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"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code incorporates by reference certain portions of s. 121(1)(a). It is therefore necessary to review s. 121(1)(a) to understand s. 121(1)(d). The full text of both the English and French versions of s. 118 (the definition provision) and s. 121 is set out in Appendix 'A' to these reasons. For convenience, the English version of s. 121(1)(a) and (d) is reproduced below:"	"121(1)(d)"	"121(1)(d)"
"James Albert Stanley FISHER, between the 22nd day of August, 2015 and the 7th day of December, 2015, inclusive, at or near Vancouver and Surrey, in the Province of British Columbia, being an official, did, in connection with the duties of his office, commit a breach of trust by kissing [A] for a sexual purpose, [A] being a witness in a criminal prosecution, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code."	"122"	"122"
"James Albert Stanley FISHER, between the 3rd day of December, 2015 and the 6th day of December, 2015, inclusive, at or near Burnaby, in the Province of British Columbia, being an official, did, in connection with the duties of his office, commit a breach of trust by kissing [B], [B] being a witness in a prior criminal prosecution, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code."	"122"	"122"
"[40] The first factor is whether or not a change in circumstances justifies the extension. In Carter , for example, the fact that Parliament had been dissolved for general elections was found by the Supreme Court of Canada to be a sufficient change in circumstances justifying the extension of the suspension of the declaration of the constitutional invalidity of paragraph 241(b) and section <mask> of the Criminal Code ."	"14"	"14"
"Norman Monty PORTER, on or about the 17 th day of May, 2002, at or near Central Saanich, in the Province of British Columbia, being at large on a recognizance entered into before a Justice or a Judge and being bound to comply with a condition of that recognizance as directed by a Justice or a Judge, did fail without lawful excuse to comply with the following condition or direction: "To surrender any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, and any related authorizations, licences and registration certificates you possess to the Central Saanich Police Department within 24 hours of your release from custody", contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code."	"145(3)"	"145(3)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that "it is not a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge" where the complainant is under the age of 16 years. Section 150.1(2.1) sets out certain exceptions where a complainant is 14 years of age or more but under the age of 16. As the respondent is more than five years older than the complainant and not married to her, the exceptions do not apply. [2]"	"150.1(1)"	"150.1(1)"
"[M.R.H.], from the 28th day of October, 2006 to the 28th day of October, 2011, inclusive, at or near Surrey and Harrison Hot Springs, in the Province of British Columbia, did, for a sexual purpose, touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of his body or with an object, the body of J.S., a person under the age of fourteen years, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code."	"151"	"151"
"[M.R.H.], from the 28th day of October, 2006 to the 28th day of October, 2011, inclusive, at or near Surrey and Harrison Hot Springs, in the Province of British Columbia, did, for a sexual purpose, touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of his body or with an object, the body of J.S. , a person under the age of fourteen years, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code."	"151"	"151"
"Dr. Bradford provided an opinion letter dated June 14, 2013 in which he concluded that the appellant currently suffered from "Schizophrenia, Catatonic Type, Continuous, with prominent negative symptoms" and further that he was severely mentally ill prior to the index offences and at the time of the index offences. His opinion concluded that "Mr. Palmer would have come within the terms of Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada at the material time of the index offences.""	"16"	"16"
""[I]n my opinion, an unprovoked attack against a complete stranger/strangers in a public place in broad daylight followed by a bizarre suicide attempt is strongly indicative of a severe mental illness at the time of the index offences. This is further indication that Mr. Palmer would not have been aware that what he was doing was wrong or even aware of the physical nature of his actions if he was in a significantly confused state. In my opinion Mr. Palmer would have come within the terms of Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada at the material time of the index offence.""	"16"	"16"
""Given the unpredictability of his actions secondary to his mental illness, the severe nature of his illness, his disorganized thinking, it would be more likely than not that he would not have been able to weigh the pros and cons of his actions, exercise rational choice or know that what he was doing was morally wrong. ... It is therefore my opinion that Mr. Palmer does meet, on the balance of probabilities, the test for Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada.""	"16.1"	"16.1"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out a range of punishment for offenders on indictment to be a minimum of 12 months to a maximum of 10 years imprisonment for accessing child pornography. The Criminal Code also sets out that conditional sentences are not available for offenses under this section. I have reviewed the jurisprudence provided by counsel, all the relevant post- Friesen jurisprudence, and the amendments to the Criminal Code , in the result, I cannot entertain a conditional sentence here."	"163.1 (4)(a)"	"163.1 (4)(a)"
"[8] See Payam Akhavan, "Should Duress Apply to All Crimes? A Comparative Appraisal of Moral Involuntariness and the Twenty Crimes Exception Under Section <mask> of the Criminal Code" (2009) 13 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 271, at pp. 277-78, 282-84 (pointing out that the penal codes of France and Germany do not exclude duress as a defence to murder yet no evidence suggests that the availability of duress in those jurisdictions facilitates organized killing); W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law , 2d ed., vol. 2 (St. Paul: Thomson West, 2003), at p. 81 (noting that Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and Utah allow duress as a defence to murder by statute)."	"17"	"17"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code makes it an indictable offence to wilfully intercept private communications by means of specified types of devices. Section 184(2)(b) exempts a person who intercepts a private communication "in accordance with an authorization" granted under Part VI of the Criminal Code from criminal liability for that interception. In order for a search under Part VI to be constitutionally compliant, it needs to be done in accordance with the authorization: R. v. Duroslovac , 2012 ONCA 680, 112 O.R. (3d) 696, at para. 30."	"184(1)"	"184(1)"
"An appeal lies, with leave, on a question of law alone, to the court of appeal, within the meaning of section <mask> of the Criminal Code , from any order or decision of a judge or a court in Canada made under this Act, if the application for leave to appeal is made to a judge of the court of appeal within fifteen days after the order or decision."	"2"	"2"
"(f) "Agent of the Province" means any agency of the Province, including OLG, that conducts and manages a lottery scheme under the authority of section <mask> of the Criminal Code , and includes the Province itself if the Province conducts or manages any such lottery scheme directly but, for greater certainty, does not include any operator that the Province, OLG or any other agency of the Province that conducts and manages such lottery schemes may hire to operate any gaming facility or to operate the conduct and manage of such lottery schemes for or on behalf of the Province, OLG or such other agency of the Province."	"207(1)(a)"	"207(1)(a)"
"[1] Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, eliminates the common law distinctions between principals and accessories and puts perpetrators of crimes and those who aid or abet them on the same legal footing, labelling them all "parties" to the crime: R. v. Maciel (2007), 219 C.C.C. (3d) 516 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 85. Nonetheless, as a matter of ordinary usage, the term "party" is often used to denote parties to an offence who are not principals. As a matter of convenience, unless I specifically indicate otherwise, throughout these reasons, I will use "party" to mean a party to an offence who is not a principal."	"21"	"21"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides for three modes of participation in a crime. Section 21(1)(a) governs principal parties: those who actually commit the crime. Sections 21(1)(b) and (c) govern aiders and abettors respectively. Those who help, through acts or omissions, or encourage others to commit crimes, may also be guilty of those crimes. Although different considerations are taken into account when assessing liability under the different modes of participation, principals, aiders, and abettors are equally culpable at law: R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 411, at para. 13."	"21(1)"	"21(1)"
"Our criminal law does not distinguish among the modes of participation in an offence in determining criminal liability. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code makes principals, aiders and abettors equally liable. A person becomes a party to an offence when that person, knowing of a principal's intention to commit the crime, and with the intention of assisting the principal in its commission, does something that helps or encourages the principal in the commission of the offence: Vu , at para. 58, citing R. v. Briscoe , 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 411, at paras. 14-18."	"21(1)"	"21(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code governs the liability of principals. The provision applies where two or more people "actually commit" an offence and makes both persons individually liable for that crime. The provision also applies where two or more persons together form an intention to commit an offence, are present at its commission, and contribute to it, although each does not personally commit all the essential elements of the offence. Provided the trier of fact is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused committed all elements of a crime, it is of no moment whether another person may also have committed it: R. v. Pickton , 2010 SCC 32, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 198, at para. 63."	"21(1)(a)"	"21(1)(a)"
"Second, the trial judge held that as the Crown had maintained throughout its case that the respondent was the getaway driver, fairness to the respondent dictated that the Crown was limited to that factual theory of liability in seeking to establish the respondent's culpability for manslaughter (paras. 73-81). The trial judge went on to hold that, given the factual theory the Crown advanced, "the Crown is limited to proving the guilt of Mr. Kelly as an aiding party, as the getaway driver, in accordance with section <mask> of the Criminal Code " (para. 83)."	"21(1)(b)"	"21(1)(b)"
"As a parent, section <mask> of the Criminal Code imposed a legal duty on the respondent to provide the necessaries of life to K.L., her child under the age of 16 years. She failed to discharge that duty. That the CAS also failed to live up to its mandate is beside the point for the purposes of the respondent's criminal liability. Likewise, in connection with the gravity of offence, her degree of responsibility and her moral blameworthiness."	"215"	"215"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the requirements for a murder to constitute first degree murder. As explained in R. v. Farrant , [1983] 1 S.C.R. 124, at p. 140, this provision does not create a separate substantive offence, but classifies murder into two categories: first degree murder and second degree murder. The subsection that is relevant to the present case is s. 231(2), which provides the following:"	"231"	"231"
"42.(2) When a youth justice court finds a young person guilty of an offence and is imposing a youth sentence, the court shall, subject to this section, impose any one of the following sanctions or any number of them that are not inconsistent with each other and, if the offence is first degree murder or second degree murder within the meaning of section <mask> of the Criminal Code , the court shall impose a sanction set out in paragraph ( q ) or subparagraph ( r )(ii) or (iii) and may impose any other of the sanctions set out in this subsection that the court considers appropriate:"	"231"	"231"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code deems culpable homicide to be first degree murder when "the death is caused [...] while committing or attempting to commit" an enumerated offence, in this case, forcible confinement. The rationale for this elevation of culpability was expressed in R. v. Paré , [1987] 2 S.C.R. 618, at p. 633, as "the [offender's] continuing illegal domination of the victim which gives continuity to the sequence of events culminating in the murder". The victim who has been dominated in the commission of the predicate offence need not be the same victim who was murdered: R. v. Russell , 2001 SCC 53, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 804, at para. 43."	"231(5)"	"231(5)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a second degree murder committed in connection with certain enumerated crimes of domination can be elevated to first degree murder: R. v. Pritchard , 2008 SCC 59, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 195. Robbery is not an enumerated offence. In order to elevate McLellan's conviction to first degree murder, the Crown therefore had to rely on unlawful confinement, the offence enumerated in s. 231(5)(e). Unlawful confinement involves coercive restraint or direction of the victim contrary to his or her wishes for "any significant period of time"."	"231(5)"	"231(5)"
"The trial judge raised the issue of provocation. She pointed out that no one had raised it thus far in their discussions about the charge. Defence counsel pointed out that since the included offence of manslaughter was being left to the jury, provocation should be included as well because it (provocation) reduced the state of mind of the shooter. This is not so. Manslaughter committed under provocation is voluntary manslaughter, sometimes called mitigated murder. As the introductory language of section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides - "Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder" - the statutory partial defence of provocation has nothing to do with the fault element of murder. And whether voluntary manslaughter should be left to a jury depends on whether there is an air of reality to the defence which is unrelated to whether involuntary manslaughter - an unlawful killing unaccompanied by the fault element required for murder - should be included in the charge."	"232(1)"	"232(1)"
"Araya surrendered to the police and was charged with murder. No one else has ever been charged in the shooting. In November 2011, after a four-week jury trial, Araya was found guilty of manslaughter. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, requires a mandatory minimum sentence of four years' imprisonment for the use of a firearm in the commission of manslaughter. In December 2011, the trial judge sentenced Araya to eight years' imprisonment (less 15 months for pre-sentence custody)."	"236(a)"	"236(a)"
"[107] Section <mask> of the Criminal Code creates the offence of attempted murder: Simpson , at p. 134. However, the subsection, in particular its phrase "by any means", does not "describe" the ways in which the offence of attempted murder may be committed: Simpson , at p. 140. The offence of attempted murder may be committed without committing an assault or causing any bodily harm whatsoever: Simpson , at p. 142. It follows that, "as described in the enactment creating it", attempted murder does not include any crime of assault or unlawfully causing bodily harm: Simpson , at pp. 142‐143."	"239(1)"	"239(1)"
"[318] It is, on the other hand, a crime to cause the death of another person by means of an unlawful act. If you were to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused administered a noxious thing to his wife, then, as I have earlier explained, that would amount to an offence, contrary to section <mask> of the Criminal Code , and, by definition, as it were, an unlawful act."	"245"	"245"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the essential elements of the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. The provision requires consideration of all the circumstances including, but not only, those listed. What must be determined, by a consideration of all the circumstances, is whether the manner in which the person charged was operating the vehicle was dangerous to the public."	"249(1)(a)"	"249(1)(a)"
"Even if the purpose of legislation is unobjectionable, the administrative procedures created by law to bring that purpose into operation may produce unconstitutional effects, and the legislation should then be struck down.... In the present case, the appellants are complaining of the general effects of s. 251. If section <mask> of the Criminal Code does indeed breach s. 7 of the Charter through its general effects, that can be sufficient to invalidate the legislation under s. 52. [Emphasis omitted.]"	"251"	"251"
"The appellant was charged with eight Criminal Code offences related to a home break-in in which a car was stolen. The appellant was convicted at trial of four offences, including fleeing the scene of an accident without leaving his name and address. His counsel conceded his guilt on this count during final submissions. Mr. Seipp appeals this conviction on the basis that the concession amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel that caused him prejudice. He contends that the mens rea of the offence was not proved. Held: Appeal dismissed. A decision by counsel to acknowledge an accused's guilt after all the evidence has been presented is a legal decision that does not require instructions. And in this case, it caused the appellant no prejudice. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code presumes that an accused who fled the scene of an accident did so with an intent to avoid civil or criminal liability unless the accused presents evidence to the contrary. Mr. Seipp's evidence that he left the scene to avoid being arrested for driving a stolen vehicle does not amount to evidence to the contrary. It is sufficiently connected to the accident to be captured by the legislative intent of the provision."	"252"	"252"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code creates what is commonly referred to as a "presumption of identity". This presumption, if applicable, relieves the Crown of the burden of proving that the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of the offence was the same as it was at the time of testing. Where this presumption is not available, the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of the offence is normally proven by evidence from a toxicologist."	"258(1)(c)"	"258(1)(c)"
"That Jeffery Brownson on or about the 28 th day of June in the year 2010 at the village of Marmora in the said Region, did operate a motor vehicle, to wit a 2006 yellow Bombardier ATV, while disqualified from doing so by reason of an order pursuant to section <mask> of the Criminal Code contrary to section 259(4)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada . [Emphasis added.]"	"259(1)"	"259(1)"
"Following the case of Pappajohn , the government was lobbied to make amendments to the Criminal Code to narrow the breadth of the defence of mistake of fact in cases of sexual assault. The Criminal Code was thereafter amended to provide that belief in consent would not be a defence to a charge of sexual assault if an accused's purported belief arose from intoxication, recklessness or wilful blindness or if the accused had not taken reasonable steps to ascertain that the complainant was consenting (s. 273.2). Section <mask> of the Criminal Code requires a judge instructing a jury in an assault case where such a defence is advanced to instruct the jury "when reviewing all the evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused's belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.""	"265(4)"	"265(4)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides: "Every one commits an aggravated assault who wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant." In this case, the indictment was particularized to permit three avenues to conviction for the offence of aggravated assault instead of four: the brothers were alleged to have wounded, maimed, and/or disfigured Mr. Miller. The indictment removes the possibility of a fourth avenue to conviction, namely, through endangerment of life."	"268(1)"	"268(1)"
"Although the test for refusing surrender on s. 7 grounds is a "strict one" and is only met in "very exceptional" cases, it is beyond debate that torture-derived evidence may not be used in legal proceedings and cannot be relied upon by a state seeking extradition or being asked to extradite. Article 15 of the Convention Against Torture -to which both Canada and France are signatories - makes this clear. It provides that parties are obliged "to ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made". Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C.46, incorporates this prohibition into Canadian domestic law. To similar effect is s. 83(1.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , which excludes from evidence in deportation proceedings any information that is believed on "reasonable grounds" to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture."	"269.1(4)"	"269.1(4)"
"Subsection <mask> of the Criminal Code , as it was at the relevant time, provides that consent means the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question. Subsections 273.1(2)(b) and (d) provide that no consent is obtained where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity or where the complainant expresses by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity. Subsection 273.1(3) provides that nothing in s. 273.1(2) shall be construed as limiting the circumstances in which no consent is obtained."	"273.1(1)"	"273.1(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code places important limits on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, including s. 273.2(b), which states " [ i ] t is not a defence" where "the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting". As Moldaver J. held in R. v. Barton ,"	"273.2"	"273.2"
"Second, I see no basis to accept the appellant's claim that the trial judge ignored the appellant's right to make full answer and defence in balancing that right with the complainants' rights to privacy, personal security, and equality based on the factors in s. 278.5(2). The trial judge noted that he had to be "satisfied that the records are likely relevant to an issue at trial and that production is necessary in the interest of justice". He then said that he had "given specific consideration to the criteria set out in sub-section <mask> of the Criminal Code and 278.3(4) of the Criminal Code ". He cited from Mills , at para. 61, which directs that the rights to be balanced include "full answer and defence, privacy, and equality". Finally, he discussed the "very high" privacy rights attaching to CAS records and concluded that, although the complainants had admitted that they lied to the CAS, "investigating the records to determine the extent of their lies is insufficient for this Court to review the records". The trial judge's explicit statement and his process of analysis refute the claim that he ignored the appellant's right to make full answer and defence."	"278.5(2)"	"278.5(2)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the procedure for an accused to apply for a hearing to determine the admissibility at trial of evidence of other sexual activity on the part of the complainant not the subject of the charge before the court. Section 278.93(4) specifies that the presiding judge or justice may decide to hold an admissibility hearing. [2] Section 278.94 prescribes various procedural rules relating to any hearing that is ordered, including a requirement that the presiding judge or justice give reasons for the admissibility determination: s. 278.94(4). [3]"	"278.93"	"278.93"
"The actus reus of the offence requires proof of: (1) a confinement, (2) the confinement is without lawful authority, and (3) a lack of consent by the complainant to the confinement. Proof of the first two elements is objective; the third, subjective. The third element, which is not referred to in s. 279(2), was the subject of discussion in R. v. Gough (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 453 (Ont. C.A.), in which the constitutionality of s. 279(3) (formerly s. 247(3)) of the Criminal Code was in issue. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code reads:"	"279(3)"	"279(3)"
"Gholam Reza Sadeghi-Jebelli stands charged that he, sometime between and including the 30 th day of April in the year 1995 and the 1 st day of July in the year 1995, at the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, in the Toronto Region, did being a parent of Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, a person under the age of fourteen years, in contravention of the custody provisions of a custody order in relation to the said Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, made by his Honour Judge Ball of the Ontario Provincial Court, Family Division, with intent to deprive Madonna Hollett, the parent of Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli of the possession of Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, did take away the said Paul Aryan Wayne Jebelli, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code ."	"282(1)(a)"	"282(1)(a)"
"I am also satisfied that the wording of the information did not prejudice the appellant or mean that the offences were not made out. The appellant's argument is that because the information refers to the Imagenation computer software and he only stole and used the source code that was used to produce the software sold to the public, no offences were made out. The charge that makes the appellant's case clearest is the theft charge: that the appellant on or about July 22, 1996 "did steal the IMAGENATION computer software, the property of Spicer Corporation, of a value exceeding five thousand dollars, contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada"."	"334(a)"	"334(a)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, codifies the law of self-defence in Canada. The section also speaks of the defence of others. Mr. Khill claimed to be protecting Ms. Benko in addition to defending himself when he shot Mr. Styres. For the purposes of the appeal, however, I will focus exclusively on the self-defence component of Mr. Khill's defence. In the circumstances of this case, his defence stands or falls on his claim that he shot Mr. Styres to save his own life."	"34"	"34"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code does not require that the Crown prove that the issuer of the credit card could be successfully defrauded by its use before the Crown can obtain a conviction under that section. In our view, the question of whether the cards could be successfully used would be relevant to a charge of defrauding the financial institutions who issued the cards, but is not relevant to the offence created by s. 342(3)."	"342(3)"	"342(3)"
"The Criminal Code does not, in fact, create an offence of armed robbery. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code creates the offence of robbery and describes the four ways in which robbery may be committed. A count that charges robbery and refers to s. 344, the punishment provision, does not specify a particular mode of committing robbery nor limit the basis upon which the Crown may prove the substantive offence of robbery."	"343"	"343"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code enacts a statutory presumption of intent. Where evidence is introduced that a person unlawfully entered or was unlawfully present in premises, the subsection requires the trier of fact to presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the intruder was there to commit an indictable offence. In other words, from evidence of the actus reus , the trier of fact presumes the mens rea , absent evidence to the contrary."	"349(2)"	"349(2)"
"[23] There is a lack of discussion within the Reasons for refusal to commit under Section <mask> of the Criminal Code by the Preliminary Inquiry Justice. The Justice states that having reviewed the definition of " forged within the meaning of Section 367 I have difficulty coming to the conclusion in law that the offence of forgery can be supported by the documents as presented ." The failure to identify the description of false document and the Crown argument about Section 321(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada inescapably leads to the conclusion that the Preliminary Inquiry Justice did not assess the whole of the evidence against the correct elements of the offence of forgery. It is not clear from the Justice's reasons if he did consider the elements of Section 321(b). Had the Justice considered the elements argued by the Crown, I find it is possible he may have reached a different conclusion."	"366"	"366"
"[2] Section <mask> of the Criminal Code was repealed by the Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act, S.C. 2012, c. 9, s. 2, which came into force on March 10, 2013. Section 35 of the Criminal Code now contains the reformulated defence of property defence, which, among other changes, does not require an individual to refrain from striking or causing bodily harm to the trespasser, but instead requires that the act committed be reasonable in the circumstances."	"38(1)"	"38(1)"
"The appellant was committed for extradition on the offence of "fraud contrary to section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada " (the "Code"). He attacks the committal order on two main grounds. First, he argues that the extradition judge had no jurisdiction to proceed since the version of the Authority to Proceed ("ATP") filed by the Attorney General at the extradition hearing was a photocopy, rather than the original, of the ATP. The appellant contends that a photocopy of an original ATP does not constitute a proper ATP within the meaning of the Extradition Act , S.C. 1999, c. 18 (the "Act")."	"380(1)(a)"	"380(1)(a)"
"THAT HE, the said KEVIN EKOW PLANGE, between August 13, 2013 and July 28, 2014, in the City of Toronto, in the Toronto Region, and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means unlawfully did defraud or attempt to defraud the Government of Canada of money in an amount greater than five thousand dollars ($5,000), by preparing and submitting false RC366 E Direct Deposit Request - GST/HST, Payroll and/or Corporation Income Tax Forms to the Canada Revenue Agency to change the direct deposit information of corporations, and as a result re-directed or attempted to re-direct Goods and Services Tax refunds and other payments properly payable to corporations, to bank accounts controlled by him, thereby committing an offence contrary to Section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada , as amended."	"380(1)(a)"	"380(1)(a)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code defines what constitutes possession for the purposes of the Criminal Code . Section 2(1) of the CDSA exhaustively defines "possession" for CDSA purposes as meaning "possession within the meaning of subsection 4(3) of the Criminal Code ". And in s. 34(2) of the Interpretation Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, makes all Criminal Code provisions relating to indictable offences applicable to indictable offences created by other federal enactments, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise provides."	"4(3)"	"4(3)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides for the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime where an offender is convicted of a designated offence. Fraud over $5,000 is a designated offence: s. 462.3(1). Section 462.37 also provides for a fine in lieu of forfeiture pursuant to subsection (3) if the court is satisfied that a forfeiture order should be made in respect of any property but that property or any part of it cannot be made subject to an order. Subsection (4) requires the court to impose a term of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine, the length of the term depending on the amount of the fine."	"462.37"	"462.37"
"Ms. Parker's submissions focussed on the forfeiture order relating to that portion of the seized monies exceeding the $20 "buy money", if indeed such an order were made. She concedes that the $20 is caught by subsection <mask> of the Criminal Code which provides for a forfeiture order where it has been established on a balance of probabilities "that any property is the proceeds of crime and that the designated offence was committed in relation to that property" (emphasis added)."	"462.37(1)"	"462.37(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes the Crown to seek the forfeiture of any property that is the proceeds of crime, obtained by the commission of a designated offence. The objectives of the provision are "to deprive the offender ... of the proceeds of their crime and to deter them from committing crimes in the future": Lavigne , at para. 16. As this court held in R. v. Schoer , 2019 ONCA 105, 371 C.C.C. (3d) 292, "where the sentencing judge is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the property is the proceeds of crime, that the offender had possession or control of it at some point, and the designated offence was committed in relation to that property, a forfeiture order must be made": at para. 88, citing Lavigne , at para. 14; R. v. Angelis , 2016 ONCA 675, 133 O.R. (3d) 575, at para. 35, leave to appeal refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 484."	"462.37(1)"	"462.37(1)"
"As much as it would be appropriate in the circumstances of this case, I cannot see that the provisions of sections 462.37(1), (3) and (4) of the Criminal Code relating to forfeiture of proceeds of crime are practical. If I were to impose a fine in lieu of of forfeiture, that fine must be $207,700 [ R. v. Lavigne , 2006 SCC 10, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 392], and as much as I believe that the defendant still has much of that money, section <mask> of the Criminal Code would necessitate that a two to three year jail sentence be imposed in default of payment of the fine."	"462.37(4)(v)"	"462.37(4)(v)"
"Between the 1 st of June, 2004 and the 30 th of September, 2004 at or near the cities of Burnaby and Vancouver, British Columbia and elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia and in Toronto, Ontario and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario did unlawfully conspire together, the one with the other or others of them and with Casey WELLS, Liaqat KHAN, Amaran TYAB, Clint FARRELL, Ernest POLONI, Micro PASTRO and Robert FRIEDMAN and with a person or with persons unknown, to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance, to wit: Cocaine contrary to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada ."	"465(1)"	"465(1)"
"Between the 1 st of June, 2004 and the 30 th of September, 2004 at or near the cities of Burnaby and Vancouver, British Columbia and elsewhere in the Province of British Columbia and in Toronto, Ontario and elsewhere in the Province of Ontario did unlawfully conspire together, the one with the other or others of them, and with Casey WELLS, Liaqat KHAN, Amaran TYAB, Clint FARRELL, Ernest POLONI, Micro PASTRO and Robert FRIEDMAN and with a person or with persons unknown, to commit the indictable offence of trafficking in a controlled substance, to wit: Cocaine contrary to section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and did thereby commit an offence contrary to section <mask> of the Criminal Code of Canada ."	"465(1)"	"465(1)"
"[90] In my view, the evidence has established that Kwok, Ng and Lau fit squarely within the definition of criminal organization set out in Section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is not a requirement that it be proven for the purposes of sentencing and s. 467.1(1) and s. [718.2(a)(iv)], that each member of a criminal organization be cognizant of every aspect of that criminal organization's activities, or that any single member know the full extent of the organization. This aggravating factor applies to these accused."	"467.1(1)"	"467.1(1)"
"[90] In my view, the evidence has established that Kwok, Ng and Lau fit squarely within the definition of criminal organization set out in Section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is not a requirement that it be proven for the purposes of sentencing and s. 467.1(1) and s. 718.2(8)(iv), that each member of a criminal organization be cognizant of every aspect of that criminal organization's activities, or that any single member know the full extent of the organization. This aggravating factor applies to these accused."	"467.1(1)"	"467.1(1)"
"Count 54 alleges the defendants participated in a criminal organization. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code criminalizes the knowing participation or contribution to a criminal organization's legal or illicit activities. It does not require a criminal act itself and the accused do not need to be a member of the organization. In R. v. Atkins et al. , 2010 ONCJ 262 (CanLII) , it was held that:"	"467.11(1)"	"467.11(1)"
"The phrase "jurisdiction over the class of offence" in section 686(1)(b)(iv) refers to the classes of offences described in sections 468, 469, and 785 of the Criminal Code . The offence with which we are concerned here - murder - is an offence listed in section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is an offence within the exclusive trial jurisdiction of the superior court of criminal jurisdiction: R. v. Esseghaier , 2021 SCC 9, at paras. 42, 47, 48."	"469"	"469"
"The presumptive mode of trial in cases of first degree murder is trial by jury: Criminal Code , s. 471. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code expressly permits an allegation of murder, an offence listed in s. 469(a)(vii) of the Criminal Code , to be tried without a jury, provided both the accused and the Attorney General consent to this alternative mode of trial."	"473(1)"	"473(1)"
"This discussion leaves for resolution the last question, whether there is a statutory foundation for Rule 7 of the British Columbia Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal Rules, 1986 , S.I./86-137, B.C. Reg. 145/86. That rule requires the filing and delivery of "an appeal book and transcript" unless otherwise ordered by a justice or the court. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code gives every Canadian Court of Appeal the power to make rules for the conduct of criminal proceedings "not inconsistent with this or any other Act of Parliament". Section 482(3) indicates that rule-making power is sufficiently broad to authorize the making of Rule 7."	"482(1)"	"482(1)"
"Judge shopping strikes at the core of our judicial system. The concept undermines the high level of confidence that is placed in our judicial system, where the decision of a judicial officer is final and binding unless and until it has been overturned by a higher court. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a "justice" may issue a warrant. The Criminal Code defines a "justice" as a Justice of the Peace or a judge of the provincial court. Therefore, [the justice at the Ontario Court of Justice] cannot be considered a higher court than [the] Justice of the Peace By applying for successive warrants on the same information to a different judge of the same court, the police committed impermissible judge-shopping . [Emphasis added.]"	"487(2)"	"487(2)"
"The search occurred after 9:00 p.m. and was by definition in the Criminal Code a nighttime search. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that search warrants must be executed by day unless the justice is satisfied, based on grounds set out in the affidavit in support of the warrant, that there are reasonable grounds to execute the warrant at night. The terms of the warrant authorized its execution after 9:00 p.m., but there were no grounds set out in the affidavit to support executing the warrant at night. The motion judge held that the failure to comply with s. 488 rendered the warrant invalid and the subsequent search of the apartment both warrantless and unreasonable. [1] The Crown does not challenge this finding."	"488"	"488"
"Storrey was decided under the former s. 450(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, when the provision read as "reasonable and probable grounds to believe". Section <mask> of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, removed the reference to "probable grounds", changing the wording to: "believes on reasonable grounds". As noted in Baron v. R., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, at p. 446, the word "probable" adds nothing additional to the requirement of reasonableness."	"495(1)(a)"	"495(1)(a)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes a peace officer to arrest without warrant a person who "on reasonable grounds" the officer believes has committed an indictable offence. The language focuses on the officer's state of mind and the reasonableness of the officer's belief, rather than the actual state of affairs. Reasonable grounds can be based on a reasonable belief that certain facts exist even if it turns out that the belief is mistaken: see Eccles v. Bourque , [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739, at pp. 744-45 ; R. v. Herritt , 2015 NBCA 33 , 325 C.C.C. (3d) 325, at para. 21."	"495(1)(a)"	"495(1)(a)"
"The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in failing to consider whether his arrest and detention was arbitrary apart from a failure to comply with section <mask> of the Criminal Code . It is not clear that this argument was advanced to the trial judge. There is no basis in the record to conclude that the conduct of the officer was arbitrary in the sense described in R. v. Cayer , [1988] O.J. No. 1120 (C.A.), "capricious, despotic or unjustifiable"."	"495(2)"	"495(2)"
"requires that offences charged in separate informations be capable of being joined in a single information before a single trial on those separate informations may be conducted. This is not possible here. Each information is laid under a different statute. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits joinder of Criminal Code offences in the same information but not provincial offences. And Criminal Code offences cannot be included in an information laid under the POA because they are not offences created by an "Act of the Legislature" as s. 25(5) of the POA requires."	"504"	"504"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits a justice, before or at any time during the course of a judicial interim release hearing, on application by the prosecutor or accused, to adjourn the proceedings and remand the accused in custody in prison. Where the adjournment exceeds three clear days, the consent of the accused is required. It necessarily follows that an adjournment that is not more than three clear days - as was the adjournment in this case - does not require any consent on the part of the accused."	"516(1)"	"516(1)"
"Once the prosecution establishes that the statutory preconditions are met, the presiding justice must cancel the existing release and the accused is detained. The effect of a revocation of bail is immediate - no further order of the Court is required for the accused to be detained. This is because the revocation of bail under section 524(8), by itself, also reverses the onus and creates a presumption that the accused remain in custody. Unless and until the accused makes a successful application, he is detained under section <mask> of the Criminal Code . At any point after the revocation of the prior release, the accused may be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why his or her detention is not justified. The common practice of "consenting" to remand in these circumstances is only the deferral of the right, which may be exercised at any time, to show cause. Upon cause being shown, the presiding justice may make a further order under section 524(8) of the Criminal Code to detain the accused or release him under suitable conditions. Section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code excludes from a person "detained" under section 524(8) and not "ordered detained" under the section."	"524(8)"	"524(8)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a custodial institution shall apply to a judge to fix a date for a hearing to determine whether or not an accused should be released from custody if the trial has not commenced within 90 days from the date the accused is initially taken before a justice under s. 503, or where there has been a previous detention review order or order detaining the accused, the date of the latter decision. The section stipulates that the person having custody of the detained adult shall make the application immediately after the expiry of the ninety days."	"525"	"525"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code imposes "positive obligations" on the attorney general and the courts ( R. v. Bujold , 2011 NBCA 24, 276 C.C.C. (3d) 442, at para. 5). This is based on the observation by the Supreme Court that "[l]anguage rights are not negative rights, or passive rights; they can only be enjoyed if the means are provided . ... [T]he freedom to choose is meaningless in the absence of a duty of the State to take positive steps to implement language guarantees" ( Beaulac , at para. 20 (emphasis added)). In the context of a bilingual preliminary inquiry in which there are accused using each of the official languages, this duty is to ensure that the two languages are treated equally: in other words, that there is no "primary language", with the other language merely being "accommodated." Equality must be the norm and not the exception, and must be achieved without creating conflict."	"530"	"530"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an accused has the right to a preliminary hearing in his or her official language. The Supreme Court of Canada has explained that language rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing in one's language, "must in all cases be interpreted purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada": R. v. Beaulac , [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768, at para. 25 (emphasis in the original)."	"530"	"530"
"The bright line approach that I consider myself compelled to follow does not enable the defence to manufacture a s. 11(b) delay by re-electing into a shorter presumptive period of delay. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code requires Crown consent before the accused can re-elect to a trial by a provincial court judge. Where re-election would create the risk of s. 11(b) problems, the Crown has the authority to, and should, refuse consent, absent a s. 11(b) waiver."	"561(1)"	"561(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code permits a provincial court judge acting under Part XIX to adjourn a trial from time to time until the trial is finally terminated. Like other adjournment provisions in the Criminal Code , such as ss. 537(1)(a) and 645(2), s. 571 contains no exhaustive or illustrative list of factors the judge is required or entitled to consider in determining whether to grant or refuse an adjournment."	"571"	"571"
"[1] Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that the proceedings stayed may be recommenced within the limited time frame of "one year after the entry of the stay of proceedings, or before the expiration of the time within which the proceedings could have been commenced, whichever is the earlier", without laying a new information. Since this was a summary conviction matter, the time within which the proceedings could have been commenced is six months. Unless the Crown gives notice that it is going to recommence proceedings within that time frame, "the proceedings shall be deemed never to have been commenced." Although the Crown could have reinstituted proceedings within six months, that time has now elapsed."	"579(2)"	"579(2)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code enacts a rule of criminal pleading. As a general rule, each count in an indictment must refer to a single transaction. The term "transaction" is not synonymous with "incident", "occurrence" or "event". A single transaction may include separate acts that are successive and cumulative and which comprise a continuous series of acts forming one transaction: R. v. Hulan , [1970] 1 C.C.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 45; R. v. Selles (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 435 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 444."	"581(1)"	"581(1)"
"Second, the appellant's argument is really one of notice. The charges, including the theft charge gave the appellant sufficient notice of the offences with which he was charged so that he could defend himself. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an information is not insufficient by reason only that "it does not name or describe with precision any person, place or thing"."	"583(g)"	"583(g)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code is a rule of pleading that does not, in express terms, authorize joinder of summary conviction and indictable offences together in the same indictment. Equally, s. 591(1) does not prohibit such joinder; it uses the undifferentiated or generic term "offences": R. v. Clunas , [1992] 1 S.C.R. 595, at pp. 611-612. In the result, indictable and summary conviction offences may be joined together in the same indictment or information: Clunas , at pp. 611-612. But where the mode of trial for the indictable offences is trial by a court composed of a judge and jury, the indictable and summary conviction counts may not be tried together: Clunas , at p. 612."	"591(1)"	"591(1)"
"The legal context for analyzing this main ground of appeal is well established and uncontroversial. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code sets out the test for severance: the court may order that two accused be tried separately "where it is satisfied that the interests of justice so require". This provision confers broad discretion on a trial judge. In exercising that discretion, the trial judge must take account of the interest of each accused and of the public, represented by the Crown: see R. v. Suzack (2000), 141 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 85, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 583."	"591(3)"	"591(3)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code grants trial judges a broad discretion to sever counts in the "interests of justice". The decision attracts considerable deference. Appellate interference is only warranted when the decision is unjudicial or resulted in an injustice: R. v. Litchfield , [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333, at pp. 353-354; and R. v. Last , 2009 SCC 45, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 146, at paras. 14-18."	"591(3)(a)"	"591(3)(a)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code contains the statutory power to amend an information or indictment. While s. 601 specifically refers to amending "indictments", s. 2 of the Criminal Code defines an "indictment" as including an "information or a count therein". Further, s. 601(10) says that where the term "court" is used within the provision, it is to be understood as including a judge acting in summary conviction proceedings. Consequently, the s. 601 power to amend an indictment applies with equal force to informations in summary conviction proceedings. As the focus of this appeal is on amendments to an information, I will use that terminology."	"601"	"601"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that a court shall, at any stage of the proceedings, amend the indictment where it appears that the indictment fails to state or states defectively anything that is requisite to constitute the offence, or is in any way defective in substance, and the matters to be alleged in the proposed amendment are disclosed by the evidence taken on the trial. In deciding whether to grant the amendment, as per s. 601(4) of the Criminal Code , the court must consider the following:"	"601(3)(b)"	"601(3)(b)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code authorizes pre-hearing conferences to be held before trial or other proceedings (for example, a preliminary inquiry) "to consider the matters that, to provide a fair and expeditious hearing, would be better decided before the start of the proceedings and other similar matters". Where a case is set to be tried by a court composed of a judge and jury, a pre-hearing conference "to consider any matters that would promote a fair and expeditious trial" is mandatory under s. 625.1(2)."	"625.1(1)"	"625.1(1)"
"Second, the substitution of the presiding judge as the trier of the truth of the challenge does not compromise the impartiality of the jury. Prospective jurors found not to be impartial by the judge must not be empanelled as jurors for the trial. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code makes this clear. And those found impartial may yet be subject to excusal or being stood aside by the trial judge. To preserve impartiality, various in-trial mechanisms serve as antidotes to counter bias, especially the ability to provide jurors with instructions throughout and at the end of the trial."	"640(1)"	"640(1)"
"The circumstances that may prompt an inquiry into the suitability of a juror to continue are myriad. Section <mask> of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 , entitles a trial judge to discharge a juror for illness or other reasonable cause. The subsection is unrevealing about the threshold for conducting an inquiry, the factors to be considered in making that determination, or the procedure to be followed on any inquiry that is conducted. It would seem logically to follow that the decision about whether to conduct an inquiry falls within the discretion of the trial judge in much the same way as the discretion to determine the procedure to be followed on any inquiry that is held: Durant , at para. 140. See also, R. v. Giroux (2006), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 512 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34, leave to appeal refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 211."	"644(1)"	"644(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code creates a summary conviction offence that prohibits jurors from disclosing information about what took place in the jury room while the jury was absent from the courtroom that was not later disclosed in open court. The prohibition is not restricted to information disclosed during deliberations and is subject to an exception for an investigation of and testimony about an alleged offence under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code in relation to a juror."	"649(1)"	"649(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code gives the appellant the right to be present in court during the whole of his trial subject to exceptions that do not apply in this case. Closing arguments are part of an accused's trial, and thus are subject to the requirement that the accused be present. This right gives effect to the principle of fairness and openness that are fundamental values in our criminal justice system. Presence gives the offender the opportunity of acquiring first-hand knowledge of the proceedings leading to the eventual result. The denial of that opportunity may well leave the offender with a justifiable sense of injustice, which is the "implicit and overriding principle underlying" the right to be present: see R. v. Hertrich (1982), 67 CCC (2d) 510, at para. 81 ."	"650"	"650"
"The email communications and requests by the trial judge would seem to have been a deliberate choice of a method of communication other than that required by section <mask> of the Criminal Code . Perhaps the trial judge was concerned about ensuring adherence to a schedule provided to the jury about the concluding aspects of the trial. Certainty is desirable. The progress of a trial in its waning moments should not be unduly delayed. But the solution is not to ignore mandatory statutory requirements such as section 650(1) of the Criminal Code . There is no email exception."	"650(1)"	"650(1)"
"As we have said in the past and reiterate today, no breach of section <mask> of the Criminal Code occurs by email transmission to counsel of drafts of proposed jury instructions. But as we have also said in the past and repeat today with emphasis, initiating and receiving by email submissions about the subject-matter contained in or omitted from final instructions does offend section 650(1) of the Criminal Code . The reason is simple. Pre-charge conferences under section 650.1 of the Criminal Code , indeed any discussions about what should be explained to the jury and the choice of instructions to be given, affect an accused's vital interests, thus are part of the accused's trial. Section 650(1) is engaged. The accused must be present unless an applicable exception applies. Use of email is not an exception. The message is in the medium. Open court. On the record. In the presence of the accused."	"650(1)"	"650(1)"
"Procedural incidents of the trial process, such as pre-charge conferences, are part of an accused's trial. It follows from the statutory requirement of section <mask> of the Criminal Code , as well as every accused person's constitutional entitlement to be present at their trial, that the appellant was entitled to be present for the pre-charge conference. The entire pre-charge conference when the availability of the statutory partial defence of provocation was discussed. No statutory exception permitted his exclusion when the subject of the availability of provocation was discussed and decided. Exclusion of the appellant from this discussion contravened section 650(1) of the Criminal Code ."	"650(1)"	"650(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that, subject to certain exceptions (that are not material here), the accused "shall be present in court during the whole of his or her trial." Section 650(1) protects the interest in allowing the accused to "hear the case made out against him and, having heard it, have the opportunity of answering it" and the interest in fairness and openness, which is advanced by allowing the accused "the opportunity of acquiring first-hand knowledge of the proceedings leading to the eventual result of the trial": R. v. Hertrich (1982), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 510 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 81. In light of these interests, the words - "the whole of his or her trial" - in s. 650(1) should be given an expansive reading: R. v. Barrow , [1987] 2 S.C.R. 694, at para. 14. A proceeding will be characterized as a part of the trial for the purposes of s. 650(1) where the accused's absence would "prejudic[e] their opportunity of defending themselves" or would violate "his right to be present so that at all times he may have direct knowledge of anything that transpires in the course of his trial which could involve his vital interests": R. v. Hertrich, at para. 82."	"650(1)"	"650(1)"
"This is not the first case in which an appellant has challenged the use of email to conduct substantive discussions about the contents of the charge to the jury. In prior decisions we have indicated that the use of email to provide counsel with copies of proposed jury instructions does not offend section <mask> of the Criminal Code . In those same decisions, we have made it equally clear that discussions about the content of those draft instructions are not to take place by email. These discussions, whether they solicit or offer submissions about charge content, affect and involve the vital interests of the accused and must take place in the actual presence of the accused. Section 650(1) requires it: Simon , at para. 137; Hassanzada , at paras. 130-131."	"650(1)"	"650(1)"
"The respondent begins with a submission that any email communications occurred within permissible limits. For the most part, the email exchanges involved providing counsel with successive drafts of the proposed instructions, pointing out changes made and explaining that each version would serve as the working copy for their in-court discussions. The preliminary nature of these discussions did not offend section <mask> of the Criminal Code and, in any event, did not cause or contribute to a miscarriage of justice."	"650(1)"	"650(1)"
"Section <mask> of the Criminal Code provides that an accused must be "present in court during the whole of his ... trial". In the context of s. 650(1), "trial" carries a broad meaning, although generally the trial proper does not commence until after a plea is entered. Martin J.A. explained the broad interpretation of "trial" for s. 650(1) purposes at para. 50 of R. v. Hertrich (1982), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 510 (Ont. C.A.):"	"650(1)"	"650(1)"
"See, E. (F.E.) , at para. 30. Provided the conditions precedent to the operation of the section have been met, the section may save harmless a breach of section <mask> of the Criminal Code : Simon , at para. 122; E. (F.E.) , at para. 31. See also, R. v. Cloutier (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 35 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 49, leave to appeal refused, [1989] S.C.C.A. No. 194."	"650(1)"	"650(1)"

Dataset Card for "LegalLAMA"

Dataset Summary

LegalLAMA is a diverse probing benchmark suite comprising 8 sub-tasks that aims to assess the acquaintance of legal knowledge that PLMs acquired in pre-training.

Dataset Specifications

Corpus	Corpus alias	Examples	Avg. Tokens	Labels
Criminal Code Sections (Canada)	`canadian_sections`	321	72	144
Legal Terminology (EU)	`cjeu_term`	2,127	164	23
Contractual Section Titles (US)	`contract_sections`	1,527	85	20
Contract Types (US)	`contract_types`	1,089	150	15
ECHR Articles (CoE)	`ecthr_articles`	5,072	69	13
Legal Terminology (CoE)	`ecthr_terms`	6,803	97	250
Crime Charges (US)	`us_crimes`	4,518	118	59
Legal Terminology (US)	`us_terms`	5,829	308	7

Usage

Load a specific sub-corpus, given the corpus alias, as presented above.

from datasets import load_dataset
dataset = load_dataset('lexlms/legal_lama', name='ecthr_terms')

Citation

Ilias Chalkidis*, Nicolas Garneau*, Catalina E.C. Goanta, Daniel Martin Katz, and Anders Søgaard. LeXFiles and LegalLAMA: Facilitating English Multinational Legal Language Model Development. 2022. In the Proceedings of the 61th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. Toronto, Canada.

@inproceedings{chalkidis-etal-2023-lexfiles,
    title = "{L}e{XF}iles and {L}egal{LAMA}: Facilitating {E}nglish Multinational Legal Language Model Development",
    author = "Chalkidis, Ilias  and
      Garneau, Nicolas  and
      Goanta, Catalina  and
      Katz, Daniel  and
      S{\o}gaard, Anders",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)",
    month = jul,
    year = "2023",
    address = "Toronto, Canada",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://aclanthology.org/2023.acl-long.865",
    pages = "15513--15535",
}

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