\.
3\.24 Among the technical studies undertaken, the proposal for coffee
processing although feasible, implied extensive charges to previous
- 12 -
operations without proposing appropriate pilot actions, phasing, or
training for farmers and ZAPI personnel\. Under the new ZAPI Director
General, appointed in 1982, a system of decentralized coffee hulling is
being introduced, although this was not considered in the processing study\.
A study for developing ZAPI's commercial operations proposed new grading
and pricing schedules for coffee\. However, these were never adequately
applied (possibly because they were not fully understood or accepted by the
relevant Government authorities) and because the lack of financial analysis
in ZAPI resulted in the PMB reimbursing less than the actual processing
costs\.
3\.25 Because of the lack of progress by the ZAPI Training Unit, the
new Director General decided to amploy a specialist organization to run
courses for in-service training and farmer animation\. Therefore, from 1983
to 1985, INADES (based in Yaounde) organized a series of correspondence and
field courses related to the farm production cycle\. These appear to be run
reasonably well but the themes are rather vague due to negligible liaison
with the ZAPI Technical Department\.
3\.26 The Project Completion Report, prepared by Project Management
(assisted by consultants Louis Berger) was inadequate; its recommendations
focussed on the need for more studies and more technical assistance rather
than suggesting reasons for lack of results and proposing remedial actions\.
B\. Contractors and Suppliers
3\.27 Although the majority of the constructions proposed under the
project were cancelled (para\. 4\.02) the following buildings were completed:
one cooperative office, three rural training offices, seven stores, one
health center, and seven dispensaries\. These buildings all involved simple
structures and despite some delays, were satisfactorily completed using
local contractors\. Similarly, the construction of a new coffee processing
plant (at Belabo) and improvements to existing coffee hulling plants were
satisfactorily completed, the former through ICB involving a local
contractor and the latter witn local construction companies\.
3\.28 The construction of village water-points, although less than
proposed (33 springs piped compared with 82), were well executed by the
MINAGRI provincial rural engineering service (Genie Rural)\. Conversely,
the similar convention with the MINEQ feeder road service upgraded only 72
km of roads (of 540 km proposed) and provided no subsequent maintenance\.
3\.29 The foreign and local suppliers of goods and materials all
performed satisfactorily, albeit with considerably delays compared with
appraisal proposals\.
C\. The Borrower
3\.30 After its initial support, in the absence of positive progress
- 13 -
Government became reluctant to comply with demands from ZAPI's management\.
Although, the Government fulfilled the major part of its undertakings
(increase in capital, recruitment of staff, substantial subsidies', these
were often paid late and not as scheduled\.
3\.31 It appears that the Project was the subject of controversy inside
the principal ministries and institutions concerned (MINAGRI, MINPLAN, and
PMB'\. This led to antagonism which included the associated organizations
(Ministries of Health and Livestock), and might have been inevitable in
view of the complexities involved\. However, had Government been more
attentive to the need for rationalisation physical operations and project
coordination (as proposed several times by Pioject Management and IDA
supervision missions), the situation would have improved\. Such rationali-
zation might have included: dissociating the different components to a
series of pilot actions, in the most suitable locations, including, for
crop production: focusing extension advice, improving the delivery of
Inputs, and streamlining marketing operations\.
3\.32 In the event, since 1983 Government authorities have almost
totally ignored communications on or from ZAPI, including the new Director
General's reorganization proposals (presented in December 1982)\. There has
been no regular field supervision or financial analysis by the MINAGRI
Planning Division (DEP), and the ZAPI Administrative Council (which is
statutarily required to meet bi-annually) has not been convened since March
1984\.
IV\. PROJECT PERFORMANCE
Strategy
4\.01 When compared with the underlying philosophy which sought firstly
to accelerate development in Eastern Province by integrating development
through a model that could be applied, at least partially, to all depart-
ments in the region, and secondly to give farmers' associations a larger
management role, the project cannot claim to have achieved any significant
improvement over the original state of affairs\. Facilities for rural
development have changed little and agricultural prodtictivity fell short of
the objectives\. The various ZAPI operations are no better coordinated and
the collaboration between different regional organizations has not been
strengthened\. The proposed establishment of new ZAPI's was abandoned
because of the need for economies, and the farmers' associations in the
village (CODEVIs) still deal only with local coffee and cocoa collection
and credit, as they did 15 years ago, and still have only a mainly advisory
role at the zone cooperatives (EPL) level\. In effect, the provisions for
project development were weighted in favor of physical and institutional,
rather than production or commercial objectives\.
- 14 -
Physical Development
4\.02 The project included provisions (totalling US$1\.8 million or 152
of total costs) for the construction of offices, training, research and
health facilities, coffee processing plants, stores, water-points and
feeder roads\. Because of the previous neglect in Eastern Province, this
was important for achieving accelerated development\. Annex 4, Table 4-1
shows that less than 30% of these construction were realized\. This
resulted partly from poor planning and coordination but mainly because of
the decision taken in PY1 to reduce this component in order to economize on
credit funds (para 3\.05)\. In view of the dearth of facilities in general
in the region, this decision adversely affected both the implementation of
the components concerned and the sustainability of the services involved,
and was a significant influence in reducing project staff morale\.
Institutional Development
4\.03 The ZAPI organigram is shown in Annex 4 (Figure 1)\. Institution
development was the central focus of the project and involved over 40X of
budgeted project costs: training, extension/cooperatives, and ZAPI
Management 20% (US$929,000 and technical assistance 22% (US$1\.1 million)\.
At appraisal, no fundamental reorganization was considered necessary and,
in fact, the institutional focus, involving four aspects of ZAPI's
operation: organization and management, training, extension, and
monitoring and evaluation, represented a reasonable institutional basis for
project implementation\.
(a) Organization and Management
4\.04 Despite of the increase in its capital base, (para 3\.01) and the
support services provided by technical assistance agents and consultants
and the training program, ZAPI's organization and management capacity has
not improved\. The project was plagued by inability to recruit personnel
from the region with experience and competence to implement a complex
development program in a previously neglected area\. This problem was
reflected in the calibre of the two directors general and, particularly in
ZAPI's departmental directors (agricultural production, finance and admini-
stration, and marketing)\. This lack of experience also reflected in the
accounting system (para 3\.11) and persisted throughout the project imple-
mentation period\. It proved equally difficult to recruit competent indivi-
duals from outside the region, particularly because of the lack of
amenities\.
4\.05 It has been impossible to obtain balance sheets and ,in fact, the
accounting year end of June 30 was inappropriate for management accounting,
because it divided two cropping years\. Separate operating accounts are not
available either for the marketing operations or for the semi-autonomous
agencies (for food crops: PROVIV, and for consumer supply stores: ERAP)\.
- 15 -
At best, only an approximation can ae attempted using non-accounting
procedures\.
4\.06 Despite the initial objective to strengthen ZAPI's overall
management during project implementation, the organizational structure
changed several times and there was frequent turnover of key personnel
(e\.g\., seven cases where the post changed four times and 13 cases where the
post changed three times)\. No key post was held by the same person
throughout the project implementation period\. Inevitably, this discontinu-
ity obstructed the development of an effective management organization\.
4\.07 At the time of the PCR mission, some improvements had been
achieved (particularly in the marketing department)\. However, even now,
although ZAPI's management team meets regularly and operates in an organ-
ized fashion, there is a lack of forward planning and dynamism\. The
operational relationship between ZAPI headquarters and the zone coopera-
tives (EPLs) is unclear, particularly with regard to the degree of autonomy
and the real responsibilities of the EPLs; the headquarters staff have very
little regular contact with work in the field and the general impression is
that of a cumbrous machine that is merely ticking over\. Whole sect'ons of
the staff (especially those concerned with extension work and the women's
programs) no longer have operational goals or work programs and consider
themselves neglected and despised by the management\. In fact, the project
appraisal was far too vague on the objectives and mechanisms for developing
the cooperative movement; phased training and organizational development
programs should have been planned for each zone\.
4\.08 On the other hand, for key decisions, the ZAPI management itself
is still very dependant on the bodies responsible for decision-making, (for
example, the Administration Council, which has not met for two years and
for supervision i\.e\., the DEP)\. Suggestions and requests from ZAPI man-
agement generally receive no response from Government\.
(b) Training Activities
4\.09 The project was intended to establish a rural development train-
ing center to develop a capacity in the ZAPI Training Unit for providing:
(i) a variety of residential courses for ZAPI staff and farmers; (ii)
technical support for district cooperative organizations; and (iii) sem-
inars and training programs for Government departments and agencies from
Eastern Province and for similar operations in the West Africa Region\.
Provisions were also included for senior staff training at specialist
centers l't Cameroon and abroad\.
4\.10 The training center was axed during the economies decided in PY1,
thereby seriously impairing the fundamental objective of the training
component\. Although the Training Unit continued to operate (with technical
assistance) and some training courses were organized for project staff,
this had no lasting effect and largely failed to help improve farmers'
- 16 -
operations because of the lack of coordination and supplies of inputs\.
With the arrival of the new Director General in 1982, it was decided to
contract in-service and farmer training to a specialist training group
INADES (see para 3\.24)\.
4\.11 Regarding training for senior project personnel, 28 staff bene-
fitted (10 in 1981/82 and 18 in 1982/83)\. Of these, six of the second
group attended extended courses in Europe and twelve attended shorter
courses in Cameroonian institutions\. Some of the trainees from the extend-
ed courses left ZAPI after their training and therefore, the project did
not diractly benefit\. Also, as this training involved four different
centers, it is difficult to assess how much of the improvement was due to
the appropriateness of the training course for the ZAFI work and how much
to the per3onal qualities of the trainees\. However, this type of training
helped to broaden the outlook of a number of the staff, and improved their
ability to do their job (particularly in the organization and management
field)\. The effect of the short training courses was rather limited
because they were not linked closely enough with the actual work and were
not based on discussions of results achieved and problems encountered, and
because the monitoring and evaluation data were not available in time\.
4\.12 With regard to training of farmers, it was intended to institute
routine training schemes\. In fact, this was restricted to the few visits
by members of the cooperatives' management committees to other rural
development in Cameroon and to short training sessions\. These sessions
could be extremely effective when linked with specific problems, for
example, preparation of the marketing year statements and keeping the
various management records connected with this work\.
(c) Extension Activities
4\.13 (i)\. Field Extension Services The project was intended to
establish a "training and visit" type extension program and to develop
specific programs for women and young farmers\. The system has worked
rather intermittently and with varying degrees of success\. The problems
associated with a lack of personal transport and the decision not to bul;d
the training center tended to be used as excuses for inefficient work\.
When the means of transport were available, they were most frequently used
for travel outside the zo-\.e ad for purposes other than work, which led to
the motorcycles for agents based in the villages being withdrawn and
replaced by bicycles, which in itself provided an excuse for not meeting
work plans\.
4\.14 To some extent, this reflected the poor management controls\.
However, in reality, the extension problem was more fundamental: with
regard to coffee and cocoa, the project did not introduce any significant
new technical innovations beyond those that had been recommended for the
last 20 years, mainly because of a lack of detailed production themes$
- 17 -
unreliable inputs supply and inconsistent extension advice\. 2/ The
potential for demonstration plots (using farmer leaders) was not well
developed\. Most of the established farmers in the original zones were
convinced that the recommendations were well-foun\.ed and the main problems
were more related to the unaveilability of inputs and the poor organization
of pest and disease control services than with the extension advice\. The
program for women was only partially effective (para 4\.17) and the program
for young farmers was not carefully followed; in fact, the project was
unable to discourage rural exodus by young people\.
4\.15 (ii)\. Physical Inputs Supply\. The supply of selected cocoa seed
pods and coffee plant cuttings, for which the only sources were the
Nkoevone, Abond Mbang or Barong Bitang agricultural stations, left much to
be desired, in both quality and quantity, and ZAPI's attempts to establish
its own nurseries were no more successful (although these operate reason-
ably well now--albeit still producing insufficient quantities)\. Deliveries
of fertilizer from the MINAGRI credit organization (FONADER) were irregular
or insufficient (partly for reasons of national policy which limited the
quantities available according to the amount of the subsidy, but also in
retaliation against ZAPI for using the farm3rs' credit repayments to offset
its own cash flow problems)\.
4\.16 (iii)\. Crop Protection Service Concerning the supply of knap-
sack sprayers, a variety of types were available due to variation in the
results of procttrement bidding and the ups and downs of the manufacturers'
agencies in Cameroon\. Of these types supplied, half were regularly out of
operation due to minor problems, generally involving the unavailability of
spare parts\. The pest and disease control unit that was to be set up under
the project was funded but was not taken over by ZAP! and remained under
the pest control service of the provincial Department of Agriculture\. The
ZAPI management, the extension workers and the farmers accuse the Depart-
ment of favoring the non-ZAPI zones, of providing sporadic and late
services, and failing to keep accurate records of the areas treated\.
Certainly, no reliable data is available for the actions of the provincial
pest control service and the lack of increased production from Eastern
Province belies any supposed progress during project implementation\. If
the proposal to establish a central unit at Doume, had been implemented,
or, better still, had an organization been set up based on the zone
cooperatives (EPLs) and coordinated by their management committees, the
dependence on an outside agency could have been avoided and ZAPI would have
been fully responsible for ensuring efficient crop protection,
2/ For example, in 1973, the research staff and the farmers seemed to be
interested in a new idea, shade trees (in particular, PLAMINGIA) which
apparently had a very favorable effect on yields\. The idea was never
mentioned again\.
- 18 -
4\.17 (iv) Assistance to Women The project proposed expanding the
women's programs by the recruitment of a female extension worker and a
female social worker at each of the technical assistance centers\. The
precise content of the proposed extension program for women was not de-
fined\. In the economic return calculations, an estimated annual increase
of 6% was attributed half to better marketing opportunities due to improve-
ment of the roads and half to a reduction in storage losses, also connected
with improvements in transportation\. The extension program for women
farmers was therefore not expected to have any direct effect on production\.
E
4\.18 In fact, the women', ^rogram was substantially reduced over
project proposals and the dist\.-ction between social work and agricultural
extension was dropped\. The female extension workers, who had very little
knowledge of agriculture (mainly through INADES correspondence course)
tried to work in cooperation with the research service on the testing and
distribution of new varieties\. However, since no arrangements were made
for groups of women farmers to propagate the new varieties, supplies were
very short\. Credit for fertilizer or other inputs for food crops was
unavailable\. Moreover, the female extension workers, apparently on the
advice of the research service, devoted their efforts to promoting single
crop cultivation and row-cropping, despite the fact that research in the
zone itself had demonstrated the value of mixed cropping and that single
row-cropping increases women's labor without any corresponding increase in
production\. Finally, no arrangements were made for iaproving marketing of
additional foodcrop supplies\.
4\.19 (v) Research The potentially valuable results of the project's
research component (for example, the development of a variety of maize
resistant to certain viruses) were not disseminated to farmers, due to poor
liaison between the research services and ZAPI, the lack of credit and the
absence of a seed production program with women's groups, the cutting back
of the women's programs, and the failure to link higher production with
increased marketing opportunities\.
4\.20 The project's basic technical/production problems, whether
related to coffee, cocoa or food crops, lay in the quality of the technical
advice, the effectiveness of the inputs supply, the availability of credit,
and the crop marketing arrangements\. It is pointless developing a large
staff of extension workers and training and equipping them, if the techni-
cal themes have not changed for 20 years and are already generally accepted
by the farmers who do not put them into practice only for lack of inputs,
equipment and spare parts or because they must await the pest and disease
control teams from the provincial department of agriculture\.
(d) Monitoring and Evaluation
4\.21 The project envisaged establishing a monitoring and evaluation
system to provide information for both management and planning\. A unit was
- 19 -
in fact established, with staff at ZAPI headquarters, an agent in each EPL
and permanent and temporary survey workers\. Training and supervision of
the unit was provided through consultancy visits of experts from Planning
Assistance in collaboration with DEP - which was intended to coordinate the
M and E activities\. The monitoring and evaluation unit produced reasonable
quality work\. However, as the baseline study was delivered late and was
rather too broad in scope, it failed, to provide a basis for comparison\.
4\.22 In 1982, two studies were undertaken which attempted to calculate
production and yield data for the major crops in the project area\.
Unfortunately, the findings leave more questions unanswered than they
resolve and inspire very little confidence since the production figures
arrived at are four or five times greater than the recorded quantities
marketed\.
4\.23 In addition to its other work, the monitoring and evaluation unit
carried out regular surveys of planters, the most recent of which suggested
that rural exodus from Eastern Province is increasing\. It made a number of
srecial surveys, for example, to obtain the farmers' opinions about
fertilizer in the two EPLs where they had shown some reluctance in using
it\. The unit was also responsible for compiling data as a basis for
preparing the pro-ress reports, however, this information lacked
consistency\. The major failing of the monitoring and evaluation unit was
the overemphasis on monitoring the work of the ZAPI employees in terms of
the amount of time given to each activity, a task that properly belonged to
the technical divisions, and therefore neglected what should have been its
main function, namely, the compilation of production records and impact
data to provide guidance to management\. At the present time, the ZAPI Study
and Programming Division has been abolished and some remaining elements of
the monitoring and evaluation activity have been transferred to the
Technical Division\.
Marketing, Processing, Credit and Supplies
(a) Marketing and processing of Coffee and Cocoa
4\.24 In 1967 the Government authorized ZAPI to market coffee in
unprocessed/cherry form, an innovation which was well received by the
planters because it enabled them to sell their coffee in the village
instead of having to travel and wait, often for days, to have it hulled by
private traders\. Responsibility for local collection was very soon taken
over by the village associations and was performed fairly efficiently\. The
cherry coffee was shipped for hulling to the three ZAPI plants (at N'Ka,
Doume and Angossas)\. In 1976, ZAPI also assumed responsibility for
exporting coffee\. ZAPI acquired a reputation for poor quality coffee
which, together with its lack of export experience and inadequace controls,
led to difficulties in disposing of the stocks (often meaning delays of up
to two years), as well as losses due to damage and theft during storage and
transport and the rejection of some consignments because of poor quality\.
- 20 -
4\.25 With the start of the project, the practice of buying coffee in
cherry form continued, but with emphasis on improving quality\. The three
coffee processing plants, whose design and equipment were outmoded, were
replaced or modernized under the project\. A new plant, with mechanical
sorting, electronic grading and packaging facilities, was constructed on
the railb,ad at Belabo\. Despite some installation delays and certain
adjustment and maintenance problems (lack of spare parts when required due
to cash flow difficulties), the plant and equipment are now operating well
and the management is good\. However, the quantities currently being
processed are economically inadequate\. The project also provided financing
for marketing studies, but these emphasized the failings of the ONCPB price
schedule and organization, rather than focussing on the need to improve
ZAPI's operations\.
4\.26 In the case of cocoa, the CODEVIs were respoDsible for collection
at the local level\. ZAPI sold the quantities purchased to exporters, with
very narrow operating margins and without taking full advantage of the PMB
price schedules\.
Food Crop Marketing
4\.27 Trials with marketing food crops in Eastern Province started in
the Doume EPL in 1983\. On this basis, a semi-autonomous body, named
PROVIV, was established with financial and technical assistance from the
Swiss cooperation agency for constructing a central multi-purpose storage
and handling center at Bertoua and for financing the purchlase and operation
of trucks\. Although PROVIV had a chequered career, it addressed an import-
ant problem for farmers who had difficulties in finding outlets for surplus
produce\. However, it was not a commercial succeds\. The staff was too big
(and still is despite the further cuts in 1986); the administration was
bureaucratic and there was a lack of proper working procedures (no operat-
ing accounts)\. Moreover, the marketing operations were not commercially
oriented, there was inadequate supervision, and constant shortage of liquid
funds (the revenues were swallowed up in the ZAPI overheads) and of working
capital\. The operation could have been financially profitable if: (i) the
market areas were carefully selected; (ii) the volume of food crops brought
to market were anticipated in terms of the numbers both of preferred
customers and of sales outlets; (iii) the turnover of stocks is efficiently
handled; and (iv) major cuts in labor costs are achieved and payment of the
remaining staff is made, at least partially, by results\.
Commercialization of Inputs Supply
4\.28 The handling of supply and distribution of goods by the semi-
autonomous body, called ERAP (e tablished in 1973 - para 4\.02), suffered
similar operational inefficiencies to PROVIV\. Especially during the
marketing season, the planters' demand for building materials (corrugated
iron and cement), farm tools, spare parts, and some basic consumer items
like soap and kerosene, are very large\. When ERAP cannot supply these
- 21 -
needs, farmers resort to private traders, who offer them comprehensive
support (pre-harvest loans, marketing, sale of consumer goods)\. Here, too,
attempts are being made to improve operations, e\.g\. a reduction in the
range of goods sold, the introduction of wholesale buying from a few
suppliers with payment after 60 or 90 days, sales of old stock at auction\.
But even these efforts will not transform ERAP to profitable operation
until there is: (i) a major reduction in staff (an energetic team of three
or four people would be more than enough at Bertoua/Belabo); (ii) the
introduction of comprehensive operating procedures; and (iii) the EPL
retail stores are transferred to the farmer's organizations\.
Agricultural Credit
4\.29 ZAPI has always provided credit services, first with its own
funds, then as intermediary using FONADER funds\. Loans were made for a
variety of putrose: agricultural inputs, rehabilitation of plantations,
housing construction, and schooling\. At the present time, the only type of
credit available is for agricultural inputs and for schooling\. The organi-
zation responsible for making loans and collecting the payment in ZAPI is
the CODEVI (Village Development Committee) and because payments are deduct-
ed on a group basis at the time of cocoa/coffee marketing, the farmers'
repayment rate has been consistently between 85X and 95%\. One of the most
serious problems has resulted from the tendency by ZAPI management to
divert credit funds repaid by farmers to finance its own operating expenses
instead of reimbursing FONADER\. Sometimes, this resulted in credit funds
being unavailable for the following year\. Another cause of dispute has
been the low mark-up of return for the services performed by ZAPI (1% of
the interest rate), which in inadequate to cover the direct expenses
involved\. Credit operations should have been reorganized to provide larger
operating margin and to leave the profit with the farmers' organizations
(EPL), which would serve to cover bad debts and to create a revolving fund
which could be lent by the farmers' organizations for the various needs not
covered by FONADER loans\.
V\. PROJECT IMPACT
Production
5\.01 The dearth of reliable data makes it difficult to determine the
project's impact on production\. ZAPI purchased and marketed some 5,000
tons of Robusta coffee in 1984/85 compared with 3,000 tons in 1978/79\. If
this level of purchases is sustained or improved, it would represent
positive impact\. However, the statistics for total coffee (and cocoa)
sales from Eastern Province show no significant change in recent years\. It
is conceivable that the project's actions prevented a decline in cocoa and
Robusta coffee production which might otherwise have occurrea due to
generally poor incentives\. Alternatively, it is more likely that the
- 22 -
increased purchases resulted from ZAPI's improved marketing performance,
indicating that some smallholders have switched from private traders\.
Project actions were focussed more on coffee than cocoa production, despite
the fact that both have similar production areas in Eastern Province and
the smallholders prefer cocoa\. The quantity of cocoa handled by ZAPI was
static throughout the implementation period\.
5\.02 Despite repeated requests by IDA supervision missions, there were
never any reliable basic in icators, such as the total number of coffee and
cocoa trees, the distribution between young plantations not yet in produc-
tion, plantations in production and abandoned plantations, or typical
yields for different ecological areas\. The various data on areas and
yields show discrepancies of up to twice as much between the appraisal
report and the various papers prepared by the monitoring and evaluation
unit\. In these circumstances, it is difficult to assess the impact of the
project on production or to try to identify key indicators from which
progress could be determined\. Annex 5, Table 5-1 contains a summary of the
estimates of the cumulative production situation\. However, this contains a
number of inaccuracies and is only, therefore, indicative\. For example,
the estimated area of new plantations (which reached 2,636 ha for cocoa and
826 ha for coffee in 1984) is based on the number of seed pods or plants
distributed and not on the number of plants established\. Again, the
productive versus the planted areas are unknown, a factor which could have
a profound effect on determining average yields\.
5\.03 In fact, although technically feasible, due to the under-develop-
ed status of agriculture in Eastern Province, the decision to purchase
coffee in cherry form and to centralize hulling operations was premature
without extensive trials and essential streamlining of organization and
training for ZAPI operators and farmers\. A comparative study should have
been made into the possibility of buying green coffee and decentralizing
hulling (see para 5\.06)\. A particularly worrying aspect of the whole
coffee marketing operation was the inability, at any time during project
implementation, to improve the efficiency of the flow from collection
through processing to exportation, due to inadequate marketing operations\.
As a result, an operation that could have made a profit continued to make
losses and there was no positive action to resolve the problem\. Belatedly,
ZAPI management is now reorganizing coffee marketing\.
5\.04 Similarly, there is no reliable data for trends in food crop
production in the project area\. Bottomlands rice production was not
sustained and has, in fact, been ignored since the Director General was
replaced in 1982\. This component could have made a contribution with
better focus during its conception and planning, and more attention during
execution\. The priority locations, optimum areas and organization of
planters should have been examined in far more detail, as should have the
best crop varieties\. Farmers did not favor rice, but high unit value
vegetable fruit products could have been profitable (even with the problem
of evacuation to demand centers, e\.g\. Yaounde 250 km by air, road or rail)\.
- 23 -
The development of fish ponds also failed to materialize more because of
inappropriate planning and inadequate development attention, than because
of low potential or lack of interest\.
5\.05 From a financial and economic viewpoint, instead of developing a
profit-making operation, coffee and cocoa marketing operations demanded
more funds throughout the implementation period, thereby exacerbating
ZAPI's overall cash flow problems\. A report produced by the ZAPI
Commercial Division in 1986, calculated that, out of the total ZAPI debt,
estimated at US$6\.8 million, about 60% consists'of the accumulated deficits
on the marketing operations\. The new Director General (1982) gave priority
to this problem: the accumulated coffee stocks were sold and exportation
was phased out, first by contracting with a private exporter and then by
entering into an agreement with PMB\. Through detailed discussion on the
coffee and cocoa baremes (price schedule), the management has succeeded in
obtaining complete pre-financing of its coffee crop by PMB plus reasonable
margins for both products, delivered to Douala\. These arrangements should
make it possible to convert ZWI's marketing operations to produce a profit
of about CFAF 350 million in a normal year\. 3/
5\.06 ZAPI is now establishing a series of decentralized coffee hulling
units located in strategic centers (a total of 17 processing units is
proposed), purchasing only hulled coffee 4/ \. According to the provi-
sional estimates, the savings resulting from an improvement in quality,
from application of the real extraction rate 5/ and from reduced trans-
port cost should be enough to make the operation profitable (the planned
investment, which has probably been underestimated, amounted to CFAF 120
million (US$350,000 in 1984 terms)\. The capital investment for processing
plants under the project probably represents one of its most favorable
aspects, and tha quality of marketed coffee has improved significantly\.
However, it is worth noting that the Belabo factory (which includes elec-
tronic grading and densimeters) is far too sophisticated for current
national policy, which does not allow higher prices for top quality coffee\.
3/ Estimates by ZAPI's Commercial Division; there has been no discussion
as yet with the Administration and Finance Division on the detailed
distribution of costs (in particular, the share of ZAPI overheads to
be charged to the marketing operation)\.
41 Or possibly in some cases a combination (cherries and hulled coffee),
since it appears that the large-scale planters prefer to sell their
coffee hulled and the small planters in cherry form, to avoid long
period of waiting for small quantities to be hulled\.
5/ ZAPI is obligated to apply a theoretical processing rate of cherry
coffee/green coffee of 0\.58 whereas the real rate is nearer 0\.56\.
- 24 -
Nonetheless, the project was positive in stimulating improvements in coffee
quality, especially when the world market is becoming more and more
competitive\. Hopefully, the continuing dialogue with Government and
studies on producer prices (and subsidies) will provide incentives for a
majority of farmers to improve their cultivation product quality\.
Research
5\.07 The project's research component was partly effective\. An
applied agricultural research capability, orientated to the eastern forest
region, was created where none existed before\. Achievements included: (i)
completion of basic studies and presentation of reports (soils analysis/-
mapping, crop varieties, socio-economic survey), (ii) trials of food crop
varieties from the region, selection and multiplication of seeds/planting
materials (maize, groundnut, cassava), and (iii) the development and
organization of a research center\. Regrettably, due to cancellation of the
building program and the premature stop on operating funds, this research
ability is not firmly implanted and important research topics have been
dropped\. However, the national crop research ins\.itute (IRA) is providing
some recurrent financing and the work will hopefully be revitalized under
the national Agricultural Research Project (IBRD/PY87)\.
VI\. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION
Financial Results
6\.01 A summary of the operating accounts for the period July 1, 1978
to June 30, 1984 a comparative table of costs for the 1984/85 crop year are
shown Annex 6\. Since the project costs were not posted separately from
commercial costs and the latter were not analyzed on the same basis, only a
global comparison can be made between actual financial results and the
appraisal projections (see para 3\.16)\.
6\.02 The financial resources received from Government during the
project implementation period (July 1, 1978 to June 30, 1984) totalled CFAF
6\.8 billion (US$18\.9 million), including a loan of CFAF 1 billion and a
capital increase of CFAF 0\.4 billion, as compared with CFAF 3 billion
(US$8\.3 million) envisaged in the appraisal report\. In addition, there
were cumulative losses of CFAF 2\.4 billion (US$6\.6 million)\. Therefore,
the total Government financing provided to ZAPI during this period was as
follows:
- 25 -
CFAF billions 1S$ Million
- Total funds advanced 6\.805
- Less loan and capital increase 1\.380
- Net financial provision 5\.425
- Plus cumulative operating losses 2\.355
total Government financing 7\.780 21\.6
6\.03 Review of the provisional results for 1984/85 shows that:
Mi) the annual deficit to maintain ZAPI's existing operations
rose to about US$2\.3 million (compared with about US$0\.7
million before the start of the project);
(ii) cocoa production has remained virtually unchanged;
(iii) coffee production handled by ZAPI has risen from 3,000
tons in Year 1 of the project to nearly 5,000 tons in
1984/85\.
Factors affecting these results were: i) the 1983/84 drought, which
reduced coffee production to 16% of the previous year's figure; ii) lack of
monitoring of the use of project funds, including diversion of funds for
equipment to the financing of operating deficits; and iii) general lack of
monitoring of expenditures, which resulted in increases in numbers of
personnel to compensate for inefficiency, and increases in salaries and
benefits out of proportion to the receipts expected from the commercial
operations\. As a result, ZAPI now has a very inefficient superstructure
which cannot be financed out of current revenue\. A detailed analysis of
complete project costs will be made when the accounts for FY 1983/84 and
1984/85 are audited\. Further development proposals for Eastern Province
should be postponed until this situation is clarified (see letter to
Government 04/16/86 - Annex 9)\.
Financial clauses
6\.04 Although the appraisal report mentions a number of commitments as
regards management and monitoring measures that were to be introduced
before and during the preject, none of them were fully carried out\. This
was primarily due to lack of managerial capacity and financial resources in
ZAPI, the associated organizations, and DEP, agency, a fact which was not
sufficiently analysed during the appraisal\.
6\.05 The financial control measures stipulated for the credit funds
were unfortunately not extended to the finances received from Government\.
Moreover, in the absence of coordinated monitoring by the supervisory
organization of the use of funds from all sources, some expenditures may
have been financed twice\. The progress reports mentioned in the appraisal
report were not submitted regularly and the annual accounts were audited
only globally, toward the end of the project\.
- 26 -
Economic Re-evaluation
6\.06 It is premature for a full calculation of the project's rate of
return, since several investments have not yet begun to produce results\.
Nevertheless, some elknents, when compared to the estimates, show that the
real rate of return will be substantially lower than the 25% calculated at
appraisal\. For example: i) project costs were more than 25% over
appraisal estimates, and certain components were not implemented or fell
short of expected targets; ii) ZAPI's annual deficit has more than tripled;
iii) although coffee prodqction rose and met the appraisal targets for
years 6 and 7, the increases in yield under the project are not
substantially greater than those for the rest of the region or the country;
iv) cocoa production has not increased significantly; and v) although
improvements have started in PY5, the benefits from processing and
marketing are not yet apparent, because of the under-utilization of coffee
processing equipment and the higher operating costs which are not being
offset by an inerease in revenue due to higher quality\.
6\.07 The lack of data and the delayed impact from some components make
it difficult to calculate an economic rate of return for the project\.
However, taking into account the negative aspects outlined above, an ERR of
about 0% can be predicted, for the following reasons: (a) Long-term bene-
fits will be realized from: (i) nurseries established under the project
which continue to operate; (ii) new cocoa and coffee plantings which would
not have been created without the project; (iii) applied research develop-
ments, especially with food crop variety; and (iv) improve quality and
handling efficiencies from the coffee processing and marketing developments
should eventually be positive; and (b) Government preparedness to enforce
the accounting and financial control measures proposed in the audit report
and associated studies made in 1985/86\.
6\.08 The Bank's appraisal report or working papers should have includ-
ed more detailed analysis and projection of ZAPI's balance sheets and
operating accounts, from the period proceeding the start of the project and
through project maturity (say PYIO)\. This would have indicated the expected
improvements in financial results and projected cash flow estimates of how
the expected return would be distributed among the various partners in the
development project, i\.e\. the growers, ZAPI and the Government (through
increases in direct revenues or those of state agencies, e\.g\. PMB)\. This
analysis would have underlined the importance of government policy changes
to ensure the expected returns\.
- 27 -
VII\. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
General
7\.01 The project's institutional development involved three aspects:
a) for the ZAPI management b) for Government and the implications for
developments outside the five project operational zones; and (c) for the
development of farmers' organizations\. Although fundamental to the project
objectives (and to the IDA's justification for%support), the last aspect
was not isolated as a specific target\.
7\.02 (a) External Impact - In ZAPI's relations with the outside world,
it is difficult to identify the specific responsibilities of each agency\.
However, it is evident that, contrary to its charter as a development
agency, and despite the many activities that were financed by the project,
ZAPI does not play any coordinating role regional development\. It is
still dependent on the provincial Department of Agriculture and there is a
lack of collaboration\. It no longer has regular contacts with the
Livestock Department (which has taken over the fisheries program), with the
Ministry of Health, or with the Ministry of Equipment (feeder roads)\.
Contacts with the research agencies are still only occasional and have not
led to regular exchanges between research staff, extension workers and
farmers\.
7\.03 On the national level, relations with PMB have improved
considerably and those with FONADER are somewhat better\. Contacts with the
DEP (the principal interlocator between ZAPI and MINAGRI) are less frequent
than in the past, and proposals put forward by ZAPI often receive no reply\.
Since the accumulated debt has not yet been paid off, relations with the
banks and the suppliers have not improved\. Lastly, the Administrative
Council which has not met for two years, has shown itself disinterested in
or incapable of either preventing the crisis or managing it and equally
unable to take timely decisions about reorganization\.
7\.04 (b) ZAPI Management - As it was the major focus of the project,
the internal difficulties have already been analyzed in Chapter III\. In
summary the factors that prevented the objectives being realized during
project implementation were:
(iv) (v) the ZAPI staff more than doubled (200 on the
paid staff in 1977; and, despite declarations and
statements of intention, the number has been
continued at about 450 since 1979) without having
any significant effect on the number of planters
reached or the quantity of cocoa/coffee produced;
(vi) the financial resources provided by Government to ZAPI
(which was about US$0\.3 million between 1970 and 1974 and
- 28 -
increased to US$0\.6 million when the project was
launched), escalated to US$1\.7 million annually during the
project implementation period\. In addition to the special
credits requested for paying off previous debts (some
US$8\.3 million), the proposed ZAPI budget for 1985-86
included a request for US$1\.7 million equivalent for
operations and equipment\. These increases far exceeded
the rate of inflation;
(ii) the ability of the ZAPI Administration and Finance
Division to prepare accounting documents on time has not
improved, and even those produced are invalid for
management guidance;
(iii) the monitoring and evaluation system has not been
maintained and it does not provide the key indicators that
would give guidance to the management;
(iv) the training programs have almost come to a halt, with the
exception of the INADES correspondence courses for
planters and junior staff;
(v) the extension program is almost ineffectual, lacking any
innovative technical ideas, or assistance for improving
the distribution of inputs and goods, or the efficiency of
pest and disease controls\. Extension work among women on
growing food crops did not develop any lasting impact;
(vi) the administration is generally weak; there is little
coordination between the divisions; in the Head Office
there is tension between the various grades of staff;
there is little contact between the Head Office and the
EPLs, and the definition of the responsibilities as
between Head Office, EPLs, and farmers' organizations is
unclear, and the junior staff have become disillusioned;
and
(vii) the decision not to build the proposed ZAPI headquarters
and other facilities, which means that the staff continues
to work in old and unsuitable offices\.
Since 1984 the Commercial Division has been quite active; it has formulated
a policy and laid down operating and supervisory procedures\.
7\.05 (c) Farmers' Organizations - The farmers' organizations, which
were quite active when the project started (especially the CODEVIs and the
management committees at EPL Level), have little progress during recent
years\. They have not taken on any new economic or technical responsibili-
ties\. They were not fostered to manage any profitable operations, which
- 29 -
might have given rise to new commercial activities\. Their only source of
funds is the payment of CPAF 1\.400 (US$4\.0) per ton as commission to the
CAMA (commission d'achat des marches autog6rfs independent purchasing
committee) and the "bonipoids" (weight difference
bonus) 6/
7\.06 The project seems to have had largely negative effects on farmer
groups which are: i) disillusioned by constantly hearing the dogmatic
statement "ZAPI business is your business," while experience has shown that
they have no share in decision-making 7/ ii) frustrated with a project
from which it appeared that all the money issued for the staff (vehicles,
buildings - which are often not utilized) without improving the situation
of the planters; and the undesirable effects of the money poured into the
project\. This financial distortion (where "the project" is regarded as an
endless source of money) has led to the elimination of voluntary labor and
the disappearance of the traditional standards for payment\. Similarly, the
farmers' leaders ("contract" farmers) in the CODEVIs considered that the
training given by the project ought to lead to a civil service position or,
at least, some remuneration for effort\.
7\.07 The search for a "participatory" dialogue, disconnected with the
management by the farmers' organizations of specific profitable economic
activities, can only lead to conflict\. The ZAPI management now proposes to
change the EPLs into cooperatives; but its efforts to kindle interest in
cooperatives by social lectures have been feeble and inadequate\.
Management and Organization Consultants
7\.08 The management and organization consultants were handicapped by
the inactivity in most government and parastatal institutions\. This had
the following results: (i) socio-political motivations prevailed over
technical or economic considerations within ZAPI (the project); (ii) power
was appropriated for personal ends at various hierarchical levels of ZAPI
(iii) there was a lack of discipline and aversion on the part of management
to taking disciplinary action, given the socio-political environment; and
(iv) there was lack of decision-making, disciplinary action and efficient
supervision on the part of the General Management, the Administrative
6/ The difference caused by rounding down the weight in kgs\. to the next
lower whole number, between the weight for which planters are paid,
and the weight actually bought\.
7/ "When we go to Bertoua and see how things are actually run, and how we
received, how can we believe that ZAPI is really our business?"
(Meeting with peasant representatives)\.
- 30 -
Council and the supervisory organizations, which weakened the consultants'
creditability and effectiveness\.
7\.09 In response, the tendency of the consultants was to accommodate
these problems or to try to bypass the organization and delegate work to
outside assistance\. None of the consultants seem to have offered to
suspend work pending resolution of the negative situation regarding the
project operations and this possibility appears not to have been proposed
by supervision missions\.
VIII\. BANK AND BORROWER PERWORMANCE
8\.01 Project Justification and Objectives _ This project analysis
shows a few points of positive impact, particularly the applied research
work and coffee processing/marketing, distinct pointers to negative impact
(e\.g\. farmers' groups), and little evidence of either sustainable opera-
tions or constructive pointers for future developments in Eastern Province\.
However, none of this was due to faulty basic objectives or Justification\.
The focus on Eastern Province as a neglected region was entirely valid (and
still is), the need to encourage balanced expansion and upgrading of cash
and food crops production is still pertinent, and, above all, the search
for sustainable, self-financing, farmer organized rural development (with
minimal Government intervention) remains sociologically and economically
desirable\. The objectives were not realised because of: i) inadequacies in
identification, analysis and phasing, and indecisive guidance during
implementation, on the Bank's side; and ii) neglect and recalcitrence
regarding and policy requirements, organization of inputs services, appro-
priate staffing and monitoring/supervision, on Government's side\.
8\.02 Identification and Phasing - The expectation of achieving the
anticipated development in Eastern Cameroon in five short years was based
on three fallacies:
(i) although the neglected situation and the serious lack of
basic infrastructure in Eastern Province were recognized,
these constraints were not realistically reflected in the
development objectives;
(ii) it involved too many components (infrastructure, produc-
tion, processing/marketing, and social services); and
(iii) it involved collaboration between organizations from five
technical ministries all with different degrees of pre-
paredness and commitment (a common fault with Bank
projects prepared at that time)\.
- 31 -
8\.03 Four basic faults are apparent in the Bank's thinking at that
time:
(M) the motivation seems to have come more from the idealism
and euphoria of the Bank's thrust in the mid 1970s, than
from the lessons of past experience and realistic analy-
sis;
(ii) the project's conception resulted from the expectation
(real or perceived) that an arbitrary economic rate of
return was paramount, irrespective of the fundamental
difficulties to be tackled;
(iii) the concept of integrating the development of several
different sectoral ministries which, therefore justified
additional Bank input (from a special division - AGRRD),
so as to provide a guide for accelerated rural development
in other similar areas; and
(iv) the belief that lack of knowledge on the part of farmers
was a major constraint to crop production\.
8\.04 The project preparation process appeared to be ideal: it extended
over two years, was organized by the ZAPI management, coordinated by
MINAGRI/DEP, supervised by several IDA missions, and included as a number
of specialist studies\. Unfortunately the prices did not analyse, in
sufficient detail organizational or management capacity of ZAPI's manage-
ment, or ZAPI's true financial situation; two factors which were keystones
to the end result\.
8\.05 A more realistic project design might have reflected the limit-
ations and included pilot actions only in an initial three year period\.
This should have involved: institution strengthening (for ZAPI and the
provincial delegations of sectoral ministries)* definition of precise
production packages, detailed infrastructure planning,
technical/organizational surveys to determine the best approach for
achieving the sociological objectives, focussed training for project
personnel to counter the previous neglect in Eastern Province, and emphasis
on improving efficiency of ZAPI's commercial operations\. These technical
and organizational changes should have been accompanied by phased policy
changes (on producer prices and input supplies)\. That these weaknesses
were not questioned at appraisal, might have resulted from the fact that
the same IDA team was responsible throughout the process (and, indeed, into
the eary years of supervision)\.
8\.06 Implementation Guidance - It is commendable to anticipate the
need for additional supervision during the start-up of a new type of
project (both to assure strong initiation and for the Bank's own learning
experience)\. However, irrespective of its usefulness, the IDA's initial
- 32 -
supervisory time was exorbitant (36\.3\. 23\.6 and 43\.9 man-weeks in FY 79, 80
and 81 respectively)\.
8\.07 Although the financial, organizational and policy problems were
evident from the early supervision missions, for more than four years
(1978-1983) IDA repeatedly suggested solutions and proposed action by
Government but received no substantive reaction\. In response to the
inertia, more positive action to effect change by simplifying the
objectives and reducing the tempo, or, at the extreme, to cancel the
credit, would have been appropriate\. One reason for not taking firmer
action was probably the project's "experimental" nature, another was the
lack of close dialogue with all of the ministries concerned\. The position
of AGRRD in isolation from the regular projects and programs operations for
Cameroon was an impediment\. It is also possible that the familiarity of
the supervisory staff in its dealings with project management, as
demonstrated in successive post-mission letters, weakened the appearance of
objectivity of their work and the scope for firmness of action\.
8\.08 The basic lack of dynamism in the project supervision was
exacerbated by the inappropriateness of the consultant group who, although
academically qualified and imaginative, lacked practical experience of
project management and problem solving\.
8\.09 Borrower Performance - The Government's involvement in project
preparation, through continuous input from MINAGRI/DEP and an interminis-
terial coordinating committee, was more thorough than with any other Bank
group financed project (before or since)\. Unfortunately, this active
involvement declined after appraisal: there was little initiative by
cooperating ministries (Health, Livestock* and Equipment) to prepare for or
to develop their specific components - and DEP failed to provide the
essential start-up coordination in Yaound6\.
8\.10 In fact, despite its statutory obligation for supervising and
evaluating projects, the DEP appears to have played a steadily decreasing
role in the project\. Without this link, there was no way that the central
policy and organizational changes could be realized; specifically
concerning: producer prices and handling payments for cocoa and coffee;
regulation of ZAPI's debts and provisions for recurrent expenditures;
adequate and timely supplies of inputs and crop protection services; and
actions to assure key investments (particularly buildings)\. Added to this
was the confusion of titular responsibility, which occurred in mid project
between MINAGRI and MINPLAN; this worsened the lack of support\. There was
ample evidence (from project performance and repeated Bank communications)
of ZAPI's financial difficulties and personnel problems (numbers, ethnic
interests and misuse of funds), yet Government elected not to take action\.
- 33 -
IX CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSITIONS
Conclusion
9\.01 General - The general conclusions on the results of the ZAPI Est
Integrated Rural Development Project are summarized below\. These reactions
were conveyed to Government by letter to the Minister of Agriculture on
April 16, 1986 (Annex 9-a)\.
9\.02 The ZAPI Est Development Company operated reasonably effectively
from its conception in 1967 until 1976 when performance deteriorated due
to: commencing export operations on its own behalf, the precipitation of
financial problems, and inexperienced and untrained management\. The
project was intended to help resolve these problems and to trigger
accelerated development in Eastern Province\.
9\.03 The project had a positive impact with respect to applied
research and seed production, the construction and rehabilitation of coffee
processing factories, and training for middle level staff\. However, by and
large, the ZAPI experience epitomises the problems of multi sector
"integrated" rural development projects, especially in relatively isolated
and less favored regions\. The following points were particularly salient
to this project:
(i) the project included too many diverse components involving
services from five technical ministries as well as a
significant building program;
(ii) the project actions were initiated before the implementing
authority (ZAPI Est) was organizationally prepared, a
problem which was never surmounted even after the ZAPI
Director General changed in 1982;
(iii) the associated organizations of the ministries outside
agriculture (health, roads, livestock and research) in the
project area were even less prepared than ZAPI Est, were
somewhat reticent, and were not actively coordinated;
(iv) the central MINAGRI services (for inputs supplies) were
inadequate throughout the implementation period; and
(v) finally, the central Government was never strongly
committed to the project: titular responsibility changed
from the Ministry of Plan to the Ministry of Agriculture
during implementation, the calibre of project management
staff was always wanting, and financing was consistently
inadequate\.
9\.04 On the Bank's side, problems resulted from:
- 34 -
(i) a certain idealism concerning the project's strategy for
autonomous development (cooperatives);
(ii) indecisive action by successive supervision missions to
rectify persistent management and financial faults; and
(iii) overemphasis on economic viability as opposed to allowing
adequate time in the first instance for institution
building, e\.g\. by 3-5 year start-up phase\.
9\.05 Detailed Aspects - The project has had limited real impact on
production, despite a large increase both in staff and in the costs (which
continued after the end of the project)\. At the institutional level, there
has been no improvement in the internal organization, while the extension,
monitoring and evaluation, and training programs have either had little
lasting impact or have been abandoned\. ZAPI did not take advantage of the
project to establish itself as the regional coordinator of development
activity\. Finally, no positive improvement has been made in the develop-
ment of farmers' organizations relative to operations prior to 1978\.
9\.06 These observations should, however, not lead to the abandonment
of the two fundamental concepts which led the Bank's original support for
the project, namely, coordinated rural development centered on farmers'
participation\. However, if it is to succeed, coordinated rural development
must be founded on a hard core of profitable economic activities, for which
the necessary skills are available, supported by sufficient management
ability to react very rapidly to changing circumstances\. There must be a
clear division of responsibility between the farmers' organizations and the
development company and there must be a continuous training program for the
farmers, linked with day-to-day activities\. None of these conditions were
to be seen in the project\. There were a number of economic and social
activities, but they were in juxtaposition and not integrated, and they
were not placed in an order of priority\. At the beginning, management was
ZAPI's weak point; it was unable to come to grips with the marketing
system, and the farmers' organizations had neither an incentive to run
their operations well, nor the possibility of making profits that could be
reinvested, since all the trading profits were absorbed by ZAPI's running
costs\. Furthermore, rhetoric aside, there was no clear division of
functions between the farmers' organizations and the development company,
nor a medium-term plan for a gradual transfer of responsibility, backed by
a training program\.
- 35 -
A 3
Table 3-1
&Zy f Prfit & Lou Acumt
For Petod July 1, 1970 to Jun 30 1985
(in \.O0D CPA kem)
PROJECT PERIOD
1977/78 1978/79 1979180 1980181 1981/82 1t9/3 193/4 Sj 11/85 185/86
(1) ~~~ - -Ws-_ _ (2)3 (3)14 -o -2-7
Sa1mofodsurcoma 674511 634768 7 1063837 4700 511381 4 2 625260
Lo eDa of oid 356556 558381 675944 1865903 757 151 479092 4093027 752622
a Mg = WC& DI 117955 96387 7 61 ( 2006) (42451) 3282" 279675 (127362)
Sam of ,c p proam ic w q 1 865 589 2 195 657 4 073 153 4 216 758 3 730 60 4 811 662 20 592 671 2 113 01
Pnbctun t* tinto stok 353 709 396 646 461 032 761 682 117 221 (1 487 238) 1 653 052 527 912
1 537 253 2 690 4 611 746 5 476 366 4 855 630 3 356 713 22 526 39 2514 351
Thtuar pM&Xtoim - 5 309 1 564 31 000 830 - 38 703 -
s9w* pmfit 149085 94 718 31 176 - 7 197 36 824 319000 543
intmt\. 6 dividsds 4 755 4 402 1 519 4 871 5 512 27 520 48 579 1 542
Pvia u td b - - - - 53 - 536 -
TM mm 1 691 093 2 793It 4646605 512 237 4 869 705 3 421 057 2 933 216 516 436
RI \. rbbls b 6s lies 911 133 1 415 282 4 148 077 4 396 240 3 914 844 1 211 197 15 996 773 2 399 649
Trwrt 206 696 196 513 156509 114 375 123 778 121465 919 338 100 507
Other seWAva 205 07 317 650 178 903 310 245 245 659 177 655 1435 199 139 890
9A\. y qeat1 wes 108 684 286 521 58 038 45 545 49 606 575 265 1 123 659 54 692
Staff expW 269 230 378 217 378990 329 326 426029 516428 2 289228 463493
Rates 6 T 71755 684 609 522 797 31 651 669 986 1222 232 3 487 030 4 04
latest pud 51 693 186 855 167 044 93 621 193 585 168 779 861 577 1 609
Dqmr _iatim 85637 201 741 175 370 413 70& 363 535 139894 1 379966 174 250
s_ CUolo& STEM 1 900 837 3 667 388 5 785 816 6 018 792 5 987 022 4 132 915 27 492 778 3 338 094
Erxcu an g 94o eof dimi:U (- 3) - 7 000 53 473 - - 60 470 -
aYE l 2 (- 209 747) ( 874 269) (1 132 11) ( 453 082)(1 117 317) ( 711 858) (4 499 084) ( 821 658)
(lWtD ES_nQG 325 096 703 032 992 681 312 060 489 144 150 000 2 972 813 254 875
IUDlC N=2 115 349 ( 171 237) ( 140 130) ( 140 222) ( 628 173)( 561 858) (I 526 271) ( 566 973)
Preo ryaw 147 210 299 286 269 809 153 311 529 916 319 400 1 718 852 190 246
- - duq(-731 947) ( 684 650) ( 157 570) ( 289 156) ( 282 002) ( 408 573) (2 53 898) ( 46 000)
Dl of fixed ts 1 762 1 000 2 386 1390 40 10 6 58 6 608
N ult (- 467 626) ( 555 681) ( 25505) ( 274 677) ( 380 219) ( 651 021) (2 354 729) ( 415 929)
pwr\. SuAw\. per sdui of Plizaa amm 250 000 369 241 408 587 1 242 130 30 175 40 681 861 803 3 23D 617 260 000 260,000
-t for miiw aplctlw
atod fer In d me\. - - - - ( 467 578) ( 467 578) +316 522 +151 056
250000 369241 408587 1 242 130 30 175 iO681 394225 2763039 576522 411 056
Diffsm ( 44145) +294445 ( 249449) + 4 685 +448463 ( 244 225) +209 774 (321 647)
Qi\.tity of coom pnvb&W (Tom) nta 1 613 1 462 1 755 1 601 1 001 1 460
- of coffcinee I=n Qla d) n/a 5 096 5 575 4 858 7 735 1 225 8 413
- of pro_sdcoffs* 0") n/a 2 986 3 111 3 089 4 324 696 4 950
Coffee nuy= 58,b 55,8 63,6 55,9 56,8 58,8
(1) pFm tot vecelwd\.
(2) Pwial fixir with aatelm of coffee sals and de"pscatl of fi samts\.
(3) Akmts for ti lt 6 &ad qxte of 1985/86 not yet wailable\.
- 36 - AM 3
Table 3-2
C-
ZAPI lNII IEIQIM PTW
Sdw&\.le of fNnmtAdl SaicM
(in\. O000 M from C"A)
Frcal MI/m NlMD am DM (S A ) SM1 MM L _ r\. CPTL GM
Year OP Invt\. Total b t\. t\. Totdr Ot ti wt\. TM\.td erg\. lh_et\. t l0 UrYN G00t\. WLM
1967/68 42,0 42,0 - 42,0 42,0 4,0 46,0
68/69 45,0 45,0 45,0 45,0 45,0
69/70 52,0 52,0 52,0 52,0 52,0
70/71 81,1 81,1 81,1 81,1 81,1
71/72 91,0 91,0 91,0 91,0 91,0
72/73 - - - - 0,8 102,4 103,2
73/74 101,0 101,0 101,0 101,0 101,0
74/75 119\.0 119,0 119,0 119,0 119,0
75/76 165,0 165,0 165,0 165,0 - 165,0
76/77 200m0 2m0,0 m0,o 200,0 2,0
77/78 250,0 250,0 250,0 250,0 250,0
SI?AL 1 146,1 1 146,1 - - - - - - 1146,1 - 1 146,1 0,8 106,4 1 253,3
1978/79 260,0 260,0 69,0 25,5 94,5 40,2 23,6 63,8 369,2 49,1 418,3 330,0 798,3
79/80 2D,o 5O,0 700,0 208,6 351,4 560,0 408,6 851,4 1 260,0 1 260,0
80/81 950,0 50,0 1 000,0 292,1 222,0 514,1 1 242,1 272,0 1 514,1 1 514,1
81/82 100,0 200m 300,0 208,2 9,8 218,0 308,2 209,8 518,0 518,0
82/83 - 500,0 500,0 40,7 32,1 72,8 40,7 532,1 572,8 1 000,0 1 572,8
1 510,0 1 250,0 2 760,0 818,6 640,8 1 459,4 40,2 23,6 63,8 2 368,8 1 914,4 4 283,2 1 000,0 - 380,0 S 663,2
83/84 200,0 - 200,0 661,8 280,0 941,8 861,8 280,0 1 141,8 1 141,8
84/85 260,0 150,0 410,0 - - - 260,0 150,0 410,0 410,0
85/86 260,0 350,0 610,0 - - - 260,0 350,0 610,0 610,0
SE= 2 230,0 1 750,0 3 980,0 1 480,4 920,8 2 401m2 40,2 23,6 63\.8 3 750,6 2 694_ 6 445,0 1 00 380,0 7 82,_0
MM ML 3 376,1 1 750,0 5 126,1 1 480,4 920,8 2 401,2 40,2 23,6 63,8 4 896,7 2 694,4 71591,1 1 000,0 0,8 486,4 9,078,3
ut; S 4 596,1 3 203,2 7 799,3
-37- AU 3
Tobl 3-3
khuyals of Rda win_t Iplkatla by ham of bpwAiuwe
a s Mo\.ued b Zqi-#\. bz n
4p CA FivDm)
Tahi1C&1 COrastb out fr\.-Paoj\.ct-
Iwlicat1m~ civul wa,* zw4unt VehIdma Assistuc frIj*InI ningaotAl CO,t TOTAL Declarmd
Nmba X CA I CAT 2A CAT 2 8 C 3A CAT 3 C 4 CAT 5 U AK Z Paosved
1978-79 Ito 13 629 424 1239 617 23 625 209 55 611 205 431 987 13 01058 94 547 050 94547 050
1979-80 14 to 32 3 707 976 298476 386 49 19589 95 876 146 2 50505 110202 782 559976685 559967 65
198041 33 to 51 55 994 058 143 753 463 22 201 273 60 768 132 16 134 149 215 227 79 514 070 865 514 078 865
1981/82 52 to 68 7 614 383 2 165 484 - 102 796 871 10 774 864 96 603 402 217 934 984 217 954 984
1082/83 69 to 77 75 541 1399107 30 680 078 13 9150 2 783 26 24 305 864 72 835 355 73 931 299
1983/84 78 t 81 - - 32 487 221 3 082 408 - ^ 191 142 923 226 712 552 226 712 769
1984/85 82 to 93 41 129 527 17 997 181 21 880 697 5 239 445 328 65 310 953 8R7 397 32962 386302 727
1985/86 94 to 110 - 72 222 917 94 338158 46 452 054 - 104 603 212 317 616 381
Tl)UAS (CFA FrW) 109 150 909 537 254 155 274 408 506 383 417 761 32 960 715 1 064 050 428 - 2 401 242 474
tgWd at Dr\. 31, 1985
lb\. 98 0D(IM (3 90D 000) ( 3 900 0O
lb\. 100 ZAPIFAST (89 077 693) ( 624 509) ( 89 702 202)
NO\. 107 (R ID1 (2 100000) ( 2 IODOO)
No\. 108 ZAPI S (3D 000 000) (3000 0OD)
No\. 109 CDM (6 775 000) ( 6 775 O)
et rewved at De\. 31, 19SI
(aFA Frams) 109 150 909 537 254155S 185 330 813 370 642 761 32 960 715 1 033 425 919 - 2 268765 272
Goat per lAd B__
latter of Fab 6\.1986 (US$) 335,070,38 2 868 121,26 1 698 102,92 2 868 205,70 30 000,00 7 799 320,26
- 38 - AM 3
Table 3-4
ZAPI D 1D mam DEIVarW rm=
QCarism of Maieted miA Actua Costa of Cocoa NWd Coffee Naiwatlna
(F"1A IWO9)
Facto Caldata Cost Actual Coat _alez 0ated
Coffee ootal Direct WIt t Total ___ P _ofit
ANDOM 28 050,0 9 965,5 38 015,5 41 936,2 5 748,3 47 684,5 + 9 669,0 2D 606,5
DLTA8 9 288,0 1 802,7 11 090,7 35 085,8 700,7 35 866,5 + 24 775,0 11 027,5
DNtAlG 22 815,0 1 806,0 24 621,0 38 157,1 3 412,0 41 569,1 + 16 948, 15 517,5
IXR)~ 22 498,5 2 255,2 24 753,7 44 992,9 2 513,5 47 506,4 + 22 752,7 19 817,0
WMNG 11 029,5 3 351,6 14 381,1 47 404\.9 2 645,5 50 050,4 + 35 669,3 6 256,2
I3EUJ)U4X= 44 072,0 8 674,9 52 746,9 56 021,1 6 680,0 62 701,1 + 9 954,2 36 187,0
LS IE: ZAU (ioq,erstives 137 753,0 27 855,9 165 608,9 263 598,0 21 780,0 285 378,0 + 119 769,1 109 411,7
BELAED 146 010,0 - 146 010,0 108 221,1 43,603,1 151 824,2 + 5 814,2 61 679,5
M =1 48,670,0 - 48 670,0 246 775,4 - 246 755,4 + 198 105,4 97 846,2
332 433,0 27 855,9 360 288\.9 683 977,6 65 383,1 683 977,6 + 323 688,7 269 937,4
Coma Purdse - 569 961,3 569 961,3 567 317,6 - 567 317,6 - 2 643,7 -
CoffeeFordu 2 106 555\.1 - 2 106 555,1 2 050 548,2 - 2 60 548,2 - 56 06,9 -
G-rqe - - - 65 383,1 (65 383,1) - - -
H&P wters Costs 2438-988,1 597 817,2 3 036005,3 3 381843,4 -0- 3 301043,4 + 265038,1 268 937,4
- - 424 641,2 - 424 641,2 + 424 641,2 -
2 438 988\.1 597 817,2 3 036 805,3 3726 484,6 - 3726484,6 + 689679,3 268 937,4
LoS For the Cwpai (lt ieiid HA & Plf and before fd AsMew Dgprv ) 420 741,9
689 679,3 689 679,3
k2ts: - Oe for 1984/85 wre eatluted at 172,3 ilUicm aid le f EW & PW at 30 ud1\.nUw,
= ui the odr sid hmmlens reesivable e aily 260 WJim CFA frama\.
- Actal Trarnport cost tarUge e iitu) w alLoced o the basis of the Tnsort
shre ImIided In the calculaed eost\.
- 39 -
Table 4-1
ZAPI INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
Physical Development Indicators
Appraisal Project
Construction Type Objectives Achievements
1) Headquarters offices
ZAPI Est Headquarters Buildings 937 m2 0
District cooperative (EPL) headquarters 3x343 m2 1x424 m2
offices
2) Training
Rural Development Training Centers 1182 m2 0
3) Extension
Farmers' Training Centers 24x102 m2 3x104 m2
District cooperative (EPL) extension 5x16 m2 0
offices
4) Foodcrop Research
Staff house lx170 m2 0
Field building 2x20 m2 0
5) Consumer Supply Stores (ERAP) and Marketing
Centers
District cooperative (EPL) stores 6x250 m2 2x162 m2
Village shops 4xlOO m2 0
Woodsheds 5x25 m2 2x46 m2
Reserve store 8xSO m2 5x130 m2
6) Health Facilities
Health Center 3 1
Maternity Annex 1 0
Prepharmacy 14x25 m2 7x62 m2
Prepharmacy store lx50 m2 0
7) Water Supply
Developed springs 82 33
New wells 6 0
8) Feeder Roads
Improve and maintain (km) 540 72
Construct and maintain (km) 280 0
9) Coffee Plants
New coffee processing plant 1 1
Improvement of small hulling plants 3 3
Installation of new hulling plants 2 1
CAMEROON
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - ZAPI
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
\. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- 3 -\.~A\.sp WI\.
$_ \.e sigm I WGiWS~iS~& WI\.
ZAP) ZpAcuP~4 CA-teF I 0-5V\.WP 25 Vw
I * U~~PhdO_ A*v* b
- j ~ *~o**Im"'
_o,t~[51 *L'
I 0_ef I I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~O
_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
S\. - \.o
Vd_1r _ Et_ \.
v~~\.1sF 1*(o Eb
- 41 - XS
T" 5-1
2W1 L4S1 E9A!W MtAL IND 1W
Pr ndati e Co t P D m f2 1D3 PM4 PY5 PY6
197I /1979 1979/198D 198D/1961 1981/1982 19w2/193 1983/198
1977/1978 AP AC to AC AP AC4t AC AD AC If AC
I) rxffea
Total am In prodkis (hl\.)/ 11500 6700 11S00 670D 11500 6700 11500 6700 11500 670 11500 6700 11600
Feti aple tD t oif (t2/422 92D 443 IOOD 462 IO0 1177 1160 0 132D 815 132D 1200
NW p1aah vitldxt fttilser (aM\. ha) - 12 50 27 150 84 30D 227 500 643 50O 826
NWpluseijv1th ftril2r (OAU\. hb) 50 0 150 0 300 0 500 0 500 0
Total rw plase (emu ha 9/ - 12 100 27 300 84 600 227 1ODD 643 100 826
)1kta\. le cafttf pudmad by 2I (t) 2304 2800 3670 2840 2955 21Y0 3226 292D 3018 3Q40 420D 304O 710
Maktathle ffee p d In Ent\. It,\. (t) 7928 8724 8818 10675 8151
20of the p o pt\.m 1, pzd- W by Z2WI 292 421 33S 292 372
hf ybi 2o tb ret\. P n A/ 288 317 320 395 296
harap YIld of du ZAP2 a kajlsW1 20D 418 319 423 257 429 280 436 261 453 365 453 IQ'J
2Ctoal er prtci 11500 6600 11500 660 11500 6600 11500 6640 11500 660D 12987 66D 12300
NVe platn (andt tI\.J 8/ 259 20D 814 600 1260 IO00 1602 1400 2248 140D 2636
Totam wifth bot c ',aetrol (lv)= 568a 3300 8047 6600 5043 6600 3067 660D 6950 66C0 663
S with better cpwid am 49S 50 702 I0S 44S IQ 272 100 5 I=2 502
Cbow Pmel by 2UWI (t) 1143 1980 1546 2150 1613 2310 1460 2310 1707 2360 160D 2360 1000
om prod in thI Eat\. Pen,inoe (t) 7928 8724 8818 10675 8UI1
2 of tlbg pwvince prahut\. pars by Wb MIi4n 18 La 13S 21
Aveeqa yield of the prwilme (taibI) "193 212 215 265 198
*rp yield of the zAP a0 (lrha)- 99 300 134 325 140 350 126 350 14 347 123 347
lBttmim* Rim
om-7-Q 9 dated)- - 3D 0 90 0 110 0 110 110
New d rom m ta (xmdxted)= 30 0 30 0 105 0 18D 0 180 180
Incrental prodcntios (t) - 21 45 74 234 402 402 402
PRuddyua by 2A1ZJ (t= 129 5 10 7 0
4) Tnlad Plebar iam \.,,212
-lb\. l i W 212 212 103 150 103 212 103 212 103 212 103 212 212
lb\. TM ftily pos- - - 29 42\.4 59 40D 70 695 1 136 tOQO 1OOO
rotat au of ad g bump pand e) 42\.4 42\.4 21\.5 4\.5 21\.5 42\.4 21\.5 42\.2 21\.5 42\.4 21\.5 42\.4 42\.4
totares, of wa fadly b (os) - - 5\.2 10\.6 12\.0 14\.2 21\.4 22\.5 3D\.0 22\.5 30\.0 30\.0
46\.9
Ttd a 42\.4 4U\.4 26\.7 21\.2 32\.1 54\.4 35\.7 44\.0 72\.4 44\.0 72\.4 72\.4
Pm&wtin of adetiu brp (t) 12\.7 12\.7 6\.4 6\.7 10\.7 29\.7 10\.7 63\.8 15\.0 42\.4 \.4\. 42\.4 42\.4
dc of nm fsdly PM" t, - 3\.2 5\.3 18\.0 9\.9 42\.4 15\.7 45\.0 N\.L 45\.0 45\.0
129 32\.1
Total pMoutim (t) 12\.7 12\.7 9\.6 27\.9 16\.0 47\.7 20\.6 74\.5 3D\.7 87\.4 LA\. 87\.4
A/ t apraisa do to s a" of coffa tn prabatias w eatimmed at 6700 ha; h \. accordin tD tu book data sumy caid
aot by UiP !E unittdhe total uvs in prodi1ction isdr be abt 1150D be\. *Ala th 1984 ptubal Osm* bad 19\.411 be\.
I At pralual it stiatd that by by3 M ab 402 of do totl e wuld mimve am WpLicatm of dbot 400 Is\. of a frtilzr 0h
bit the aAs ow d 253\. by P4 the djectivw to fertIlIz bot 43S of di total a it w fertilie we applil\.
By PY4 do 227 ha pIwAal gaiat a objectiv of 60 ha or 37S; bh r, thi b plobay arsgrated, efz dt lm plated to e*tted
an the base of yetr plats ailable ie tIn n Ia \.
4/ Ta fiwa d thats V) do CAMP yiels wm owretiaee at appralsali ii) yielids within t poject mm ae m r dbrt
die aes ; ad 1 2W'I pura asly dust aadslzd of th ?evs'a codta ad ass-fifth of ts s pm&Ctimu
5/ 7T1um of 1983 dtu*t\.
i/ At qpralel ee total ses of oa in pr-dmation mm estitd at 6XO ha bat acwonia to dt bauc da am it sild rar be do
11500 hb, tAl thu 1964 ^IlAltal cow\.u dind 32\.400 h\.
7/ Tm fig asly inicetiv slw daiy we bad an dot r of yae cooa plaits allable in asa e\.
i ci pd amtol ha st bon improved wler the pn ,ece\. ZAP! did sot tde am eo aticqWad t nt a \.
/ It _s nt very melitic duet by f3 oe better capddi atol idil own tda total a 'tth mom
1I0 Thee fie a d thret wa little tweet a the rim prodoctian &iiw p?Oi\.e biql_tati
im/ Tv qytity of pay psrsm by IWV decrased fea U29 t In PYO to 7 Cm in PY4\.
12 At appraiel it - eatlatd dat 212 bmTp pads with a total asm of 42\.4 ha adss In the p aect m ordis to the
psasil epuame for inlaild fi the _ umar of barra pads ms 103 iuAtad of 212 xd tho totl m 21\.5 bsat of 42\.4 ha\.
Uk/ Atcorig to ZAP'\. ataft dxt SU of dt 136 fay pa% that hs bb carsd ar the pject am atea l project s\.
T i\. T 5' podmal fti im&Atd by tdh mb-project _ ad aom cavalusted\.
- 42 -
Annex 9-a
Son Excellence Jean-Baptiste Yonke
Ministre de l'Agriculture
Yaoundg
Cameroun
Subject: ZAPI Est Integrated Rural Development Project (Cr\. 776-CM)
Final Sugervision Mission
Mr\. Minister,
We have just completed our final supervision mission for the
above project and are now writing the project completion report for
information of the Bank and the Government of Cameroon\. We would like to
arrange a meeting between all relevant parties within the next few months
to review the completion report in detail\. In the meantime we would like
to share with you the main conclusions from the mission's round-up meeting,
on February 25, 1986, for which Mr\. Kamga the Director of the MINAGRI
Planning Department was President\.
1\. Principal Conclusions at Project Termination
For the main part, the objectives of the project (institutional
development; agricultural production - cocoa, coffee and food crops;
processing and marketing developments; and socio-economic developments)
have not been realised\. The main reasons for this lack of achievement are
as follows:
i) The project had too many components involving the services of
five technical ministries (Agriculture, Livestock, Health, Public
Works, and Research)\.
ii) The ZAPI Est was a weak organisation at the outset of the project
and was therefore not capable of implementing the physical
developments without considerable preparatory reorganization and
training\. No time for this evolutionary development was allowed
for in the scheme of development for the project\.
iiI) The organisations in Eastern Province responsible for the
associated components (agricultural production services, rural
water points, fisheries, health, feeder roads, and research) were
less prepared than ZAPI Est to implement their respective
developments\.
iv) There was a lack of dynamic, innovative management at the head of
ZAPI Est throughout the project Implementation period, as a
result of which, the organisation, suparvision and coordination
was totally insufficient\. Associated with this, ZAPI Est's
Administrative Council met only infrequently and failed to give
strict directives to project management\.
- 43 -
v) There was a lack of detailed work planning and budgeting and the
monitoring, and evaluation was weak and the limited results which
were produced were ignored\. As a result, the project proceeded
in a vacuum which, inevitably, resulted in paucity of management
information which has also affected the thoroughness of the
ex-post evaluation\.
vi) A situation of inadequate accounting and weak financial
controls in ZAPI Est persisted throughout the project\. This
resulted in a serious financial situation involving losses of
Government funds, some of which are still unexplained - as was
identified in the reports produced by the consultant accountant
(Mr\. P\. Gista)\.
vii) The development of permanent training facilities for ZAPI Est
personnel and for other project staff, and for farmers was not
realised;
viii) The Government was not strongly committed to the project, as
shown by: the titular responsibility changed between the
Ministries of Plan and Agriculture during implementation; the
failure to appoint experienced and competent management staff;
and the persistent lack of financial resources;
ix) The supporting services of the Ministry's Agricultural
Department, especially for crop protection treatment for coffee
and cocoa, but also for fertilizers, were constantly insufficient
(in quantity and quality) and badly timed\.
x) The marketing of coffee and cocoa was poorly coordinated
and supervised by the Produce Marketing Board (ONCPB)\.
2\. Short-term Proposals for Remedial Actions
At the end of the project, certain of the problems listed before
had started to be improved, notably the marketing arrangements for coffee
and cocoa\. However, the planning, supervision and coordination within ZAPI
Est is still lacking\. As a consequence, the round-up meeting agreed on the
following program of urgent remedial actions:
i) Restrict the Government's investment and operating budget for
ZAPI Est for the year 1986-87 to an absolute minimum biding
management and financial reorganization\.
ii) Analyze the competence of the entire personnel of ZAPI Est and
Immediately reduce their numbers to the minimum necessary to
assure the basic agricultural production and marketing services\.
This will involve removing about 180 persons from the payroll of
ZAPI Est\.
iii) Complete the revision of the ZAPI Est accounts and balances for
- 44 -
the two years up to 30/6/85 and rectify the queries about
outstanding funds (which were raised by the last audit and
subsequent work of the consultant accountant - M\. Gista)\.
Complete the audits up to the closing date of the IDA Credit
776-CM\. Because of the serious arrears, this exercise will
involve the replacement of the chef comptable, revision of the
work organization of the remaining accounting personnel, and the
temporary employment of a competent audit company to expedite the
work\.
iv) Immediately introduce a system of work programming and budgets
for each service of ZAPI Est, together with a simple but thorough
system for monitoring actual progress and for preparing short but
precise quarterly progress reports for information of the
Ministers concerned\.
v) Develop a basic agricultural production programme for the 1986-87
campaign involving realistic targets for numbers of farmers to be
touched and the key locations involved, training programs and for
the timely and adequate provision of inputs\.
vi) Devise more detailed physical and financial stocks and sales
controls for coffee and cocoa between the Marketing Department
and the Financial and Administrative Department of ZAPI Est\. We
believe that a team from the MINAGRI Planning Department
(including the experts in place) should be able to effectively
expedite this urgent programme with the assistance of an
accounting/audit company and an experienced agronomist\.
We recommend that the Administrative Council of ZAPI Est should
assemble immediately to examine the problems of the society in detail and
give specific directives for their resolution\. Thereafter, the Council
should meet quarterly during the next year to review progress and advise
the Minister on a long term development plan for Eastern Province\.
3\. Long term Proposals for Development in Eastern Province
The Director of the MINAGRI Planning Department requested that
the Bank prepare terms of reference for a study, to commence as soon as
possible, for proposing a concise plan for future development in the
Province\. This we will be pleased to do, and we will send you our draft
proposals within the next few weeks\.
Sincerely yours,
Ben Thoolen
Chief
Agriculture Division D
Western Africa Region
_ 45 - ANNEX 9-b
Page 1
Propositions for Future Rural Development in Eastern Province
1\. ZAPI should not be abandoned\. Instead, lessons shoul be
drawn from the successes or failures of the past and the gains should be
consolidated and ZAPI should revert in earnest to the original
principles\.
(a) First, it is essential to make a clear distinction between
what can be expected of a public service undertaking
(especially extension activities and the improvement of the
position of women) and profitable commercial activities\. The
former should be subsidized by the State; all the others
should be shifted gradually to the cooperatives and their
unions coffee processing, (coffee processing, marketing of
coffee and cocoa, aiding the marketing of food products,
supply of goods and inputs, and credit)\.
(b) Second, using the items in the PMB price schedule and the
detailed accounting statements, a number of additional activi-
ties (collection 1/ hulling, transportation) could eventually
be transferred either wholly or in part to the cooperatives
(at least, to the more efficient ones), with the corresponding
payments for services performed\. When there is only a partial
transfer of activities and others are still carried out by
ZAPI (e\.g\. maintenance of machinery, accounting, transporta-
tion from Belabo to Douala), there must be a service charge
that is clearly identified and paid for accordingly\. On the
other side, the cooperative (at the EPL level) would have to
accept the corresponding outlays, including those for the
essential staff\. The manager of the EPL can become the
manager of the cooperative, with a salary that can, if neces-
sary, be paid wholly or partially by the State, especially for
the smallest cooperatives\.
2\. The Administrative Council must be properly constituted, with
a core of interested representatives from Eastern Province\. The choice
of ZAPI General Manager must be left exclusively to this Council and
should not be imposed by the State with prior approval from the super-
1/ For the crop year 1985-86, according to the price schedule for
coffee, collection was paid at the rate of CFAF 19,334 per ton;
hulling at the rate of CFAF 25,137 per ton, and transportation at
the rate of CFAF 43,258 per ton\.
46 -
ANNEX b-9
Page 2
vising Ministry" (Article 34 of Law No\. 73/15 dated December 7, 1973
confirmed by Article 42 of Decree No\. 74/874 dated October 29, 1974,
which provides for making a government official available)\. The State
should develop an effective supervisory role through the DEP\.
3\. With a prudent policy of accumulating reserves,(required by
the recent PMB pricing regulations), the operating margins on both
coffee and cocoa should enable the accumulation of reasonable surpluses\.
A small part of these could perhaps be distributed in the form of
bonuses to individuals; but the largest portion should be set aside as a
credit security fund, for making loans for purposes not covered by
FONADER credit, or for providing initial working capital for priority
social developments or for making joint investments approved by
cooperativen or by their village sections\.
4\. The feasibility for developing a cooperative union should be
considered, with responsibility, for example, for sorting and grading
the coffee, shipping coffee and cocoa to Douala, negotiating with PMB,
the banks and FONADER (for credit), making wholesale purchases of goods
for the ERAP central store, and for the work carried on by PROVIV
(following reorganization to make it commercially efficient)\. Some of
these activities should be fully commercialized and self-financing (ERAP
and PROVIV), while grading and sorting are covered by specific line
numbers in the PMB price schedule, and still others would come to be
regarded as overheads, export profits, or insurance\. Until the cooper-
ative union is formed, these tasks will have to continue to be carried
out by ZAPI, but with entirely separate accounting for both revenue and
expenditure\.
5\. The development company should receive financial assistance to
carry on the work, with a smaller staff, of extension services, liaison
with research groups, seed propagation in conjunction with farmers'
groups, programs for women, pest and disease control, and education in
cooperative principles and methods\. This last should be closely
associated with day-to-day activities and should give priority to
management questions, explaining the financial results to the
cooperators as a vhole, and discussions on the possible uses of
surpluses\. The provincial MINAGRI cooperatives service (COOP/MUT)
should perform a supervisory role (supervising audits, ensuring
adherence to the law, and providing assistance at General Meetings\.
6\. Until these arrangements have been effectively established, it
would be pointless to extend the ZAPI areas or to restart export
activities\. In the meantime, in order to make the factory at Belabo
more profitable, ZAPI could, (as is already being discussed), make
contracts with private traders that would enable the factory both to
sort and to grade larger quantities\.
- 47 -
AhNEX 9-b
Page 3
7\. At Government level, the underlying policy problems (which
recur in most ara developmet projects), must be urgently resolved\.
This includes: installing a systematic review sechanism for producer
prices; streamlining the procurement, qualities, quantities and timing
for farm inputs supplies (Including thb provision of crop protection
services) on a couercialized basis; accelerating the exploitation of
applied research work; and redefining the role of the MINAGRI provincial
delegation\. Because of their fundaametal Importance and national
significance the rosolution of theo problems should be the principal
focus of the Bank's involve mn t in the Agricultural Sector\. Some small
progress has been made In these ar"s In Bank dialogue with Government
in recent years, and efforts should be redoubled to resolve the
problems, possibly in the context of a sector adjustent loan\.
- 48 - Annex 10
TRANSLATION OF COMENTS BY BORROWER
Ministry of Public Health Republic of Cameroon
Yaounde 27 April 1987
The Minister of Public Health
Subject: Project Completion Report
Cameroon-Integrated Rural Development Project
ZAPI East (Credit 776-CAM)
To: Mr\. Graham Donaldson
Chief, Agriculture and Human Resources Division
Operations Evaluation Department
World Bank
1818 H St\. N\. W\.
Washington, D\. C\. 20433 USA
Dear Sir,
I refer to your letter of April 1, 1987 attaching the above
report for our comments\.
I have the pleasure of informing you that I have the
following observationss
1) The preparatory phase did not take sufficiently into
account the local socio-economic aspirations, whi:h
explains the lack of interest on the part of the
beneiiciaries;
2) The intervention of five ministries (Health, Agriculture,
Transport, Livestock Research) without preliminary
definition of tasks has not been conducive to the
coordination of act!-cies;
3) Working in parallel with the Produce Marketing Board, the
project opted for managing marketing operations, while,
at least initially, the project should have used an
agency more experienced in these activities\.
4) Excepting some isolated actions in training traditional
midwives, the health component has not appreciable
progressed, especially in the construction of medicine
dispensaries as foreseen in the Fifth Development Plan;
- 49 -
5) the organization of management activities appeared
cumbersome, which led to much effort given to decision
making and its follow-up\.
In nn=mary, the project concentrated too quickly in searching
for economic results while neither staff nor beneficiaries were
sufficiently prepared for the implementation of the project\.
To maintain and reinforce the lessons learned, it would be
desirable to reorient the strategy of these types of projects to new
approaches:
- Detailed preliminary studies
- Sensitizing and mobilizing beneficiaries
- Determination of what are the different tasks
- Restructuring management
- Staff training and appropriate programming
Sincerely yours,
Pr\. Victor Anomah Ngu
MAP SECTION
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| APPROVAL
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P006438
| Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No\. 16694
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
ENDEMIC DISEASE CONTROL PROJECT
Loan 2931-BR
June 6, 1997
Social and Human Development Group
Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without
World Bank authorization\.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(as of June 5, 1997)
Currency Unit = Real (R$)
R$ 1\.00 = US$ 1\.07
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CODEPRO Coordenadoria de Gerencia de Projetos
Project Management Coordination Unit
COGEP Coordenadoria de Ger8ncia de Projetos
Project Management Coordination Unit
DALY Disability-Adjusted Life Years
FIOCRUZ Fundacao Instituto Oswaldo Cruz
Oswaldo Cruz Institute Foundation
ENS Fundacao Nacional de Sauide
National Health Foundation
FSESP Fundacao Servicos de Saude Publica
Public Health Services Foundation
IBAM Instituto Brasileiro de Administra=ao Municipal
Brazilian Institute for Municipal Administration
IEC Information, Education and Communication
IERR Internal Economic Rate of Return
KAP Knowledge, attitudes and practices
MOH Ministry of Health
MPAS Ministerio da Previdencia e Assistencia Social
Ministry of Social Security and Welfare
NHF National Health Foundation
NGO Non Government Organization
PAHO Pan American Health Organization
SES Secretaria Estadual de Sauide
State Health Secretariat
SUCAM Superintendencia para Campanhas de Saiude Puiblica
Superintendency for Public Health Campaigns
SUS Sistema Unico de Saude
Unified Health System
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
Vice President Shahid Javed Burki
Director Gobind T\. Nankani
Country Sector Leader Alain Colliou
Staff Memeber Alexandre V\. Abrantes
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
NORTHEAST ENDEMIC DISEASE CONTROL PROJECT
Loan Number 2931-BR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE \.1i
EVALUATION SUMMARY \. ii
PART I: FINDINGS AND LESSONS
A\. Background \. 1I
B\. Project Objectives \.3
C\. Project Implementation \.5
D\. Project Sustainability \.8
E\. Performance \.8
F\. Assessment of Outcomes \. 10
G\. Future Operations \.11
H\. Key Lessons Learned \. 12
PART II: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
Table 1: Summary of Assessments \. 14
Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits \. \. 15
Table 3: Project Timetable \. 16
Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual \. 16
Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation \. \. 17
Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation \. 18
Table 7: Studies Included in Project \. 19
Table 8a: Project Costs \. 21
Table 8b: Project Financing \. 21
Table 9a: Cost-effectiveness Analysis \. 22
Table 9b: Cost-benefit Analysis \. 23
Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants \. 25
Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements \. 26
Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (SW, Actual) \. 26
Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions \. 27
Table 14: Documents in Project File \. 28
Map: IBRD Nos\. 21334 and 20434
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the
performance of their official duties\. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without
World Bank authorization\.
DEFINITIONS
CHAGAS DISEASE: (American Trypanosomiasis) is a disease which occurs in Central and South
America, is caused by a parasite known as Trypanosoma cruzi\. The disease is observed at any
age, altough children are mainly affected\. The disease can present itself as a congenital, acute or
chronic affliction, affecting mainly the heart and the gastrointestinal tract, and leading to
dilatation of the heart, arrhythmia, heart failure, megaesophagus and megacolon, all of which
result in severe disability and can lead to death\. Humans and marsupials are the major disease
reservoir\. The disease is predominantly transmitted by vector bugs of the genera Triatoma,
which are largely disseminated throughout rural areas of Latin America, where mud huts of the
agricultural workers are their favorite habitats\. Transmission occurs predominantly at night,
since the bugs attack only at night\. Other less usual methods of transmission are transplacental,
blood transfusion and laboratory transmission from infected syringes or blood\. Residual
insecticides applied to floors, walls and thatch will elimintate most vectors, but reinfestation can
occur in a few months\. Chagas' disease flourishes only where socio-economic levels are low,
and long-term control measures involve economic rehabilitation, in particular, better housing:
thatched roofs and unplastered mud walls must be replaced with materials and designs where
bugs find no harbor\.
SCHISTOSOMIASIS is a disease caused by a species of parasites known as Schistosoma
mansoni\. The disease causes a variety of symptoms affecting mainly the liver\. Severe forms can
lead to liver failure and death\. There is a strong relationship between the intensity of infection
(parasite load) and severity of the disease\. Patients eliminate the parasite's eggs through the
feces\. When these eggs end in water they hatch and produce free living forms (miracidium)
which invade some particular species of snails which act as intermediary hosts\. In the snails, the
miracidia evolve into free swimming larval forms (cercariae) which abandon the intermediary
host and on contact with humans penetrate the skin and migrate to the bowel and the liver\.
Humans acquire the infection by wading, swimming, bathing or washing clothes and utensils in
the streams containing free-swimming cercariae, which have developed in snails and penetrate
the human skin\. Three species of snails (intermediary host) exist along the northeast Atlantic
coast and in other focal areas throughout the country\. Control is based on diagnosis and
treatment of patients with appropriate chemotherapy (oxaminiquine and praziquantel), avoidance
of pollution of surface waters, elimination of the vector with moluscicides, prevention of human
contact with the infected water, health education and community participation, ideally in an
integrated approach\.
LEISHMANIASIS is a disease caused by protozooa known as Leishmania\. The disease can
present itself as a severe visceral disease (kala-azar), or as a chronic cutaneous or muco-
cutanuous sore (Tegumentar American Leishmaniasis -- TAL)\. Kala-azar is predominantly a
disease of children under 10 years of age\. The disease reservoir are dogs, humans and rodents\.
The vector which transmits the disease from one reservoir to another in the Americas is the
Lutzomia sandfly\. When the appropriate sandfly feeds on an infected dog or person, it ingests
the parasite with the blood meal\. These develop in the sandfly into intermediate forms which are
passed to the new hosts when they next feed\. In the new host the parasite reassumes its
leishmania form and migrates to deep-seated organs such as the liver or the spleen (visceral
leishmaniasis), or they go back to the skin\. Leishmaniasis control is based on identifying and
treating infected persons, attacking the sandfly, as well as the animal reservoir of infection\.
Pentavalent antiominals are the choice for treating kala-azar and TLA\. Sandfly bites can be
partially avoided by sleeping on the upper floors of houses and using repellents\.
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
NORTHEAST ENDEMIC DISEASE CONTROL PROJECT
Loan Number 2931 -BR
PREFACE
This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Northeast Endemic
Disease Control Project in Brazil, for which loan 2931-BR in the amount of US$109
million equivalent was approved in June 1988 and made effective in December 1988\. In
1991, US$20 million and in 1993, US$ 7 million were canceled from the original loan
amount reducing the loan amount to US$82 million\. The loan Closing Date was June 30,
1996\.
The ICR was prepared by Alexandre Abrantes (Senior Public Health Specialist,
LASHD), in collaboration with Claudia Rosenthal Dariush Akhavan, James Cercone
(consultants), Renato Gusmao (PAHO) and Brenda C\. Enuton (Operations Analyst,
LASHD)\. Assistance in the production of the report was provided by Sarah Menezes
(Task Assistant, LASHD)\. It was reviewed by Alain Colliou (Country Sector Leader,
LAl) and Orville Grimes (Projects Adviser, LA1)\. The Borrower provided comments
that are included in the project file\.
Preparation of this ICR began during the Bank's final completion mission, on July
10, 1996\. It is based on material in the project file\. The borrower provided reports and
other materials and contributed insights through interviews\.
ii
NORTHEAST ENDEMIC DISEASE CONTROL PROJECT
Loan Number 2931 -BR
EVALUATION SUMMARY
BRAZIL
Introduction\. A significant portion of Brazil's territory is located in the tropical zone,
where the environment is rich in vectors and reservoirs of communicable diseases\. Many of
those have become endemic, primarily due to insufficient control measures, exacerbated by
limited resort to treatment even for those diseases that are treatable\. At the time of project
preparation, the health status in the Northeast was poor, as evidenced by the low life
expectancy at birth of 51 years (65 years for the whole country), high infant mortality rate
of 125 per 1,000 live births (67/1,000 for the whole country), and an exceptionally high
prevalence of endemic infectious diseases including Chagas'disease, schistosomiasis, and
leishmaniasis\. Endemic diseases were, and still are, responsible for a considerable burden of
death, disease and disability, with direct and indirect economic impacts, such as high costs
of medical and hospital care, low labor productivity and loss of productive years of life\. In
the early 1980s, endemic disease control programs were short of resources, and covered
less than one half of the population living in high endemicity areas\.
In 1986, the Government of Brazil asked for the Bank's help in addressing the
burden of disease caused by endemic diseases in Northeast Brazil\. The Bank was becoming
familiar with such projects, as the health sector had made control of communicable disease
a priority\. In Brazil, the Bank had already financed a malaria control component, within the
Northwest Region Integrated Development Program - Health (Ln\. 2061-BR)\. This time,
the Brazilian Government wanted to extend and strengthen its endemic disease control
efforts in the Northeast, and to develop a successful management program within the
Superintendency for Public Health Campaigns -- SUCAM, a federal agency represented in
all 26 States, with 40,000 staff, which had general responsibility for endemic disease
control in Brazil\.
Project Objectives\. As originally conceived, the project's objective were to reduce the
prevalence of Chagas'disease, schistosomiasis, and leishmaniasis in the Northeast, and
bring the intensity of human infection to minimum levels where only epidemiological
surveillance activities would be needed to keep these diseases under control\. This was to be
done mostly through vector control\. A second objective was to strengthen SUCAM's
capacity and efficiency to expand control activities in the Northeast\. A complementary
objective was to support the MOH activities to reduce the occurrence of new AIDS cases\.
The project involved five components: (1) prevention and control of disease transmission,
i\.e\. vector control; (2) institutional development; (3) community mobilization; (4)
operational research; and (5) AIDS prevention and control\.
iii
The project covered about 1018 municipalities in which the responsible vectors
were prevalent, in nine Northeastern states (Alagoas, Bahia, Ceara, Maranhao, Paraiba,
Pernambuco, Piaui, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe), and in sections of the states of
Minas Gerais, Goias, Parana, and Rio Grande do Sul\. The target high-risk population
covered by the project was 12\.2 million for Chagas disease; 30 million for Schistosomiasis,
and 8\.4 million for Leishmaniasis\.
Implementation Experience and Results\. The project got off to turbulent start, due to
political and institutional instability\. By the end of 1992, after five years of project
implementation, only 34 percent of the loan funds had been disbursed\. Management was
poor during the early years, and SUCAM was eventually dissolved and absorbed into
another federal agency\. This happened at the time of the Collor government, under which
there were four Ministers of Health and six different project managers\.
The situation greatly improved after 1992, when the Bank and the Borrower
agreed to a radical reorientation of the project\. The strategy was to target vector control
on the basis of epidemiological information, and to complement traditional vector control
with early diagnosis and vigorous treatment\. After 1993, implementation accelerated and
the project ended 30 months after the original closing date with full disbursement and
significant and positive impact on the incidence, the severity and the mortality of Chagas
Disease, schistosomiasis and leishmaniasis\. Vector transmission of Chagas disease
transmitted by TJ infestans has almost been interrupted as well as blood transfusion\. The
1995 kala-azar epidemic in Piauf and Maranhao was brought under control much faster
than a similar epidemic which took place 10 years earlier, and the fatality rate was a
fraction of what it had been in the previous epidemic\. Between 1988 and 1996, the project
is estimated to have prevented about 18,500 deaths, which translates into about 520,000
disability adjusted life years (DALYs) saved\. With an US$140\.8 million investment
involved, the project cost about US$558 per DALY saved, which places it among the high
cost-effectiveness health interventions (Table 9a)\. The project saved about US$470 million
in direct and indirect benefits with a total present net present value (benefits - costs = NPV))
of just over US$370 million, or 2\.5 times the total investment\. This corresponds to an
internal economic rate of return (IERR) of over 500 percent and a pay back period of
aproximately five years\. That is, by 1993, the project had already generated retums
equivalent to the total investment of US$140 million over the period of 1988-1996 (Table
9b\.)\.
Also important was the creation of a new scheme of management and
accountability for health projects that did not exist previously, and the transfer of more
power and authority for health programs to states and municipalities\. Many towns now
have laboratories to make diagnoses, trained staff to administer treatments, and specialists
who can control different vectors and reservoirs in infected areas\. Further, the project
introduced management contracts, performance indicators, monitoring, supervision and
evaluation, which are now common practices not only in the National Health Foundation
regional offices, but also in state and municipal health secretariats\.
iv
Sustainability and Lessons for Future Operations\. The project leaves an extended
Chagas control program, an expanded Schistosomiasis control program, and new
knowledge of how to control kala-azar epidemics\. It leaves a network of equipped and
staffed laboratories, as well as a better defined reference system and strengthened
institutional capacity to deal with endemic diseases in the Unified Health System (SUS)\.
Some states and municipal health secretariats are now ready to take responsibility for
financing and organizing endemic disease control\. Changes in the SUS payment system,
consisting in the reimbursement of traditional health promotion and disease prevention
interventions carried out by states, municipalities or NGOs, ensure sustainable financing
of the recurrent costs associated with endemic disease control\.
BRAZIL
NORTHEAST ENDEMIC DISEASE CONTROL PROJECT
(Loan No\. 2931-BR)
PART I: FINDINGS AND LESSONS
A\. BACKGROUND
Endemic Diseases\. This project was designed to assist the Government in a
five-year program to arrest the increasing trends of three endemic diseases, Chagas' disease,
schistosomiasis, and leishmaniasis in Northeast Brazil\.
Endemic Diseases\.
(a) Chagas'disease\. At the time of project preparation, there were about 6 million
Chagas' disease patients in Brazil, of which 60 percent lived in the Northeast, and another
15 million more were at risk of contracting the disease by living in inadequate dwellings
infested with the vector (Triatoma infestans)\. In addition, many more were at risk of
getting infected through blood transfusions and transplacental infection\. The existing
Chagas' Disease Control Program covered 2050 municipalities in 19 states, which had been
identified as endemic areas by the 1981 national Chagas'serological survey\. In the absence
of vaccines and effective pharmaceuticals suitable for large-scale treatment of Chagas'
disease, interruption of transmission had to rely on insecticides to ensure vector control,
blood donor screening and blood transfusion control, which had been proven successful in
medium-scale trials in Brazil and in other countries\. Home improvements, to get the vector
out of the household, was used as the long-term approach for solving the problem\. Between
1975 and 1986, the Program was able to reduce incidence to low levels in only 414 (20%)
of those municipalities, and more than 60 percent of blood banks did not screen donors for
Chagas' disease, due to lack of laboratory resources and technical staff\.
(b) Schistosomiasis\. At the time of project preparation eight to ten million people
were infected with the parasite and another 30 million were at risk of contracting the
disease\. The disease occurred mostly along the Northeast Atlantic coast, where a particular
species of snail which serves as the intermediary host to the Schistosoma mansoni parasite
is very common\. The disease had been spreading to other areas in the Country, due to
significant migrations of infected people, which led to the contamination of soil and
waterways where the intermediary host snail existed\. The Brazilian Program for
Schistosomiasis Control had been successful in controlling the disease in some areas, by
using chemotherapy and application of molluscicides in infected waterstreams\. But, by
1986, the Program only covered about 40 percent of infested areas, i\.e\., in the states Minas
Gerais and Bahia, due to lack of resources and organizational weakness\.
2
(c) Leishmaniasis\. The vector sandfly and the main disease reservoir (infected
dogs) exist throughout the Northeast, including in many urban areas\. A 1985 serologic
survey showed that all Northeast states had infected dogs, with a prevalence ranging from 1
percent in Paraiba to 50 percent in Piaui\. In the 1980s, Leishmaniasis Control Program
activities had been reduced due to lack of resources and institutional weakness, thus leading
to an alarming increase in new cases: between 1979 and 1985, the number of reported cases
increased from 3,243 to 16,200 per year, 95 percent of which were reported in the
Northeast\. Unreported new cases could easily have tripled this figure\. Over 8 million
people were estimated to be at risk\. The National Leishmaniasis Control Program focused
on vector control, i\.e\., using insecticides to eliminate sandflies, and elimination of infected
dogs\. By 1996, however, the activities of the Program were restricted to relatively few and
scattered areas in the Northeast, representing less than 25 percent of the endemic area\.
(d) AIDS\. AIDS appeared in the mid-1980s as a new fatal viral disease which
created a serious public health problem due to its explosive propagation in the country\. In
1987, there were 267 new cases reported in Brazil in only 4 months\. The onl\.- effective
measures available were information, education and communication aimed at changing
risky behavior, and HIV screening of blood donors and control of tranfusions\.
At the time of project preparation, the three major federal institutions supervised
by the Ministry of Health were responsible for endemic disease control in Brazil: the
Superintendency for Public Health Campaigns (SUCAM), the Public Health Services
Foundation (FSESP), and the Osvaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ)\. States and
municipalities played a minor role in endemic disease control\. SUCAM implemented
nationwide programs of prevention, control and surveillance; it was semi-autonomous
and was the lead agency for endemic disease control\. It was represented in each of the 26
states and employed over 40,000 workers\. The agency was noted for its strong staff and
line organization, its excellent record in implementing endemic disease control
programs, and, in particular, its ability to sustain programs in remote areas under difficult
conditions\. In 1988, SUCAM created a Coordination Unit for Project Management
(COGEP) to coordinate Bank-supported projects: the Northeast Endemic Disease Control
(Ln\. 2931-BR) and the Amazon Basin Malaria Control Project (Ln 3072-BR)\. In 1991,
SUCAM and FSESP were closed and their functions transferred to a new institution: the
National Health Foundation (NHF), with headquarters in Brasilia\. The NHF created a
special unit, CODEPRO (Coordenadoria de Gerencia de Projetos) to manage Bank-
funded projects\.
Brazil's Constitution of 1988 called for universal health coverage for all citizens\.
This Constitution established the principles of a Unified Health System (SUS) which
would publicly finance personalized health services for the entire population, to be
provided through a decentralized network of public and private providers\. The SUS was
created in 1990, and state and municipal governments have been progressively gaining
more health care planning and management responsibilities, including those of endemic
3
disease control\. SUS hospitals and ambulatory networks did not have a tradition of
diagnosing or treating endemic diseases\. Most endemic disease patients seeking care in a
SUS facility were referred to SUCAM (later NHF) units\.
B\. PROJECT OBJECTIVES
Objectives\. The main objective of the project was to reduce the prevalence of
Chagas'disease, schistosomiasis, and leishmaniasis to levels at which only
epidemiological surveillance was needed to keep these diseases under control\. The
project also aimed at improving the institutional capacity of SUCAM to carry out disease
prevention programs in the Northeast\. The project would also assist the development of a
National AIDS and STD Control Program\.
Definition\. To achieve this goal the project would: (a) control the presence of
disease vectors and intermediary hosts in the households and in neighboring
environments, by applying pesticides and carrying out health education; (b) reduce the
human reservoir of these diseases by early diagnosis and treatment of target population
groups; (c) set up surveillance activities for populations at risk; (d) strengthen SUCAM's
capacity and efficiency to expand control activities in the Northeast; and, (e) support the
MOH activities aimed at reducing the occurrence of AIDS cases\.
Cost and Timing\. At an expected cost of US$218 million to be supported by a
US$109 million Bank loan, the project was made effective in December 1988, to be
completed on June 30, 1993, and closed by June 30, 1994\. The project closing date was
extended 24 months to June 30, 1996\. There were two cancellations from the original
loan amount: US$20 million in 1991, and US$7 million in 1994\. Thus, the revised loan
amount was US$82 million for Loan No\. 2931 -BR\.
Achievement of Objectives\. As a result of the project, hospital admissions and
deaths from Chagas' disease, schistosomiasis, and leishmaniasis have all decreased,
suggesting a reduction in the incidence and/or a reduction in the severity of these
diseases\. Vector and blood transmission of Chagas' disease was interrupted in large
endemic areas\. The number of severe schistosomiasis cases and the respective mortality
were significantly reduced\. The cyclical visceral leishmaniasis (kala-azar) epidemic,
which occurred in 1995 in Piaui and Maranhao, was brought under control much faster
and with many fewer deaths than a similar epidemic having occurred 10 years previously\.
Chagas'disease\. The project reduced the incidence of transfusional Chagas' disease
by 89\.7 percent, more than the 80 percent reduction which had been set as a target a the
time of project preparation\. Hospital admission and mortality rates decreased
significantly\. Vector and transfusion transmission have been interrupted in large endemic
areas, and the Triatoma infestans (vector) have been eradicated from most States\. There
are several indirect indications that transmission and incidence of Chagas' disease are
decreasing: (a) between 1989 and 1995 alone, the prevalence of houshold infestation by
4
the T\. infestans fell by more than 20 percent; (b) between 1957 and 1995, the number of
municipalities in the endemic area (i\.e\. 2,500 municipalities) where transmission has been
interrupted rose from 414 to over 940, bringing the population at risk from about 70
million down to about 40 million; (c) between 1987 and 1995 the proportion of positive
blood donor samples decreased from about 1 percent to less than 0\.7 percent; (d) between
1986 and 1996 the number of cases caused by transfusion of infected blood fell from
20,000 per year to about 500 per year; (e) between 1985 and 1995, the number of hospital
admissions due to Chagas' disease decreased from about 751 to less than 123; and finally
and most importantly (f) between 1975 and 1985, Chagas' disease specific mortality, for
the age groups which could have benefited significantly from the project (i\.e\., aged 10-14
and 15-19), dropped by about 89 percent\.
Schistosomiasis: Between 1988 and 1996, the number of hospital admissions due
to schistosomiasis in the Northeast dropped from 2,900 to 1,400, and the number of
hospital days dropped by 50 percent, from about 23,000 to 14,000, suggesting a reduction
in incidence and/or a reduction in the severity of the disease\. During the same interval
the schistosomiasis mortality rate dropped from 9\.8 to 5\.8 per million inhabitants, a 41
percent reduction, which is smaller than the 50 percent reduction target set at the time of
project preparation\. Most of the Northeast region currently has a prevalence of only 25
percent from the figures of 1988, with some parts showing a lower prevalence of 5 to 10
percent\.
Leishmaniasis: In 1995, the Northeast experienced an epidemic of kala-azar, one
that has occurred cyclically every 10 years\. As a result, the number of cases jumped from
700 to 1,500 cases per year, which were observed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to
3,600 in 1995\. The project was able to bring the number down to 2,500 in less than a
year, and down to pre-epidemic levels in less than two years, much faster than during the
epidemic which occurred ten years before\. In addition, and in spite of the epidemic, the
kala-azar fatality rate dropped from 7\.9 per 100 cases in 1988, to 3\.51 per 100 cases in
1996, suggesting better diagnosis and treatment of cases\. The project did not manage to
reduce the incidence of kal-azar by 30 percent as anticipated at project appraisal\. The
epidemiological information on cutaneous leishmaniasis is scarce and does not allow for
proper evaluation and does not allow to judge whether the project did reduce the
incidence of the disease by 50 percent as estimated at project appraisal\.
Rabies: although not part of the original project, and at the request of the
Borrower, the Bank agreed that the activities of Rabies Control could be associated with
those of canine leishmaniasis control\. As a result, the coverage of dog anti-rabies
vaccination grew significantly from 56 percent in 1989 to over 83 percent in 1995, and
the number of rabies cases dropped by 50 percent, from 57 in 1995 to 31 in 1995\.
Institutional Development\. The project left a network of well-equipped public
health laboratories in the Northeast and in Minas Gerais; a large pool of trained
professionals (enough to staff all regional offices); and hundreds of trained middle level
staff, not only in the NHF federal and regional offices, but also in state and municipal
5
health secretariats\. The project leaves an expanded Chagas and schistosomiasis control
programs, and new experience in how to control a kala-azar epidemic\. In addition, many
personal health care services of the Unified Health System acquired the capacity and the
supplies necessary to diagnose and treat patients with Chagas' disease, schistosomiasis
and leishmaniosis\. Furthermore, the project introduced a new management culture and
instruments, including management contracts, performance indicators, monitoring,
supervision, and evaluation\.
C\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation and Major Factors Affecting Project Implementation\. The project
tested two major approaches over the traditional endemic disease control programs which
focused on the eradication of vectors and elimination of infected reservoirs\. First, the
project began to target vector control to a limited number of municipalities and localities
with the highest incidence of Chagas' disease, schistosomiasis, or leishmaniasis, as
opposed to the traditional approach of making widespread use of insecticides and
moluscicides to eradicate the vectors and reservoir snails\. Second, much more emphasis
was put into early diagnosis and vigorous treatment of patients, both in the NHF facilities
and in the health services of the Unified Health System (SUS)\.
After a slow start and a 24-month extension of the closing date, the project used
the full proceeds of the loan:
Part A: Prevention and Control of Disease Transmission\. This component of the
project executed 80 percent of funds, financing the application of pesticides,
molluscicides, household sanitation and rehabilitation, the elimination of dogs infected
with leishmaniasis, as well as the diagnosis and treatment of patients\. Activities were in
most cases carried out in partnership between the SUCAM/NHF and municipal health
secretariats\. In most cases, the former provided for the training, equipment and supplies,
while the later provided the necessary community health workers\. The decentralization
process of the activities involved in this strategy remains effective, and the local
responsibility for the programs keeps growing\.
(a) Chagas' disease: This subcomponent executed about 17 percent of project
funds, five times more than had been anticipated at appraisal\. The project financed the
purchase of insecticides, trained hundreds of field inspectors, which constitute the
backbone of vector control, created a serologic surveillance system based on 12 reference
laboratories, left one reference entomologic laboratory for the diagnosis and study of the
Triatoma genera, controlled transmission via contaminated transfusions, and left a
network of well-equipped personal health services which provide improved care for
Chagas patients\. In the case of blood safety, public awareness and assistance from PAHO
led Brazil to pass significant legislation in 1989 and 1993, while the project made it
possible for increasing the proportion of transfusions for which the blood sample had
been tested from 10 percent in 1987, to over 60 percent in 1996, which means that the
potential infected transfusions dropped from 20,000 per year in 1987 to about 5,000 in
6
1996\. In addition, the project established endemic disease control partnerships between
the federal agency (NHF/SUCAM) and numerous states and municipalities\.
(b) Schistosomiasis: This subcomponent executed about 35 percent of project
funds, close to what had been anticipated at appraisal\. The project allowed
SUCAMINHF to extend its control activities to extensive endemic areas which
previously had not been covered\. In Minas Gerais alone, the project extended coverage
with schistosomiasis control activities from 30 to 380 municipalities\. The strategy
adopted for the control of schistosomiasis included: (i) early diagnosis and treatment of
infected people; (ii) basic household sanitation; and (iii) information, education and
communication (IEC)\. Again partnerships with municipalities were key to the success of
the operation\. The project installed laboratories, provided supplies and equipment and
trained local agents to perform diagnostic tests and refer patients for treatment in the
network of local health care services\. In addition, the project piloted the introduction of
mass-treatment of schistosomiasis in school health programs, in municipalities with a
high incidence of the disease\. The project also helped set up health promotion teams at
the municipal level, which carried out significant amount of IEC activities\. The project
showed that it is very difficult to eliminate low-level transmission with the traditional
control approach\. Disease eradication depends very much on environmental and
household sanitary conditions, and thus the project fostered collaboration with the
environmental sector and provided for training of thousands of municipal sanitation
agents in endemic areas\.
(c) Leishmaniasis: This subcomponent executed about 28 percent of project
funds, close to what had been estimated at appraisal\. In the case of cutaneous
leishmaniasis, and given the paucity of epidemiological data, the project focused on
establishing an adequate information system, on establishing laboratories capable of
diagnosing the disease, and on training doctors and other health care personnel in the
appropriate treatment of the disease\. In the case of kala-azar, the project set up a network
of laboratories, provided equipment and supplies for controlling the sandflies, established
a network of municipal kennels equipped for diagnosing and eliminating infected dogs,
and established treatment protocols, trained doctors and other health care personnel in
treating the disease\. Treatment of this form of the disease requires specialized medical
expertise, which most physicians did not have\. Therefore, one of the main contributions
of the project to the reduction of the incidence of this disease was the establishment, with
the assistance of PAHO, of treatment protocols for kala-azar, training of medical
personnel and the provision of the Glucantime, the effective chemotherapeutic agent,
which is difficult to get because it is produced by only one company in the world\. The
second largest contribution of this component was to establish a network of laboratories
and kennels to diagnose canine leishmaniasis and eliminate infected dogs, the disease
reservoir, from which humans get infected via the bite of sandflies\. For example, before
the project, the city of Belo Horizonte could not process more than 3,000 canine serologic
tests per month, while there was a need to carry out some 100,000 such tests\. Finally, the
project financed the development and tested the use of a new serologic diagnostic method
for canine leishmaniasis (TRALD), one which allows cutting the time taken to diagnose
7
the canine disease from days to minutes, and disposal of the infected dog on the spot,
thereby reducing the transmission of the disease\.
(d) Rabies and other\. as mentioned earlier, at the request of the Borrower the
Bank authorized that the activities of Rabies Control be associated with those of canine
leishmaniasis control\. As a result the rate of dog anti-rabies vaccination grew
significantly from 56 percent in 1989 to over 83 percent in 1995\.
Part B: Community Mobilization\. This component executed around 4 percent of project
funds, a little less than originally estimated\. The project established state- and municipal-
based information, education and communication (IEC) teams, and financed production
of educational materials, such as posters, brochures, and videos, and supported
community participation in endemic disease control programs\. Most of the educational
activities were carried out by community health workers\.
Part C: Operational Research\. This component executed about 0\.7 percent of project
funds as had been planned\. Operational research was delayed mainly due to management
problems at SUCAM/NHF and the lack of a tradition of collaboration between health
services and academia\. In the latter part of project implementation, its importance for the
improvement of institutions and programs was recognized and, by 1996, the project was
funding 22 research and development projects (Table 7)\. Eighteen studies funded under
the project were presented at the most important tropical disease forum in Brazil,
resulting in 12 publications, and 4 abstracts, some of which were considered particularly
innovative\. This component also financed a post-graduate scholarship program to
strengthen the pool of endemic disease control specialists\.
Part D: Institutional Development\. This component executed 16 percent of project
funds, leaving (a) a large pool of trained personnel, (b) management information systems
which allow monitoring the epidemiological situation and the execution of different
program activities, and (c) improved public health service facilities, vehicles and
equipment which make the endemic disease control programs viable\. These investments
had been originally designed to apply to SUCAMINHF facilities only, but ended up
benefiting municipal and state health secretariats which took more and more
responsibility for endemic disease control as the project developed\. The project helped
forge sound partnerships between the federal agency and state and municipal health
secretariats, between academia and public health services, as well as new intersectoral
collaboration between the health sector and the education and environment sectors\.
Part E: AIDS ControL This component executed about 4 percent of project funds,
financing the production of mass media campaigns and various educational materials, and
the acquisition of equipment and supplies for blood banks and public health laboratories\.
The project helped establish the National AIDS and STD Control Program and prepare a
specific investment project which the Bank is now financing (AIDS and STD Control
Project, Ln\. 3659-BR)\.
8
D\. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
This project leaves behind a strong base from which Brazil can continue its already
successful endemic disease control programs\. The infrastructure and equipment established
by the project, all the staff of whom were trained by the project, and the experience gained
in the fields of management and partnerships should not disappear now that the Bank's
involvement has ended\. The introduction of endemic disease control activities among the
expenditures reimbursable by the Unified Health System (SUS) will cover recurrent costs
and further ensure sustainability\.
The project put endemic disease control on the agenda of state and municipal
governments, as well as on the agenda of other key agencies operating in the regions which
are increasingly assuming responsibility for vector-borne disease control\. The project
introduced a financing system by which the Unified Health System reimbursed
municipalities for endemic disease control activities, making the decentralization of
endemic disease control financially sustainable\. The project trained hundreds at the state
and municipal levels, enabling a follow-up of all necessary activities, and the
decentralization of health actions in the region\. These benefits were gained in spite of the
fact that the project was implemented at a time of political and macroeconomic instability,
of reduced technical and managerial capabilities, and changing and uncertain institutional
environ-ments\. The project also leaves a culture of management and accountability which
did not exist before\. Management contracts, performance indicators, monitoring,
supervision and evaluation were introduced by the project and are now common practice
not only in the regional offices of NHF but in state and municipal health secretariats\.
E\. PERFORMANCE
Borrower Performance\. Project management was poor during the early years of
project implementation, due to frequent changes in Government\. In the early 1990s, a
series of political appointees in a volatile political environment almost brought the project
to a halt\. During the project's life, there were eight Ministers of Health\. These resulted in
further changes at other levels of government, including six project coordinators in 1991
and 1992 alone, halting actions and decisions and thus delaying project implementation\.
Also, priorities changed from one administration to another, and commitments made in
prior administrations were not always maintained by others\.
In its early stages, project implementation was also slowed by counterpart fund
and procurement problems\. Counterpart funds were difficult to secure during the first
part of project implementation, but have been adequate and timely since 1994\. The fact
that the Bank allowed the use of Special Account funds to be used as advances, together
with matching counterpart funds, facilitated disbursements, because there was no longer a
9
need for the counterpart funds to cover the full cash flow up to the reimbursement\. The
project disbursed the full proceeds of the loan with only small deviations from the
proportions agreed with the Bank for each disbursement category\.
Intemational competitive bidding for insecticides and pharmaceuticals was
extremely difficult because the international market is oligopolistic\. The interest groups
involved are extremely powerful, and tried to invalidate the bidding procedure in court\.
As a result, further large purchases of insecticides, pharmaceuticals, and specialized
equipment were done using limited international bidding, through PAHO\. The latter
process was very efficient: prices were very good, and the process was transparent\. But it
took longer than six months between the request to purchase and the delivery of the
goods, much longer than both the Borrower and the Bank had anticipated, but still within
the time taken by other UN agencies such as UNICEF\. National competitive bidding at
state and municipal levels was more effective than similar bidding at the federal level to
purchase smaller quantities of goods, again because of the interests involved in a large
federal bidding processes, and because the federal level was not able to plan and carry out
procurement and distribution in a timely fashion, resulting in periods of lack of inputs
alternating with others of inefficient stockpiling\.
In 1992, project management became competent and stable and from 1993,
showed excellent performance\. Some committed Northeast governors and mayors took
responsibility for endemic disease control, developed state- or municipal-based endemic
disease control programs and allocated local funds to communicable disease control\. At
the federal level, strong support by the Minister and by the President of the National
Health Foundation between 1993 and 1995 accelerated project implementation\.
Bank Performance\. The Bank and the Borrower identified and prepared the
project in much detail\. The staff appraisal document and the respective background
documentation are very complete\. Retrospectively, we can now say that there were three
significant flaws in terms of the objectives set for the project and project design\. First,
neither the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), nor the Loan Agreement, set measurable and
realistic project outcome indicators which would have allowed closer monitoring and
evaluation of development objectives\. The key indicators in the SAR consisted of
process/output indicators, with a heavy emphasis on vector control (Table 6), which did not
allow questioning whether the selected strategy was helping to reach the development
objectives\. Second, there was no clear objective or strategy to reduce the severity and
mortality of either schistosomiasis or leishmaniasis, as the focus of the programs was to
eradicate the vectors and the infected reservoirs\. Third, the project design was too rigid and
did not accommodate a quick response to epidemics which took place during the period of
project implementation\. Between 1988 and 1996, the Northeast suffered several epidemics,
including cholera and a very serious outburst of Dengue and, in both instances, the project
was unable to support the swift response which was necessary, without having to make a
major amendment of the loan agreement\.
The Bank kept a steady level of project supervision from the early stages of project
implementation, although it may have started with an excessive focus on vector control and
10
sometimes showed rigidity in the interpretation of the loan agreement\. This rigidity may
have been warranted during the period of political and managerial instability\. Project
supervision became more outcome-oriented and flexible after 1993, when the Borrower
appointed competent and stable project management, turning the project into a very good
performer\. From 1993, project supervision emphasized: (a) outcome indicators (i\.e\.
reduced incidence, reduced mortality, reduced fatality rates, and reduced hospital admission
rates), as opposed to project outputs (i\.e\., houses sprayed, stool or dog serum tests
processed, etc\.) or inputs (i\.e\., procurement and disbursements); (b) diagnosis and
treatment, in addition to traditional vector or reservoir control; (c) shifting the
accountability for project performance from the PCU to states and municipalities; (d)
intensive informal supervision through electronic mail with communications flowing to and
from the PCU more than once a week (the project was one of the first to have an All-in-I
account at the Bank's Resident Mission, and later switched to a Brazilian Internet server);
and (e) flexible interpretation of the Loan Agreement to adapt to new environmental and
political realities during the long period of project implementation\.
F\. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME
Between 1988 and 1996, the project is estimated to have prevented about 18,500
deaths, which translates into about 520,000 disability adjusted life years (DALYs) saved\.
Given the US$140\.8 million investment involved, the project cost about US$558 per
DALY saved, which places it among the high cost-effectiveness health interventions (Table
9a)\. The project saved about US$470 million in direct and indirect benefits with a total
present net present value (benefits - costs = NPV)) of just over US$370 million, or 2\.5 times
the total investment\. This corresponds to an internal economic rate of return (IERR) of over
500 percent and a payback period of aproximately five years\. That is, by 1993, the project
had already generated returns equivalent to the total investment of US$140 million over the
period of 1988-1996 (Table 9b)\.
Chagas' disease\. The project is estimated to have prevented 12,500 cases of
Chagas' disease, and 3,800 deaths, translating into about 72,900 DALYs saved, 48 percent
from averted deaths and 52 percent from averted disability\. With an investment of about
US$23 million, the component is estimated to have costed US$260 per DALY saved, which
places it among those with highest cost-effectiveness ratio\. Even if we did not consider
indirect economic benefits associated with the life years saved, the program would have
returned US$2\.30 for each invested dollar\. The project saved a total of US$37 million in
direct benefits associated with reduced treatment costs of Chagas' disease patients and
another US$82 million in indirect benefits associated with foregone output saved\. The net
present value of these benefits was US$50 million, which correspond to an internal
economic rate of return (IERR) of 164 percent (Table 9b)\.
Schistosomiasis\. The project is estimated to have prevented at least 3,400
schistosomiasis deaths, which translates into 67,000 DALYs saved\. With an investment of
11
about US$65 million the component is estimated to have cost US$980 per DALY saved,
which puts it among the moderately good cost-effective interventions\. The project saved a
total of US$6 million in direct benefits associated with reduced treatment costs of
schistosomiasis patients and another US$87 million in indirect benefits associated with
foregone output saved\. The net present value of these benefits was US$18 million, which
correspond to an internal economic rate of return (IERR) of 56 percent (Table 9b)\.
Leshmaniasis\. The project is estimated to have prevented 770 cases of kala-azar,
and avoided 11,300 deaths, which translates into 380,000 DALYs gained\. With an
investment of about US$53 million, the component costed about US$140 per DALY saved,
which places it among the most cost-effective public health programs\. This analysis has to
be read with caution\. For lack of a better model, the cost effectiveness analysis uses a
general epidemic model to estimate the expected number of cases and deaths, one which
assumes that the disease exists in an endemic state, that epidemics occur every ten years,
and that incidence increases with every successive epidemic\. The model is robust for many
epidemics, but may be speculative for leishmaniasis, given the general lack of
understanding about the epidemiology of the disease\. The project saved a total of US$260
million in direct benefits associated with reduced treatment costs leishmaniasis patients and
another US$494 million in indirect benefits associated with foregone output saved\. The net
present value of these benefits was US$302 million, which correspond to an internal
economic rate of return (IERR) of over 2,000 percent (Table 9\.b)\. The main reason for the
relatively high estimates for the net present value of the component, and the consequently
elevated rates of return, is that the deaths by kala-azar occur in very young children
causing a loss of 30 to 35 DALYs per death, and deaths to the sequelae of Chagas, for
example, occur at roughly 45 years of age, with an associated loss of about 20 years\.
Additionally, the DALYs gained due to Chagas' prevention are spread over 20 years in
the past and roughly another 25 to 35 years into the future, thus the effects of the discount
factor (3% for the DALYs) are much more pronounced than in the case of kala-azar
where the majority of the deaths averted are attributable to the period of the project and
not in the distant future\.
G\. FUTURE OPERATIONS
Environmental and demographic conditions in the Northeast, i\.e\., poor household
and environmental sanitary conditions, and the strong migration in and out of the region,
will continue to favor the occurrence of communicable diseases which are endemic in the
area\. State and municipal capacity to control such diseases has greatly improved, but is still
weak in many places\. Some states and municipalities, such as Minas Gerais, Bahia,
Pemambuco, and Ceara, are now able to take more responsibility for communicable disease
control than before, but other states such as Alagoas will continue to need strong assistance
from the federal level, i\.e\., from the National Health Foundation\. Bank support for a
follow-up communicable disease control operation is thus justifiable\. Such a follow-up
operation will probably (a) have broader objectives (i\.e\., include the control of
12
communicable diseases which cause a heavier burden of death and disability, which may
vary by State, and allow for quick response to unexpected epidemics); (b) include demand-
driven components to finance state and municipal communicable disease control
subprojects; and (c) have an institutional development component to (i) strengthen the
capacity of weaker states and municipalities, and (ii) assist in restructuring the National
Health Foundation, from a federal vertical program organization toward a mostly
regulatory, monitoring and technical assistance agency\.
More broadly, conditions for future operations in the health sector are good\.
Political, economic, institutional, and managerial conditions have improved significantly,
and the country is much more capable of carrying out social programs with objectivity and
efficiency\. With better-trained human resources and improved management capability
achieved through this project and other health-related Bank projects, future health
operations in Brazil should be implemented with fewer obstacles and in less time\. Future
operations in the health sector, including those in the area of communicable disease control,
should include efforts towards the decentralization and municipalization of health care
activities through the SUS\.
H\. KEY LESSONS LEARNED
Through the experience gained during project implementation the following are the
key lessons learned:
(a) Chagas' disease: (i) the severity of the disease seems to be associated with
reinfection\. When the program manages to eliminate the Triatoma from the household, the
level of reinfection of patients decreases and the clinical course of the already infected
person is more benign; (ii) it is possible to interrupt vector transmission with rigorous
application of residual insecticides, on the basis of careful epidemiological stratification by
municipalities and by community; (iii) the preferred vector, Triatoma infestans, is strictly
domestic and does not become peridomiciliary; as a corollary, the vector can be eradicated
through house improvements and targeted application of insecticides;
(b) Schistosomiasis: (i) early diagnosis and vigorous treatment can reduce the
severity of the disease; (ii) it is very difficult to completely eliminate low-grade
transmission by means of diagnosis and treatment alone; eradication of the disease requires
long-term solutions, including better home and environmental sanitation; (iii) adding the
treatment of schistosomiasis to intestinal deworming in school health programs increases
the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the program;
(c) Leishmaniasis: (i) the severity of kala-azar is closely associated with
malnutrition; (ii) the new immunology-based, on the spot, diagnostic test for canine
leishmaniasis (TRALD) is a valid and efficient alternative to the traditional diagnostic
method; it allows immediate elimination of infected dogs which are the natural reservoir of
13
human disease; (iii) well-defined standard treatment protocols, training of health care
personnel and supply of appropriate antimonials can control the spread of a serious kala-
azar epidemic and reduce the severity and fatality of cases;
(d) Management contracts, performance indicators, monitoring, supervision,
and evaluation are crucial to successful project implementation\. There is also a need for
further decentralized management and accountability;
(e) Competent and stable project management is necessary for continuity of the
project in a changing political environment\. In the early 1990s political appointees in a
volatile political environment almost brought the project to a halt;
(f) Government commitment is key for the project\. States with more committed
governors were more successful than others\. At the Federal level, strong support by the
Health Minister between 1993 and 1995 accelerated project implementation;
(g) Training and other forms of institutional strengthening should be
implemented at least at the same pace as investments in civil works and equipment;
(h) Flexible project design and interpretation of the Loan Agreement are
necessary so that projects can be adapted to new environmental and political realities which
may arise during the long period of project implementation;
(i) The Unified Health System (SUS) can play an important role in endemic
disease control at two levels: first, by reimbursing health promotion and disease prevention
activities carried out by municipalities, states and the National Health Foundation; and
second, by providing early diagnosis and prompt treatment endemic diseases through the
public and health care provider network contracted with the SUS; and
(j) UN specialized agencies such as PAHO/WHO and UNDP can offer
valuable technical assistance and facilitate project implementation in the areas of
procurement and contracting\.
14
PART II: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
Table 1: Summary of Assessments
A\. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible NotApplicable
Macro policies E li x
Sector policies x a El
Financial objectives O O O x
Institutional development x El Ol El
Physical objectives x O O O
Poverty reduction O x O O
Gender issues l O O x
Other social objectives O x O E
Environmental objectives O x O O
Public sector management x Oi O
Private sector development E l O x
B\. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikelv Uncertain
x n °
C\. Bank Performance Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficie
Identification n x g
Preparation assistance x O O
Appraisal 0 x Oi
Supervision x Oi E]
D\. Boffower Performance Highly Satisfactory SatisfacoI Deficient
Preparation El x g
Implementation X after 93 a X before 93
Covenant compliance x O C
Operation n x 0
Highly Highly
E\. Assessment of Outcome Satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
x x
Disease Institutional 0
control development
15
Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits
Loan/ Year of
Credit Title Purpose Approval Status
Preceding operations:
Loan 2061-BR To improve the health status of Rond6nia's increasing 1981 Closed
Northwest Region Integrated population with malaria control, extension of basic 6130/88
Development Program - Health services, training of health workers and operational
research\.
Loan 2448-BR To improve the Government's ability to address a 1984 Closed
National Health Policy Studies variety of health needs through strengthening policy 12/31/89
formation\.
Loan 2447-BR To improve the health status in five main target areas 1984 Closed
Sao Paulo Basic Health Care and nine health districts in Greater Sao Paulo and 6/30/92
improve the cost-effectiveness of health services
delivery within Greater Sao Paulo\.
Loan 2699-BR
NE Basic Health I To improve the health status of 3\.6 million small 1986 Closed
farmers and other poor people living in specific areas 12/31/95
of the states of Minas Gerais, Bahia, Rio Grande do
Norte, and Piaui\.
Following operations:
Loan 3072-BR
Amazon Basin Malaria Control To reduce malaria transmission in Amazonia and 1989 Closed
prevent its reintroduction to areas now under control\. 6/30/96
Loan 3135-BR
NE Basic Health II To strengthen basic health services in selected low- 1989 Closing
income areas of the Northeast and to reinforce Date
implementation of sectoral reforms, including the 12/31/97
decentralization of financial resources and
administrative authority within the NE states\.
Loan 3659-BR
AIDS & STD Control To strengthen AIDS and STD prevention and services, 1993 Closing
and build up institutional capacity for AIDS and STD Date
control at the Federal and State levels\. 6/30/98
Loan 4047-BR
Health Sector Reform To improve the delivery of care under the Unified 1996 Closing
Health System (SUS), which is the sole source of Date
publicly subsidized care for the poor\. 12/31/00
16
Table 3: Project Timetable
Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Actual Date
Identification April 1985 April 1985
Preparation June 1986 June 1986
Appraisal June 1987 June 1987
Negotiations November 1987 November 1987
Board Presentation February 1988 March 1988
Signing April 1988 June 1988
Effectiveness September 1988 December 1988
Midterm Review May 1993
Project Completion June 1993 December 1995
Loan Closing December 1993 June 1996
Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual
(US$ million)
FY 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Appraisal Estimate 8\.0 24\.5 50\.0 76\.0 98\.0 109\.0 -- -- --
Actual -- 8\.0 11\.5 24\.8 33\.4 37\.0 48\.9 67\.0 77\.9
Actual as % of 33 23 33 34 34 60' 82 95'
Estimate
l US$27 million was canceled from the original loan amount of US$109 million; the percentage therefore was based
on the revised loan amount of US$82 million\.
17
Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation
Indicators Actual Date Accomplished
PMU organization and staffing September 1988
Accounting systems and procedures A substantial review of the financial
management, accounting and audit
aspects of the project was carried out in
August 1989\.
Annual action plan First plan received in December 1988
Financial Project Monitoring Manual March 1989
Project Implementation Manual June 1989
Annual progress report First report received in March 1990
Midterm review of the project May 1993
Scientific meeting to discuss and December 1995
disseminate results of operational
research funded under the project\.
18
Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation
I\. Key Operating Indicators in SAR Estimated Actual
1 \. Average number of houses sprayed/trip 6 to 15 6 to 15
2\. Daily average of houses sprayed/guard 2 to 5 2 to 5
3\. Daily average of stool tests processed/laboratory technician 200 200
4\. Daily average of treatments administered/guard 15 to 30 15 to 30
5\. Average number of dogs tested/trip 30 to 60 30 to 60
6\. Daily average of household visits/guard 15 to 30 15 to 30
7\. Monthly average of dogs eliminated/No\. tested positive 90% 90%
8\. Average cost per case diagnosed NA NA
9\. Average cost per case treated NA NA
10\. Average cost per death averted NA US$7,611
11\. Average cost per DALY saved NA US$271
19
Table 7: Studies Included in Project
Study
1\. Comparative study of the use of Glucantime, Pentamidine and Aminosidine
in the treatment of primary skin lesions caused by Leishmania braziliensis\.
Philip Marsden\. Tropical Medicine Unit, Universtity of Brasiilia
2\. Evaluation of the Direct Aglutination Test for the serologic diagnosis of
visceral leishmaniasis in the State of Para\. Fernando T\. Silveira\. Instituto
Evandro Chagas/National Health Foundation
3\. Use of imumologic parameters for the evaluation of schistosomiasis and
Chagas' disease surveillance and control programs\. Sumie H\. Shimizu\. Sao
Paulo Institute of Tropical Medicine\.
4\. Evaluation of the Direct Aglutination Test for the serologic diagnosis of
visceral leishmaniosis in the State of Ceara\. Hermenio Lima Filho\. Federal
Unity of Ceara\.
5\. Impact of rapid reservoir elimination in the reduction of the prevalence of
canine kala-azar in the Rio Curu Valley\. Marcus D\.M\. Braga\. Tropical Medicine
Unit/Federal University of Ceara\.
6\. Chagas' disease morbidity and potential control in two areas in NE Brazil\.
Jose R\. Coura\. Fundacao Oswaldo Cruz\.
7\. American Tegumentar Leishmaniasis in the State of Maranhao\. Clinical and
epidemiologic characteristics\. Comparison between the systemic and lesional use
of antimonial drugs in the treatment of skin lesions\. Jackson M\. L\. Costa\.
Federal Universtity of Maranhio Medical School\.
8\. Eficacy of Chagas' Disease Control\. Case-control study\. Carlos M\. F\.
Antunes and Mariangela Carneiro\. Federal University of Minas Gerais
9\. Chagas' Disease hospital morbidity in Brazil\. Susete B\. Franca\. Community
Medicine and Nutrition Unit, NESCON, Federal University of Minas Gerais\.
IO1\. Schistosomiasis morbidity in Queixadinha, Cari, Minas Gerais\. Federal
1University of Minas Gerais Medical School
I11\. Medical care for Chagas' disease patients in the Unified Health System\.
Proposal for evaluation\. Eliane D\. Gontijo\. Federal University of Minas Gerais\.
12\. Integrated research and development of American Tegumentar
Leishmaniasis in the State of Sao Paulo\. Jose E\. Tolenzano\. Adolfo Lutz
Institute\. Sao Paulo State Health Secretariat
13\. Leishmania donovani FML\. A new tool for the diagnosis and control of
blood transfusions and for the development of vaccines against kala-azar\.
Clarissa B\.P\. de Souza\. Federal University of Rio de Janeiro\.
14\. Evaluation of recombinant leishmania proteins for the development of
vaccines and diagnosis of kala-azar\. Ronaldo A\. do Amaral\. Federal University
of Rio Grande do Norte\.
20
15\. Clinical and epidemiological study of schistosomiasis in irrigation areas in
NE Brazil\. Amaury D\. Coutinho\. Funda,ao Oswaldo Cruz/Pemambuco\.
16\. Production of fluorescein marked antibodies for the imunofluorescence-
based diagnosis of kala-azar\. Sinval P\. Brandao\. Funda,cao Oswaldo
Cruz/Pernambuco
17\. Ecology of lesihmaniasis vector sandlies in Bahia State\. Italo Sherlock\.
Funda,ao Oswaldo Cruz/Bahia
18\. Epidemiology of kala-azar in Novo Mundo, Piaui\. Carlos H\. Neri Costa\.
Federal Universtity of Piaui\.
19\. Epidemiology of acute Chagas' disease cases in the Sao Luis Island,
Maranhao\. Triatoma rubrofasciata as the probable vector\. Sebastiao A\. S\.
Valente\. National Health Foundation/Maranhao\.
20\. Use of PCR in the evaluation of the impact of specific treatment for
Tripanosoma cruzi\. Mariane M\. A\. Stefani\. Federal University of Goias\.
21 Vaccination against visceral leishmaniasis and against muco-cutaneous
canine leishmaniasis with semi-defined antigen from Leishmania braziliensis\.
Mauro Marzochi\. Funda,ao Oswaldo Cruz\.
22\. Evaluation of DOT-ELISA recombinant test for the laboratorial diagnosis of
canine kala-azar\. Ronaldo Amaral\. Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte\.
21
Table 8A: Project Costs
Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual (US$M)
Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Costs Costs Costs Costs
I\. Control/Prevention of 83\.0 73\.5 156\.5 64\.6 60\.6 125\.2
Transmission
II\. Community Mobilization 7\.7 2\.9 10\.6 3\.3 2\.8 6\.1
III\. Operational Research 1\.3 \.0\.2 1\.5 0\.9 0 3 1\.2
IV\. Institutional Development 20\.2 3\.6 23\.8 10\.8 13\.3 24\.1
V\. Control & Prevention of 6\.1 1\.6 7\.7 2\.4 5\.0 7\.4
AIDS
TOTAL BASE COST 118\.3 81\.8 200\.1 82\.0 82\.0 164\.0
Physical Contingencies 6\.5 4\.7 11\.2 - - -
Price Contingencies 3\.8 2\.9 6\.7 - - -
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS 128\.62 89\.4 218\.0 82\.0 82\.0 164\.0
Table 8B: Project Financing
Appraisal Estimate (USSM) Actual (US$M)
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Federal Government 109\.0 -- 109\.0 82\.0 82\.0
IBRD 19\.6 89\.4 109\.0 82\.0 82\.0
TOTAL 128\.6 89\.4 218\.0 82\.0 82\.0 164\.0
2 Excludes taxes of US$9\.4 million equivalent\.
22
Table 9a: Cost Effectiveness Analysis Summary\. 1988-1996
Endemic Disease Control Costs Program Project
Chagas'Disease US$516\.7 million US$23 million
Schistosomiasis US$140\.2 million US$65\.3 million
Leishmaniasis US$95\.2 million US$52\.5 million
Total US$140\.8 million
Endemic Disease Control Effectiveness
Chagas' Disease
No of cases prevented 277,000 12,500
No of deaths prevented 85,000 3,800
No of DALYs saved 1\.6 million 72,900
Schistosomiasis
No of cases prevented
No of deaths prevented 7,300 3,400
No of DALYs saved 143,000 67,000
Leishmaniasis (kala-azar only)
No of cases prevented 1,400 770
No of deaths prevented 20,500 11,300
No of DALYs saved 690,000 380,000
Total No\. of deaths saved 112,800 18,500
Total No\. of DALYs saved 2,433,000 519,900
Endemic Disease Control Cost-effectiveness
Chagas'disease US$315 US$315
Schistosomiasis US$980 US$980
Leishmaniasis (kala-azar only) US$139 US$139
Average cost/DALY saved US$558
Note: Chagas' Disease Control Program analysis covers 1975 to 1995\.
Schistosomiasis and Leishmaniasis Control Program analysis covers 1988 to 1996\.
The cost figures are all converted into 1996 U\.S\. Dollars\. A three percent
discount rate was applied for each year into the past and, in the case of benefits, into the
future\. Effectiveness was measured in terms of burden of disease prevented, in disability
adjusted life years -- DALYs\.
The impact of the project is assumed to be proportional to part of the program
investment financed under the project\. The estimate is conservative, as the project added
value to the traditional ongoing program, by bringing in many of the program innovations,
on both the technical and the managerial sides\.
23
The impact of the Leishmaniasis control subcomponent counts only the benefits
associated with reducing incidence and mortality of kala-azar\. It does not account for the
possible impact of the project on cutaneous leishmaniosis, nor does it include the benefits
accrued from adding the rabies control to the subcomponent\.
Table 9 b: Cost-benefit Analysis Summary\. 1988-1996
(US$ million)
Investment/Cost Program Project
Chagas' disease
Total investment 517 23
Present value 503 16
Schistosomiasis
Total investment 141 65
Present Value 100 47
Leishmaniasis
Total investment 95 53
Present value 66 36
Total Project Investment 753 141
Total Project Present Value 668 99
Benefits
Chagas ' disease
Direct cost savings 828 37
Indirect cost savings 2119 82
Benefits, present value 1557 66
Net benefit, present value, (NPV) 1054 50
Schistosomiasis
Direct cost savings 12 6
Indirect cost savings 187 87
Benefits, present value 139 65
Net benefit, present value, (NPV) 39 18
Leishmaniasis
Direct cost savings 472 260
Indirect cost savings 897 494
Benefits, present value 615 339
Net benefit, present value, (NPV) 550 302
Total Project Benefits
Direct cost savings 839 20
Indirect cost savings 3203 663
Benefits, present value 2310 469
Net benefit, present value, (NPV) 1642 371
Internal Economic Rate of Return (IERR) 89 535
The estimated quantitative benefits generated from the project are based on the
observed reduction in morbidity and mortality in Brazil over the period 1988 to 1996\.
The estimated reductions over the period of evaluation were converted into quantitative
benefits in terms of a reduction in the demand for health services and a reduction in the
burden of disease\. The estimates for the reduction in the demand for health care services
24
are evaluated based on the observed estimates of demand for ambulatory and hospital
level services, in terms of frequency of utilization and cost per incident\. Reductions in
the burden of disease are based on an analysis of the total Disability Adjusted Life Years
(DALYs) saved due to the reduction in morbidity and mortality\. The reduction in the
burden of disease is then translated into economic benefits by attaching the value of the
average minimum yearly salary to each DALY, and discounting the stream of benefits
using a discount rate of eight percent (8%)\.
There are two reasons for selecting an 8% discount rate, a little lower than would
be appropriate for a private investment project\. First, the highly redistributional nature of
the project, demonstrated by a high proportion of the target population in the lowest tiers
of the income distribution\. Second, the public goods nature of the investment provides
justification for a discount rate different from the discount rate traditionally assumed for
investments where the output is a private consumption good\.
In order to determine the total Net Present Value of the project, and to calculate
the observed rate of return, the benefits are then weighed against the investment costs of
the project, both during the period 1988-1996 and, in the case of Chagas', over the period
1975 to 1996\.
The analysis assumes a distribution of the estimated benefits between the program
and the NE Endemic Disease Control Project that is roughly proportional to the share of
expenditure attributable to the project relative to the overall program, the distribution of
direct and indirect benefits over the period of evaluation\.
Total project benefits were determined by converting the total DALYs saved and
the reduction in health care services utilization into monetary terms\. The cost estimates
used to determine monetary benefits related to reductions in the utilization undoubtedly
underestimate the total economic value of the project given the fact that the estimates
consider only the direct costs to the health care system\. Indirect costs, such as savings in
time and transport costs, time costs for family members who look after the patient, and
time and money costs of preventive action taken by households and the community are
not considered in the present analysis due to a lack of data\.
The analysis of the Chagas' disease program spans a period of 21 years, from
1975 to 1996, due to the chronic nature of the disease and the protracted period of
evolution\. The respective project benefits and costs are prorated for the years of project
implementation\.
25
Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants
Original Revised
L\.A\. Covenant Fulfillment Fulfillment
Section Type Status Date Date Description of Covenant Comments
3\.01(a) 5 C Carry out project through Complied with\.
SUCAM/NHF with due
diligence and efficiency\.
3\.01 (b) 10 C Write Convenio with States\. Complied with\.
Write Termo Aditivo to the
Convenio with FIOCRUZ
regarding the research
component\. Write Termo
Aditivo to Convenio with
PAHO\.
3\.01c/d 10 C Not assign, amend, abrogate, or Complied with\.
waive convenio without Bank
authorization\.
3\.01(e) 5 C Hire staff required for project Complied with\.
execution, directly or through
States or Municipalities\.
3\.01(f) 5 C Ensure that project manager is Complied with\.
acceptable to the Bank\.
3\.02 10 C Procurement and hiring of Complied with\.
consultants according to Bank
procedures\.
3\.03 10 C Complete a KAP survey Complied with\.
regarding endemic diseases in
the target States\.
4\.01(b) I C Have records and accounts for Complied with\.
each fiscal year audited by
independent auditors acceptable
to the Bank\.
26
Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements
[ N\.A\.
Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs (SW, Actual)
Stage FY
Tota
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 1
Preparation 9\.0 80\. 4\.2 93\.5
3
Appraisal 12\.7 12\.7
Negotiations 7\.3 7\.3
Supervision 2\.6 14\.7 18\.5 13\.0 14\.0 9\.6 13\.6 7\.2 93\.2
Mid-Term Review 16\. 16\.7
I'TOTAL T9;\. 8 2 16'8 t \.A'T*' W 7 _tA *1_
27
Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions
Performnance Rating'
*I
Days in Specialized
Stage of Project Cycle Month/ No\. of Field Staff Skills Impl\. Devt\.
Year Persons Represented Status Objs\. Types of Problems
Identification 3/85 4 12 PH, 0
Preparation 6/86 2 14 PH
9/86 7 12 PH, O, L
12/86 4 12 PH, P, F,
3/87 7 18 PH, P, M, 0,
l ~~~~~~~~~~~~~F
Appraisal 6/87 4 8 PH, P, 0, L,
PLW** 4/88 5 6 PH, P, L, D,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ F _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __F
Supervision:
I 8/88 1 5 PH 1 1
II 2/89 1 17 PH 1
III 8/89 2 12 PH, IC I 1
8/89 1 7 F
IV 3/90 1 12 PH, TD I I
V 10/90 2 11 PH, E 2 1 M, F
VI 4/91 1 14 PH 2 1 M
VII 10/91 1 12 PH 2 1 M
VIII 5/92 2 14 PH 3 1 M, L
IX 12/92 2 12 PH 2 2 M, PR, F
X 5/93 4 11 PH, ED 2 2 M, PR
(Mid-Term Review)
XI 12/93 2 14 PH, ED 3 2 L, M, F, PR,
XII 7/94 3 12 PH, MS, ED S S F
XIII 2/95 3 12 PH, ED, MS S S F, PR
IX 4/96 1 7 PH HS HS
Completion I I_I_ I
* D = Disbursement specialist; E = economist; ED = endemic disease specialist;
F = financial analyst; IC = IEC specialist; L = legal; M = management specialist; MS = malaria specialist;
0 = operations specialist; P = procurement specialist; PH = public health specialist; TD = tropical diseases
specialist\.
** PLW = Project Launch Workshop
'Ratings: I/HS = minor problems 2/S = moderate problems; 3 = serious problems\.
2Types of Problems: L = legal; M = management performance; F = availability of finds; PR = procurement\.
28
Table 14: Documents in Project File
1\. Projeto de Controle de Doencas Endemicas no Nordeste -- PCDEN\. Acordo de
Emprestimo No 2931\. Borrower/Government project completion report
2\. AnAlise de Custo-Efetividade do Componente de Doenca de Chagas no PCDEN, by
Dariush Akhavan, November 1996\. Cost-effectiveness analysis of Chagas' Disease
component\.
3\. AnAlise de Custo-Efetividade do Componente de Esquistosomose no PCDEN, by
Dariush Akhavan, November 1996\. Cost-effectiveness analysis of schistosomiasis
component\.
4\. Analise de Custo-Efetividade do Componente de Leishmaniose no PCDEN, by
Dariush Akhavan, November 1996\. Cost-effectiveness analysis of leishmaniasis
component\.
5\. Cost-benefit Analysis of the Brazil Northeast Endemic Disease Control Project, by
James Cercone, May 1997\.
6\. Borrower's comments on the implementation completion report\.
I
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IMAGING
Report No\.: 16694
Type: ICR
| APPROVAL
|
P002019
| Document of
The World Bank
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY
Rqrt No\. 5936
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
NIGERIA: FOURTH POWER PROJECT
(LOAN 847-UNI)
November 22, 1985
Operations Evaluation Department
This decamedt lbw a -estricted distrilem mayO be age bY reciplmis oNlY la the Peforaande Of
their allela ducles Incdel maW me adwerwise be diselend wihtod Werld Bank asbhtleaon\.
FOR OMFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT PERFOEMANCE AUDIT REPORT
NIGERIA: FOURTR POWER PROJECT
(LOAN 847-UNI)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No\.
Preface \.
Basic Data Sheet \. III
Evaluation Suamary \. \. v
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
I\. PROJECT SUMMARY \. 1
II\. SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS \. 9
Distribution Planning and Expansion \. 11
Rehabilitation and Development Program \. 12
Self-reliance \.eo\. *\. 13
Institutional Reforms: Accountability and
Autonomy \.0\.0 \. 18
Inter-agency Coordination \. 19
Staff Morale and Incentive Package \. 20
Sustainability of Power Supply Industry
and Facilities \.o\.e\.e\.e\.s 20
III\. CONCLUSIONS \. 21
Annex Table 1 - 4 \. 23
Appendix I - Comments from NEPA \. 27
Appendix II - Comments from the Co-financier (CIDA) \. 30
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
1\. Introduction \. \. 32
2\. Project Preparation and Appraisal \.********** 33
3\. Project Implementation \. 37
4\. Operating Performance \. \. 48
5\. Financial Performance \. 48
6\. Institutional Performance and Development \. 49
7\. Project Justification \. 51
8\. Bank Performance \. 53
9\. Conclusions 0\.6000\.60060\.00\.00\.0\. 54
Thidocument hs a trded ditribuioU ad amy be ud by socipleets only in the perforMsge of
thdew offici duti\. Its contents may not otherwis be disclosd without Word Bak atherladi\.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
Page No\.
ANNEXES:
1\. Estimated and Actual Project Costs \. 56
2\. Economic Justification \. \. \. \. 57
3\. Schedule of Supervision Missions \. 61
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
NIGERIA: FOURTH POWER PROJECT
(LOAN 847-UNI)
PREFACE
This report presents the results of a performance audit of the
Fourth Power Project (Loan 847-UNI)\. The Bank provided a US$76\.0 million
loan, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), a US$ 0\.9
million grant\. Tae loan was made to the National Electric Power Authority
(NEPA) and was fully disbursed on April 25, 1980 and closed by June 30, 1980\.
This report consists of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum
(PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and a Project
Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office\.
The PCR was prepared by a consultant who reviewed Bank reports,
project records and files\. He also prepared a detailed PCR for NEPA\. The
PPAM is based on similar sources,1/ including the two PCRs prepared by NEPA
and the Bank, and a three-week OED mission to Nigeria\. In reviewing the
generation, transmission, and distribution components, the audit mission
visited Kainji, Jebba, Ilorin, Oshogbo, Kano, Yola, Egbin and Lagos\. Many
adjoining towns and villages were also visited including: New Bussa,
Erinile-Offa, Bacita, Okinni village, Igbaye, Bichi, Dawakin-Tofa, Gaya, and
Wudil\. In addition to meeting NEPA's field staff, several residential,
commercial and industrial consumers and potential customers were
interviewed\. The mission is grateful for the assistance provided to it by
NEPA\.
The PCR has examined the performance under the project with some
emphasis on financial and institutional development\. While reviewing these
issues, the audit has considered the project's economic justification and the
sector's need for reform and rehabilitation measures, including:
(a) distribution planning and expansion;
(b) rehabilitation and development program;
(c) self-reliance;
1/ Appraisal Report No\. PU-98, June 1972; President's Report No\. P-1108,
June 1972; the Loan and Guarantee Agreements, June 1972; correspondence
with the borrower, supervision mission reports, and internal Bank
memoranda on the project issues contained in the Bank files; country
economic memoranda, sector reports, and several studies by consultants\.
(d) institutional reforms: accountability and autonomy;
(e) inter-agency coordination;
(f) staff morale and incentive package; and
(g) sustainability of power supply industry and facilities\.
Following normal OED procedures, copies of the draft report were
sent to the country and the co-financier for comments\. Comments received
have been reproduced in Appendices I and II and referred to in the audit
report\.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET
NIGERIA: FOURTH POWER PROJECT
(LOAN 847-UNI)
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal Actual
Total Project Cost (million US$) 126 178
Cost Overrun () - 34
Loan Amount (million US$) 76\.0 76\.0
Date Physical Components Completed 9/77 5/81
Proportion completed original completion
date (%) - 75
Economic Rate of Return
- Kainji Extension (%) 23 /a
- 1972-78 Program (n\.a\.) 7a
Financial Performance (min\.) 8% return 5% return /b
Institutional Performance - below expectations
OTHER PROJECT DATA
Original Revisions Actual
Plan
First mention in files 1969
Government application 1971
Negotiations 5/72
Board Approval 6/29/72
Loan Agreement Date 6/30/72
Effectiveness Date 6/26/73
Closing Date 12/31/77 12/31/78 6/30/80 /c
12/31/79
Borrower: National Electric Power Authority (NEPA)
Guarantor: Federal Republic of Nigeria
Fiscal year of Borrower: ending March 31 (until 1980)
Follow-on Projects:
(1) Lagos Distribution Project (Power V)
(2) Power Transmission and Distr\. Project (Power VI)
Loan Numbers: (1) : 1766 -UNI (2) : 2085 - UNI
Amounts: (1) : US$100 million (2) : US$100 million
Loan Agreement dates: (1) : 2/19/80 (2) : 6/23/82
/a Because of the present underutilization of capacity no meaningful rate
of return can be estimated\.
/b Non-revalued asset base, PPAM, Annex Table 2\.
/c Final disbursement was on 04/25/80\.
MISSION DATA
Month/ No\. of No\. of No\. of Date of
Item Year weeks Persons manweeks Report
Pre-appraisal 3-4/71 2 2 3
Pre-appraisal 10/71 2 2 4
Appraisal 1-2/72 5 3 15 6/16/72
9 22
Supervision I 12/72 2 3 5 1/09/73
Supervision II 11-12/73 3 2 4 1/18/74 and
3/29/74
Supervision III 6/74 1 1 1 7/03/75
Supervision IV 2/75 1 2 2 3/07/75
Supervision V 5/77 2 1 2 6/15/77
Supervision VI 1/78 1 1 1 2/23/78
Supervision VII * 6/78 1 1 1 6/28/78
Supervision VIII * 8/78 1 1 1 9/22/78
* In connection with pre-appraisal of Lagos Distribution Project\.
-v-
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT
NIGERIA: FOURTH POWER PROJECT
(LOAN 847-UNI)
EVALUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
The Fourth Power project (Loan 847-UNI) was the Bank's first loan
to the newly established National Electricity Power Authority (NEPA)\. The
project bad generation, transmission and distribution components, including:
two generating units (200 MW total capacity) at Kainji; a second 330 kV
transmission line (420 km) from Kainji to Lagos; the expansion of distribu-
tion networks and the establishment of new service centers in over 80 cities
and towns; a study of power development strategy; and technical assistance to
NEPA\. The Bank provided a US$76\.0 million loan, and CIDA, a US$0\.9 million
grant\. The Bank loan was closed on June 30, 1980\. The project was
physically completed in May 1981\.
Objectives
Since NEPA was a new organization, the project supported it with
technical and financial assistance to meet the country's growing requirements
for electrical energy\. It was also intended to help sustain the Authority's
efforts in developing and reforming its management, system planning,
operation, finances, and training program (PCR, para\. 2\.11)\.
Implementation Experience
Technically, the project was a success\. The 34% overall increase
in project cost is mainly caused by distribution subprojects which had
considerably expanded in scope (PPAM, para\. 20)\. These subprojects also
experienced considerable time-overruns (5-36 months)\. On the whole, however,
the time overruns are in line with similar experiences in several major oil
exporting countries\.
NEPA considers the performance of consultants, contractors, and
equipment manufacturers to have been generally satisfactory\. Further, after
clearing some initial misapprehensions, no significant procurement problem
arose during the implementation phase (PCR, paras\. 3\.17-3\.20)\. The Bank
experienced some difficulty in getting timely government approval for sending
supervision missions (PCR, para\. 8\.03)\.
- vi -
Results
An "investment that is quickly used to full capacity should have a
high return" in Nigeria (PCR, para\. 7\.08)\. This is because the country is
populous and large, with rich natural resources, requiring, in the medium-
term, most of the additional supply capability created under the project,
provided that the electricity supply industry is operated efficiently, the
system reliability improves significantly, and the distribution network
expands rapidly\. Without major reforms these objectives cannot be realized
and the project's economic rate of return would be negative\. Because of
water deficiency in dry periods, the additional generating capacity installed
at Kainji is underutilized, and owing to maintenance/repair problems and
other institutional weaknesses the expansion of the transmission grids has
yet to yield appreciable gains in overall system reliability and efficiency\.
Also, this project followed a strategy of providing electricity from the
national grid in areas where the market for power is highly underdeveloped
(forward linkage strategy)\. Such a development policy is hard to justify,
unless: the reliability of electricity supply improves markedly, the size of
captive market (auto-generators) sags spontaneously in response to cheaper
and better public supplies, the system losses fall from over 30% to a
reasonable level (12-14%), and the distribution networks in existing centers
expand considerably (PPAM, para\. 13)\.
Financial agreements, under the project, constitute a sound basis
for a good financial management system\. The rate of return covenant could
not be achieved\. Compliance, which was possible, would have required an
average of 50% additional tariff increase in the period 1974-80 and a
doubling of NEPA's rates in 1983\. Moreover, the Anthority and the Bank have
yet to agree on a methodology to revalue assets (PPAM, para\. 23)\.
NEPA's overall performance should be viewed in the light of:
institutional development in a conglomerate society where the emphasis is on
integration of diverse cultural groups even within parastatals; the oil
syndrome, creating severe imbalances in the economy; and geographical
disparity in income distribution (PPA14, paras\. 32-34)\. These macro-problems
have affected, for example: the staff's career development, which has not
been solely based on individual performance or merit; supplies of spares,
skills and natural gas; and the Authority's investment decisions, often
reflecting socio-political rather than economic objectives\.
Sustainability
Sustainability depends on NEPA's self-reliance, accountability, and
autonomy\. Self-reliance has human-resource, know-how, and financial dimen-
sions\. To secure it NEPA needs to develop a well-administered training
program\. But so far it has disregarded the need for supportive Nigerian
counterparts\. This indifference to training requirements cannot be remedied
by the external funding of expatriate teams\. The Bank must make the
establishment of such a training program a key provision of its future loan
covenants (PPAM, para\. 49)\. In addition, the Authority must increase inter-
nal savings through a series of measures\. A substantial increase in tariffs,
- vii -
although necessary, is insufficient\. Any tariff increase needs to be accom-
panied with significant improvement in system efficiency\. Self-reliance also
requires that the Government gradually eliminate fuel price and interest rate
subsidies\. Once achieved, it would make NEPA accountable and help secure its
autonomy (PPAM, para\. 63)\.
Findings and Lessons
Field visits in areas served by the project (PPAM, para\. 35)
provided good evidence of hurdles impeding full utilization of capacity
created under the project\. The visits confirm:
(a) NEPA's impressive physical assets, largely underutilized and in
need of maintenance/repair;
(b) the economy's great dependence on auto-generators, emphasizing the
existence of a large potential market, and the need for reliable
and least-cost public supplies; and
(c) a weak distribution network, the task of its rehabilitation and
rapid extension posing the most severe development challenge to
NEPA's management skill and technical competence\.
If left unresolved, these problems would hamper the country's economic
development\. The reform package to rehabilitate the sector and ensure the
sustainability of power institutions and facilities is summarized in PPAM,
para\. 80\.
PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM
NIGERIA: FOURTH POWER PROJECT
(LOAN 847-UNI)
I\. PROJECT SUMMARY
1\. The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) was established in
1972 by merging the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), and the Niger
Dams Authority (NDA)\. The new organization has been mandated to maintain an
efficient, well-coordinated and cost-effective system of electricity supply
in generation, transmission and distribution facilities throughout Nigeria\.
To accomplish these objectives NEPA had to overcome formidable obstacles\.
The oil boom triggered rapid expansion of demand for electricity supply\. But
the Authority was new and had few well-trained and experienced staff to
effectively respond to the demand upsurge\.
2\. During the appraisal of the Fourth Power Project (Loan 847-UNI),
ECN and NDA prepared, with the help of the World Bank, a six-year investment
program (FY1973-78)\. The Fourth Power Project, constituting an important
part of the program, included:
- Two new generating units (100 MW capacity each) at Kainji, with
associated switchgears, a 330/132 kV substation, and reinforce-
ment of four existing substations;
- A second 330 kV transmission line (420 km\.) from Kainji to Lagos,
plus four associated substations;
- Expansion of distribution network in 43 cities, and electrification
of 41 townships;
- A study of power development strategy, including Kainji hydrology;
preparation of a long-term expansion plan; and also design and
specifications of the next generation station\. In addition, the
project envisaged management studies, and technical assistance to
NEPA\.
3\. These subprojects, reviewed in the ensuing paragraphs, became part
of a massive expansion program which went far beyond the original six-year
plan\. The extent of NEPA's investment in generation and transmission sub-
sectors can be inferred from the following statistics\. The generation capa-
city in operation expanded by about five-fold from 600 MW in 1973 to about
3,000 MW in 1985 with a further 2,300 MW under construction\.1/
1/ See footnote 5\. Further, between 1973 and 1980 the Authority
constructed 2,390 km of 330 kV lines, 2,810 km of 132 kV lines, nine 330
kV substations, and forty-seven 132 kV substations\. Currently, NEPA has
about 9,000 km of 330 kV and 132 kV lines, twenty 330 kV substations,
and eighty 132 kV substations\. Many transmission lines are lightly
loaded, supplying state population centers throughout Nigeria\.
-2-
"Whereas the Bank participated in the financing of a substantial part of
early additions, its contribution to those implemented after 1976 was small"
- Borrower's PCR, para\. 4\.06\.
4\. This impressive physical infrastructure is underutilized, and
provides an unreliable service\. The considerable increase in system losses
and the rapid groath of captive capacity2/ suggest that tbe operating effi-
ciency of the system needs to be upgraded\. Without a comprehensive sector
rehabilitation program focusing particularly on quality and extension of
service to the existing service areaa, many parts of the Fourth Power
Project, which would continue to be greatly underutilized, will not have been
justified\.
5\. The Kainj i multi-purpose dam, located on the Niger river, was
Nigeria's principal source of power supply in the early 1970s\. The power
house, at the site, was designed to accommodate 12 generators, each with 80
MW capacity\. Four of these units were installed in the 1960s with the Bank's
financial assistance\. Two Kaplan-type generators, with 200 MW aggregate
capacity, were built under the Fourth Pcwzr Project\. Another two propeller-
type units, totalling 240 MW capacity, were installed later but without Bank
assistance\.
6\. Currently, Kainji has 760 MW in installed capacity\. Of the six
units, financed by the Bank (including the Fourth Power), three were out of
service in February 1985, curtailing operable capacity to 500 MW\. Moreover,
since the stored water behind the dam was very low, not all the operable
capacity was being utilized: in February 1985, only 320 MN were being used
as base load, and 360 MW3/ as peak load\. Thus because of the drou ht, the
additional capacity, under the project, can be partially utilized\./ The
repair work on the three units, which are out of service, will probably be
completed in 1985\. Considering the possibility of long term subnormal water
inflows, NEPA needs to assess the best way of using the 1,320 NW installed in
Kainji and Jebba\.4/ Of this capacity currently about 500 NW is being
operated for meeting the base load, and 650 YW for satisfying the peak load\.
2/ Auto-generators, established mostly by the manufacturing industry,
provide for their critical needs, and are known as captive plants\.
3/ National Control Center, Oshogbo, February 26, 1985\. This assessment is
based on hydro conditions prevailing at the time of audit mission in
February 985\. Since then heavy rains have improved the hydro outlook\.
4/ The capacity at Jebba (6 x 93\.5 MW) is largely underutilized\. Since the
water release from the Kainji largely determines Jebba's generation
capacity, of the five completed units in February 1985, one or two
operated at non-peak hours and three, periodically, at peak hours
(February 26, 1985: 175 MNW base-load, and 270 MNW peak-load)\.
- 3 -
7\. After the commissioning of Egbin and Shiroro, NEPA will have over
5,300 MW5/ of installed capacity, requiring probably some 1,300 KW (30%) in
reserve margin\. For a good part of the projected reserve margin at peak
hours, the system could depend on Kainji and Jebba provided that: peak
demand expands at least twofold from the current level of 1,600-1,700 KW; the
power stations and transmission system are well-maintained, and efficiently
operated as an integrated system; they are not underutilized because of fuel
shortages, notably natural gas; and stored water behind Kainji and Jebba is
conserved to enable the full use of the reserve margin primarily as peaking
and for coping with major system failures\. It will be several years before
such a stage of development can be reached and the installation of the two
generators under the project be vindicated\.
8\. Given the potential use of Kainji station for purposes of reserve
margin, the selection of Kaplan-type units over the propeller-type generators
has probably been wise\. This is because the Kaplan units can be operated
flexibly, much below capacity if necessary\. In contrast, the propeller-type
units must operate near full capacity\. A comparison of the two in Kainji, in
terms of water usage per unit of energy generation, provides no conclusive
evidence that one type enjoys a decisive operating cost advantage over the
other\. The ability to use units below capacity would be handy when supplies
are to be tailored, at the margin, to the size of additional loads because of
unexpected system outages\.
9\. The construction of a second 330 kV line from Kainji to Lagos was
envisioned by project consultants in 1964\. The line was to be completed when
the peak demand of the interconnected grid had reached 1,200 MNW\. But the
first line proved less relidble than NDA and consultants had assumed\. This
was because numerous savanna fires in the area proved to be serious, disrupt-
ing supplies\. For improving reliability, the Government advanced the comple-
Clon of the second line by three years and this became a part of the Fourth
Power Project\.
10\. In addition, Nigeria has constructed a third 330 kV line from Jebba
to Oshogbo, providing a transmission capability far beyond what can currently
be generated at Kainji, Jebba or even later from Shiroro\. Yet, as noted in
5/ Kainji 760 MW Delta 312 MW
Jebba 560 MW Egbin 1,320 MW
Shiroro 600 MW Others 70 MW
Sapele 1,030 MW
Afam 660 MW Total 5,312 MW
For the short, and possibly medium-term, NEPA's system will be energy
constrained because of low water level at Kainji and fuel supply limita-
tions affecting Egbin\. Further, because of foreign exchange shortage
and excess power capacity, installation of generators on Shiroro Dam,
which has been completed, was deferred\. Therefore, effective capacity
utilization would be gradual\.
the PPAM, para\. 3, the infrastructure for a reliable electric supply industry
has been put in place\. They must be maintained well and operated effici-
ently\. Because of maintenance problems, weakness elsewhere in the system,
and unmanageable fires, the fast growth of the transmission network did not
improve reliability\. Almost every manufacturing firm and medium and large-
sized commercial establishment must have auto-generators\. These sets are
being used frequently and have replicated a major part of public investment
in the electricity supply industry\.
11\. The distribution program, accounting for two-thirds of the proj-
ect's actual cost, constituted the core of the Fourth Power\. The program
included: reinforcement of the facilities in Lagos, and ten major towns;
interconnection of some of these centers by 132 kV line, and the electri-
fication of adjoining townships; extension of electricity to 73 towns,
mostly through 132 kV lines, and also construction or reinforcement of
distribution facilities at these centers\. PPAM, Annex lable 1 summarizes the
scope of distribution program\.
12\. The extension of NEPA's service to power consumers has followed a
forward, rather than a backward linkage strategy\. Many utility companies in
developing nations have first developed their markets and distribution facil-
ities, and after sufficient growth in loads to justify linkage to the
national grid\. transmission lines were extended to such centers\. But NEPA
has, in most ca3es, extended its transmission and sub-transmission lines to
towns with inade\.qua:e distribution facilities\. This is true of, fc\.% example,
most of the 73 towns electrified under the Fourth Power Project\. Also, the
330 kV super grids have been extended to fairly small load ceaers like
Gombe, and Birnin Kebbi\.
13\. SAR states6/ "no detailed analysis has been made to determine
whether, at the opportunity cost of capital, it would be cheaper in present
worth, to connect the townships to the Kainji rather than to generate power
locally by small captive generating units\. There are, however, strong rea-
sons in judgment to believe that connection tc the network is the most econo-
mic solution; incremental cost of Kainji power is very low, and due to high
transp3rtation costs, poor maintenance, and small unit size, captive diesel
power generation is very expensive\." This strategy has been costly\. NEPA's
insta\.:1-d geaerating capacity, albeit eiecgy-constrainid (see foc;note 5),
has so far a devEliped market for less than 1,700 M4 peak capacity\. This
discrepency between distribution system End supply f\.?cilities is also in
evidence at the transmission and subtransmission luvels\. Morcover, the
attainable reliability at the generation and transmission levels is unmatched
at the distribution end\. This is because, except for the Lagos market the
Nigerian distribution networks are radial rather than ring systems\. The
advantage of a ring over a radial system stems from the possibility of pro-
viding power to the coasumer from both ends of a loop, but of course at extra
cost\. The lack of reliability at the distribution level hinders efforts to
6/ SAR, Report Uo\. PU-98, Annex 9, para\. 2\.
- 5 -
diminish dependence on the captive power plants\. Therefore, unless system
reliability greatly improves, the available capacity is better utilized, and
the captive market sags spontaneously as cheaper NEPA power becomes avail-
able, the forward linkage strategy of the Fourth Power Project would be hard
to justify\.
14\. Nevertheless, NEPA displaced its own diesel generators in most
places that were connected to the national grid\. These sets were later rein-
stalled in isolated load centers, although in some major towns, (for example,
Maiduguri and Kaduna) they were left to operate as standbys\.
15\. An additional benefit was the Authority's expanding distribution
networks, which have been serving an increasing number of customers:
1973 1975 1978 1979 1980
Number of connections, 338 438 708 829
of which residential (265) (353) (590) (694)
(in '000)
Energy sales, 1,752 2,343 3,571 4,178 4,006
of which residential (633) (895) (1,496) (2,082)
(in GWh)
NEPA's generation and 2,108 2,906 4,592 6,500
power purchases (in GWh)
Actual systems losses 16\.9 19\.4 22\.2 38\.4
as % of generation
SAR's projection of 19\.5 18\.5 17\.0 16\.0
system losses
Source: Borrower's PCR, paras\. 4\.11-4\.12\.
16\. During the 1973-79 period NEPA's customers increased 16% a year and
its sales 15% a year\. In the year 1980 system losses reached a peak of
38\.4%, probably because of large unmetered consumption, resulting from "the
substantial tariff increase of early FY 1980" - Borrower's PCR, para\. 4\.13\.
System losses continue to be inordinately high\.
17\. NEPA prepared a power system development plan under the Fourth
Power Project in 1976\. In addition to the completion of Sapele gas-fired
steam plant (720 MW), the plan called for the construction of hydropower
plants at Shiroro Gorge (600 MW) on the Kaduna river, and at Jebba (540 KW)
on the Niger river\. Moreover, in reviewing the Niger river hydrology in
November 1972, the consultant recommended the installation of at least four
more units in addition to the generators partially funded by the World Bank
- 6 -
(Borrower's PCR, para\. 3\.81)\. Sapele and Jebba schemes, and the Shiroro dam
have already been completed\. Generators have yet to be installed in Shiroro,
and Jebba is short of one generating set\. Two additional propeller-type
units have also been installed at Kainji (PPAM, para\. 5)\.
18\. The only Bank project item qualifying as management study was the
valuation of NEPA's assets as of April 1, 1972\. Since then asset additions
in the balance sheets are at cost\. NEPA has desisted from any further asset
revaluation and has turned down revaluation methods proposed by the Bank\.
19\. According to the SAR, the cost of the Fourth Power Project was
estimated at $126\.0 million, of which $76\.9 million was in foreign exchange
(SAR, para\. 4\.05)\. The Bank funded $76\.0 million of the foreign exchange
cost and CIDA the balance ($0\.9 million)\. Of the Bank loan, $73\.0 million
(96%) was disbursed by mid-1977, six months before the original closing
date\. Three more years were needed for disbursing the balance ($3\.0 mil-
lion)\. The loan was closed on June 30, 1980\.
20\. The slow disbursement of the last $3\.0 million reflects the long
delays experienced by several distribution schemes\. Otherwise, the Kainji
extension and the completion of the second 330 kV transmission line fell 6-11
months behind the original schedule\. Together, the cost of generation and
transmission components were 4-1/2 Z less than the SAR estimate\. The follow-
ing table presents the project's time and cost overruns:
Cost Overrun (% of SAR Estimate) Project
Time over- Foreign Composition
run (in Local Exchange Total (%)
months) Cost Cost Cost SAR Actual
Kainji extension 6-11 17 (-) 12 (-) 6 17 12
Reinforcement of
330 kV substations 20 100 17 40 3 3
Second 330 kV line 6 9 (-) 20 (-) 10 20 14
Distribution schemes 5-36 53 82 68 53 66
Power development
studies - (-) 20 (-) 25 C-) 23 4 2
Management studies - - 32 22 3 3
40 31 34 100 100
Source: Borrower's PCR
The actual cost and the completion dates of many distribution schemes cannot
be compared with those in the SAR, because in most cases their scope had been
significantly modified\. Given that Nigeria experienced significant price/
- 7 -
cost7/ increases and operated under severe constraints, such as port conges-
tion and skill shortages, the time and cost overruns are in line with similar
experiences in several other major oil exporting LDCs over the same period\.
21\. Financial agreements with NEPA, under the Fourth Power Project,
form a sound basis for a good financial management system\. The covenants
require: (a) prompt valuation of assets; (b) at least an 8% rate of return on
revalued assets; (c) methods of valuation and revaluation acceptable to the
Bank; and (d) proper and timely audit of NEPA's accounts and financial
statements by independent firms acceptable to the Bank and submission of the
audited accounts to the Bank not later than four months after the end of each
fiscal year\.
22\. The fixed assets of ECN and NDA, which were merged to form NEPA,
were evaluated as of April 1, 1972 (Borrower's PCR, para\. 5\.13)\. Since 1972,
however, the Authority's assets are presented in terms of their historical
values\.
23\. The Bank and NEPA have yet to agree on a revaluation method\.8/
The SARs on the Fifth and the Sixth Power Projects present possible revalua-
tion methods\.9/ PPAM Annex Table 2 illustrates the difference in NEPA's
financial performance under a non-revalued and revalued asset base\.
24\. The table shows that NEPA could not generate enough revenue to
satisfy the rate of return covenant\. Compliance with the terms of agreement
would have required a tariff increase of about 50% during the 1974-80 period
and about 100% in 1983\.
25\. Although tariffs increased greatly in 1979, the gap between the
prevailing and the required rates has widened\. Because of heavy investments,
still in the pipeline, the required rate increase will be more than 100%\.
This assessment is reflected in the spread between the rates of growth of
work in progress (WIP) and of net fixed assets in operation (NFA)\. As a
proportion of NFA, WIP increased from 6% in 1973 to 98% in 1983; its annual
growth rate being 56% during the ten-year period\. In contrast, NFA increased
16\.9% a year and power sales 13\.4% a year over the same period\. Further, in
the absence of significant financial assistance from the Federal Government,
the divergence between the WIP and the NFA growth rates would signal signifi-
cant cash flow problems\.
71 17% p\.a\. in domestic market and 11% p\.a\. in foreign markets over the
1972-80 period\. In contrast to the actual price escalation, the SAR had
allowed for 3% annual rate of price increases (SAR, para\. 4\.05)\.
8/ See NEPA's comments and OED notes, Appendix I, p\. 3\.
91 Report No\. 2502-UNI, October 1, 1979, Annex 7\.01, p\.3; Report
No\. 3041-UNI, September 10, 1981, Annexes 6\.06-6\.09\.
- 8 -
26\. NEPA's cash flow position is also aggravated by a large accumula-
tion of unpaid bills\. The audit mission's field visits confirm the existence
of serious administrative problems, already recognized by the Authority's
Enquiry Committee on billing and collection:10/ meter readers often esti-
mate electricity bills without reading the meters for several months\. This
negligence is encouraged by not providing close supervision and control, and
by not paying for the full cost of meter readers' visits\. Further, the
unpaid bills pile up for several months\. As they grow so does the prospect
of disconnections ending in permanent defaults\.
27\. As regards the timeliness of NEPA's audited accounts, the auditing
of the 1982 financial statement is still incomplete\.11/
28\. NEPA had little difficulty with procurement under international
competitive bidding (ICB)\. Some problems arose at the outset, since a sub-
stantial part of the procurement had begun before conclusion of the loan
agreement\. Also, NEPA's staff were relatively inexperienced in following ICB
guidelines\. Provisions, such as alternative finance clause in tenders, did
not help either\. The Bank's 1973 supervision mission focused, therefore, on
clarification of the ICB procedures, and resolution of the pending issues\.
No significant procurement problems arose thereafter\. The Bank supervision
missions were not readily welcome, however\. The PCR states that these mis-
sions visited Nigeria at unusually long intervals (PCR, para\. 8\.03), chiefly
because of delays in obtaining Government approval to such missions\. Cur-
rently, mission visits are cleared satisfactorily by the Government and NEPA\.
29\. NEPA used consultants for the Kainji extension, the transmission
project, the distribution program, the Kainji hydrology, and studies concern-
ing management and power sector studies\. NEPA considers their performance
satisfactory\. However, the Authority considers the failure of some auger-
bored pile foundation along the Kainji-Lagos transmission line a result of
faulty design rather than of deficient construction method (PCR, para\. 3\.30)\.
30\. Also the contractors and equipment manufacturers generally per-
formed well\. There was -only one instance of a contractor not fulfilling his
obligations and forcing NEPA to complete installation with its own workforce-
- PCR, para\. 3\.32\.
31\. No major difficulty arose in the commissioning of Kainji extension
and transmission systems\. One of the generators, commissioned in February
1976, ran without major interruption for six years, but was severely damaged
10/ The Enquiry Committee, established in May 1984, was to examine the
billing and collection procedure and recommend measures for correct
billings and expeditioas collections\. The Committee issued its report
in November 1984\.
11/ See NEPA's comments, Appendix I, p\. 3\.
in 1982 and has to be replaced\. NEPA is not fully satisfied with the perfor-
mance of generators (PCR, para\. 3\.36)\. As regards distribution, many systems
were overloaded nearly from the start because of the fast growth of demand
and the delay which the program had suffered" - PCR, para\. 3\.37\.
II\. SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS
32\. Despite NEPA's impressive physical assets, the Authority's past
accomplishments are open to question\. This is because of sizeable underuti-
lized capacity, high losses, lack of reliability of electricity supply,
replication of a large part of public generation by auto-generators in the
productive sector, and an inability to collect bills, establish an effective
training and maintenance/repair programs, expand rapidly distribution ser-
vices, and raise staff morale\. However, NEPA's performance needs to be
assessed in light of major constraints and problems that also apply to other
parastatals and have an adverse impact on the country's overall development
efforts\. For example, it is important to develop in Nigeria, as it is in
many other countries, a much stronger merit system whereby career development
and promotion are closely linked to individual job performance\. In addition,
a merit system should be supported by sufficient financial compensation to
permit public sector institutions to compete effectively with the private
sector, particularly at the management and higher skill levels\. Major
advances in both of these areas will be essential for improving staff morale
and for raising productivity\.
33\. The "oil syndrome" poses another problem in Nigeria\. The experi-
ence of most oil-rich LDCs and Nigeria points to the difficulty of implement-
ing a least-cost, balanced, and cost-effective program in an economic envi-
ronment, severely constrained by manpower and institutional weaknesses, and
by physical bottlenecks\. Rich windfall gains from petroleum exports encour-
aged an easing of financial and economic disciplines\. Abundant foreign
exchange income had shifted the development strategy towards the acquisition
and construction of physical assets\. Human resource and institutional devel-
opment as well as upgrading the quality of service have generally received
scant attention\. NEPA's future growth strategyl2/ must, therefore, focus on
neglected areas, especially: institutional and human resource development;
expansion of the distribution services; balanced and cost-effective program-
ming; and improved coordination within NEPA and with outside agencies\.
12/ The two follow-on projects have primarily focused on improving Lagos
distribution system (Power V), the rehabilitation and expansion of the
distribution network to 23 cities, and the construction of the Egbin
interconnection line to the existing 330 kV grid (Power VI)\. Because of
NEPA's needs for repair and rehabilitation of generation and transmis-
sion facilities, the 23 cities distribution system originally envisaged
in the Sixth Power Project was replaced by a rehabilitation program in
September 1984\.
- 10 -
34\. A third difficulty, exacerbated by the oil boom, is about NEPA's
investment decisions, particularly concerning new transmission lines\. In the
past, these decisions often reflected socio-political objectives, which led
to, for example, the extension of power lines to areas before markets could
be established\. These investments were frequently unaccompanied by an ade-
quate provision of distribution facilities\. Nevertheless, the audit finds
that NEPA has succeeded in building supply infrastructures and the backbone
of a sound distribution network\.
35\. For assessing performance under the Fourth Power project, the audit
mission visited several sub-project sites\. Since the project is sectoral in
scope, comprising generation, transmission/subtransmission facilities, and
some 73 distribution networks, these visits have provided the perspective for
improving the utilization of facilities, created under the project, and rein-
forcing their economic justification\. The visits confirm:
(a) NEPA's impressive physical assets, largely underutilized and in
need of maintenance/repair;
(b) the economy's great dependence on auto-generators, emphasizing the
existence of a large potential market, and the need for reliable
and least-cost supplies; and
(c) a weak distribution network, the task of its rehabilitation and
rapid extension posing the most severe development challenge to
NEPA's management skill and technical competence\.
These problems, if left unresolved, would prevent the restructuring of the
electricity supply industry into a dynamic and sustainable sector capable of
supporting the country's economic activities\. The ensuing themes, emanating
from field visits and discussion with Nigerian officials, concern:
(a) distribution planning, and rapid expansion of service network
necessary for tapping excess capacity in other parts of the system;
(b) rehabilitation and development program concentrating on: mainte-
nance/repair, de-bottlenecking, curtailment of system losses,
upgrading service reliability and the quality of supply, and prepa-
ration of a least-cost expansioa program;
(c) measures supportive of NEPA's effort at self-reliance in human
resource development and finance;
(d) institutional changes to underpin the Authority's accountability
and autonomy;
(e) inter-agency coordination, notably with the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and Rural Electrification Boards
(REB); and
- 11 -
(f) promotion of staff morale, through administrative reforms and
introduction of an incentive package for NEPA's employees\.
The following paragraphs review these issues\.
36\. Distribution Planning and Expansion\. Despite massive investment in
generation and transmission sub-sectors, the distribution networks are in a
rudimentary stageL3/ of development\. Still, 85-90% of Nigerians are without
electricity supply, and the quality of service to those who are connected is
poor\. Although the rehabilitation of generation and transmission lines
requires considerable skill (PPAM, paras\. 41-47), the extension of a well-
managed distribution network is more difficult and time-consuming\. Also, the
lack of reliable socio-economic information necessary for service expansion
renders efforts at a detailed analysis of demand and potential beneficiaries
largely futile\. The following table compares recent efforts in this area:
SALES PROJECTIONS
(TWh)/a
Forecasts by: 1987 1992
A\. NEPA, Jan\. 1985 7\.6 12\.4
B\. Consultants, Aug\. 1984
1\. Global
- low 16\.0 26\.8
- medium 16\.5 28\.5
- high 17\.7 32\.2
2\. Semi-Global 11\.5 16\.7
/a Tera (T) = one trillion\.
37\. The growth of demand for public power supply is largely constrained
by NEPA's inability to generate enough energy, extend service network, and
improve the quality of supply\. For example, electricity sales suffer because
of the limited availability of uninterruptible power, shortages of trans-
formers, meters, poles, etc\., and a pervasive lack of interest, at local
levels, in the potential beneficiaries\. Middlemen and private contractors
often intervene to provide connection and internal wiring services, many of
them defrauding potential consumers\. In brief, NEPA has yet to develop and
promote a connection and internal-wiring package that could be provided inex-
pensively and at a competitive price\.
13/ NEPA's network is quite extensive, comprising: 50,000 km\. of overhead
lines, 4,000 km\. of underground cables, and over 9,000 transformers\.
But many distribution systems are in poor condition, because of
inadequate maintenance and/or lack of spare parts\.
- 12 -
38\. Demand projections need to be based on a detailed analysis of
socio-economic conditions in each district, with a focus on the demand of
productive establishments in manufacturing, agriculture and tertiary sec-
tors\. During its field visits the audit mission was struck by the absence of
information\. Even in important population centers, key socio-economic data
are unavailable\. In addition, the Authority must develop its own rural elec-
trification (RE) data-base and program\. Currently, for electrification pur-
poses, many large population centers are classified as rural\. Quite a few of
them are also located in the proximity of subtransmission lines, awaiting
service\.
39\. Advance preparation for the extension of distribution networks is,
therefore, essential\. Expatriate consultants cannot remedy the weakness,
since they also must have access to key socio-economic information, based on
local surveys\. Distribution planning must, therefore, be introduced at the
Authority's central office and at the 22 district headquarters\.
40\. Although a few REPA managers recognize the importance of distribu-
tion planning, the requisite competence is absent at almost all levels\. In
the districts the planning competence can probably be established under the
district engineer\. But the capability, once developed, needs to be protected
against day-to-day operational assignments that could deflect the planning
staff from their main objectives\. The team must also receive active techni-
cal and monitoring support from the NEPA headquarters\.
41\. Rehabilitation and Development Program\. Maintenance/repair jobs
are more than a prioritized series of physical wears and tears, and defects
that need correction\. A diagnostic team of expatriate consultants have
already identified maintenance and repair works\. But the main task remains:
the establishment of a maintenance and repair function within NEPA as an
organized and effective operation\. Therefore, while rehabilitating the
existing facilities, NEPA needs to strengthen its maintenance/repair unit,
develop skills and the strategy necessary for an effective and continuous
maintenance operation, and acquire spare parts in advance, making them read-
ily available for planned maintenance and unforeseen outages\.
42\. More specifically, a considerable portion of the generation
capacity (about 1,000 MW) is currently inoperative because of the unavail-
ability of essential spare parts\. Morever, de-bottlenecking efforts need to
focus on removing specific shortages in spare parts, skills and gas sup-
plies\. Foreign exchange limitations have caused prolonged delays in obtain-
ing supplies\. The establishment of an annual foreign exchange currency bud-
get for the import of maintenance equipment and spare parts would mitigate
supply availability\. The level of funds necessary for such imports should be
based on an independent assessment of the Authority's requirement for a com-
prehensive and effective maintenance and repair program\. Moreover, the acute
shortage of skills has impaired maintenance/repair work\. The commissioning
of Egbin thermal station, sharply escalating the need for technicians, is
expected to exert added pressure on the supply of scarce skills\. Also,
inadequate gas supply, beyond NEPA's control, has curtailed power production
- 13 -
in Afam\. More seriously, delays in building the Escravos-Lagos gas transmis-
sion line will severely restrict supplies from Egbin for a few years\.
43\. As for the transmission grids, a comprehensive maintenance manage-
ment system needs to be introduced, focusing on the establishment of targets,
reporting systems, and audits\. The Transmission Division within NEPA needs
to be strengthened for setting standards, monitoring equipment use, and pro-
gramming maintenance/repair works\. Even in the distribution sub-sector reha-
bilitation should take precedence over extension\. A key area, meriting con-
siderable attention, is the elimination of transmission and distribution (T &
D) losses\. NEPA's objective should be to pare down the loss rate from over
30% to a reasonable level (say 12-14%)\. Causes of the high loss could be
overloading, poor maintenance, and unauthorized usages\. NEPA must precisely
identify the cause, work out an action program to lower the loss rate, and
establish a strong monitoring system to promptly accomplish the loss reduc-
tion objective\.
44\. In addition, NEPA needs to maintain an inventory of essential dis-
tribution equipment for undertaking a planned maintenance program\. Cur-
rently, the Authority is seriously short of distribution transformers in many
areas, resulting in load shedding and insufficient use of overhead facili-
ties\.
45\. Maintenance/repair works would, no doubt, upgrade the quality of
service\. System rehabilitation must, however, be followed by a least-cost
expansion program\. As discussed elsewhere (PPAM, para\. 36), distribution
networks should expand rapidly so as to ensure a more effective use of excess
generation and transmission capacity\. They must also be converted, where
possible, into cost-effective ring systems\.
46\. Given the excess capacity in generation and transmission sub-
sectors, NEPA has enough time for the preparation of the next phase of an
expansion program\. In addition to natural gas and petroleum, Nigeria has
been endowed with considerable hydro-energy resources\. Although the Kainji
and Jebba projects have cast doubts on the advantage to be gained from this
potential, a balanced development program should encompass a continuing study
of the country's hydro-resources, particularly small-scale schemes which
could be supportive of a decentralized system of power supplies and supplies
to remote areas\. The emphasis must, however, be on cost-effectiveness\.
47\. Self-reliance\. A sound self-reliance policy must be based on:
(a) the development of a good technical staff, expertise, and know-how;
and
(b) the generation of sufficient internal savings to fund NEPA's debt
service, a good slice of investment outlays and removal of interest
rate and fuel subsidies\.
- 14 -
48\. Human Resource Development\.14/ The Nigerian education system
turns out graduates of acceptable quality for the Authority's operation\.
However, NEPA is unable to attract, train, and retain a sufficient number of
graduates because of intense competition from other sectors for high quality
cadre\. Since 1976 the Authority is required to pay civil service salary
scales, which are unattractive\. The private sector has been employing a good
part of NEPA's experienced staff\. Although because of the recent downturn in
the Nigerian economy the severity of competition for skills from the private
sector has diminished, the private manufacturing sector still depends appre-
ciably on expatriate staff for high professional, technical, and administra-
tive tasks\. Some of these slots can be filled by NEPA employees\. A 1981
study5/ shows the basic salaries in the comparator organizations to be, on
average, 80-100% more than in NEPA\. Therefore, these firms continue to
attract qualified staff from NEPA\.
49\. The Fourth Power Project had no training component\. The Nigerian
Government and NEPA had already concluded an agreement with a foreign con-
sulting team in 1973, seeking assistance in management and training during
the initial years of the Authority's operation\. The contract with the con-
sulting team was for 1,200 man-months of services\. The head of the team
functioned as Assistant General Manager, an adviser to the General Manager,
and Chief of the Corporate Planning Division\. The team's main emphasis was
on training\. They also helped introduce management tools and methods in
various areas\. NEPA's management was, however, "somewhot disappointed at
rather low level of communication and thus of know-how transfer achieved
between the team and the higher echelon of NEPA- Borrower's PCR, para\.
6\.03\. But NEPA had also undertaken to appoint Nigerian counterparts to work
with the team, and did not do so\. When the team left Nigeria, the Author-
ity's training program suffered\. Under the Fifth Power Project, the Bank
undertook to finance the work of another team (312 man-months)\. NEPA has,
again, disregarded the need for supportive Nigerian counterparts and as the
team will be completing its term by the end of 1985 no well-organized group
will be left to assume the function\. This indifference to training require-
ments cannot be remedied by external funding of the expatriate teams alone\.
NEPA must display a keen appreciation of the importance of organizing an
effective program by establishing a competent Nigerian team and supportive
facilities, designed to meet the Authority's considerable skill require-
ments\. The Bank should make the establishment of such a training program a
key provision of covenants for any future loan, and then provide suitable
matching funds to supplement NEPA's own efforts\.
50\. The Authority is currently short of top professional staff, both
technical and administrative\. Although it has enough employees at the middle
level (the artisan group), comprising roughly 30% of the work-force, they are
14/ See NEPA's comments, Appendix I, p\. 2\.
15/ NEPA, Salary Structure and Conditions of Service, from Final Report of a
Consultant, September 1981\.
- 15 -
insufficiently trained\. This is because the artisan group receive inadequate
in-service training and work supervision from the limited number of profes-
sionals\. A 1982 study reveals that on many of the lines and substations wor\.
standards were poor\. This has been partly because of the artisans' lack of
knowledge or skill and more importantly because of lack of site supervision
and discipline\. The study recommends that considerable improvement might
result by introducing an experienced foreman/instructor linesman into each
district\. Further, new thermal stations at Afam, Sapele, and Egbin have been
and are being established\. Although equipment manufacturers have helped to
train some of the required operators, these stations are short of qualified
skills\. In brief, four priority training fields merit attention\. They con-
cern: the professional class; the artisan group; the cadre needed for new
fields; and the team of planners for preparation and monitoring of expansion
programs\. Such a program needs to be closely monitored and periodically
evaluated so that the right type of staff receive training; the program
develops skills effectively; and possible abuses of the system are minimized\.
51\. After completing a few years of apprenticeship, NEPA's professional
and engineering staff, numbering over 700, qualify for overseas training\.
This does not mean that all professionals need to be sent abroad\. The
program is desirable for at least three reasons: to acquire technical
knowledge in new fields (for example for managing and operating efficiently
Sapele, Afam, and Egbin stations); to expose staff to system maintenance,
management and operation in other countries; and to improve staff morale\.
Because of foieign exchange limitations, NEPA has de-emphasized its overseas
training program\. Every year, at least 10% of NEPA's senior staff need to
receive advanced training in foreign utility companies and similar centers\.
The investment should help curtail system inefficiency, upgrade staff morale,
and reduce dependence on foreign consulting services\. Overseas training will
not be enough, however\. The 1982 study, referred to earlier, indicates
severe shortages of qualified engineering staff at principal and senior
engineering levels where a large number of positions are vacant\. Even if
sufficient graduates join NEPA, a large training program will be required for
them in Nigeria\.
52\. The NEPA staff belonging to the artisan class exceed 8,000\. They
are craftsmen, operation and maintenance technicians, with a variety of
skills\. They constitute the bulk of the Authority's technical field staff\.
Each year, about 20% of this group need to be trained and retrained\. The
existing training centers at Ijora and Kainji, and the supportive Nigerian
staff, are woefully inadequate for this task\. The Authority needs new
training centers at Afam, Kaduna, and Jos\. Also operation and maintenance
training for steam power generation at Egbin and Sapele must be established
and reinforced\. An effective training program for the artisan group must be
prepared, involving: the determination of training requirements of each
district for specific skills, reflecting the trainee's job performance and
know-how; the preparation of suitable curricula with the help of consultants;
the training and retention of a core of skillful Nigerian teachers; suitable
accommodation for trainees coming from remote areas; and the periodic
evaluation of the program's effectiveness\.
- 16 -
53\. In addition, NEPA needs to train a team of planners for Lagos and
district centers to program rehabilitation and expansion work (PPAM, paras\.
38-40), and to monitor and evaluate progress\. The training program should
instruct trainees how to prepare a least-cost expansion program, and how they
should collect and analyze key socio-economic information needed for arriving
at sound judgment about the system's extension to new areas\.
54\. The Authority also has over 10,000 unskilled employees, many of
them redundant16/ workers\. NEPA needs to increase the usefulness of this
group by arranging a program for skill development in the regular Nigerian
educational and training institutions throughout the country\. Incentives
must be provided to the group to acquire the necessary skills\.
55\. Interest Rate and Fuel Subsidies\. Earlier, the audit referred to
financial self-reliance (PPAM, para\. 47), which requires substantial tariff
increases, prompt collection of unpaid bills (PPAM, paras\. 21-26), improve-
ment in the system's operation and investment efficiency, and elimination of
fuel and interest rate subsidies\. Financial self-reliance is, therefore, a
complex objective\. The ensuing paragraphs (56-61) focus on the elimination
of interest rate and fuel subsidies, and on tariff adjustment\.
56\. As shown in PPAM Annex Table 4, domestic loans financed the bulk of
NEPA's investment during the period 1973-83\. "The majority of NEPA' loans
have come from the Federal Government, on soft terms\. Interelst has been at
5%, with repayment over 25 years, including a five-year moratorium in inter-
est, and a five-year grace period on principal repayments\. The effective
interest rate on such loans (allowing for the interest moratorium) has been
about 3%\.17/ But given that during 1973-83 prices in Nigeria increased
10-14% a year, Government has been subsidizing NEPA with an appreciably nega-
tive interest rate (6-9% a year)\.18/ In the power sector the persistence of
a negative real interest rate has been accompanied by an increase in unuti-
lized capacity and possibly a desire on the part of NEPA for financial gains
ensuing from investment in real resources\. An example of the gain follows:
NEPA which could have borrowed, N 100 mn in say the year 1973 would have been
committed to repay, at prevailing interest rates during the 1973-83 period N
134 an\. In contrast, the financial value of assets created by such an
16/ In several areas visited by the audit mission, NEPA's field offices had
6-7 employees\. In one instance 4 were watchmen, watching probably an
idle old machine! in another place, again, 4 were classified as
watchmen, but with hardly anything to watch\.
17/ SAR, Power VI Report No\. 3041-UNI p\. 32\.
18/ Real interest rate (r)= nominal interest rate (i), divided by inflation
rate (p): r = (1+1 )\.
-+-1
(L+4p )
- 17 -
investment would have been N 300 man\. Positive interest rates19/ need,
therefore, to be introduced for promoting economy, cost-effective investment,
financial self-reliance, and possibly institutional autonomy\.
57\. Moreover, NEPA needs to pay fuel prices'9/ which reflect their
economic opportunity cost\. Currently, high pour fuel oil used by NEPA is
greatly subsidized\.20/ Similarly, the price of gas for Egbin need to
reflect its netback value\. Already under the Gas Technical Assistance
Project, a study is expected to determine the level and the structure of
natural gas tariff\.21/ Since the long-run marginal cost of electricity
supply in Nigeria will partly depend on the price of gas, power tariffs need
to gradually reflect such costs\.
58\. Tariffs\. Power tariffs have not changed since August 1979\.22/ As
discussed elsewhere (PPAM, paras\. 24-25) the prevailing rates are insuffi-
cient to provide the sector with a reasonable rate of return and pay for the
cost of capital, which currently is negative\. The objective of tariff
adjustment should be:
(a) to secure a steady improvement, in the medium-term, in the sector's
financial performance; and
(b) to achieve, shortly after realizing the financial objective and
improving system efficiency, a tariff level reflecting the future
cost of power supply\.
59\. This dual approach in reforming the tariff system responds suitably
to the Nigerian needs, since, with the exchange rate distortion, subsidized
capital and fuel costs, the low capacity utilization and a high system loss
rate, the LRMC calculation is bound to be arbitrary\. Under the Fourth Power
Project, the consultants had studied an LRMC pricing system\. A recent
interim report presents questionable results because of several dubious
assumptions\.
60\. NEPA should develop the know-how to continue refining, in-house,
the LRMC pricing study, which needs to be based on a least-cost expansion
program for an increasingly efficient electricity supply industry\. These
191 For NEPA's comments and OED notes, see Appendix I, p\. 2\.
20/ 1\.1 kobo/liter, ex-refinery prices or about 11% of the international
cost, at official exchange rate\. See, Nigeria: Issues and Options in
the Energy Sector, UNDP/World Bank Energy Sector Assessment Program,
August 1983, p\. 132\.
21/ The President's Report on a $25 million Loan to NNPC, February 23, 1984,
Report No\. P-3620 UNI, para\. 61\.
22/ See NEPA's comments, Appendix I, p\. 1\.
- 18 -
refinements should measure the divergence between the prevailing level/
structure of rates and the LRMC tariffs\.
61\. However, the immediate focus must be on a substantial increase in
power rates, in real terms, so that an 8% financial rate of return on the
sector's revalued assets is secured at the end of a four to five year
period\. This gradual approach at securing the rate of return objective is
necessary since NEPA's investments are highly underutilized and work-in-
progress constitutes a considerable slice of the Authority's assets\. For
achieving this objective, power rates need to be adjusted quarterly by
combining23/ an index that accurately measures changes in the cost of capi-
tal goods for the electricity supply industry (CGEL Index) with another
component introducing a sustained rate of increase in tariffs, in real terms,
so as to achieve the sector's overall financial objective\. The appropriate-
ness of a sector-specific price index for capital goods stems from the need
to recover investment cost by reflecting changes in such costs in the tariff
level\.
62\. Institutional Reforms: Accountability and Autonomy\. The achieve-
ment of financial self-reliance should be accompanied with NEPA becoming
increasingly accountable and autonomous\. According to Onosonde Commission,
accountability means parastatals achieving socio-economic goals in a cost-
effective manner\. Objective criteria must, therefore, be devised for measur-
ing performance in attaining stated goals\. "The principle of cost recovery
or cost minimisation, as appropriate, must be rigorously enforced, and desir-
able rates of return on total capital employed must be prescribed by Govern-
ment\."24/ In its loan agreements with the Bank, the Government has already
stipulated for NEPA the achievement of an 8% rate of return on revalued
assets\. Therefore, the Authority's accountability can be interpreted to mean
the achievement of the 8% rate of return objective in 4-5 years, accompanied
by significant improvement in system efficiency\.
63\. Improved self-reliance and accountability should ensure greater
autonomy\. NEPA needs to enjoy an autonomous employer status within the uni-
fied grading system\.25/ Such a status would confer on it the freedom to
23/ Tariffs need to be adjusted as follows:
First quarter: A price index, reflecting quarterly changes in the cost
of capital goods, to be expressed in cedis, for the electricity supply
industry (CGEL Index) + -1 1\.10\.
Second quarter: CGEL Index\.
Third quarter: CGEL Index + V 1\.10\.
Fourth quarter: CGEL Index\.
24/ Presidential Commission on Parastatals, 1981, p\. 45\.
25/ Onosonde Commission recommended that unified grading system should be
distinguished from the unified salary system; jobs in different
parastatals should be re-evaluated to ensure that the right grade is
maintained for each job; and each organization with an autonomous
employer status should determine the pay or price for the job in
accordance with factors relevant to its operations\.
- 19 -
price job levels with reference to prevailing rates in comparator organiza-
tions in Nigeria\.
64\. In addition, NEPA needs institutional autonomy\. That means the
Government and the supervising ministry would determine broad sectoral objec-
tives and policies, but scrupulously refrain from dictating the project con-
tent of expansion programs\. Since power projects must be least-cost and
because they support development schemes, particularly in the manufacturing
sector and need to be complemented by other investment schemes funded by
different agencies, NEPA's investment decisions should be fully explained to
the Nigerian planning and funding authorities (PPAM, para\. 67)\. Currently,
the Authority's investment decisions \. are primarily determined by
socio-political rather than economic considerations\.
65\. A series of important organizational changes within NEPA have also
been identified by the British Electricity International Limited (January
1982)\. Implementation of these recommendations would greatly streamline the
Authority's structure and help improve its performance\.
66\. Inter-agency Coordination\. Better coordination needs to be
achieved at the federal level between NEPA and the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), at the state level between NEPA and Rural
Electrification Boards (REB), and within NEPA between the Distribution
Division and Rural Electrification Department within the Commercial
Division\.26/ NEPA reports to the Ministry of Mines, Power and Steel which
is unable to provide inter-agency coordination\. For example, Egbin station
is nearing completion but NNPC's Escravos-Lagos gas pipeline has yet to be
constructed\. Thus the non-availability of gas would severely restrict the
use of Egbin's capacity\. A suitable inter-agency coordinating mechanism
should have obviated this problem\.
67\. The weakness is not remedied at the the federal level by the
Federal Ministry of National Planning (FMNP), or the Federal Ministry of
Finance (FMF)\. FMNP does not perform an effective planning function in the
energy sector\. They have little information concerning the sector\. The
energy parastatals are also not required to provide FMNP with information\.
Although FMF allocates funds in hudget review sessions to parastatals, major
decisions are made by the Economic and Finance Committee where six permanent
secretaries, including FMNP's, decide on economic questions, often prior to
any technical analysis by FMNP staff\. What is more, NEPA receives block
allocation without being subject to project by project scrutiny of its
investment program\. This lack of information concerning NEPA's operation at
the federal planning center, and the uncritical processing of its investment
program has hardly promoted institutional accountability or inter-agency
coordination, notably with NNPC and REB\.
68\. Coordination o' extension planning with REB will become increas-
ingly important as the electricity network gets extended beyond the existing
load centers\. NEPA and REB's respective roles in planning and programming
26/ See NEPA's comments, Appendix I, p\. 2\.
- 20 -
service extension to potential beneficiaries (85-90%) is ill-defined and
ambiguous\. Unless the problem is resolved, NEPA will not be able to formu-
late a comprehensive and cost-effective distribution expansion program\.
Moreover, NEPA's Rural Electrification Department need to form an RE unit
within the Distribution Division which, as argued earlier, should be equipped
to do an effective planning job (PPAM, para\. 36-39)\.
69\. Staff Morale and Incentive Package\. NEPA's staff receive modest
pay which should be reassessed in light of salaries for corresponding jobs in
the private sector (PPAM, para\. 48)\. The Authority should, however, be able
to motivate, attract and retain staff not because of high monetary rewards,
but primarily because they perceive NEPA as providing a good opportunity for
career development and as giving an incentive package focused on their basic
needs\. Elsewhere, the need for human resource and career development has
been emphasized (PPAM, paras\. 48-54)\. A good training program should be
supplemented by a work environment, where promotion and career development is
based primarily on individual performance and merit (PPAM, para\. 32)\. A
well-balanced incentive package is also necessary, including housing benefits
and mass transportation facilities to work place\. To sum up, a strong and
sustainable power sector requires an accountable but autonomous institution
that is able to attract, train and retain a highly competent technical staff,
necessary for achieving cost-effective investment and efficient operation\.
70\. Sustainability of the Power Supply Industry and Facilities \. The
audit has argued for self-reliance, accountability, and autonomy\. They cons-
titute the three pillars of a sustainable power supply industry\.
71\. Self-reliance has human-resource, know-how, and financial dimen-
sions\. To secure it NEPA needs a well-administered training program, with an
overseas content to familiarize key staff with the latest relevant develop-
ments in technology\. It must also have an important local training compo-
nent\. In addition, the Authority must increase internal savings\. A substan-
tial increase in tariffs, although necessary, is insufficient\. Any tariff
increase must be accompanied with significant improvement in system effici-
ency\. For achieving this objective, the reform measures have to include:
marked improvement in system reliability, an appreciable and spontaneous fall
in captive plant requirements, the high utilization of generation and trans-
mission capacities, a lowering of system losses from over 30% to a reasonable
level (12-14% range), the extension of distribution network, accurate bill-
ings, and the prompt collection of unpaid bills\. Self-reliance also requires
the elimination of fuel price and interest rate subsidies\. As argued in PPAR
para\. 63, self-reliance would make NEPA accountable and help secure its auto-
nomy\. However, a sector rehabilitation and development program needs to be
prepared to achieve these objectives (self-reliance, accountability and
autonomy), and ensure the sustainebility of the power sector\. Such a pro-
gram, which should be partly funded by a Bank loan, is summarized in PPAM,
para\. 80\.
- 21 -
III\. CONCLUSIONS
72\. Physically, the Fourth Power Project was successfully completed,
with distribution sub-projects greatly modified (PPAM, paras\. 5-16)\. The
unreliability of power supply, the fuel constraints and the imbalances in
system's facilities have impeded realization of the project's potential
benefits\.
73\. The generating capacity at Kainji and Jebba are underutilized,
because of water shortages\. Should the water problem persist the capacity
can still be used chiefly as peaking reserve margin, subject to certain
conditions (PPAM, para\. 7)\. Moreover, the expansion of transmission grids,
under the project, has yet to produce appreciable gains in overall system
reliability (PPAM, para\. 10)\. Also, the strategy of providing electricity
from the national network to areas where the market for power is not yet
developed cannot be justified without certain pre-conditions (PPAM, paras\.
12-13)\.
74\. Since NEPA experienced significant price escalation and operated
under severe constraints, such as port congestion A skill shortages, the
project's cost overrun is not excessive and the time overruns are in line
with similar experiences in many major oil-exporting countries (PPAM, para\.
20)\.
75\. Of the Bank loan, $73\.0 million (96%) was disbursed by mid-1977\.
Three more years were needed for disbursing the balance ($3\.0 million) -
PPAM, para\. 19\.
76\. NEPA could not satisfy the rate of return (ROR) objective\. The
covenant, which was reasonable, required an average of 50% rise in tariffs
during 1974-80, and a doubling of rates in 1983\. Because of heavy
investment, still in the pipeline, the required increase in tariffs will be
more than 100% for an 8% ROR on revalued assets in the near-term\. Moreover,
NEPA's cash flow position is aggravated by a large accumulation of unpaid
bills; its audited accounts are also considerably behind schedule (PPAM,
paras\. 21-27)\.
77\. As for implementation, NEPA considers the overall performance
of consultants, contractors and equipment manufacturers to have been
satisfactory (PPAM, paras\. 29-30)\. Further, after the clarification of
procedures under the ICB, the Authority had no serious procurement problems
(PPAM, para\. 28)\. The Kainji extension and transmission systems were
commissioned without major difficulties\. But one of the generators, which
went on stream in early 1976, was severely damaged in 1982 and the stator
winding has to be replaced (PPAM, para\. 31)\.
78\. NEPA's performance needs to be assessed in the context of major
challenges confronting Nigeria (PPAM, paras\. 32-34)\. These problems have
inevitably overshadowed the Authority's operations\. For example, staff
promotion could not be based exclusively on performance and merit\. Moreover,
the sector has been short of spare parts, skills, and gas supply, and state
- 22 -
governments have often influenced NEPA's investment decisions, reflecting
socio-political goals rather than economic objectives\.
79\. A sustainable power supply industry depends on self-reliance,
accountability, and autonomy\. Self-reliance has human-resource, know-how,
and financial dimensions\. To secure it NEPA needs to develop a well-adminis-
tered training program\. So far the Authority has disregarded the need for
supportive Nigerian counterparts\. This indifference to training requirements
cannot be remedied by the external funding of expatriate teams\. The
Authority must display a keen appreciation of the importance of organizing an
effective program by a fully competent Nigerian team\. Also, the Bank needs
to make the establishment of such a training program a key provision of any
future loan covenants (PPAM, para\. 49)\. In addition, the Authority must
increase internal savings through a series of measures\. Tariff increases
need to be accompanied by significant improvement in system efficiency\.
Self-reliance also requires that the Government eliminate gradually fuel
price and interest rate subsidies (PPAM, para\. 63)\.
80\. Field visits in areas served by the project and discussions with
Nigerian officials have shed light on major hurdles that impede improved
utilization of capacity under the project\. The reform package to remove
these obstacles and help to ensure system's sustainability include:
(a) measures to secure NEPA's self-reliance, accountability and auto-
nomy, focusing on reducing system losses, improving utilization
rate and system reliability, collectit\.g unpaid bills, adjusting
tariffs and eliminating fuel and interest rate subsidies (PPAM,
para\. 70);
(b) training of professionals, the artisan class, and the planning team
(PPAM, paras\. 48-54);
(c) distribution network rehabilitation and expansion;
(d) institutionalization of maintenance and repair functions within
NEPA (PPAM, para\. 41);
(e) establishment of an annual foreign exchange currency budget for the
import of maintenance equipment and spare parts; the level of the
fund to be based on an independent assessment of NEPA's requirement
for a comprehensive and effective maintenance/repair program (PPAM,
para\. 42);
(f) institutional reforms within NEPA for implementing the major recom-
mendations of the British Electricity International, January 1982
(PPAM, para\. 65);
(g) the institution of an effective planning system within the Federal
Ministry of Planning, and within NEPA (PPAM, paras\. 66-67); and
(h) a study of Nigeria's small hydropower potentials (PPAM, para\. 46)
in support of a more decentralized and renewable energy supply
system\.
-23- ANNEX
Table 1
DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM
UNDER THE FOURTH POWER PROJECT
Time Cost
overrun overrun
Name of the Scheme Description (in months) (Z)
1\. Lagos Metropolitan Seventeen 132/33/11 kV and
Distribution 33/11kV substations,
uprating Akangba-Maryland
overhead line from 33kV to
132 kV and 20 km of new cable 24 72
connection\.
2\. Major Towns Lower voltage switchgears at
10 substations; transformers:
seven 30 MVA 132/33 kV, three
132/33 kV, and four 15 MVA
132/11 kV\. 36 Not
Comparable
(NC)
3\. Aba-Calabar 110 km of 132 kV transmission
line\. 5-24 68-122
4\. Oshogbo-Ilorin-Akure 132 kV lines, and electrification
of 11 townships\. 6-12 NC
5\. Zaria-Funta-Gusau 132 kV lines, associated
substations, and distribution
facilities\. 13-36 NC
6\. Countrywide Electrification of 73 towns,
Electrification including: more than 500 km
Program of 132 kV lines to feed the new
systems, 33 kV lines inter-
connecting towns to the grid;
33/0\.415 kV transformers, corres-
ponding switchgears and low
voltage distribution facilities\. 14-36 NC
Source: Borrower's PCR, paras\. 3\.36-3\.79
NEPA'S ASSETS, SALES AND RATES OF RETURN
ON REVALUED AND NON-REVALUED ASSET BASE, 1973-83
(Assets in Million Nairao)
Net Fixed Rate of Return
NEPA's Grogs Net Fixed Work Total Revaluation Assets in Net Income (2)
Sales Fixed Accumulated Assets in in Fixed Index 1/ Operation, Before Non-Revalued Revalued
(CUb) Assets Depreciation Operation Progress Assets (1972-1) Revalued Interest Base Base
1973 1,750 460 132 327 18 345 118 386 17 6\.0
1974 2,020 465 149 316 34 350 157 496 15 4\.6 3\.4
1975 2,343 488 165 323 75 398 183 591 13 4\.1 2\.4
1976 2,707 518 180 338 157 495 197 666 14 4\.4 2\.2
1977 3,243 543 199 344 278 622 219 753 13 3\.7 1\.8
1978 3,571 729 201 528 395 923 248 1,309 14 3\.3 1\.4
1979 4,178 833 229 604 647 1,251 287 1\.733 22 3\.9 1\.4
1980 4,070 1,039 262 1,047 446 1,493 341 3,570 100 12\.1 3\.8
1981 5,627 1,825 369 1,456 674 2,130 374 5,445 148 11\.9 3\.2
1982 5,916 1,999 445 1,554 1,050 2,604 374 5,812 111 7\.4 2\.0
1983 6,150 2,067 528 1,559 1\.532 3,091 390 6,080 75 4\.8 1\.3
Annual
Change
(M) 13\.4 16\.3 14\.9 16\.9 56\.0 24\.5 12\.7 31\.7
1/ The International Financial Statistics (IFS) provides data on (a) the consumer price index in Nigeria,
rnd (b) import unit values for developing countries (oil importers)\. The revaluation index is derived from
the conaumer price index and the import unit value index\. Annual changes in these two indicators have been
combined at a ratio of 3565, reflecting roughly the relative dependence of capital formation in the Nigerian
electricity supply industry on the domestic and foreign sources of supplies\.
Sources Borrover's PCR, Supervision Hisasion Reports, and IFS\.
bi\.
POWER RATES AND RATE OF RETURN (ROR) COVENANT
(Revenues in Million Nairas)
Additional Net
Revenues Required
Needed for Tariff/
Actual Compliance Power Power Rates Net Revenue
Operating With the Sales (kobo/kWh) Increase
Revenues ROR Covenant Total in GWh Existing Required (%)
1974 63 20 83 2,020 3\.1 4\.1 32
1975 70 30 101 2,343 3\.0 4\.3 43
1976 83 37 120 2,707 3\.0 4\.4 47
1977 97 44 141 3,243 3\.0 4\.3 43
1978 126 68 194 3,571 3\.5 5\.4 54
1979 166 100 266 4,178 3\.9 6\.4 64
1980 264 Ill 376 4,070 6\.5 9\.2 42
1981 403 216 619 5,627 7\.2 11\.0 53
1982 426 338 764 5,916 7\.2 12\.9 79
1983 434 398 832 6,150 7\.0 13\.5 93
M
-26 - AMiEX
Table 4
CHANGE IN NEPA'S ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, 1973-83
(IN MILLION NAIRAS)
1973-76 1976-80 1980-83 Total
Assets 224 1,693 1,493 3,410
Fixed 151 998 1,597 2,746
Others 73 695 1/ (-) 104 664
Liabilities 224 1,693 1,493 3,410
Equity capital 38 139 383 560
Local loans 141 1,420 737 2,298
Foreign loans 15 15 171 201
Others 30 119 202 351
1/ Largely cash and bank baiances\.
Source: Borrower's PCR, and Supervision Mission Reports
- 27 -
COMMENTS FROM THE COUNTRY APPERDIX I
Page 1 of 3
NEPA's COMMENTS
NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWSR AUHOKITY
SL M^1~4
i\.
'epeber 20, 1?8
hir\. Y\. --atanabe,
Director\.
Operations Evaluation Lepartment,
The -vorld Bank,
I818 B ttreet, N\.W\.,
H-ashinton D\.C\. 20433,
L\. S\. A \.
Dear M'r\. V-atanabe,
PROrMT P1ROR:'lC-c ; trDIT REPORT -
FOURTH Pl\.EL PRc1C%T L3; N 847-V1Z1)
16eference your letter doted July 31, 1985, plea se find below our brief
commeants on a few issues raised in the report\. The report on the whole
seeff zit even if rather hard ots the ;uthority's overallperformance, alIven
the conditionE (socL%l and economic mainly) under which XuM- has to
render services on semi-commercial basis with its inhorent capital
Intensive Investments typical of such on Industry\. L-nlike its counternarts
In developed countries where Investments can directly be related to
revenue returns with reasonable profit rer7ina, NEP operates under rather
difficult and complex soclo-economic factors much outside Its control\.
Comment on more specific issues are appended below: OED loLas
(a) TAdff a
The last Tariff revision was in 1979\. Consideerln the inflation- NEPA's races of return
ary effects on prices in Nigeria, It Is obvious that a tariff (RORs) on revalued asset
considered reasonable In 1979 would by 1985 have become base were much lower rhan
inadequate to meet a reasonable rate of return\. Costs of t figures given In
lnade~ateborrower's comments\. Since
materials, labour have risen by at least 4 times\. Similary the i an inflationary env-
income and expenditure accounts for the years 1981 to 1984 ronment RoRs\. derived from
have been showing dwindling net profit, with the rate of return historical values, greatly
of 9\.70%\. 10\.20%, 6\.75, 4\.65 and about 41 In 1980\. 1981, distort the real financial
1982\. 198! and 1984 respectively\. This trcrd scente reflect picture, the calulatlon
the economic aeession In the country attectat most of the of such rates mst take
f~OtIfl~the revalued rather than
private sector as well\. It is therefore correct that the historical assets as theIr
Electricity Tariff need to be substantially revised to make base\. B t a
is possible for the Authority to meet at least the 8% return stipulates an OZ financial
expected by the BRD\. rate of return on revalued
assets (PPAR, par&\. 61)\.
The Authority has indeed employed the services of EDF for
a study which could result to the revision of the Electricity
taritf The report on the EDF Study is expected to be
received within a short time\. After the appraisal of the
report the Management hopes to submit its proposal ta the
Federsb wileitary Govrumoa for consideration\.
- 28 -
NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY APPENDIX I
Page 2 of 3
(b) Fuel Price\.1!um1dx!- OED Notes
Fuel price subsidy is a delibrate government policy and it Th audit sests that the
is appUicable to every sector of Nigerian economy\. The NlgerUn Government size up
report seem to suggest that NEPA should withdraw from this the extent of fuel subal-
subsidy\. It Is unrealistic to expect NEPA to reject the dies nd e1-Imiunte them
subsidy enjoyed by the Nigerlan citizens just In order to be gradually\.
autonomous\. For the purposes of comparison it will suffice
to compare NEPA with companies operating in Nigeria rather
th3a foreign companies who might have their local advantage
in terms of cost of production and cost of equipment for
which NEPA has to Import possibly at hlhly inflated costs\.
(c) Snhsidv n Interest Rate:- The audit recommads that the
Nigerian Governstent charge a
NEPA is a Government utility and its operations cannot be positive rather than a nega-
completely discociated from Government policy\. 3overnment t I r
policy often makerit mandatory for NPA to embark on projects lerin 56\.ratn (PPA
aimed at promoting social policies of Government but which should present the Government
do not necessarily fall within NEPA's priority and its financial with the cost of services for
scope\. It is therefore fair if Government subsidtses the their waidatory projet\.
Interest rate so as not to throw the burden of Jovernment A must Insist that these
policy completely on the a costs are fully recovered
frow\. the beneficiaries and/
(d) Transmission and DistrUnItion Logat
It is obvious that 30% loss rate is abnormal and unacceptable\.
The ikely sources of non-techrcal losses are beln2 identified
though they could be sail to be largely due to over-loading,
plifering, illegal connections etc\.
\.Management has already as a first step commenced on
consumer audit aimed at identifying all premises connected
to NZPA mains, so that as a second step it will ensure that
they are billed\. Other steps will then follow to achieve
Improvement In billing and debt collection\. It Is also Intended
that all power injection points will be metered so as to quantify
the losses related to a given area and assess the viability of
DIstrict ServiCe\.
(4) Manower and 1rainine Poararme:-
It is true that the Authority is short of middle and top profe-
ssional staff\. Training is equally Inadequate\. Local
traintg programme has to be exploited adequately, however\.
overseas training which exposes personnel to new ideas, and
practice In other countries will be undertaken\. However it
should be noted that with the current service conditions even
to sttract the right material for training is dilficult and worse
still the economy seem to subtly regard NEPA as a training
ground for staff of other services I
(f) Inter aency Coordination:-
As the eport has stated we have observed a few Instances
which reveal Inadequate Inter -ency Coordination\. The
Federal Military Government itself has indentiLfed this
weakness and a delibrate attempt towards Intor Agarcy
Coordination is being encouraged particulary La the next
Development Plan 1986 - G99o\.
- 29 -
NATIONAL ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY APPENDIX I
Page 3 of 3
OED Notes
(g) Audtd Accounts:-
The Accounts of 1982 has n3w been auditad but the Auditors
are yet to conclude the don estic report\. The Audit of 1993
Accounts will -e co*npleted soon\. Vigorous efforts are being
made to complte the audit of 1984 and 1985 accounts before
the end of June 1985\. so as to meet the Nigerian Government
directive\.
(h) ftvaluation of Asts:-
At present the Authority is preoccupied on rendering the audited Asset revaluation is essential
accounts promptly and uo to date\. In vieA of the arreers of for an upward revision of
accounts, It la advisable to be up to date on accounting ifs\. in an ueeding
Instead of disaipatag energy on Assets revaluation\. As operation to the power sector
soon as the accounting is up to date, about June 1986, that NEPA's assets are
It Is anticipated that the two accounts will be prepared, properly revalued and a mean-
one on historical basis and the other on the revalued ingful ROR, as recomended in
current value of asstss the audit, is enforced\.
fours sincerely\.
Originif Signed BY:
Ennr\. D\. A\. OYEYELE
EnMr\. D\. A\. Oyeyale\.
foro General p neanaeer\.
cc: *4NEP' a aCe)
cc: World Bank Resident Mission,
Plot 1309A
Karimu Kotun Street,
Victoria Island\.
ee: 44 (Fswer
Agmnce canadienne de Canadan Intemationai - 30 - APPENDIX II
dveoppemernt intemnaticnal Development Agency Page 1 of 2
u (Outec) HuO\. 0u@bc
caaa Canada
KAGG4 K1AOG4 COMENTS FROM THE CO-FINANCIER
CIDA's COMMENTS
AW-reowrce ow w
702/00126
September 24, 1985
BY COURIER
Mr\. Yokinori Watanabe
Director
Operations Evaluation Department
The World Bank
1818 H Street, N\.W\.
Washington, D\.C\. 20433
Dear Mr\. Watanabe:
Further to your letter of July 31, 1985, we have reviewed
the World Bank Project Performance Audit Report on the
Fourth Power Project in Nigeria (Loan 847-UN1) together
with the Completion Report\. We have found both papers to
be methodical and comprehensive and would like to
congratulate your Department for a successful report\.
Since the Canadian involvement in the project related
enclusively to management consultancy and tiaining, you
will understand that we have found the report's description
of training and human resources problems (paras 47-54 of
the Audit Report) to be particularly useful\. Fundamental
to the Canadian contribution in the Fourth Power (and
continuing into the Fifth Power) is the problem of a lack
of counterpart staff\. The Canadian consultants have
reportedly indicated that the number of Nigerians assigned
to them for training was well below what they could absorb,
especially during the first year of their task\. The
problem is directly related to the level of pay, benefits
and incentives available to NEPA staff\. We found that
it is impossible to impart technology, train staff and
institutionalize an efficient and self reliant organiz-tion
when staff do not exist, are too busy with other duties to
be seconded for training, or do not have the requisite
capabilities, desire or incentive\. Further, any staff
that it is possible to train under these conditions will
immediately depart to achieve improved conditions elsewhere\.
\.2
Canadra SEPZ
- 31 - APPENDIX II
Page 2 of 2
Until this problem of pay scales and other incentives can be
resolved, little meaningful progress will be made in the
essential area of modifying NEPA into an efficiently
operating, self reliant organization\. As noted in the
Report (pages 18-19) no progress on these critical items
have occured to the date of the draft\.
It is impossible to assess whether it would be feasible to
build into any financing agreement a conditionality which
could resolve this situation\. Increases in benefits as
necessary to attract and retain staff with the required
capabilities within NEPA would result in massive problems
within all other agencies of the Nigerian Government\. An
adjustment of benefits for all agencies would have a marked
effect upon the national economy\.
It appears from the report that a middle approach has been
contemplated with increased benefits becoming available
only to some essential agencies\. However, again it appears
nothing has been accomplished in this area\.
It is not feasible to stop all capital investment in electric
system development either as a lever to impress on the
Government of Nigeria the importance of this problem or
during the period it takes for the Government to agree to
institute changes\. It is however necessary to recognize
this fundamental problem in the electric sector and every
effort should be made to convince the Government of Nigeria,
and NEPA, of the absolute necessity of resolving this problem,
if an effective, efficient and self reliant utility is to be
achieved with all of the important economic and developmental
benefits which will accrue to it\.
Until such can occur, it will be necessary to continue to
include, as a condition of the funding availability, the
technical assistance of offshore specialists in all elements
of utility planning, engineering, management and operation\.
Technology transfer and training elements can begin to be
included when NEPA becomes capable of assimilating such
elements\.
The problem of local human resources continues to affect
any development activity in Nigeria\. Despite this ongoing
concern, we are pleased to note that the Bank considers the
Fourth Power Project to have been a success on the whole
and we share this assessment\.
Your sincerely,
\. a gton
Country PVogram Director
GhanalRegional Program
Anglophone Africa Branch
- 32 -
NIGERIA
FOURTH POWER PROJECT : LOAN 847-UNI
COMPLETION REPORT
1\. INTRODUCTION
1\.01 This completion report reviews the implementation and
effectiveness of the Fourth Power Project financed under US$ 76 million
Loan 847-UNI made in 1972 to the National Electric Power Authority
(NEPA)\. The project included the addition of two 100 MW units at Kainji
hydro plant, 330 kV substation facilities, a second 330 kV transmission
line from Kainji to Lagos, expansion of distribution systems, power
development studies, management studies and technical assistance\. The
report explores the background to the project, describes the
implementation of the project and the problems encountered, reviews the
project justification, and evaluates the performance of the borrower,
consultants, contractors and the Bank during project implementation\.
The Electric Power Sector
1\.02 In the early 1970's public electricity supply was the
responsibility of Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) and Niger
Dams Authority (RDA)\. Whereas ECN was developing and operating
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities throughout the
country, NDA was responsible for planning, implementing, and operating
hydropower facilities on the Niger river (i\.e\. at that time the Kainji
plant) and associated transmission facilities\. In the 1960's, the Bank
had already played a significant role in the development of the power
sector as it had assisted:
- ECN with Loan 372-UNI (1964) for US$ 30 million to finance
transmission and distribution facilities and
- NDA with Loans 383-UNI (1964) for US$ 82 million and
572-UNI (1968) for US$ 14\.5 million to help finance the
first stage of the Kainji hydropower plant\.
In spite of this assistance, both entities' management and operations
deteriorated during the second half of the 1960's and in particular
during the civil war (1967-69) which, inter alia, dramatically worsened
the utilities' shortage of competent managerial personnel\.
Context of Project
1\.03 In 1970, in order to create the basis for improving the
physical and administrative performance of the sector, Government, after
discussions with the Bank, appointed a consultant to study the power
supply industry to make recommendations on a possible merger of ECN and
- 33 -
NDA as well as on improving management\. In 1971, the consultant submitted
a report outlining a new Government owned utility to be set un by
consolidatiug ECN and NDA\. The new entity was to be provided with
strong central management superimposed on a decentralized organizational
structure\. The power sector consultant also pointed out the scarcity of
competent staff and the need for recruiting additional highly qualified
personnel for top positions\. The sector study became one of the main
foundations for both the creation of NEPA and the Bank's Fourth Power
Project in Nigeria\.
Sources for this Repoit
1\.04 This completion report is essentially based on the Borrower's
Completion Report dated May 1984 which in turn uses progress and
completion reports by the consultants for the main project items\. The
report also includes information from the Bank's supervision reports and
files concerning this project as well as the two subsequent projects,
Power V and VI (Loans 1766- and 2085-UNI)\.
2\. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
Origin and Preparation of Project
2\.01 In 1968-70, i\.e\. during the final implementation period of
Kainji hydro (first stage) and in the aftermath of the civil war, demand
growth rates were between 20 and 25% per year and at the same time
institutional deterioration of ECN and NDA became alarming\. Meanwhile,
the Bank was emphasizing economic development in Africa and a further
operation in the Nigerian power sector seemed particularly promising\.
Indeed, such a project could not only help this large sector implement
an investment program that, in view of the fast demand increase, had to
be large, but also assist in improving management and operations in the
sector\. This would also permit Nigeria to reap the full benefits of the
previous Bank operations\.
2\.02 In 1970 the Governsent agreed to have a consultant carry out the
power sector study referred to in para\. 1\.02 above\. In early 1971, before
the consultant submitted its report, the Government also agreed that
the Bank, together with the managements of ECN and NDA should start to
define the proposed project\. This essentially took place in the context
of two pre-appraisal missions the Bank carried out in March/April 1971
and in October 1971\. When the first mission took place, the sector consul-
Eaint had already reached preliminary conclusions\. During the second mis61on
the Bank team was able to discuss the final report with the Nigerian
authorities\. This led to the Government's decision to prepare the
merger of ECN and NDA into a new authority, the National Electric Power
Authority - NEPA - which was to start operations on January 1, 1972\.
- 34 -
2\.03 In the course of the pre-appraisal missions, the Bank team and
the specialists of the two utilities prepared an investment program for
NEPA's first six years of operation\. This FY73-78 plan remained
somewhat sketchy and subject to substantial uncertainty as, in the
absence of detailed and coordinated development programs for ECN and
NDA, the plan had to be based on the following rather general documents:
- the second National Development Plan,
- three consultants' reports on distribution reinforce-
ment and electrification, and
- a report on the electrification of 140 towns\.
2\.04 In January/February 1972, although Government had not yet
implemented the merger of NDA and ECN, the Bank appraised the project\.
The appraisal proved difficult due to the vagueness of the information
available, which did not permit the mission to ascertain the investment
program substantially beyond the level reached during the pre-appraisal\.
However, given the rate of load growth even more serious power shortages
undoubtedly would have occurred if the project had been delayed until
all detailed engineering studies were completed\. The available
financial data was inaccurate and out of date\. This was particularly
the case for ECN, as the last audited accounts concerned the fiscal year
ending March 31, 1970 (i\.e\. FY70) and the auditors' report qualified
them as not fully representing the company's financial position\.
2\.06 The most serious obstacle to a full project appraisal was the
Government's refusal to allow the Bank to study the legislation
concerning the creation of NEPA before its formal approval\. Only in
early May 1972, after the promulgation of Federal Decree No\. 24 (1972)
setting up NEPA as of April 1, 1972, was the Bank in a position to
ascertain that the legislation was such as to permit the Bank to
complete project appraisal\. The creation of NEPA was a requisite for
making the loan, as otherwise the Bank would have to lend to the
Government, and the Bank's Loan Committee had declined such a solution\.
2\.07 A further subject of discussion was the necessity (perceived
by the Bank) for NEPA to obtain expatriate management assistance for the
first few years of its operation\. Originally, the Bank envisaged the
appointment of three expatriates as General Manager, Assistant General
Manager Planning , and Assistant General Manager Finance as a condition
of effectiveness of the loan\. During negotiations in late May 1972 the
Bank dropped the condition that the three top managers be expatriates\.
However, it agreed with the Nigerians that loan effectiveness would be
subject to NEPA signing an agreement, satisfactory to the Bank, with a
management firm or a large public utility to provide a team of experts
to assist and train NEPA's senior staff\.
- 35 -
2\.08 During project preparation, some controversy arose in connection
with the design of the Kainii extension\. The consultants NDA had hired for
this sub-project, proposed propeller turbines as being more advantageous
than Kaplan units which had been installed in the first stage
development of the hydroplant\. Whereas the Bank agreed with the
consultants, NDA, judging that the additional flexibility provided by
Kaplan turbines was worth more than the cost difference, disagreed\.
Finally, NDA prevailed and the Bank agreed to keep the Kaplan turbines
in the Bank project\. A similar discussion occurred in connection with
the transformers for which the consultants had suggested the same
arrangement as for the existing units, i\.e\. the connection of two units
to a single transformer\. However, NDA decided to adopt the more
flexible solution assigning to each unit its own transformer\. The Bank
also concurred to this lesser change\.
2\.09 Following the October 1971 pre-appraisal mission, further
project preparation and appraisal had to be compressed into a relatively
short schedule to achieve loan signing in FY72\. Nevertheless, it seems
fair to note that, had the Bank insisted on a more detailed project
preparation, the operation would have materialized about a year later as
NEPA would have had to hire consultants to carry out at least the
distribution extension and electrification studies\. Such a delay could
have had a negative impact on the institutional development of the
sector, as the management training assistance contract could well have
been further postponed\.
2\.10 On June 30, 1972 the parties signed the documents for the
US$ 76 million Loan 847-UNI at a 7\.25% interest rate, for a term of
25 years, including a 5 1/2 year grace period\. However, almost a whole
year elapsed before loan effectiveness on June 26, 1973\.
Project Objective
2\.11 The Bank project essentially pursued three goals:
- to assist NEPA in financing and implementing a first stage
investment program;
- to help the new utility build up a management, operational,
financial, and training capability that would make it able
to operate successfully and meet the rapidly increasing
demand; and
- to support the Authority's planning of further development\.
Through the achievement of these goals the project was meant to help
provide Nigerian industry, commercial enterprises, as well as urban and
- 36 -
increasingly also rural dwellers with reasonably reliable electric
energy in the quantity required and at reasonable cost\.
Project Description
2\.12 The Bank project covered about one third of NEPA's total
planned investment for FY73 to FY78\. It included the following items:
A\. First Kainji Extension consisting of the addition of two
100 MW generating units (the fifth and sixth units in the
sequence, Nos\. 11 and 12 in the layout) and associated
switchgear, and a 330/132 kV substation at Kainji\. The
units, which were expected to be commissioned in
October 1975 and April 1976, respectively, were to bring
the installed capacity of Kainji to 520 MW\.
B\. Installation of additional transformers, capacitors,
reactors, and related switchgear at the 330 kV substations
of Akangba, Oshogbo, Onitsha\. and Kaduna\. These were to
improve the reliability of the major substations of the
system and to be completed by March 1977\.
C\. Construction of a second 330 kV transmission line, about
420 km lung, from Kainji to Lagos and extension of the
Kainji, Jebba, Oshogbo, and Akangba substations\. These
facilities, which were expected to be completed by March
1977, were aimed at increasing the reliability of the power
supply in Lagos\.
D\. Reir\.orcement of the existing distribution system in 43
cities and towns, and electrification of 41 sizeable
townships by connecting them to the Kainji grid\. The work
was to be carried out during FY72 through FY77\. They were
grouped into 10 schemes (for details see para\. 2\.02 of the
Borrower's Completion Report): Lagos, Major Towns,
Aba-Calabar, Onitsha, Oshogbo-Ilorin-Akure, Ibada\.,
Jebba-Bacita-Pategi, Zaria-Funtua-Gusau, Kano, and 15 other
towns\.
E\. Power development studies consisting of a review of the
Kainji hydrology, preparation of a long-range (15 year)
sector expansion program including feasibility studies of
the projects for development during the next phase, and
design specifications for the next generating plant\.
F\. Management studies and technical assistance\. This item,
which complemented the expected Canadian technical
assistance program, included management studies by
consultants and advisory services\.
- 37 -
2\.13 Beyond the implementation of the physical items and the
services listed above the project included the following measures:
- In consultation with the Bank, NEPA was to determine,
within 18 months of the connection to the National Grid of
an area formerly served by a diesel station, whether it
would hold the units in reserve at their existing site,
move them to serve other isolated areas, or scrap them\.
- Government was to set up NEPA's basic organization and
management, in particular by appointing, in agreement with
the Bank, the three top managers and implement with an
expatriate management consultant or a large power utility a
management assistance and training program (para\. 2\.07)\.
- NEPA, once set up, was to define all internal procedures
required for efficient operations\.
3\. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Conditions of Effectiveness
3\.01 Apart from the usual requirements for execution and
ratification of the Loan Agreement, the latter included three special
conditions of effectiveness concerning:
- the appointment of NEPA's three top managers (para\. 2\.07),
- the securing of management and training assistance
(para\. 2\.07), and
- the provision of ECN's and NDA's consolidated audited
balance sheets as of March 31, 1972\.
3\.02 The Government met the second condition and part of the first
in January 1973 by contracting a team of consultants for management and
training assistance\. Included in the contract was the provision of an
Assistant General Manager Finance and an Assistant General Manager
Corporate Planning who at the same time was to be head of the consul-
tant'steam and the special adviser to the General Manager\. At about the
same time it appointed the former Chief Executive of NDA as General
Manager of NEPA\. In view of the excellent qualifications of all the
proposed managers, the Bank, though it originally had thought of an
expatriate filling the top position, did not object to the appointments\.
3\.03 Although by early 1973 Government had fulfilled all three
special conditions of effectiveness, the Bank had to postpone the limit
- 38 -
for effectiveness from December 27, 1972 as originally foreseen, in
steps to June 29, 1973 mainly because the processing of the Loan
Assumption Agreement took much longer than expected\. Finally, the loan
became effective on June 26, 1973, i\.e\. about half a year later than
planned\.
Changes in the Project
3\.04 NEPA carried out parts A, B, C, and E of the facilities and
services included in the Bank project essentially as foreseen during
project appraisal\. A change of some substance occurred in part B
(installation of additional transformers and switchgear at 330 kV
substations) where NEPA, with Bank agreement, included a 90 MVA
330/132 kV transformer for the Benin substation, as detailed analysis of
the system had shown the need for this addition\.
3\.05 The main changes occurred in part D of the project
(reinforcement of distribution systems and electrification)\. As the
basis for the appraisal was rather preliminary, it is not surprising
that the thorough studies carried out after loan signature produced
proposals for development significantly different from those originally
envisaged\. The modifications mainly concerned the towns foreseen for
priority electrification and hence the subtransmission systems feeding
them\. The 132 kV-transmission system, however, remained as planned\. As
the appraisal mission had anticipated the possible need for modifying
the list of towns to receive a distribution system\. Schedule 2 (Project
Description) of the Loan Agreement provided for the possibility of such
changes\. Thus, the adjustments of the project description, once NEPA
and its consultants had finally defined the priorities, proceeded
without difficulties\.
3\.06 If there had not been any changes of substance in the project
definition (except for those in the electrification component discussed
above), the proportion of the Bank contribution to total cost for many
items would have been much smaller than envisaged at appraisal\. This
was mainly the case for items implemented in the latter part of the
project period, in particular distribution extensions and
electrification works\. Indeed, as a result of the first large increases
in oi\. prices in 1973-74, the economic boom in Nigeria made costs soar\.
Thus, the rates of inflation in 1974 to 1976 averaged 17% against an
average of 3% in the appraisal estimates\. The impact of inflation was
aggravated by the fact that many items suffered long delays in delivery\.
Thus, the Bank had to become selective in the application of its funds
to ensure that components in the project did not suffer from
under-funding\. In agreement with NEPA, from 1975 onwards it allocated
the funds not committed by that date to the country-wide electrification
program aimed at maximizing the number of people having access to
electricity in reasonable quantity and quality\.
- 39 -
Implementation Schedule
3\.07 NEPA commissionea units 11 and 12 at Kainji (Part A of the
project) in February and August 1976, i\.e\. 6 and 11 months late,
respectively\. The main reasons for the delays lay with the turbine
manufacturer for both units and the generator supplier for unit 12\.
Turbine manufacturing did not proceed at the speed expected, during
overland transport of the turbine for unit 11 the transporter broke down,
a grass fire damaged the wicket gates of unit 11, the turbine shaft
of unit 12 was damaged during unloading at Lagos port and had to be
returned to Europe for repair, and a similar accident occurred to
the generator shaft, which the supplier had to ieplace\.
3\.08 The above delays refer to the contractual completion dates\.
The schedule used for project appraisal foresaw completion in
October 1975 (unit 11) and April 1976 (unit 12)\. Thus, with respect to
these dates commissioning was only 4 months late for both machines\. The
contractual schedule established by NEPA and its consultants for this
project part foresaw a total design, manufacturing, transport, and
erection time of 36 months which would have been tight under any circum-
stances and was certainly too tight under those foreseeable in Nigeria\.
3\.09 For execution of part B of the project covering the extension
of the 330 kV substations associated with the Kainji plant, NDA and
later, NEPA carried out engineering, procurement, and supervision of the
work with their own resources\. The facilities should have started
operating at the same time as the three new units at Kainji\. Until
early 1975 the contractors had incurred less than three month-' delay\.
They completed the installations at Oshogbo, Onitsha, Kaduna, and Benin
two to four months late, i\.e\. essentially in time for picking up the
additional supply from Kainji\. However, in August 1975 the transformer
for the Akangba substation feeding the Lagos area was damaged during
delivery and the supplier had to return it to the factory for repair\.
This increased the delay to 20 months, which was significant, as it
impaired the planned improvement of supply in the capital city\. Here,
though tight, the construction schedule does not seem to have been
unrealistic\.
3\.10 For the engineering work of Part C of the project comprising
the second 330 kV transmission line Kainji-Lagos and associated switchgear
in \.33U kV-substations NDA had contracted an engineering consultant
who NEPA retained\. At the time of project appraisal the schedule
called for completion by March 1977\. Commissioning took place in May
1977, which was two months late with respect to this schedule but about
six months later than foreseen in the contract, in which NEPA had
insisted on a tighter schedula, which appears to have been somewhat too
ambitious, though in this case, too, unforeseen difficulties arose\.
First, the congestion in Lagos port, which peaked in 1975, delayed
unloading by months\. Then, the contractor, faced with sky-
rocketing costs on a contract with fixed prices for the imported
- 40 -
goods and service, considered prematurely terminating the contract\.
Until NEPA and its consultants had persuaded the contractor to continue
construction valuable time was lost\. The supplier of the additional
substation equipment was also late but he completed the facilities
before the line was ready\.
3\.11 As discussed in para\. 3\.05 the main changes with respect to
the appraised project occurred in Part D concerning reinforcements of
distribution systems and electrification\. Sections 3\.5 to 3\.10 of the
Borrower's Completion Report analyze the implementation of this part in
as much detail as the information available in late 1983 permitted\. In
summary, it consists of three components:
- The Countrywide Electrification Program established on the
basis of the studies which NEPA consultants carried out in
1973; included in a first stage development the electrifi-
cation of 73 towns; this was carried out under six contracts
partly financed by the Bank\.
- The reinforcement of existing distribution systems of which
the most important part was the first stage of the Lagos
Metropolitan Distribution Project essentially covered by
one contract partly financed by the Bank; in most other
distribution reinforcement projects included in the Bank
project, NEPA constructed facilities at a voltage less than
33 kV with its own workforce or used contractors it
supervised directly; though the Bank project also included
these items, NEPA financed them out of resources other than
Loan 847-UNI\.
- The 132 kV transmission lines and switch ards connecting
the new and reinforced distribution systems to the National
Grid were carried out by NEPA assisted by consultants
within the framework of contracts partly financed by the
Bank\.
3\.12 For the reasons set forth in para\. 3\.05 it is impossible to
meaningfully compare actual and forecast work progress and investment in
the individual systems listed under Part D in para\. 2\.04\. However, the
analysis of the implementation of the individual contracts discussed in
sections 3\.5 to 3\.10 of the Borrower's Completion Report allows one to
conclude that the contracts suffered delays ranging from 3 months to 3
years with respect to the contractual completion dates and that the main
reasons for the delays were:
- temporary scarcities of construction materials (cement,
steel, wooden poles, etc\.);
- 41 -
- NEPA's difficulties in marshalling an adequate supply of
distribution equipment;
- difficulties arising from Nigeria's weak infrastructure
(e\.g\. ports of Lagos and Port Harcourt);
- lack of personnel for the work NEPA carried out itself;
- the fact that the foreign exchange part of most contracts
was on a fixed price basis which, after 1973-74, when world
market prices were rapidly increasing, led several
contractors into difficulties and made them reluctant to
proceed;
- changes in design during execution;
- several strikes; and
- difficulties with wayleaves\.
The above delays, together with those mentioned earlier (in particular
para\. 3\.10) made it impossible for NEPA to meet the demand and to
improve the quality of supply\. Thus they were the main cause of the
large increases in private captive plant (see para\. 4\.01) that took
place during the project period\.
3\.3 Though NEPA carried out the four sets of studies included in
Part E of the project, the Bank only financed the determination of the
most desirable sequence of new generating plant, the preliminary design
of the next addition (Sapele gas-fired steam plant) and the feasibility
analysis of township electrifications\. This work also incurred some
delays but they were limited and had no major consequences\.
3\.14 As CIDA financed the management assistance, the Bank's
contribution to Part F of the project covering management studies
was limited to financing the valuation of NEPA's assets as of
March 31, 1972 carried out in 1974\.
3\.15 In general, project implementation was fraught with
difficulties which had their origin in the following shortcomings:
- Though officially NEPA started operating on April 1, 1972,
it took all of that year and part of 1973 to get the new
utility reasonably organized\.
- Demand for electricity had already increased at high rates
before 1973, but the oil boom starting in 1973-74 brought a
dramatic and persistent call for increased supply\. Thus
NEPA had to accelerate the construction of new facilities,
which in turn required more resources, in particular
- 42 -
skilled personnel; however, during the entire project
period, NEPA was sorely short of such staff\.
- During practically the entire project implementation period
NEPA had to operate in a general environment characterized
by overtaxed national infrastructure and administration on
the one hand and shortages in all types of resources except
capital on the other\.
- Prcject implementation had to start when sector planning
was still only at a preliminary stage\.
3\.16 In reality, it seems there would have been little leeway for
NEPA and the Bank to proceed differently\. They might have avoided some
difficulties by more detailed planning before starting the project but
this would have been at the expense of incurring even longer delays
resulting, in turn, in further pressure from dissatisfied actual and
potential consumers\.
Procurement
3\.17 NEPA, in most cases assisted by consultants with extensive
international experience, carried out procurement of the items financed
by the Bank generally in accordance with the Bank's Guidelines for
Procurement\. However, in the starting phase of the project, NEPA and
the Bank had to overcome some difficulties, which took the form of
incomplete or late submission of tender documents to the Bank, late
comments by the Bank on documents by NEPA, and protracted discussion
about some clauses\. The reasons for these difficulties were mainly
related to:
- Government policies or at least practices which were in
contradiction to the Bank's Guidelines;
- the fact that a substantial part of the procurement had
already started before signing of the Loan and Guarantee
Agreements and that, from the Nigerians' point of view, it
was far from clear that the Loan would materialize in time
to cover the items already in the pipeline before mid-1972;
- some of the NEPA staff responsible for procurement not
having had substantial previous exposure to international
competitive bidding in accordance with the Bank's
Guidelines;
- The regionalization of the Bank which took place in
mid-1972 and put new teams in charge of the operations in
Nigeria in general and in NEPA in particular\.
- 43 -
3\.18 The most important point of disagreement between the Bank and
NEPA concerned NEPA's inclusion of a clause asking bidders for
alternative financing in the tender documents for several contracts\.
The Bank objected to this clause, but NEPA, having acted on the
Government's instructions, could not comply with the Bank's requirements
without Government's agreement\. Ultimately, the Government, NEPA, and
the Bank agreed that the latter would not object to documents including
the controversial clause for biddings taking place before
November 15, 1973\.
3\.19 The Bank was justified in giving in to the Nigerians on the
alternative financing clause as the analysis of the bids for the
contracts for Parts A and B of the project had shown that the bidd,rs
had not offered any attractive financing\. In fact, most of the
competing firms had not offered any financing at all\. Therefore, it
would appear that the clause did not discourage the invited firms from
bidding and therefore did not limit competition to any notable degree\.
3\.20 In July 1972, immediately after regionalization, the Bank
decided to send a supervision mission to Nigeria, primarily to clarify
the procurement issues\. However, the Government asked the Bank to
postpone such a mission\. It finally took place in December 1973 and was
successful\. From then on, procurement proceeded without complications\.
Costs
3\.21 In accordance with NEPA's investment plan as estimated at
appraisal time, annual expenditures on new facilities and associated
services were to increase from N 21\.4 million (US$ 32\.5 million) in FY73
to N 54\.8 million (US$ 83\.3 million) in FY78\. Actually, they greifrom
N 22\.0 million (US$ 33\.4 million) to N 323\.7 million (US$ 515 million)
within the same time span\. Table 2\.01 of the Borrower's Completion
Report gives further details\. The main reasons for this discrepancy are
the following:
- The actual inflation rate over the period was on average
about 13% against an estimated 3%\.
- The high demand called for a large additional investment\.
- Due to local constraints related to the boom starting in
1973-74, costs substantially increased even in real terms\.
3\.22 Annex 1 compares the estimated and actual project costs\. It
shows that the Kainji extension and the second Kainji-Lagos line cost
less than estimated mainly because the foreign exchange component, i\.e\.
the cost of equipment and foreign services was lower than forecast\.
This shows that the corresponding base line cost estimates were
- 44 -
essentially accurate\. The difference was of the order of the allowance
for physical contingencies (about 10%) which, as no additions were
necessary, NEPA did not need to use\. The influence of inflation was
practically nil, as NEPA let the contracts on a fixed price basis for
the imported goods and services and the main payments became due before
the unforeseen inflation could substantially affect costs\. The local
cost part exceeded the estimates because, on the one hand, base line
costs were possibly underestimated and, on the other, the civil works'
contracts were subject to escalation which became effective in the
latter part of the contract period\.
3\.23 This also applies to the reinforcement of the 330 kV
substations except that here all coscs were higher than estimated
because of the addition of a transformer which NEPA installed in Benin\.
3\.24 It is impossible to compare in a meaningful way estimated and
actual costs of distribution reinforcement and electrification as set
forth in Annex 1 because the two sets of figures, though they concern
the same type of items, do not refer to the same physical facilities\.
The available information shows that the estimate underrated the base
line costs because it was based on a technical concept\. The more
detailed investigations carried out after the project started called for
more expensive facilities and modified the estimate\. Furthermore, NEPA
constructed and installed the items discussed here in the latter part of
the project period i\.e\. after 1975\. Therefore, their costs were heavily
affected by inflation not covered\.by the price contingency allowance
included in the appraisal estimate (para\. 3\.21)\.
3\.25 The estimated and actual costs of the planned development and
management studies do not allow a meaningful comparison either, as in
part they cover different items\.
Disbursements and Financial Sources
3\.26 As discussed in para\. 3\.21, from FY75 on, NEPA's annual
investment was much higher than expected (see also Table 2\.01 of the
Borrower's Completion Report)\. As at the same time the project period
was longer than forecast, the contribution of the Bank in terms of total
investment was much lower than expected\. Even in the original project
period, i\.e\. FY1973-78, it amounted to only about 11% against 30%
estimated at appraisal time\.
3\.27 Section 3\.15 of the Borrower's Completion Report discusses
the actual Ydrawdown of the loan and the allocation of the used funds to
the various categories\. At an early stage of project implementation it
became evident that the electrification program would cost substantially
more than expected\. As this type of investment has an immediate impact
on the living standard of low income people, particularly in rural
areas, the Bank and NEPA agreed that any excess funds from the loan
account would be applied to the foreign exchange cost of electrification
contracts (para\. 3\.06)\. This was done when the Bank decided not to
- 45 -
contribute to the financing of the civil works for the Kainji extension
and again when, after thorough discussion, the Bank agreed not to cancel
the amount originally earmarked to meet the foreign cost of the Kainji
generators\. Indeed, after internatia -al competitive bidding for which
a Japanese firm was the lowest evaluated bidder, the Government decided
to finance the equipment through a Japanese line of credit offered in an
entirely different context, i\.e\. not in connection with the alternative
financing clause in para\. 3\.18 above\.
3\.28 From the approximately N 64 million (US$ 102 million) of the
project not financed by the Bank, CIDA provided some N 3\.0 million
(US$ 4\.8 million) whereas NEPA (thriugh internal cash generation) and
the Government (through loans) contributed the rest\.
Performance of the Consultants
3\.29 In connection with the Bank project, NEPA used the services of
consultants for:
- the Kainji extension;
- several transmission projects;
- the Aba-Calabar transmission project;
- the Lagos Metropolitan Distribution Project, part of
the Countrywide Electrification Program, and for the
long range sector expansion program; and
- the review of the Kainji hydrology\.
3\.30 The performance of the above consultants, most of whom had
already worked for ECN and NDA, was satisfactory\. In connection with
the design of the Kainji-Lagos transmission line difficulties arose
when, after the completion of the facility, some auger-bored pile
foundations failed (two cases occurred on another line not included in
the Bank project)\. Apparently such foundations do not perform well in
wet lateritic soil\. NEPA considered the failure a result of faulty
design rather than of deficient construction methods\. It decided to
reinforce all the foundations of the type that had shown tailures\.
- 46 -
3\.31 Several of the consultants received payments owed them only
after long delays\. This is surprising as NEPA could have drawn a large
part of these sums from the Bank loan but failed to do so\.
Performance of Contractors
3\.32 Sections 3\.2 to 3\.10 of the Borrower's Completion Report deal
in detail with the performance of NEPA's contractors\. Taking into
account the difficult circumstances prevailing during project execution,
the equipment manufacturers performed reasonably well\. Indeed, the long
delays several of them incurred were to a limited extent their
responsibility\. There seems to have been only one instance of a
contractor not fulfilling his obligations and forcing NEPA to complete
installation with its own workforce, i\.e\. the supplier for transformers
for Major Towns Scheme\.
3\.33 Two local companies carried out major contracts in the
context of the Bank project\. Company A performed satisfactorily overall,
though a Bank supervision mission felt that part of the delay incurred
in connection with the Lagos Metropolitan Distribution project was\.-the
result of the contractor's poor planning\. However, Company B worked
poorly throughout, as it was inadequately staffed, financed, and
equipped\. To complete the work (one lot of the Countrywide Electrifi-
cation Program) NEPA had to bring in a foreign firm as "assisting
subcontractor"\.
3\.34 Several local civil contractors carried out subcontracts for
firms that had won packages involving supply, erection, and
construction\. In several instances difficulties, in particular delays\.
occurred in connection with such subcontracts, mostly because of poor
management and lack of experience compounded by the difficult
environment\. In the case of the Lagos Metropolitan Distribution Project
the originally designated civil works subcontractor had to be replaced\.
Performance of Borrower
3\.35 During the entire project execution NEPA was overtaxed\. In
FY73 to FY75 it was struggling to get organized\. When, with the
assistance of the consultant's team, management had substantially
improved, NEPA was swamped by the demands which the dramatically
increased investment program made on it on the one hand and the
operating difficulties arising from the rapid increase in consumer
demand on the other\. As it was not in a position to recruit, train, and
retain enough skilled people (para\. 6\.03)\. it never had a chance to get
abreast of events and had mostly to concentrate on avoiding the worst\.
This resulted in many instances of late availability of construction
sites, delayed project modifications, poor planning, and
non-availability of crews to carry out the physical work for wh±ch NEPA
was directly responsible\. Thus, there is little doubt that NEPA also
contributed to the delays incurred in several project items\.
- 47 -
Operations
3\.36 During commissioning of the units of the Kainji extension the
contractors had to correct only minor deficiencies and during the
warranty period NEPA did not find any defects in the equipment, which
ran without major interruption until, in 1982, the generator of unit 11
was so severely damaged that it had to be replaced\. The causes of the
accident are the subject of an in-depth investigation the results of
which were not available when this report was written\. Apart from this,
NEPA is aot fully satisfied with the performance of the units (in
partici::\.ar generator controls and the hydraulic pumps of the governors),
as it has to replace the pumps far too often\. NEPA also feels that the
expertise of the operation and maintenance personnel needs further
im;irovement and is preparing an appropriate training program\.
3\.36 The equipment corresponding to the extension of 330 kV
substations has worked satisfactorily since commissioning\. The same
applies to the second Kainji-Lagos line after zontractor completed the
reinforcement of the auger bored pile foundations in lateritic soil
(para\. 3\.31)\.
3\.37 It is impossible to judge accurately the operation of the
facilities covered under distribution reinforcement and electrification\.
Whereas the transmission and subtransmission installations seem to have
worked without major difficulties, many distribution systems were
overloaded nearly from the start because of the fast growth of demand
and the delay which the program had suffered\. Combined with this
overload, substandard maintenance arising from NEPA's chronic lack of
sufficiently skilled personnel resulted in many operational
shortcomings\. Deficient equipment quality or installation cannot be
identified as a factor contributing to these inadequacies\.
- 48 -
4\. OPERATING PERFORMANCE
4\.01 Chapter 4 of the Borrower's Completion Report discusses the
development of NEPA's operations in comparison with that expected at the
time of appraisal \. An increase of demand substantially beyond that
expected, a shortfall in the available supply capability and the
resulting substantial amount of suppressed demand characterize these
operations\. The deficit in availability in turn resulted from a
combination of delays in the commissioning of new plant and failures in
existing facilities\. As a consequence, customers installed an
inordinately high amount of captive plant, recently estimated to exceed
600 MW\.
4\.02 These disappointing developments occurred even though NEPA's
management, assisted by the consultant's team, achieved marked
improvements particularly in the fields of management and information
systems, operational planning, and financial control\. However, the
stumbling block was the lack of implementation capability at lower
echelons related to the difficulties NEPA experienced in finding,
training and retaining the skilled staff it needed (para\.6\.03)\.
5\. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
5\.01 Chapter 5 of the Borrower's Completion Report discusses
details of NEPA's financial performance which was characterized by:
- after FY73, a return on net fixed assets between 3 and 5%,
i\.e\. far below the 8% stipulated in Loan Agreement; FY80,
the year immediately after two consecutive tariff increases
(which about doubled the revenue per kWh), is an exception
with a 12% return;
- internal cash generation decreasing from 76% of capital
expenditure to 7% and then increasing to 42% after
implementation of new tariffs;
- a current ratio decreasing to 1\.3 and then jumping to
nearly 6\.0 after the 1979 tariff adjustment dramatically
increased the cash account;
- gross customers' receivables increasing from 4 to about
6 months' billings;
- an investment program far in excess of that foreseen and
increasingly financed through long term debt thus entailing
an increase in the debt/equity ratio from about 30:70 to
80:20\.
- 49 -
5\.02 The improvement in the revenue situation at the end of the
project period, as satisfactory as it may appear, conceals numerous
serious problems\. In 1980 NEPA's statistics show a sharp increase in
energy unaccounted, which may be a result of the high level of unmetered
consumption, perhaps a consequence of the tariff increase\. Furthermore,
accounts receivable have consistently increased and reached a critical
level reflecting persisting if not worsening collection problems\.
6\. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
Organization and Management
6\.01 Federal Decree No\. 24 of 1972 creating NEPA and defining its
role and structure remained valid during the entire project period\. It
seems quite adequate for pursuing the objectives the Government had set
for NEPA, i\.e\. essentially to develop and maintain an efficient,
coordinated and economic supply of electricity for all parts of the
country\. The organizational set-up envisaged in the decree was
adequate, too\. Neither the decree governing NEPA nor this set-up were
at the root of the institutional problems that plagued NEPA especially
during the second half of the project period and thereafter\.
6\.02 More problematic than the above decree was legislation that
was not primarily directed against NEPA but seriously affected it, in
particular:
- the partial abrogation in 1977 (Enterprises Promotion Act)
of the exemption NEPA had been granted from the obligation
of all companies doing business in Nigeria to incorporate
themselves in the country (see Borrower's Ccmpletion
Report, para\. 3\.88),
- the ordinances defining the procedures for the approval of
awards and the granting of import licenses, and
- the subjection of NEPA to civil service salary scales\.
6\.03 The first of the above measures restricted international
competitive bidding but it did not affect the Bank project, as at the
time it became effective all bidding under Loan 847-UNI was completed\.
In the context of the Fifth Power Project (Loan 1766-UNI), Government
agreed to exempt companies with contracts finar-Ced through the loan from
incorporation\. The second measure did not substantially affect the
Fourth Project either, as Government also implemented it late in the
project period\. However,the third, decided in 1975, is the most
important reason for NEPA's limited achievement of the project
objectives\. Civil service salary scales, compared with remunerations in
the private sector, were far too low for NEPA to attract and retain the
skilled personnel it needed\. This problem still affects NEPA today\.
- 50 -
Many employees stay with NEPA only until they have received sufficient
training to allow them to get better paid jobs in other sectors of the
Nigerian economy\. The Bank was fully aware of the importance of the
salary issue throughout the project period\. However, it could not
address the problem, which affected all parastatals, in the context of a
NEPA project alone\. Therefore, within the Sixth Power Project, the Bank
asked for a comparative analysis of salary scales in the Nigerian
economy as a basis for possible corrective measures\. Government
appointed a commission under Mr\. Onosode to examine the problem in 1981
but declined to act upon its recommendations\. Up to late 1984, no
progress of substance had occurred and NEPA's skilled staff losses
continue\.
6\.04 Chapter 6 of the Borrower's Completion Report discusses the
institutional aspec\.ts related to the Fourth Power Project in more
derail\. It shows, in particular, that at the time of the project the
management assistance program vas successful in introducing
efficient management procedures and in Improving training both
quantitatively and qualitatively\. Unfortunately, after project
completion, improvement did not proceed further\. It seems that, on the
contrary, the quality of management has again deteriorated, not so much
at the top as at middle levels, where the difficulty in retaining
qualified staff is most pruLLLct\.
Covenants
6\.05 NEPA employed consultants to carry out the project (Section
3\.02 of Loan Agreement) and to prepare a long-range sector expansion
program as well as feasibility studies for the next generating plant
(Section 3\.08 of Loan Agreement)\.
6\.07 NEPA had a consultant carry out a valuation of NEPA's
assets as of March 31, 1972 in accordance with Section 4\.05 of the Loan
Agreement\.
6\.08 As already discussed in Chapter 5 above, NEPA never came near
to meeting the rate covenant (Section 5\.05 of Loan Agreement) requiring
the utility to earn a return on net fixed assets in operation of at
least 8%\.
6\.09 After the fact, it is difficult to judge whether at any time
in the past debt service coverage as defined in Section 5\.07 of the Loan
Agreement was lower than 1\.5 and therefore called for NEPA to obtain
Bank agreement for incurring further long term debt\. It seems that in
FY77 and FY78 this was the case\. However, there appears to be no record
that NEPA ever asked the Bank for such approval\.
- 51 -
7\. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION
Demand
7\.01 Chapter 4 of the Borrower's Completion Report compares
forecast and actual energy generated and sold as well as the
corresponding system loads\. It shows in particular that up to FY79
annual growth of generation deviated little from the average of 16\.2%,
which is slightly lower than the 17% forecast\. Growth of sales,
however, with an average 15\.6%, was somewhat lower than the 17\.5%
expected\. This reflects an increase of the losses from about 17% of
energy generated and purchased in FY73 to about 19% in FY 79 as against
a forecast decrease from 19\.5 to 16\.5%\. Also between FY73 and FY79,
peak load on the National Grid increased from 340 to 979 MW, whereas the
appraisal report forecast a growth from 362 to 931 MW\. FY 1980 and to a
lesser degree the following years show a striking departure from the
above trends with total system losses about twice as large as those in
preceding years\. In the second half of 1983, NEPA had not yet reached
definite conclusions about the reasons for the anomaly\. However, it
seems to be the result of large unmetered consumption\.
7\.02 In any event, even though the reliability of NEPA's data is
limited, it is fair to state that the demand expected in 1972
materialized\. In fact, there always has been suppressed demand, be it
in the form of connected customers not receiving as much power and
energy as they required, or potential consumers that NEPA was not in a
position to connect up\. The installation of captive plant in excess of
600 MW is a consequence of this situation\.
Least Cost Solution
7\.03 The 1972 appraisal showed that the first Kainji extension was
the least cost solution as the capital cost alone of the two additional
hydro units was already lower than that of any thermal alternative\.
This, of course, still holds after completion of the project, as the
actual equipment cost was lower than that estimated at appraisal time,
whereas, between 1972 and 1976, cost of thermal units underwent
substantial increases\. The reservation made in the appraisal report
that among the hydraulic turbine types propeller units would have
represented the least cost solution still holds (para\. 2\.08)\. Indeed,
the slightly greater efficiency of Kaplan turbines does not appear to
justify the additional cost of such units and the benefits of their
better flexibility are not easily quantifiable\. Moreover, it is worth
noting that the next units NEPA installed at Kainji are of the propeller
type\.
7\.04 Within the general transmission concept of NEPA, which NDA had
determined and justified in the context of the first stage of the Kainji
development, the second 330 kV Kainji-Lagos line was the least cost
solution as there was no alternative to it\.
- 52 -
7\.05 In 1972, the appraisal team had no detailed analysis available
to show that the proposed distribution extensions and electrification
represented the least cost solution to provide electricity to the
corresponding areas of development\. The consultant's studies,
conducted under this project, established this fact and also
optimized the design\. As the actual costs of the projects executed are
substantially higher than those estimated by the consultants in current
terms but only some 10% higher in constant terms, it is fair to assume
that after construction the consultants' conclusions remain valid\.
Economic Return
7\.06 Applying the method which was used for the appraisal and
which led to a return of 23% results, after project completion, in a
comparable rate of 28% for the first Kainji extension\. However, this
return is sensitive to changes in the basic assumptions\. A reduction of
10% in the assumed revenues from non-industrial consumers and a 10%
increase in the rather uncertain transmission and distribution costs
reduces the rate by 5 and 3 percentage points, respectively\.
7\.07 As the construction of the second 330 kV line Kainji-Lagos was
justified essentially through further extensions of the Kainji plant,
only the justification for the advancement of its construction by three
years had to be established\. The evaluation set forth in the appraisal
report demonstrated that the return for this early construction was
about 12%\. The data used, however, was rather speculative\. At this
time, similar data is still affected by high uncertainty\. However,
qualitatively, it can be said that the frequency of faults observed
were, in the years 1972-1975, rather in excess of the 17 per year used
for the appraisal\. Therefore, it seems reasonable to state that the
return on this part of the project is likely to be higher than that
estimated in 1972\.
7\.08 Since the costs were unreliably established in the first place
there is little point in trying to determine the return on the
individual distribution expansion and electrification projects
(para\. 3\.24) or on the sum of the programs\. Instead it seems more
meaningful to calculate instead a return on the entire FY72-78 tranche
of NEPA's investment program which includes over 95% of the above
distribution and electrification program and a similar percentage of the
Bank project\. This results in a rate of 12%, which, at first sight, is
adequate\. It is evident that an investment that is quickly used to full
capacity should have a high return\. Nevertheless, the above result
should not lead to an exaggerated sense of satisfaction, as the
implementation of the Fourth Power Project went in parallel with the
deeply worrying increase in the installation of captive plant referred
to in para\. 4\.01 with an associated loss to the Nigerian economy which
substantially reduced the positive economic benefit of the investment
program discussed here\. The above rate of return on the tranche of
investment is not overly sensitive to a variation in the parameters as a
10% reduction in the estimated benefits only reduces it by 2\.5
percentage points\.
- 53 -
8\. BANK PERFORMANCE
Assessment of the Borrower's Implementation Capacity
8\.01 Early on in project preparation the Bank perceived the need
for considerable outside assistance to NEPA's manaEiment in order to
ensure that a Bank project had a reasonable chance of success\. The
100 man-year Canadian program agreed between Government and the Bank was
adequate\. The fact that after some understandable initial difficulties
the project progressed satisfactorily until about 1975 tends to confirm
this judgment\. The less satisfactory performance after 1975, both In
project implementation and in operations, to a large extent resulted
from circumstances beyond NEPA's control, particularly the economic boom
which overtaxed Nigeria's institutions and infrastructure\.
8\.02 Initially, the Bank had envisaged that NEPA's General Manager
would be an expatriate\. However, in 1972, it agreed to the appointment
of NDA's former Chief Executive to NEPA's top position\. This was a wise
decision as the appointee proved very competent and later developments
showed that a foreigner would never have had the ear of the Board and of
the Government to the same extent\. Thus, this choice enhanced the
Borrower's implementation capacity\.
Supervision
8\.03 Annex 3 sets forth a schedule of the supervision missions the
Bank carried out in connection with the project\. It is characterized by
the unusually long intervals of 1, 1 1/2, and 2 years between full
missions\. This was mainly due to delays in obtaining Government
agreement to such missions\. Thus, the Bank had to delay the most
important supervision mission (the second), which was to clarify the
pending procurement issues, from mid-1973 to the end of that year\. The
missions that took place towards the end of project implementation were
supervisions that the Bank carried out in connection with pre-appraisal
and appraisal of the Fifth Power Project in 1978, i\.e\. at a time when
Government and NEPA's interest in cooperation with the Bank had
increased again\. However, these late missions contributed little to
improve project results\. Currently, mission visits are cleared satis-
factorily by the Government and NEPA\.
Working Relationship
8\.04 Relations between Bank staff and Government officials were
generally good even though the relationship between the institutions was
to some extent at arm's length throughout project preparation and
implementation\. The latter is reflected in the Government's exceedingly
- 54 -
cautious response to the Bank's request for information about the
content of the planned legislation concerning NEPA (para\. 2\.06), and to
the Bank's request for permission to carry out supervision missions
(para\. 8\.03)\. This reluctance was further increased once the oil boom
started, as that on the one hand reduced the need for Bank financial
assistance and, on the other hand, reduced the Bank's contribution to
NEPA's investment program to a small proportion\.
8\.05 At the start of project implementation, relations with the
Borrower were difficult, as its management was not properly organized
until early 1973\. The fact that the various managers of the former ECN
and NDA were in competition for the top positions in NEPA also made
contacts delicate\. Once management was set up and initial difficulties
overcome, in particular those in connection with procurement, working
relationships with NEPA substantially improved\.
9\. CONCLUSIONS
9\.01 The project did not succeed in fully meeting all of the
objectives set out in para\. 2\.11\. NEPA completed the physical part of
the project, but it did so in rather loose cooperation with the Bank,
although the latter often manifested its willingness to contribute to
the solution of the many operational, organizational, and institutional
problems that existed from the start and cropped up from time to time\.
The main reason for this was the oil boom, which temporarily freed
Nigeria from the need to seek financial support from development
institutions\. As the economy thrived, the Government, which had always
been quite reluctant to accept the conditions attached to Bank loans,
became even more opposed to such conditions\. Therefore, the next Bank
operation (Power V), that was supposed to assure the continuity of the
policies and measures associated with the Fourth Power Project, did not
materialize until October 1979, i\.e\. about four years later than planned
in 1973\.
9\.02 The build-up of a strong management and training capability,
though it occurred, did not result in a lasting improvement, mainly
because NEPA's salary scales did not permit the utility to retain highly
qualified and motivated staff in the numbers required\. The growth of
demand, which was extraordinarily fast for a relatively large utility,
also contributed to NEPA's inability to maintain the quality of
management and financial control, however modest, it had attained after
the first three years of the project\. The same factors hampered the
improvement of NEPA's quality of supply which, in some parts of the
country and particularly in Lagos, even deteriorated, making it
exceedingly difficult to implement the tariff increases necessary to set
the utility on a strong financial base\.
9\.03 The Bank's support of NEPA's planning activities was probably
the most successful of the measures associated with the project, though
in this area too, a more timely follow-up via an earlier Bank project
- 55 -
might have helped avoid the deterioration observed in recent years, and
which the two successive Bank operations as yet have not succeeded in
reversing\.
9\.04 In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, one might ponder
the wisdom of proceeding with the loan given the reluctance of the
Government to provide information required for project appraisal
(para\. 2\.06) and the inadequate project preparation (para\. 2\.04)\. Given
the importance of assisting in such a critical sector and the importance
of institutional development it is difficult to argue that the Bank
should not have proceeded\. It is also difficult to see what the Bank
should have handled differently to assure the success of the project\.
Indeed, whatever influence it could have had under the circumstances
foreseeable at the time of appraisal was nearly eliminated when the
economy unexpectedly soared as a consequence of the first round of large
increases in oil prices making the Government further doubt the value of
a close relationship with the Bank in the power sector\.
Annex 1
NIGERIA
FOURTH POWER PROJECT
COMPLETION REPORT
Estimated and Actual Project Costs
million N (million US $)
Actual Appraisal Estimate Cost Variation
in Z of Estimate
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Part A: First Kainji extension 3\.4 9\.7 13\.1 2\.9 11\.0 13\.9 + 17 - 12 - 6
(2 units of 100 MW each (5\.4) (15\.5) (20\.9) (4\.3) (16\.8) (21\.1)
and extension of sub-
station
Part B: Reinforcement of 330 kV 1\.4 2\.1 3\.5 0\.7 1\.8 2\.5 +100 + 17 + 40
substations (including (2\.2 (3\.4) (5\.6) (1\.0) (2\.8) (3\.8)
Benin)
Part C: Second 330 kV line 6\.2 9\.0 15\.2 5\.7 11\.2 16\.9 + 9 - 20 - 10
Kainji-Lagos (9\.9) (14\.4) (24\.3) (8\.6) (17\.2) (25\.8)
Part D: Reinforcement of exis- 32\.8 41\.0 73\.8 21\.4 22\.5 43\.9 + 53 + 82 + 68
ting distribution sys- (52\.5) (65\.6) (118\.1) (32\.5) (34\.2) (66\.7)
tem and electrification
Part E: Power Development 0\.8 1\.5 2\.3 1\.0 2\.0 3\.0 - 20 - 25 - 23
Studies (1\.3) (2\.4) (3\.7) (1\.5) (3\.1) (4\.6)
Part F: Management Studies 0\.8 2\.5 3\.3 0\.8 1\.9 2\.7 0 + 32 + 22
1\.31 (4\.0) (5\.3) 1121 (2\.9) (4\.1)
Total 45\.4 65\.8 111\.2 32\.5 50\.4 82\.9 + 40 + 31 + 34
(72\.6) (105\.3) (177\.9) (49\.1) (77\.0) (126\.0)
- 57 -
Annex 2
Page 1 of 4
NIGERIA
FOURTH POWER PROJECT
COMPLETION REPORT
Economic Justification
1\. Basic Assumptions
1\.01 For the computations to confirm that the executed sub-projects
represent least cost solutions to meet the corresponding objectives and
to determine the economic rate of return, the present report uses the
following basic assumptions:
Costs and benefits are expressed in constant 1978 Naira
i\.e\. of the year when most of the project was completed\.
- The computations use a shadow exchange rate of US$ 1\.25 to
the Naira\. The market price for local labor was used as in
Nigeria there was no unemployment of the type of skilled
and semi-skilled manpower that NEPA required\.
2\. Least Cost Solution
First Kainji Extension
2\.01 The total cost of the 200 MW extension was US$ 21 million,
which corresponds to 105 US$/kW which is substantially less than the
least expensive thermal alternative\. In 1978 prices, the latter cost in
excess of 250 US$/kW\. Even taking into account that to make the
alternative strictly comparable one might have to add to this one-third
of the cost of the additional 330 kV line Kainji-Lagos, the unit capital
cost of the extension would still not exceed 150 US$/kW\. Furthermore,
considering that the operating costs of the thermal alternative would
have been much higher than that of the hydro, it is safe to state that
the first Kainji Extension was the least cost way of adding 200 MW of
generating capacity\. If one assumes that a thermal plant of 130 MW
would be capable of producing 800 GWh annually, i\.e\. the minimum output
of the extension (which under normal circumstances can generate 1350 GWh
annually), the capital costs of the hydro extension and the thermal
alternative would, under the worst case for the extension, be about
equal at US$ 30 million\.
Second 330 kV Kainii-Lagos Transmission Line
2\.02 Within the general concept of the Nigerian transmission
- 58 -
Annex 2
Page 2 of 4
system, NDA's consultants had already demonstrated in the 1960's that a
330 kV system was the least cost solution for further development of the
transmission network\. Therefore, the duplication of the existing line,
once the latter's capacity was fully used, was the least cost expansion
of the system within the overall concept of the grid\.
Distribution Extension and Electrification
2\.03 At project preparation time, only general studies of these
items existed\. Therefore, ECN hired consultants to study some of the
sub-projects ultimately included in the Bank project, in particular, the
Lagos Metropolitan Distribution Project, the Major Towns Scheme, and the
Zaria-Funtua-Cusau Scheme\. These studies as well as those included in
the Bank project mostly concerning electrification, set forth standards
for such facilities in Nigeria\. Such standards describe the least cost
alternative to provide the service in the quantity and quality desired
within a uniform concept\. The qualitative standards were set on the
basis of experience and judgment in agreement with the Bank\. They still
seem reasonable, even if in many places the quality of supply is
deficient, as the latter is mostly due to substandard maintenance and
not to inadequate design and/or equipment\.
3\. Economic Rate of Return
First Kainji Extension
3\.01 The appraisal team assumed that, of the 1350 GWh assignable to
the extension, non-industrial consumers would use 650 GWh and industries
270 GWh, the remaining 270 GWh representing losses\. Costing the first
tranche at the price customers were paying in 1972 and the second
tranche at the cost of generation by captive plant led to a return of
23%\.
3\.02 The present analysis proceeds similarly\. However, the costs
also include one third of the cost of the second Kainji--Lagos line, as
the latter is required to assure a reasonable reliability but is only
justified in connection with the further extensions\. For the
non-industrial consumption, in accordance with NEPA's income statement,
the cost of transmission and distribution is about 0\.025 N/kWh and the
revenues in 1977 correspond to 0\.032 N/kWh\. On the basis of the 1983
Energy Sector Assessment generating costs by captive plant are at least
0\.025 N/kWh\. Therefore, the economic cost and benefit streams are as
follows:
- 59 -
Annex 2
Page 3 of 4
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978-2002
(in million N)
Costs
Capital 3\.0 2\.0 5\.0 8\.0 3\.0
Operation 0\.2 0\.8
Transmission and 4\.0 16\.2
Distribution
Benefits
Revenue from non-
industrial consumers 5\.0 20\.8
Savings on captive
generation 1\.5 5\.7
3\.03 The resulting rate of return is 28% which is high but
understandable as the revenues from non-industrial consumers
(0\.032 N/kWh) are substantially higher than those assumed in 1972
(0\.024 N/kWh)\. However, the result is sensitive to changes of the
parameters, in particular the cost of transmission and distribution
(which is uncertain)\. A 10% increase in the latter reduces the return
by some 3 percentage points\. It is even more sensitive to the tariff
for non-industrial consumers as a decrease of this rate by 10% reduces
it by 5 percentage points\. However, future tariffs are unlikely to be
lower in real terms than those of 1978 used here\.
Second Kainji-Lagos Transmission Line
3\.04 Originally, NDA and its consultants considered the
commissioning of the second line necessary at the time when peak load in
the interconnected system wculd have reached 1200 MW, which they
forecast to be the case by about 1980\. However, as the reliability of
the first line was much lower than expected, they proposed to advance
construction of the second line by three years\. The Bank concurred and
included the item in the Bank project\. The appraisal team demonstrated
that advancing the installation of the line by 3 years yielded a return
of at least 12% on the basis of the benefits of the increased
reliability to industrial consumers valued at the shadow-priced salaries
paid to workers to make up the production lost during power
interruption\. However, the data used for calculating this return was
rather uncertain\. The same still holds after completion of the project\.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the 17 interruptions per year which the
appraisal team used were exceeded at least twice between 1972 and 1975\.
Furthermore, the cost of the line was lower than expected and the demand
- 60 -
Annex 2
Page 4 of 4
increased roughly in line with the forecast\. Thus it seems reasonable
to assume that the rate of return on advancing the construction of the
line by three years is probably higher than estimated in 1972\.
1972-78 Investment Program
3\.05 As set forth in para\. 7\.08 of the report, it is not worthwhile
calculating a return on the distribution extension and electrification
projects\. On the other hand, it is worth determining such a return on
the 1973-78 tranche of NEPA's investment program\. This return
corresponds to the discount rate equalizing incremental cost and
incremental revenues related to the investment program\. The
corresponding cost and benefit streams with operating cost calculated on
the basis of NEPA's income statement and benefits on actual tariffs
until FY79 and 0\.055 N/kWh (i\.e\. substantially lower than the FY80 rate
of 0\.065 N/kWh) for the following years, are as follows:
Fiscal Capital Cost Operating Cost Revenues
Year
(in million N)
1973 22 --
1974 21 -- --
1975 65 2 10
1976 116 5 20
1977 146 10 35
1978 324 15 50
1979 -- 20 70
1980 -- 27 118
3\.06 The resulting return is 12%\. It is rather sensitive to a
change in the tariff prevalent from 1980 onwards, as a 10% drop in the
rates reduces it by about 2\.5 percentage points\. However, a 10%
increase in the operating costs reduces it only by about 0\.5 percentage
points\.
- 61 -
Annex 3
NIGERIA
FOURTH POWER PROJECT
COMPLETION REPORT
Schedule of Supervision Missions
Date of Duration Mission Months since
mission days staff previous mission
12/72 12 Engineer No\. 1
Fin\. Anal\. No\. 1
Economist No\. 1
12/73 20 Engineer No\. 1 12
Fin\. Anal\. No\. 1
06/74 6 Fin\. Anal\. No\. 1 7
02/75 7 Engineer No\. 2 8
Fin\. Anal\. No\. 1
05/77 10 Engineer No\. 2 27
01/78 10 Fin\. Anal\. No\. 2 8
06/78 5 Engineer No\. 2 5
08/78 1 Fin\. Anal\. No\. 3 2
The last three missions were carried out in connection with the
pre-appraisal of the Power V Project\.

| APPROVAL
|
P007793
| R E S T R I C T E D
FILE COpy Report No\. P90
This document was prepared for internal use in the Bank\. In making
it available to others, the Bank assumes no responsibility to them for
the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein\.
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
of the
PRESIDENT
to the
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
on a
PROPOSED LOAN
to the
REPUBLIC OF PANAMA
for a
HIGHWAY REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT
in
PANAMA
July 1, 1955
INTERNATIONAL BAN\. FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOP1'ENT
REPORT A]CD RECOiMVENATIONS CF THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED LOAN TO THE
REPUBLIC OF PANAMA FOR A HIGHWAY REHALBILITATION
AYD 1AIIYTENANCE PROJECT
1\. I submit the following report and recommlendations on a pronosed
loan of $5\.9 million to the Republic of Panama, to assist in financing a
program for the rehabilitation of its highway system\.
PART I - HISTORICAL
2\. At the request of the Government of Panama, a Bank mission visited
Panama during August and September 1954 to study a 4-year program of highway
construction prepared by the h;inistry of Public llorks\. After a study of the
program and of the organization of the Highway Department of the Vinistry of
Public Works, the mission concluded that a program of road construction weas
premature and that it would be preferable for the Government first to under-
take a program for the rehabilitation of the existirg highway system and to
strengthen the highway organization\.
3\. These recommendations were adopted by the late President Remon as
the basis of a new national highway policy for Panama, and he created in the
Ministry of Public 'Torks a Comisi6n de Caninos, Aeropuertos y 1Niuelles (CAM)
which was made responsible, among other things, for all matters pertaining
to highways\. The new policy is fully supported by Dr\. Ricardo Arias who
succeeded to the Presidency after the assassination of President Remon earlier
this year\.
4\. As a first step in strengthening the highway organization, the Govern-
ment, early in 1955, hired competent consultants and placed them in executive
positions in the Highway Department of CAM\. Their first task was to prepare
a report entitled "A 4-Year Program for Administrative Reorganization, Per-
sonnel Training, Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Public Highways," which
was presented to the Bank in April 1955\.
5\. This program appeared to be suitable for Bsnk financing, and formal
loan negotiations began on June 15, 1955, with Mr\. Roberto Heurtematte,
Comptroller General of the Republic of Panama, as the representative of the
Government\.
6\. If the proposed loan of $5\.9 million were made, the total amount
of Bank loans to Panama would be equivalent to '7\.39 million\. The Bank has
already made the following loans to Panama-
- 2 -
"1\.2 million, 7-year, 4-5/8,0 loan of September 25, 1953
to the Instituto de Fomento Economico for agricultural
machinery;
$\.29 million, 8-year, 4-5/8% loan of September 25, 1953
to the Instituto de Fomento Economico for the construc-
tion of a grain storage plant in Panama\.
PART II - DESCRIPTION CF THE PROPOSED LOAN
Borrower
7\. The Borrower wc,uld be the Republic of Panama\.
Amount
8\. The loan would be in an amount in various currencies equivalent to
%'5\.9 million\.
Purnzose
9\. The proceeds of the loan would be used to provide the Borrower with
the foreign currency for the financing of equipment, machinery, materials and
services required for the following project which would be carried out by CAi"i:
(a) the organization and strengthening of the Highway
Department of CAM so that it will be able to carry
out effectively the maintenance and the construction
of public highways and roads in "anama;
(b) a program for the selection and training of personnel
to fill the administrative and supervisory positions
created in the newly organized Highway Department,
including the positions now held by the consultants,
and a program for the traiiiing of skilled labor at all
levels in proper methods of maintenance and construc-
tion of highways and the operation, servicing and repair
of equipment;
(c) the reconstruction of approx\.imately 645 km of primary
roads and 380 km of secondary roads, including improve-
ment in base, pavement, surface, shoulders, bridges ard
culverts\. The roads would be widened and re-aligned
where necessary\.
Interest\. Commission and Commitment Charges
10\. The loan would bear interest at the rate of 4-1/4% per annum,
including the statutory commission of 1%\. The commitment charge would be
3/4 of 1% per annum and would accrue from the Effective Date of the Loan
Agreement or 60 days after the Loan Agreement is sie ied, whichever is earlier\.
Amortization
11\. The loan would be for a period of 9 years\. The loan would be
serviced by semi-annual principal and interest payments beginning May 1,
1959 and ending May 1, 1964 as set out in Schedule I of the proposed Loan
Agreement\.
Legal Instruments and Legal Authority
12\. A draft Loan Agreement between the Republic of Panama and the Bank
is attached (No\. 1)\. The following are points of special interest in the
proposed Loan Agreement:
(a) Section 5\.09 would require the Borrower to retain
consultants satisfactory to the Bank who would serve
as executives in the Highway Derartment in such posi-
tions and for such periods as prescribed by the Banlc;
(b) Section 5\.10 would require the Borrower to be guided by
the recommendations of the consultonts with respect to
the organization of the Highway Department and policies
for the recruitment, training and dismissal of personnel;
(c) Section 5\.11 would require the Borrower to bind itself
not to undertake or execute any major project for the
construction of new highways unless it had previously
satisfied the Bank that the necessary funds to carry out
this projpct were available\. For the purposes of defini-'
tion, a pzoject costing more than 25,000 balboas would be
considered to be a major project\. The Inter-American High-
way would be excluded from the provisions of this Section\.
13\. The National Assembly of Panama has authorized the'Government to
contract loans abroad up to 10 million balboas or their equivalent in other
currencies\.
14\. The report of the Committee provided for irn Article III, Section
4(iii) of the Articles of Agreement is attached (No\. 2)\.
Local Financing
15\. In order to ensure that there will at all times be sufficient funds
to meet the local expenditures of the project, notwithstanding fluctuations
in the collection of revenues allocated to highwray works, the Government of
Panama, on June 15, 1955, entered into an agreement with the Banco Nacional
de Panama whereby the Banco Nacional will open a special line of credit, for
a 4-year period, for amounts up to the sum of 250,000 balboas (ap7roximately
3 months' requirement of local funds over the 4-year period of the program)\.
Its validity would have to be affirmed in the legal opinion for the purposes
of the Effective Date as specified in Section 7\.01 of the proposed Loan Agree-
ment\.
- 4 -
PART III - APPRAISAL OF TIE PROPOSED LOAN
16\. A detailed appraisal of the project (No\. 3) has been distributed
(R-886)\.
Justification of the Prolect
17\. Except for activities connected with the Canal and the Canal Zone,
the economy of Panama is almost wholly dependent on agriculture\. The main
agricultural areas are some distance from the principal consuming centers
and almost all produce has to be transported overland\.
18\. The poor condition of the existing roads causes excessive wear and
tear on motor vehicles, high fuel consumption and slow transport service, all
of which raise transportation costs\. High transport costs seriously reduce
farm prices and remove the incentive to produce\. Poor roads also force farm-
ers to limit output to products which can withstand the rigors of transport\.
By improving and speeding up road communications, the project would have
important and far-reaching effects on agricultural production and contribute
substantially to the development of Panama\.
19\. The new establishment of a highway department organized to carry
out permanent maintenance and construction of highways and the training of
personnel to staff such an organization should improve the effectiveness and
reduce the costs of future highway maintenance and construction\.
Method of Procurement
20\. All equipment and materials bought abroad will be acquired on the
basis of international bidding or shopping\.
Economic Situation
21\. A rerort on the current economic position and prospects of Panama
(W\.H\. 39-a circulated under Secretary's Memorandum 1-225 on April 6, 1955)
outlined the advances in production achieved in recent years and indicated
the need for more basic investment, especially in roads and power, to support
further economic development\. It pointed out that government finances had
improved over the previous two years, with higher revenues and a steep reduc-
tion in the floating debt\. Service on public external debt (including the
loan now proposed) will average about il\.8 million over the next five years\.
This would not be a heavy burden on government finance nor on foreign exchange
earnings\.
22\. As indicated in the economic report, recent treaty negotiations with
the U\.S\.A\. have led to agreement for an increase in the Canal annuity from
$430,000 to l,930,000, besides other provisions favorable to the economy,
such as greater opportunities for Panama to supply the Canal Zone market\. The
new treaty has been ratified by Panama and is now awaiting ratification by
the U\.S\.A\.
-5-
Prospects of Fulfillment of Obligations
23\. The outlook for the satisfactory execution of the project is favor-
able\. The work of the consultants hired by the Panamanian Government has
started in a most promising way and there is every prospect that it will so
continue\.
24\. The economic benefits which can be expected from the rehabilitation
of the existing road system of Panama would fully justify the exnenditure
and, indeed, compare more than favorably with any equivalent investment in
any other sector of the country's economy\.
25\. I have every confidence that the Borrower should be able to meet
its obligations\.
PART IV - COMPLIANCE -JITH TIE ARTICIES CF AGREEIENT
26\. I am satisfied that the Droposed loan would comply with the require-
ments of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank\.
PART V - RECOMMENDATIONS
27\. I recommend that the Bank make to the Republic of Panama a loan in
various currencies equivalent to $5\.9 million for a term of 9 years, with
interest (including commission) at the rate of 4-l/4A per annum and on such
other terms as are specified in the draft Loan Agreement, and that the Execu-
tive Directors adopt a resolution to that effect in the form attached (No\. 4)\.
Eugene R\. Black
July i, 1955
| APPROVAL
|
Dataset Card for World Bank Project Documents
Dataset Summary
This is a dataset of documents related to World Bank development projects in the period 1947-2020. The dataset includes the documents used to propose or describe projects when they are launched, and those in the review. The documents are indexed by the World Bank project ID, which can be used to obtain features from multiple publicly available tabular datasets.
Supported Tasks and Leaderboards
No leaderboard yet. A wide range of possible supported tasks, including varieties of summarization, QA, and language modelling. To date, the datasets have been used primarily in conjunction with tabular data (via BERT embeddings) to predict project outcomes.
Languages
English
Dataset Structure
Data Instances
Data Fields
- World Bank project ID
- Document text
- Document type: "APPROVAL" for documents written at the beginning of a project, when it is approved; and "REVIEW" for documents written at the end of a project
Data Splits
To allow for open exploration, and since different applications will want to do splits based on different sampling weights, we have not done a train test split but left all files in the train branch.
Dataset Creation
Source Data
Documents were scraped from the World Bank's public project archive, following links through to specific project pages and then collecting the text files made available by the World Bank.
Annotations
This dataset is not annotated.
Personal and Sensitive Information
None.
Considerations for Using the Data
Social Impact of Dataset
Affects development projects, which can have large-scale consequences for many millions of people.
Discussion of Biases
The documents reflect the history of development, which has well-documented and well-studied issues with the imposition of developed world ideas on developing world countries. The documents provide a way to study those in the field of development, but should not be used for their description of the recipient countries, since that language will reflect a multitude of biases, especially in the earlier reaches of the historical projects.
Additional Information
Dataset Curators
Luke Jordan, Busani Ndlovu.
Licensing Information
MIT.
Citation Information
@dataset{world-bank-project-documents, author = {Jordan, Luke and Ndlovu, Busani and Shenk, Justin}, title = {World Bank Project Documents Dataset}, year = {2021} }
Contributions
Thanks to @luke-grassroot, @FRTNX and @justinshenk for adding this dataset.